What Is a Composite Hypostasis? Leontius of Jerusalem, Maximus the Confessor and the Nestorian Challenge

At the Fifth Ecumenical Council the concept of a ‘composite hypostasis’ was enshrined in dogma. This implied that after the incarnation the divine and human natures had the status of parts that constituted a single whole. In order to make this concept intelligible a comparison was drawn with the human compound where two different natures, the soul and the body, formed one being. In the seventh century Maximus, the foremost Chalcedonian theologian of the time, came to the conclusion that the differences between the incarnated Word and a human individual were too great for a strict comparison to be useful. Yet he continued to defend the notion of composition. Indeed, his views on this point have been lauded as an important step in the development of doctrine. This article seeks to show that composition itself had become problematic, and that it was relentless Nestorian polemic that induced Maximus, and his contemporary Leontius of Jerusalem, to change their understand ing of the concept.

used the alternative formula 'composite hypostasis' (ὑπόστασις σύνθετος), which was reconcilable with the Chalcedonian teaching of two natures.6 It needs to be said, however, that this formula occurs only twice in John's theological oeuvre. Leontius of Byzantium who flourished in the second quarter of the sixth century was even more reserved.7 In his treatise Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos he makes frequent use of the anthropological paradigm and refers to body and soul as parts.8 Yet he does not employ the crucial term composition. In his later work Solutiones he acknowledges that composition can be used in the Christological discourse but does not accord the concept any particular significance.9 By Leontius' time, however, steps had already been taken to make 'composition' the central plank of Chalcedonian Christology. In the year 519 a group of men, the so-called Scythians monks, had claimed that the formula of the 'one composite hypostasis' was needed in order to safeguard the oneness of the incarnated Word on which Cyril had insisted and to dispel any suspicion that Chalcedonians were in reality followers of Nestorius.10 These developments raised the ire of the 'Nestorians' , who may at this point simply have been Chalcedonians who did not wish to go beyond the conciliar formula and put more emphasis on the distinction between the two natures.11 In Leontius of Byzantium' Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos we encounter a 'Nestorian' interlocutor who points out that the incarnated Word and the human being are not alike since the Word pre-existed the flesh whereas the souls come into being at the same time as the bodies.12 In a dialogue penned by John Maxentius, one of the Scythian monks, the 'Nestorian' not only challenges the anthropological paradigm but also rejects the notion of a composition. 6 See J. There is no doubt that every compound consists of parts, but a part is lesser than the whole. Accordingly, the divine Word is a part of Christ, whom you assert to be composed of divinity and humanity, and if the divine Word is a part of Christ, the divine Word is according to you lesser than Christ whose part he is.
This is quite an intricate argument. It is claimed that all compounds consist of parts and that these parts must behave in the same way. This would make it impossible to apply the concept to the specific case of the incarnation. Of course, Leontius and John Maxentius let the 'Nestorians' only speak in order to refute them immediately afterwards. Leontius claims that paradigms need not in all respects be identical with that which they illustrate;14 and John Maxentius declares that the Word as a part is not lesser than the compound Christ, because he himself is Christ.15 Yet these clarifications also show that the concept could only in a loose sense be used in the Christological discourse. Even so, composition, as exemplified by the human being, became a leitmotif in the theological writings of Emperor Justinian.16 In his Edictum de recta fide Justinian declares that in the one Christ the difference between the natures is preserved and then adds the explanation: 'for when composition is confessed the parts exist in the whole and the whole is recognised in the parts' (συνθέσεως γὰρ ὁμολογουμένης καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν γινώσκεται). 17 The notion of a composite nature is rejected with reference to the human being. Justinian declares that a human individual can be called a composite nature because it is an instantiation of a common nature or species, whereas Christ is a singular being. Yet he does not go so far as to abandon the anthropological paradigm.18 In the year 553 Justinian convened the Fifth Ecumenical Council and saw to it that the participants gave his theological position the status of a dogma.19 The fourth anathema, which resembles very closely a passage in his Edictum de recta fide, condemns Nestorian concepts such as 'relation' (σχέσις), 'equality of honour' (ἰσοτιμία), and 'reference' (ἀναφορά), and presents the formula 'one composite hypostasis' (μία ὑπόστασις σύνθετος) as the orthodox alternative.20 The anathema had a clear purpose. It was meant to reassure the Monophysites that the Chalcedonian position was not Nestorianism in disguise.21 Not everybody found it easy clearly to distinguish the orthodox composite hypostasis from the heretical composite nature.22 Yet this did not hinder the dissemination of the concept. In one of his theological treatises Anastasius, the patriarch of Antioch, makes the following statement.
Ὅσον οὖν ἐστι τοῦ τρόπου στοχάσασθαι τῆς πρὸς τὴν σάρκα τοῦ λόγου ἑνώσεως, ἄλλην ἁρμοδιωτέραν οὐχ εὑρήσομεν εἰκόνα τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, ἐξ ὧν ἀποτελεῖται ζῷον ἓν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε τῶν μερῶν τρεπομένων ἐν τῇ συνθέσει …23 As far, then, as it is possible to conjecture the manner of the union of the Word with the flesh, we will not find another more fitting image than that of the soul with its own body, from which is effected one living being, the human being, where neither the parts are changed in the composition … This does not, however, mean that all opposition had been silenced. In the late sixth or early seventh century the 'Nestorian' theologian Babai the Great Then after these an evil of evils erupted, which obscured with its wickedness all earlier evils, all of which are in it, that is, a complete consummation of impiety, which gathered strength at the hands of Emperor Justinian, the Roman tyrant, and still persists. This is a clear reference to the Fifth Ecumenical Council.28 Babai states that he has already written a treatise against the emperor in eight books, which he is now summarising.29 As one might expect he is incensed at the posthumous 24 On Babai see T. condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Diodore of Tarsus who were considered authoritative figures in the 'Nestorian' church.30 Yet he is not simply engaging in ad hominem polemic. He discusses in turn each of the anathemas against heretics, which Justinian had drafted, and strives to show that they are themselves heretical. Of particular importance is his refutation of the fourth anathema. The version, which he presents to his readers, is a conflation of two passages in the Acts of the Council and in Justinian's Edictum de recta fide, which must at some point have been translated into Syriac.31 Unsurprisingly, Babai seeks to show that terms such as 'grace' (χάρις), which had been rejected by the council, are justified both through Scripture and through the tradition of the church.32 Yet he does not stop there. He also attacks the concept of a 'composite hypostasis' , which the anathema presents as the orthodox point of view.
For this is the order of things that are composed to one, that without the composition with each other, they cannot effect anything nor hypostatically exist, and they would not suffer when one (sc. of them) is without its companion; as long as they are in a composition, and each of them loses through composition and mutual communication the quality which it had while it was still in its own simplicity.
Here Babai claims that there is a common 'law' , applying to all parts of compounds, under which the incarnated Word would also fall if the incarnation were conceptualised as a composition. It is evident that none of the features listed by him could be attributed to the divine Word who exists on his own and is in no way changed by the union with the flesh. The similarity between this argument and the reasoning of John Maxentius' 'Nestorian' is striking. There, too, the argument started with a universal proposition. At the time this was, of course, not the only model on offer. Other authors who took their inspiration from Platonic philosophy were of the opinion that the soul did not need the body in order to function and that it remained active even after death.37 Consequently they found it much easier to create a parallel between the soul and the divine Word. Babai could not hope to 'convert' these people but he could capitalise on a religious trend, which led to the rejection of a Platonising anthropology.38 Curiously enough, this development reached its peak at the same council that anathematised Theodore of Mopsuestia and Diodore of Tarsus Everything that is composed with something else, is composed either as a whole with a whole, or as a part with a part, or as a part with a whole.
In every composite there is composed either a whole with a whole or a part with a part or a part with a whole.
Since both authors were contemporaries it is possible that they relied on now lost older sources, which would have dated to the second half of the sixth century. If this hypothesis is correct, we could speak of a broader 'Nestorian' discourse, sparked by the Fifth Ecumenical Council, which spanned both the Persian and the Roman spheres. The arguments put forward by the anonymous 'Nestorian' are self-contained. At their most elaborate they begin in the following manner.
Πᾶν ὁτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἑτέρῳ πρὸς μιᾶς φύσεως καὶ ὑποστάσεως ζώσης σύστασιν, μέρος δείκνυται τῆς ἀποτελεσθείσης φύσεως ἢ καὶ ὑποστάσεως, πᾶν δὲ μέρος φύσεως καὶ ὑποστάσεως ζώσης….46 Everything that is composed with something else in order to constitute one living nature and hypostasis, is shown to be a part of the nature or also hypostasis that has been effected. Yet every part of a living nature and hypostasis is … In each case there then follows a statement about a particular property of the part. The similarity of this approach to the Nestorian argument found in John Maxentius' treatise is even more striking than in the case of Babai. Both authors insinuate that there is no difference between the one composite nature and the one composite hypostasis and that the Chalcedonians are therefore in reality Monophysites. Unlike his forebear, however, Leontius of Jerusalem's 'Nestorian' adversary adduces the human being as an illustration of the general rule. Only after this step follows the Christological application. We are told that the divine Word cannot have this property and that it can therefore not be a part of a composite hypostasis. For example, we read that in all compounds one part suffers with the other, and benefits from the other, and that this is therefore also the case with the soul as a part of the human compound.47 Another passage reveals further parallels with Babai's Liber de unione.
Εἰ σύνθετος ὁ δεσπότης Χριστός, καθά φασι, μέρος ὁ θεὸς Λόγος, καθὰ βούλεται τῶν συνθέτων ὁ νόμος⋅ πᾶν δὲ μέρος ἔλαττον κατά τι καθέστηκε τοῦ ἰδίου ὅλου⋅ ἐλάττων ἄρα τινὸς κατά τι ὁ θεὸς Λόγος⋅ οὐκ ἂν γὰρ εἴη μέρος, μὴ ἐλάττων ὢν τοῦ ὅλου. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ θεὸς ἀληθινὸς ὁ θεὸς Λόγος, ἐπεὶ τὸν ἀληθινὸν θεὸν οὐδενὸς ἐλάττονα λέγειν δυνατόν.48 If the Lord Christ is composite, as they say, the divine Word is a part, as the law of compounds demands it. But every part is in some respect lesser than its own whole. As a consequence, the divine Word would be in some respect lesser than something. For it would not be a part, if it were not lesser than the whole. But if this is the case, the divine Word would not even be true God, since one cannot say that the true God is lesser than something else.
The argument that the whole is greater than the parts had already been put forward by John Maxentius' 'Nestorian' sparring partner. It is not found in the Liber de unione even though it makes an appearance in another text authored by Babai.49 Yet the closeness between the two contemporary texts is evident. Both authors speak of a 'law of compounds' , which applies to all cases of composition and which would also apply to the incarnation if it were conceptualised in this manner. In this instance, too, the only example that the 'Nestorian' considers relevant is the human being. He declares that the human 47 Leontius of Jerusalem. Contra Nestorianos, I.6.7, PG 86, 1420B6-12, 1428A11-B4. 48 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.10, PG 86, 1437C8-D2. 49 See Abramowski, Goodman, Nestorian Christological Texts…, II, no. VIIb, 94.11- 18. being is greater than the soul because the soul is inactive after its separation from the body as it lacks the necessary organs.50 A similar argument we have already encountered in the Liber de unione. In this case, however, the polemical aspect is much more obvious. The anonymous 'Nestorian' claims that those who believe that the disembodied soul continues to be active after death, by necessity also believe in its pre-existence and are thus not true Christians but Manicheans and pagans.51 These are the usual accusations directed against the followers of Origen and Evagrius who were actively persecuted at the time. Thus, it is insinuated that all Chalcedonians who continue to make use of the anthropological paradigm are in reality heretics.52 … Leontius of Jerusalem preserved the syllogisms of the anonymous 'Nestorian' author only in order to refute them. Employing a strategy that is often found in Late Antique polemical texts he builds his case incrementally. In a first step he questions the validity of the general rule. In a second step he concedes 'for the sake of the argument' that the rule is valid in principle and then proceeds to show that there are exceptions to it. The former topic is dealt with in chapters six and eight. There Leontius attacks the axiom that everything that is composed with something else in order to constitute a hypostasis is a part of this hypostasis.53 His aim is to show that the divine Word does not have the status of a part and therefore is not affected by whatever happens to parts. Yet he does not focus on the specific case of the incarnation but instead claims that even in creation one cannot speak of 'parts of a hypostasis' . In order to make his case he defines hypostasis as a bundle of accidents, without according it a substantial component. τῶν συνθέτων μέρη τῶν ὑποστάσεών εἰσι· τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν οὐσίαι τὰ μέρη γίνονται, οὐ τῶν ὑποστάσεων).55 In chapter seven he sets out a more elaborate argument.
Εἰ δὲ μέρη τῆς ὑποστάσεως τὰς τῶν κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἰδιωμάτων φύσεις λέγετε, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ὁμοίως τοῖς μέρεσι φύσιν εἰδότες πᾶσαν ὑπόστασιν, φύσιν τινὰ κατὰ συγχύσιν τῶν συντεθεισῶν ἴστε φύσεων, καὶ ἐπιγέννησιν56 ἑτέρας παρὰ τὰς ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει συνελθούσας, ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως τοῖς μέρεσιν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ὅλον τῆς ὑποστάσεως εἶναι λέγετε, εἴπερ οὐσίας τὰ μέρη, ἀνούσιον τόδε τι εἶναι νομίζετε, καὶ ἐκ συνθέσεως τῶν ἐνυπάρκτων συνάγετέ τι ἀνύπαρκτον·μέσον γάρ τι οὐσιῶν καὶ ἀνουσίων οὐκ ἔστι.57 If you call 'parts of the hypostasis' the natures of the idioms in it, you either know that the whole is similar to the parts, and consequently know that every hypostasis is a certain nature according to confusion of the composed natures, and additional birth of another one apart from those that have come together in the hypostasis, or you say that the whole of the hypostasis is dissimilar to its parts, if indeed you think that since the parts are substances this particular thing is non-substantial, and conclude something inexistent from the composition of the ones that are existent, for there is no middle thing between substances and what is without substance.
Here, too, Leontius offers two alternatives: if the hypostasis were a whole and the natures its parts, the parts could be either similar or dissimilar to the whole. The second option is manifestly absurd. By contrast, the first option is again based on Aristotle's dictum. If the parts were similar, the two substances would constitute one substance. Such a scenario, however, would be heretical since the substances would then be confused. Leontius' arguments are truly astonishing since they undermine the traditional Chalcedonian position where the divine and human natures are said to be parts of the composite hypostasis. This raises the question whether one can still meaningfully speak of the incarnation as a composition. The second step of the argument is more traditional. Leontius  study the commandments, Leontius declares that the body is the main obstacle to studying;58 and where the 'Nestorian' avers that the soul suffers with the body, he objects that the soul can thrive when the body is in pain.59 Thus he can insinuate that the human being is an exceptional case to which the general rule does not apply and that it can therefore serve as a paradigm for the incarnation. Yet it is worth noting that he does not challenge the Nestorian's claim that the soul is lesser than the human compound.60 This is surprising when we consider that half a century earlier John Philoponus had still declared that the soul was better than the complete human being, just as the Word was better than the compound Christ.61 It is possible that Leontius felt he had to tread more carefully because an overtly 'Platonic' anthropology would have laid him open to accusations of Origenism. Indeed, his trust in the anthropological paradigm appears to have been shaken since he develops another line of argument, claiming that God can always create new kinds of composition, beyond those that can be found in the present world, and that the composite hypostasis of Christ would therefore not need to have a counterpart that is known to us. This leads him to conclude.
Φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν ἀποδεδειγμένων πάντων, ὡς καὶ μέρος ὁ Λόγος οὐ μετὰ μερικῆς ἀτελείας λέγεται, καὶ συντιθέμενος οὐ καθώς φατε, τῷ νόμῳ τῶν συνθέτων οὐσιῶν τῶν παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ὑποβάλλεται.62 It is, then, evident from all that we have proved, that the Word is called part not with the incompleteness that is the sign of parts, and that even when he is composed, he is not, as you say, subjected to the law of the composite substances that exist beside him.
Not all of the conceptual problems faced by Leontius were caused by the Nestorian. He himself found it very difficult to apply the concept of composition to the incarnation. At one point he concedes that wholes cannot constitute themselves. Yet then he declares that this rule does not apply to the incarnation of the Word. 58 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.6, PG 86, 1421D7-9. 59 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.7, PG 86, 1429B4-7. 60 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.51, PG 86, 1517C4-7. 61 See Lang, John Philoponus…, 84. 62 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.10, PG 86, 1444D1-4.
Ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτό τινος⋅ μόνος γὰρ εἶναι οὐσιαστὴς καὶ φυσικὸς εἰδοποιὸς ὁ ὑποβληθεὶς ὡς μέρος τῷδε τῷ ὅλῳ ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν πᾶσιν. Εἰ δὲ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τόδε γέγονέ πως ὡς ὅλον τι, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος αὐτὸ ὡς ἐξ ἰδίου μέρους γινόμενον εἴη τὸ ποίημα· ἔσται γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ὡς μέρος ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ περιεχόμενον τὸ αἴτιον ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τάδε ἀδύνατα, δῆλον ὡς οὐ κυρίως λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ προαγαγὸν τὴν λεγομένην Χριστοῦ ὁλότητα μέρος, αὐτό ἐστι ὃ σύγκειται ἑτέρῳ, ἤγουν ὁ Λόγος τῇ σαρκί.63 He, then, would not be brought into existence by something else, for it is confessed by us all that the one who is subjected as part to this whole is the only maker of substance and natural producer of species. But if this had been somehow brought into existence by him as some whole, the product would be brought into existence by the one who creates it as by its own part. For thus the cause as part in the whole will be comprehended by that which is caused, which is impossible. Since, then, this is impossible, it is obvious that it is not called thus in the strict sense of the word but the part, which has produced the so-called whole of Christ, is that which is composed with another, that is, the Word with the flesh.
Here Leontius wrestles with a problem that is inherent in the concept of composition. In normal cases there are three factors, which are clearly distinguished from each other: the parts, the whole, and a 'composer' who puts together the parts in order to make a whole.64 One such case is the human being whom God creates by uniting a body and a soul. This model is evidently not applicable to the specific case of the incarnation where one of the parts is at the same time the 'composer' and is furthermore identical with the whole. Thus, Leontius comes to the conclusion that in the case of Christ one cannot speak of part and whole in the strict sense. It is doubtful whether even Leontius himself would have been satisfied by this contorted argument. When he does not engage in polemic, he speaks about the incarnation in quite a different way. In the sixth chapter he declares that Christ had already established a relation with this world when he created it and that the incarnation was therefore only the logical next step 'when he brought it forth into being and hypostasised it into himself, leading it to a higher state of being, embracing and enfolding it as the one who is, in order that none of those who are his own again return to non-being through 63 Leontius corruption' (προβιβάσας ἤδη εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ εἰς τὸ ὑψηλότερον εἶναι αὐτὰ ἄγων ἑαυτῷ ἐνυπέστησε, πάντα ἐγκολπισάμενος καὶ περιπράξας ὁ ὢν ἑαυτῷ ἵνα μηδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἰδίων διὰ τῆς φθορᾶς εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν πάλιν ἀνακάμψῃ). 65 Here all talk of part and whole has disappeared. Instead, we encounter the concept of insubsistence, which expresses the Biblical notion of an assumption of the flesh by and into the Word.66

…
In the seventh century Leontius of Jerusalem was not the only Chalcedonian theologian who wrestled with these conceptual problems. Another important contribution to the debate was made by Maximus the Confessor.67 As is well known the concepts 'part' , 'whole' and 'composition' play an important role in Maximus' cosmological speculation.68 At first sight the situation does not appear to be very different in the field of Christology. In his fifteenth letter Maximus speaks of a 'true union in a hypostasis of each of the parts that come together with one another to the composition of a whole' (ἀληθὴς καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσις ἑκατέρου τῶν εἰς ὅλου τινὸς σύνθεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνερχομένων μερῶν). 69 Such statements give the impression as if this framework can be applied without any problems to the incarnation and that Word and flesh can be regarded as equivalent.70 Yet this is not Maximus' final word on the topic. A more considered discussion is found in the last two sections of his thirteenth letter. 71 There we find the following statement.
Εἰ δὲ ὅτι καὶ πᾶσα σύνθετος ὑπόστασις ἀλλήλοις ὁμόχρονα κέκτηται τὰ μέρη, νομίζοι τις τὴν αὐτὴν ἀτοπίαν συνάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς λέγουσι μίαν τὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι σύνθετον ὑπόστασιν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπολαμβάνει λόγον. οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς πᾶσα σύνθετος ὑπόστασις ἀλλήλοις ὁμόχρονα κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἔχει τὰ μέρη, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ὑπὸ φύσιν σύνθετον δηλονότι τελοῦσα, καὶ εἶδος ἔχουσα τοιοῦτον αὐτῆς κατηγορούμενον.72 If because every composite hypostasis, too, possesses the parts as being simultaneous with one another, someone might think that the same absurdity can also be concluded in the case of those who say that Christ is one hypostasis, such a one does not suppose correctly in my opinion, for it is not simply the case that every composite hypostasis has the parts as being simultaneous with one another as regards their coming-to-be, but it is only so when it falls under a composite nature, and has such a species predicated of it.
The starting-point of Maximus' argument is a syllogism: in every composite hypostasis (just as in every composite nature) the parts come into existence at the same time; according to you Christ is a composite hypostasis; consequently, in Christ divinity and humanity would come into existence at the same time, which is absurd.73 This syllogism was evidently formulated by a 'Nestorian' author. Indeed, it resembles very closely the arguments put forward by Leontius of Jerusalem's 'Nestorian' adversary. The only part that is missing is a reference to the human compound as an exemplification of the general axiom. Yet there can be no doubt that this step is understood: as we have seen 'Nestorians' reject the anthropological paradigm because in the human being the soul and the body come into existence at the same time. In his refutation Maximus makes a distinction between two cases -a composite hypostasis that is a member of a species, and a composite hypostasis that is not a member of a species -and contends that the syllogism is only valid in the first case.
Here again we are meant to think of the human being. According to Maximus, an individual such as Peter is not only a hypostasis but also a nature because 'nature' has the meaning of species and humanity constitutes such a species. This part of the argument is directed against the Monophysites who not only spoke of a composite hypostasis but also of a composite nature of the Ἐπὶ γὰρ πάντων καθ᾽ ὅλου τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνθέτων, οὐχ ἡ τοῦδε πρὸς τόδε κατὰ πρόσληψιν σύνοδος, τὴν δὲ τοῦ εἴδους, ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὅλου ποιεῖται σύστασιν. ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἀθρόα τῶν μερῶν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι γένεσις, κατὰ τὴν ἅμα τῷ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα σύνοδον, ποιεῖται τοῦ ὅλου τὴν σύνθεσιν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ μυστήριον, οὐ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ θεὸς ὑπάρχων φύσει καὶ θεοῦ κατὰ φύσιν Υἱὸς ἁπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀσώματος, … ἐξ ἡμῶν γέγονεν οἰκονομικῶς καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν σύνθετος καὶ ἐνσώματος.75 For generally in all compounds according to nature, it is not the concurrence of this one with that one according to assumption, but that of the species that makes the constitution of a whole as from parts. But it is the sudden coming-to-be from non-being to being of the parts, insofar as the concurrence with one another happens at the same time as the coming-to-be, that produces the composition of the whole. But the mystery of our Lord and God and Saviour Jesus Christ did not come to be in this manner, but being God by nature and Son of God according to nature, simple and incorporeal … he came to be from us 'economically' composite and corporeal as regards his hypostasis.
In this passage, too, Maximus juxtaposes a hypostasis that is at the same time an instance of a species, with a hypostasis that is singular. In the latter case he states that the composition happens through assumption of the flesh by the Word. Comparison of the two complementary statements reveals a significant difference. Maximus employs the terms, 'part' and 'whole' only in the case of created compounds such as the human being, whereas in the case of the incarnated Word he merely speaks of 'simple' and 'composite' . This is undoubtedly a deliberate move. According to Maximus one can only use the terms 'part' and 'whole' in the case of created beings, which fall under species. At this point one can ask whether it still makes sense to refer to the incarnation as a composition. It is arguable that Maximus would have abandoned the term in favour of assumption if it had not been enshrined in dogma.76 Since he could not take this step, he declared instead that assumption was one type of composition, rather than an alternative to it as had been argued by Cyril. This conclusion, too, is not simply a logical consequence of Maximus' thought. In the following passage we read.
Εἰ τοίνυν μὴ κατὰ νόμον καὶ τάξιν τῆς τῶν συνθέτων φύσεως, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρῳ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν τῶν συνθέτων θεσμῷ -κατὰ πρόσληψιν γὰρ ἀφράστως ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τὴν σάρκα συνετέθη Λόγος, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ γένεσιν ἅμα τῇ σαρκὶ πρὸς σύνθεσιν τὸ εἶναι λαβὼν εἰς ὅλου τινὸς κατ᾽ εἶδος συμπλήρωσιν, καθὼς ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας διαπρυσίως πᾶσιν ἐμβοᾷ λόγος -, μάτην τοῖς ὑπὸ φύσιν θεσμοῖς ὑπαγαγεῖν ἀθέσμως ἐπιχειροῦσιν οἱ ἀμαθεῖς τὴν πάντα φύσεως ὅρον τε καὶ λόγον ἐκβαίνουσαν σύνθεσιν.77 If then (sc. the composition is effected) not according to the law and order of the nature of the compounds, but through another law besides the nature of the compounds -for the Word of God was composed with the flesh ineffably according to assumption, but has not received being as regards the coming-to-be together with the flesh so as to effect a composition, for the completion of some whole according to species, as the word of truth loudly shouts to all -the uneducated vainly attempt to subject the composition that exceeds all definition and concept of nature in an unlawful manner to the laws of nature. 76 See Garrigues, La personne composée…, 199-201, who juxtaposes composition (composite nature) and assumption (composite hypostasis) but does not explain how assumption could be conceptualised as bringing about a composite hypostasis. See also Bieler, Der Einheitsbegriff…, 280. 77 Maximus the Confessor, Epistula 13, PG 91, 529C11-D7.
This statement bears a striking resemblance to the passage in the treatise of Leontius of Jerusalem that I have quoted above. In both cases the authors speak of people who claim that there exists a 'law of compounds' , which is derived from examples in the created order, and that the incarnated Word must be subject to this law when one conceptualises the incarnation as a composition. These people whom Maximus calls 'uneducated' can only be 'Nestorians' . Like Leontius of Jerusalem before him, Maximus is forced to give up on seeking parallels for the incarnation in the created order, such as the human being. As a consequence he declares that God became man in a supernatural way. This shows clearly that two hundred years after the condemnation of their Christology 'Nestorian' theologians could still incommodate their Chalcedonian counterparts. It seems very likely that Maximus had in his hands a Nestorian text.78 Whether this text was identical with the treatise excerpted by Leontius of Jerusalem is doubtful since none of the arguments in the first book of Contra Nestorianos creates direct juxtaposition of the co-existing soul and the pre-existing Word.79 In the end Maximus, like Leontius of Jerusalem, opts for the concept of insubsistence as an alternative conceptual framework that is more in tune with the model of assumption. In his fifteenth letter he declares that the flesh 'is enhypostasised as having received its coming-to-be in him (sc. the Word) and for him and has become his flesh through union, and is made one with him in hypostasis' (ἐνυπόστατος ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸν λαβοῦσα τοῦ εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ αὐτοῦ γενομένη καθ᾽ ἕνωσιν σάρξ, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν ἑνιζομένη).80 … To conclude, the Fifth Ecumenical Council decreed that the incarnation should be understood as a composition of two parts, the divine and human natures, and that one should therefore use the term 'composite hypostasis' . This Christological model was made intelligible through recourse to a parallel in creation. It was claimed that in the human being two different natures, the soul and the body, became parts of a whole. In the fourth anathema 'composite 78 Alternatively one could argue that Maximus' adversaries were 'strict Chalcedonians' . Yet there is no evidence that this group survived until the seventh century. 79 It appears only as part of a complex argument. See Leontius