The Mind as Container

A Study of a Metaphor in Homer and Hesiod with a Parallel Analysis of the Sanskrit Epics

Maria Marcinkowska-Rosół | ORCID: 0000-0001-5573-232X
Institute of Classical Philology, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poznań, Poland
marmarro@amu.edu.pl

Sven Sellmer | ORCID: 0000-0002-6688-0667
Institute of Oriental Studies, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poznań, Poland
sven@amu.edu.pl

Received June 2020 | Accepted October 2020

Abstract

One of the most widespread and natural ways of conceiving of the human mind in European culture is the image of the mind as a container for thoughts, images, memories, reasonings, etc. In this article, we explore the evidence of this metaphor in the Ancient Greek epic poems, Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey as well as Hesiod’s Theogony and Works and Days, and, for comparative purposes, the evidence of the analogous metaphor in the Ancient Indian epics, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa. We examine how the metaphor is used, what its functions are and what it implies for the conception of mind in both ancient traditions. Additionally, we offer a brief comparison with the image of the mind-container that emerges from the use of this metaphor in modern English.

Keywords

ancient Greek epics – Homeric psychology – Sanskrit epics – container metaphor – mind
1 Introduction

The aim of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the psychology of the early Greek epics by exploring one of the most significant metaphorical means of describing cognitive phenomena in the epic poems, namely the image of the mind as a kind of ‘container’ for thoughts, images, memories, reasonings, etc. To achieve a clearer picture of the Greek concept we will not only examine the Greek material, but will apply a comparative approach and perform a parallel analysis of the Sanskrit epics, texts particularly well-suited for this purpose. Since these two traditions—the oldest representatives of epic poetry in Indo-European languages—share a general linguistic and cultural heritage, they are similar enough to allow for a meaningful comparison between them; at the same time, the Sanskrit epics are sufficiently different from their Greek counterparts to serve as a foil, highlighting distinctive traits of the early Greek epic model of the mind as a container. To our knowledge, this metaphor in Homer and Hesiod has so far received only brief scholarly treatment, and the Indian texts have been given even less attention in this regard. We thus hope that our study will go some way towards filling these gaps.

Before turning to the ancient material, however, it will be helpful to clarify our own hermeneutic point of departure, because the metaphor in question is one of the basic ways of conceiving of the human mind in Western culture. Lakoff and Johnson explain it in the following way:

We conceptualize the mind metaphorically in terms of a container image schema defining a space that is inside the body and separate from it. Via metaphor, the mind is given an inside and an outside. Ideas and concepts are internal, existing somewhere in the inner space of our minds, while what they refer to are things in the external, physical world. This metaphor is so deeply ingrained that it is hard to think about mind in any other way.  

---

1 In addition to having a common general background, these epic traditions most probably go back to Proto-Indo-European heroic poetry (see Schmitt 1967, 61-141; West 2008). It is even possible that the metaphor of the mind as a container was known to the Proto-Indo-Europeans (in addition to the Greek evidence, it can already be found in the Rgveda, where emotions and experiences are several times located in the heart [ṛṛd, hṛdaya]; see Sellmer 2000, esp. 387-391; cf. also the Hittite examples in Kammenhuber 1964). In our paper, however, we do not deal with the historical problem of the origin of this metaphor in the Greek and Sanskrit epics, but investigate the metaphor in both traditions exclusively from a comparative perspective.
3 Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 266.
The modern metaphor of the mind as a container, as present in English texts, has been the subject of research by, among others, Jäkel and Barnden. We used their analyzed material to extract the following components of the metaphor:

1) The mind is a container in which there are thoughts, concepts, images, etc., and in which cognitive states and processes take place. For example: ‘I keep something in my mind’; ‘I go over something in my mind’.

2) Thoughts, ideas, etc. enter and leave the mind-container. For example: ‘A thought comes to my mind’; ‘I can’t get something out of my mind’.

3) The mind-container is spacious and has specific parts (back, front, depths, rim, etc.), the deepest of which can be used to denote the unconscious. For example: ‘At the back of my mind I knew that ...’; ‘something takes place in the dark interior of my mind’; ‘it seems to me in some dark recess of my mind that ...’

4) The space of the mind is a ‘workshop’ where ideas are manipulated. For example: ‘I have turned the matter over and over in my mind’; ‘I haven’t really worked it out in my own mind yet’.

5) Memory is often imagined as a remote area of the mind-container or even as a separate container. Being committed to memory means entering this memory-container or a specific area of the mind-container. Cognitive items can also be retrieved from the memory store. For example: ‘Something is stored up in my memory’; ‘I retrieve something from the depths of my memory’.

6) The mind as a container is usually imagined to be located in the head. This conception seems obvious to most people nowadays, but is nevertheless highly controversial. It has been argued that its use might easily delude one into perceiving the mind as a real space situated inside the body and containing certain ‘things’. This danger has been famously diagnosed with particular

---

4 Jäkel 1995 investigates the mind as a space where ideas are manipulated; Barnden 1997 analyzes the metaphor of mind as a physical space, among other common metaphors of mind, cognition and ideas; both Jäkel and Barnden concentrate on the cognitive part of mental life—a perspective we will also adopt in our analysis. Besides, see Kövecses 1990, 144-159, who identifies a two-container model with the mind as a container for thoughts and the body as a container for emotions, and Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, who touch upon different versions of the container metaphor, dealing with both cognitive and emotional phenomena. The question of the origin of the container schema is discussed by Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 36, and Kövecses 2006, 209 (according to these researchers, it arises on the basis of the experience of our own bodies as containers, of larger objects containing our bodies, and of all kinds of physical boxes).

5 The examples under points 1-3 and 5 are simplified versions of real samples from a databank built by Barnden 2019; the examples under point 4 are taken from Jäkel 1995, 211.
zeal by Gilbert Ryle. Lakoff and Johnson, on the other hand, believe that this and other metaphors of the mind “are necessary for any detailed reasoning about mental acts.” The aim of our study cannot be to settle this philosophical dispute, but we hope that it will enrich the empirical evidence of the earliest usage of the container metaphor, and thus contribute to a better understanding of the history of that concept.

2 Method and Scope of the Present Study

Our analysis is based on one hand on Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and on Hesiod’s *Theogony* and *Works and Days* (ca. 30,000 lines, dated mostly to the 8th-7th c. BCE), and on the other hand on selected parts of the two great Sanskrit epics: books II-VI of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (= *Rm*) and books VI-IX of the *Mahābhārata* (= *Mbh*) (excluding the *Bhagavadgītā*), the so-called battle books (more than 70,000 lines). Both Indian epics underwent a composition process that lasted for many centuries (very roughly from the 5th c. BCE to the 5th c. CE), but it is acknowledged by most scholars that the oldest core of both texts is largely contained in the books that we have chosen, and that the percentage of younger material is lower there than in the remaining parts. (This selection strategy has the additional advantage of excluding the large didactic parts of the *Mahābhārata*, with their advanced psychological teachings.) When in the following we use formulations like ‘in the Greek epics’ and ‘in the Indian epics’, it is these corpora that we have in mind.

We do not claim that the authors using the metaphor in question consciously endorse a specific conception of the mind, and in our analysis we do not presuppose any specific nature or ontological status of a container for thoughts, memories, etc.—we take into account all descriptions that locate such phenomena in some special space that is confined by borders and itself located ‘in’ a given person. We do, however, restrict our selection of passages with a view to the content located in the container, excluding phenomena

---

7 Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 266.
8 We use the following editions: for the *Iliad*, Allen 1931; for the *Odyssey*, von der Mühll 1962; for the *Theogony*, West 1966; for the *Works and Days*, Solmsen 1970. Some translations of Homer have been taken from Murray 1995 and Murray 1999; the remainder are ours.
9 The following editions are used: for the *Mahābhārata*, Sukthankar et al. 1933-1966; for the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Mehta et al. 1963-1975. All translations are ours.
10 For an account—widely accepted in its general outlines—of the two textual developments see Brockington 1998, 130-158 and 377-397.
of a vital (the feeling of vital strength or lack thereof), desiderative (urge, desire, aversion, etc.) and emotional (feelings, emotions) type, and focusing on thoughts and thought-related phenomena (which we call ‘cognitive’ in the following): processes such as, e.g., deliberating, wavering, judging, planning, expecting, imagining, remembering, forgetting, recognizing; states such as, e.g., having knowledge, understanding, being conscious and self-aware; and items such as, e.g., thoughts, ideas, memories, plans, conclusions, etc. Without suggesting that the Greek or Indian epics conceptually distinguished cognitive phenomena in this sense from other mental phenomena, we want to examine to what extent the epic imagery locates cognition (as just specified) in some inner space, and how it depicts this kind of space. Considering utterances of the circumscribed type, we will first analyze the usages of the metaphor of the mind-container (section 3), and then sketch the pictures of this ‘container’ that emerge from both groups of texts (section 4).

3 The Metaphor, Its Variants and Meanings

The metaphor of locating cognitive items, processes or states in some special inner space is to be found both in the Greek and in the Indian epics. In the Greek texts, there appear in the role of this ‘container’ the φρένες (lit. ‘diaphragm’11 or ‘lungs’12), the θυμός (originally probably the vital breath residing in the chest),13 and the στήθεα (‘breast’); exceptionally14—and only provided one assumes a certain interpretation—also the νόος (‘mind; thinking; thought’).15 Somewhat surprisingly, in connection with the metaphor of the mind-container for the cognitive content (as specified above) we do not find any of the words meaning ‘heart’: κραδίη, κῆρ, ἦτορ. In the Indian epics, on the other hand, cognitive items are located in the heart (ḥṛd, ḥṛdaya) or in the manas16 (manas is a neuter noun derived from the verbal root √man ‘to think’17 and often translated as ‘mind’).

14 See Il. 1.363 = 16.19, Od. 19.42; cf. n. 33 and 34 below.
16 On the manas in the Mahābhārata, see Sellmer 2016; on hṛd and hṛdaya in the Mahābhārata, see Sellmer 2012.
Three variants of the metaphor under analysis will now be discussed:

- Type 1: A cognitive item is located in a mind-container.
- Type 2: A cognitive item enters a mind-container.
- Type 3: A cognitive process or state is located in a mind-container.

### 3.1 Type 1 A Cognitive Item Is Located in a Mind-Container

From a formal point of view the first type can be further divided into the following two subtypes.

#### 3.1.1 Type 1.1 A Cognitive Item Is in a Mind-Container

Two examples from both epic traditions may suffice to illustrate this type. Euryclea, having learned of Telemachus’ intention to go on a voyage to find information about Odysseus, expresses her worries by asking ‘Why did this thought arise (τοῦτο νόημα ἔπλετο) in your φρένες?’\(^{18}\) where ‘thought’ refers to Telemachus’ intention. In the Rāmāyāṇa, the demon king Rāvaṇa declares his determination to abduct Rāma’s wife Sītā: ‘This well-settled plan abides in my heart (ḥṛdi ... vartate) ... it cannot be reversed, even by the gods and the antigods, with Indra among them.’\(^{19}\)

In Greek epic poetry this kind of utterance appears only several times, mainly together with the noun νόημα;\(^{20}\) the metaphor here merely means to have certain thoughts or intentions. In the Indian epics this type of expression occurs more often and in connection with a greater variety of cognitive items (in addition to the plan just mentioned: an intention or decision,\(^{21}\) a general conviction,\(^{22}\) an expectation,\(^{23}\) an imagined event,\(^{24}\) a dilemma,\(^{25}\) but also items coming from outside and preserved: the advice once given by somebody,\(^{26}\) threats\(^{27}\) or harsh words\(^{28}\) uttered by somebody in the past, even

---

18 Hom. Od. 2.363-364.
19 Rm 3.38.7.
20 Apart from Od. 2.263-264, see also 13.333 (νόημα in the breast), 15.326-327 (νόημα in the φρένες), 17.403 (νόημα in the breast), Il. 20.20 (βουλή in the breast). We do not take into account places like Il. 18.419, 24.40-41, Th. 122, etc., in which νόημα, νόος or βουλή, though located in the φρένες and the like, are not cognitive items (but the mind itself or a specific mental faculty).
21 Rm 2.84.20; Mbh 6.114.96, 7.135.31.
22 Mbh 7.113.2.
23 Rm 3.71.5-6b.
24 Rm 2.23.3.
25 Mbh 6.4.14; 8.49.60.
26 Rm 2.110.7.
27 Mbh 8.64.30.
the Vedic texts remembered by brahmins). Also, the Sanskrit variant of the metaphor usually seems to have a more pregnant meaning: it is often used in connection with content that is treated seriously by a person, is accepted, and has consequences for her actions (for instance, one may refuse someone's request or advice by saying: 'this is not [or: will not stay] in my manas').

3.1.2 Type 1.2 Someone Has a Cognitive Item in a Mind-Container

Once more, Euryclea may serve as an example: She is characterized as a person 'having (ἔχουσα) wise counsels in her φρένες'—in such expressions, 'to have in the φρένες (or in the θυμός)' means roughly the same as 'to have, possess'. This metaphor takes on a more concrete sense only where a verb with a more specific meaning than 'to have' is employed, e.g., 'to hide' or 'to keep [a secret]', 'to hold', 'to guard' (with the meaning 'to keep in mind [somebody's advice] and obey [it]'). For instance, Achilles says: 'For hateful in my eyes as the gates of Hades is that man who hides one thing in his mind (κεύθε ἐνὶ φρεσίν) and says another'. Interestingly, in the Indian texts Type 1.2 is completely absent.

3.2 Type 2 A Cognitive Item Enters a Mind-Container

This type can be further divided into four subtypes.

3.2.1 Type 2.1 A God Puts a Cognitive Item in the Mind-Container of a Human

This metaphor is used in the Greek epics to describe cognitive events that are not the effects of conscious activity and can to a certain extent be described as non-volitional, like the spontaneous conceiving of a plan, the sudden...
understanding of something, or the presence of premonitions.37 The item most frequently placed by the gods into the mind-container of a person is a thought concerning an action (a counsel, a plan, etc.).38 Apart from that, there are three interesting passages that describe a cognitive event as the result of double (mental and divine) causation:39 ‘But now since you have found me out and a god has put this in your heart (καί τοι θεὸς ἔμβαλε θυμῷ)’ (about recognizing somebody),40 ‘But since you have thought of this, and a god has put it into your heart (καί τοι θεὸς ἔμβαλε θυμῷ)’ (about recalling something)41 and ‘I will now prophesy to you, as the immortals put it in my heart (ἐνὶ θυμῷ ἀθάνατοι βάλλουσι), and as I think it shall be brought to pass’.42

Type 2.1 appears quite often in the Greek epics, but is completely absent in the Indian material (even though that tradition also includes a parallel world of gods who intervene in the lives of humans).

3.2.2 Type 2.2 A Human Puts a Cognitive Item in the Mind-Container of Another Human

This type features exclusively in the Greek epics, and there only rarely. A person begins her utterance by saying that she will put (τίθημι) words in the φρένες of the addressee.43 This is nothing more than a metaphorical announcement that a piece of information is about to be conveyed to the addressee, probably with the aim of attracting his attention.

3.2.3 Type 2.3 A Human Puts a Cognitive Item in Her Own Mind-Container

This type is to be found both in Greek and in Indian epic poetry, and expresses an intentional cognitive activity. In the Greek epics, it refers to (a) accepting and adapting to someone’s advice or exhortation (e.g., the Greeks ‘threw into their θυμός’ [ἐν θυμῷ δ᾿ ἐβάλοντο] Ajax’s words urging them to fight and began fiercely to defend the ships;44 the Hesiodic expression ὃς ... ἀκούων ἐν

37 Sporadically, this type of expression is also used to describe divine actions of bestowing permanent abilities on humans; see Od. 22.347 and Op. 77-80.
38 E.g., Il. 17.469-470 (βουλή), Od. 2.124-125 (νόος), 14.273-274 (νόημα); implicitly: Od. 16.282, 16.291, 19.138-139.
39 For double causation in Homer see Lesky 1961, 22-32.
41 Od. 23.260; trans. Murray.
43 Il. 15.566. See also Od. 1.361 = 21.355.
θυμῷ βάλλεται\textsuperscript{45} takes up the earlier ὃς εὖ εἴπόντι πίθηται,\textsuperscript{46} and so it refers to accepting advice given by wise persons); (b) listening attentively and taking seriously someone's words (in the introductory exhortations like ἀλλο δὲ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ᾽ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσι,\textsuperscript{47} which are not always followed by a piece of advice or a request, but sometimes, for instance, by a threat,\textsuperscript{48} a prophecy,\textsuperscript{49} a promise,\textsuperscript{50} the announcement of an action to be undertaken by the speaker,\textsuperscript{51} or simply an important piece of information);\textsuperscript{52} (c) intentionally calling to mind and concentrating on something (Antilochus is advised to ‘throw all his expertise’ into his θυμός [μῆ τιν ἐμβάλλεο θυμῷ | παντοιην] during the chariot race),\textsuperscript{53} or simply thinking about something.\textsuperscript{54}

In the Indian epics, similarly, the metaphor refers either to accepting and obeying someone's advice or order,\textsuperscript{55} or, more frequently, to intentionally thinking about something. The frequent negative imperative version of the latter usage ('do not put') expresses an admonition not to think of something or concentrate on something any longer.\textsuperscript{56} The passages with the positive version include some particularly interesting examples. Thus, for instance, Kṛṣṇa urges Arjuna to attack his enemy in the following way: ‘Put into your heart (hṛdi kṛtvā), o son of Pāṇḍu, the robbing of the kingdom [from you and your brothers] by deceit, [your] life [of exile] in the forest and Draupadi's sufferings, then show your bravery!’\textsuperscript{57} Accordingly, Arjuna should recall and focus on the acts of injustice inflicted on himself and his family by his enemy, in order to arouse anger in himself, which, in turn, will support a display of his heroism. Hence, in this case the possession of an inner space that enables a person to focus his thoughts on a specific interiorized object opens up the possibility of intentionally evoking in oneself specific emotional states. In another passage, Bhīma tries to cause his enemy Droṇa to withdraw from the battle by making him

\textsuperscript{45} Op. 296-297.
\textsuperscript{46} Op. 295.
\textsuperscript{48} Il. 1.297.
\textsuperscript{49} Il. 16.851.
\textsuperscript{50} Od. 17.548.
\textsuperscript{51} Od. 19.495, 19.570.
\textsuperscript{52} Od. 19.236.
\textsuperscript{53} Il. 23.313-314.
\textsuperscript{54} Il. 10.447, 23.195-196, Od. 4.729-730.
\textsuperscript{55} Rm 2.18.7, 4.62.3; cf. also 6.51.25, 6.52.10.
\textsuperscript{56} Mbh 9.60.61; Rm 2.58.7, 2.104.19, 6.7.16.
\textsuperscript{57} Mbh 7.77.14.
believe the false report that his son Aśvatthāman has been slain. He first kills an elephant which is also called Aśvatthāman, before continuing his mission: ‘Feeling ashamed, Bhīma approached Droṇa in the battle and said aloud, “Aśvatthāman has been slain”, because the elephant named Aśvatthāman had been killed. Putting him in his manas (kṛtvā manasi taṃ), Bhīma spoke deceitfully at that time.’58 ‘Putting him (i.e., the elephant) in his manas’ seems to mean that Bhīma, while uttering the word ‘Aśvatthāman’, purposefully thinks of the elephant, instead of Droṇa’s son. Apparently, he tries to mislead Droṇa (who is unaware of the dead elephant) and at the same time to avoid the sin of lying.59 This passage suggests a developed reflection on truth and falsehood, as well as acquaintance with the idea that the intention of the speaker is one of the sources of a word’s meaning.60 It also implies a crucial distinction between the internal (intention and actual consciousness) and the external (utterance).

3.2.4 Type 2.4 A Cognitive Item Enters the Mind-Container of a Person of Its Own Accord

This type of metaphor occurs only very rarely. In Greek epic poetry it describes a spontaneous recalling. The word of seers, heard some time ago, ‘falls into’ (ἔμπεσε) Odysseus’ θυμός, i.e., it comes to his mind.61 The words hṛd-gata (as a noun, ‘wish’) and mano-gata (as a noun, ‘thought, hope’), with the etymological sense ‘having gone (in)to the heart resp. manas’, could possibly be regarded as indirect evidence for this metaphor in the Indian epics.62

Summing up Type 2, it should be noted that in many instances of the metaphor of ‘throwing something into the mind-container’ the action of throwing can hardly be imagined as a single act (which seems to have been the original way of understanding it). In the Greek epics, in addition to aorists with the meaning ‘threw, put’, there occur present forms (βάλλωσι, ἐμβάλλεο, etc.),63 which can have a durative aspect, so ‘throwing in’ may refer to a continuing

58 Mbh 7.164.72-73.
59 His attempt fails in two ways: Droṇa does not believe him, and his equivocation is regarded as morally reprehensible. For an interpretation of the whole episode of the deceiving of Droṇa (of which Bhīma’s attempt is only the first part) and for its moral assessment in the Mahābhārata itself, see Ganeri 2007, 61-93.
60 This theory has been advocated by many schools of Indian philosophy of language; see Deshpande 1992, 2.
61 Od. 12.266-268. Earlier Circe, giving Odysseus her prophetic instructions for his voyage, had assured him: μνήσει δέ σε καὶ θεὸς αὐτός (12.38), which may suggest that the falling of her advice into Odysseus’ θυμός is the work of a god.
63 Type 2.1: Od. 1.200-201 = 15.172-173; Type 2.3: Il. 10.447, 20.195-196, 23.313-314, Op. 296-297, as well as the formula ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σύ δ᾿ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσι and similar expressions (see n. 47).
mental process or activity (esp. intentionally thinking about, concentrating on, and paying attention to something). A weakening of the metaphorical strength of the expressions belonging to Type 2 can also be observed in the cases where a verb with the meaning ‘to throw into’ occurs without an explicit (and an obvious implicit) object. In the Indian epics, the item put into the mind is in one case the content expressed by a subordinate subject clause, and the frequent negative admonitions of the form ‘do not put it into your heart resp. manas’ directed at a person who is already thinking of the thing in question also show that this metaphor is no longer understood as referring to a single act, but to a mental state.

3.3 Type 3 A Cognitive Process or State Is Located in a Mind-Container

In the Greek epics this metaphor is extraordinarily frequent; it occurs in oft-repeated formulas and in connection with almost all cognitive processes and states mentioned in these texts: In his mind-container a hero (a) reflects, deliberates, particularly concerning a future action (ὁ ρμαίνω, μερμηρίζω, φράζομαι, συμφράζομαι, βούλεύω), (b) plans, devises, plots, intends (μήδομαι, ὑφαίνω, φράζομαι, βούλευω, μερμηρίζω, ὁρμάω, τιτύσκομαι, νεώμαι, βυσσοδομεύω),

---

64 A different interpretation of this continuing process is offered by the theory that the expressions using the present tense among those discussed here under Type 2.3 do not (on the literal level) mean ‘to throw into one’s mind’, but rather ‘to cast around in one’s mind’ (Horn 2016, 171, about [ἐμ-]βάλλομαι + [ἐν] φρεσίν or θυμῷ, which he interprets as “the metaphorical space in which thoughts are contemplated by being moved about”; cf. Zanker 2019, 117 n. 55; 126-127). Such a meaning, however, is improbable in Ὀμ. 296-297 (also with the present tense, which here represents the iterative aspect, see above), and a disconnection of the metaphor using (ἐμ-)βάλλομαι in the present tense from the variant using the aorist (II. 15.566; see above under Type 2.3) and from the instances with present tense and active voice (Od. 1.200-201 = 15.172-173; see above under Type 2.1) would require a solid justification, which so far has not been delivered. In fact, it seems more cogent to consider (ἐμ-)βάλλομαι (pres. tense with durative aspect) + (ἐν) φρεσίν or θυμῷ as a ‘faded’ version of the metaphor of placing something into the mind-container, but as still belonging to the whole system of metaphors based on this image (Type 2).


66 Mbh 9.60.61.

67 See Mbh 9.60.61, Rm 2.34, 2.104, 6.7, 6.51.30. See also II. 10.447.

68 This verb, which is mostly taken to have the literal (etymological, not attested) meaning ‘to build in the deep’ and the metaphorical sense ‘to devise something in concealment’ (Od. 4.676: μύθους, ἐνὶ φρεσὶ; 8.273 and 17.66: κακὰ φρεσὶ; 9.316, 17.465, 17.491 and 20.184: κακὰ), possibly conveys a metaphorical image of the mind as an inner space in which a person conceives plots or the like. This hypothesis should not, however, be combined with the additional assumption that “the notion of depth must be understood more immediately in conjunction with the dative locative φρεσί, denoting the metaphorical space (‘mind’) in whose depth the thought process is being located” (Horn 2016, 168).
(c) expects, hopes, suspects (ἐλπιά, ἐπιέλπομαι), (d) thinks about, worries about or cares for something (μέλω, φρονέω), (e) forgets or recalls (ἐκλανθάνομαι, μιμνήσκομαι), (f) notices, sees, hears (νοέω, συντίθεμαι, φράζομαι), (g) has a premonition, imagines (δορσομαι), (h) something seems or appears to him in a certain way (δοκέω, φαίνομαι, εἴδομαι), (i) he understands and recognizes (γιγνώσκω, νοέω, *εἴδω), (j) knows and has expertise (οἶδα, ἐπίσταμαι), (k) prays (εὔχομαι).

This metaphor allows a more detailed description of cognitive processes, but generally it does not have any substantial semantic weight, nor does it fulfill an indispensable syntactic function. In most cases it merely underscores that the event is a mental one (which usually is obvious already from the meaning of the verb), perhaps occasionally implying that a person's whole mental sphere is involved in and focused on a given process. Only in a small number of passages does the fact that the process is described as taking place in a mind-container change the nature of that process. For instance, the statement that Odysseus prayed κατὰ θυμόν means that he did not pray aloud, but only silently; in a verse saying that a hero 'in his φρένες aimed (τιτύσκετο) to attack an enemy with his spear' the verb τιτύσκομαι does not mean, as usually, 'try to hit, aim' but 'to intend'; also 'to see' (*εἴδω) in the φρένες does not refer to literal seeing, but to getting to know.

As far as we can see, in the Indian epics cognitive activities are never described as taking place in a mind-container. Instead, in similar contexts, and serving similar functions, we often find constructions with verbs denoting cognitive activities accompanied by the nouns manas or buddhi ('intellect'), or (very rarely) hṛdaya, in the instrumental case.

---

69 See, e.g.: (a) Il. 1.193, Od. 4.123, Op. 688; (b) Il. 9.423, Od. 1.144; (c) Il. 17.603, Od. 3.275; (d) Il. 2.36, Od. 1.351, Th. 61; (e) Od. 1.29, 10.557; (f) Il. 5.44; Od. 1.322, Th. 488; (g) Il. 18.224, Od. 4.453, Th. 551; (h) Il. 2.5, Od. 9.318; (i) Il. 1.333, Od. 7.327; (j) Il. 2.331, Od. 4.632; (k) Il. 23.769, Od. 5.444.

70 Il. 23.769, Od. 5.444. See the analysis of these two passages in Pelliccia 1995, 131-2.

71 Il. 13.558.

72 Il. 21.61.
4 The Concept of the Mind-Container

All terms denoting a mind-container are in some way specific: the Greek words φρένες, θυμός and στήθεα have their own physiological or anatomical meanings (whereas νόος lacks them). Similarly, in the Indian epics hṛd and hṛdaya have an anatomical reference, while manas does not; in addition, the heart, especially in other usages than the container metaphor, is connected most closely with the emotional sphere, whereas the manas is more typical of cognitive contexts. So—although it is not possible to demonstrate the difference between, for instance, deliberating in the θυμός and in the φρένες or putting something into the manas and into the heart—it seems that neither the Greek nor the Indian metaphors refer to a conception of a single, ‘unified’, and consequently also abstract mind-container, but that in each particular case they are based on a given specific entity, presenting it in its quasi-spatial aspect. Talking of the mind-container in the following, we therefore merely have in mind what is common to several slightly different images.

4.1 Ascription, Location and Content of the Mind-Container

The first common trait of these images is that the mind-container for cognitive items is located in the chest region.73 Secondly, it is ascribed only to humans and to beings endowed with a human personality (in the Greek epics: to the gods; in the Indian epics: to the demons and to Sampāti, the anthropomorphic king of vultures74), and only very exceptionally to animals.75 Looking for further characteristics of the mind-container in epic texts, it is plain to see that—apart from belonging to someone—it has no positive attributes, that is to say, we do not find any traits ascribed to it specifically as the mind-container, apart from the attributes characterizing the φρένες, the manas, etc., in other contexts. Never is it said to have a specific form or an internal structure,76 there is no

---

73 This is obvious for φρένες, στήθεα, and the heart in the Indian epics. The location of θυμός and νόος can be inferred from other passages which speak of them as being in the breast or in the φρένες, although in those passages they do not function as mind-containers. Finally, the manas was imagined to be located in the vicinity of the heart: already in the Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā 8.100.5 (ed. Aufrecht 1877) it speaks ‘from the heart’ (ḥṛda ā), and according to the White Yajurveda (Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā 34.6, ed. Weber 1852) it is ‘established in the heart’ (hṛt-pratistha).

74 Rm 4.62.3. That it is not mentioned in connection with the quasi-human monkey protagonists of the Rāmāyaṇa is clearly accidental.

75 Il. 18.224 (the Trojans’ horses turn the chariots back because they ‘saw misfortune in their θυμός’).

76 Cf. Il. 19.125, where the φρήν is called ‘deep’ (βαθεῖα), but the item located in it (‘sharp pain’, ἁχός δίν) is an emotion, probably accompanied by a bodily sensation. For the exceptionality of this verse see Edwards 1991, 251 ad loc.
mention of dedicated entrances for cognitive items, nor is it depicted in terms of real containers (rooms, boxes, etc.). The only thing that can be stated is that it is not imagined as a closed container: It is in some way open for the person herself, and in the Greek texts it is also open for the interventions of gods, and even of other humans, who can put their words into it.77

An important element of the mind-container metaphor is the nature of its content.78 In the Greek epics this content is more inclusive, because it comprises also cognitive processes and states, which are not mentioned in the Indian metaphors. As far as cognitive items are concerned, however, the imagery in the Indian texts is more diverse. This difference is made visible by a more detailed analysis of the items mentioned in both traditions:

- **type:***
  - epistemic, informative or deliberative items (‘information’ in a broad sense; effects of one’s own cognitive processes; only in the Indian tradition also: remembered texts, convictions, dilemmas)
  - programmatic and imperative items (plans, intentions, decisions, ideas for acting; advice, instructions, orders; only in the Indian tradition also: a task to achieve)
  - imaginative and optative items (expectations, hopes; only in the Indian tradition also: imagined events)

- **status:***
  - fresh (only actually being thought; in both epic traditions)
  - lastingly current (abiding near the sphere of actual consciousness for a longer period of time; in both epic traditions)
  - remembered (only in the Indian epics)

- **origin:***
  - arising in the subject (especially as a result of the subject’s own epistemic processes; in both epic traditions)
  - of external origin (e.g., advice or recommendation; in both epic traditions); in the Greek epics, this category may also include such items as a

---

77 This image brings to mind the well-known conception of the Homeric man as “ein offenes Kraftfeld” formulated by Fränkel 1969, 88-89, but is ultimately antithetic to it, because the mind-container does have borders that allow the subject, at least potentially, to control what is allowed to enter from the outside (see below).

78 The present analysis is restricted to cognitive items. However, both in the Greek and the Indian epics other types of content—emotional, desiderative, and vital ones—are also located in the mind-container (exceptionally even in the νόος, and very rarely in the heart, mostly χρώσιτο; in the Indian epics we additionally find examples for subtype 2.4: an emotion enters the heart).
plan for an action, if it was ‘thrown’ into the mind of a hero by a god, or a word that was recalled in such a way that it ‘fell into’ the θυμός of a hero (evidently from outside).

4.2 The Scope of the Mind-Container: From Actual Consciousness to Memory

In most places in both the Greek and the Indian epics the mind-container seems to be the sphere of actual consciousness. For instance, when a hero engages in a cognitive activity in his θυμός or his φρένες, what is meant is a conscious activity that requires attention, and when some non-volitional mental event takes place there, this event becomes an object of his attention; similarly, when Antilochus is advised to ‘throw all his expertise’ into his θυμός while driving his chariot,79 what is clearly meant is that he should recall and ‘fix his mind on’ all he knows in this respect. The Indian examples are even more precise: When in the scene described above Bhima ‘puts him [i.e., the elephant] into his manas’,80 he turns (the thought of) the elephant into the object of his actual consciousness; similarly, the advice received by Arjuna to ‘put into the heart’ acts of injustice inflicted on him by his enemy81 encourages him to recall them vividly and focus on them in the present moment.

In other passages, however, the mind-container transcends the sphere of actual consciousness. In the Greek epics, a person not only has knowledge82 or practical wisdom83 in her θυμός or φρένες, but is also admonished to ‘hold’ or ‘guard’ received advice in the mind,84 which means that it should not be forgotten, but preserved and interiorized. This does not imply, however, that these suggestions should be ‘stored away’; instead, they should be kept ready as guidelines for acting: they must stay ‘close’ enough to actual consciousness to become its object whenever necessary.85 An analysis of all relevant passages does not provide any reason to conceive of the φρένες and the θυμός as memory in the sense of a kind of dedicated storage place, where acquired knowledge

---

79 Il. 23.313-314.
80 Mbh 7.164.72-73.
81 Mbh 7.77.14.
82 E.g. Il. 2.301-303 (the object of knowledge here is an important event of the past that is still vividly present for its witnesses), Od. 13.339-340, 13.417.
83 E.g. Il. 5.326, 17.325, Od. 11.445, 19.353.
84 Il. 2.33, Od. 15.445, Op. 491.
85 Cf. Agōcs 2019, 72-73, who seems to advocate a somewhat similar interpretation suggesting that memory in Homer consists in the ability to perceive the internalized content of “consciousness’ receptacle” by directing one’s attention to it.
and recorded experiences are laid down for later extraction. The metaphor of memories or information ‘escaping’ from a mental repository does not occur, and recalling is not described in terms of extracting memories or information from the mind-container. The container mentioned in the context of a spontaneous or deliberate recalling of knowledge is just the container entered by a cognitive item at a given moment, i.e., the container of actual consciousness. Advice once heard ‘falls into’ Odysseus’ θυμός; Antilochus recalls his expertise by ‘throwing’ it into his θυμός. The origin of the mental items recalled in these examples is not mentioned; it remains unclear where they were located before becoming present in the space of the θυμός. It must therefore be concluded that in the Greek epics the metaphor of the memory as a special storage place did not evolve, and that the spaces of the θυμός and of the φρένες are basically spaces of consciousness: either in the restricted sense of actual consciousness, or more broadly as spaces of what one may call ‘consciousness in the wider sense’, comprising all content of significance for a given person that is continuously accessible to her and can be brought to attention at an appropriate moment.

In the Indian epics we also find several instances where the space of the mind-container transcends the actual consciousness. When the heroes describe a firm decision or a lasting conviction as something that ‘stands in their manas’, they are clearly speaking of the ‘consciousness in the wider sense’. The examples with the heart are even more significant. Among these, we not only find the image of keeping someone’s advice in the heart (which is comparable to the Greek passages), but it is also said that threats or painful words, heard in the past, stay in someone’s heart for a long time, which points to the specific memory function of spontaneously preserving emotionally charged content. However, it is clear from the contexts of the two latter passages that this function is only secondary here: what is meant is not that the words have been stored in memory, but that they still rankle or worry the

86 Od. 12.266.
87 Il. 23.313-314. In the passages where verbs such as μυνήσκομαι (Od. 1.29, 4.187) or ἐκλανθάνομαι (Od. 10.557) are used, remembering and forgetting are depicted as taking place in the θυμός or the φρένες, just like any other cognitive process (Type 3), and no image of either leaving or entering a mind-container is implied.
88 Cf. Bakker 2002, 67-71, who—explicitly denying that the memory was conceived of as a storage place in archaic Greece—suggests that the development of this idea goes back to the introduction of writing (as a way of storing information), since the concept of memory “is a function of a culture’s dominant medium of communication” (67).
89 See Mbh 6.114.96, 7.135-31, 7.113.2.
90 Rm 2.110.7, 4.62.3.
91 Mbh 8.64.30.
person. The image of the mind-container combines with the heart’s emotional connotations to express the idea that past events continue to exert a strong influence on a person’s emotional state. In another interesting passage, a group of brahmins who want to follow Rāma into the forest declare that the Vedas, their ‘greatest treasure’, abide in their hearts. Here, we are dealing with a memory function that—thanks to extended studies and the application of specialized techniques in the framework of a strictly oral tradition—makes it possible to preserve long texts containing knowledge of an impersonal and objective kind (as opposed to personalized advice and spontaneously remembered emotionally charged content). But also in this instance of the container metaphor, its memory function is secondary, since the main point of the brahmins’ statement is not that they will not forget their Vedic knowledge, but that they can travel safely because their ‘treasure’ is well guarded against robbers and other external dangers: the primary function of the heart-container here is protection, not retention.

To sum up, the mind-container in the Indian epics can sometimes perform the function of memory, and in the case of the brahmins’ hearts the space of this container seems to extend further beyond the actual consciousness than in any of the Greek examples. However, as shown above, the function of memory in these rare passages is rather secondary, and the mind-container does not seem to be conceived of as a dedicated storage place. The metaphor of memories or pieces of knowledge ‘leaving’ the mind-container does not appear in the Indian texts, and recalling is not depicted in terms of extracting memories or knowledge from the mind-container, but—as in the Greek passages—of throwing the recalled content into it.

4.3 Control over the Content of the Mind-Container

In the Greek epics people are encouraged to ‘hide’, ‘keep’, ‘hold’, or ‘guard’ something in their mind-container, to throw something into it, or admonished not to do so (any more); the mind-container is also a place where a person can undertake volitional activities. All of these passages imply that a person is capable of deciding about the content of the mind-container. Other utterances, however, show that a person’s control over the content of her mind-container is not complete, specifically in the case of non-volitional events. As we have seen, it is mainly to this type of events that the metaphor of the gods throwing something into the mind-container of a human refers.

93 Rm 2.40.23.
95 Il. 2.33, 9.312-313, Od. 3.18, 15.445, Op. 491.
96 Il. 10.447.
The Indian epics present a slightly different picture. As shown above, according to the Indian conception, no mental processes (including non-volitional ones) take place in the mind-container. Neither does the metaphor of a god throwing an item into the mind-container of a human appear here. Similarly absent is the image of a cognitive item spontaneously entering the mind-container, apart from the expressions mano-gata and hṛd-gata, whose interpretation is uncertain. The only variant of the metaphor of putting something into the inner space that does feature in the Indian material is inserting something into one’s own mind-container, which refers to intentional mental activity; the negative admonition ‘do not put it into your manas/heart’ is used in situations where a person who is focusing on something due to strong emotional engagement is prompted to stop doing so (which implies a purposeful and volitional act).97 The verse Rm 5.22.6, where a person encouraged to do something rejects the suggestion saying: ‘these words do not stay in my mind’,98 shows that a person can decide about what permanently stays in her mind-container. This corresponds to the fact that the phrase ‘(thus) it stands in my manas’ is used to express a purposefully adopted standpoint (strong decision, lasting conviction), which expresses—to use modern words—someone’s personality and moral character. Thus, it seems that at least in the case of her manas, a person exerts full control over its mental content. In the case of the heart, this control seems to be somewhat limited, as the heart also functions as a place of long-term storage for emotionally challenging content like threats and harsh words99—clearly, this is not the type of content that anyone would intentionally throw into and preserve in his mind-container.

4.4 Functions of the Mind-Container

The main function of the mind-container in both analyzed text groups is to provide a natural place for cognitive items, in the Greek epics also for cognitive states and acts, including (rarely) the construction of cognitive items100 and their manipulation.101 At the same time, it is also the default place where other persons presuppose cognitive items to be located. In the Greek epics there are examples of ascribing to a second person the possession (or non-possession) of certain thoughts in her mind-container based on her words or behavior.102 More specific functions of the mind-container are connected with the fact that it possesses borders:

97 See Mbh 9.63.61, Rm 2.58.7, 2.104.19, 6.7.16, 6.50.12-16.
99 Mbh 8.64.30, Rm 6.107.15.
100 E.g., the ‘weaving’ of a plan at Od. 4.739.
101 Od. 13.255, 18.216.
– Accepting and rejecting cognitive content:

Items are received into the mind-container from other persons\(^{103}\) (such items can also be rejected), from gods, and from unspecified origins;\(^ {104}\) they can also be ‘inserted’, i.e., brought to special attention, by the person herself, thus enabling regulation of one’s own thoughts,\(^ {105}\) and thereby also emotions and motivation.\(^ {106}\)

– Regulating the preservation of cognitive content:

Preservation of a cognitive item may imply that it is kept secret (by refraining from uttering it)\(^ {107}\) or simply that it is held on a long-term basis, thus making it possible to rely upon it in deed and thought;\(^ {108}\) analogously, unacceptable content (advice and requests) is not kept.\(^ {109}\) Moreover, in the Indian epics the mind-container preserves content which is remembered (spontaneously, due to its emotional impact,\(^ {110}\) or purposefully,\(^ {111}\) which includes texts memorized in a methodical way).\(^ {112}\)

– Regulating outside access:

The mind-container excludes its content from being directly inspected by others, which can be used by a person to mislead others (to devise secret plans,\(^ {113}\) to hide one thing inside the mind-container while uttering another,\(^ {114}\) to deceive by purposefully making a distinction between the meaning that a word acquires in the mind-container and its meaning in a public utterance).\(^ {115}\) Furthermore, in the Indian epics this function of the mind-container also serves to protect its content.\(^ {116}\)

\(^{103}\) The latter explicitly only in *Mbh* 9.30.51, cf. *Rm* 5.22.6.

\(^{104}\) *Od.* 16.457-459.


\(^{106}\) *Rm* 2.134.19, 6.7.16, 6.51.25, 6.51.30; *Mbh* 7.77.14, 9.65.61.


\(^{110}\) *Rm* 2.110.7.

\(^{111}\) *Rm* 2.40.23.

\(^{112}\) *Rm* 2.40.23.

\(^{113}\) *Od.* 4.676, 8.273, 17.66.

\(^{114}\) *Il.* 9.312-313.

\(^{115}\) *Mbh* 7.164.72-73.

\(^{116}\) *Rm* 2.40.23.
5 Conclusions

From our analysis of the relevant passages in the Greek epics it emerges that the metaphor of the mind-container provides interpretations of many non-obvious aspects of our mental life, such as cognitive events which are not results of our conscious acts (= external intervention in the content of our mind-container), influencing and regulation of our thoughts and attention (= our own manipulating of the content of our mind-container), or restraint in expressing our thoughts in words or behavior (= hiding thoughts in the mind-container); it also ‘explains’ the great riddle of how it is possible to have thoughts ‘at hand’ for a longer time without being actively conscious of them all the time and without losing them either.

As we have seen, the image of the mind-container is used to some extent differently in the Greek and in the Indian epics. The Greek epics feature more variants of the metaphor than the Indian texts, in which Types 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 3 do not occur; also its purely formulaic use is specific to the Greek tradition. The absence of Type 3 (‘A cognitive process or state is located in a mind-container’) from the Indian material implies that the content of the mind-container in the Greek texts is more inclusive, because, in addition to cognitive items, it also comprises cognitive processes and states; in contrast, in the Indian texts the cognitive items contained in the mind are considerably more diverse. Whereas the general types of functions of the mind-container are similar in both traditions, there are some important differences in the conception of the container as such. Firstly, only in the Indian epics does the heart appear in this function—in the Greek epics, instead, mental content is located in the θυμός and the φρένες, which do not have close parallels in the Sanskrit tradition. Secondly, the Greek epic poets did not come as close as the Indian authors to developing a conception of a memory container capable of preserving remembered knowledge for a long period of time. Thirdly, the mind-container in the Greek poems is significantly more often and more explicitly a location of cognitive events that are beyond the control of the person.

These major and other more minute differences help us to grasp the specific character of the Greek metaphor; nevertheless, it seems that the similarities between these conceptions are more significant than the differences. These similarities become striking when we compare both ancient conceptions with the analogous metaphor used in contemporary English:

1. Among the six fundamental traits of the contemporary metaphor mentioned in the introduction, it is only with respect to the first—the conception that cognitive processes and events (as opposed to cognitive items) are located in the mind-container—that the two ancient traditions
clearly differ; this trait is present in the ancient Greek metaphor, but absent from its Indian counterpart.

The remaining points rather reveal differences between the contemporaneous imagery and both ancient ones:

2. In all three variants of the metaphor there occurs the image of cognitive items entering the mind-container, but only the modern one additionally has the conception of them leaving it. The ancient epics do not feature phrases like: ‘I dismiss something from my mind’, ‘I can’t get something out of my mind’, etc.

3. Only in the modern conception does the mind-container have a differentiated internal structure: The ancient epics do not mention its front, back, recesses, etc. Neither does the epic mind-container comprise the unconscious in the sense of content which is hidden from and not immediately accessible to the person concerned.

4. Essentially, only the modern mind-container is a workshop in which mental items are observed, selected and ‘worked on’. In the Indian epics this type of imagery is completely absent; in the Greek epics it is restricted to a few isolated examples. In these traditions the mind-container is not yet a place where a person would conduct complex operations.

5. Although the mind-container of the Greek and especially of the Indian epics can preserve cognitive content for a longer time, it differs significantly from the memory container of the modern metaphor. It is not yet a dedicated repository in which cognitive items are stored and from which they are extracted when being recalled. Apparently, the epics did not develop the conception of a separate memory container, or the conception of an internally structured mind with recesses or depths as memory stores.

6. In the metaphors of the ancient texts, the mind-container is located in the chest region; according to the modern imagery, it is essentially conceived of as being in the head.

It turns out, then, that among the three versions of the metaphor the greatest similarity exists between the two ancient variants, that is to say, the archaic Greek conception is closer to the Indian conception than to the Modern English one. In later Greek texts, however, we find ideas that show a greater affinity to the modern concept. The archaic authors already pave the way for this development: The lyric poets frequently use the image of the depths of the mind (βαθεία φρήν, βαθύφρων, etc.)\(^1\) and the philosopher-poet

---

\(^1\) See Thgn. 1051-1052 (Young); Pi. N. 4.8, 7.1; A. Th. 593; Sol. 33.1 (West); cf. Il. 19.125. Cf. also Snell 1993, 25-26.
Empedocles introduces the metaphor of a ‘road of persuasion’ (πειθο ῦς ἁμαξιτός) leading from the sense organs into the mind (ε ἰς φρένα). For the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition the mind is already by definition the ‘place of forms’, i.e., of cognitive items par excellence. In Plato we also find the image of the mind as a vessel (ἀγγεῖον), into which the objects of learning are inserted (in analogy to the insertion of food into the body), and as an aviary, in which doves, i.e., acquired pieces of knowledge, are kept and can be caught again, i.e., recalled, when needed. Still later—especially Roman—versions of the mind-container metaphor display new traits that are characteristic of the modern conception. Thus, in Augustine’s Confessions the memory, which there is almost synonymous with the mind as a whole, becomes ‘a vast hall’, ‘grand palaces’, and a ‘treasure-store’; it is ‘filled with so many and such powerful impressions of things’ and is internally structured, featuring ‘concealed and indescribable hiding places of one sort or another’; it receives entrances, through which every sensual impression ‘enters it by its own access route’; the things remembered are ‘stored away in remarkable caches’ and later ‘as it were, unearthed from more inaccessible places’; finally, pieces of knowledge learned in former times are stored separately, ‘in some interior place which is not a real physical place at all’. As shown in our analysis, all these traits were clearly absent from the image of the mind in archaic Greek epic, and comparison with the old Indian concept seems to confirm the interpretation that this essential difference is not merely the result of the incompleteness of our evidence; rather, the dichotomy between the two ancient cultures on one hand and a modern one on the other is to be explained by changes in the conception of the mental sphere, which were shaped over many centuries by different factors,

118 DK 31 B 133.
119 τόπος εἰδῶν, see Arist. De an. 429a27-28.
120 Pl. Prt. 314b1-4.
121 Pl. Tht. 197d-e.
122 See Aug. Conf. 10.8-9. We use the edition and translation by Hammond 2014.
123 Conf. 10.8.14 (aula ingens).
124 Conf. 10.8.12 (lata praetoria).
125 Conf. 10.8.14 (thesaurus).
126 Conf. 10.8.14 (plenus tot et tantarum rerum imaginibus).
127 Conf. 10.8.13 (nescio qui secreti atque ineffabiles sinus).
128 Conf. 10.8.13 (suis quaeque foribus intrant ad eam).
129 Conf. 10.9.16 (miris tamquam cellis reponuntur).
130 Conf. 10.8.12 (tamquam de abstrusioribus quibusdam receptaculis eruuntur).
131 Conf. 10.9.16 (quasi remota interiore loco, non loco).
among them the influence of philosophical conceptions of the mind on folk psychology. The particular stages of this development, the most important of which took place in antiquity, still await a detailed examination, and we hope that our inquiry can serve as an inspiration and a stepping stone for further research on this topic.132

**Bibliography**


---

132 We are very grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.


Onians, R.B. (1951). The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate. Cambridge.


