Between Exclusivism and Inclusivism: The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s Divided Responses to the “Arab Spring”

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Abstract

This article focuses on how and why some Jordanian Muslim Brothers have engaged in relatively exclusive, Islamist ways of confronting the regime during the “Arab Spring,” while others adopted a more inclusive, national strategy in the same period. As such, this article not only contributes to our knowledge of divisions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, but also shows how this can impact Islamist-regime relations in the Arab world. It argues that the organization as a whole initially wanted to exploit the uprisings in the region through a relatively exclusive, Islamist approach to the regime, but that others within the organization disagreed with this method as the “Arab Spring” proved mostly unsuccessful. Aware of the dangers of provoking the state from a position of increased isolation, these members advocated a more inclusive attitude toward the regime and others. While both groups were ultimately unsuccessful, the latter at least survived as a legal entity, while the Muslim Brotherhood lost its official presence in the kingdom because the regime was able to exploit the existing divisions within the organization.

Keywords

Islamism – Jordan – Muslim Brotherhood – coalitions – contentious action
1 Introduction

Jordan is quite special when it comes to Islamism, since its main Islamist organization – the Muslim Brotherhood – long enjoyed a good relationship with the regime in the Hashemite Kingdom, unlike in other Arab states. Since 1989, however – and apart from the political parties that have acted as platforms of contention in Jordanian politics – there have been many protests against the Jordanian government or the regime, including ones supported by the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the country has been spared any attempts by Islamists to overthrow the regime in the so-called “Arab Spring,” during which rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were forced out, this series of uprisings in the early 2010s has not left Jordan completely untouched, as reports in the media, studies by think tanks, and articles in academic journals have pointed out. Jordan has witnessed a huge increase in the number of protests

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since the start of the “Arab Spring,” during which not only Islamists, but also labor movements, youth (including Brotherhood-affiliated youth), tribal groups, and military veterans have demonstrated in the streets. Several of these publications have focused on the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan during the “Arab Spring,” but they pay little attention to how the different trends within the divided Jordanian Brotherhood have responded to the uprisings in the Arab world, which is what this article will concentrate on.

More specifically, this article shows how and why some Jordanian Muslim Brothers have engaged in relatively exclusive, Islamist ways of confronting the regime during the “Arab Spring,” while others adopted a more inclusive, national strategy in the same period. The sources for this article consist of secondary literature, newspaper articles that I have collected at the Newspaper Archive at the University of Jordan in Amman or downloaded from the internet, and interviews with leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood conducted in the period 2012–2014. Using these sources, I start with a theoretical section on Islamist dealings with Arab regimes, followed by a brief historical overview of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. I then move on to how and why the different trends within the Brotherhood have used these means to deal with the Jordanian regime in an exclusive, Islamist or inclusive, national way during the “Arab Spring.” As such, this article not only contributes to our

11 ICG, Popular, 16–17.
12 Yom, “Tribal,” 229–47.
knowledge of divisions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, but also shows how this can impact Islamist-regime relations in the Arab world.

2 Islamist Dealings with Arab Regimes

Research on Islamist dealings with Arab regimes has often focused on the extent to which “moderate” groups like the Muslim Brotherhood can work within existing states. Much of this research has focused on the inclusion-moderation thesis: the idea that ideologically inspired groups moderate their views if they are included in political systems, which require accountability, compromise, and cooperation. This process, in turn, allows regimes to provide more space for such organizations to flourish, thereby indirectly taking the wind out of the sails of radicals.15

Scholars of Islamist movements have widely tested the inclusion-moderation thesis. Academics have pointed to mixed results without a clear and unambiguous process of moderation16 or have expressed doubts about the term “moderation” itself.17 Some have confirmed the thesis’ validity (or have shown that repression leads to radicalization) in certain contexts,18 while others doubt whether it holds up elsewhere,19 and still others even discern its opposite (that repression and exclusion actually lead to ideological moderation) in

countries across the Middle East and North Africa. Although it may not be surprising for scholars to reach different conclusions when focusing on different countries, many equally disagree with regard to the thesis’ validity in Jordan.

Scholars such as Dalacoura and, most comprehensively, Schwedler have pointed out that the Jordanian regime’s inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood has, indeed, led to the group’s moderation. Yet others, like Clark and Rosefsky Wickham, have shown that while this moderation did take place, it was limited and did not apply to certain social issues related to women’s rights in Jordan. Bondokji, moreover, has added that – besides inclusion – repression has also contributed to the Brotherhood’s moderation, while Hamid had argued that repression, rather than inclusion, explains the organization’s moderation. These very different conclusions about the same organization in the same country can partly be attributed to the fact that scholars look at different aspects of the Brotherhood (their political behavior or their ideology, for example). Yet, part of the reason for these divergent conclusions also lies in the Muslim Brotherhood’s dividedness, meaning that some parts of the organization have responded differently to certain developments than others. This suggests that multiple conclusions with regard to the inclusion-moderation thesis are possible, even when applied to the same organization.

The divisions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood have also been the subject of quite some research, with many scholars adopting the terminology used in the Jordanian media – “hawks” (suqur) and “doves” (hama‘im) – to label the different trends in the organization. While such labels are often used to

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21 Dalacoura, Islamist, 124–30; and Schwedler, Faith.
26 Some authors also recognize a third trend of so-called “centrists,” who hold a middle position between the “hawks” and the “doves,” and even a fourth trend of pro-Hamas Brothers.
indicate a generally confrontational or radical attitude (hawks) versus a more accommodationist or pragmatic one (doves), relatively few publications explain precisely what they mean by these terms. However, at least five different dimensions of this division can be discerned – ideology, character, identity, participation and openness – the last of which is dealt with in this article.

The first dimension of the Jordanian Brotherhood’s dividedness – ideology – is often described as the main or even the only dimension of the division between “hawks” and “doves.” More specifically, “hawks” are often associated with a greater focus on Islamist ideology and ideological rigidity, as opposed to the greater pragmatism of the “doves” in this respect and are sometimes described as often having enjoyed a religious – rather than a profane – education. They are sometimes also seen as closely aligned with the radical ideas of Egyptian Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), particularly his idea that modern-day Muslim societies live in a state of pre-Islamic ignorance (jahiliyya) that should be countered by setting up an Islamic state, which may imply a reluctance (or even a refusal) to accept existing regimes. Doves, on the other hand, are seen as influenced by more “moderate” Islamist scholars, such as


the Tunisian Rashid al-Ghannushi (b. 1941), the Egyptian Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926) and the Sudanese Hasan al-Turabi (1932–2016).

The second dimension of the “hawk”- “dove” division is the character of the Muslim Brotherhood. This pertains to the ethnic background of the organization’s members – Palestinian-Jordanian or East-Jordanian, respectively – and what the group should focus on first and foremost: the Palestinian question (sometimes advocated by Brothers of Palestinian descent) or internal Jordanian affairs (the preferred choice of many East-Jordanian members). This dimension should not be mistaken as pro- and anti-Palestinian; Muslim Brothers in Jordan are united in their dislike of Israel and their pro-Palestinian sentiment. They are divided, however, in their ethnic backgrounds and where the organization’s priorities should lie. This dimension has been noticed by several scholars, but has recently been re-emphasized by Patel, who argues that divisions within the Brotherhood with regard to its attitude toward the regime largely fall along ethnic lines.

The third dimension of the internal divisions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood – identity – has to do with the choice between seeing the organization as primarily missionary in nature or as a political group. Some scholars have argued that missionary activities (da’wa) are the backbone of the Muslim Brotherhood in general and, indeed, this is an area of focus for some of its members in Jordan. At the same time, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) party,
which is strongly affiliated with the Jordanian Brotherhood, shows the political side of the organization and seems to concentrate far less on *da‘wa*.

The fourth dimension of the divisions between “hawks” and “doves” pertains to participation in the Jordanian political system. In practice, this refers to the willingness to boycott parliamentary elections and the government or to participate in them. This was initially a question strongly related to Islamist ideology – is it allowed to participate in “un-Islamic” parliaments and governments or not? – but after this had been settled in favor of those wishing to participate, it mostly became a question of interests and political considerations. As such, the organization has become divided between those who do not deem participation worth the effort and those who do, but these considerations are mostly based on weighing the political pros and cons, not on strictly Islamist arguments.

While all of these dimensions exist, there is another aspect to the Muslim Brotherhood’s internal dividedness that deserves to be treated separately, namely the organization’s openness to others, particularly in cooperation with non-Islamists. With regard to its members’ willingness to cooperate with others in dealing with the regime, the Brotherhood can be divided into exclusivists and inclusivists, with the former representing the hawkish side of the equation and the latter the dovish one. This dimension of the Brotherhood’s divisions has not been dealt with in the literature so far, and this article partly seeks to fill this gap.

As mentioned in the introduction, the “Arab Spring” saw a huge increase in the number of protests against the Jordanian regime, including those in which the Brotherhood was involved. There had, of course, been protests in Jordan before, and the Brotherhood had long been divided. Still, the “Arab Spring” involved so many (and sometimes successful) broad-based demonstrations in various other countries that the fifth dimension of the organization’s dividedness (openness) became increasingly relevant; the protests would show to what extent “hawks” and “doves” in the Jordanian Brotherhood were willing to cooperate with others to achieve similar success in their own country during this period. As such, the “Arab Spring” provides us with an excellent case study to test the openness dimension of the Brotherhood’s “hawk”–“dove” divide: did the organization take an exclusive, Islamist approach to demand reforms at a

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time when the regime was perceived to be weak or did it seek to build an inclusive, national platform to achieve its goals?

In order to analyze this openness dimension of the Brotherhood’s dividedness, I build on Clark and Schwedler’s work on political coalitions, which is particularly useful here because coalitions necessarily involve a certain openness to and cooperation with others. Various Jordanian political actors – including the Muslim Brotherhood – joined coalitions to unify their efforts in dealing with the regime in the past.\footnote{Clark, “Conditions,” 539–60; Janine A. Clark, “Threats, Structures, and Resources: Cross-Ideological Coalition Building in Jordan,” \textit{Comparative Politics} 43, No. 1 (2010): 101–20; Curtis R. Ryan, “Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan,” \textit{British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies} 38, No. 3 (2011): 367–90; and Jillian Schwedler and Janine A. Clark, “Islamist-Leftist Cooperation in the Arab World,” \textit{isim Review}, No. 18 (2006): 10–11.} Schwedler and Clark have divided such coalitions between 1) tactical ones, in which “groups engage in joint activities on an issue-by-issue and short-term basis”; 2) strategic coalitions, where “engagement is sustained and encompassing of multiple issues”; and 3) ideational ones, in which “groups remain distinct entities but strive to develop a collective vision for political, social, and economic reform.”\footnote{Schwedler and Clark, “Islamist,” 10.} Exclusivists can be said to believe in tactical and strategic cooperation with others, but tend to look out for the Brotherhood’s Islamist interests first. Inclusivists, however, are more open to ideational cooperation and stress the organization’s reformism, which they share with others. In order to put these developments during the “Arab Spring” in context, a brief history of the Jordanian Brotherhood is in order.

3 Historical Overview of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

The Muslim Brotherhood in (Trans)Jordan was founded in 1945 by a trader called ‘Abd al-Latif Abu Qura (c. 1906–1967) and was given an official license the next year. The Brotherhood was initially rather vague about its principles and mostly stuck to activities like religious education and charitable work. This apolitical attitude was due to several reasons, the most important of which was perhaps that Abu Qura enjoyed close ties with the royal family and did not want to jeopardize them by taking a more political (and potentially confrontational) stance. The Transjordanian King ‘Abdallah I (r. 1946–1951), meanwhile, had his own reasons not to seek confrontation with the Brotherhood; having come from Mecca without any local ties to Transjordan, the king wanted to shore up his Islamic credentials to cement his authority and probably believed that befriending an explicitly Muslim organization would help him do...
that. As such, the Muslim Brotherhood started out enjoying a rather good relationship with the Transjordanian regime.\textsuperscript{39}

Yet, the era of Abu Qura’s leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood quickly came to an end. A new generation of younger and more politicized leaders joined the ranks of the organization and wanted the Brotherhood to compete with secular organizations and appeal to the large number of Palestinian refugees who had entered the country after fleeing Palestine in 1948. For the Brotherhood to do this, a more activist approach was called for, something Abu Qura was loath to do. As a result, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahman Khalifa (1919–2006) became the organization’s new leader or General Controller (\textit{al-muraqib al-‘amm}) in 1953 and intensified the expansion of the organization’s activities.\textsuperscript{40}

Despite this greater tendency towards politicization, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the regime remained good, including under King ‘Abdallah I’s grandson, King Husayn (r. 1953–1999). The reason for this could partly be found in the Brotherhood’s support for the king’s foreign policy. Although King Husayn was clearly more pro-Western and pro-British than the Brotherhood, he decided against joining the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact founded in 1955,\textsuperscript{41} refused to endorse the anti-communist Eisenhower Doctrine published in 1957,\textsuperscript{42} and expelled the British General and Chief of Staff of the Jordanian army, John Bagot Glubb, from the country in 1956.\textsuperscript{43} Despite the fact that the king most likely took these decisions because of popular pressure on him to do so (rather than out of conviction), the Brotherhood strongly supported him and his “anti-imperialist” policies.\textsuperscript{44}

Apart from international issues like those mentioned above, an important reason for the generally good ties between the Jordanian Brotherhood and the Hashemite regime was found in regional questions. Both had a common enemy, for example, in Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir (Nasser; r. 1954–1970), who repressed the Egyptian Brotherhood and whose republican socialist

\textsuperscript{39} Marion Boulby, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945–1993} (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999), 37–49.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 50–8.
rhetoric challenged King Husayn. When, in 1957, an alleged coup organized by supporters of Nasser threatened the Jordanian regime, the Muslim Brotherhood sided with the king, thereby strengthening a relationship that – despite occasional periods of repression – was strategic and generally strong.45 This relationship was strengthened further when the Muslim Brotherhood implicitly supported46 the regime’s decision to expel Palestinian militants from Jordanian soil during the so-called “Black September” in 1970.47

During most of this, the Muslim Brotherhood had the benefit of parliamentary representation through regular elections. This came to an abrupt end, however, with Jordan’s loss of the West Bank to Israel in the war of 1967, when the regime decided to suspend elections. It was not until 1989 – a year after the regime had formally renounced its perceived rights to the West Bank – that national parliamentary elections were held again. In the two decades in between, the Muslim Brotherhood had grown bigger, but – because of the loss of enemies that it had in common with the regime (Western powers, British influence, and Nasserism) and the absence of Palestinian militants, it also started focusing on internal Jordanian issues and, as a result, became increasingly oppositional. When the Brotherhood and its Islamist allies participated in the elections of 1989, they were quite successful, winning 34 out of 80 seats. This was not to the liking of the regime, however, and through gerrymandering and changing the electoral law it ensured that the Muslim Brotherhood would not achieve a similar success in the future. In fact, the process of democratization after 1989 turned out to be inspired more by the regime’s wish to provide Jordanians with a controllable avenue to vent their frustrations over painful economic reforms than by a genuine desire to democratize the country.48

As a result of the regime’s efforts to influence the electoral process, the Muslim Brotherhood’s parliamentary fortunes changed and – given the absence of any meaningful reform – the organization eventually decided to boycott the

45 Boulby, Muslim, 58–65; and Wagemakers, “Foreign.”
46 Wagemakers, “Foreign.”
elections in 1997, a means they also resorted to in 2010 and again in 2013. Because the Brotherhood felt that the regime was unwilling to reform and because the latter wanted to confine any opposition to an ineffective and rather toothless parliament so as to avoid extra-parliamentary opposition (demonstrations, protests, sit-ins, et cetera), relations between the two deteriorated. This has particularly been the case under King ‘Abdallah II, who succeeded his father as king in 1999 and still rules today.49

Although it may seem as if the Muslim Brotherhood has acted as a united front since 1989, this is not the case. In fact, the divisions in the organization described above existed long before that year. The Brotherhood had always been ideologically diverse and also with regard to ethnic background, but divisions over loyalty to the king, participation in an “un-Islamic” government and whether to prioritize the Palestinian question or Jordan itself remained largely theoretical until 1989. They became very real, however, after parliamentary life was resumed in that year and more concrete choices had to be made. At multiple times throughout the group’s history, members have left the Brotherhood, most prominently in 2001, when several members resigned and set up the Islamic Center Party (Hizb al-Wasat al-Islami). There were two main reasons for this: firstly, the members who founded the new party felt that the Brotherhood had too much influence on the IAF, which was founded in 1992. Although the latter was meant to be independent of the Brotherhood, it was increasingly seen as the political wing of the organization; secondly, some Brotherhood-members did not agree with the decision to boycott the parliamentary elections in 1997 and left for this reason.50

Divisions in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood thus go back decades, and the terms “hawks” and “doves” have also been around for a long time. The dimension of openness to others, however, while relevant before the revolutions in the Middle East, became particularly important during the “Arab Spring.”

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50 Abu Rumman and Abu Haniyya, Al-Hall, 36–7, 87–9; and Rosefsky Wickham, Muslim, 214–17.
with its broad-based coalitions of anti-regime protesters. In this period, the exclusivists, inspired by the Brotherhood’s success in Egypt in 2011–2012, wanted to focus on protests and a boycott of parliamentary elections to confront the regime, which they perceived to be vulnerable and susceptible to their Islamist demands in the wake of the regional uprisings. As such, they were unlikely to join anything more than strategic or even tactical coalitions. The inclusivists, on the other hand, did not entirely disagree, but were warier of the dangers of the “Arab Spring”. Partly for that reason, they sought to enter into an ideational coalition that would help them accommodate the regime’s wish for moderation, thereby avoiding the blowback the uprisings could create, such as the coup in Egypt in 2013. These disparate responses to the “Arab Spring” exacerbated the existing differences between the organization’s members and contributed to making the group more divided than ever.

4  “Hawkish” Closedness: Exclusivism

The “Arab Spring” proved a source of inspiration for Jordanians critical of the regime in Amman. It was not for nothing, therefore, that many Jordanians adopted the example of Tunisians, Egyptians, and Libyans and took to the streets to vent their frustration about corruption, a bad economy, and a lack of political reform, as we saw above. As Amis has pointed out, members of the Muslim Brotherhood – probably like many other Jordanians – felt that the uprisings showed the regimes’ weakness and that the Jordanian regime, in order to avoid a fate similar to that of other countries, would therefore be susceptible to their demands. It is tempting to ascribe such ideas solely to “hawks” in the Brotherhood, but initially these were, in fact, widely held beliefs across the organization, with prominent “doves” expressing similar views.51

While most of the publications on protests mentioned above deal with the demonstrations and rallies in 2011 or up to late 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood – stimulated by the victory of fellow Muslim Brother Muhammad Mursi in the Egyptian presidential elections in June 2012 – continued to be involved in protests after that. By that time, however, the political atmosphere in Jordan had become increasingly tense. The protest on October 5, 2012, for example, was described by Hammam Sa’id, the Brotherhood’s General Controller at the time, as “civilized” and “peaceful,”52 and Salim al-Falahat, a leading figure in the

52 “Al-Muraqib al-’Amm li-l-Ikhwan al-Muslimin: Masiratuna Hadariyya wa-Silmiyya Tahdafi fi Islah Haqiqi fi Binyat al-Nizam” [The General Controller of the Muslim Brothers:
organization, actively denied that the Brotherhood had an “army” with which they would cause danger to citizens.\textsuperscript{53} Such remarks were not made because the Brotherhood’s rallies were usually violent, but because the organization had come under intense criticism from pro-regime media for its increasingly confrontational attitude.

Both immediately before and after the protest of October 5, 2012, the Brotherhood found its reformist motives questioned by pro-regime media,\textsuperscript{54} who sometimes also accused them of being exclusivist and narrow-minded,\textsuperscript{55} of wanting to confront and overthrow the regime,\textsuperscript{56} and of having the establishment of a theocracy as their ultimate goal.\textsuperscript{57} Accusations such as these were perhaps especially stinging at a time when the violent Islamic State (IS) organization rose to prominence in the region, maybe suggesting that the Brotherhood and IS were two sides of the same coin. Moreover, these accusations were particularly controversial because the slogan of so many other protesters in the region had been “al-sha’b yuridu isqat al-nizam” (the people want the downfall of the regime), words that the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan rejected and had been careful to avoid in its own protests. Despite its increasingly confrontational stance, its preferred alternative was “al-sha’b yuridu islah al-nizam” (the people want the reform of the regime).\textsuperscript{58}
Still, during a protest in November 2012, calls for the downfall of the Jordanian regime were heard among members of the Brotherhood for the first time, leading to condemnation from others. Moreover, the organization – perhaps convinced that the “Arab Spring” called for rhetorical escalation – was not always unambiguous in its rejection of such slogans. Zaki Bani Irshid, for example, the Brotherhood’s Deputy General Controller at the time, stated that “Jordan faces three scenarios today: corruption, reform or the demand for the downfall of the regime.” Although it was clear that Bani Irshid wanted reform (not either of the other two options), it was easy to interpret his words as a threat (reform, or else...). Such incidents, coupled with a widely perceived escalation of the Brotherhood’s methods (continued protests against, instead of broad-based dialogue with, the regime), fed the belief among some Jordanians that the organization had a hidden agenda and was on a collision course with the regime. One commentator even referred to this as the Brotherhood’s taqiyya, the word used to describe the originally Shiite practice of hiding one’s true beliefs when one’s life is in danger. “Although since the beginning of what has become known as the ‘Arab Spring,’ he stated, “they have raised the slogan ‘the reform of the regime’, they really want ‘the downfall of the regime’.”

The fact that the Brotherhood wanted to use the “Arab Spring” to confront the regime and demand reform but was criticized for doing so did not mean they were the only ones calling for an end to corruption, limits to the king’s powers, and a new electoral law, to name some of their most important demands. As we saw above, others were involved in protests and the Muslim Brotherhood often joined them. In fact, the organization even cooperated with other groups who (partly) shared their reformist agenda. As Clark and Ryan have shown, the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF have joined reform

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61 Jamal al-Rashid, “Taqiyyat al-Shi’a wa-Taqiyyat al-Ikhwan” [The Dissimulation of the Shiites and the Dissimulation of the Brothers], Al-Ra’y, October 3, opinion 1.
coalitions several times throughout the past two decades. In Clark and Schwedler’s terms, these included tactical alliances against the Iraq war in 2003 or normalization with Israel, but also more strategic coalitions like the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties in 1995, the Conference on National Reform in 1998, and the National Coalition for Reform in 2010.62

The “Arab Spring” witnessed similar, relatively exclusivist Brotherhood tendencies in Jordan, with the organization allying itself with the National Front for Reform in 2011, but refusing to join the National Dialogue Committee, which had been set up by the regime to defuse tensions in the country.63 The Brotherhood also – like in 2010 – boycotted the parliamentary elections in January 2013, which meant that it rejected the regime’s preferred avenue for political opposition. The organization similarly refused to join a new government in 2013 and insisted on real and meaningful reform prior to any governmental participation, thereby not only rejecting efforts to accommodate the regime’s wishes while continuing its confrontational approach,64 but also taking an exclusivist stance by alienating allies who were more willing to compromise.65

Instead of engaging with the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to participate in protests in early 2013,66 but because it took a relatively exclusive approach, its participation in coalitions was rarely more than tactical (and never more than strategic). This, in turn, led to a situation in which the Brotherhood grew increasingly isolated, also because the organization could expect little support from, say, Salafis in Jordan, who not only abhor the Brotherhood, but are also mostly apolitical or radically anti-regime.67 As a result, the organization became a (though not the only) target of the regime’s efforts to blunt

63 Ryan, “Political,” 382–8.
the effects of the “Arab Spring.”\textsuperscript{68} This expressed itself in more violent measures by the security services during the Brotherhood’s protests, which then became a new reason for the organization to take to the streets.\textsuperscript{69} The Brotherhood continued its relatively exclusive and confrontational approach even after it was becoming increasingly clear that the “Arab Spring” in general was not turning out to be what many people – including the Brotherhood itself – had hoped for. This became particularly obvious in Egypt, where a military coup removed the Muslim Brother Muhammad Mursi from the presidency in July 2013, an act that was widely condemned by members of the Jordanian Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{70}

The idea that the coup in Egypt would have a weakening effect on the Jordanian Brotherhood ran counter to the organization’s view that taking an exclusivist approach would eventually pay off and, as such, it was dismissed by prominent leaders like the aforementioned Zaki Bani Irshid and Hamza Mansur, the Secretary General of the IAF at the time.\textsuperscript{71} The Brotherhood’s General Controller, Hammam Sa’id, even explicitly stated that “the Brotherhood of Jordan has no need for revising its political views in light of the events in Egypt.


\textsuperscript{71} Musa Kara’in, “Bani Irshid: Al-Hukuma La Turidu an Yakuna Ladayna Hirak Sha’bi” [Bani Irshid: The Government Does Not Want Us to Have a Popular Movement], \textit{Al-Sabil}, July 8, 2013, 3; Musa Kara’in, “Mansur: Hamla I’lamiyya li-Tashhwih al-Haraka al-Islamiyya” [Mansur: Media Campaign to Defame the Islamic Movement], \textit{Al-Sabil}, July 21, 2013, 4; and Musa Kara’in, “Mansur: Man Yahlumu bi-Id’aaf al-Islamiyyin Wahim” [Mansur: Whoever Dreams of Weakening the Islamists is Delusional], \textit{Al-Sabil}, July 12, 2013, 2.
and the removal of President Muhammad Mursi from power.”

The Jordanian Brotherhood, in other words, was not backing down and continued its relatively exclusive and confrontational approach.

The Jordanian regime, in the meantime, not only took tougher measures against the Brotherhood during demonstrations, but was also said to have plans to use the regional turmoil against the organization and even ban it in order to avoid a situation like the one in Egypt. One anonymous source explained that “the position of the king may have changed [from tolerating the Brotherhood to taking action against it] after the latest escalation by the Brotherhood of Jordan,” adding that the king “does not want the scene of confrontation with the Brotherhood to move [from Egypt] to Jordan.”

Although dialogue between the Brotherhood and the regime was resumed in 2013 and the king stated his rejection of outlawing the organization, the idea of banning the Muslim Brotherhood altogether was not entirely far-fetched. Egypt, Saudi-Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – at least partly as a response to the coup – all went on to ban the organization in 2013 or 2014 and some even labeled it a “terrorist organization,” a designation that the Jordanian Brotherhood obviously rejected. By 2014, it thus seemed as if the regime's net was slowly tightening around the Muslim Brotherhood. Although there were signs that the organization realized that the “Arab Spring” had only brought losses,
the Brotherhood as a whole was not ready to give up its relatively exclusive position of confrontation just yet.

5 “Dovish” Openness: Inclusivism

The existing division with regard to openness within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood could, in light of the early successes of the “Arab Spring,” fairly easily be ignored since all of the organization’s members were united in supporting an end to dictatorship, corruption, and oppression. Yet when, in 2012–2013, it became clear that the revolutions in several countries were not going to succeed (Syria), were not going to be as positive as was first expected (Libya), or were even reversed (Egypt), perceptions of the “Arab Spring” changed. In this context – and supported by the idea that the regime appeared more and more willing to target the increasingly isolated Brotherhood – some members of the organization decided to take a more inclusive approach.

In November 2012, a prominent dovish member of the Brotherhood, Ruhayyil Gharayiba, revealed that he and some 60 other members of the organization had met with people from outside the Islamist movement at Hotel ZamZam in Amman to set up an initiative to reform the Jordanian state.77 This “Jordanian Initiative for Building” – or “the ZamZam initiative,” as it quickly became known – was to be a “collective national initiative (mubadara wataniyya jami’a) that accommodates all Jordanian abilities and energy dedicated to this country” and was committed to a “project of all-encompassing national reform.” This was to be achieved through “public, peaceful and civilized means, far from regional, Islamic legal (madhhabi) or religious violence, extremism and clannishness.” Its members included “personalities from the Islamic movement, from outside the Islamic movement and from all colors of the Jordanian spectrum (min kull alwan al-tayf al-Urdunni).”78

The language of the press statement quoted above seemed to be aimed at addressing the very things that some Jordanians hold against the Muslim Brotherhood – such as its supposed disloyalty to Jordan and alleged willingness


78 Press statement published by the Jordanian Initiative for Building, provided to me by its author, Ruhayyil Gharayiba.
to use violence – and assuring people that the ZamZam initiative was not going to be like that. The text of the initiative itself similarly referred to “renewal,” “reform,” and a “peaceful method.” The belief, however, that the Muslim Brotherhood would be against such views is based more on preconceived ideas about the organization than on its actual points of view as expressed in its statements. In my interview with prominent “hawk” Zaki Bani Irshid, for example, he did not really say anything that clashed with these words, a point that was acknowledged by Gharayiba himself, who stated that none of the ideas expressed in the initiative’s text were at odds with the Brotherhood’s views.

Yet, there is a fundamental difference between the ZamZam initiative and the Brotherhood’s approach, namely the openness to others that both express. While the Muslim Brotherhood, as we saw above, was never involved in ideational coalitions and wanted to remain exclusively Islamist and confront the regime as such through extra-parliamentary means like protests during the “Arab Spring,” the inclusivist ZamZam initiative was entirely different. It stressed not only the “spreading of moderate thinking,” which the Brotherhood would probably agree with, but did so “on the basis of tolerance, mutual respect, cooperation and comprehension.” Moreover, the ZamZam initiative mentioned that its members wanted to “partake in the institutions of the state, the institutions of civil society and the strengthening of the values of cooperation and positive participation.”

The ZamZam initiative was, in other words, precisely the ideational coalition that the Brotherhood had never wanted to enter and, as such, constituted the inclusivist antithesis to the exclusivist approach of the organization as a whole. Not surprisingly, the Muslim Brotherhood was highly skeptical of the ZamZam initiative. Gharayiba himself stated that what accounted for the Brotherhood’s opposition to ZamZam was the fact that “there are some people [in the Muslim Brotherhood] whose thinking is narrow and small. They are not flexible in opening up Jordanian society or they fear opening up Jordanian society.” To be sure, Gharayiba does have real ideological differences with the “hawks” in the Muslim Brotherhood (as do many of his fellow Brothers who are also part of the initiative, such as Nabil al-Kufahi and Jamil Duwaysat), but these differences were not expressed in the ZamZam initiative and were not

79 Al-Mubadara al-Wataniyya li-l-Bina’ [National Building Initiative] (ZamZam), text of the Jordanian Initiative for Building provided to me by Ruhayyil Gharayiba, 1.
82 Al-Mubadara al-Wataniyya li-l-Bina’ (ZamZam), 1.
the main reason the organization objected to it. Instead, their objection to “ZamZam” lay in the latter’s inclusivist approach outside the boundaries of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The ZamZam initiative should be seen in the context of the “Arab Spring” and the way its initiators interpreted this series of uprisings. While the Brotherhood leadership saw it as an encouragement to push for reform through exclusivism, the people who set up the ZamZam initiative were far more careful and wary of the outcome of the “Arab Spring,” even though they shared its reformist ideals. This became particularly clear after the coup in Egypt, which showed what the consequences could be if the Brotherhood actively sought to push its exclusivist agenda to the very end. Around that time, the regime was also indirectly stimulating this line of thinking, with pro-regime commentators pointing to the lessons the Brotherhood should learn from the coup. One former minister, for example, stated that the Brotherhood “must adopt a new approach in dealing with the authorities in Jordan” and “give up confrontation with the establishment.”

The king himself also weighed in on this issue, stating in response to a question on banning the Muslim Brotherhood that the IAF was “capable of playing a positive and constructive role in the march of political reform.” The fact that the king only referred to the Brotherhood’s political party – not the organization itself – seemed to emphasize the fact that the regime has long wanted the country’s opposition to work through parliament, where it can be controlled and limited, not through extra-parliamentary organizations like the Brotherhood. This was underlined by his statement that “it would be preferable if the [Islamic] Action Front Party participated in the political process as represented by parliamentary and local elections.”

84 This obviously does not mean that the Muslim Brotherhood does not have the right to pursue its own goals, but merely that – in the context of a state that is run by a highly skeptical military regime that is willing and able to crack down on alternative views – pursuing the highest number of seats in parliament may not always be the safest approach. On this very problem that Middle Eastern Islamists face, see Brown, Victory; and Shadi Hamid, “Arab Islamist Parties: Losing on Purpose?” *Journal of Democracy* 22, No. 1 (2011): 68–80.


Beyond such statements, it is unclear to what extent the regime has supported the ZamZam initiative's inclusivist approach to exploit the divisions within the Brotherhood, to limit the organization's effectiveness, and to cut a deal with those willing to cooperate with the state, although it seems obvious that it would seize the opportunity if it arose. The belief that this inclusivist tendency was somehow supported by the regime was also something I regularly heard in informal talks with analysts and Brothers in Jordan, although this was dismissed by Ruhayyil Gharayiba, who stated that the initiative was financed by two major (and many minor) private donors. He also claimed that its contacts with the state were merely rooted in the belief that if one wanted to influence the regime, one had to engage with it.¹⁸⁷

Whatever the case may be, while the Brotherhood-leadership dismissed calls from the regime to change course, as we saw above, the people behind the ZamZam initiative – like other “doves” in the Brotherhood – were more inclined to take this advice¹⁸⁸ or to make changes as a result of the banning of the Brotherhood in several countries.¹⁸⁹ Gharayiba, for example, declared during the official announcement of the ZamZam initiative in 2014 that “we are witnessing a transitional period that is characterized by danger and we [therefore] need the utmost degree of collective wisdom and intelligence in order to benefit from what is happening in the surrounding states.”¹⁹⁰ To Gharayiba, this entailed “not insisting on [an exclusivist approach of] showing Islamic identity and the need to keep doctrinal, ideological discourse away from the language of [inclusivist] dialogue with all sides.” He also stated that Islamists should “distance themselves from the slogan of the application of Islamic law and...
imposing an Islamic system." More specifically, Gharayiba argued against differences of opinion with the state and in favor of differing with one another within the boundaries of the state and further wrote that such divisions should ideally be based on party manifestos, not doctrinal or ideological issues.

Gharayiba and his fellow Brothers supporting him in the ZamZam initiative thus argued not only for a far more inclusive way of interpreting the “Arab Spring” than the leadership of the Brotherhood, but also used that inclusive effort to present the regime with a much more accommodating alternative. While the Brotherhood as a whole sought confrontation through relatively exclusive protests, “ZamZam” wanted accommodation with the regime by handling conflicts inclusively and within the confines of the state’s institutions. They did so by entering into an ideational coalition with others and being far more willing to cooperate with the regime. By doing so, they realized that if (or when) the “Arab Spring” turned sour and the regime came after those who had opposed it, they would be safe from the regime’s repercussions. As such, Gharayiba’s words cited above represented a clear effort to compromise from an ideological point of view and thus to contribute to a truly ideational coalition with other, non-Islamist Jordanians. While the state did not object to ZamZam’s inclusivist coalition, the Muslim Brotherhood did. Through a lengthy process of discussions and mediations, the organization eventually decided to dismiss Gharayiba, al-Kufahi, and Duhaysat, the Brotherhood’s most prominent members of the ZamZam initiative.

The dismissal of three prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood created a lot of tension within the organization and exacerbated the existing divisions. So much so, in fact, that it would require a separate publication to deal with all of them. Some members felt that ZamZam was an unwanted force intruding on Brotherhood-affairs, while others believed the three members who were dismissed had deserved a better fate, even if they personally disagreed with them. Partly because of these tensions, but also because of existing divisions and disagreements, hundreds of members submitted their resignation.

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to the Brotherhood in 2015, while still others decided to set up a new Muslim Brotherhood altogether that was independent of ZamZam, but ideologically closely aligned with its dovish members. At this point, the regime also became actively involved in stimulating the organization’s divisions when it legalized the new Brotherhood, while declaring the old one illegal. This has led to a situation in which there are two Brotherhoods in Jordan today: one legal organization under the guidance of ‘Abd al-Majid Dhunaybat, a former General Controller of the old Muslim Brotherhood, and another illegal organization under a caretaker leadership. As such, it became abundantly clear that the Brotherhood was not only divided, but also that the regime’s policies toward the organization and the latter’s response to these policies justify different answers to the question of whether inclusion leads to moderation or not, which helps explain the hugely different conclusions drawn by scholars on this issue.

The reason the regime clearly distinguished between the Muslim Brotherhood (which it outlawed), on the one hand, and the IAF (which it allowed), on the other, is three-fold: firstly, the former was an organization that had long been viewed with suspicion for its ties with the Egyptian Brotherhood (even though it cut those in February 2016), while the IAF was an entirely Jordanian political party; secondly, the Muslim Brotherhood, as mentioned above, was an extra-parliamentary organization that could (and often did) function outside the regime’s preferred avenue of opposition (parliament), while the IAF was founded precisely to be in parliament; and thirdly, the Brotherhood was licensed in the 1940s and 1950s as a religious and charitable organization that had changed drastically over the years, while the IAF was founded under the 1992 political parties law without having changed its legal status. ZamZam itself, meanwhile, has transformed into a political party that is now represented in parliament with five seats (out of a total of 130). The IAF, having realized that in order to stay relevant it had to make use of the only


avenue of participation it could use (parliament), decided to participate in the 2016 parliamentary elections after boycotting the two previous election cycles. Although some reformist measures were taken to pave the way for the IAF’s return to parliament – the controversial electoral law, for example, was finally amended – it was hard to escape the conclusion that the original Muslim Brotherhood’s relatively exclusive and confrontational approach had yielded very few positive results. ZamZam’s inclusive and accommodationist approach had not brought it much success either, but at least it was still a legal entity, which is more than can be said about the original Muslim Brotherhood.

6 Conclusion

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has interpreted the “Arab Spring” in two highly divergent ways: the organization as a whole initially wanted to exploit the uprisings in the region to take a relatively exclusive, Islamist approach – so without deep and ideational coalitions with non-Islamists – to confront the regime with its demands for reform; others within the organization disagreed with this method as the “Arab Spring” turned out to be less successful. Aware of the dangers of provoking the state without achieving results, these members called for a more inclusive, national approach and a more accommodationist attitude toward the regime. Some of the latter group set up the Jordanian Initiative for Building – or the ZamZam initiative – which explicitly sought to build bridges with others and enter into an ideational coalition with them on a national basis.

Both approaches were less than fully successful; the Brotherhood as a whole was eventually banned and had to accept that a new version of the organization was set up in its stead, while ZamZam ended up with a small parliamentary presence, unable to seek the inclusivist societal and political reform it wanted through a toothless and ineffective parliament. The regime, in other words, had weathered the storm and been able to withstand both relatively exclusive confrontation and inclusive accommodation by returning the situation to one it could handle without adopting the reform measures that the Brotherhood – and others – had so often called for.

In analyzing the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s different approaches toward the “Arab Spring,” this article has shown that the organization’s openness toward others, as measured in Clark and Schwedler’s terms on coalition-building, is a clear dimension of the Brotherhood’s “hawk”-“dove” divisions. As such, it reaffirms and also sheds new light on the dividedness of the organization as a whole, which – in turn – helps explain why scholars can draw such
different conclusions with regard to the inclusion-moderation thesis when applied to the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Thus, taking this dividedness – including on the dimension of openness – into account can perhaps help us understand the question of Islamist political participation in the Arab world a bit better.