An Aristotelian Account of Religious Music in Strabo, 10.3

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Received August 2022 | Accepted March 2023

Abstract

Strabo, in 10.3.7-23, presents an account of the music performed in initiation rites, according to which such music is used, naturally, to facilitate knowledge of divinity. I argue that, despite appearances, religious music, for Strabo, does not fulfill that function by reflecting the harmonious constitution of the cosmos—a Pythagorean-Platonic (and later, Stoic) idea that Strabo mentions but ultimately rejects. Instead, Strabo’s account is clearly influenced by Aristotelian theory, and it stresses the significance of the emotional effect (i.e., awe or astonishment) generated by religious music, which in turn is useful toward gaining knowledge of the gods, most probably because it motivates audiences to learn about them. Indeed, the affinity between Strabo’s text and Aristotle seems sufficient for Strabo’s 10.3.23, perhaps in addition to parts of 10.3.7 and 10.3.9, to count as Aristotelian ‘fragments.’

Keywords


1 Introduction: Strabo 10.3.7-23

Strabo, in 10.3, introduces his discussion of the Curetes—a people depicted in ancient sources going back to Homer and whom Strabo associates with the region of Aetolia—intended to delineate their geography, name derivation,
and history of warfare (10.3.1-6). He then introduces an additional set of reports concerning the Curetes that are ‘farther away’ (ἀπωτέρω) from those historical facts about them, and are more properly associated with Satyrs, Sileni, Bacchae, and Tityri, according to which the Curetes are ‘some divinities or servants of the gods’ (τινάς δαίμονας ἢ προπόλους θεῶν, 10.3.7).1 These, Strabo reports, are consistently depicted as experiencing inspiration, as Bacchic, and as ‘astounding’ (ἐκπλήττοντας) in their religious rites by means of martial movement with uproar and the sound of cymbals, timpani, and shields, as well as of flute and shouting (10.3.7). The investigation of such features and behaviors, Strabo adds, is ‘theological,’ and is ‘not foreign to the contemplation of a philosopher’ (ibid.).

As becomes clear in 10.3.9, and as we shall see in more detail in the next section, the reason why Strabo says that the investigation of music (specifically, the type of music that he surveys throughout the chapter, and which he associates with mystery rites) overlaps with theology and philosophy is that such music either conveys or facilitates philosophical apprehension of the divine.2 However, there remains a controversy concerning the details of the relation between music and philosophical knowledge of the divine in Strabo. One’s understanding of these details depends in large part on one’s understanding of both the nature of the divine knowledge in question and the source for, or the philosophical theory in the background of, Strabo’s text.

In section 2, I present Strabo’s account in 10.3.9 of the general features of initiation rites involving the performance of religious music, and the natural usefulness that he takes music to have toward attaining knowledge of the divine. In section 3, I argue that the production of astonishment in the audience is a dominant feature of the various instances of religious music surveyed in Strabo’s text, and that a successful reading of Strabo’s text would need to explicate the way in which that feature might contribute to the role that Strabo envisages for religious music, i.e., facilitating divine knowledge. In section 4, I argue that the Pythagorean-Platonic (and later, Stoic) view of celestial music and its relation to music performed by humans, which Strabo alludes to in 10.3.10, is most likely ultimately rejected by him. In sections 5-6, I argue for the

1 Recently, Roller 2018, 601 has argued that “it was clear to Strabo that these had little, if anything, to do with the ethnic group of western Greece, and were similar to other natural spirits who inhabited the early Greek world.” Whether or not Strabo thinks that these mythological depictions are representative of the historical Aetolian Curetes, he evidently thinks that these myths, like myths in general, when analyzed properly, afford us historical knowledge concerning ancient views and opinions, as we shall see (cf. 10.3.23).

2 See Hatzimichali 2017, 9-11 for a discussion of Strabo’s references to philosophy and its relation to geography and practical affairs.
affinity between Strabo’s account of the function of music in religious rites and Aristotelian theory, which makes them mutually explanatory. In section 6, I offer the hypothesis that Strabo’s 10.3.23, and perhaps also parts of 10.3.7 and 10.3.9, should be regarded as Aristotelian ‘fragments.’ Whereas this proposal is admittedly more speculative, I support it by appealing to parallels between these sections in Strabo and relevant parts of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and surviving evidence for his lost *De philosophia.*

2 The Function of Religious Music in 10.3.9

Strabo offers a preliminary sketch of a ‘theological’ account of the kind announced in 10.3.7 as relevantly connected to the historical survey of religious practices conducted in the chapter as a whole. In 10.3.9, he sets out to explain why many names were given to the same thing—i.e., to the religious servants of different deities (e.g., Dionysus, Apollo, Hecate, the Muses, and Demeter), all sharing a common role in initiation rites (cf. 10.3.15)—and to discuss ‘the theology inherent in the history concerning them’ (τὴν ἐνοῦσαν θεολογίαν ἐν τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἱστορίᾳ). Apparently, then, Strabo seeks to extract a unified account of the nature, functioning, and theological underpinning of a specific and prevalent type of religious practice, i.e., initiation rites involving strong psychological effects often associated with musical performance.

Strabo extrapolates the following general features of such a practice from both Greek and non-Greek occurrences of it. Such religious services, he says:

1. are held alongside the recreation (ἀνέσις)4 of festivals.
2. may involve inspiration (ἐνθουσιασμός).
3. may feature musical performance.
4. may be held in secret.

Whereas Strabo does not claim that features 2-4 are invariably associated with the type of rite in question, his point is that they are effective additions to it, whenever they are employed. Accordingly, he goes on to explain why it is that

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3 Cf. Lozat 2018, 249 on the referent of φυσικὸν λόγον in Strabo 10.3.8.
4 Apart from ‘recreation,’ *LSJ* lists as possible translations of ἀνέσις, e.g., ‘relaxing,’ ‘remission,’ ‘abatement,’ ‘indulgence,’ and ‘relaxation.’ ‘Relaxation’ and ‘recreation’ both appear in *LSJ* as possible translations for ἀνάπαυσις, which is indeed appropriate given the affinity between Strabo’s discussion here and Aristotle’s reference to ἀνάπαυσις in his discussion of the uses of music in *Politics* book 8 (see section 6 below). I take the two terms to be closely related in the relevant discussions in Aristotle and Strabo, and I translate ἀνέσις as ‘recreation’ to distinguish it from ἀνάπαυσις, which I render as ‘relaxation’ below.
these four features are naturally useful or, as he puts it, why ‘nature suggests’ (ἡ φύσις ... ὑπαγορεύει) each of them:

1. Recreation leads the mind (τὸν νοῦν) away from human non-leisurely pursuits (ἀσχολημάτων) and toward the divine (τὸ θεῖον).

2. Inspiration (ὁ ἐνθουσιασμός) seems to excite something divine, and to be similar in kind to that of the soothsayer (τῷ μαντικῷ).

3. Music (encompassing dance, rhythm, and melody) brings us into contact with the divine, by means of pleasure and ‘artistic beauty’ (καλλιτεχνίᾳ). This is because human beings imitate the divine when they ‘perform their function well’ (εὐεργετῶσιν), and, more properly, when they are happy (εὐδαιμονῶσι). This involves rejoicing, participating in festivals, philosophizing, and pursuing music.

4. The mystic hiddenness of the sacred services magnifies (σεμνοποιεῖ) the divine, ‘since it imitates its nature in escaping our perception.’

In Strabo’s estimation, thus, all four features, when they are incorporated into religious practice, are useful toward human beings reaching an affinity with ‘the divine.’ The discussion of such matters indeed overlaps with theology and philosophy, as Strabo notes (10.3.7), since it is these domains of inquiry that ought to be tasked with clarifying just what the nature and knowledge of the divine amounts to. Strabo, qua historian-geographer, does not explicitly provide such an account himself. However, in the subsequent sections of 10.3, he compiles data from the often myth-laden depictions of relevant religious practices based on various literary sources.

Given Strabo’s initial expression of interest in the general usefulness of mystery rites for grasping divinity, it is safe to assume that his subsequent survey of relevant sources concerning various versions of such rites is meant to supply evidence for the way in which they might be used thus, as well as of the conceptions of divine knowledge that they were meant to facilitate. This assumption is indeed explicitly supported by Strabo’s methodological remarks in the final section of the chapter (10.3.23), in which he argues that he has been examining mythological depictions of religious practices, despite not being a ‘myth-lover,’ ‘because these matters touch upon the theological kind [of investigation].’ Every account concerning the gods, he adds, examines ‘ancient ... opinions and myths’ (ἀρχαίας ... δόξας καὶ μύθους), since ‘the ancients’ (τῶν παλαιῶν) spoke in riddles in expressing their physical concepts and ‘always added myth to the accounts’ (προστιθέντων αἱ τοῖς λόγοις τὸν μύθον).

In what follows, we shall ask in what ways the features of mystery rites delineated by Strabo are meant to facilitate knowledge of the divine, focusing on the case of religious music. Inevitably, the controversial question would also arise concerning the sources Strabo might be relying on. An additional
and related question is whether Strabo, in discussing this topic, is engaging in the historiography of theology and philosophy, or rather endeavors to arrive at a correct conception of divine knowledge (or at least to point toward the type of inquiry that might arrive at such a conception). To begin with, we may adopt the former, more modest, assumption. But, as I will argue, the two practices in fact coincide, for Strabo, inasmuch as he is committed to the idea that the ancient views embedded in ancient myths are philosophically correct, following Aristotle.5

3 The Survey of Musical Practices in 10.3.7-17

We may do well to begin by delineating the type of religious music Strabo is concerned with, as he describes it throughout the chapter. As we have seen, he initially describes the Curetes’ rites as involving the sound of shouting, cymbals, timpani, and shields (10.3.7). In 10.3.11, Strabo makes the point that young attendees of Dionysus, who were called Curetes, were involved in the performance of rites in honor of the god, portraying the birth of Zeus. The role of the Curetes in the story depicted in the rite, in particular, included the use of tambourines, loud instruments, dancing (presumably involving foot stomping; cf. 10.3.15), and shouting, to surprise or astonish (ἐκπλήξει ν) Cronus while Zeus was being snatched away from him. In 10.3.13-14, he adduces reports by Pindar and Euripides, who speak of the rites in question as including, in addition to tambourines, shouting, and dancing, also cymbals, rattles (χρόταλα), and high-pitched Phrygian auloi. In 10.3.16-17, Strabo goes on to discuss, based on Aeschylus, similar music performed in Thracian rites, which involved the use of pipe-flutes (βόμβυκες), ‘cup’ cymbals (κοτύλαι), a stringed instrument (ψαλμός), frightening (φοβεροί) hidden bull-imitators, and tympani producing a thunderous, awe-inspiring (βαρυταρβής) sound.6

A common feature of these versions of religious music that Strabo reports is the generation of a striking effect, which might involve the depiction of a particular myth (as in the Dionysian rites) or the imitation of formidable

5 Throughout, I speak of the views represented by Strabo’s text as his own. Whereas Strabo extensively relies on, or even directly quotes, other source(s) in the chapter (a point we shall return to shortly), I see no reason to deny that he is himself committed to the ideas he makes use of, and that he indeed uses them for that very reason. On this point, see also Lozat 2018, 239.

6 In 10.3.17, Strabo goes on to introduce foreign names of instruments (probably similar to those described in 10.3.16), namely, the Asian kithara, nablas, sambuké, barbitos, and magadis. See Roller 2018, 607-608 for a discussion of these.
natural phenomena, such as thunders or bulls (as in the Thracian rites). How is such a practice meant to ‘bring us into contact with the divine’ (10.3.9), for Strabo? His following remarks on music might provide us with a hint. After having stated, in 10.3.9, that music is capable of bringing us closer to divinity, and accordingly linking it to happiness, philosophy, and education, rather than mere entertainment (e.g., at symposia), Strabo says, at the beginning of 10.3.10:

It is also because of this that Plato, and yet earlier the Pythagoreans, called philosophy music, and they say that the cosmos has been constructed in accordance with harmony, supposing that every musical form is a work of gods. And thus (ὁὕτω) the Muses are goddesses and Apollo is the guide of Muses, and all poetry is laudatory (ὑμνητική). And in a similar way (ὡσαύτως) they assign the conditioning of characters to music, on the supposition that (ὡς) all that is entirely corrective of intellect is near to the gods. (Translation mine.)

On the Platonic-Pythagorean view that Strabo presents in this passage, music contributes to knowledge of the divine because the cosmos exhibits divine harmony, which music in general reflects, so that engaging with music generally conveys the divine ordering of the world. And, for the same reason—i.e., because of the affinity of music with the divine world-order—music is also taken to be ‘corrective of the intellect’ and to have a positive habituating effect.

Strabo’s summary of this view and its rootedness in Pythagoreanism is indeed faithful to Plato’s dialogues. In Cratylus 405c-d, Socrates relates the circular motion of the heavens to musical harmony, deferring to ‘those who are wise in music and in astronomy,’ and refers to Apollo as the director of all such harmonious occurrences, both human and divine. And, in Republic 7, Socrates more specifically attributes to the Pythagoreans the idea of an affinity between astronomy and harmonics, on the basis of which he recommends both as necessary components of the philosopher’s ideal education (530d-531d), after having already argued previously for the potential of music education to make one good and discerning (2.401d-402a).7 Similarly, in the Laws, the Athenian Stranger speaks of the regularity of heavenly motion in the context of discussing the importance of including astronomy in the city’s curriculum (7.822a-c), and he later claims that for people to become ‘firmly god-fearing’ (βεβαίως

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7 For a detailed account of Plato’s views on harmonics and its relation to the views on psychic/political harmony and moral education expounded in the earlier books of the Republic, as well as to the view of heavenly harmony discussed in book 10 and the Timaeus, see Burnyeat 2000, 53-56.
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They must use that science toward ‘ethical practices and customs’ (τὰ τῶν ἡσύχων ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμιμα), specifically taking into view the connection between that science and music (τὰ ... κατὰ τὴν Μοῦσαν) (12.967d-e). In Laws 2, furthermore, Plato emphasizes the benefits for moral education of music having ‘correctness by nature’ (τὴν ὀρθότητα φύσει) (646a-657c; cf. 7.795d-e, 812c), echoing the terminology in Strabo’s summary quoted above from 10.3.10. The Athenian Stranger also states that legislating the use of such music is in the province ‘of a god or someone divine’ (657a), and goes on to stress the importance of associating such music with religious worship (664e-665b; 668a-674d; cf. 7.799a-b).

On one possible reading of 10.3.10, Strabo (or the author he is quoting from) endorses the Platonic-Pythagorean view that he presents, and brings it up as the basis for his own considered view concerning the significance of music in religious rituals for contacting the divine. But, as I shall argue in the next section, this reading, though favored by some, is ultimately mistaken, primarily because it fails to explain the specific details and aspects of religious music that Strabo’s text focuses on.

4 Imitating Celestial Music?

There is, in fact, evidence for the idea that Greek mystery rites featured music intended to convey and honor the harmonious constitution of the cosmos. As Hardie 2000, 31-33 shows, sacred music was similarly seen as revelatory of cosmic truth, and as corresponding to celestial harmony, in the case of the Samothracian rites symbolizing the marriage between Cadmus and Harmonia—a deity associated “with musical harmony and the harmony of the cosmos”—as is evidenced by Pindar’s depiction of Cadmus as listening to Apollo’s ‘correct music’ (fr. 32). Hardie 2000, 34-35 further argues that this idea of a correspondence between celestial and terrestrial music is rooted “in the Pythagorean idea of terrestrial music as a μίμημα of heavenly music,” and is also found in Plato (cf. Timaeus 47c-d). Elsewhere, Hardie 2004, 26-28 lists Strabo’s reference “to the harmonious construction of the universe in his exposition of the role of orgiastic music” in 10.3.10 (quoted in the previous section) as evidence for the claim that “mousikê too featured in the exegesis of the Greek mysteries,” alongside Pindar (fr. 29-35c), the references in the Derveni papyrus to musical harmony associated with offerings to the dead, and later evidence

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8 I am thankful to an anonymous referee for a helpful comment on these texts.
from Apuleius, Philo, Clement, and pseudo-Lucian’s *Astrologia* 10, which states that “the celestial zones were assimilated to the seven strings of Orpheus’ lyre.”

Furthermore, as Scade 2017, 207-209 has recently argued, there is good evidence (primarily, in Cicero’s *N.D.*) to the effect that the Stoics, influenced by Plato’s *Timaeus*, are similarly committed to the “idea that the heavenly motions and musical structure both share a ratio-based mathematically analysable structure,” and quite possibly even to the idea “that musical patterns are superior to words in representing the truth about the contemplation of the divine.”9 And, as Scade 2017, 200 also notes, Quintilian again “locates the Stoics on a continuum with Plato and the Pythagoreans in treating music as a worthwhile pursuit for the philosopher (1.10.12-15; cf. Stob. 2.67.5-12 = LS 26H).” Since Strabo explicitly aligns himself with the Stoics elsewhere,10 the presence of such ideas (along with the genealogy envisaged for them) within Stoicism may well be seen as grounds for thinking of Strabo as sharing similar philosophical commitments (or, at least, as borrowing from a philosopher with such commitments in the relevant discussions in 10.3; see below).11

Nevertheless, it should be noted that Strabo’s comment on Plato and the Pythagoreans in 10.3.10 merely reports the opinion of these philosophers, without endorsing it. It is true that Strabo argues that it is ‘because of this’ (διὰ τοῦτο)—namely, due to the affinity between music, philosophy, and education, which Strabo has stated as fact in 10.3.9—that Plato and the Pythagoreans assimilate music to philosophy. But that assimilation itself already advances one step further than Strabo himself is willing to go. For the conclusion of the discussion in 10.3.9 is that the nature of the practice of instruction has music as its starting point (τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνθένδε ἔχουσα).12 And this implies that music is to be distinguished from philosophy and understood specifically as a preliminary practice preparing one for philosophical activity. The next points that Strabo’s text attributes to Plato and the Pythagoreans, concerning cosmic harmony and the divinity of all musical compositions (in addition, possibly, to the mythological significance of the Muses and Apollo, the laudatory nature of all poetry, and the potential that music has toward proper character development based

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9 Cf. Scade 2017, 216, where he concludes that it is a Stoic view that “musical language is particularly suitable for describing both the human end and the orderly structure of the cosmos.” Cf. Cicero, *N.D.* 2.13:15; 19; 191; 153; 155:3-27.
10 See Hatzimichali 2017, 13; cf. Strabo 3.3.8; 14.4.27.
11 But see Hatzimichali 2017, 14-15 on Strabo’s substantial deviation from Stoicism, including his criticism in 2.3.7 of Posidonius on the issue of divine providence.
12 Taking ἐνθένδε (c. 468, l. 3) to be picking up τὸ πράγμα (c. 468, l. 2), which in turn picks up τῶν μουσικῶν ... τὰς τέχνας (c. 467, ll. 47-48).
on some affinity between the intellect and the gods), while related to the Pythagorean notion of celestial music, are not even loosely connected to the views presented as true in 10.3.9, but are rather simply added as further things that ‘they say’ (φασί), or that ‘they assign’ (προσνέμουσιν).

Nor are the specific cases of religious music that Strabo includes in his survey in 10.3, or the texts that he quotes, suggestive of the use of such music for the purpose of mimicking cosmic order or celestial harmony. The production of striking sounds in a dramatic depiction of an astonished Cronus, or the imitation of awesome bulls or thunders (10.3.13-17), can hardly be construed as mimicking heavenly music in any straightforward sense. At a stretch, it could be argued that, since at least some of the sounds imitated in these rites are of natural phenomena (thunder; bulls), they may be thought of as indirectly representing the ordered natural world of which they are parts. But such an explanation, even if tenable, does not account for all the cases surveyed in Strabo’s text. Indeed, Strabo arguably goes out of his way not to present evidence that can be taken to support the inclination in mystery rites to perform music representing the heavens (for which, as we have seen, there is indeed evidence), as his quote in 10.3.13 from Pindar, fr. 7οb (ll. 8-10) merely mentions the use of cymbals, rattles, and torches in rites in honor of the ‘great mother’ (Ματέρι ... μεγάλα).

Strabo’s discussions in 10.3.9-18, and occasionally in 10.3.23 as well, are often attributed to Posidonius. As we have just seen, Strabo’s general allegiance to the Stoics, who uphold a Pythagorean-Platonic view on celestial music and

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13 Reinhardt 1928, 50 argues that, in this part of Strabo’s text, music is “nicht mehr im äusseren Kosmos und seinen harmonischen Verhältnissen, sondern verinnerlicht, als Macht der Seele selbst, durch die sie sich mit Gott verbunden weiss.” But there is no indication in Strabo’s text that his report deviates from the Pythagorean-Platonic doctrine, which indeed seems to be alluded to by the reference in Strabo’s text to the harmonious constitution of the world.

14 It is worth noting that the sentence in fact does not specify a subject for προσνέμουσιν so that, whereas it is natural to take the verb to pick up Plato and the Pythagoreans, one need not do so, and could rather opt to read it as a general statement concerning the views of philosophers broadly speaking, or even of people more generally.

15 Pindar in fact proceeds to mention the marriage of Cadmus and Harmonia in ll. 25-28, but these lines are left out of Strabo’s quotation. Hardie 2004 does mention evidence for the use of torches in dancing to symbolize astral motions in mystery rites. But no such use is specifically indicated by the lines that Strabo quotes from Pindar and, even if it were, that would have no direct bearing on the music performed at the rites depicted there.

its relation to philosophy, should not be read into his remarks on music and philosophy in the chapter, and so should not serve as the basis for such an attribution.\textsuperscript{17} Reinhardt 1953, 814 suggests as reasons for such an attribution, in addition, the alleged presence in Strabo's text of the ideas that music deteriorates over time,\textsuperscript{18} and that both music and philosophy are directed toward happiness.\textsuperscript{19} But whereas Strabo speaks of music performed for mere entertainment (e.g., at symposia) as a 'decline toward the worse' (ἐκπτωσις πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον, 10.3.9), there is no indication that such a decline is novel (i.e., preceded by a time during which music invariably performed its true function effectively), or that such a misuse of music supplants the correct usage of it (i.e., that later in history only corrupt music is to be found). Indeed, Strabo's point is precisely that one ought not to discard music based on such occurrences (μὴ … διαβαλλέσθω τὸ πρᾶγμα), which implies that the appropriate usage of music (at least potentially) persists. The idea concerning happiness as being aimed at by both music and philosophy, finally, is anything but distinctly or originally Posidonian, or even Stoic. Most importantly for our purposes, that idea goes back to Aristotle, who, as I will argue in the next section, is the most obvious source for the philosophical views presented in Strabo's texts.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} Halliwell 2002, 273-275 distances Strabo's idea concerning the "symbolic" or "allegorical" mimesis of the imperceptibility of the divine at 10.3.9 from the Pythagorean idea of "metaphysical" imitation alluded to at 10.3.10, but still sees Strabo's view as "a partial continuation of Pythagorean-cum-Platonic traditions of metaphysical mimesis." Schwartz 1894, 2874, while reading "Platons Einfluss" into the discussion in 10.3.10, which he attributes to Apollodorus, argues that it is nevertheless "weit absteht von den ps.-platonischen pythagorisierenden Richtungen, die in Alexandrien ... sich rührten ..." Jeanmaire 1939, 595, while attributing 10.3.10 to a Peripatetic source, takes it to be reflecting the view, shared by Stoicism, that the order of music "est l'expression même de l'ordre dans le monde" and is "un moyen d'arriver à cette communion avec le divin."

\textsuperscript{18} Cf. Wilamowitz 1932, 415-416. Boyiacé 1937, 206-207 traces the idea found in Strabo of the deterioration of music back to Aristotle and Aristoxenus.

\textsuperscript{19} For Reinhardt 1928, 47, in addition, the point in 10.3.9 that mystery rites "magnify the divine," by imitating its imperceptible nature, goes back to Posidonius's Stoic view of god as breath. However, not only are Aristotle's unmoved movers imperceptible as well, but on the traditional conception, too, 'we do not see' the gods (Plu. Per. 8.9.3-4). Strabo's statement that the hiddenness factor in mystery rites 'makes [the divine] august' (σεμνο-ποιεῖ) hearkens to the idea, discussed in detail below, of the educational usefulness of generating astonishment concerning the divine in religious art.

\textsuperscript{20} Incidentally, as Nock 1965, 3.4 notes, Strabo himself describes Posidonius as deviating from the Stoic mainstream toward Aristotelianism (at 2.3.8; cf. Hatzimichali 2017, 17-18), and his view is supported by evidence concerning Posidonius's interests and methodology. Conceivably, then, Strabo could have used Aristotelian materials from Posidonius in writing 10.3.9-23.
5 Religious Music and Philosophical Wonder?

Following the preceding discussion, Strabo does not accept the Platonic-Pythagorean view that he mentions in 10.3.10 concerning cosmic music and the corresponding role of music performance in conveying philosophical truths concerning the way in which the world is constructed and functions directly. Rather, in ch. 10.3 he focuses on the ancient practice of producing a striking effect through music during mystery rites, and claims that this practice is beneficial toward acquiring philosophical knowledge of divinity in some way. Strabo’s account of the philosophical relevance of music is incomplete and often inexplicit. Indeed, this seems a conscious choice, reflecting Strabo’s reluctance, qua non-philosopher, to present a full theoretical account of this matter himself. Immediately upon introducing the subject of music in mystery rites in 10.3.7, he somewhat apologetically states that, given the overlap between the historical investigation of such issues and theological and philosophical theorizing, he shall provide a ‘naturalistic account’ (φυσικὸν λόγον) of the relevant facts that is ‘proper to history’ (οἰκεῖον τῇ ἱστορίᾳ) (10.3.7-8). The concluding section of the chapter (10.3.23), however, does provide us with significant clues, which, I shall argue, point toward an Aristotelian understanding of the matter.

In 10.3.23, Strabo reiterates the overlap, originally mentioned in 10.3.7, between the historical discussion of religious practices carried out in the chapter and theological inquiry, this time referring to it as the reason why ‘we have taken up an elaborate discussion concerning these issues (περὶ τῶν) although we are the least myth-loving (καίπερ ἥκιστα φιλομυθοῦντες).’ The reason why the link between history and theology necessitates an elaborate discussion of myths, Strabo continues, is as follows:

Every account concerning the gods inspects ancient opinions (ἀρχαίας ... δόξας) and myths, since the ancients (τῶν παλαιῶν) expressed in riddles those natural conceptions that they had concerning these matters, and always added (προστιθέντων) myth to their accounts. It is not easy, then, to solve all the riddles with accuracy, but if the bulk of things spoken of mythically were placed out in the open, those agreeing with one another and those opposing each other, one would have been able to infer the truth from them based on comparison more easily. (Translation mine.)

21 The Loeb translation (Jones 1961, ad loc.) has ‘these people’ for τούτων, which seems to me rather to correspond to τὰ πράγματα in the subsequent clause.
According to what Strabo says here, ‘ancient’ people actively add myths to their theoretical accounts, which is why engaging with the mythological features surrounding mystery rites can yield ‘the truth.’ In context, the truth to be arrived at in this way is specifically philosophical truth concerning the gods, rather than merely anthropological data concerning the practices and beliefs of the ancient people in question. This is also supported by the similar point made in Aristotle’s Metaph. A.8, 1074a38-b14, which, as we shall presently see, is clearly echoed in Strabo’s text.

The parallels between this part of the discussion and Aristotle are instructive. To begin with, Strabo contrasts the inquiry he promotes with the questionable tendency of certain people to love myths. Whereas the relevant verb (φιλομυθεῖν) and its cognates are rare in Strabo, they are famously attested in Aristotle, in a similar context. For Aristotle, the ‘lover of myth’ (φιλόμυθος) is motivated by ‘wonders’ similarly to a philosopher, whom the lover of myth nevertheless fails to match up with (Metaph. A.2, 982b12-19). Aristotle also describes lovers of myths, pejoratively, as ‘babblers’ (EN 3.10, 1117b28-1118a1). The rest of Strabo’s remark follows another discussion in Aristotle’s Metaphysics closely, paralleling it both in terminology and in content:

**Strabo 10.3.23**
Every account concerning the gods inspects ancient opinions (ἀρχαίας ... δόξας) and myths, since the ancients (τῶν παλαιῶν) expressed in riddles those natural conceptions that they had concerning these matters,

**Aristotle, Metaph. A.8, 1074a38-b13**
It has been transmitted to us through the ancients and very old ones (τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπαλαιῶν), and has been passed on to future generations, in the form of a myth, that these [i.e., the unmoved movers] are gods, and that the divine encloses the whole of nature.

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22 See Roller 2018, 610: “Strabo, as a Stoic, (...) realized that properly analyzed, myths could contribute to an understanding of early peoples.” Lozat 2018, 265 takes Strabo’s compilation of myths to be primarily intended to convey the development and progress of (especially Greek) civilization. But note that Reinhardt 1928, 41-42 n. 1, who attributes Strabo’s discussion to Posidonius, nevertheless recognizes that the point about myths being added to an already established opinion runs contrary to “Stoic orthodoxy.”

23 See Hatzimichali 2017, 17 on Strabo’s Peripatetic education.

24 Incidentally, these words are to my knowledge also unattested in Posidonius, despite the tendency in the scholarship to view him as a primary source for Strabo’s discussion in 10.3. On φιλόμυθος as going back to Aristotle, see also Lozat 2018, 219.

and always added myth (προστιθέντων...τὸν μύθον) to their accounts.
The rest has been added, mythically (μυθικῶς...προσήκται)...

It is not easy, then, to solve all the riddles with accuracy, but if the bulk of things spoken of mythically were placed out in the open, those agreeing with one another and those opposing each other, one would have been able to infer the truth from them based on comparison more easily.

If one were to take the first point by itself, separately from those [things added], namely, that they think the first substances\(^\text{26}\) are gods, they would be thought to have spoken divinely (…) These opinions (τὰς δόξας) of theirs have been preserved like remains up until now.

Strabo’s text echoes, in the same order and using almost identical terminology, Aristotle’s statements that certain ‘ancient people’ (οἱ παλαιοί; οἱ παμπαλαιοί) tend to ‘add’ (προστιθέναι; προσάγεσθαι) certain myths to their true ‘opinions’ (δόξαι) concerning theoretical matters.

Helpfully, Strabo’s text proceeds to apply that Aristotelian view to the case of the myths discussed earlier in 10.3. The mythical depiction of people occupied with the gods (and of gods themselves) as (i) mountain-dwellers (and hence as searching for metals, hunting, and seeking other things useful for life) and as (ii) experiencing inspiration (and hence as juggling, practicing witchcraft, and exhibiting ‘love of craft’), he says, probably occurs for the same reason that gods are believed to be (i) heaven-dwellers and (ii) foreknowing of both foretokens and other things. The depiction of gods and godlike people as mountain-dwellers is similar to the depiction of gods as sky-dwellers, since both symbolize the supreme value of lofty metaphysical speculation. And the depiction of gods and godlike people as experiencing inspiration, via religious rituals and art, is similar to the depiction of gods as engaged in divination, since both exemplify activities conducive to, and preparatory toward, philosophical contemplation. It is worth remembering in this respect that, in 10.3.9, Strabo has already listed both inspiration and music as key features of religious service, alluding to the status of inspiration, including that involved in divination, as prompting ‘something divine,’ similarly to the way in which music puts us in contact with divinity (see section 2).\(^\text{27}\) Hence, one would expect Strabo’s

\(^{26}\) The ‘first substances’ referred to here are the unmoved movers of the heavenly bodies and spheres, which for Aristotle consist of pure instances of intellectual activity functioning as the basic causes of all of reality, and which he counts as gods (cf. Metaph. Λ.7, 1072b18-30). See also Segev 2017, 18, 59; Segev 2018, 296, 305-306; Palmer 2000, 198-200.

\(^{27}\) Cf. Lozat 2018, 271.
discussions of the music performed in religious rites, introduced between 10.3.9-23, to offer, or at least presuppose and hint at, an account of the role of both music and inspiration in philosophical activity.

Now, as we have seen, Strabo in 10.3.10 distances himself from the Pythagorean-Platonic (and, later, Stoic) view according to which music might afford divine apprehension by reflecting some cosmic or celestial harmony. Since (1) the specific cases of music performance discussed in 10.3 are in any case ill-suited for such a purpose (cf. section 4 above), and since (2) Strabo’s concluding remarks in 10.3.23 mirror Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and since (3) Aristotle himself opposes the Pythagorean idea of music being produced by the heavens (cf. Cael. 2.9), a more promising approach would be to look for clues in Aristotle’s own views on related subjects. In De philosophia (fr. 15 Ross = Synesius, Dion 10.48a; Michael Psellus, Schol. ad. Joh. Climacum 6.171), Aristotle is reported to have claimed that those initiated into the mysteries are not to be taught, but rather are to be ‘affected,’ ‘conditioned’ (διατεθῆναι), or ‘formed.’

This view fits into Aristotle’s more general view of traditional religion, according to which religious practices and conceptions, though naturally useful, are not intended to convey true information by way of teaching.

Strabo’s examples of religious music throughout the chapter support that Aristotelian view. They repeatedly indicate a specific type of effect to be generated by music in such settings, namely, ‘astonishment’ (ἐκπληξίας) (10.3.7; 10.3.11), ‘inspiration’ (ἐνθουσιασμός) (10.3.7; 10.3.9; 10.3.21; 10.3.23), and (indirectly, via Aeschylus) the use of devices inspiring ‘madness’ (μανία), ‘awe’ (τάρσεως), and ‘fear’ (φόβος) (10.3.16). At first sight, it may seem as if Strabo could not link such an effect to the potential of music to facilitate divine apprehension, especially since, elsewhere, he regards ‘fear of the divine’ (δεισιδαιμονία) as appropriate for ‘the multitude,’ who are incapable of being led toward piety ‘by reason’ (1.2.8). But, first, for Strabo, δεισιδαιμονία (which, importantly, is not used to describe the effects of music in 10.3) means, more specifically, defiantly excessive fear of the gods, and so relegating it to non-intellectual religiosity is compatible with thinking that appropriate fear of the divine (including, potentially, periodic bouts of religious inspiration or ecstasy) is useful, or even necessary,

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28 See Jeanmaire 1939, 608 on the relevance of these texts to the attribution of parts of 10.3 to a Peripatetic source (see also n. 38 below).
29 For a similar argument see Segev 2017, 66-67, citing De philosophia fr. 15 Ross above. Ford 2016, 28-29, appealing to this fragment, links Aristotle’s reference to the sacred tunes of Olympus in Politics 8.7 with “the rites of the Great Mother by her attendants, the Corybants,” which Ford in turn compares to Dionysian mystery rites, involving music and “terrifying” elements, without, however, mentioning the connection to Strabo.
30 See Koets 1929, 63-65.
toward philosophical knowledge of the divine.\textsuperscript{31} Second, the proper emotional effect that Strabo expects religious music to elicit may be altogether distinct from fear. It is, specifically, the educationally beneficial wonder prompted by those features of artistic depictions of myths that are either fearful or pleasurable (1.2.8).\textsuperscript{32} Strabo’s language and ideas here are, again, closely reminiscent of Aristotle. Indeed, in several places Aristotle himself links ‘astonishment’ (ἐκπλήξις) to ‘wonder’ (θαυμασία), in line with Strabo’s reliance on Aristotle in 10.3.7 and 10.3.11.\textsuperscript{33} And Aristotle’s discussion of the ‘inspiration’ generated by religious music in \textit{Politics} 8 describes that experience as a strong emotional response affording catharsis, which in turn is linked directly to wonder and astonishment in the \textit{Poetics}.\textsuperscript{34}

In all likelihood, then, Strabo takes the role of religious music in philosophical activity to consist in the production in the listener of an emotional effect, specifically astonishment or awe, in the context of a scene involving the gods, so as to spark their interest in the subject of divinity which, upon adequate subsequent education and inquiry, would lead to philosophical inquiry concerning it; and Strabo, in formulating this view, and especially in summarizing his methodology leading up to it in 10.3.23, directly follows in Aristotle’s

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[31] See Segev forthcoming (a); cf. the description of \textit{deisidaimonia} in Theophrastus, \textit{Characters} 16, and the account of it as a vice deviating from proper piety in the Peripatetic view in Stob. 2.7.25.
\item[32] See Segev 2017, 61-66; Segev 2018, 308-312. For the link between 1.2.8 and 10.3 as establishing the pleasure produced by music as beneficial for education, see Lozat 2018, 261, 264. See also Lozat 2018, 57 on Strabo’s allusion to Aristotle’s \textit{Poetics} on the didactic usefulness of poetry in 1.2.3.
\item[33] Moles 1979, 89, notes that ἔκπληξις, which “can be used for the onset of any strong emotion,” is linked to τὸ δρωματόν, e.g., in Top. 126b14 and Po. 146a14-b25. A similar association between the two terms can be found in Strabo 14.2.5. Note, in addition, the connection of both concepts to ἐνθουσιασμός in Hsch. ε 3052-3053. Ferrari 2019, 146 argues that Aristotle in \textit{Pol.} 8 “secularize[s]” the “cathartic experience of the sacred songs,” and that, similarly, his account of catharsis in the \textit{Poetics} is devoid of any “component of the numinous or of religious awe,” even if “the gods bulk large” in Greek tragedy. But since Ferrari 2019, 145 arrives at this view by taking Aristotle to be using the “religious ecstasy” experienced by “religious zealots” as “a good, because definitive, example of emotional absorption in music,” albeit one that is “at the far extreme of the emotional spectrum,” such a case would have to at least be included in Aristotle’s conception of cathartic music. Indeed, it is not obvious why even more attenuated emotional responses to music associated with divinity (or to the role of gods in drama) should be labeled ‘secular.’
\item[34] See Ferrari 2019, 164. Ferrari 2019, 137, \textit{et passim} also instructively argues that, for Aristotle, religious cathartic music (and poetry) produces an emotional effect, rather than treating a preexisting condition. For further discussion of Aristotle’s view on music in \textit{Pol.} 8 and its relation to Strabo, see section 6 below.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The fact that Strabo, throughout the chapter, refrains from explaining the content of the philosophical knowledge to be had at the end of such a process is understandable, and indeed to be expected. He reserves it for specialized discussion—the ‘theological’ ‘way of inquiry,’ which is ‘not foreign to the contemplations of the philosopher’ (τῆς τοῦ φιλοσόφου θεωρίας) (10.3.7), or ‘the theological type [of inquiry]’ (10.3.23)—an inquiry into divine objects, in other words, such as the one carried out in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

6 10.3.7, 9, and 23, as an Aristotelian ‘Fragment’?

Strabo’s reliance on Aristotle in 10.3 has been endorsed by scholars, to varying degrees, as the main alternative to proposing Posidonius as its main source. Some find an Aristotelian influence on the chapter as a whole, while others have opted to read only part of the chapter (e.g. 10.3.7-12) as going back to a Peripatetic ancestor.

One might also add, as a further point of contact, the mutual support, or at the very least compatibility, between Strabo’s account of music in 10.3 and Aristotle’s account of music in Politics 8. According to Pol. 8.5, music ought to be used, ideally, not merely for relaxation (ἀνάπαυσις), but also for the...

35 See Segev 2017 for an account arguing that this is Aristotle’s view of religion more broadly. See also Lozat 2018, 219-220.
36 See also Lozat 2018, 244 on this statement as being prefigured already in Str. 1.1.1.
37 See Boynacé 1937, 217-225, endorsed by Nock 1965, 8. Schwartz 1894, 2874, insisting that Strabo’s discussion in 10.3.7 and following (presumably, including 10.3.23) “ist nicht stoische Systematik,” takes it to be based instead on Apollodorus’s theological discussion and categorization of religious rituals and music, which is in turn based on Aristotle’s methodology, for him.
38 For Jeanmaire 1939, Strabo’s discussion of religion and music in 10.3 ultimately goes back to one Peripatetic philosophical text (for 10.3.7-12), as well as one historical text, possibly by Demetrius of Scepsis (for 10.3.12-22), with the concluding section (10.3.23) being an afterthought (presumably by Strabo himself). In arguing for a Peripatetic source for 10.3.7-12, Jeanmaire 1939, 607-612 appeals to the evidence concerning Aristotelian treatises and discussions dedicated to relevant topics (e.g. On Prayer, and Synesius, Dion 10.48a = De Philosophia fr. 15a Ross), the omission in 10.3.7-12 of cults that would not have been known to a 4th century writer, the presence in 10.3.9 of discussions of the value of the contemplative life and of happiness as a divine gift and as related to leisure and the divine, echoing Aristotle’s views (cf. EN 1199b; 1154b; 1177a-b; Metaph. 1072b), the Theophrastean disparaging attitude in Strabo’s text toward divine inspiration in initiation rites, as well as Schwartz’s point concerning the method of division employed in Strabo’s discussion of ritual (see n. 37 above). See also Boynacé 1937, 219-223, who links Strabo’s text both to Philo, the Protrepticus, EN 10.8, 1178b-32, and Metaph. Λ.7, 1072b3-26, on the relation between human happiness and divinity, and to the Politics, on the significance of leisure.
development of character virtue, for practical wisdom, and for leisurely activity (most plausibly, philosophical contemplation) (1339a11-26; b11-15).\textsuperscript{39} There is debate over which of these uses applies to the case of religious music, which Aristotle goes on to describe as influencing one’s emotions, specifically by engendering “inspiration” (ἐνθουσιασμός) (1340a5-12; cf. 8.7, 1341b32-1342a7).\textsuperscript{40} On one plausible reading, Aristotle thinks that such music, though it is a form of relaxation and does not itself constitute leisurely philosophical activity, nevertheless ought to be used primarily as preparation for philosophy.\textsuperscript{41} As we have seen, Strabo, too, associates religious music with ‘inspiration,’ which generates wonder or astonishment, thereby facilitating the acquisition of divine knowledge. And he thinks that such an effect is enabled by the recreation that such musical performances constitute.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39} For a defense of viewing philosophical contemplation as the primary goal of Aristotle’s ideal polis, see Depew 1991; Segev 2017, 172-173. For a recent rebuttal, see Destréé 2018, 201-202.

\textsuperscript{40} Destréé 2018 and Ferrari 2019 point out Aristotle’s sharp distinction between leisure and relaxation throughout Politics 8 concluding, respectively, that Aristotle thinks of cathartic music as either unconnected to leisure or as itself a type of leisurely experience rather than mere relaxation.

\textsuperscript{41} Ferrari 2019, 148 argues that Aristotle’s association between music and correct judgement (at 8.5, 1339b1-4) picks up a prerequisite for music appreciation, rather than a contribution by music to continued moral improvement. But Aristotle reemphasizes the importance of the ability ‘to judge correctly and to rejoice at excellent characters and beautiful activities’ in the context of discussing cathartic music specifically (1340a17-18; cf. Ferrari 2019, 147), which suggests that such music is directed toward intellectual pursuits. For Depew 1991, 367-368, Aristotle is unclear about which types of music are to qualify as leisurely and as “inducing reflection and learning,” but thinks that doing so surpasses the other uses of music, including catharsis. Interestingly, Depew 1991, 368-370 goes on to link that superior cognitive function of some forms of music to Aristotle’s notion of catharsis in the Poetics, which he helpfully links to the production of wonder concerning superhuman beings, but which he thinks is fundamentally different from musical catharsis as discussed in the Politics. A simpler solution would be to take both types of catharsis to converge, and to assign to them the role that Depew reserves for the poetic type. Ford 2016 offers a unified account of catharsis in Aristotle, but understands it as an anxiety-reducing pleasure, rather than as geared toward intellectual activity.

This idea would also seem to be indicated by Strabo’s language in 10.3.9, where he says that ἥ ἄνεσις … τρέπει πρὸς τὸ θεῖον (rather than, say, ἐστι θεῖο τι). Boynacé 1937, 223-225 sees an apparent tension between Strabo’s talk of festivals as featuring imitation of divinity and Aristotle’s view of contemplation as conducted internally, which he alleviates by arguing that for Aristotle the inspiration in religious festivals is an approximation to philosophy for the multitude (citing Pol. 8.7, 1342a and Metaph. Λ.8, 1084b4-5), and even philosophers, qua human beings, require relaxation, afforded by music and festivals, in order to contemplate (citing Pol. 8.3, 1337b). But this proposal reduces the role of music to one of many mere prerequisites for philosophical activity (e.g., food and drink), and does not account for the point that, as Strabo claims, it directly affords us contact with the divine.
Indeed, drawing the link between the benefits of music and astonishment not only brings Strabo’s account closer to Aristotle’s theory, but also potentially distances his account from the Stoic view upon which it is often purported to be based. De Lacy 1948, 249, it is true, does argue that, for the Stoics, emotions such as ἔκπληξις “are in themselves evil,” but “may be justified” on the grounds that “they provide a means for the betterment of the auditor.” Indeed, De Lacy 1948, 270 unpacks that idea by arguing that ἔκπληξις serves as a means of motivating students to learn, following the model provided by Strabo in 1.2.8. However, the evidence for attributing that model to Stoic philosophers is scarce. More recently, Bartsch 2007 has plausibly argued, based especially on Seneca, that the Stoics regard the “stunned wonder” (ἔκπληξις) engendered by art or literature as useful only insofar as it might contribute to numbing that very emotional response in the audience later in life. It is difficult to see how this could function as the background theory for Strabo’s view that awe-inspiring religious music brings us into contact with the divine. At most, one could argue that the Stoic sage, in his unperturbed state, is envisaged as being better able to contemplate divinity.

But Strabo’s point is that emotional reactions of this type are meant, not to eradicate emotion, but to motivate one to learn. His view on this matter, then, seems more Aristotelian than Stoic. It is true that Aristotle does not discuss

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43 De Lacy 1948 n. 181 cites Plutarch, De audiendis poetis 16a, 17b, 20f, De audiendo 41c, and Philodemus, De bono rege col. 19-20. Recently, Van Wassenhove 2021 has argued that Seneca, in Letters 94 and 108, develops an account of the usefulness of a kind of excitement—which he indeed compares to religious, Corybantic enthusiasm—as an aid to philosophical education, and that he furthermore attempts to square such an attempt with his Stoic commitments. But, as Van Wassenhove 2021, 621 himself recognizes, the relevant reference in Letter 94 to adfectus is “ambiguous,” and, to be made consistent with Stoic theory, must be distanced from the ordinary sense of an emotion, and associated rather with “a fundamentally rational desire for the good that emanates from the ‘seeds of virtue’ within us.” Kamtekar 1998 argues that, for Epictetus, shame (ἀἰδώς) plays an educational role, specifically in moral improvement, but recognizes that that view is at least in tension with the standard Stoic conception of ἡδυς as “a good emotion.” Kamtekar 1998, 141, 157 cites as supplemental evidence the alleged educational usefulness in Epictetus of anxiety (ἀγωνία) (4.10) and shame (παράχυνη) (2.8), but these occurrences seem inconclusive, and quite possibly rhetorical. I am thankful to David Kaufman for these references and a helpful discussion on these issues.

44 See also Boynacé 1937, 190 on Aristotle’s main objective as regulating, rather than minimizing, inspiration. Boynacé 1937, 197 also links this idea to Aristotle’s view of musical and poetic catharsis in the Politics and Poetics. Cf. also Boynacé 1937, 216 on the relation between the contribution of music toward relaxation and its cathartic function in
the usefulness of music specifically in the religious context (though he does bring up ‘the holy melodies’ as a representative example, at Pol. 8.7, 1342a8-9). However, Strabo’s discussion of music builds on Aristotle’s ideas concerning the critical role of wonder in learning, and on his views of the general usefulness of music. If Strabo’s account indeed turns out to be counter-Stoic, then that too would support attributing to it a Peripatetic influence (though, of course, even if Strabo’s view is shared by the Stoics, both could still go back to a Peripatetic ancestor).

Based on the foregoing, Strabo’s discussion in 10.3.23, which anchors the methodology and goal of 10.3 as a whole, emerges as distinctly Aristotelian, bearing an especially close affinity to Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ.8, 1074a38-b14. Conservatively, one might also add at least 10.3.7 and 10.3.9 as drawing on Aristotle as well, as both sections directly refer, in a way and terms closely paralleling 10.3.23, to the overlap between the discussion carried out in the chapter and philosophical inquiry.45 Indeed, I submit that it is reasonable to think that Strabo’s account in these sections not only draws on Aristotle, but also supplies evidence for Aristotle’s views in his lost work. Although this latter contention is admittedly more speculative, there are reasons to endorse it. Several features in Strabo’s text do not appear in the extant Aristotelian corpus, though they clearly correspond with and expand on Aristotle’s text. First, the contrast announced in 10.3.23 between ‘love of myth’ (φιλομυθία) and the usefulness of myth for philosophical inquiry is not presented in the text of Metaph. Λ.8 as we have it. Second, the idea, taken from Λ.8, that philosophical truths are discoverable in certain ancient myths, is applied in Strabo’s discussion in 10.3.23 to specific myths and practices, particularly to religious music performed in mystery rites. Third, Strabo’s text links the usefulness of myth and religious music to the production of astonishment (10.3.7), in a way which, as we have seen, coheres with Aristotle’s theory. Fourth, Strabo’s text explicitly specifies divine knowledge as the aim toward which such religious myths and practices are directed (10.3.9), which, if indeed reflective of Aristotle’s position,

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45 The rest of the sections, and the detailed historical and anthropological information presented in them, may either go back to an Aristotelian source as well, or else be an addition by Strabo intended to bolster the Aristotelian position he adopts. The issue cannot be settled within the scope of this paper, and need not be.
helps to answer a longstanding debate concerning Aristotle's own view of the ultimate ends of political organization.

It is in principle possible that the views mentioned above, although Aristotelian in nature, are not found in Aristotle's corpus because they are Strabo's original contributions, supplementing the core Aristotelian ideas familiar to us from, e.g., Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. But that is unlikely, since, as we have seen, Strabo by his own admission leaves philosophical reasoning to specialists in that field. In light of the above, I would submit as a possibility, which I hope would spark further debate, that Strabo's discussions in 10.3.7, 10.3.9, and especially 10.3.23, should be regarded as Aristotelian 'fragments.' Specifically, I would propose that these texts pertain to Aristotle's lost dialogue titled *De philosophia*, for the following two reasons.

First, as we have seen, these sections in Strabo pick up and expand on ideas in Aristotle's *Metaph. A.8, 1074a38-b14*; and, apart from links generally drawn between other parts of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*—specifically those presenting his views on the development and perfection of philosophical knowledge by human beings—and *De philosophia*, 1074a38-b14 has also been argued to itself derive from that lost work, based both on stylistic considerations (specifically, hiatus avoidance) and overlap in subject matter.

Second, surviving evidence indicates that Aristotle's *De philosophia* contained a sustained discussion of the connection between religion and philosophy, and especially of the relation between the development of philosophical

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46 See section 5; cf. Str. 10.3.7-8. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions on the issues discussed in this paragraph.

47 I use the term 'fragment' in a similar way to the way used in standard editions of Aristotle's *fragmenta*, namely, as a set of texts that include, not only direct quotations of Aristotle's text, but also ancient, reliable "paraphrases or summaries of his opinions and arguments" (Barnes and Lawrence 1988, 2385).

48 For a similar argument concerning Str. 1.2.8, see Segev 2017, 62; Segev 2018, 308-309. Reinhardt 1928, 50 n. 1, who also sees a connection between Str. 1.2.8 and 10.3.23, nevertheless traces both sections to Posidonius.

49 See, e.g., Chiesara 2001, 59-60 on the parallel between the discussions of philosophical development in *Metaphysics A.1-2, 980a21-982a21* and in *De philosophia* fr. 8b Ross = Philoponus, in *Nicom. Isagogen* 1.1. See also Segev forthcoming (b).

50 See Burnyeat 2001, 143-145, who argues that the contention by Blass 1875 that *Metaph. A.7, 1073a down to A.8, 1073b* is taken from *De philosophia* "is extremely plausible", both because of "consistent hiatus avoidance" in that part of the *Metaphysics* and because "we know from other evidence that the *De philosophia* included a discussion of the movements of the heavenly bodies," and similarly for 1074a38-b14; Burnyeat continues to argue for 1074a38-b14 as the continuation of 1073a3-b38 in that same dialogue.
knowledge and religious practices and beliefs. Arguably, then, this work would have been the most likely place in which to expect a discussion supplementing Aristotle’s theory in the *Metaphysics* in just the way that we find it in Strabo’s *Geographica*, viz., by applying Aristotle’s ideas concerning the discovery of philosophical truths via examining surviving mythical depictions of divinity devised by earlier philosophers to specific cases of religious practices and beliefs facilitating philosophical apprehension. This proposal seems most promising in the case of Strabo’s discussion in 10.3.23, which elaborates on specific traditional religious musical practices and the beliefs associated with them in precisely those terms.

If so, then the original work on which 10.3.23 (as well as, possibly, the relevant parts of 10.3.7 and 10.3.9) would seem to be based may well have contained information from the *De philosophia* that is missing from the *Metaphysics* text, but visible in Strabo.  

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**Appendix: Strabo, Geography, 10.3.23. Meineke’s Teubner Text with my Translation**

Προήχθημεν δὲ διὰ πλειόνων εἰπε ῖν περ ὶ τούτων καίπερ ἥκιστα φιλομυθοῦντες, ὅτι τοῦ θεολογικοῦ γένους ἐφάπτεται τὰ πράγματα ταῦτα. πᾶς δὲ ὁ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγος ἀρχαίας ἐξετάζει δόξας καὶ μύθους, αἰνιττομένων τῶν παλαιῶν δὲ εἶχον ἐννοίας φυσικὰς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ προστιθέντων ἀεὶ τοῖς λόγοις τὸν μύθον. ἄπαντα μὲν οὖν τὰ αἰνίγματα λύειν ἐπ’ ἀκριβὲς οὐ ῥᾴδιον, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους τῶν μυθευομένων ἐκτεθέντων ἀεὶ τὸ μέσον, τῶν μὲν ὀμολογούμενων ἀλλήλοις τῶν δὲ ἐναντιομένων,

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51 The clearest sustained example of such a discussion, attributed directly to the *De philosophia*, is Aristotle’s version of Plato’s cave allegory in *De philosophia* fr. 13a Ross = Cicero, *N.D.* 2.37.95-96; cf. Segev 2017, 29-47. The relation between experiences in initiation rites and learning occurs in *De philosophia* fr. 15a Ross = Synesius, *Dion* 10.48a and *De philosophia* fr. 15b Ross = Michael Psellus, *Schol. ad Joh. Climacum* 6.171; cf. section 5 above and Segev 2017, 66-67. Finally, Aristotle seems to have discussed both Orphism and Chaldean theology in the *De philosophia*. See, respectively, *De philosophia* fr. 7a-b Ross = Philoponus, *in De An.* 186.21-26 and Cicero, *N.D.* 1. 18. 107 and *De philosophia* fr. 6c Ross = Plutarch, *De Is. et Os.* 370c; cf. Segev forthcoming (b). See also Segev 2014, ch. 1.

52 A version of this paper was presented at the “Music and the Order of the World from Classical Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century” conference, held at the Musikhochschule Lübeck in October 2022. I am thankful to the participants at this event for the useful discussion, and especially to my co-organizers, Christiane Tewinkel and Christine Blättler. I am also grateful to David Kaufman, an anonymous referee, and the editorial team at *Mnemosyne* for very useful written comments. Finally, I would like to thank the American Foundation for Greek Language and Culture (AFGLC) for supporting my research through my endowed professorship at the University of South Florida.
We have taken up an elaborate discussion concerning these issues although we are the least myth-loving, because these matters touch upon the theological kind [of investigation]. And every account concerning the gods inspects ancient opinions and myths, since the ancients expressed in riddles those natural conceptions that they had concerning these matters, and always added myth to their accounts. It is not easy, then, to solve all the riddles with accuracy, but if the bulk of things spoken of mythically were placed out in the open, those agreeing with one another and those opposing each other, one would have been able to infer the truth from them based on comparison more easily. For example, they depict mythically the mountain-dwellings and the inspirations of those occupied with the divine and of the gods themselves, probably for the same reason for which they believe that the gods are foreknowing of both foretokens and other things. Hence, metal-seeking, hunting, and searching for other things useful toward life are manifestly akin to mountain-dwelling. And juggling and witchcraft are close to inspirations, religious worship, and prophecy. And the love of art is of this kind, especially the one that is concerned with the Dionysian and Orphic arts. But let this suffice concerning these things.

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