Critical Edition

The Dialogue *Xenedemos, or Voices*, by Theodore Prodrornos

A Critical Edition, with English Translation

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Abstract

This paper offers the first critical edition of the dialogue *Xenedemos, or Voices*, by Theodore Prodrornos (c. 1100-1170), together with an English translation and commentary. This work is dedicated to an analysis of the definitions of the five *voices* from Porphyry's *Isagoge*. The publication of this good-humored scholarly text will allow for a

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better understanding of the development of logic studies in the 12th century, and also gives further insight into the nature of the tendencies within Byzantine intellectual circles of that period.

Keywords

Theodore Prodromos – *Xenedemos* – Byzantine logic – Byzantine philosophy – Porphyry's *Isagoge* – Byzantine punctuation

1 Introduction

The *Xenedemos*, or *Voices* (Ξενέδημος ἢ Φωναί), is one of the minor works of Theodore Prodromos (c. 1100–1170), a Byzantine writer¹ who was well known for his prose and poetry, and who had an important influence on later Byzantine literature and philosophy. In this short, Plato-style dialogue, Prodromos examines a standard Byzantine textbook on logic, namely Porphyry's *Isagoge*, or *On the Five Voices*; he expands on its definitions of the five voices (*genus*, *species*, *difference*, *propriety*, *accident*), and leads these voices to the *aporias*. The influence of Porphyry's *Isagoge* on Byzantine thought, an influence lasting from the 6th to the 11th century, cannot be overestimated. The Church Fathers of the period made more use of Aristotle's logical method than of Plato's dialectics because the former offered systematic treatment of terms which were at the center of Christological controversies. In fact, most theologians did not go back to the works of Aristotle himself, but turned rather to the commentaries and, often, to the condensation of the *Categories* made by Porphyry and his followers; these commentaries provided Christian theology with the necessary tools to make tight distinctions and careful definitions.² In contrast, Prodromos seems to doubt not only Porphyry's definitions of Aristotle's *predicables* in

1 On the life and work of Prodromos, see W. Hörandner, *Theodoros Prodromos, Historische Gedichte*, Wien, 1974.

2 The History of Aristotelianism in Byzantium is a subject that has received a little scholarly attention, except for a few specialized enquiries, see K. Oehler, "Aristotle in Byzantium," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 5 (1964), pp. 133–146; L. Benakis, "Commentaries and Commentators on the Logical Works of Aristotle in Byzantium," in: *Gedankenzeichen: Festschrift für Klaus Oehler zum 60 Geburtstag*, ed. R. Clausen and R. Daube-Schackat, Tübingen, 1988, pp. 3–12; L. Benakis, "Bibliographie internationale sur la philosophie byzantine (1949–1990)," in: *Bibliographie byzantine publiée à l'occasion du XVIII^e Congrès international d'Études byzantines*, Athens, 1991; L. Benakis, "Commentaries and Commentators on the Works of Aristotle (Except the Logical Ones) in Byzantium," in: *Historia philosophiae Medii Aevi, Festschrift Kurt Flasch*, ed. B. Mojsisch and O. Pluta, vol. 1, Amsterdam, 1991, pp. 45–54.

this work, but also the possibility of any definition and, indeed, of man's capacity to formulate such definitions at all.³

It is a curious fact that, unlike the logical works of Aristotle, Plato's dialogues were not even a regular part of the standard Byzantine educational system.⁴ The *Xenedemos*, written in prose dialogue form, demonstrates that its author is very well versed in Plato and aware of Platonic language and style to the extent that he is able to use these elements in his own original work.⁵ But this play with Plato's style does not entail putting forth Plato's metaphysical ideas. Pro-dromos was indeed a devoted reader of Plato, but he did not read him through neo-Platonic eyes, as was generally done by his contemporaries, or with the idea of finding a system; he admired the imaginative poetical side of Plato and his literary gifts: the beautiful language, elegant style, and the perfect dramatic propriety of his dialogues.

2 The Characters

The dialogue opens with an introductory conversation between Xenedemos, son of Aristandros, from Constantinople, and an Athenian, Mousaios, who questions Xenedemos about Theocles, a great Byzantine philosopher. Their short exchange presents a sketchy portrait of Theocles, and constitutes a frame for the lengthy dialogue between him and young Xenedemos, who, at the time, was a pupil of a philosopher called Hermagoras. These characters may be purely fictional, created with no intention to refer to a specific person, or they may be based on fictional or real-life persons. Since there have been so many discussions about the prototypes of these characters,⁶ we should discuss their characteristics and possible models in more detail.

3 See O.Yu. Goncharko and Yu.M. Romanenko, "A Brief History of Self-Reference Notion Implementation in Byzantium: Did the Byzantine Theologians and Scholars Formulate the Russell's Paradox?", *Scrinium*, 12 (2016), pp. 244–260.

4 A. Cameron & N. Gaul, "Introduction," in: *Dialogues and Debates from Late Antiquity to Late Byzantium*, London—New York, 2017, p. 3.

5 For a more detailed analysis, see N.Γ. Χαραλαμπίδης, "Ένας 'πλατωνικός' διάλογος του 12^{ου} αιώνας: Θεοδώρου Προδρόμου Ξενέδημος ἢ Φωναί," *Αριάδνη*, 11 (2005), σ. 189–214.

6 There have been several suggestions regarding a possible model for the character of Theocles. 1) **Ioannes Italos**: F.J.G. La Porte-du Theil, "Notice d'un manuscrit de la Bibliothèque du Vatican, coté CCCV parmi les Manuscrits Grecs," *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, 8:2 (1810), pp. 215–217 (reprinted in: PG 133, cols. 1087–1088). This suggestion was absolutely refuted by P. Tannery (Théodore Prodrome, "Sur le grand et le petit (À Italicos)," ed. P. Tannery, *Annuaire de l'Association pour l'Encouragement des Études Grecques en France*, 21 (1887), pp. 104–119). Anyway, Italos pur-

MOUSAIOS. This character has not been provided with any specific attributes, except the name referring to the son of Orpheus, the poet Mousaios, who was also an Athenian.

XENEDEMOS. He is called the son of Aristander – this is most likely a reference to the “son of Ariston,” i.e., Plato. He also has one particular trait, namely, long blonde hair, which later fell out (248.26–249.2) – this is an almost verbatim reference to the description of Phaedo by Plato (89b.2–5). Nevertheless, it might also be a reference to Theodore Prodromos himself, who likewise had long blonde hair in his childhood, which then also fell out due to disease.⁷

HERMAGORAS. The philosopher Hermagoras, according to Theocles, “is one of the most learned, which is evident from many things, but first and foremost from the sickly pallor covering his skin and the beard falling down to his knees, which makes him appear a philosopher” (249.10–12). His name and this caricatured description were borrowed almost verbatim from Lucian’s *Icaromenippos*,⁸ which parodies both the philosopher who claims to know something about the heavens and his heavenly ascent. Such characters whose beards are described as *philosophical* were a common object of literary satire; this character also appears in the later works of Theodore Prodromos, e.g., in the poem *Against a Long-bearded Old Man*.⁹ Prodromos, for whom philosophy presented a blend of grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy, here ridicules the *pure* philosophers, who attempted to focus only on philosophy, disregarding the “beauties” of rhetoric.¹⁰

sued his philosophy at the expense of rhetorical style that does not suit to Theocles. (2) **Michael Psellos:** С.Д. Пападимитриу, *Феодор Продром: Историко-литературное исследование*, Одесса, 1905, с. XXII–XXIV (S.D. Papadimitriou, *Study of the Life and Works of Theodore Prodromos*, Odessa, 1905, pp. XXII–XXIV). This suggestion was rejected by E. Kurtz. (3) **Michael Italikos:** E. Kurtz, “[review of] С.Д. Пападимитриу, Феодор Продром. Одесса, 1905,” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 16 (1907), S. 289–300; Ν.Γ. Χαράλαμπίδου, “Ένας ‘πλατωνικός’ διάλογος τοῦ 12^{ου} αἰῶνος: Θεοδώρου Προδρόμου Ξενέδημος ἢ Φωναί,” *Αριάδνη*, 11 (2005), σ. 189–214. (4) **A composite of Ioannes Italos and Michael Psellos:** S. Ebbesen, “Greek and Latin Medieval Logic,” *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin*, 66 (1996), pp. 67–95; O.Yu. Goncharko and D.A. Chernoglazov, “Platonic Dialogue of Theodoros Prodromos “Xenedemos”: Pseudo-Antique Protagonists, and their Byzantine Prototypes,” *Schole*, 10:2 (2016), pp. 571–582 (in Russian).

7 PG 133, cols. 1251A, 1257B.

8 *Icaromenippos, or the Sky-Man*, §5, in: Lucian, vol. 2, ed. A.M. Harmon (Loeb, 54), Cambridge–MA, 1915, pp. 274–276.

9 *Anecdota Graeca e codicibus regijs*, t. 4, ed. J.Fr. Boissonade, Paris, 1829, pp. 430–435.

10 See J. Kucharski, P. Marciniak, “The beard and its philosopher: Theodore Prodromos on the philosopher’s beard in Byzantium,” *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 41:1 (2016), pp. 45–54.

THEOCLES. This character seems to be the most fully individualized, which suggests that it may be based on a real person. The most attractive candidate for the representation of Theocles might be Prodromos' friend and teacher Michael Italikos (c. 1090?–before 1157), metropolitan of Philippolis, whom he described as “imitator of Plato and the second Plato.”¹¹ More objectively, he suits many of Theocles' criteria, thus:

(1) **Provenance.** Michael Italikos, like Theocles, was born in Constantinople but his family descended from Italy. He was un-Byzantine enough or, in Browning's words, “he was a man of independent character and is often jocularly skeptical of much in Byzantine culture; in his ability to stand outside of and criticize the cultural tradition, which he so richly inherits, he was unusual in the 12th century.”¹² This corresponds to the description of Theocles, who “characterized himself as an alien among the Byzantines and whose attitude toward his native city was not too positive” (247.24–25).

(2) **Works.** Prodromos gives a list of Theocles' works that can be divided into two major groups. One comprises those which were dedicated to the emperors; they depict wars and also consider diseases in a scientific manner. The other group contains those which were addressed to private men or written on various occasions. Some of these writings were composed in verse and some in prose (247.11–17).

This enumeration of the works fits well with those of Michael Italikos, who was in a position to pen addresses to the emperors Ioannes and Manuel, and who, therefore, described the emperors' deeds in verse and in prose, as we know from his own words.¹³ We know two such works by him, a *basilikos logos* for Ioannes II, describing his achievements during the campaign of 1137–1138 in Cilicia and Syria, and a monody for the death of Andronikos, whose greatest military feats had been against the Turks in 1116 and the Pechenegs in 1122.¹⁴ Michael Italikos also had the right sort of medical knowledge, having been for a long time *didaskalos* of the doctors,¹⁵ most likely at the hospital of the Pantocrator Monastery, which was a center of medical teaching. His pupil, Theodore Prodromos, provided us with the most reliable and scientific description among the Byzantine authors of the clinical depiction of smallpox.¹⁶ Further-

11 *Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens grecs*, vol. 2, ed. E. Miller, Paris, 1881, p. 771.

12 R. Browning, “Unpublished correspondence between Michael Italicus, Archbishop of Philippopolis, and Theodore Prodromos,” *Byzantinobulgarica*, 1 (1962), pp. 279–297.

13 Michel Italikos, *Lettres et discours*, ed. P. Gautier, Paris, 1972, p. 7.

14 Michel Italikos, *Lettres et discours*, ed. P. Gautier, Paris, 1972, lettre N°43, 44.

15 Michel Italikos, *Lettres et discours*, ed. P. Gautier, Paris, 1972, lettre N°5, 9, 33.

16 J. Lascaratos, “Two Cases of Smallpox in Byzantium,” *International Journal of Dermatology*, 41 (2002), pp. 792–795.

more, Michael Italikos was a very prolific and skillful epistolograph and a writer of monodies.

It is remarkable that Prodlromos emphasizes the fact that Theocles was well versed in poetry, saying that his tongue breathed with the force of Attic fire and his hand was rapid in improvising text, but he does not mention any philosophical works written by him, although he placed him among the most prominent philosophers. Similarly, in the Funeral Oration on Theodore Prodlromos, Niketas Eugeneianos extols the rhetorical (rather than philosophical) virtues of his friend, whom he nevertheless addresses as philosopher.¹⁷ Italikos also addresses Prodlromos as philosopher.¹⁸ The point is, that at that time the word φιλόσοφος did not necessarily denote people dealing with philosophy as such but rather educated men, rhetoricians, including also teachers.¹⁹ Michael Italikos, who was well versed in both rhetoric and philosophy,²⁰ and even argued the superiority of rhetoric over philosophy,²¹ was nevertheless ranked among the most prominent Byzantine philosophers in the 12th century.

(3) **Kinship and Friendship with Xenedemos.** Prodlromos' mention of close kinship and friendship between Xenedemos and his teacher, Theocles, very likely points to the close relationship between Theodoros Prodlromos himself and Michael Italikos, his best friend and teacher, with whom he shared the same beliefs and convictions. "Whoever calls Italikos, therefore, has simultaneously revealed Prodlromos"²² wrote Italikos in one of his letters to Prodlromos. This coincides with the words from the edited dialogue, which suggest

17 "Monodie de Nicétas Eugénianos sur Théodore Prodrome," ed. L. Petit, *Византийский временник*, 9 (1902), pp. 446–463.

18 Michel Italikos, *Lettres et discours*, ed. P. Gautier, Paris, 1972, lettre №42.

19 F. Dölger, "Zur Bedeutung von φιλόσοφος und φιλοσοφία in byzantinischer Zeit," in: F. Dölger, *Byzanz und die europäische Staatenwelt: Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Ettal, 1953, S. 197–208, especially at p. 202, where he discusses Prodlromos. See also S. Papaioannou, "Rhetoric and the philosopher," in: *Essays in Byzantine Philosophy*, ed. K. Ierodiakonou and B. Bydén, Athens, 2012, p. 193.

20 He taught philosophy and rhetoric (Michel Italikos, *Lettres et discours*, ed. P. Gautier, Paris, 1972, lettre №4, 22), every science (Ibid, lettre №27).

21 For example, Italikos begins one of his letters to an unknown addressee by claiming that "after comparing science against science, I find philosophy quite lacking in comparison to rhetoric" (Michel Italikos, *Lettres et discours*, ed. P. Gautier, Paris, 1972, lettre №13).

22 Michel Italikos, ed. P. Gautier, Paris, 1972, lettre №1, p. 60.5. For a full English translation of the letter, as well as for a detailed analysis, see S. Papaioannou, "Language Games, Not the Soul's Beliefs: Michael Italikos to Theodoros Prodlromos, on Friendship and Writing," in: *Byzantinische Sprachkunst: Studien zur Byzantinischen Literatur gewidmet Wolfram Hörandner zum 65. Geburtstag*, hrsg. von M. Hinterberger & E. Schiffer (Byzantisches Archiv, 20), Berlin–Boston, 2007, pp. 218–233.

that it is possible to see Theocles just by visiting Xenedemos (246.8–9). In this letter to Prodrornos, Italikos employed all possible rhetorical means of persuasion, including logical ones, to prove that singularity would express their relationship better than duality, despite the geographical distance between them.²³ It could explain why Prodrornos puts his own words into Theocles' mouth, and why Theocles uses the same method mostly based on linguistic grounds, a method Prodrornos himself employed in his *Commentary on the Second Book of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*²⁴ and in his anti-Aristotelian letter-treatise, *On Great and Small*, addressed to Italikos.²⁵

(4) **Speech impediment.** Theocles at times duplicated a syllable or a word, a duplication that proceeded from a defect of nature (247.1–3). We encounter almost the same words in the small treatise entitled *On Those Who Condemn Providence Because of Poverty*, which is also attributed by the manuscript tradition to Prodrornos.²⁶ The author, describing himself as a brilliant polymath and rhetorician, tells about the same defect of nature, which he nevertheless concealed with his skillful pen.

The question therefore arises: must we think that Prodrornos, portraying Theocles, meant to provide his original audience with clues to recognize a real person, or 'two persons in one,' such as Italikos and Prodrornos, or did he merely depict an integrated portrait of the Byzantine polymaths of the intellectual milieu of the 12th century, in which Prodrornos was active. This is a question that we may never fully be able to answer confidently. We can only say at this point that whereas Hermagoras personifies a false teacher of philosophy, Theocles incarnates a type of good philosopher, which, in turn, probably includes some specific traits of his own teacher, Michael Italikos, as well as of Prodrornos himself, and incorporates also some of the attributes of an ideal rhetor of the 12th century.²⁷ Thus, the aim of this text might be to defend Prodrornos' peculiar way of teaching, which he partly inherited from Italikos.

23 He began his speculation by showing first the logical evidences, referring to Porphyry, Simplicius and Aristotle.

24 This work is still unpublished: M. Cacouros, *Le commentaire de Théodore Prodrome au second livre des Analytiques postérieurs d'Aristote: texte (édition princeps et tradition manuscrite), et étude du commentaire de Prodrome*, Doctorat (Lettres), Paris IV-Sorbonne, 1992.

25 Théodore Prodrome, "Sur le grand et le petit (À Italikos)," ed. P. Tannery, *Annuaire de l'Association pour l'Encouragement des Études Grecques en France*, 21 (1887), pp. 104–119.

26 PG 133, cols. 1297–1298.

27 It should be noted that Italikos, in his letter to Prodrornos, described an ideal rhetor with exactly the same words by which Prodrornos described Theocles, see Michel Italikos, *Lettres et discours*, ed. Gautier, Paris, 1972, lettre N°1, p. 63.15.

3 Aims of This Edition

This work by Theodore Prodromos was first edited by J.A. Cramer²⁸ from two codices (*Barocci 165* and *187*, the latter being a copy of the former) in the first half of the 19th century. However, in addition to containing a number of lacunae, ranging from one or two words to whole phrases, this edition introduces numerous errors that fatally alter the meaning of the text. Since, moreover, Cramer's edition did not take into account all surviving manuscripts, including the earliest one, it appeared that a critical edition of the text would be appropriate.

Another purpose of this publication is to make the text, which is an important one for the history of Byzantine logic and literature, easily available to scholars. Therefore, we provide an English translation, which is intended to be as faithful to the Greek text as possible, while remaining understandable to the reader.

4 Manuscript Tradition of the *Xenedemos*

For the new edition of the text of the *Xenedemos* we used the four known manuscripts in which it is preserved. The collations have been performed by means of photographic copies or microfilms, therefore the descriptions of the manuscripts, which follow in alphabetical order, will generally be brief; for our purpose, full codicological analyses would be superfluous.

B OXFORD, *Bodleian Library*, *Barocci 165*²⁹

15th c., bombycine paper (in folio), 170 folios; *Xenedemos*, ff. 68^r–73^v.

This codex is a miscellany of Byzantine philosophical works including Gemistus Pletho and Maximus Planudes. Its scribe has been identified as Michael Lygizos (Μιχαήλ Λύγιζος),³⁰ who was associated with the scriptorium of Michael Apostoles (c. 1420–1474 or 1486), in Crete, that produced books for Cardinal Bessarion (1400–1472).³¹

28 “Ξενέδημος ἢ Φωνναί,” in: *Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscriptis Bibliothecarum Oxoniensium*, ed. J.A. Cramer, vol. 3, Oxonii, 1836, pp. 204–215.

29 H.O. Coxe, *Catalogi codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleianae pars prima recensionem codicum graecorum continens*, Oxford, 1853, cols. 279–281.

30 E. Lobel, *The Greek Manuscripts of Aristotle's Poetics*, Oxford, 1933, p. 57; R. Stefec, *Die Briefe des Michael Apostoles* (Schriften zur Kulturgeschichte, 29), Hamburg, 2013, p. 35.

31 M. Vogel and V. Gardthausen, *Die griechischen Schreiber des Mittelalters und der Renaissance*, Leipzig, 1909, S. 315; B. Λαούρδα, “Κρητικά παλαιογραφικά: 7. Ο κωδικογράφος

The codex is distinguished by good spelling and the clearest script among the preserved copies of the *Xenedemos*. The copyist indicates the speaker's name in the margin at each point of change. The manuscript is in good condition and perfectly legible.

O OXFORD, *Bodleian Library*, Barocci 187³²

Early 16th c., paper (in folio), 254 folios; *Xenedemos*, ff. 245^r–248^v.

The codex **O** is a collection of different treatises primarily on the topics of tactics and strategy.

It is also written in very neat and legible handwriting, but the spelling is worse than in **B**. The scribe does not introduce direct speech with the name of the speaker. The manuscript survives in good condition. With respect to our text, it seems that **O** is a copy of **B**, as will be described further.

P PARIS, *Bibliothèque nationale de France*, Supplément grec 655³³

14th c., bombycine paper (260 × 170 mm), 104 folios; *Xenedemos*, ff. 100^r–104^v.

This is a part of the Suppl. gr. 1161. This codex, a collection of works on logic, belonged to some 14th-century scholar. Unfortunately, we do not know more about the provenance of **P** other than that it was acquired by Constantinus Minoïde Mynas during his missions in the East (1840–1855).³⁴ Closer examination of the codex (or its photocopy, to be precise) reveals that at least five different scribal hands can be distinguished. The copyist of our text was not very careful; he sometimes omitted a word or phrase and made a good number of spelling errors. The codex has suffered a little damage, seemingly from moisture, which has affected the inner margins.

Μιχαήλ Λυγίζος ή του Λυγγέως," *Κρητικά Χρονικά*, τόμος Δ', τεύχος II (1955), σ. 242–245; Χ.Γ. Πατρινελής, *Έλληνες κωδικογράφοι των χρόνων της Αναγεννήσεως*, Αθήναι, 1961, σ. 95; P. Canart, "Scribes grecs de la Renaissance. Additions et corrections aux répertoires de Vogel-Gardthausen et de Patrinélis," *Scriptorium*, 17:1 (1963), p. 64.

32 H.O. Coxe, *Catalogi codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleianae pars prima recensionem codicum graecorum continens*, Oxford, 1853, cols. 314–316; The British Library, *Summary Catalogue of Greek Manuscripts*, vol. 1, London, 1999, pp. 72, 234.

33 H. Omont, *Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits du Supplément grec de la Bibliothèque nationale*, Paris, 1883, p. 72; W.J.W. Koster, "À propos de quelques manuscrits d'Aristophane de la Bibliothèque Nationale," *Revue des Études Grecques*, 66 (1953), p. 20.

34 H. Omont, "Minoïde Mynas et ses missions en Orient (1840–1855)," *Mémoires de l'Institut national de France*, 40 (1916), pp. 337–421, (here p. 369).

V VATICAN, *Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana*, Vaticanus graecus 305³⁵ 13th c., paper (250 × 167 mm), 209 folios; Xenedemos, ff. 129^r–134^r.

V is regarded as the most important manuscript for all of Prodrōmos' works. The scribe and the date of the codex are known precisely from a note at the end of the manuscript (f. 170^v): "Ἐτελειώθη τὸ βαρὸν βιβλίον τῶν θηριακῶν τοῦ Νικάνδρου κατὰ τὴν κγ' τοῦ ἀπριλλ. τῆς ιβ' (ι)ν(δικτ.) γραφέν διὰ χειρὸς Θεοφυλάκτου τοῦ Σαπωνοπούλου"³⁶ (This book of Nicander's Theriaca was finished on the 23rd day of April of the 12th indiction by the hand of Theophylaktos Saponopoulos). The 12th indiction may be identified with the following years: 1209, 1224, 1239, 1254, 1269, 1284, 1299, and 1314. V. Gardthausen³⁷ inclined to 1314; I. Mercati³⁸ provided only the *terminus ante quem* as 1282; W. Hörandner³⁹ pointed to 1268/69 or 1253/54; S.D. Papadimitriou⁴⁰ demonstrated convincingly that it could be only 1254. Thus, this codex comes closer than any other to the date of the composition of the *Xenedemos*.

The copyist of V used abbreviations, ligatures, contractions, suspensions, and superposition of letters in abundance, and his handwriting is rough, so that reading is difficult. Moreover, the manuscript has suffered from various types of damage, the ink has faded extensively, and the script has flaked off in some cases (already by the end of the 18th century).

- 35 F.J.G. La Porte-du Theil, "Notice d'un manuscrit de la Bibliothèque du Vatican, coté CCCV parmi les Manuscrits Grecs," *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, vol. 6 (1798) pp. 496–565; vol. 7:2 (1801), pp. 234–260; vol. 8:2 (1810), pp. 78–253 (for the *Xenedemos*, see – vol. 6 (1798), p. 497; I. Mercati & P. Franchi De' Cavalieri, *Codices Vaticani graeci*, t. I: Codices 1–329, Romae, 1923, pp. 443–450; W. Hörandner, *Theodoros Prodrōmos, Historische Gedichte*, Wien, 1974, S. 159–161. See also M.D.J. Op de Coul, "The letters of Theodore Prodrōmos and some other 12th century letter collections," *Medioevo greco*, 9 (2009), pp. 231–239; A. Majuri, "Anecdota Prodrōmea dal Vat. gr. 305," *Rendiconti della Reale accademia dei Lincei, Classe di Scienze morale, storiche e filologiche*, 5:17 (1908), pp. 528–535; M.A. Roldán, "Un nuevo manuscrito de Heráclito «Mitógrafo» y el Anónimo Περὶ πίστεως (Μονὴ Ἰβήρων 1317 = Lambros 5437)," *Emerita*, 83 (2015), pp. 63–86.
- 36 M. Vogel et V. Gardthausen, *Die griechischen Schreiber des Mittelalters und der Renaissance*, Leipzig, 1909, S. 148; P.A. Ariatta, "Glosse Inedite ai Theriaka di Nicandro (Cod. Vat. Graec. 305)," *Studi Classici e Orientali*, 9 (1960), pp. 7–41.
- 37 M. Vogel et V. Gardthausen, *Die griechischen Schreiber des Mittelalters und der Renaissance*, Leipzig, 1909, S. 148.
- 38 I. Mercati & P. Franchi De' Cavalieri, *Codices Vaticani graeci*, t. I: Codices 1–329, Romae, 1923, p. 449.
- 39 W. Hörandner, *Theodoros Prodrōmos, Historische Gedichte*, Wien, 1974, S. 159–161.
- 40 С.Д. Пападимитриу, *Фео́дор Продро́м: Историко-литературное исследование*, Одесса, 1905, с. XXII–XXIV (S.D. Papadimitriou, *Study of the Life and Works of Theodore Prodrōmos*, Odessa, 1905, p. XXII–XXIV).

T* TURIN, *Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria di Torino*, Tauriensis C. II. 07 (= Pasini 2.108)

14th c.,⁴¹ the second half of the 16th c.⁴² (by identification of the scribe), paper (230 × 143 mm), pre-fire state – 341 folios (preserved: only ff. 282^r–284^v).

Michel Cacouros identified the scribe as Nikolaos Choniates, who is known from other sources. The codex was almost completely destroyed in the fire of 1904, including the pages of the *Xenedemos*.⁴³

5 Principles of this Critical Edition

The Relationships Between the Manuscripts

The collation of the manuscripts did reveal one definite group. In general, the manuscripts from the Bodleian Library, **B** and **O**, share many common significant errors, clearly separating this group from **VP**. In fact, where differences between **BO** and **VP** occur, **VP** has the better readings, with two exceptions. At the same time, **O** contains all the significant errors of **B** and a number of additional errors not found in **B**. Hence, it seems that **O** descends directly from **B**.

Comparing **V** and **P**, we can conclude that **V** obviously is a more reliable witness than **P**, which contains a large number of minor errors and unique secondary readings, most of which are caused by carelessness. We have therefore taken **V** as the basis for our text; in otherwise undecidable cases, we have preferred the readings from this manuscript. Nevertheless, in two cases, against all expectations, **VP** does not give the correct reading: 1) τὴν τρύγα **BO** against τὸν τρύγα **VP** (246, 15), which probably resulted from confusion in the Byzantine Greek between the attic ἡ τρύξ (masculine and feminine nouns

41 J. Pasini, A. Rivautella, Fr. Berta, *Codices manuscripti Bibliothecae Regii Taurinensis Athenaei* ..., Turin, 1749, cols. 214b–215a.

42 M. Cacouros, "Un commentaire byzantin inédit au deuxième livre des Seconds Analytiques, attribuable à Jean Chortasménos," *Revue d'histoire des textes*, 24 (1994), pp. 149–198 (here pp. 177–178).

43 G. De Sanctis, "Inventario dei codici superstiti greci e latini antichi della Biblioteca Nazionale di Torino," *Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica*, 32 (1904), pp. 417, 429; *Inventari dei manoscritti delle biblioteche d'Italia*, t. 28, ed. C. Mazzatinti, A. Sorbelli, L. Ferrari, Torino, 1922, p. 36; L.G. Westerink, *Pseudo-Elías (Pseudo-David), Lectures on Porphyry's Isagoge*, Amsterdam, 1967, pp. VIII–IX; P. Eleuteri, "Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria di Torino, Concordanze delle segnature dei manoscritti greci," *Codices manuscripti*, 15 (1990), pp. 28–39; E. Elia, *Libri greci nella Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria di Torino. I manoscritti di Andreas Darmarios*, Alessandria, 2014, p. 17.

ending in the nominative in –ξ follow the same pattern of declension) and the Byzantine ὁ τρύγος; and 2) ἡ φροντις **BO** against ἡ φορτις **VP** (259, 6). These readings may have been derived from one lost copy, or they may have been in Theodore Prodromos' autograph itself, as a similar mistake is found in the autograph of George Pachymeres (1242–c. 1310) (MS Berlin, *Ham.* 512), which also has the meaningless reading φορτίζειν in the author's own hand, corrected to φροντίζειν in the copies.⁴⁴ Pachymeres' intention must have been to write the latter, but what he actually wrote was the former.

Marks of Punctuation

The manuscripts containing the text of the *Xenedemos* utilize a consistent system of punctuation and layout. In fact, where differences between manuscript readings occur, they are quite straightforward and can be explained without great difficulty. In view of the very high level of agreement among the four witnesses, it seems justified to suppose that their punctuation division may be attributed to the hand of Theodore Prodromos rather than to those of the scribes.

Byzantine punctuation is always assumed to convey information about the way in which the author or scribe intended the text to be read aloud. In preparing the text, we came to the conclusion that these breath marks or breathing indications were introduced not only as aids for reading aloud, but also as tools to facilitate the understanding or listening comprehension of the text. Since the *Xenedemos*, written in a learned language, is full of difficulties regarding the interpretation of the author's thoughts, the punctuation marks appear to be especially relevant. For this reason, we decided to keep the punctuation marks as they appear in the manuscripts.⁴⁵

Another aspect of this issue is that the Byzantine punctuation served not only for marking a sense break, but also for indicating a rhythmical cadence. It was Karl Krumbacher who first noticed this tendency. Based on this fact, he recommended that editors pay close attention to the transmitted punctuation of Byzantine texts.⁴⁶ Wolfram Hörandner⁴⁷ endorsed Krumbacher's observa-

44 Börje Bydén, "Imprimatur? Unconventional Punctuation and Diacritics in Manuscripts of Medieval Greek Philosophical Works," in: *Ars Edendi Lectures*, Series 2, ed. A. Bucossi and E. Kihlman, Stockholm University, 2012, pp. 155–172.

45 On the use of punctuation marks by other scribes or authors, see also *From Manuscripts to Books Proceedings of the International Workshop on Textual Criticism and Editorial Practice for Byzantine Texts (Vienna, 10–11 December 2009)*, ed. A. Giannouli and E. Schiffer, Wien, 2011.

46 K. Krumbacher, "Ein Dithyrambus auf den Chronisten Theophanes," in: *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse* 4, Munich, 1896, S. 583–625.

47 W. Hörandner, *Der Prosarhythmus in der rhetorischen Literatur der Byzantiner*, Wien, 1981.

tion on the relationship between the prose rhythm and the transmitted punctuation. Moreover, he emphasized that more attention should be paid to the manuscript evidence on this point as representing authentic contemporary witnesses.

In view of the lack of Byzantine theoretical treatises on Byzantine minuscule punctuation, as well as any fundamental research undertaken in this area,⁴⁸ it is evident that an editor should reproduce the punctuation found in the most reliable text witness. In our case, it is V, which, in addition, is the closest to the composition of the text. Unfortunately, the poor quality of the microfilm we have consulted makes it impossible to establish a complete system based only on this reproduction. In attempting to collate this manuscript with the other sources, however, another difficulty arises. Though all four manuscripts reproduce an almost identical pattern of markings, the copyists of BO introduce very few modifications, sometimes differentiating the high and middle dots and converting several commas into low dots; the copyist of P often substitutes commas for semicolons, which for him obviously do not indicate a question but an incomplete thought. Such variation obviously causes a problem for an editor, who may have to choose between the different systems employed in the manuscripts. However, we see no strong reason to observe in our transcription meaningful differences between high and middle dots or between a low dot

48 A discussion of the Byzantine punctuation may be found in J. Noret, "Notes de ponctuation et d'accentuation byzantines," *Byzantion*, 65:1 (1995), pp. 69–88; C. Laga, "La ponctuation (Dont on ne doit pas se soucier)," in: *Philomathestatos, Studies in Greek and Byzantine Texts Presented to Jacques Noret for his 65th Birthday*, ed. B. Janssens, B. Roosen, P. Van Deun (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 137), Leuven–Paris, 2004, pp. 359–375; E.V. Maltese, "Per l'edizione di autografi bizantini," in: *Problemi di ecdotica e esegesi di testi bizantini e grecomedievali*, ed. R. Romano, Napoli, 1993, pp. 81–94; E.V. Maltese, "Ortografia d'autore e regole dell'editore: gli autografi bizantini," *Rivista di studi bizantini e neoellenici*, 32 (1995), pp. 32, 91–121; C.M. Mazzucchi, "Per una punteggiatura non anacronistica, e più efficace, dei testi greci," *Bollettino della Badia Greca di Grottaferrata*, 51 (1997), pp. 129–143; Dionisio Longino, *Del sublime*, ed. C.M. Mazzucchi, Milano, 2010; D.R. Reinsch, "What should an Editor Do with a Text Like the Chronographia of Michael Psellos," in: *Ars Edendi Lectures*, Series 2, ed. A. Bucossi and E. Kihlman, Stockholm University, 2012, pp. 131–154; *Michaelis Pselli Chronographia*, ed. D.R. Reinsch, Berlin–Boston, 2014; *Theodori Scutariotae Chronica*, ed. R. Tocci (Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae, 46), Berlin, 2015, pp. 141–149; A. Bonifazi, A. Drummen, and M. de Kreij, "Discourse segmentation," in: *Particles in Ancient Greek Discourse*, vol. IV, Washington, DC, 2016; *Ioannis Canani de Constantino-politana obsidione relatio*, ed. A.M. Cuomo, Berlin–Boston, 2016, pp. XLVI–LII. For discussion of the Byzantine punctuation in Plato's dialogues, see L. Perria, "L'interpunzione nei manoscritti della «collezione filosofica»," in: *Paleografia e codicologia greca*; atti del II colloquio internazionale (Berlino–Wolfenbüttel, 17–21 ottobre 1983), ed. D. Harlfinger et al., Alessandria, 1991, pp. 199–209.

and a comma in this text, given the brevity of dialogue's utterances. We suppose, therefore, that the set of marks selected by V is sufficient for clarifying the segmentation of the discourse. In this respect, we reproduce the punctuation of V in our text as far as possible, generally comparing it with the punctuation found in other manuscripts.

In the present publication, we employ five punctuation marks; none of them displays exactly the same range of functions as modern punctuation marks.

COMMA ⟨ , ⟩ is a sign of a minor break; one of the most common usages of the comma is to disambiguate the meaning of a phrase or to place an emphasis on a word or group of words.

MIDDLE DOT ⟨ · ⟩ is a sign taken up for a longer breath; it is the most frequent mark used for indicating syntactic or sense units. We leave a short space between middle dots and previous words in the hope that this layout will make them more easily recognizable.

DICOLON ⟨ · · ⟩ (in one instance followed by a paragraphos ⟨ · ~ ⟩ in V) denotes a full stop at the end of a completed thought or a changing of the speaker; in our modern terminology, it comes closest to a paragraph.

SEMICOLON ⟨ ; ⟩ functions as a question mark, but only when the sentence does not begin with an interrogative pronoun or adverb, as observed by Ch.B. Randolph.⁴⁹

DIPLES ⟨ > > ⟩ is used as a marginal signal to mark quotations; very short quotations may also be introduced without punctuation.

In many cases, of course, pauses coincide with the cut-off points of syntactical units, but this is not consistent in other specific cases. We have to respect the logic of Byzantine Greek, which is not always identical with the syntactical logic of modern European languages, which, for their part, differ from one another.

The Names of the Speakers

Prodromos mixed the dramatic and narrative styles in the *Xenedemos* so that the dialogue begins in the dramatic form and then moves to the narrative form.

49 Charles Brewster Randolph formulated the following general principle: "the sign of interrogation does not follow questions introduced by an interrogative pronoun or adverb," see C.B. Randolph, "The Sign of Interrogation in Greek Minuscul Manuscripts," *Classical Philology*, 5:3 (1910), p. 310; see also Plato, *Ion or: On the Iliad*, ed. A. Rijksbaron, Leiden–Boston, 2007, p. 246, n. 358; Anna Liverani denotes the same for the autograph of the commentaries on Homer's *Odyssey*: A. Liverani, "Sul sistema di interpunzione in Eustazio di Tessalonica," *Medioevo greco*, 1 (2000), pp. 187–197.

There are two different modes of presentation in the manuscripts. The dramatic dialogue changes are always marked by the name of the new speaker combined with a dicolon. The narrative dialogues have other markers of transitions between the speakers, which are the explicit statements of who the speaker is, e.g., “I said” or “Theocles said.” These signs, combined with Byzantine punctuation, were considered as sufficient in the Byzantine book culture. To facilitate the modern reader in following the speaker changes, we always introduce the names of those who pose questions and those who answer at the beginning of their statements but we put them into brackets. Quoted speech as well as internal monologues are marked with bold letters.

Accentuation

With respect to accents, it may be observed that there is no considerable variation between the manuscripts; all breathings and accents are used consistently. All four copyists systematically mark the oxytones with a grave accent, except for cases when they are followed by enclitics. The copyists of V and B mark the oxytones with a grave accent even when this word is followed by a breath mark.

As for the accentuation of the enclitics and proclitics, we accept the principles proposed by Jacques Noret in a series of interesting articles⁵⁰ regarding the accentuation of Byzantine texts. Our codices seem to comply with Noret’s rules, although these might seem unusual to modern readers.

Spelling

Spelling in the text is adapted to standard philological practice; we have added an iota subscript where the modern reader would expect it. The following are not recorded in the apparatus: graphic variants, iotacism (affecting η, ι, υ, οι, ει, ηι, υι), confusion between ε and αι, ο and ω, obvious slips of the pen, haplographies, dittographies, double/single consonants, omission/addition of the euphonic –ν.

50 J. Noret, “Une orthographe insolite et nuancée, celle de Nicéphore Blemmyde, ou à propos du δέ enclitique,” *Byzantion*, 55:1 (1985), pp. 493–505; J. Noret, “Quand donc rendons-nous a quantité d’indéfinis, prétendument enclitiques, l’accent qui leur revient,” *Byzantion*, 57 (1987), pp. 191–195; J. Noret, “Faut-il écrire οὐκ εἰσιν ou οὐκ εἰσίν,” *Byzantion*, 59 (1989), pp. 277–280; J. Noret, “L’accentuation de τε en grec byzantin,” *Byzantion*, 68:2 (1998), pp. 516–518; J. Noret, “L’accentuation byzantine. En quoi et pourquoi elle diffère de l’accentuation «savante» actuelle, parfois absurde,” in: *The Language of Byzantine Learned Literature*, ed. M. Hinterberger (Byzantios. Studies in Byzantine History & Civilization, 9), Turnhout, 2014, pp. 96–146.

We capitalize only the proper names. We also do not use a capital letter after a strong punctuation mark.

The spelling of the noun ὑπόψηλμα (as a variant of ὑπόψαλμα), attested by all manuscripts of the *Xenedemos* text, was corrected in our edition (249.3). We believe that the scribes incorrectly transmit the original spelling here or that the author himself might have committed the error due to distraction. This “strange” spelling is attested neither in the TLG nor in papyri. Moreover, a search of Greek words ending in -ηλμα reveals no such instances whatsoever. At the same time, a search under ὑπόψαλμα produced six attestations. In addition, the TLG search also yields a number of cognate words, such as διάψαλμα (321), ἀπόψαλμα (15), ψάλμα (8), σύμψαλμα (4), and κατάψαλμα (1). Consequently, we have corrected the text, with proper notation of the change in the critical apparatus.

Apparatus Criticus

The critical apparatus is a negative one, that is, it gives readings only for those manuscripts that diverge from the preferred reading. In some important cases, we give a positive apparatus.

We collated our text with that of the previous edition by J.A. Cramer but did not incorporate its numerous variants in the apparatus because they seem to have been caused by misreading or misprint. The page numbers of Cramer’s edition are indicated for ease of reference on scholia.

Quotations

We distinguish conscious or explicit quotations and literary reminiscences as well as passages parallel to the witness of a fragment. This is illustrated in the *apparatus fontium* by using terms such as *confer* (*cf.*), *alludit ad* (*all.*), or *locus parallelus* (*lp.*). As in all modern editions, the quotations from Homer are printed as an indented block of hexameter lines.

6 Abbreviations used in the *Apparatus Fontium*

Alcibiades	PLATO, <i>Alcibiades</i> <i>Platonis opera</i> , ed. J. Burnet, vol. 2, Oxford, 1901, St 11.103a–135c.
Analytica posteriora	ARISTOTELES, <i>Analytica posteriora</i> <i>Aristotelis analytica priora et posteriora</i> , ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford, 1964, pp. 114–183.
Categoriae	ARISTOTELES, <i>Categoriae</i>

- Aristotelis Categoriae et liber de interpretatione*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford, 1949, pp. 3-45.
- CparG I et** *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum*, ed. E.L. Leutsch and F.G. Schneidewin, 2 vols, Göttingen, 1:1839; 2:1851.
- CparG II**
- Damasc.** DAMASCIUS, *De principiis*
- De princ.** *Damascii successoris dubitationes et solutiones*, ed. C.É. Ruelle, vol. 1, Paris, 1889.
- De anima** ARISTOTELES, *De anima*
Aristotle, *De anima*, ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford, 1961.
- Elias, In Porph.** ELIAS, *In Porphyrii isagogen*
Eliae in Porphyrii isagogen et Aristotelis categorias commentaria, ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1900, pp. 35-104.
- Eustrat., Comm.** EUSTRATIUS NICAENUS, *Commentaria*
Eustratii in analyticorum posteriorum librum secundum commentarium, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin, 1907.
- Greg. Naz.** GREGORIUS NAZIANZENSUS, *Funebris oratio in laudem Basilii Magni Caesareae in Cappadocia episcopi (orat. 43)*
Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours funèbres en l'honneur de son frère Césaire et de Basile de Césarée*, ed. F. Boulenger, Paris, 1908, pp. 58-230.
- Hyginus** HYGINUS, *Fabulae*
Hygini Fabulae, ed. H.J. Rose, Leiden, 1967.
- Icaromenippos** LUCIANUS SAMOSATENSIS, *Icaromenippos*
Lucian, vol. 2, ed. A.M. Harmon (Loeb, 54), Cambridge-MA, 1915, pp. 268-322.
- Ilias** HOMERUS, *Ilias*
Homeri Ilias, ed. T.W. Allen, Oxford, 1931.
- Indicopleustes** COSMAS INDICOPLEUSTES, *Topographia Christiana*
Cosmas Indicopleustès, *Topographie chrétienne*, ed. W. Wolska-Conus, 3 vols. (Sources chrétiennes, 141, 159, 197), Paris, 1:1968; 2:1970; 3:1973.
- Isagoge** PORPHYRIUS TYRIUS, *Isagoge sive quinque voces*
Porphyrii isagoge et in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, ed. A. Busse (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 4.1), Berlin, 1887, pp. 1-22.
- Lycophron** LYCOPHRON, *Alexandra*
Lycophronis Alexandra, ed. L. Mascialino, Leipzig, 1964.
- Lysis** PLATO, *Lysis*
Platonis Opera, vol. 3, ed. J. Burnet, Oxford, 1903, St II.203a-223b.

- Mang. Prodromus** MANGANEIUS PRODROMUS, *Carmina Theodori Prodromi de Manganis*, ed. S. Bernardinello, Padova, 1972.
- Menandr.** MENANDRUS ATHENIENSIS, *Fragmenta Menandri quae supersunt*, ed. A. Körte and A. Thierfelder, vol. 2, Leipzig, 1959.
- Metaphysica** ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica Aristotelis Metaphysica*, ed. W.D. Ross, 2 vols., Oxford, 1924.
- Michael Italicus** MICHAEL ITALICUS, *Epistulae Michel Italikos, Lettres et discours*, ed. P. Gautier, Paris, 1972.
- Odyssea** HOMERUS, *Odyssea Homeri Odyssea*, ed. P. von der Mühl, Basel, 1962.
- Opera et Dies** HESIODUS ASCRAEUS, *Opera et Dies Hesiodi opera*, ed. F. Solmsen, Oxford, 1970, pp. 49-85.
- Phaedo** PLATO, *Phaedo Platonis Opera*, ed. J. Burnet, vol. 1, Oxford, 1900, St I.57a-118a.
- Phaedr.** PLATO, *Phaedrus Platonis Opera*, ed. J. Burnet, vol. 2, Oxford, 1901, St III.227a-279c.
- Phileb.** PLATO, *Philebus Platonis Opera*, ed. J. Burnet, vol. 2, Oxford, 1901, St II.11a-67b.
- Physica** ARISTOTELES, *Physica Aristotelis Physica*, ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford, 1950.
- Pindar., O.** PINDARUS, *Olympia Pindari carmina cum fragmentis*, ed. H. Maehler (post B. Snell), pt. 1, Leipzig, 1971.
- Plut., Alexander** PLUTARCHUS, *Alexander Plutarchi vitae parallelae*, ed. K. Ziegler, vol. 2.2, Leipzig, 1968, pp. 152-253.
- Plut., De defectu oraculorum** PLUTARCHUS, *De defectu oraculorum Plutarchi moralia*, ed. W. Sieveking, vol. 3, Leipzig, 1929, pp. 59-122.
- Proclus, In Plat.** PROCLUS, *In Platonis rem publicam commentarii Procli Diadochi in Platonis rem publicam commentarii*, ed. W. Kroll, vol. 2, Leipzig, 1901.
- Ps.-Apollodor.** PSEUDO-APOLLODORUS, *Bibliotheca Apollodori Bibliotheca, Pediasimi libellus de duodecim Herculis laboribus*, ed. R. Wagner, Leipzig, 1894, pp. 1-169.
- Respublica** PLATO, *Respublica Platonis Opera*, ed. J. Burnet, vol. 4, Oxford, 1902, St II.327a-621d.

- Sophistici Elenchi** ARISTOTELES, *Sophistici Elenchi*
Aristotelis Topica et sophistici elenchi, ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford, 1958,
 pp. 190-251.
- Stobaeus** IOHANNES STOBAEUS, *Anthologium*
Ioannis Stobaei anthologium, ed. O. Hense et C. Wachsmuth, vol.
 3, Berlin, 1894.
- Stromata** CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS, *Stromata*
 Clemens Alexandrinus, vol. 2, ed. L. Früchtel, O. Stählin et U. Treu,
 Berlin, 1960.
- Th. Prodromus** THEODORUS PRODROMUS, *In eos qui ob paupertatem providentiae*
conviciantur
 Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca, t. 133, ed. J.-P. Migne,
 Paris, 1804, cols. 1291-1302.
- Theaetetus** PLATO, *Theaetetus*
Platonis Opera, ed. J. Burnet, vol. 1, Oxford, 1900, St I.142a–210d.
- Theages** PLATO, *Theages*
Platonis opera, ed. J. Burnet, vol. 3, Oxford, 1903, St I.121a–131a.
- Theogonia** HESIODUS ASCRAEUS, *Theogonia*
 Hesiod, *Theogony*, ed. M.L. West, Oxford, 1966.
- Topica** ARISTOTELES, *Topica*
Aristotelis topica et sophistici elenchi, ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford, 1958,
 pp. 1-189.
- Vita Meletii** THEODORUS PRODROMUS, *Vita S. Meletii iunioris*
 “Николая епископа Мефонского и Феодора Продрома,
 писателей XII столетия, жития Мелетия Нового,” изд. и пер.
 В.Г. Васильевский, in: *Православный Палестинский Сборник*,
 Вып. 17, Санкт-Петербург, 1886, с. 40-69 (*Meletios of Myoupolis*
 – *Vitae by Nicholas of Methone and Theodore Prodromos*, ed. Vasi-
 lievskij, Saint-Petersburg, 1886, pp. 40-69).

7 *Conspectus Siglorum*

- B** *Codex Baroccianus* 165 (XV s.)
- O** *Codex Baroccianus* 187 (XVI s.)
- P** *Codex Parisinus supplementi graeci* 655 (XIV s.)
- V** *Codex Vaticanus graecus* 305 (XIII s.)

Ξενέδημος ἡ φωναί¹(p. 204
Cramer)

- Μουσαῖος · εἶεν ὦ παῖ Ἀριστάνδρου · Θεοκλέος δέ τινα φήμην Βυζαντίου ἔχεις
 ἑλὼν , ἀνδρὸς ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασι φιλοσόφων ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τεθειμένου , ὡς
 5 ἐμέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ὁπόση τις ἱερὰ περὶ τάνδρὸς ὁμφῇ ἐκκεκῶφωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν
 ἐκείθεν καταιρόντων Ἀθήνησιν · οἷ με καὶ τῶν ὤτων¹ οἷον ἀπηρωρήκεσαν τοῖς
 τεραστίοις περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ διηγῆμασι καὶ ἀκούσμασι · ἀπείδῃ πολὺς
 ἐνεκείμην ἐκείνοις ἐναργῇ² μοι παραστήσειν αὐτὸν , οἱ δὲ , παρὰ σέ ἥκειν
 ἐκέλευον εἰ τρανῶς³ ἀναθεωρῆσαι βουλοίμην τὸν Θεοκλέα · αὐτήκοον γάρ σε
 10 τῆς ἐκείνου γενέσθαι φιλοσοφίας , καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀγχιστείας δὲ ἄλλως εἶναι
 γένους οὐ πόρρω · οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε σοῦ καταψεύσαιντο οἱ εἰπόντες μήτε σὺ τὸν
 φίλιον ἀποπροσποιοῖο , λέγοις οὐκ ἂν φθάνων ἥδη τὸν ἄνθρωπον ·
 Ξενέδημος · τοῦτ' ἐκείνο Μούσαιε ἄτὸν ἵππον ἄγεις εἰς τὸ πεδῖον⁴ · καὶ βῶ
 παροιμιακῶ δελφίνι δίδως τὴν θάλατταν^b · περὶ οὗ γὰρ ἄλλου μάλλον⁵ ἢ
 15 ἀκούοιμ' ἂν ἥδιον ἢ διηγόιμην , ἢ Θεοκλέος · ὅς περὶ τὴν⁶ τρύγα μὲν ἐξέφυ
 τοῦ βίου^c · τὸ δὲ μὴ ^dτὸν γενάρχη γηράσαι χρόνον^d τοῖς καθ' ἑαυτὸν
 ἐπιστώσατο · ἐφύσιν μὲν αἰθερίαν⁷ εἰληχῶς καὶ πτηνὴν · καὶ οὐ μόνον ἔπ'
 ἄκρων ἀνθερίκων κατὰ τὰς Ὀμηρικὰς φερομένην αἶθας^f · ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν
 γεγρανὴν βασιλικῶ τῷ πῆχει ὑπερναβάσαν οὐσίαν · τὸ δὲ ἀέριον ὑπερπτάσαν
 20 χύμα καὶ τὴν τοῦ ὑπεκκαύματος⁸ λεπτομέρειαν · μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀστρώαν φύσιν
 καὶ πλανωμένην τῇ ἀπλανεῖ καὶ ἀνάστρω πελάσασαν , καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ
 γενομένην^e · ἔγλωσσαν δὲ πλουτήσας ἀττικὸν πυρὸς μένος πνεύουσαν πολὺ

^{a-a} cf. CparG I 191, CparG II 464 ^{b-b} cf. CparG I 237 ^{c-c} *Lp. Vita Meletii* 41.7 ^{d-d} cf. Damasc., *De princ.* 318.10; Proclus, *In Plat.* 138.14; Pindar., *O. II.17* ^{e-e} *all. Phaedr.* 249c; *Phaedo* 109e ^{f-f} cf. *Ilias* XX.227; *Lp. Mang. Prodromus* V.27–28 ^{g-g} cf. *Ilias* VI.181–182; *Theogonia* 319; Greg. Naz., *or. XLIII*, cap. 23, §4.1–2

Tit. ¹ Ξενέδημος ἡ φωναί] τοῦ αὐτοῦ προδρόμου ἀπορία ἀπὸ τῶν φωνῶν Ξενέδημος ἡ φωναί V τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ξενέδημος ἡ φωναί PB om. O

¹ ὄντων O ² ἀργῇ O ³ τεανῶς BO ⁴ παιδίον BO ⁵ om. P ⁶ τὸν VP ⁷ αἰθέριον V

⁸ ὑπερκαύματος O

(p. 205)

πλέον · ἢ ἦν οἱ μῦθοι πλάττουσι χίμαιραν⁸ · κἄν ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἀνεδίπλου ἐνίοτε συλλαβὴν καὶ φωνὴν · οὐ μὰ τὸν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος ἐπικειευόμενος ἔλεγε διὰ πλημμέλειαν φύσεως^a · ἀλλ' ἵνα τῇ διπλῇ τῆς ἀπηχρήσεως διπλασιάζοι τὴν ἀπορρέουσιν ἡδονὴν · τιμῶν κἄν τούτῳ τὴν παροιμίαν · ^bδὶς¹ τὰ καλὰ παραγγέλλουσιν γίνεσθαι^b · .

5

Μουσαῖος · ὦ Ἡράκλεις · αὐτόν μοι τὸν Ἑρμῆν ἀναγράφῃ τῷ λόγῳ · καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἔραμαι τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπολιπὼν φοιτῆσαι πρὸς τὸ Βυζάντιον · ὅπως ἂν καὶ ξυγγενέσθαι μοι τάνθρωπῳ γένοιτο · .

Ξενέδημος · τί δ' ἂν ὦ λῶστε καὶ ἐπεπόνθεις εἴ πῃ τυχὸν τὰς ἐκείνῳ πεπονημένας βίβλους ἱστορήκας · ὡς μὲν, πλείστας · ὡς δὲ, καλλίστας · ὡς δὲ, διαφόρους τοῖς εἶδεσι καὶ τοῖς χαρακτήρσιν · αἱ μὲν γὰρ οἱ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλέας ἀναγεγράφονται, πολέμους καὶ νίκας · εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ καὶ τὰ δυσφημότερα νόσους καὶ θανάτους ἐπικαίρως² ὡς ἕκαστα διασκευαζόμεναι · καὶ τούτων αἱ μὲν, μέτρῳ καὶ τούτῳ ποικίλῳ τὲ καὶ παντοδαπῷ · αἱ δὲ, πεξευούσῃ τῇ γραφῇ μεμερίδονται · αἱ δὲ³, πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ τὰ συμπίπτοντα ἄλλως τετάχεται · ὁμοίως καὶ αὗται τῷ ἐμμέτρῳ καὶ πεζῷ μεριζόμεναι · ὁκνῶ γὰρ λέγειν ὅσος μὲν εἰπεῖν⁴ ὁ ἀνὴρ · ὅσος δὲ αὐτοματίσαι γράμμα καὶ ταῦτα ἐπὶ μεγίστοις · θάττον ἥλιος κάμοι⁵ πυρίνοις ἵπποις διῖππεύων τὸ ὑπὲρ γῆς ἡμισφαίριον, ἢ ἡ γλῶσσα ἐκείνη καὶ χεὶρ, ^cμικροῖς τὰ μεγάλα διασαφοῦσα λόγοις καὶ γράμμασι πράγματα · καὶ τὰ μικρὰ μεγάλους διοικονομουμένη^c · .

10

15

20

Μουσαῖος · εἴτ' ὦ παῖ Ἀριστάνδρου τηλικούτον ἔθρεψε τὸ Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα, ὃν μόγις ἂν καὶ Ἑλλάδες ὄλαι;

Ξενέδημος · οὐδ' ἐκεῖνος οὐ μὰ τὴν θέμιν τῇ πατρίδι πάνυ ἰλαρῶς προσεφέρετο ταῖς παλαιαῖς περὶ ταύτης πειθόμενος ἱστορίαις · ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἐξονειδίζειν⁶ αὐτόν εἰς τὴν ἐνεγκαμένην ἐθέλουσι, μεγαλοψύχως ἀπῆντα · .

25

^{a-a} *Lp.* Th. Prodrōmus, col. 1297–1298 ^{b-b} *cf.* Phileb. 59e.1; CparG I 66 ^{c-c} *Lp.* Michael Italicus 63.15

¹ διὸ BO ² ἐπικαίρους BO ³ αἱ δὲ V : ὡς δὲ BO πεξευούσῃ — δὲ om. P ⁴ om. P ⁵ τέμοι P ⁶ ἐξονειδίσιν P

καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅσα ταύτην ἐσεμνολόγει· ^aπροκαθεζομένην τὲ τῆς ἐώας
 ὀνομάζων μητρόπολιν^a· καὶ τῆς ὅλης οἰκουμένης καρδίαν· ἐώας τὲ καὶ
 ἐσπερίου λήξεως σύνδεσμον· ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν ἐπιτηδεῖων ἔπηλυν
 5 ἑαυτὸν Βυζαντίους καὶ παράγραπτον πολίτην ἐγνώριζε· τὸ γὰρ οἱ γένος ἐξ
 Ἰταλίας ὠρμήσθαι ἔλεγε·.

Μουσαῖος· μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ὅλως ἡρωϊκὰ τῷ ἀνδρὶ· ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐχ
 ἴσθησι τὴν ὁρμὴν τῆς ἐφέσεως· καὶ τοσαῦτα γε ὄντα· φύσιν μὲν γὰρ¹ ἀπλῶς
 πτηνὴν· καὶ γλώσσαν δεινὴν· καὶ χεῖρα γοργήν, καὶ ψυχὴν σοφὴν (p. 206)
 ὑπογράφουσιν· ἐμοὶ δ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἀσαφέστερος ὁ ἐκ τῶν κοινοτέρων
 10 ὁτουοῦν δοκεῖ γνωρισμός· καὶ ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀπόχρη ἀθηναῖον εἰπόντας εὐθύς
 αἰνίζεσθαι Πλάτωνα· εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος γνωρίσματα εἴπομεν· τυχὸν
 τὸν ἐν Τιμαίῳ φυσικευσάμενον²· τὸν ἐν Φαίδωνι περὶ ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας
 φιλοσοφῆσαντα· τὸν γράψαντα νόμους· τὸν οἰκίσαντα πόλεις· τὸν³, ἵνα μὴ
 τὰ καθέκαστον ἐπεξίωμεν, ὀνομαστὶ Πλάτωνα· οὕτως οὐδὲ Θεοκλέα τὰ
 15 ρηθέντα παρίστησιν ἄντικρυς, εἰ μὴ μοι καὶ ἰδίως τῶν ἐκείνῳ πεπονημένων⁴ ἢ
 καὶ ἄλλως εἰρημένων τινὰ· εἰ δ' οἶον τε, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα ὑπ' ὅψιν ἀγάγῃς·.
 Ξενόδημος· τὸν Ἄθω με ὦ φίλ' ἑταῖρε ἀνορύττειν κελεύεις, ἢ ^bτὴν στεφάνην
 τῆς γῆς διαμετρεῖν τὸν ὠκεανόν^b, τὰ Θεοκλέος κελεύων ἀναλέγεσθαι
 γράμματα· ἀλλ' ὅσα μὲν ἐκείνῳ καὶ εὔρηται καὶ ὑπὸ διφθέραις ἐντέθεται,
 20 λῶϊον ἂν εἰδῇς τοῖς ἐκείνου ἐντυχὼν πονήμασι, πολλοῖς ὦ χάριτες καὶ
 καλοῖς· ἃ δ' ἐμοὶ μειρακίῳ γε ὄντι καὶ οὐδέπω τῷ ἰούλῳ γεωμετρηθέντι τὴν
 γένυν, ἐκ μηχανῆς ὁ φασι⁵ εὖς, ἐντυχὼν διελέξατο, οὐ φθονήσαιμ' ἂν
 Μουσαίῳ εἰπεῖν· ἢ γὰρ ἑμαυτῷ φθονοίην Μουσαίῳ φθονῶν· ἀγαθὸς γάρ μοι
 25 δαίμων⁶ ἐς διδασκάλου ποτέ φοιτῶντι, τὸν ἄνδρα συμπαρέστησε τοῦτον· καὶ
 ὃς ἅμα ἰδὼν με καὶ ἀναγνοὺς, [Θεοκλῆς] ὦ λόγοι ἀνέκραγεν, οὐχ ὁ καλὸς
 οὐτοσί Ξενόδημος, αὐτότατος οὗτος· καὶ ἅμα ἐπιπήσας μου τῇ χειρὶ τὴν

^{a-a} cf. Greg. Naz., or. XLIII, cap. 14, §1.1–2 ^{b-b} Indicopleustes, lib. II, §36.10; lib. III, §52.3; lib. V, §34.6 ^{c-c} cf. Phaedo 89b.2–4

¹ om. BO ² φυσικευόμενον P ³ om. BO ⁴ ποτέ πενημένων O ⁵ φθασι O ⁶ δαιμόνων V

κόμην · ξανθή δέ μοι τηνικαῦτα μέχρι καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ὤμους καθεῖτο τῷ ζεφύρῳ
 παίζουσα^c, ^aποιὶ δὴ¹ καὶ πόθεν^a ἔφη Ξενεδημήδιον · ἢ τάχα² ἐς διδασκάλου · εἰ
 μὴ με ^bἢ ὑπὸ κόλπον βίβλος^b καὶ τὸ ἐν χεῖλεσιν ὑπόψαλμα³ διαψεύδε-
 ται · [Ξενέδημος] ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ μὴ πῶ ποτέ σοι ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ^cὁ μάντις τὸ
 κρήγυσον ἔειπεν⁴, ἀλλὰ νῦν παρὰ γὰρ Ἑρμαγόραν ἄπειμι τὸν διδασκαλόν · 5
 [Θεοκλῆς] τί δὲ ἦ δ' ὅς παιδεύσεως μέτει μέρος · ὑπ' αὐτῷ καθηγεμόνι τοῦ
 λόγου · [Ξενέδημος] τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους ἔφην κατηγορίας · [Θεοκλῆς] καὶ ὅς
 ἀγαθὰ σοι εἶπε τὰ προοίμια ὦ παιδίον · καὶ ὄντως ^dεὐτυχεῖ θαλάμῳ χρυσέας
 ὑπεστήσω τὰς⁵ κίονας^{d6} · σοφώτατόν τε γὰρ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ διδασκάλων ὁ
 Ἑρμαγόρας πολυμαθέστατος · ἐκ πολλῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ^eτῆς ὑπῆνης 10
 μάλιστα καὶ τῆς ὥχρας · τῆς μὲν, τὰ πρόσωπα περιπλανωμένης · τῆς δ' ἄχρι
 καὶ ἐπὶ γόνατον καθειμένης, τεκμηριούμενος τὸ φιλόσοφον^e · ἀλλ' ἔχοις ἦν τι σε
 καὶ ἐροίμην ἔφη τοῦ μύστακος⁷ ἅμα ἐπιλαβόμενος καὶ ἐπιμειδιάσας τῷ λόγῳ,
 μὴ ἀνάξια τῆς Ἑρμαγόρου διδασκαλίας ἀποκρινεῖσθαι ; [Ξενέδημος]
 ἔχοιμ' ἂν · [Θεοκλῆς] τὴν Πορφυρίου δ' ἔφη πάντως⁸ προτελέσθης 15
 εἰσαγωγὴν · [Ξενέδημος] πάνυ τι ἦν δ' ἐγὼ · [Θεοκλῆς] οὐκοῦν ἀρξώμεθα
 εἶπεν ἐκ ταύτης · καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τοῦ γένους ζητήσωμεν ·
 [Ξενέδημος] ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμόν μοι ἦν δ' ἐγὼ τὸ γένος ὀλεῖται · εἰ μὴ σοι τὰ περὶ
 γένους ἀκριβῶς διασαφισαίμην⁹ · [Θεοκλῆς] καὶ μὴν οὐδὲν τί σε ἄλλο
 πρῶτον ἐροίμην ἔφη ὁ Θεοκλῆς, ἢ ὁ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστηθῆναι ἀνάγκη · 20
 τοῦτο γὰρ πρῶτον ζητητέον, ὃ καὶ πρῶτον ἐπιστητέον · εἰ μὴ ἀπιστητέον¹⁰
 Ἀριστοτέλει ^fτὰ ζητούμενα ὡσαύτως ἔχειν λέγοντι, τοῖς ἄ ἐπιστάμεθα^f ·
 ἑπρότερον οὖν εἰ¹¹ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἔστι τὸ γένος ἀπαιτητέον^g · [Ξενέδημος] ἀλλ'
 ἔστι γε ἦν δ' ἐγὼ καὶ τῶν ὄντων τὸ κάλλιστον · [Θεοκλῆς] καὶ ὅς ὀρθῶς ἔφη
 λέγεις · οἰχῆσεται γὰρ ἡμῖν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο δοθεῖν, τὰ πλείονα¹² τῶν βιβλίων · 25

a-a Phaedr. 227a b-b *all.* Phaedr. 228b c-c *cf.* Ilias I.106 d-d *cf.* Pindar., O. VI.1-3
 e-e *cf.* Icaromenippos §5 f-f *cf.* Analytica posteriora 89b g-g *all.* Isagoge 1.9-16

¹ ποῖ δὲ P πῇ δὴ B πῇ δὲ O ² καὶ add. P ³ corr. ὑπόψηλμα VPBO ⁴ ἔοιπεν P ⁵ τοῦ P
⁶ πινδάρου in marg. V ⁷ μάστακος P ⁸ δ' ἔφη πάντως] πάντως ἔφη P ⁹ διεσαφισαίμην O
¹⁰ ἐπιστητέον P ¹¹ om. O ¹² πλέονα BO

- καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀνατραπήσεται· καὶ συνόλως τὰ ἄνω κάτω
γενήσεται· τί¹ δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ καὶ τίιν ἀποδίδεται λόγῳ, λέγοις² ἂν
ἐφεξῆς· καὶ ἅμα ὑποφθάσας ἐγώ, τὴν παρὰ Πορφυρίῳ τοῦ γένους
ὑπογραφὴν· ἔτυχον γὰρ οὐκ ἀμελετήτως ἔχων τοῦ βιβλίου, ἀπεστομάτισα·
5 καὶ ὅς χαίρει εἶπεν ὦ τέκνον· πλήν ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν τοῦ γένους ὑπογραφῆς³ ὡς
κάλλιστά σου φαμένου, ξυνήκαμεν· τί δὲ τῶν ὄντων ὑπάρχον τὸ γένος, τῷ
τοιούτῳ ἀποδίδεται λόγῳ, οὕτω ξυνίαμεν· τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀπάντων εἰς τὴν
δεκάδα τῶν κατηγοριῶν ὡς εἰς⁴ ἀρχὰς ἀνάρχους ἀναλυθέντων ὡς μὴ ἐξεῖναι
τι τῶν⁵ ὄλων, τὰς λαβυρίνθους ταυτησί τῆς δεκάδος διεξελεῖν, ζητῶ τινί γ'
10 ἂν αὐτῶν τὸ γένος οἰκειωθῇσεται· [Ξενόδημος] πρὸς φιλοσοφίας τῷ πρὸς τι,
γένος γὰρ εἶδους ἐστίν· [Θεοκλῆς] ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄπορον πάλιν οὐδὲν ἤττον
μεμένηκεν ἄπορον· τί γὰρ ὄν, ἐρήσομαι σε πάλιν, ἔπειτα τὴν πρὸς τὸ εἶδος
εἵληχε σχέσιν· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι ^aπρῶτον Σωκράτην ἵνα παρυσταίῃ αὐτῷ καὶ (p. 208)
πατήρ^a· καὶ ^bπρότερον ὑποτεθῆναι τετράδα· ἵνα τὸ ἥμισυ ταύτη παραφυῇ
15 ἐὰν οὕτω τύχη ἢ τὸ διπλάσιον^b· τί γοῦν⁶ καὶ τὸ γένος γε ὃν ἔπειτα πρὸς τι
πῶς ἔχει· καὶ τίιν τῆς δεκάδος μέρει τοῦτο συνάψαιμεν· πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνάγκη
τῆς λοιπῆς ἀλλοτριῶσαι αὐτὸ ἐννεάδος ὁποιοῦν ἐνὶ προσαρμόσαντας· ἀλλὰ
μὴν ὁρώμεν καὶ τὰ δέκα αὐτὸ μερισάμενα· κατὰ⁷ ζυγὰ καὶ λόγους
ἀπαρρρόπους⁸ ἰσότητος· ὡς μὴδὲν μᾶλλον ἔτερον ἐτέρου γένους⁹ εἶναι καὶ
20 γενικώτατον· κινδυνεύει οὖν ἢ τὸ εἶναι τὸ¹⁰ γένος διαπεσεῖν, ἢ ὄν, ἔξω τῆς
δεκάδος καὶ ὑπὲρ ταύτην εἶναι ὑποτεθῆναι· εἰ δὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἀλογισταίνει¹¹,
τὸ δεύτερον ἀναγκαίως εἰσάγεται· [Ξενόδημος] πάνυ τι ἦν δ' ἐγώ καὶ οὐκ
ἔστιν ἄλλως εἰπεῖν·
Μουσαῖος· εἰπέ μοι ὦ Ξενόδημε ξυνίεις δὲ σὺ τηνικαῦτα τηλικαύτης¹²
25 ὑψηλογλογίας καὶ θεωρίας κομιδῇ φιλοσοφίας πρωτόπειρος ὡς ἔφησθα ὦν· εἰ
μή μοι κατατιτῶ τοῦ πράγματος, τὸ ὅξυ σου τῆς φύσεως, καὶ πτηνὸν· καὶ

^{a-a} *all.* *Metaphysica* 1021a.21–24 ^{b-b} *all.* *Categoriae* 6b.30–31; 7b.16–21; 14b.29–33;
Sophistici Elenchi 181b.32–34; *Topica* 142a.27–31

¹ τίιν O ² λέξεις O ³ ὑπογραφὴν O ⁴ om. P ⁵ ὄντων add. P ⁶ οὖν P ⁷ καὶ τὰ P
⁸ ἀπαρρρόπους P ⁹ γένους O ¹⁰ om. P ¹¹ ἀλογισθαίνει O ¹² τηνικαύτης P

σφαίρα κατὰ πρανοῦς τεθειμένη καὶ μόνου δεδεημένη τοῦ πρώτως κινήσοντος· εἰκοῶς·.

Ξενέδημος· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως¹ ὦ λῶστε· τὸ δ' ὅλον ἢ Σειρήν² ἐκείνη τῆς γλῶττης ἦν εἰς³ αὐτὸ τῶν καρδιῶν τὸ βάθος ἐνημαίνουσα τὰ νοήματα· [Θεοκλῆς] κάπειδῆπερ οὕτω ταῦτα καὶ συνδοκεῖ Ξενεδήμῳ ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ 5 Θεοκλῆς, κατηγορῶμεν τῶν δέκα⁴ τοῦ γένους τὸ ὄνομα· [Ξενέδημος] κατηγορῶμεν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· [Θεοκλῆς] μὴ πρότερον ἔφη πρὸς Ἑρμοῦ καὶ Μουσῶν, πρὶν καὶ τὸν⁵ κατὰ τοῦνομά οἱ, ἐπισκεψόμεθα λόγον· ἔν' εἰδέναι ἔχωμεν ὅπως ποτε ἡμῖν τὸ κατηγορήμα ἔξει· [Ξενέδημος] ἀλλ' εὐεπίσκεπτος ἔφην ὁ λόγος· καὶ οὐ πολὺ⁶ τι περὶ τούτου καμούμεθα· ἄγε⁷ 10 γὰρ καὶ ἀνωτέρω⁷ ἐφάμην εἶναι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφορῶν⁸ τῷ εἶδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον^a· [Θεοκλῆς] εἰ τοίνυν εἶπεν ὁ Θεοκλῆς τὸ μὲν τοῦ γένους ὄνομα κατηγορεῖται τῶν κατηγοριῶν· ὁ δὲ κατὰ⁹ τοῦνομα τούτου λόγος, οὐχὶ, ὁ μῶνυμος^b ἡμῖν πεφώραται ἢ κατηγορία· εἰ δ' ἅμα ταῦτα, 15 «συνώνυμος^c· [Ξενέδημος] ἀλλ' ἅμα γε ἦν δ' ἐγὼ καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦνομα τοῦ γένους ἢ ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα τούτου λόγος κατηγορεῖται τῶν κατηγοριῶν· καὶ γένῃ γὰρ ἅμα πάντα καὶ ὁ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφορῶν τῷ εἶδει λεγόμενα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι^d· [Θεοκλῆς] τί οὖν λοιπὸν ἔφη ὁ Θεοκλῆς ἀπὸ τῆς 20 ζητήσεως εὗρομεν συνωνύμου τῆς κατηγορίας ἀναφανείσης, ἢ γένος εἶναι τῶν δέκα τὸ γένος· εἴ γε κατὰ πλειόνων αὐτῶν καὶ διαφορῶν τῷ εἶδει καὶ ἐν τῷ, τί ἐστι λέγεται, κινδυνεύει· μετέπεσεν οὖν ἡμῖν ἢ πολυαρχία εἰς μοναρχίαν· καὶ εἰς ἐνάδα τὸ πλῆθος· εἰ δέ τις πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν φωνὴν τὸ γένος λέγων εἶναι ἀπράγματος· μὴ δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑφεστῶσαν· ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς προχειρίζομένοις τῶν δέκα τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνουσας, πρῶτα μὲν 25 τῆς ἀντιθέσεως κατεῖρυνουσάμενοι, ἀφιλόσοφος οὖν ὁ Πορφύριος φῶμεν ὦ ξένη· ἀνυπόστατον φωνὴν ὀρισάμενος· ὅσον γὰρ ἐκάστου ὄρον, τῆς τούτου¹⁰

^{a-a} Isagoge 2.15–16 ^{b-b} cf. Categoriae 1a.1–6 ^{c-c} cf. Categoriae 1a.6–12 ^{d-d} Isagoge 2.15–16 ^{e-e} cf. Metaphysica 1029b.12–14; Physica 194b.26–27

¹ ἴσος V ² Σερρήν O ³ ἐς BO ⁴ δέκα] δε O ⁵ τῶν O ⁶ περὶ O ⁷ ἀμφοτέρω P ⁸ διαφερόντων P ⁹ δὲ κατὰ] δέκα BO ¹⁰ τούτων BO

- φύσεως εἶναι δηλωτικὸν^ε, ἡγνόησε μὴ ὑπὸ σοί γε ὡς ἔοικε παιδαγωγῆθεις
καὶ τελεσθεῖς τὰ ἀπόρρητα· ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ ζῶον, τοιαύτην εἶναι φωνὴν
ἀνυπόστατον ὑποθέσθαι αὐτὸν ἀπαιτήσομεν¹· εἰ μὴ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ληφθεῖη,
καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὴ θεωρουμένην· καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη κομίσομεν μάρτυρα ^ατὸ
5 ζῶον λέγοντα τὸ καθόλου, ἢ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἢ ὕστερον^α· εἰ δ' ὑπόστασιν ἐκεῖνος
τῷ ζῳῷ² διδοίη· ^βοὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικὴν^β τιθέμενος εἶναι· κατὰ ταυτὸν
καὶ ἡμεῖς, τῷ γένει ὑπόστασιν δοίημεν· ^ετὸ κατὰ πλεόνων ἀποδιδόντες καὶ
διαφόρων τῷ εἶδει καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι^ε· ταῦτα φάμενος καὶ δὴ μικρὸν
ἡρεμήσας· καὶ ὅλοις βλεφάροις πρὸς ἐμὲ ἀφεωρακῶς, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπέισθης
10 ἔφη, χάρις τῷ λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ Πλατωνικόν, ^δτί σοι ἔτι³
ποιήσω· ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον^δ, ὅμως κοινωτέα ταῦτα καὶ
Ἑρμαγόρα· καὶ ἴσως ἢ ὑπήνη ἔχει τί λέξαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερον·
[Ξενόδημος] καὶ ναὶ μὰ τοὺς λόγους ἔφην, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν λόγον
φέρων ἐνέθηκας⁴· ὥστ' οὐδ' Ἑρμαγόρου ἔτι δεήσομαι· [Θεοκλῆς] τί οὖν
15 λοιπὸν ἢ δ' ὅς· μεταβατέον ἡμῖν ἀπὶ τὰ πρόσω τῆς ἐγχειρήσεως, ἢ αὐτοῦ
μενετέον⁵· [Ξενόδημος] μεταβατέον ἦν δ' ἐγὼ πρὸς χαρίτων· [Θεοκλῆς] πῇ
δὴ⁶ ἄλλη ἔφη, ἢ δῆλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν δευτέραν τῆς κλίμακος ταυτησι⁷ βαθμίδα
τὸ εἶδος· καὶ ἀπορητέον εἰ πῇ⁸ ἐγχωροίη κἀνταῦθα· μηδὲν ὑποστειλαμένους
εἰ πρὸς κρείττονας ἀντιλέγοιμεν· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κατὰ τὸν εἰπόντα, ^εοὐκ οἰμαί
20 τινά οὕτως εὐτυχῇ γραφὴν, ἢ μηδεὶς ἀντερεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐκείνην εὐλογον, ἢ
μηδεὶς εὐλόγως ἀντερεῖ^ε· καὶ ἄλλως δὲ τὸ Δημοκρίτειον ἐκεῖνο καλῶς ἂν
ἔχοι καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν·
>> ἴστρεπτή γλῶσσα βροτοῖς⁹· πολέες δ' ἐν μῦθοι
>> παντοίων ἐπέων δὲ πολὺς νόμος ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα^ε·

^{a-a} De anima 402b.7–8 ^{b-b} cf. Topica 135a.16–19; Isagoge 10 ^{c-c} Isagoge 2.15–16

^{d-d} Respublica 345b.5–6 ^{e-e} *l.p.* Stromata, lib. 1, cap. 1, §17.2 ^{f-f} Ilias XX.248–249; Stromata, lib. 1, cap. 3, §22.2–3

¹ ἀπαντήσομεν O ² τῶν ζῳῶν P τῷ ζῳδίῳ O ³ ἔστι O ⁴ ἀνέθηκας O ⁵ μεταβατέον — μενετέον om. O ⁶ δὲ BO ⁷ ταυτασί VP ⁸ γ' add. O ⁹ om. P

τοι γὰρ ἀκολούθως κἀνταῦθα τὸν λόγον ἐφοδευτέον· καὶ τὸν τοῦ κυρίου εἶδους ἡγουν τοῦ ειδικωτάτου λόγον· ὅς τις ποτέ ἐστι πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαιτητέον· [Ξενέδημος] ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ μάτην μοι ἐν χεροῖν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ παντάπασι τὸ βιβλίον, ^aειδικώτατον εἶδος εἶναι λέγεται, τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον^a· [Θεοκλῆς] ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ μοῖραν, ἥ δ' ὅς ἡ ἀπόκρισις Ξενεδήμω·

>> ^bοὐδέ σοι βέλος ἄλιον ἔκπεσε γλώσσης^b·

>> ^cἄλλο δέ τοι² ἐρέω· σὺ δ' ἔμφρονα μῦθον ὀπάζοις^c·

ἵνα τελέως ὁ λόγος ραψωδηθῇ· τίνοι τὸν ἀποδοθέντα λόγον ἐφαρμόττεις εἶδει· καὶ τίνος ειδικωτάτου εἶναι τιθῆς αὐτὸν, πρὸς Μουσῶν, ἀνθρώπου, ἢ ἵππου, ἢ τοῦδε τῶν ειδικωτάτων καὶ τοῦδε· ἢ τοῦ κοινοῦ τε καὶ ὀλικῶς ειδικωτάτου, τοῦτό γε οἶμαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ξυνθεῖο³ τῷ λόγῳ· ὥς γὰρ ὁ τὸν ἀνθρωπον ὀρίζομενος, οὐ⁴ τόνδε καὶ τόνδε τὸν Σιμμίαν τυχὸν ἢ τὸν Κέβητα· ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀπλῶς ὀρίζεται ἀνθρωπον· καὶ τὸν, τῶν⁵ ἀνὰ μέρος συνεκτικὸν τε, καὶ περιεκτικὸν· ὥς δέ, καὶ ὁ τὸ ζῶον ἀποδιδοὺς, οὐ τὴν ἄρκτον οὐδὲ τὴν πάρδαλιν, ἀλλ' αὐτό γε τὸ ζῶον καθολικῶς ἀποδίδωσι· ^dφύσεως γὰρ δηλωτικὸν ἐστὶ τὸ χρῆμα τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ^d· καθολικὸν δέ αὕτη καὶ ἐναιῖον, οὕτως οὐδ' ὁ τὸ⁶ ειδικώτατον ὀρίζομενος, τά δέ τινα τῶν ειδικωτάτων ὀρίζειτο ἂν, ἀλλ' αὐτό γε συνόλως τὸ ειδικώτατον· οὐδ' ἂν, τὸν ἀνθρωπον· οὐδ' ἂν, τὸν ἵππον· τινὰ γὰρ εἶδη ταῦτα· ὁ δὲ ὀρισμὸς, οὐ τινῶν· ἀλλὰ τοῦ⁷ καθόλου· καὶ πολλὰ μὲν ταῦτα· ὁ δὲ ὀρισμὸς, οὐ πολλῶν· ἀλλ' ἐνός· [Ξενέδημος] πάννυ μὲν οὖν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· [Θεοκλῆς] ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα τοιαῦτα εἶπεν ὁ Θεοκλῆς, οὐχ ὑγιῶς ἂν ἔχοι τοῦ εἶδους ὁ λόγος τῷ Πορφυρίῳ· εἰ γὰρ καθὰ τὲ εἴρηται καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι συνδοκεῖ τοῦ ὀλικῶς ειδικωτάτου καὶ τὰ ἀνὰ μέρος περιέχοντος ειδικώτατα, ἡ ἀπόδοσις ἐστὶ· τὰ δὲ ειδικώτατα ἑτεροφυῇ καὶ εἶδει ἀλλήλων διάφορα, οὐ ^eτὸ κατὰ διαφορῶν τῷ ἀριθμῷ⁸ λεγόμενον ἐν

^{a-a} Isagoge 4.11–12 ^{b-b} cf. Ilias IV.498 ^{c-c} cf. Odyssea XVI.281. ^{d-d} cf. Metaphysica 1029b.12–14; Physica 194b. 26–27 ^{e-e} Isagoge 4.11–12

¹ κυρίως P ² τι PO ³ ξυνθῆς P ⁴ σὺ BO ⁵ τὸν τῶν] τῶν τὸν P ⁶ οὐδὲ τὸ BO ⁷ τῶν BO ⁸ τὸ add. V

τῷ τί ἐστίν^ε, εἶδος ἔδει θέσθαι· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ^ατὸ κατὰ διαφόρων τῷ εἶδει^α·
 πάλιν δὲ εἰ τοῦτο δοθῇ, ὁ λόγος τοῦ εἶδους τῷ τοῦ γένους ταυτισθῆσεται
 λόγῳ· εἰ γὰρ κατ' ἄλλο μὴ δὲν¹ ἀμφοτέρω τῷ ὄρω² διενηνόχαιτον, εἰ μὴ τὸ
 5 διάφορον³ εἶδει καὶ διάφορον ἀριθμῷ, ὑφέλοι δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ τοῦτο, λείπεται
 παντάπασιν ἀλλήλοιν ἰσάζειν τῷ ρηθέντε ὄρω· ὦν δὲ οἱ ὅροι κατ' οὐδὲν
 διαλάττουσι, τούτων οὐδὲ τὰ ὀριζόμενα πράγματα· ἔσται⁴ ἄρα γένος τὲ καὶ
 εἶδος, ταυτὸν· καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ἢ πεντάς τῶν φωνῶν, εἰς τετράδα μετενεχθῇ·
 [Ξενέδημος] οἶ⁵ ἐγὼ δειλαῖος ἦν δ' ἐγὼ τῆς ἀγνοίας· ὁπόση τις μου
 10 περικαθημένη τὸν νοῦν, ἐλάνθανεν· ὡς εἴ τις με ἤρετό ποτε, ποῖον ὦ
 Ξενέδημε κρειττόνως ἀμφοτέροιν τούτοις ἐπίσταιο⁶, τὴν σαυτοῦ κλήσιν, ἢ
 τὴν Πορφυρίου εἰσαγωγὴν, τὸ δεύτερον ἂν, θαρρούντως⁷ ἀπεκρινάμην· νῦν δ'
 ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ πρᾶγμα περιετράπη μοι· καὶ τοῦτό γε
 ἡσθόμην τὸ εἰδέναι μὴδὲν· [Θεοκλῆς] καὶ ὃς ἐπιμειδιάσας, βούλει δὲ εἶπε
 καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν⁸ τρίτην ἀναβαθμίδα τὸν πόδα βάπτομεν ὦ Ξενέδημε;
 15 [Ξενέδημος] πάνυ μὲν, οὖν δαιμόνιε ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· καὶ τοσοῦτον, ὡς καὶ⁹ ἐπὶ τῇ
 κλίμακι ἄχθεσθαί με ὀλιγοβάθμῳ γε οὔση· μέχρι γὰρ καὶ εἰς οὐρανὸν
 προήκειν αὐτὴν ἐβουλόμην πολὺ πλεόν ἢ ἡ^β μῦθος τῶν Ἀλωάδων^β βούλεται·
 [Θεοκλῆς] ναὶ ἦ δ' ὃς ἀλλὰ ^ετὸ Ἀλωάδαις ἐπενεχθὲν ἐπιτίμιον^ε, οὐ τοσαύτην
 οἰκοδομήσαι τὴν κλίμακα τὸν Πορφύριον εἶασε· καίτοι καὶ αὕτη¹⁰ βαθμίσι
 20 μὲν ὀλίγαις καταμετρήται· εἰς αὐτοὺς δὲ ὅμως φθάνει τοὺς οὐρανοὺς·
 [Ξενέδημος] τί γοῦν διαμέλλομεν ἔφην καὶ οὐκ ἀναβαίνομεν¹¹ ἀλλ' ἔτι χαμαὶ
 καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς νεφέλας ἰστάμεθα· [Θεοκλῆς] καὶ ὁ Θεοκλῆς ἀναβαινετέον οὖν
 ἔφη, πλὴν ἀλλὰ δυσάντης γὰρ¹² ἢ ἄνοδος καὶ ἀκροσφαλῆς, σκοπιμώτερόν
 τε βαίνει καὶ ἀνάβαινε βεβαιότερον· μὴ πη καὶ καταρραγῆς πτώμα
 25 οἰκτιστον· [Ξενέδημος] ἀλλ' οὔτι γε ὦ θαυμάσιε εἶπον ὑπὸ σοὶ τῆς ἀνόδου
 ταττόμενος ἡγεμόνι· [Θεοκλῆς] τίς οὖν ἡμῖν ἢ τρίτη αὕτη ἔφη ἀναβαθμῖς·

^{a-a} Isagoge 2.15–16 ^{b-b} cf. *Odyssey* XI.305–385; *Ps.-Apollodor.*, cap. 1, §53–55 ^{c-c} cf. *Hyginus* §28

¹ δ' BO ² λόγῳ P ³ τῷ add. P ⁴ δ' add. P ⁵ οἶον P ⁶ ἐπισται BO ⁷ θαρούντως O ⁸ om. P
⁹ om. P ¹⁰ αὕτη BO ¹¹ ἀναμένομεν P ¹² om. P

(p. 212) [Ξενέδημος] ἡ διαφορὰ ἦν δ' ἐγὼ τὸν λόγον ἀρπάσας· [Θεοκλήης] καὶ ὅς οὐκοῦν τίνα σοι ταύτης ὁ Ἑρμαγόρας καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος πολὺ πρὸ τούτου λόγον ἀπέδοτο· [Ξενέδημος] πολλοὺς μὲν εἶπον καὶ καλοὺς· ἀλλ' οὔτι πάντας ταῖς ἀπάσαις διαφορότησιν ἐφαρμόττοντας· ὁ δὲ κοινῇ ταῖς ἀπάσαις ἀρμόττων, εἶπου ἀπομνημονεύω, τοιοῦτος τίς ἐστι· «διαφορὰ¹ ἐστίν, ὅτῳ διαφέρει ἕκαστα ὡς ὄλον^a· [Θεοκλήης] ἡ δ' ὅς τὸν Πορφύριον μεираκίον καταπέπρωκας²· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐχὶ τέθηπά σε τῆς φύσεως καὶ ὑπερφιλῶ· καίτοι ^bτὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ φιλομεираκίον εἶναι^b μαθὼν παρὰ Πλάτωνος· πλὴν ἀλλὰ ^cπερικρουστέον^c τὸν ὅρον μήτι καὶ κατὰ τὰς οὐχ ὑγαινούσας φθέγγηται χύτρας· εἰ γὰρ μία μὲν τῶν φωνῶν ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τεττάρων διάφορος, ὀρίζοιτο δὲ τῷ ὅτῳ ἕκαστα διαφέρει, πρῶτα μὲν περὶ τοῖς γένεσι δέδοικα μὴ τεταγμένα φύσει πρὸ τῶν διαφορῶν, ταῖς διαφοραῖς συντετάσσεται· διαφέρει γὰρ καὶ τοῖς³ γένεσιν ἕκαστα· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει ^dλευκὸν καὶ Σωκράτης^d· τὸ μὲν, γὰρ ὑπὸ τὸ χρῶμα· ὁ δ' ὑπὸ τὸ ζῶον ἀνήνεκται· ἔπειτα οὐ μικρόν με δέος ὕπαισι καὶ περὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι μὴ καὶ ταῦτα τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν ἀπολωλεκότα προσηγορίαν, ὀνομασθεῖεν διαφοραὶ· εἰ γὰρ διαφορὰ μὲν ὅτῳ ἕκαστα διαφέρει, διαφέρει δ' ἄνθρωπος ἵππου⁴ τῷ εἶδει, εὐδηλον, ὡς διαφορὰ τὸ εἶδος ἐσεῖται· ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο δοθῇ καὶ σὺν ταῖς διαφοραῖς τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη τετάσσεται, οὐκέτι ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν κατηγορηθήσεται· ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὁποῖον τί ἐστίν· εἴ γε καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἐν τούτῳ κατηγορεῖται· πρὸς ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ εἶδος κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφόρων⁵ τῷ εἶδει ρηθήσεται· ὡς ἀμέλει καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ οὕτως ὑπέκειτο· ἔτι εἰ ^eτὸ μὲν γένος ὕλη, ἀνάλογον, μορφὴ δὲ ἡ διαφορὰ^e, ὕλη ἂν, καὶ μορφὴ ἔσται ταυτὸν· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ στέρησις καὶ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι· [Ξενέδημος] ὦ μοῦσαι καὶ χάριτες ἦν δ' ἐγὼ καὶ βιβλία· οἷός με παρὰ Ἑρμαγόρα ὑπελάμβανε πλάνος⁶ τῷ ἀμφιλαφεῖ ἐκείνῳ

^{a-a} cf. Isagoge 11.21 ^{b-b} *Lp.* Stromata, lib. 1, cap. 11, §51.2–3 ^{c-c} *all.* Phileb. 55c ^{d-d} *all.* Isagoge 5.4 ^{e-e} cf. Isagoge 11.15–16

¹ γὰρ add. BO ² καταπέπρωκας BO ³ ταῖς BO ⁴ ἀνθρώπου ἵππος P ⁵ καὶ διαφόρων om. BO ⁶ πλάνης BO

- πιστεύονται¹ πώγωνι · σὺ δὲ ἀλλὰ μὴ γάρ μοι φθονοίης τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἐπὶ
τὴν τετάρτην πρὸς τῆς τετρακτύος βαθμίδα ποδήγησον · [Θεοκλῆς]
ποδηγήσαιμ' ἂν ἡ δ' ὅς · καὶ μοι ἐρομένῳ ἀποκρίναι · εἰς πόσας ἡ εἰρημένη
αὕτη τῶν ἀναβαθμίδων τὸ ἴδιον τῷ Πορφυρίῳ διηρέθη τομᾶς · [Ξενέδημος]
5 εἰς τέτταρας ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ἡ τετάρτη · ^aδὲ τὸ γὰρ μόνῳ τινὶ ξυμβέβηκεν εἶδει · κἂν
εἰ μὴ παντὶ μὴ δ' αἰεὶ · ὥς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἰατρεῦειν · καὶ ὁ παντὶ² κἂν³ εἰ μὴ (p. 213)
μόνῳ · ὥς τούτῳ τὸ εἶναι δίποδι · καὶ ὁ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ κἂν εἰ μὴ αἰεὶ · ὥς τῷ
αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν γήρᾳ πολίωσις · καὶ τὸ , ἐφ' οὗ τὰ τρία συνδραμον τὸ , μόνῳ καὶ
παντὶ καὶ αἰεὶ , ἴδια τῷ Πορφυρίῳ ὠνόμασται^a · [Θεοκλῆς] τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς
10 ἡ δ' ὅς καὶ ἀκριβοῦς διαιρέσεως · καὶ ἅμα σὺ μὲν φυλάττοιο τέκνον εἶπεν ·
οὐκ ἀγεννῆς ἐσόμενος φιλοσοφίας ὀργιαστῆς⁴ · ἵνα τὰ μὲν ἀναπληρώσῃς τῶν
ἐνδεόντων · τὰ δ' ἀνακαθήρῃς τῶν ὑπερμυγμένων καὶ βεβυσμένων · ἔστι δ'
ὦν καὶ αὐτὸς γεννήτωρ ἀναδειχθείης · νῦν δ' ἀλλὰ τεττάρων σοι τῶν ἰδίων
ἀναπεφασμένων τῇ διαιρέσει , καὶ πάντων διαφόρων πρὸς ἅπαντα , ἡ γὰρ ἂν
15 οὐδὲ τέτταρα ἦν εἰ μὴ διάφορα ἦν , τὴν τοῦ τετάρτου ζητῶ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον
διαφορότητα · τοῦ , οὗ τὸ γελαστικὸν παράδειγμα , πρὸς τὸ , οὗ τὸ
ἰατρεῦειν , παράδειγμα · τίς οὖν ἡ τούτοις διαφορὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖν ἰδίοις ·
[Ξενέδημος] ὥς προφανῆς ἦν δ' ἐγὼ καὶ πᾶσι σαφές · [Θεοκλῆς] μὴ πᾶσιν ἡ
δ' ὅς ὦ⁵ γαθῆ⁵ οὐ γὰρ καὶ ἐμοὶ · εἰ δὲ σὺ τὰ τηλικαῦτα σοφὸς , διδάξόν με ὦ
20 πρὸς Ἑρμοῦ · [Ξενέδημος] παίζεις ἔχων · τίς γὰρ ἂν σε καὶ ἀγνοεῖν
ὑποπτεύσῃ Θεοκλέα γε ὄντα , ὅση τίς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τοῦ γελᾶν καὶ
ἰατρεῦειν διαφορότης · ὦν τὸ μὲν , αἰεὶ καὶ παντὶ τὸ γελᾶν · τὸ δὲ , τινὶ καὶ
ποτὲ τὸ ἰατρεῦειν ἀνθρώπῳ πέφυκεν · ὅσον γὰρ τὸ μὴ αἰεὶ τοῦ αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ μὴ
παντὶ τοῦ παντὶ διενήνοχε , τοσοῦτον καὶ τὸ⁶ ὥς τὸ ἰατρεῦειν ἴδιον τοῦ ὥς τὸ
25 γελαστικὸν · [Θεοκλῆς] ὥς βᾶγαμαί σε τῆς εὐφυΐας^b Ξενέδημε · καὶ εὐχομαί
γε καὶ ἀναγωγῆς αὐτὴν⁷ τυχεῖν δεξιᾶς · ^cτάς γὰρ εὐφροσύνας ψυχὰς κακῆς

^{a-a} Isagoge 12.13–18 ^{b-b} *all.* Theaetetus 144a ^{c-c} *Respublica* 491e

¹ καὶ add. BO ² κἂν — ὁ παντὶ om. O ³ καὶ P ⁴ ὀργιαστῆς BO ⁵ ὦ ἀγαθὲ O ⁶ om. VO
⁷ αὐτὸν P

παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας, κακωτέρας γίνεσθαι^c διδάσκει με¹ ὁ Ἀρίστωνος·
 μέγα μέρος λέγων εἰς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν, τὴν ἀνατροφὴν² συντελεῖν· ἀλλὰ
 σοῦ ἀπείη ταυτὶ τὰ κακόφημα· καὶ ἀπέσται πάντως παρ' Ἑρμαγόρα
 παιδευομένου· νῦν δ' ἀλλὰ τοῦτό μοι μὴ φθονήσης ὡς ἄριστα ἀποκρίνασθαι·
 πῶς παντὸς ἀνθρώπου καὶ αἰεὶ κατηγορεῖς τὸ γελαστικόν· [Ξενέδημος] πρὸς 5
 Ἑρμοῦ γε ὅτι ^aαἰεὶ γελᾷ καὶ ὅτι σύμπας γελᾷ^a, [Θεοκλής] καὶ μὴν οὐθ' ἅπας
 ἀνθρώπων γελᾷ· εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ καὶ παντάπασιν τὸ τοῦ γέλωτος ἡγνότησαν
 χρῆμα· καθάπερ καὶ Λυκόφρων ἰστόρηκε ^bτὸν ἄνδρα Τορώνης³ νῆϊδα
 δακρύου καὶ γέλωτος^b, οὐθ' ὁ γελῶν αἰεὶ τῷ γέλῳτι κέχρηται· ἀναλγῆτου
 γὰρ ἐν πένθεσι καὶ νόσοις καὶ μάλιστα θανάτοις ἐπιτηδεῖων⁴ γελᾶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, 10
 καὶ ἐσθίων ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ πίνων γελῶ· καὶ ὁμιλῶν καὶ⁵ καταδαρθάνων· οὐ
 τί γελοιότερον· λείπεται δὴ⁶ ^cκατὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι λέγειν τὸ παντὶ τε καὶ τὸ
 αἰεὶ^c· πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ ἅπας ἀνθρώπων γελᾶν, καὶ αἰεὶ· ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως
 δοῖμεν ἔχειν, ζητῶ μαθεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν· δι' ἣν μὴ⁷ καὶ τὸ ἱατρεῦειν αἰεὶ καὶ
 παντὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ λεχθεῖη· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ ἱατρεύοι αἰεὶ, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἱατρεῦειν 15
 πέφυκεν ἄνθρωπος· καὶ εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἱατρεύοι, ἀλλὰ πέφυκε πᾶς· ἔσται ἄρα
 καὶ τὸ ἱατρεῦειν, ἀνθρώπῳ ἴδιον κατὰ τὸ γελαστικόν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ
 γεωμετρεῖν καὶ τὸ ρητορεύειν· καὶ ἐπιστήμη συνόλως ἅπασα· εἴ γε δεκτικόν
 ἐπιστήμης ἀπάσης ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὥριστα· κἂν εἰ τοῦτο, πλείω τοῦ αὐτοῦ
 ἐσεῖται εἰδούς τὰ ἴδια· ἀλλ' ἐν ἐνὸς ὑποτίθεται· κινδυνεύεται ἄρα μὴ καλῶς 20
 μήτε διελεῖν μήτ' ἀποδοῦναι τὸ ἴδιον τὸν Πορφύριον· [Ξενέδημος]
 κινδυνεύεται ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· σοῦ δὲ τῆς ἐπὶ τῇ πειθοῖ χάριτος, τί ἂν ἄλλο
 οἰκειότερον κατεπάσαιμι· ἢ ὁ ποτε καὶ ^dὁ κωμῳδὸς Μένανδρος ἐπὶ ταῖς
 εὐτυχίαις τοῦ Μακεδόνος εἶπε⁸ παίζων πρὸς τὸ παράδοξον· ^eὡς
 ἀλεξανδρῶδες τοῦτο· κἂν ζητῶ τινὰ αὐτόματος οὗτος πάρεστι· κἂν διελθεῖν⁹ 25
 διὰ θαλάσσης δέη τόπον· οὗτος ἔσται μοι βατὸς^{ed}· ἐγὼ δ' ὡς θεοκλεῶδες

^{a-a} cf. Isagoge 12.19 ^{b-b} Lycophron 116–117 ^{c-c} cf. Isagoge 12.19 ^{d-d} Plut., Alexander, cap. 17, §7 ^{e-e} Menandr., fr. 751

¹ om. P ² ἀναστροφὴν O ³ καθάπερ — Τορώνης] κ. καὶ. Λ. τ. ἄ. T. I. PBO ⁴ ἐπιτηδεύει P
⁵ om. BO ⁶ τὸ add. P ⁷ μοι BO ⁸ εἶπε om. P ⁹ δεηθῆναι V διελεῖν P

τοῦτο· εἴποιμ' ἂν ἐπὶ σοὶ τὰς συλλαβὰς ὑπαλλάξας· κἂν τι ἀναπόρητον
 δοκοίη ἀπορηθῆσεται· κἂν ἐπ' ἀσφαλούς ἐστηκός τε¹ ἀνατραπήσεται·
 [Θεοκλῆς] ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς Ξενεδήμου εἶπεν ἡλικιώταις καὶ ἀκούειν
 5 κατὰ κόσμον καὶ λέγειν· τυχὸν δὲ καὶ Ἑρμαγόρῃ ταῦτα λέξας χαρίσαι·
 ἡμῖν δὲ περὶ γὰρ τὸν κολοφῶνα τῆς κλίμακος τὴν πέμπτην ἦδη² ἀναβαθμίδα
 γεγόναμεν τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἀναβατέον καὶ ταύτην· καὶ στάσιν ἐπὶ τῆς
 ἀκρωρείας ἐπισκοπητέον τὰ ὄντα· ὅπως ἂν ὀντότητος ἔχῃ· [Ξενεδήμος]
 πάνυ τι³ ἦν δ' ἐγὼ καὶ μάλιστά σε⁴ πρὸς τῷ τέλει τοῦ λόγου ποτνιώμαι
 >> φιλοτιμήσασθαι· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῷ Ἀσκληθεὶ ποιητῇ, ἀρχομένου πίθου καὶ (p. 215)
 λήγοντος κορέννυσθαι^a, δέδοκται· [Θεοκλῆς] οὐκοῦν ἐμποροῦ γε ἦ δ' ὅς τοῦ
 πίθου καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πυθμένι χαρίτων ἀπόλαυε⁵· [Ξενεδήμος] ἀλλ' ἦν σύ γε
 εἶπον κερῶης· [Θεοκλῆς] τίνα γοῦν ἔφη τῷ συμβεβηκότι ἀποδοίης τὸν
 λόγον, ὃ τὰ λοιπὰ ὡς ἄριστα ἀποδοῦς· [Ξενεδήμος] ραδία ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ἢ
 ἀπόδοσις· ^bδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, τοῦτο συμβεβηκός^b·
 15 [Θεοκλῆς] αὕτη ἐκείνη εἶπεν ἢ παρὰ Πορφυρίῳ ἀπόδοσις· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν
 ὅπως ἂν σοι τίς καὶ ἐπιμέμψῃται αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ τοῦτό μοι ἀπόκριναι· εἰ
 Σωκράτην κατὰ Σωκράτην ἀλλ' οὐ κατ' ἀνθρώπον ὀρίζεσθαι βούλοιο, τίني γ'⁶
 ἂν ἀφορίσαι· ἢ οὐ τῇ⁷ συνδρομῇ τῶν τούτῳ συμβεβηκόντων, [Ξενεδήμος]
 πάνυ μὲν οὖν· [Θεοκλῆς] καὶ τίني⁸ ἂν διασταίῃ Πλάτωνος, ἢ οὐ ταύτη,
 20 [Ξενεδήμος] ναί· [Θεοκλῆς] καὶ δὴ ὑπόγραψαι ἦ δ' ὅς Πλάτωνα καὶ
 Σωκράτη· τὸν μὲν, μέλανα τυχὸν τετανότριχα σιμὸν λαγαρόν⁹· ἢ ὅπως
 ἄλλως· τὸν δὲ, ^cτῷ προκοιλίῳ ἐκείνου διάφορον· μέλανά τε γάρ¹⁰ καὶ τοῦτον
 καὶ τετανότριχα καὶ σιμὸν^c· τίني διαφέρετον ἀλλήλων τῷ ἄνδρῃ, ἢ πάντως
 τῷ λαγαρῷ καὶ τῷ προκοιλίῳ· ἀλλ' εἰ συμβεβηκός τὸ λαγαρόν καὶ
 25 25 προκοιλίον, τοῦτο δ' ἐνδέχεται τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν καὶ
 λαγαρόν εἶναι Σωκράτην καὶ προκοιλίον Πλάτωνα· καὶ οὕτω Σωκράτης ἂν ὁ

^{a-a} Opera et Dies 368 ^{b-b} Isagoge 13.3–4 ^{c-c} cf. Elias, In Porph. 76.6; Eustrat., Comm. 81.19–20

¹ ἐστηκός γε PB ἐστηκοί γε O ² δὴ P ³ τοι BO ⁴ γε BO ⁵ ἀπόλαβε O ⁶ δ' P ⁷ om. P ⁸ τι BO ⁹ γαλαρόν O ¹⁰ om. P

Πλάτων ἐσεῖται · εἶχον σοι καὶ ἄλλα περὶ τούτων διαπορήσασθαι¹ καὶ ἴσως οὐκ ἀγεννή² · ἀλλὰ καλῶς ἐκεῖνο ἔχει τὸ Ἀναξάρχειον³ ·.

>> ^aπολυμαθίη κάρτα μὲν ὠφελέει · κάρτα δὲ βλάπτει · ὠφελέει μὲν τὸν ἄξιον ἐόντα · βλάπτει δὲ τὸν ρηϊδίως φωνέοντα πᾶν ἔπος καὶ ἐν⁴ παντὶ δήμῳ · χρή δὲ καιροῦ μέτρα εἰδέναι · σοφίης γὰρ ὅρος οὗτος^a ·

5

καὶ ἅμα Ξενεδήμῳ δὲ πλήρης ὦ χάριτες παιδεύσεως γένοιτο ἢ φροντίς⁵ εἰπῶν, ἀπηλλάττετο · μέτρια μὲν ταῦτα περὶ Θεοκλέος ἐρρέθη · ἀλλ' οὔτι Μουσαίῳ γε μέτρια ἀνδρὶ συμβάλλειν καὶ ^bἐξ ὀνύχων μόνων εἰδότη⁶ τὸν λέοντα^b ·.

^{a-a} Stobaeus, lib. III, cap. 34, §19 ^{b-b} Plut., De defectu oraculorum 410c.2–3

¹ διαπορίσασθαι BO ² ἀγενή P ³ ἐξανάρχειον O ⁴ καὶ ἐν] κέν V ⁵ φορτίς VP ⁶ εἰδὸ BO

XENEDEMOS, or VOICES¹

MOUSAIOS. Well, son of Aristandre. So, you should have heard something about the fame of Theocles, a man from the city of Byzantion, who, as most people say, is one of the best philosophers. The people arriving from Byzantion to Athens sing the most beautiful and charming songs about him that I have ever heard, songs whose sound made me deaf to anything else. These travelers sparked my interest in hearing the marvelous tales and rumors about this man. But when I began to induce them to make Theocles more visible for me, they proposed that I should visit you, if I wanted to see him clearly, since you are one who has been instructed in philosophy by Theocles himself, in addition to your close kinship with him. So, if these people are not wrong about you, and if you do not want to repudiate the god of Friendship, tell me at once about this man!

XENEDEMOS. O Mousaios, getting me to talk about Theocles is like leading a horse to pasture or releasing the proverbial dolphin into the sea.² There is nothing sweeter for me than speaking or hearing about him.

Theocles, who was born at the time of the lees of life, confirmed by himself that the Universal Father, Time, is ageless.³ He was gifted with a celestial and

- 1 Explaining Aristotle's *Categories*, Porphyry mentioned πέντε φωναί (literally, five uttered words): *species, genus, difference, propriety, and accident*. They might better be translated as "five utterances or forms of speech," but these five terms are usually called *voices*, from the Latin *quinque voces*. They were also the five *universals* that recur in medieval discourses.
- 2 The author has in mind the following popular proverbs: "to teach a horse to run to pasture" ("ἵππον εἰς πεδίον διδάσκεις τρέχειν" – *Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum*, vol. 1, F.G. Schneidewin and E.L. von Leutsch, Göttingen, 1839, p. 191; vol. 2, ed. E.L. von Leutsch, 1851, p. 464) and "to teach a dolphin to swim" ("Δελφίνα νήχεσθαι διδάσκεις" – *Ibid*, vol. 1, p. 237).
- 3 The *Life of Meletios the Younger* by Theodore Prodromos (BHG 1248) contains a similar phrase, which appears there in a broader context that helps us better to understand the passage here (see "Николая епископа Мефонского и Феодора Продрома, писателей XII столетия, жития Мелетия Нового," изд. и пер. В.Г. Васильевский, in: *Православный палестинский сборник*, вып. 17, Санкт-Петербург, 1886, с. 41 (*Meletios of Myoupolis, Vitae by Nicholas of Methone and Theodore Prodromos*, ed. V.G. Vasilievskij, Saint-Petersburg, 1886, p. 41)). In this work, Prodromos states that many believe sainthood to be limited to the patriarchal age and to the first ages of Christianity. However, the example of his contemporary Meletios, he says, shows that a saint can be born at any time in history, even in the last days, because God, the Father of all, who gives life and begets the mercies in us, is "the same yesterday and today and to the ages to come" (*Hebrews* 13.8). And this should also be the case for the great philosopher Theocles, who was supposed to be Prodromos' contemporary. But, while in the *Life*, Prodromos refers to Jesus Christ, in the *Xenedemos*, he speaks about the Ageless Father Time. In Greek

winged nature which was capable not only of flying like the Homeric bay “mares coursing over the topmost ears of ripened corn,”⁴ but also of lifting up from the earthly substance, rising up over the fluid atmosphere, over the fiery sphere of concentric rings of fire, then traveling beyond the stellar realm of the fixed stars and planets to the starless sphere, and thence ascending to being with God.⁵ Theocles was also endowed with a tongue breathing the “might of Attic fire” much more than the mythical Chimaera,⁶ even if he at times duplicated a syllable or a word.⁷ Indeed, as he humbly said, this speech habit did not proceed from a defect of nature, but he would double the resonance in order to double the pleasure emanating from his speech.⁸ In this regard, he also ap-

pagan literature, the epithet of God as the Father of all was generally applied to Zeus, but Pindar also calls Time the father of all things in the *Olympians* 11.17. According to Orphic cosmogony, Ageless Time was a primordial god (*Orphicorum Fragmenta*, ed. O. Kern, Berlin, 1922, p. 130, fr. 54). See also a celebrated passage of Plato's *Timaeus* 37d–38c and its commentary by Plutarch in the *Platonic Questions* 1007b. For more see: M. Nieto, R. Beatriz, “15. OF 111: Χρόνος ἀγῆραος,” in: *Tracing Orpheus: Studies of Orphic Fragments*, ed. H. de Jáuregui et al., Berlin–Boston, 2011, pp. 93–98.

- 4 This metaphor is based on a proverbial line from Homer's *Iliad* xx.227. The same figure is also found in the poems, long attributed to Prodrornos, contained in a codex of the *Biblioteca Marciana* x1.22 (*Theodori Prodromi de Manganis*, ed. S. Bernardinello, Padova, 1972, p. 47, v.27–28).
- 5 Here, the author describes the heavenly journey of the winged mind from the shadows of the sensible world to the divine realm, which constitutes the goal of the Platonic philosopher. On this journey, the mind traverses the whole universe which, in Byzantine times, was seen as consisting of a series of concentric spheres. The sublunary world was surmounted by the sphere of fire – the purest of the four elements. The superlunary world consisted of the sphere of the fixed stars, and then of the planets, and, finally, of the starless sphere that was the limit of the universe. See *Phaedrus* 249c, where Plato speaks of the winged mind of the philosopher; also *Phaedo* 109e.
- 6 The use of this metaphor of eloquence is very common in Byzantine literature. Its origin is found in the *Iliad* vi.181–182, also in Hesiod's *Theogony* 319. But Prodrornos is clearly keeping in mind the passage from the *Funeral Oration on the Great S. Basil* by Gregory Nazianzen (Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours funèbres en l'honneur de son frère Césaire et de Basile de Césarée* (Orat. XLIII), ed. F. Boulenger, Paris, 1908, ch. 23, §4.1–2).
- 7 A similar description may be found in another work by Prodrornos, where he applies it to himself (Theodore Prodrornos, *In eos qui ob paupertatem providentiae conviciantur*, PG 133, cols. 1297–1298).
- 8 Discussing the elegant style and euphony, Demetrius of Phalerum points out that words like Καλλίστρατος and Ἀνοῶν are “pleasant to the ear” because the double λ and double ν have a certain resonance. For the sake of euphony an extra letter can sometimes be added (*Demetrii Phalerei qui dicitur de elocutione libellus*, ed. L. Radermacher, Leipzig, 1901, §174–175).

preciated the proverb saying that “we ought to repeat twice that which is good.”⁹

MOUSAIOS. O Heracles! You are portraying Theocles as if he were Hermes himself! How much I want to depart from Athens to visit the city of Byzantion and converse with him!

XENEDEMOS. I wonder, my good friend, what you would feel if you knew about his works: how numerous, how excellent they are, how different in genre and style! They can be arranged into two major groups. One comprises those which were dedicated to the emperors; they depict wars and victories as well as indigenous issues – that is, diseases and the causes of instant death, presented in an orderly manner. Some of these writings to the emperors were composed in different and various verses and some in prose. The other group contains those which were addressed to private men or written on various occasions; they are also divided into verse and prose.

I am not sure that I could tell you enough to describe sufficiently how eloquent he was in oral speech and how particularly gifted he was in improvising texts. Helios would sooner become fatigued from riding the fiery horses across the hemisphere of the sky than Theocles’ tongue and hand would tire of explaining complicated issues as if they were trivial ones, and of treating trivial issues as if they were complicated ones.¹⁰

MOUSAIOS. O, son of Aristander! How might it be possible that the city of Byzantion has produced a man so great that all the lands inhabited by Hellenes could hardly have reared?

XENEDEMOS. However, I swear by Themis that Theocles’ attitude toward his native city was not too positive, given his skepticism about its ancient history. Meanwhile, to those who wanted to insult him for his provenance, he always gently opposed, lavishing Byzantion with praise: he called it “the metropolis presiding over the East,”¹¹ the heart of the whole world, the bridge between the

9 The proverb “we ought to repeat twice and even three times that which is good” (Δὶς καὶ τρίς τὸ καλὸν) is mentioned by Plato in the *Philebus* 59e.1.

10 Michael Italikos, in his letter to Prodromos, described an ideal rhetor with the same words by which Prodromos described Theocles (Michel Italikos, *Lettres et discours*, ed. P. Gautier, Paris, 1972, lettre N°1, p. 63.15).

11 See Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours funèbres en l’honneur de son frère Césaire et de Basile de Césarée*, ed. F. Boulenger, Paris, 1908, ch. 14, §1.1–2.

Eastern and the Western side. But speaking to me and to his other friends, he characterized himself as an alien and an intrusive citizen among the Byzantines, for, as he said, his family descended from Italy.

MOUSAIOS. All that you said about this man is indeed great and heroic, but this does not satisfy me. The fact of the matter is that, though you told me much, you have just indicated the nonspecific traits as a winged nature, an eloquent tongue, a rapid hand, a wise soul. Whereas for me the description of a person consisting only of such general characteristics seems to be very uncertain. As for instance, it is not enough merely to say “an Athenian” to make a direct reference to Plato.¹² Indeed, we should list those characteristics by which Plato differs from other people, defining him as the one who examined nature in the *Timaeus*, who discussed the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedo*, who wrote the *Laws*, who established the new states [in the *Republic*] and, in brief, who is called Plato. Hence for this reason, so far everything you have told me does not clearly induce Theocles, unless you place before me anything – the more, the better – of what he has written or said.

XENEDEMOS. Dear friend, to ask me to read through the works of Theocles is the same as to ask me to destroy Mount Athos by digging or to measure the ocean encompassing the Earth! How much he stated and committed to parchment you will know better if you meet with his works, which are numerous and, O Charites, excellent.

[XENEDEMOS says to himself] Now, I will not conceal my discussion with Theocles after his emergence before me, *deus ex machina*, while I was an adolescent,¹³ whose cheeks had not yet been covered with down. Since if I concealed it from Mousaios that would be as if I concealed something from myself.

[XENEDEMOS says to Mousaios] One day, my guiding spirit caused this man to appear on my way to school. He recognized me at once as soon as he saw me.

– “Oh, my oratory!” he exclaimed. “Well, if it is not his very self, my fair Xenedemos, appearing in the flesh!”

At this moment, he stroked my then-sandy hair, which had fallen on my shoulders so that the wind could play with it.¹⁴

– “My little Xenedemos, where are you going and where have you been?” he asked me. “You are very likely making your way to a teacher, if the book at your bosom¹⁵ and the memory verse on your lips do not mislead me.”

12 Just as “the Stagirites” can refer to Aristotle, “the Ascræus” to Hesiodus, etc.

13 “μειράκιον” – an age group that extends from 14 to 21 years old.

14 Plato depicts the young *Phaedo* with the same words (Plato, *Phaedo* 89b.2–4).

15 Prodrornos makes a reference to the meeting of Socrates with the young *Phaedrus* in Athens (Plato, *Phaedrus* 227a–228b).

– “Even though ‘the prophet has never before given you a true prophecy,’¹⁶ now you are right, I am going to my teacher, Hermagoras,” I answered.

– “And what subject of the school program are you studying with the assistance of such a guide to science?” he asked me.

– “The *Categories* of Aristotle,” I answered.

– “It is a good start for you, my boy,” he said. “Indeed, you ‘have erected golden columns to support a well-walled inner chamber,’¹⁷ since your book is most wise and your teacher, Hermagoras, is one of the most learned. The latter is evident from many things, but first and foremost from the sickly pallor covering his skin and the beard falling down to his knees, which makes him appear a philosopher.”¹⁸ Then, twirling his moustache and smiling, he told me: “If I question you, could you give me answers that would be worthy of Hermagoras’ pupil?”

– “Yes, I could,” I answered.

– “Surely, you are already acquainted with Porphyry’s *Isagoge*?”¹⁹ he asked me.

– “Certainly!” I answered.

– “Let’s start with it! The first thing we should discuss is the *genus*,” he said.

– “Let my genus perish in obscurity, if I do not clarify entirely for you everything about the *genus*!” I said.

– “To begin with, I am going to ask you nothing but what we need to know before knowing anything else,” Theocles told me. “Since we have to explore first that which we need to know first, unless we discount Aristotle, who likewise said that the kinds of questions we ask correspond to the kinds of things we know.²⁰ Thus, we have to inquire primarily whether the *genus* exists or not.”²¹

16 The exact quote is from Homer, *Iliad* 1.106. From Hellenistic times onwards, this passage was read in various ways because of the Homeric hapax “κρήγυος” (favorable, good, true, false, etc.), whose precise meaning is not entirely clear. Here the context indicates that it means “true.”

17 This passage from the prelude of Pindar’s *Olympians* VI.1–3 is a widely used Byzantine quotation for defining the best way to start.

18 This caricatured description of a false philosopher is borrowed from Lucian’s *Icaromenippos* §5.

19 Porphyry’s *Isagoge* was taught as an introduction to Aristotle’s *Categories* in the schools of Byzantium.

20 See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 89b.

21 Porphyry leaves open as too profound for beginners the question of whether *genera* and *species* exist in reality or in thought. See *Porphyry’s isagoge et in Aristotelis categorias commentarium*, ed. A. Busse (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 4.1), Berlin, 1887, p. 1.9–16.

- “Yes, it does exist and it is the finest of all things!” I answered.
- “Well, you speak properly! If this view is not accepted as the correct one, then books, for the most part, would vanish and the best of philosophy would be overturned, and everything would be turned upside down. So could you, please, say what among the existing things the *genus* is and what definition you would suggest for it?” he asked me.

I hastened to say the definition of *genus* by Porphyry because I had carefully studied this book.

- “Well, rejoice, my child!” he said, “we already know that you remember the description well, but I still do not know whether you understand what, among the existing things, is the *genus*, defined by these words. Since all the existing things are divided into the ten *categories*, which are the beginnings without beginning, and it is impossible to get out from the labyrinth of these ten *categories*, so I inquire which of these *categories* is suitable to the *genus*.”

– “In the name of Philosophy! The name of this *category* is *relation*,²² because we can say *genus* of the *species*.”²³

- “Well, but this is still an issue that remains incomprehensible for us. I ask you, therefore, again, what is the *genus* if the *genus* is related to the *species*? Since, look, there must be prior Socrates in order for the father of Socrates to exist.²⁴ And we need to presuppose the existence of the number four in order for half of four to exist or, even, the double of four.²⁵ Thus, I ask you what the *genus* is if it can be related to something else. And which of the ten *categories* the *genus* could join? For it is wholly inevitable that, if the *genus* fits into one of the ten *categories*, the other nine *categories* are alien to it. However, we see that the ten *categories* are a range of equal weighting principles, for no one of them is more a *genus* than another and no one of them is more general than the other. Hence, there are two possibilities: either the *genus* will perish as be-

22 Given that the *genera* are called *substances* in *Categories* 2a.15–20, *genus* must fall into the *category* of *substance*.

23 This means that the *genus* is related to the *species*. Aristotle does not provide a precise terminology of the *relation*; he utilizes the grammatical features of the Greek, i.e., a thing being *of* or *than* or being somehow related to something.

24 For a father is called father if, and only if, he engendered a son. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1021a.21–24.

25 See Aristotle, *Categories* 6b.30–31; 7b.16–21; 14b.29–33. Aristotle suggests that relative words are practically devoid of meaning without mention of their correlatives. The word “double” has no meaning at all, nor does “half”; and even if it has a meaning, it does not have the same meaning as it does when used in combination (*Sophistical Refutations* 181b.32–34; *Topics* 142a.27–31).

ing, or, if it exists, it should be above the ten *categories*. But if the former is impossible, the latter we need to introduce,” he said.

– “Certainly,” I said, “it is not possible to say otherwise.”

MOUSAIOS. Tell me, Xenedemos. You were capable of comprehending such highly elevated speculations and theories at that time when, as you told me, you were but a novice in philosophy. Could you attribute it to your keen nature, which was like a sphere placed on an inclined surface and required only a primary mover?

XENEDEMOS. My dear friend, this may be so, but mostly it is due to the Siren charm of eloquence that impresses the notions into the depth of my heart.

– “If Xenedemos takes the same view,” Theocles said, “why do we not make the name of the *genus* to be predicated of the ten *categories*?”

– “Well,” I said.

– “But before we do,” he stated, “in the name of Hermes and the Muses! We should examine the *definition corresponding with the name* so that we can learn how it can be predicated.”

– “This definition is easy to examine, we won’t be burdened with it,” I exclaimed. “The *genus*, as I have already said, is ‘that which is predicated of multiple things differing in *species*, in answer to what a thing is.’”²⁶

– “If, therefore,” said Theocles, “the name of the *genus* is predicated of the *categories* and the *definition corresponding with the name* is not, then the *category* will be *equivocal*. However, if both of them [the name of the *genus* and the *definition corresponding with the name*] are predicated, then the *category* will be *univocal*.”²⁷

– “Indeed, both of them,” I said, “the name of the *genus* as much as the *definition corresponding with the name* is predicated of the *categories*. Since all *genera* at the same time are ‘said of multiple things differing in *species* in answer to what a thing is.’”²⁸

– “So our investigation has revealed that the category appears to be *univocal*, but what does it really mean?” asked Theocles. “Indeed, if ‘it is said of multiple

26 The definition is from Porphyry’s *Isagoge* 2.15–16.

27 In *Categories* 1a.1–6 Aristotle defines that beings are *homonymous* if they share the same name, although the account that corresponds to that name is different. For instance, an animal and a picture are both called *animal*, although for an animal to be an *animal* (i.e., a living being) is quite different from what it is for a picture to be an *animal* (i.e., an image). In addition, Aristotle defines (1a.6–12) that beings are *synonymous* if they share not only the same name but also the account corresponding to that name. For instance, a human being and an ox are both called *animal* in the same sense of the word: for both of them, to be an *animal* is to be a living being.

28 See Porphyry, *Isagoge* 2.15–16.

things differing in *species*, in answer to what a thing is,' then the *genus* should be a *genus* of the ten *categories*, then the polyarchy [of the ten *categories*] would turn into monarchy, and plurality into a singularity.

However, if someone, opposing us, said, to the contrary, that the *genus* is not a real thing, but a word; it does not exist as itself but takes its existence as soon as the ten *categories* are assumed to exist. At first I would not contradict him but I would rather speak ironically as follows: 'O Stranger, Porphyry was not a philosopher as he gave a definition to a word without significance; he did not even know that 'the definition of anything is the statement of its nature,'²⁹ so it seems that he has not learned under your guidance and the mysteries have not been revealed for him.' But then I would ask him to consider the [genus of] *animal* as such a word without significance, because no one could apprehend it by the senses and conclude by observation. Further, I would call Aristotle to witness, he who said that "the *universal animal* is either nothing or it is posterior."³⁰ If he thought the *animal* to be real, assuming an *animate substance endowed with sensation* to exist,³¹ then, accordingly, we would think the *genus* to be real, defining it as something 'that is predicated of multiple things differing in species, in answer to what a thing is.'"³²

As Theocles said this, he stopped talking for awhile, then looked at me steadily and said: "If thereby I have persuaded you, thanks be unto the Word, if not, then – using the expression of Plato – 'what more can I do for you, must I go and infuse the argument into your soul?'"³³ But we should share it with Hermagoras, and, perhaps, the Beard can say something wiser than others about that."

– "I swear by the Letters!" I exclaimed. "And you have already put the word into my soul, so I will not need Hermagoras anymore."

29 Theocles refers to Aristotle, who said in both *Physics* 194b.26–27 and *Metaphysics* 1029b.12–14 that to explain how it is that a thing remains the same and is called by the same name is to show "what it was to be" (τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι).

30 Theocles refers to Aristotle's statement in *On the Soul* 402b.7–8. The term *posterior* indicates here that it is not prior to the sensible realm, but derived from the objects of the senses and, therefore, posterior. The notion of animality, according to Aristotle, is formed in our minds after we have perceived the many particular animals. Thus, the universal animal cannot be "nothing" insofar as particular animals exist, although, of course, the universal animal does not exist in and of itself.

31 See Aristotle, *Topica* 135a.16–19; see also *Isagoge* 10.

32 The definition is from Porphyry's *Isagoge* 2.15–16.

33 This was said by Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic* 345b.5–6, who is portrayed as relying on the rhetorical force of his argument, leading to passive assimilation rather than critical examination.

– “Well then, should we pass on to the next stages of our venture, or shall we have to stay here?” he asked me.

– “In the name of the Graces we must pass on,” I said.

– “So where else should we go next,” he said, “if not obviously to this second step of the ladder, to the *species*. A doubt must arise whether it would be possible for us there to speak with complete frankness against the best thinkers. For truly, he was right who said: ‘I do not think there is such a fortunate writing, which no one contradicts, but I believe the writing which no one justly contradicts will be just.’³⁴ In addition, the famous apothegm of Democritus is well for us too:

*Men’s tongues are glib, with various languages –
Words can go here and there in all directions.*³⁵

Well! Let us begin! We have to examine the definition of the proper *species* or, otherwise, *the most specific species*, the definition that is necessary for us to know before anything else,³⁶ he said.

– “It is for good reason I have the book in my hands which says that ‘the *most specific species* is the species that is predicated of multiple things, which differ only in number in answer to what a thing is,’³⁷” I replied to him.

– “Xenedemos’ answer is meet and right.

*The arrow indeed did not fall from your tongue in vain,
And I tell you something else again, and so that you may give me a sensible answer.*³⁸

I continue to use rhyme.

34 This quotation is preserved only in Clement of Alexandria’s *Stromata* book 1, ch. 1, §17.2.

35 This verse from Homer, *Iliad* xx.248–249, was a proverbial saying, independently transmitted by the paroemiographers without any attribution (e.g., Arsenius, *Apophthegmata*, in: *Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum*, vol. 2, ed. E.L. von Leutsch, Göttingen, 1851, cent. 15, §81i). That is why we suggest that this phrase might have become such a commonplace that its origin would have been forgotten. What is surprising is that Prodomos ascribed it to Democritus. The reason for this is that he did not learn this verse directly from the *Iliad*, but borrowed it from the *Stromata* of Clement of Alexandria (book 1, ch. 3, §22.3), where this quote is preceded by the phrase “ὥς ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης ἐκεῖνός φησιν” (as the famous [Democritus] of Abdera says), referring to another saying previous to that by Homer. For proverbial quotation of Homer, which does not require any extensive acquaintance with the poems, see R. Browning, “Homer in Byzantium,” *Viator*, 6 (1975), pp. 15–33, here p. 18.

36 Theocles obviously alludes to Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* 89b.

37 The definition is from Porphyry’s *Isagoge* 4.11–12.

38 Theocles offers a conflation of two modified Homeric lines: *Iliad* iv.498 and *Odyssey* xvi.281.

Do you determine to which of the *species* this definition is applied? In the name of the Muses, what do you think, may it be applied to one of the *most specific species*, such as *horse* or *man*, or to both of them, or to the *most specific species* in general? In my opinion, it is the latter, and I hope you will agree with my reasoning. In fact, one who defines a *man* does not define Simmias or, for example, Cebes,³⁹ but a *man* in the absolute sense, a *man* that conserves and holds together the being of each man. In the same way, one who defines an *animal* does not define a bear or a leopard, but an *animal in general*, because ‘the definition of anything is the statement of its nature,’⁴⁰ which is united and universal.

Hence, one who defines the *most specific species* does not define some of the *most specific species* but the *most specific species* as a whole. So, he does not define a *man* or a *horse*, seeing as they are ones among the *species*, whereas the definition does not refer to some of them, but to the universal one, since though there are many *species*, the definition speaks not of many, but of one.”

– “Certainly,” I replied.

– “Then if that is so,” said Theocles, “the definition of the *species* may be formulated incorrectly by Porphyry. If everything we have told you so far corresponds to reality, then this definition is that of the *most specific species in general* (that holds together each of the *most specific species*).

The *most specific species* are different in nature and form, therefore they should be considered, not as something ‘predicated of many things differing in number, in answer to what a thing is,’⁴¹ but rather as something ‘predicated of the things differing in the species.’⁴² And, if we suppose that this is the case, then the definition of the *species* will coincide with that of the *genus*.⁴³

If the two definitions do not differ in anything other than one *differing in number* and the other *differing in species*, and the last definition undermines even this distinction, then nothing remains for us to do but to equate both of the definitions.

39 Simmias of Thebes and his friend Cebes of Thebes were disciples of Socrates; they were introduced by Plato in the *Phaedo*.

40 See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1029b.12–14; *Physics* 194b.26–27.

41 Porphyry, *Isagoge* 4.11–12.

42 Porphyry, *Isagoge* 2.15–16.

43 Theocles takes the definition of the *media species* and applies it to the *most specific species*. Porphyry avoids such a contradiction. He writes: “the media of the extremes are called subaltern *species* and *genera*, and each of them is admitted to be *genus* and *species*, with reference, however, to different things” (*Isagoge* 5.21–23).

Given that the definitions do not differ in anything, the things they define do not differ either. Consequently, the *genus* and the *species* will be the same.⁴⁴ Thus, our five *voices* will reduce to four,” he said.

– “Oh, how miserable I am from the gross ignorance that seized my mind without being noticed. If you had asked me: ‘Xenedemos, which do you know better, your proper name or Porphyry’s *Isagoge*,’ I would have replied with confidence: ‘The latter.’ But now the situation has been absolutely reversed, and I feel that I don’t know anything.”

– “Are you willing, Xenedemos, to raise your foot to the third step?” he asked, smiling.

– “Certainly, oh master,” I replied. “I wish so much that this ladder had more steps so that I could ascend up into heaven as in the myth of the Aloades.”⁴⁵

– “Yes,” he said. “But the Aloades received punishment⁴⁶ and that kept Porphyry from erecting such a great ladder. And even if the ladder has only a few steps, it reaches to heaven.”

– “So why do we delay and not go up? Why do we remain on the ground and under the clouds?” I exclaimed.

– “So we must ascend,” Theocles stated. “However, the way up is difficult and dangerous. So you must step cautiously, go forward and up with a confident gait lest you should fall off in the most piteous manner.”

– “But it will never happen as long as you, o admirable sir, are my guide on the way up,” I said.

– “What, then, is the third step?” he asked me.

– “The *difference*,” I immediately replied.

– “So what is the definition of the *difference* which Hermagoras gave to you and Porphyry had formulated long before him?”

– “There are many excellent definitions,” I said, “but not all of them befit every *difference*. A general definition that fits every *difference*, if I recall cor-

44 Porphyry was aware of the fact that the *genus* and the *species* can be defined in the same manner. He writes that *genus* and *species*, in fact, have much in common, because all *species* except the *most specific* are also *genera*, and all *genera* except the *most generic* are also *species* (*Isagoge* 15.10–16.24).

45 The Aloades were two brothers, Otus and Ephialtes, who attempted to storm Mount Olympus by piling three mountains – Olympos, Ossa, and Pelion – one on top of the other (see Homer, *Odyssey* XI.305–385; Ps.-Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca* ch. 1, §53–55).

46 As a punishment for their presumption, they were bound by serpents to a column in Hades, and were perpetually tormented by the shrieks of an owl (See Ps.-Hyginus, *Fabulae* 28).

rectly, is as follows: ‘the *difference* is that by which each singular thing differs as a whole.’”⁴⁷

– “You, young man, have almost devoured the book of Porphyry! I cannot but admire your nature, and I love you beyond measure, even though ‘Virtue dislikes young boys,’⁴⁸ as I learned from Plato. Yet we should tap this definition all round to verify it, lest it should sound like a cracked pot.”⁴⁹

For if the *difference* is one of the *voices*, and it differs from the remaining four [from the group of five], and it is defined as something that renders the things different, I fear that the *genera* may be set on a par with the *differences*, despite being prior by nature to them. For each singular thing differs in the *genus* as well, for instance, the color white and Socrates.⁵⁰ The former refers to the *genus of color* and the latter to the *genus of animal*.

And now another and still greater fear took possession of me, lest the *species* should lose the name of *species* and receive the name of the *difference*. For if the *difference is that by which each singular thing differs*, and man and horse differ by *species*, so then it is obvious that the *species* will be considered as the *difference*.

And, if we suppose that both the *genus* and the *species* are set on a par with the *difference*, then neither of them will ‘be predicated in answer to what a thing is,’ but ‘in answer to what kind of a thing it is’ (provided that the *difference* is predicated in that manner); and, moreover, then the *species* will be ‘predicated of multiple things differing in *species*’ as well as the *difference*. However, it is impossible to assume.

In addition, whereas the *genus* corresponds to *matter* and the *difference* to *form*,⁵¹ so then *matter* and *form* will be the same; if so, then *substance* and *emptiness* as well as *being* and *non-being* will coincide, too.”

– “O Muses, Graces, and Books!” I exclaimed. “I trusted so much in the bushy Beard of Hermagoras. And now, I realize how seriously deluded I have been by him! Do not conceal the way up from me, and guide me, please, to the fourth step.”

– “Well, I shall guide you! But would you answer a question? How many footsteps, called the *properties*, does this step have?”

47 See Porphyry, *Isagoge* 11.21.

48 This quotation is not found in our texts of Plato, but it is preserved with the same attribution in Clement of Alexandria’s *Stromata* book 1, ch. 11, §51.2–3.

49 Theocles alludes to Plato, *Philebus* 55c.

50 Theocles alludes to Porphyry’s *Isagoge* 5.4.

51 See Porphyry, *Isagoge* 11.15–16.

– “The fourth is divided into four!” I said. “The first one is that which ‘happens to some *species* alone, though not to every individual of that *species* and not always, as to a man to heal.’ The second one is that which ‘happens not to that *species* alone, but to every individual of that *species*, as to man to be a biped.’ The third one is that which ‘happens to a *species* alone, and to every individual of it, but not always, as to every man to become gray.’ The fourth one is that in which ‘all three cases concur: to happen to one *species* alone, and to every individual of it, and always.’⁵² These four parts Porphyry called the *properties*.”

– “What a scientific and precise division!” he exclaimed. “Nevertheless, if you do not want to be an ignoble adherent of philosophy, you should watch your step! Only then would you fill up that which is lacking, and clear out that which is decayed and littered; and then you would even become a progenitor. As long as you have pronounced the classification into these four types of *properties*, each of which is distinct – they would not be a group of four if there were no difference between them – may I ask you what the difference between the fourth and the first is? I mean that exemplified by the *capability to laugh* and that exemplified by the *capability to heal*. What is the difference between these two *properties*?”

– “It is clear and obvious to everyone!” I exclaimed.

– “Not to everyone, my dear friend!” he said. “At least, not to me. But if you are so clever, please, teach me, in the name of Hermes!”

– “You are jesting with me, right?⁵³ How is anyone supposed to believe that you, being Theocles, do not know what the difference between laughing and healing is. *To laugh* is inherent to every man and always, and *to heal* – only to some men and sometimes. Insofar as *sometimes* differs from *always* and *someone* from *everyone*, such a *property* as the *capability to heal* differs from such a *property* as the *capability to laugh*,” I answered.

– “I am impressed by your natural faculties, my dear Xenedemos!⁵⁴ I wish for your mind to be properly educated. The son of Aristonos teaches me that ‘the naturally best souls which happen to have a bad upbringing become particularly bad,’⁵⁵ and so he implies that education has a significant influence on virtuosity and viciousness. I hope that these ominous words will not be fulfilled like a prophecy for you. To be sure, they will not be fulfilled, because you are studying under guidance of Hermagoras. But now be so good as to tell us

52 The definition is from Porphyry’s *Isagoge* 12.13–18.

53 A similar passage can be found in Plato, *Alcibiades* 124d.1 and *Theages* 125e.4.

54 See Plato, *Theaetetus* 144a.

55 See Plato, *Republic* 491e.

clearly: why are you maintaining that the *capability to laugh* is inherent to every man and always?" he asked me.

– "In the name of Hermes! Well, at least because 'man is always capable of laughing and everybody laughs!'"⁵⁶ I replied.

– "But not everyone laughs! There are people who have no idea what it is to laugh. For instance, Lycophron tells about a man from Toron, who did not know what tears and laughter mean.⁵⁷ Moreover, even those who laugh do not always laugh, since only heartless people are capable of laughing in sorrow, in sickness, and, at the worst, in mourning the death of a close friend. If man is always capable of laughing, then such a person will laugh while eating, drinking, speaking, and sleeping. What can be more ridiculous? Yet it remains to be said about 'everyone' and 'always' that everyone is 'of such a nature as to laugh and this holds of him always.'⁵⁸

If we assume this, then I would like to know the reason why we cannot also say that the capability of healing is always inherent to everyone. For even if everyone does not always heal, everyone is of such a nature as to heal. Thus, the *capability to heal* will be a *property* of men like the *capability to laugh*. If so, then even the capability to study geometry, rhetoric, and any science in general will be a *property* of everyone. Thus, everyone will be capable of comprehending any science, and if so, though the *properties* assigned to the same *species* will be more numerous, one *property* will be implied by another *property*. Thus, it seems that Porphyry has not defined and classified the *properties* in the best way," said Theocles.

– "Indeed, you have the gift of persuading! There is no passage more suitable for quotation in this connection than that of the comic poet Menander, which refers jestingly to the marvel of Alexander of Macedon:

*How Alexander-like, indeed, this is; and if I seek someone,
Spontaneous he'll present himself; and if I clearly must
Pass through some place by sea, this will lie open to my steps.*⁵⁹

56 See Porphyry, *Isagoge* 12.19. Porphyry specified that, "even if a man does not always laugh, he is said to be laughing not in that he always laughs but that he is of such a nature as to laugh – and this holds of him always, being connatural, like neighing of horses" (Porphyry, *Isagoge* 12.18–22).

57 See Lycophron, *Alexandra* 116.

58 See Porphyry, *Isagoge* 12.19.

59 *Menandri quae supersunt*, ed. A. Körte and A. Thierfelder, vol. 2, Leipzig, 1959, fr. 751=Comitorum Atticorum Fragmenta, t. III, ed. T. Kock, Leipzig, 1884, fr. 924; however, Theocles actually borrows this quotation from Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* ch. 17.7).

But I would rather say:

*How Theocles-like, indeed, this is; – I slightly modify it for your sake –
If something seems clear, thanks to Theocles it will become unclear;
If something is known with certainty, it will be refuted certainly.*

– “It is typical for Xenedemos’ fellows to utter and listen to such witticisms. You might have been praised if you had recited this to Hermagoras. Well, then we are already near the top of the ladder, now there is only the fifth step left, and that is the *accident*, to which we must ascend. Standing on the ridge, we should explore to what extent the existing things are real,” he stated.

– “Certainly! Might you be more generous at the end of this discourse,” I asked him, “inasmuch as the poet from Ascrea said: ‘Take your fill when the storage jar is just opened or nearly empty.’”⁶⁰

– “Satisfy yourself with what is in the storage jar and savor the Graces at its bottom,” he replied to me.

– “I would do this if it were you who would blend the wine,” I said.

– “Well, what definition would you give to the *accident* then,” he asked me, “because the rest you have defined in the best way.”

– “The definition is a simple one! An ‘*accident* is that for which it is possible to be present or absent in the same thing,’”⁶¹ I answered at once.

– “Yes, this is Porphyry’s definition. No one would be able to find fault with it. Well, then, tell me the following: if you want to define Socrates – I mean specifically Socrates, not referring to him through ‘a man’ – you will define him as nothing but as the combination of the *accidental attributes*,⁶² will you not?” he asked me.

– “Yes, I will!” I answered.

– “So, that is what differs him from Plato, is it not?” he asked me again.

– “Yes, it is,” I answered.

– “In this case, you may describe Plato and Socrates, for instance, as follows. The first one is dark-haired, straight-haired, snub-nosed, and thin, or somehow otherwise. The second one is dark-haired, straight-haired, snub-nosed, but

⁶⁰ Hesiod, *Works and Days* 368.

⁶¹ Porphyry, *Isagoge* 13.3–4.

⁶² According Aristotle, a proper definition of something will list only its *essential properties*, and he asserts that only *substances* have *essential properties*. Individuals, by contrast, have only *accidental properties*, and we cannot define them with *essential properties*. Aristotle, therefore, argued that individuals are undefinable (*Metaphysics* 1031a.1–14).

potbellied.⁶³ So, what is the difference between one and the other? The answer is clearly evident, the former is thin and the latter is potbellied, is it not? However, if being thin and being potbellied are the *accidental attributes*, they can be present and absent in the same subject; hence, Socrates can be thin, and Plato cannot be, and consequently, Socrates can become Plato.

I could also put to you some other questions about this, and they would perhaps merit your attention. But let me quote a wise saying of Anaxarchos:

*Wide learning can be both extremely helpful and extremely harmful – useful for one who is worthy, harmful for one who lightly says anything in any company. You must know the limits of the appropriate moment. That is the definition of wisdom.*⁶⁴

So, I wish, O Graces, that education would be the primary concern for Xenedemos.” At this point, he finished speaking and went away.

[XENEDEMOS says to himself] I told only a little about Theocles, but for Mousaios it was quite enough, because he is able ‘to know the lion by its claws.’⁶⁵

63 See Eliae in Porphyrii isagogen et Aristotelis categorias commentaria, ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1900, p. 76.6; Eustratii in analyticorum posteriorum librum secundum commentarium, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin, 1907, p. 81.19–20.

64 This quotation is preserved in Stobaios, *Anthologium* book III, ch. 34, §19.

65 According to the proverb “from the claw, the lion,” i.e., small traits give a clue to the character of a person (this saying is quoted [with attribution to Alcaeus] in Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum* 410c.2–3).