Introduction: Challenges from “The Periphery”? – Salafī Islam Outside the Arab World. Spotlights on Wider Asia

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Over the last decade or so, “Salafism” seems to have tacitly replaced the spectres of “Islamism” and “Islamic fundamentalism” in the lexicon of public media, of politicians on every level, of law enforcement agencies, and, subsequently, of the general public, especially in what these days is labelled the “Global North”. While select publications had already appeared in the first years of the 2000s, it was a volume edited by Roel Meijer which, in 2009, shifted this distinct Sunnī Islamic orientation into the limelight, not least thanks to a catchy title that cast “Salafism” as “Islam’s New Religious Movement” discernible all over the world.¹ The volume had emerged from an international conference at Radboud University in Nijmegen in 2007, kick-starting a five-year research project on the matter, generously funded by the Dutch Organization for Academic Research (NWO) until the end of 2012, which has produced a number of important studies to date.

Still, it is very much Meijer’s edited volume that has set the agenda for the investigation of “Salafism” ever since, in conjunction with the earlier article by political scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz, who, at the time of publication, served as chairman of the US Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism.² In this most influential article of his, Wiktorowicz laudably undertook a first

1 See Roel Meijer (ed.), *Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement* (London: Hurst / New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

2 See Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29:3 (2006), 207–39.

attempt at systematically tackling the ‘ambiguity and fragmentation’ of “Salafism” that ‘makes [it] so difficult to define’.³ Indeed, systematizing the phenomenon in all its various manifestations has been a focal point in research on “Salafism” since Wiktorowicz’s seminal opener of the debate, and, based on the research presented in the various contributions to the present special thematic issue of *Die Welt des Islams*, we also wish to enter it and suggest further advances from the taxonomy as it presently stands.

Two points are to be taken from Meijer’s programmatic introduction to the 2009 volume because they appear still to dominate the academic and, by implication, general public views on “Salafism”. The first is the relationship of “Salafism” with “Wahhābism” and the religious and political culture of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in general, which, judging from recent publications, still carries quite some currency.⁴ While, in 2009, that connection was still rather undefined, meandering somewhere between synonymity and analogy,⁵ more recent research suggests that the official interpretation of Sunnī Islam in Saudi Arabia – eponymously called “Wahhābiyya” – was indeed a major driving force in religious developments that, eventually, emerged self-confidently as “Salafism”.⁶ Yet, as shown not least by the five studies assembled here, we counter that stressing the centrality of Saudi Arabia in shaping what Meijer has named “global Salafism” at times obscures the more complex historical trajectories and realities on the ground, and, moreover, somewhat deprives Muslims outside Saudi Arabia and the wider MENA region of their agency.

The second point is related to this prevalent emphasis on Wahhābī Islam and, more generally, the MENA region as the cradle of “Salafism”. First, it blurs the lines between “Wahhabism” and “Salafism”,⁷ and, second, it suggests a clear-cut divide between this conglomerate, on one side, and “Sufism” on the

3 Meijer, “Introduction”, in *Global Salafism*, ed. idem, 1–32, here 3.

4 Emblematically, see Rüdiger Lohlker, *Die Salafisten: Der Aufstand der Frommen, Saudi-Arabien und der Islam* (Munich: Beck, 2017), where the Saudi nexus is already explicitly made in the title. Leaving aside the title, Lohlker does draw attention to the complex relationship between Wahhābī and Salafī interpretations of Islam, and highlights the prolonged outside influences on the former, including from West Africa, Egypt and South Asia. See *ibid.*, 33–54. Moreover, he clearly notes that the “Wahhabi establishment has consciously appropriated the “Salafī” label”. (p. 33 [trans. ours]).

5 Meijer, “Introduction”, in *Global Salafism*, ed. idem, 3.

6 See, for example, Guido Steinberg, “Saudi-Arabien: Der Salafismus in seinem Mutterland”, in *Salafismus: Auf der Suche nach dem wahren Islam*, ed. Behnam T. Said and Hazim Fouad (Freiburg i.B.: Herder, 2014), 265–96.

7 This is even the case in the otherwise excellent study by Terje Østebø, *Localising Salafism: Religious Change among Oromo Muslims in Bale, Ethiopia* (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2012), 1, who states that the only “reason for my avoidance of the term Wahhabism is its pejorative connotation, consequently rejected by all my Salafī informants”.

other. By doing so – here, the issue of agency is virulent – Islamic reform attempts in South Asia (and, by implication, other regions in the “periphery” of the Muslim world) get discounted as possible manifestations of “Salafism” due to the adherence of its leading protagonists to “Sufism”.⁸ In our view, this argument is based on two questionable assumptions: first, it presupposes a rather monolithic understanding of “Sufism”, or – for systematic reasons that we shall explain below – *taṣawwuf*; and, second, it presupposes a single and fixed identity in a person which does not allow for the contingent and oftentimes strategically flexible choices from a range of affiliations and modes of identity formation.

In the following, we shall address all these areas and bring in our own views as a new impulse into the wider discussion. These views are informed by a fresh appraisal of the ever-growing body of academic literature on the matter, including the research of the contributors to this special thematic issue. We will try to tackle the issues outlined in three distinct, yet interrelated, steps. First, we will question the widespread assumption that “Salafism” is derived unidirectionally from Wahhābī Islam and the efforts of the Saudi Arabian political and religious establishment to use its financial and logistic assets to spread this interpretation of Sunnī Islam beyond the Arabian Peninsula. Therefore, we need, second, to further modify the existing ideal-typical taxonomy as developed by Wiktorowicz and already further remodelled by other scholars in the field, by suggesting the departure from categories that cast actors as consistent representatives of clear-cut doctrinal camps and to instead focus on their respective positions themselves. This will, third, liberate the various actors from the requirement of consistency and take their divergent, and at times even contradictory, positions in varying temporal and spatial contexts into account. As soon as this is achieved, the alleged opposition between initially firm and clearly defined categories such as “Salafīs” and “Šūfis” dissolves and potentially allows for actors to cross back and forth between them.

Acknowledging Multidirectionality

The first overall contribution that we aim to make is to critically test the widely accepted view that all things “Salafi” have to have a primary reference to Saudi Arabia, or are indeed unidirectionally informed by the official interpretation of

8 See Meijer, “Introduction”, 5f., where Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1206/1792), eponymous progenitor of the “Wahhābiyya”, is dissociated from Shāh Valiyallāh b. ‘Abd al-Raḥīm of Delhi (d. 1176/1762), solely because of the Šūfī inclinations of the latter.

Islam in the kingdom, which was shaped by Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb in eighteenth-century Najd and is therefore eponymously labelled “Wahhābiyya”.⁹ The essays assembled in this special thematic issue indicate that this is not necessarily the case, a fact that has already been stressed for the period considered to be formative – that is, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – by authors as diverse as Reinhard Schulze and Martin Riexinger. These and other authors have, in fact, pointed to the exceptional significance of the Indian *Ahl-i Ḥadīs*, a distinct thread within Sunnī Islamic scholarship in northern India that promotes a particular legal hermeneutics entirely outside the four canonical *madhāhib fiqhīyya*, as well as the prominence of the celebrated *qāḍī* of Ṣan‘ā’, Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Shawkānī (d. 1255/1839), and his master students in this process.¹⁰ In a similar vein, Mayeur-Jaouen has recently asserted that ‘Muslim reformist tendencies’, including proto-Salafī thought, had first appeared not in the Arab world but rather in Russia (i.e. the Ural-Volga region), Central Asia and India from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries onwards.¹¹ Based on such and similar observations, we would like to regard the investigations underlying the contributions to this volume as windows onto alternative developments outside of the Arabic-speaking world, which invite us to consider additional, less widely recognized intellectual genealogies and trajectories of the phenomenon in focus here. In fact, we wish to emphatically stress the polycentricity in the origins of a distinct interpretation of Islamic

9 See Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (London: Tauris, 2006). It shall be noted that Commins’ account of the global Wahhābī mission is a much more balanced one than the former, and, moreover, attentive to multi-directional influences. See also Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam: Religious Authority and Political Authority in Saudi Arabia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).

10 See Reinhard Schulze, *Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Islamischen Weltliga* (Leiden et al.: Brill, 1990), 66–68; Bernard Haykel, *Revival and Reform in Islam. The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkānī* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Martin Riexinger, *Sanā’ullāh Amritsarī (1868–1948) und die Ahl-i Ḥadīs [sic] im Punjab unter britischer Herrschaft* (Würzburg: Ergon, 2004), 523–37; also Claudia Preckel, *Islamische Bildungsnetzwerke und Gelehrtenkultur im Indien des 19. Jahrhunderts: Muḥammad Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Ḥān (st. 1890) und die Entstehung der Ahl-e ḥadīth-Bewegung in Bhopal* (Ph.D. dissertation, Ruhr-University Bochum, 2005), stable URL: <www.brs.ub.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/netahtml/HSS/Diss/PreckelClaudia/diss.pdf/>, 120–34; Michael Farquhar, *Circuits of Faith: Migration, Education, and the Wahhabi Mission* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017), 97–99; Itzhak Weismann, “A Perverved Balance: Modern Salafism between Reform and Jihād”, *WI* 57:1 (2017), 33–66, here 39 and 54.

11 Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen, “À la poursuite de la réforme: Renouveaux et débats historiographiques de l’histoire religieuse et intellectuelle de l’islam, xve–xxie siècle”, *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 73:2 (2019), 317–58, here 330.

normativity called *salafiyya*. Even Henri Lauzière's acknowledgment of the nexus of Saudi Arabian Wahhābī scholarship and the Indian *Ahl-i Ḥadīṣ*¹² appears as if the driving impulse went out exclusively from the Arabian Peninsula, and may therefore benefit from some readjustment.

Similarly, Richard Gauvain makes a strong case for a genuine Egyptian development of a *salafiyya* current since the 1920s, which is distinct from the circle around Jamāl al-Dīn Asadābādī "al-Afghānī" (d. 1314/1897), Muḥammad 'Abduh (d. 1323/1905) and Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1354/1935), and rather associated with the *Jamā'at al-Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya*, founded by Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqī (d. 1378/1959).¹³ Even though al-Fiqī had been a student of Rashīd Riḍā, benefitted logistically from his teacher's publication enterprise and maintained close personal relations to Saudi-based scholars and leading Muslim Brethren alike,¹⁴ his organization and its agenda remained quite particular, a fact that led Gauvain to question the unidirectionality of Salafī dissemination from Saudi Arabia.¹⁵ This contention is bolstered by the fact that al-Fiqī was a major scholar on Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) – alleged pillar-saint of all adherents to the *salafiyya* – and has, in fact, prepared critical editions of many texts both of this Damascene traditionarian and his foremost student, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350).¹⁶

Last but not least, also Laurent Bonnefoy, in his work on the development of a *salafiyya* current in Yemen, has indicated that, despite the proximity to Saudi Arabia and the long history of labour migration to the kingdom, this particular

12 See Henri Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 200.

13 See Richard Gauvain, "Salafism in Modern Egypt: Panacea or Pest?", *Political Theology* 11:6 (2010), 802–25, here 810–16. Gauvain refers here to an unpublished PhD dissertation by a K.M. Yūnus from the University of Karachi (2006), titled *al-Qarn al-Ashrīn wa-Juhūd al-Ḥaraka al-Da'wiyya fī Miṣr*, which, unfortunately, was not available to us. The whole matter will be comprehensively dealt with in the forthcoming HDR thesis of Stéphane Lacroix, tentatively titled *Un histoire sociale et politique du Salafisme en Egypte*. Schulze had already earlier coined the label "Neo-Salafiyya" to describe the Islamic currents, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which emerged out of the mentioned circle of reformers. See Schulze, *Islamischer Internationalismus*, 87ff. and idem., *Geschichte der islamischen Welt: Von 1900 bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Beck, 2016), 31, 151f.

14 See Gauvain, "Salafism in Modern Egypt"; also Schulze, *Internationalismus*, 137 n. 436, 389; Rainer Brunner, *Annäherung und Distanz: Schia, Azhar und die islamische Ökumene im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Schwarz, 1996), 100 n.60; Guido Steinberg, *Religion und Staat in Saudi-Arabien: Die wahhabitischen Gelehrten, 1902–1953* (Würzburg: Ergon, 2002), 286–99.

15 The complex role of al-Fiqī is also brought out well in Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism*, 88–90, 115–26.

16 See the bibliographical references in Birgit Krawietz and Georges Tamer (eds.), *Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya* (Berlin and Boston, MA: de Gruyter, 2013), 519–25.

current drew inspiration from a much wider range of sources.¹⁷ This is facilitated by the Indian Ocean nexus,¹⁸ which, as we have indicated above, was already conducive for establishing an immediate link between al-Shawkānī and his students and the Indian *Ahl-i Ḥadīs*, and has also resulted in more contemporary links between, for example, the doyen of the *salafiyya* current in Yemen, Muqbil b. Ḥādī al-Wādī'ī (d. 1422/2001), and the Pashtun activist Jamīl al-Raḥmān (killed 1412/1991), supreme head of the short-lived Islamic Emirate of Kunar in northeastern Afghanistan already around the time of the withdrawal of the Soviet army in 1989.¹⁹

Even where the initial impulse did indeed come from Saudi Arabia, as is the case with the Salafiyya in the eastern Oromia region in Ethiopia, the tenets of the *salafiyya* world view are almost instantly moulded deeply into the local socio-religious fabric and unfold their own dynamics.²⁰ As diligently carved out by Østebø, the rise to prominence of an interpretation of Islam hitherto unknown in the region was inseparably linked to the emergence of new socio-economic groups and their subsequent quest for status-recognition in the Oromo Muslim communities. Clearly, Saudi Arabian politically motivated

17 See Laurent Bonnefoy, *Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity* (London: Hurst / New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 137–220.

18 The Indian Ocean as a space of tremendous cultural exchange, similar to the “Mediterranean world” as conceived by French *Annales* historian Fernand Braudel in his seminal study from 1949 (revised and expanded in 1966), has now for a few decades received a great degree of scholarly attention. See, for example, Ashin Das Gupta and Michael D. Pearson (eds.), *India and the Indian Ocean* (New Delhi et al.: Oxford University Press, 1987); Ulrike Freitag and William Clarence Smith (eds.), *Hadhrami Traders, Scholars, and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s–1960s* (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 1997); Jan-Georg Deutsch and Brigitte Reinwald (eds.), *Space on the Move: Transformations of the Indian Ocean Seascape in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century* [sic] (Berlin: Schwarz, 2002); Edward Simpson and Kai Kresse (eds.), *Struggling with History: Islam and Cosmopolitanism in the Western Indian Ocean* (London: Hurst / New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). Yet, Indian Ocean research with regard to the origins and developments of the Salafiyya persuasion still remains in its infancy.

19 Indicative in this regard is Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Muqbil al-Wādī'ī, *Maqal al-Shaykh Jamīl al-Raḥmān al-Afghānī* (Ṣan‘ā': Dār al-Āthār, 1421/2000, 2nd ed.). On the Islamic Emirate of Kunar, see Hartung's contribution to this issue.

20 See Østebø, *Localising Salafism*; also, although with a lesser focus on the Salafiyya, Patrick Desplat, *Heilige Stadt – Stadt der Heiligen: Manifestationen, Ambivalenzen und Kontroversen islamischer Heiligkeit in Harar/Äthiopien* (Cologne: R. Köppe Verlag, 2010). Similar conclusions have already been drawn by Roman Loimeier, “Islamic reform and political change: The example of Abubakar Gumi and the Yan Izala movement in Northern Nigeria”, in *African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists*, ed. David Westerlund and Eva E. Rosander (London: Hurst, 1997), 286–307; and Lansiné Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya: Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa, 1945–1960* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974).

aspirations to export its officially established interpretation of Islam throughout the Muslim world coincided with distinct local developments that facilitated openness to the *da'wa* radiating from the kingdom. At the same time, however, this *da'wa* was substantially transformed in order to respond to specifically Ethiopian sensibilities and local challenges. It could thus serve as a cultural reference point that promised a resolution of local problems.²¹

These few examples are indeed suggestive of a need to revisit the perceived centrality of Saudi Arabia and its official interpretation of Sunnī Islam in the genesis, as well as in the maintenance, of the religious persuasion under the label *salafīyya*. With the essays assembled here, we wish to make a first contribution to that end, by expressly adopting a vantage point outside the Arabophone MENA region, while not even remotely claiming, nor aiming at, comprehensive representation of all its local manifestations around the globe. After all, studies about these exist already in abundance.²² There is also a growing number of solid case studies on the so-called "Global North" – that is Europe, North America and Australia.²³ Yet, none of those studies has, to the best of our knowledge, undertaken systematic efforts to contribute to answering the above questions we have posed to ourselves. Rather, our impression is that, by and large, the view of the unidirectional origin of all *salafīyya*-related phenomena from Saudi Arabia is maintained. Conversely, however, the spotlights thrown here on diverse regions in Asia pay closer attention to alternative local sources of inspiration and indicate that the whole matter seems more

21 See Østebø, *Localising Salafism*, 134–85 et passim.

22 For the African continent beyond northern Africa, see the seven contributions to *Islamic Africa* 6:1–2 (2015), 1–184, assembled by Terje Østebø, which cover a wide range of regions, from Tanzania (Søren Gilsaa), via Ghana (Ousman Murzik Kobo), Niger and wider West Africa (Abdoulaye Sounaye), Nigeria (Alex Thurston), Somalia (Roland Marchal and Zakaria N. Sheikh) to the Sudan (Einass Ahmed). Territories of the former Soviet Union have been dealt with to variant extent in Alfrid K. Bustanov and Michael Kemper (eds.), *Islamic Authority and the Russian Language: Studies on Texts from European Russia, the North Caucasus and West Siberia* (Amsterdam: Pegasus, 2012), here esp. Kemper, "Jihadism: The Discourse of the Caucasus Emirate", 265–93.

23 See, for example, Martijn De Koning, "The Moral Maze: Dutch Salafis and the Construction of a Moral Community of the Faithful", *Contemporary Islam* 7:1 (2013), 71–83; Shadee Elmasry, "The Salafis in America: The Rise, Decline and Prospects for a Sunni Muslim Movement among African-Americans", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 30:2 (2010), 217–36; Sindre Bangstad and Marius Linge, "'Da'wa is our Identity': Salafism and IslamNet's Rationales for Action in a Norwegian Context", *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 4:2 (2015), 174–96; Sabine Damir-Geilsdorf and Mira Menzfeld, "Who are 'the' Salafis? – Insights into the Lifeworlds of Persons connected to Salafis(m) in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany", *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 6:1 (2017), 22–51; Susanne Olsson, *Contemporary Puritan Salafism: A Swedish Case Study* (Sheffield: Equinox, 2019).

complicated than it radiates from many of the available studies. Consequently, we look at *salafiyya*-related phenomena from the direction of Azerbaijan (Aliyev), Cambodia (Pall and Pérez Pereiro), Indonesia (Sunarwoto) and the Pashtun Borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Hartung), while not losing sight of the MENA region, and Saudi Arabia in particular, as provider as well as recipient of formative *salafiyya* ideas (esp. Bruckmayr), and we hope to demonstrate the need also to revisit other regional cases, even those already honoured with a monograph, in this light.

In order to identify the formative *salafiyya* ideas, however, an in-depth investigation into the current definitions and taxonomies of the *salafiyya* phenomenon is inevitable. While we certainly do not seek to reconstruct its origins from certain agendas for moral and social reform in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Egypt and the wider Fertile Crescent – associated with the circle around Jamāl al-Dīn “al-Afghānī”, Muḥammad ‘Abduh and Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, as well as ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (d. 1320/1902) in Greater Syria or the earlier Abū l-Thana’ al-Alūsī (d. 1270/1854) in Baghdad²⁴ – we still see a strong need to engage with it. After all, our agenda of dissolving unidirectional approaches in favour of more multidirectional ones has a direct bearing on the conceptual framework that had evolved from Wiktorowicz’s above-mentioned early considerations on that matter. In fact, the research underlying the contributions to this special thematic issue appears quite conducive to a genuine contribution to sharpening the analytical terminology and, thus, advancing the quest for firm categories that can help to tackle the “ambiguity and fragmentation” which Meijer has rightly observed regarding the phenomenon subsumed under the Arabic term *salafiyya*.

24 This is at the heart of the controversy between Henri Lauzière and Frank Griffel, who come to opposing conclusions from a common stock of historical materials, regarding the continuity, or discontinuity, of *salafiyya* as a distinct interpretation of Islamic normativity from the activities of these scholarly circles in the late Ottoman period. See, chronologically, Henri Lauzière, “The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History”, *IJMES* 42 (2010), 369–89; Frank Griffel, “What Do We Mean By ‘Salafi’? Connecting Muḥammad ‘Abduh with Egypt’s Nūr Party in Islam’s Contemporary Intellectual History”, *WI* 55:2 (2015), 186–220; Lauzière, “What We Mean Versus What They Meant by ‘Salafi’: A Reply to Frank Griffel”, *WI* 56:1 (2016), 89–96; Griffel, “Rejoinder: What is the Task of the Intellectual (Contemporary) Historian? – A Response to Henri Lauzière’s ‘Reply’”, *WI* 56:2 (2016), 249–55. Certainly inadvertently, Griffel’s position in this controversy nonetheless strongly resembles those of prominent Muslim (Sūfī) critics of the Salafiyya phenomenon. See, for example, Hüseyin Hilmi Işık, *Ehl-i Sünnet Yolu* (Istanbul: Bağlum Kitabevi, 1972); and al-Duktūr Muḥammad Sa’id Ramaḍān al-Būṭī, *al-Salafiyya: marḥala zamaniyya mubāraka lā madhhab islāmī* (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1408/1988).

Revisiting the Terminology

In previous years, the conceptual debate has been strongly shaped by the works of Henri Lauzière on the genealogy of what he – like Meijer and many others – calls "Salafism". After identifying an explicit reference and indebtedness to the variously defined *salaf ṣāliḥ*, loosely rendered as the "pious elders" who lived during the formative period of Islam, as the lowest common denominator of an initially highly diverse intellectual movement, Lauzière scrutinized a number of contemporaneous scholarly circles: those around al-Afghānī, 'Abduh and Riḍā in Cairo, as well as those around al-Alūsī in Baghdad and al-Kawākibī in Greater Syria. After all, these scholars have in the past been widely associated with the *salafiyya*;²⁵ a careful and thorough assessment of their proclivities, moreover in comparison to those forms of Sunnī Muslim religiosity associated with the *salafiyya* label today, was therefore inevitable. Lauzière certainly allows for this label for the mentioned circles in the late Ottoman period, even though he argues that they had not used the label *salafiyya* themselves other than in a rather general sense:

Indeed, the mere presence of the Arabic words *salaf*, *salafī* and *salafiyya* in primary sources is too often read as proof that a distinct Salafi movement or a self-evident concept of Salafism existed in the past. ... We are quick to accept this interpretation because it fits with our pre-conceived notion that *salafiyya* is the name of a major religious orientation.²⁶

True enough, 'Abduh's references to the *salaf ṣāliḥ* were rather pithy: they were not confined to the first three generations of Muslims, but included also medieval luminaries,²⁷ and have therefore constituted little more than, as Reinhard Schulze has put it, an 'ideological leitmotif'.²⁸ Thus, the reference to the *salaf*

25 Prominently, see Pessah Shinar and Werner Ende, "Salafiyya", *IE*, XIII: 900-09; also Schulze, *Internationalismus*, 47-69.

26 Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism*, 15; also see *ibid.*, 4-25, 43. In this context Lauzière rightly stresses the paramount role of Henri Laoust's scholarship in the emergence of this "pre-conceived notion". See Henri Laoust, "Le réformisme orthodoxe des 'salafiya' et les caractères généraux de son orientation actuelle", *REI* 6 (1932), 175-224.

27 See al-Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh, *al-Islām wa-l-naṣrānīyya ma'a al-'ilm wa-l-madaniyya*, ed. al-Sayyid Muḥammad Rashid Riḍā (Cairo: Maktabat wa-Maṭba'at Muḥammad 'Alī Ṣubīḥ wa-Awlādih 1373/1953-54, 8th ed.), 138. Strikingly, the scholars he mentions here – i.e. al-Ash'arī, al-Māturīdī, al-Bāqillānī and al-Isfarā'īnī – not only lived in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries, but were all major figures in *kalām*, a science roundly rejected by today's Salafiyya. See Bruckmayr's contribution to this volume.

28 Schulze, *Internationalismus*, 47 (our translation).

ṣāliḥ was foremost symbolic, an appeal to a glorious common heritage which transgresses the spatial confines and could be utilized as a reference point for a programme of timely moral and social reform in a single and self-contained community, the *umma wāḥida*, which is why, for Lauzière and those in his wake, they represent “modernist Salafism”. On the other end of the spectrum towards the end of the nineteenth century stood the Indian *Ahl-i Ḥadīṣ*, representing a specific textual-cum-legal hermeneutics²⁹ which, in Hartung’s contribution to this present thematic issue, is attempted to be captured as “Salafi reduction”: an historically unmediated recourse to the legal precedents established by the Prophet Muḥammad, his Companions and – if the traditional definition of the *salaf ṣāliḥ* is accepted – the following two generations of Muslims, the so-called *tābi’ūn* and *tābi’ al-tābi’īn*.³⁰

Still, Lauzière argues, the label *salafiyya* was not yet “canonized”,³¹ with *salafī* initially referring merely to a particular position in *‘aqida* (i.e. Ḥanbalī creed), and therefore loosely used by many individuals and groups with ever-changing semantics. The formation of *salafiyya* as a concept proper did not occur, according to him, before the publication of *Qawā’id al-Manhaj al-Salafī* of the Egyptian Muṣṭafā Muḥammad Ḥilmī Sulaymān (b. 1351/1932) around 1976. In this work, the former professor of Islamic philosophy at Cairo’s *Dār al-Ulūm* and renowned editor of classical works of *kalām* and *falsafa* stated that

29 In this, the Indian scholarly movement differed greatly from the earlier Arab *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* who represented exclusively the theological positions later associated with those of the Ḥanbaliyya, as opposed to the *Ahl al-Kalām*, represented by the competing traditions of speculative theology. See Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism*, 28–33; Livnat Holtzman, *Anthropomorphism in Islam: The Challenge of Traditionalism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 189–206.

30 See the sound Prophetic *ḥadīth* “The best among you are those of my generation, then those who follow them, and then those who follow them.” in *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, K. al-Shahādāt, Bāb lā yashhad ‘alā shahādāt jawr idhā ushhida, no. 3 (2,652); also, with slight differences, *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, K. faḍā’il al-ṣaḥāba, Bāb faḍl al-ṣaḥāba – rāḍī allāhu ‘anhum – thumma alladhīna yalūnahum, nos. 3f., 6f., 9, 11 (6,364f., 6,367f., 6,370, 6,372). Justyna Nedza, “‘Salafismus’ – Überlegungen zur Schärfung einer Analyse-kategorie”, in *Salafismus*, ed. Said and Fouad, 80–105, here 96–100, argues that this normative imaginary disguises the fact that there is no real consensus over who constitutes the *salaf ṣāliḥ* in particular. This disagreement has significant implications, which will be discussed further below.

31 On the weighty concept of “canon” and semantically related terms, such as “canonization” and “canonicity”, see, for instance, Frank Kermode, “Institutional Control of Interpretation”, *Salmagundi* 43:1 (1979), 72–86; Aleida and Jan Assmann, *Kanon und Zensur: Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation II* (Munich: Wilhelm Finke Verlag, 1987); Jonathan Z. Smith, “Canons, Catalogues and Classics”, in *Canonization and Decanonization*, ed. Arie van der Kojn and Karel van der Toorn (Leiden et al.: Brill, 1998), 295–311.

al-salafiyya became an all-inclusive [technical] term designating the way of the *salaf* in embracing Islam, and comprehending and applying it, not limited to any specific historical period, but extending to the present times as a pointer to the correct understanding of the Islamic creed [*ilā al-fahm al-ṣaḥīḥ li-l-aqīda al-islāmīyya*].³²

This attempt at a definition by Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī is indeed significant, as it may well contain the crux of the opposing positions of Lauzière and Frank Griffel, as expressed in their controversy in *Die Welt des Islams* in 2015 and 2016.³³ For Ḥilmī, there appears to be no doubt at all that the Islamic creed is only one, and this can result in only one correct way of putting it into practice (*manhaj*).

The choice of the term *manhaj* appears strategic, as it serves as a lexical distinction from the semantically similar concept *madhhab* that is claimed by the adherents to the canonical legal and creedal traditions from which proponents of the *salafiyya* clearly dissociate themselves.³⁴ This, in fact, has serious social implications, as the most visible trench exists in the *ʿibadāt*, here especially in the form of prayer. The importance of seemingly marginal ritual details should not be underestimated, especially in the light of what Christian Lange aptly calls "salvation anxiety":³⁵ after all, the wrong performance of the ritual prayer (*ṣalāt*) may well jeopardize a believer's chances of salvation on Judgement Day. The disruptiveness of variant forms of prayer being performed in one confined space is already indicated by the controversy between the *Ahl-i Ḥadīs* and the followers of one of the canonical legal traditions in early nineteenth-century India over the issues of raising the hands during prayer (*rafʿ al-yadayn*) and saying aloud the acclamation at the end of the recitation of the *fātiḥa*

32 al-Duktūr Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī, *Qawāʿid al-manhaj al-salafī fī l-fikr al-islāmī: buḥūth fī l-aqīda al-islāmīyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1426/2005), 176. The first half of the passage is also cited in Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism*, 221.

33 See above, note 24. This has also already been recognized by Weismann, "A Perverted Balance", 38 n. 13 and 50 n. 63.

34 See Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism*, 225. Dissociating the Salafī *manhaj* from *taṣawwuf*, a topic of which more will be said below, was another main concern for Ḥilmī and others following in his footsteps. See Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī, *al-Taṣawwuf wa-l-ittijāh al-salafī fī l-aṣr al-ḥadīth* (Alexandria: Dār al-Daʿwa, 1402/1982).

35 See Christian Lange, "Introducing Hell in Islamic Studies", in *Locating Hell in Islamic Traditions*, ed. idem (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2016), 1-28, here 5. While "salvation anxiety" reminds somewhat of Max Weber's "religiöse Angstafekte" (see Max Weber, "Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus", in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* [Tübingen: Mohr, 1920], 17-205, here 106), translated in 1930 by Talcott Parsons as "feelings of religious anxiety", Lange's term adds some significant momentum here.

(*amīn bi-l-jahr*).³⁶ Likewise, Aaron Rock-Singer has recently highlighted the conflict-laden issue of praying in shoes within Salafī circles in contemporary Egypt and beyond, in which the perceived conformity with the Prophetic *sunna* has to be weighed against the potential for serious disruption within the Sunnī Muslim community (*fitna*).³⁷

The matter of the correct form of prayer was already reflected in the epistle *Tanwīr al-ʿAynayn fī Ithbāt Rafʿ al-Yadayn* by Shāh Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbd al-Ghanī of Delhi (killed 1246/1831), a protagonist in Hartung's contribution to this volume, which he is said to have composed after his study trip to the Yemen, where he got acquainted with the legal thought of the above-mentioned local celebrity Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Shawkānī.³⁸ It was one of al-Shawkānī's direct students, Ḥusayn Ibn Muḥsin of Hudayda, who, after having moved to the princely court of central Indian Bhopal on the invitation of Nawwāb Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān Qannawjī (d. 1307/1890), established the issue of the correct prayer, vis-à-vis conflicting views of the adherents to other legal schools, as a pivot of the *Ahl-i Ḥadīs*, arguments against their opponents.³⁹ Thereby he linked al-Shawkānī and his intellectual heritage to the nascent *Ahl-i Ḥadīs* in British India, as well as to various scholars from the Najd who ventured out to the subcontinent in order to study *ḥadīth* in the tradition of al-Shawkānī,⁴⁰ thus defying the above-mentioned unidirectional agency of Wahhābī Islam in shaping the Salafīyya of

36 See Preckel, *Islamische Bildungsnetzwerke*, 343–53; Riexinger, *Sanāʾullāh Amrītsarī*, 129.

37 See Aaron Rock-Singer, "The Rise and Fall of Praying in Shoes: How Salafis Came to Marginalize a Practice of the Prophet", paper presented at the international conference [*The*] *Future of Salafism*, University of Oxford, 7 December 2018. The matter has already been touched upon in idem, "Prayer and the Islamic Revival: A Timely Challenge", *IJMES* 48 (2016), 293–312, here 305f. Although it was the conflict between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya, which was regarded as the initial and proverbial *fitna*, the term soon came to be commonly applied to various types of intra-Islamic dissensions and disturbances. See Louis Gardet, "Fitna", *EP*, 11: 930f.

38 See Muḥammad Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbd al-Ghanī, *Risālat tanwīr al-ʿaynayn fī ithbāt rafʿ al-yadayn* (Mongīr: Maṭbaʿ-ʿyi Raḥmānī, 1206h).

39 See Ḥusayn ibn Muḥsin al-Anṣarī, *Nūr al-ʿayn min fatāwā Shaykh Ḥusayn* (Lucknow: Maṭbaʿ Shams al-Maṭābīʿ, 1339h), 150–52.

40 Prominent example of early Najdī scholars in the tradition of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb who ventured out to South Asia for the study of *ḥadīth*, which was said to have been substantially more advanced there than anywhere in the Arab Peninsula, are Saʿd b. Ḥamd b. ʿAtīq (d. 1349/1930) and Iṣḥāq b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Āl al-Shaykh (d. 1319/1901). See ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Bassām, *ʿUlamāʾ Najd khilāla sittā qurūn*, 3 vols. (Mecca: Maktabat wa-Maṭbaʿat al-Nahḍa al-Ḥadītha, 1398h), 1: 205f., 266–69. The early study missions of Wahhābī scholars have been discussed, from opposite vantage points, by Steinberg, *Religion und Staat in Saudi-Arabien*, 117–20; and Jan-Peter Hartung, *Viele Wege und ein Ziel: Leben und Wirken von Sayyid Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī Ḥasanī Nadwī (1914–1999)* (Würzburg: Ergon, 2004), 112f., 225, 345 n. 215.

today. The contributions of Bruckmayr and Hartung, respectively, address this matter extensively.

But, let us return to the conceptual issue. For Lauzière, the process of what we have decided to call "*manhajization*" – that is, the explicit derivation of a distinct *manhaj* from the *ʿaqīda* which he dates to the 1970s – is the moment in which "Salafism" is constituted, as 'an ideology in its own right ..., a worldview that encompassed the whole of existence, from knowledge to practice, from morality to etiquette, and even from religion to politics. Salafism was now a total ideology'.⁴¹ This is a crucial moment, because this "*manhajization*" not only constitutes what Lauzière terms "purist Salafism", in dissociation from "modernist Salafism"; for him, this represents a crucial conceptual development that requires analytical distinction: the constriction from a more open "Salafi Islam" with different contours to "Salafism" proper, which is also taken as a precondition for the further differentiation of "Salafism" along the lines of different *manāhij*. Thus, while all adherents to "Salafism" claim to represent the "Salafi *manhaj*" (singular), they appear to disagree over what the correct *manhaj* is. This, in turn, results in the existence of a multitude of *manāhij* which academics have tried to capture systematically.

The first, and so far most significant, attempt at such a systematics was made, as repeatedly acknowledged above, by Quintan Wiktorowicz, who proposed a somewhat ideal-typical tripartite scheme of "purists", "politicos" and "jihādīs".⁴² More recently, this taxonomy has been refined by Joas Wagemakers.⁴³ Rooted predominantly in his research on the highly influential Jordanian theorist Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī (b. 1379/1959),⁴⁴ Wagemakers uses a core element in al-Maqdisī's expositions, the principle of "loyalty and disavowal" (*al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ*), to suggest a modification of Wiktorowicz's division based on varying views on this principle by different adherents to the *salafiyya*. Besides his reservations towards the label "purist" ('because all Salafis claim to be purists in their own way, not just those Wiktorowicz refers to as such'⁴⁵), and its replacement with the label "quietist", Wagemakers suggests a

41 Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism*, 201 and 216.

42 See n. 2.

43 See Joas Wagemakers, "Revisiting Wiktorowicz: Categorizing and Defining the Branches of Salafism", in *Salafism after the Arab Awakening: Contending with People's Power*, ed. Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone (London: Hurst, 2016), 7-24, 241-48 (notes). The latter appears to be an advancement from the author's earlier "Salafistische Strömungen und ihre Sicht auf *al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ* (Loyalität und Lossagung)", in *Salafismus*, ed. Said and Fouad, 55-79 (trans. Said and Fouad).

44 See here, most importantly, his *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

45 Idem, "Revisiting Wiktorowicz", 11.

further differentiation of each category. “Purists/quietists” would then be – depending on their relationship to the governing regimes – subdivided into “aloofists”, “loyalists” and “propagandists”; “politicos”, into those involved in parliamentary activities and those dedicated to extra-parliamentary work; while the “jihādīs” are divided into those whose militant activities refer to a regionally confined context and those who operate on a global scale.⁴⁶ We shall return to this certainly laudable attempt at a refined terminology.

First, however, we have to acknowledge that also the proposition of one distinct ‘*aqīda*’ by Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī, which likewise forms the backbone of Lauzière’s conceptual deliberations, has been pointedly challenged by Justyna Nedza, who has questioned the notion of the perceived singular Salafī ‘*aqīda*’ and of mere differences in its understanding as the constitutive elements of the different *manāḥij*. She argues instead that the trench wars between adherents to the *salafīyya* are debates not over interpretation but, in fact, over ideological differences considered as alternate ‘*aqā’id*’. As severe as this issue are its legal implications: adherence to a “wrong” ‘*aqīda*’ results, in the best possible case, in clear physical dissociation (*al-barā’*), which has serious repercussions on the social and economic status of the accused, or, even more so, in his, or her, being declared an unbeliever (*takfīr*), with profound potential implications for the physical integrity of the accused.⁴⁷ In fact, Nedza’s thrust to assume not only a variety of *manāḥij* but also, and more consequential still, a multiplicity of ‘*aqā’id*’ has lately been shared by others, though much more timidly.⁴⁸ One of the most hotly contested parts of ‘*aqīda*’, which results in the factual emergence of distinct ‘*aqā’id*’ within the *salafīyya* spectrum and reinforces sociopolitical principles and legal practices such as *al-walā’ wa-l-barā’* and *takfīr* within the *manhaj*, is the definition of faith (*īmān*), as prominently shown by Mohammad Gharaibeh and Daniel Lav⁴⁹ and, moreover, in Bruckmayr’s contribution to this issue. Additionally, Gharaibeh has shown that, for instance, the approach of contemporary Salafī scholars towards the divine attributes departs in certain respects from that of Ḥanbali theology (i.e. the *madhhab al-salaf*, the exclusively theological position which Lauzière has identified as lying at the

46 See *ibid.*, 15–19.

47 See Nedza, “Salafismus”, 80–105. It should be acknowledged, however, that also Daniel Lav, *Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) and Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi*, have argued in a somewhat similar direction, although rather implicitly so.

48 See, for example, *idem*, *Revisiting Wiktorowicz*, 14.

49 See Mohammad Gharaibeh, *Zur Attributenlehre der Wāḥḥābiyya unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Schriften Ibn Uṭaimīn (1929–2001)* (Berlin: EBV, 2012), esp. 314–53; Lav, *Radical Islam*, esp. 122f.

root of the label "Salafī" before it was gradually broadened in the twentieth century to eventually canalize into the new concept of the *salafīyya*).⁵⁰

If Nedza, Lav and others are correct and there is indeed no singular *'aqīda*,⁵¹ as is most forcefully indicated by numerous cases of intra-Salafī charges of unbelief in the last decades, then Lauzière's scheme for the emergence of a distinct ideology called "Salafism" appears not fully sustainable anymore. Even though the *manhaj*ization of Salafī Islam and the concomitant marginalization of modernist notions of the *salafīyya*, as observed by Lauzière, led to a greater systematization of "purist Salafism", the subsequent differentiation into different *manāhij* and the accompanying fierce debates about what constitutes "true Salafism" (an issue of prime importance in Sunarwoto's contribution to this volume), seems to somewhat belie the idea that 'the meaning of the term was no longer up for grabs'.⁵² Indeed, it would seem as if – at least – its constitutive elements were quickly up for grabs – or debate – again. Thus, although its adherents (as well as outside observers) tend to frame it that way, the phenomenon subsumed under the label *salafīyya* perhaps turns out to be much more diverse and fragmented, and not essentially one ideology, especially not if one considers definitions of "ideology" alternative to that of sociologist Daniel Bell, which Lauzière chose to follow. Yet, there are certainly other deliberations on that matter one may want to consider, for instance those of political theorist Michael Freeden. In a succession of publications since the inauguration of the *Journal of Political Ideologies* in 1996, Freeden has engaged with, and positioned himself to the multifarious historical and contemporary attempts at defining, "ideology", which include asking whether or not there can actually be "non-political ideologies",⁵³ whether "isms" are indeed distinct and unequivocal markers for ideologies,⁵⁴ and whether or not, as

50 See Mohammad Gharaibeh, "Zur Glaubenslehre des Salafismus", in *Salafismus*, ed. Said and Fouad, 106–31.

51 This is also affirmed by Wagemakers, *Revisiting Wiktorowicz*, 11f., although not further elaborated.

52 Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism*, 199.

53 See Michael Freeden, "Editorial", *Journal of Political Ideologies* 1:1 (1996), 5–13, here 9f.

54 See idem, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1. As random counter-examples in this short work, which is intended rather for a broader and less specialized audience, Freeden gives "optimism" and "witticism" to prove his point that "not every 'ism' is an ideology" (Ibid.). Likewise, Jussi Kurunmäki and Jani Marjanen, "A Rhetorical View of Isms: An Introduction", *Journal of Political Ideologies* 23:3 (2018), 241–55, here 246, provide the example of "rapist" to demonstrate that not every "ist" has a corresponding "ism". This latter one, however, seems flawed, as it appears to work only within the English linguistic universe.

suggested for example by Lauzière's reference to Daniel Bell, there is such a thing as an "end of ideology".⁵⁵

The matter of whether or not "isms" are indeed distinct markers for ideologies remains virulent, as indicated not least by the fact that only most recently the *Journal of Political Ideologies* and the *Contribution to the History of Concepts* have dedicated special thematic issues to this matter.⁵⁶ In one of the contributions to the former, Finnish historians Jussi Kurunmäki and Jani Marjanen programmatically elaborate – with recourse to Reinhard Koselleck – on the notion of "isms" as 'ideological future-oriented "concepts of movement" ... on which modern political ideologies were built from the early nineteenth century on'.⁵⁷ In order to advance the outlined conceptual discussion further, we propose to set out from this valuable insight and to adopt an understanding of "ideology" as a distinctly politics-related concept, formally reflected in the suffix "ism".⁵⁸ The viability of such a definition stands and falls on how "politics" is conceived. While we are certainly aware of the many and partly opposing definitions of "politics" – some going as far as regarding all public transactions as constituting "politics"⁵⁹ – we wish to confine the understanding of "politics" that underlies our following considerations, by its reference to "government" – that is, the

55 See Freeden, *Editorial*, 8; idem, *Ideology*, 35–39. The programmatic work on that matter is indeed Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (New York: Free Press, 1960).

56 See the special issues on "The Political Rhetorics of Isms", *Journal of Political Ideologies* 23:3 (2018), and "Ism Concepts in Science and Politics", *Contribution to the History of Concepts* 13:1 (2018). The driving force behind both collections of essays appears to be scholars associated with the research project "The Political Rhetoric of 'Isms'", conducted between early 2014 and the end of 2016 at the University of Helsinki.

57 Kurunmäki and Marjanen, "Isms, Ideologies and Setting the Agenda for Public Debate", *Journal of Political Ideologies* 23:3 (2018), 256–82, here 256. The reference to Koselleck is his "Einleitung" to the monumental *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, ed. idem, Otto Brunner and Werner Conze, 8 vols. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1972–97), 1: xiii–xxvii.

58 We are well aware, however, that many religious traditions have been cast as "isms": "Buddhism" and "Zoroastrianism" are just two cases in point which work in a variety of European languages. In response, we wish to emphasize that these "isms" do not correspond to the object-language dimension, where "Buddhism" renders the Pali-derived "buddha (dharma)" (lit.: the Teaching of the Buddha) and "Zoroastrianism" the Avestan "Māzdēsn-daēnā" (lit.: the Ahura Mazdā-Focussed Religion) or "Mazdayasna" (lit.: the Worship of Ahura Mazdā). While we are certainly aware that old habits die hard, we nonetheless hope that an eventual careful conceptual reflection on these terms will put them to test, too.

59 See, for example, the discussion by James Alexander, "Notes towards a Definition of Politics", *Philosophy* 89:2 (2014), 273–300.

structures and institutions of public administration.⁶⁰ The question thus arising is precisely whether individuals and groups applying the Arabic *salafiyya* label to themselves, be they first-language users or not, all equally regard themselves as subscribing to an “ism” (i.e. an ideology) which outsiders commonly subsume under the analytical label “Salafism”. It is particularly scholars working on currents within the *salafiyya* from an ethnographic perspective, such as Anabel Inge, who doubt the usefulness of “Salafism” as a coverall for all its different strands.⁶¹ By way of comparison, it should also be kept in mind that there is wide agreement that it is necessary to distinguish the terms “Muslim” and “Islamist”, as only the latter says something about its object’s political inclinations. Employing proper terminology to indicate that Salafī Islam is not always or inevitably linked to political postures and security threats, serves also as a counterweight to what Mayeur-Jaouen has – with reference to Pierre Larcher – called the ‘hypertrophy of “Islamismology”’ – in other words, the excessive scholarly (and public) preoccupation with forms of politicized religion in the study of contemporary Islam.⁶²

Setting out from the aforementioned notion of “politics”, it is our aim to distinguish those adherents to the *salafiyya* who deny any stake in political matters from those proactively invested in them, be it affirmative with regard to existing political structures, or in different degrees of opposition. The former category would then only include those who Wagemakers calls “aloofists” among the “purists/quietists”, and as whose epitome he considers Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (d. 1419/1999).⁶³ Of course, we need to remind ourselves that a model can only be an approximation to reality, where empirical actors defy their unambiguous classification more often than not. This means that actors can, and do, represent different positions at different points in time, depending on a variety of factors which political scientist like Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow and others in their wake attempted to account for in social movement theory,

60 This may well be compared with Schulze’s brief but pertinent definition of Islamism as “a frequently ideologically formulated way of defining and qualifying state, society and culture through recourse to Islam”. Schulze, *Geschichte der islamischen Welt*, 32 (our translation).

61 Anabel Inge, *The Making of a Salafi Muslim Woman: Paths to Conversion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 9f.

62 Mayour-Jaouen, “À la poursuite de la réforme”, 336f.

63 See Wagemakers, *Revisiting Wiktorowicz*, 16. Strikingly, it has been related by Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Shaybānī, *Ḥayāt al-Albānī wa-āthāruhu wa-ṭhanā’ al-‘ulamā’ ‘alayhi*, 2 vols. (Kuwait: Markaz al-Makhṭūṭāt wa-l-Turāth wa-l-Waṭhā’iq, 2004), 1: 58, that in his study circles in Syria al-Albānī, inter alia, employed Muḥammad Asad’s *Minhāj al-Islām fī l-Ḥukm*, i.e. the Arabic translation of his *The Principles of State and Government in Islam* (1961).

subsuming many of them under the header “opportunity structures”.⁶⁴ We therefore propose, first, to change the categories of Wiktorowicz and Wage-makers into categories of actions, not actors. This, as exemplarily shown in Aliyev’s contribution to this issue, allows more flexibility to the actors, based on circumstances, opportunities and constraints, while retaining a differentiation of variant types of social action.

Yet, we secondly propose to go even further and – for the moment disregarding the potential implications of the further “ism” – subsume those holding “aloofist” positions under the label “Salafi Islam”, not “Salafism”. The latter, in turn, is, because of the grammatical suffix “ism” and our above reflections on the relationship of “isms”, ideology and politics, and its function as an indicator for a deeper engagement with structures of governance and the wider socio-economic framework. In other words, we regard “Salafism” as a political ideology, with subdivisions depending on the forms and degree of engagement with political power structures. In practical terms, we plea for terminological consistency: the adherent to an “ism” would necessarily be an “ist”. Hence, we argue that to call the adherents to “Salafism” “Salafis” is grammatically flawed; however awkward and uncommon, they would need to be labelled as “Salafists”.⁶⁵ Still, by arguing for this terminological adjustment we claim that, this way, much greater clarity in which phenomenon one is actually referring to is achieved: a religious persuasion that puts much more stress on individual purity and – *idealiter* – entirely disregards the sociopolitical context, would be “Salafi Islam”, adhered to by “Salafis”, while the corresponding persuasion for which an engagement in whatever way with the sociopolitical context is constitutive, is to be regarded as an “ideologized Salafi Islam”, hence “Salafism”, which is adhered to by “Salafists”.⁶⁶

64 See Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: McGraw-Hill/Random House, 1978), esp. 98-142; Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2011, revised 3rd ed.), 26-28; also Douglas McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions”, in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. idem, John D. McCarthy and Mayer Y. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 23-40.

65 That this is consistently the case in Bernard Rougier (ed.), *Qu’est-ce que le salafisme?* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2015), however, is based on the fact that in the French context no distinction appears yet to be made between “salafisme” and “Islam salafite”. The German case is similar, as indicated, for example, by Said and Fouad (eds.), *Salafismus*, and Lohlker, *Die Salafisten*; Damir-Geilsdorf and Menzfeld, *Who are “the” Salafis?*. The only author writing in English known to us to deliberately employ the term “Salafist”, though without further explanation, is Jacob Olidort, “The Politics of “Quietist” Salafism”, *Center for Middle East Policies at Brookings Analysis Paper* 18 (2015).

66 Similarly, though without problematizing the intricacies of using an “-ism” (i.e. Salafism),

On the same tenor, finally, we wish to contest the use of "quietism" as appropriate for what it is supposed to capture in the prevalent conceptual framework – namely, the persuasion we have just established as "Salafi Islam". Our doubts in the appropriateness of "quietism" are, in fact, well sustainable from a perspective of the history of concepts. As more extensively elaborated elsewhere, historically the term "quietism" denotes a mystical disposition which is exclusively oriented towards an individual and affectionate relationship with the numinous, which is entirely devoid of any reference to the "political".⁶⁷ Personalities usually classed as "quietist Salafis", however, do still position themselves to matters of governance and society; a fact well acknowledged for instance by Bonnefoy and Meijer.⁶⁸ This is most obvious in the case of those classified as "loyalists" and "propagandists", who are defined by either implicitly supporting political power holders against all sorts of opposition or by explicitly working at their service. Again, we should remind ourselves that we deal almost exclusively with statements and other acts, bound in time and space, and someone who, for example, utters a statement to be classed as "loyalist" at one moment, may utter another one that would fall into a different category at another time.

Perhaps a good illustration for this is provided by the Saudi Arabian scholar Rabīʿ b. Hādī al-Madkhālī (b. 1352/1931), who figures prominently in Aliyev's and Sunarwoto's contributions. This student of important scholars like Ibn Bāz and al-Albānī is categorized by many as a "quietist Salafī", based on the de-temporalized assessment that, as he is 'agitating against *hizbiyya* [sic] and the founding [of] "groups" (*jama'at* [sic]), calling for refraining from contact with impure Muslims and promoting undivided loyalty to the ruler, [he] is the most prominent representative of this current that denies the political'.⁶⁹ If one is more sensitive to the fact that an individual is hardly ever consistent in itself,

Inge, *Salafi Muslim Woman*, gf., restricts the usage of "Salafi" to actors who stay largely aloof from politics: "In the contemporary UK context at least, it makes sense to associate the term "Salafi" only with groups that focus on non-violent religious and social reform and oppose Jihadism" and shun "organized forms of political participation, [...] oppose voting and strongly promote obedience to rulers".

67 See Jan-Peter Hartung, "Making Sense of 'Political Quietism' – An Analytical Intervention", in *Political Quietism in Islam: Sunni and Shi'i Thought and Practice*, ed. Saud al-Sarhan (London: I.B. Tauris, 2020), 15–32.

68 See Laurent Bonnefoy, "Quietist Salafis, the Arab Spring and the Politicisation Process", in *Salafism after the Arab Awakening*, ed. Cavatorta and Merone, 205–18 and, 295–99, here 209; Roel Meijer, "Conclusion: Salafis and the Acceptance of the Political", in *ibid.*, 219–39, 299–302, here 220.

69 *Ibid.*, 226.

then al-Madkhalī may, at times, also stand for other positions in the typological spectrum projected by Wiktorowicz and Wagemakers. While this is implicitly attested in Meijer's works on him,⁷⁰ it may be worthwhile to be more explicit about it.

His main thrust, which appears largely stable, is his criticism of those he casts as *ḥarakī* or *ḥizbī*, terms which correspond with Wiktorowicz's category "politicos".⁷¹ This should, however, not detract from the fact that he has been explicit about his attitude not only towards the ruling regime in his native Saudi Arabia but also, increasingly, towards heads of government in other states in the MENA region, with the intensity and clarity of such statements depending on the concrete circumstances under which they were, and are, made.⁷² We therefore argue here that this proactive engagement with political authorities does not fit the "quietism" category, but rather shows a great degree of acknowledgement of, and engagement with, political rule.⁷³

Tied to this reassessment of al-Madkhalī as a – most of the time – "Salafist" of the loyalist and, occasionally, even "propagandist" variety are issues which, again, touch more immediately upon the importance of the concrete respective context that is highlighted throughout the contributions to this thematic issue. Thus, we have classed al-Madkhalī predominantly as a "Salafist", due to his explicit engagement with matters of governance. His emphatic rejection of any form of social and political organization, including prominently charities

⁷⁰ See idem, "Politicising *al-jarḥ wa-l-ta'dīl*: Rabī' b. Hādī al-Madkhalī and the Transnational Battle for Religious Authority", in *The Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honour of Harald Motzki*, ed. Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort, Kees Versteegh and Joas Wagemakers (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2011), 375-99.

⁷¹ See, for example, his *Bayān fasād al-mu'ayyār: ḥiwār ma'a ḥizbī mutasattir* (Medinah: Maktabat al-Ghurabā' al-Athariyya, 1417h).

⁷² In February 2011, al-Madkhalī had made explicit statements in support of the late Col. Mu'ammār al-Qadhāfī and his regime in Libya. A few weeks later, he issued a similarly supportive statement for Ḥusnī Mubārak in Egypt. See Rabī' b. Hādī al-Madkhalī, *Kalimat 'an al-iḥdāth wa-l-muḏāhirāt wa-l-khurūj 'alā al-hukkām* (17 Rabī' I 1432). URL: <www.djelfa.info/vb/showthread.php?t=517064> (accessed 27 November 2018). In 2016 he addressed a letter to "the Muslims in general, and specifically the Salafis, in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, India, Pakistan and of other Muslim countries", denouncing the Muslim Brotherhood as "the most treacherous after the *rawāfiḍ*", as covert advocates of secularism, archenemies of the Salafis and progenitors of the Islamic State (IS). Idem, *Nasiḥa li-l-muslimīn 'umūman wa-l-salafīyyīn khāṣṣatan fī Libyā wa-ghayrihā min al-bilād al-islāmīyya* (28 Ramaḍān 1437). URL: <www.rabee.net/ar/articles.php?cat=8&id=319> (accessed 11 December 2018).

⁷³ This, in fact, is also explicitly acknowledged by Bonnefoy, "Quietist Salafis", 208-12; and Frederic Wehrey, "Quiet No More? 'Madkhalī' Salafists in Libya are Active in the Battle against the Islamic State, and in Factional Conflicts", *Dīwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie* (13 October 2016), URL: <http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/64846> (accessed 15 December 2018).

or more grassroots *da'wa* movements, would, however, still make him a "Salafī", in the eyes of authors labelling him as "quietist" or "purist".⁷⁴ Yet, the contribution of Pall and Pérez Pereiro on Salafis and Salafists in Cambodia shows that in that distinct local case, those associated with Islamic charities, such as the Kuwait-based *Jam'īyyat Ihya' al-Turāth al-Islāmī*, which may be classed differently in Kuwait,⁷⁵ are regarded as belonging to the "purist" spectrum, hence, are local representatives of "Salafī Islam".

There is another important aspect relating to al-Madkhalī that is radiated from the contributions of Aliyev on Azerbaijan and, even more so, Sunarwoto on Indonesia. While formally maintaining the deep suspicion of learned authorities after the *salaf ṣāliḥ*, al-Madkhalī is a prime example of an interesting shift in how authority is constructed and remoulded among both Salafis and Salafists. After all, these two contributions highlight a concentration of authority not only in the *salaf ṣāliḥ* but also, and emphatically so, in the person of al-Madkhalī, giving rise to an eponymous branch, for instance, in Indonesia. Already Meijer speaks of "Madkhaliyya" and "Madkhalism", labels sustained also by Arab media and authors.⁷⁶ A case in point is the recent work of 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ al-Nāshī, a scholar linked to Tunisia's *Jāmi'at al-Zaytūna*, who uses the "Madkhaliyya" as an example for wider processes of authority construction within the *salafiyya*.⁷⁷ Both Meijer and al-Nāshī have demonstrated how al-Madkhalī diverted authority away from the *salaf ṣāliḥ* proper and rather aimed at concentrating it in his person. Consequently, adherents to a *Salafiyya-Madkhaliyya* – and this is clearly shown by Sunarwoto for the Indonesian case – would forego the hermeneutical principles allegedly constitutive for all things *salafiyya* and embrace the interpretation of al-Madkhalī instead. Technically, this attitude constitutes an anathema to any Salafī and Salafist persuasion, as it clearly resembles the imitation that the adherents to the four classical canonical Sunnī legal traditions are castigated for. Spinning this thread further, the *manhaj*, which was terminologically embraced in contradistinction to the four classical *madhāhib*, begins to apply also to various tendencies within the spectrum of the *Salafiyya*.

74 See, for example, Bonnefoy, "Quietist Salafis", 209. Bonnefoy, of course, does not employ the label "Salafī" here, but rather "quietist" and/or "purist".

75 Prominently, see Zoltan Pall, *Kuwaiti Salafism and its Growing Influence in the Levant* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014); idem, "Salafī Dynamics in Kuwait", in *Salafism after the Arab Awakening*, ed. Cavatorta and Merone, 169–86.

76 See Meijer, *Politicising al-jarḥ*, 376 et passim.

77 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ al-Nāshī, *al-Marji'īyya al-salafiyya bayn al-ta'ṣīl wa-l-tawẓīf wa-l-ta'wīl al-salafiyya 'al-madkhaliyya' anmūdhajan* (Kairouan and Tunis: Manshūrāt Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya, 1435/2014).

As al-Nāshī has ascertained, this trajectory is hardly confined to al-Madkhalī. Similar developments can also be observed regarding the Ethiopian Muḥammad Amān al-Jāmī (d. 1419/1998), the former Syrian Muslim Brother Muḥammad Surūr (d. 1438/2016), the Mauretanian Muḥammad al-Ḥasan Ould (Ar.: *wuld*) Dadaw al-Shinqīṭī (b. 1386/1963) and Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī.⁷⁸ As noted by Lacroix,⁷⁹ the latter's authority was most decisively manifested in the wide adoption of the particular style of prayer, which he claimed to have identified as the only one truly based on the prophetic model,⁸⁰ and the acceptance of his reassessment of parts of the *ḥadīth* canon.⁸¹ It is interesting in this regard that al-Nāshī includes the 'fallacy of the Sunni Islamic movements in drawing closer to the Shi'a' among his points of critique of the *salafīyya*.⁸² Even though his work is of a polemical nature, the patterns of authority construction around individual scholars among certain strands within Salafī Islam and Salafism are arguably indeed akin to the role of the *marja'īyya* (i.e. the believer's obligation to follow the legal rulings of one specific senior scholar regarded as *marja' al-taqlīd* – source of emulation – among Imāmī Shī'īs).⁸³ Thus, the question may be raised whether the position of some of the mentioned shaykhs among their followers bears more resemblance to that of Shī'ī *marāji'* than to classical *taqlīd* within the established Sunnī schools of law. The notion of *marja'īyya* becomes even more conspicuous if one considers the fact that numerous *aḥādīth* and *fatāwā* websites nowadays tend to provide classifications

78 For Jāmī, see Markaz al-Misbār, *al-Salafīyya al-jāmiyya: 'aqīda al-tā'a wa tabdī' al-mukhtalif* (Dubai: Markaz al-Misbār li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Buḥūth, 2012); for the so-called "Surūriyūn", see Stéphane Lacroix, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*, trans. George Holoch (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), esp. 63, 69–71 and, 123–29; for al-Albānī, inter alia, idem, "L'apport de Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani au salafisme contemporain", in *Qu'est-ce que le salafisme?*, ed. Rougier, 45–64; idem, "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism", in *Global Salafism*, ed. Meijer, 58–80; for al-Shinqīṭī, see Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, *Prêcher dans le desert: Islam politique et changement social en Mauritanie* (Paris: Karthala, 2013), 93–100; Lohlker, *Die Salafisten*, 62f. Such eponymous naming is found in both exo- and endo-definitions, in intra-Salafī(st) as well as in broader intra-Sunnī debates, as indicated by the title of one of the key refutations of the orientation: Gibril Fouad Haddad, *Albani & his Friends: A Concise Guide to the Salafi Movement* (Birmingham: AQSA Publications, 2009, 2nd ed.).

79 Lacroix, "L'apport", 53 and 58.

80 Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī, *Ṣifāt ṣalāt al-nabī min al-takbīr ilā al-taslīm ka'annaka tarāhā* (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Ma'ārif li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzī', 1410/1990).

81 See Jonathan Brown, *The Canonization of al-Bukhārī and Muslim: The Formation and Function of the Sunnī Ḥadīth Canon* (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2007), 321–34.

82 al-Nāshī, *al-Marja'īyya al-salafīyya*, 205–218.

83 See Linda S. Walbridge (ed.), *The Most Learned of the Shi'a: The Institution of the Marja' Taqlid* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

of each individual *ḥadīth*, including those from the canonical collections, which are explicitly based on the revisionist grading of al-Albānī.

In contrast to the Shīʿī spectrum, where the claims to authority of competing *marājiʿ* commonly tend to affirm the overall edifice of the *marjaʿiyya*,⁸⁴ contending *salafī* shaykhs and their followers, such as "Madkhālīs" and "Sūrūrīs", are often bitterly opposed to each other, sometimes up to the level of *takfīr*. Moreover, even though the different orientations are spread on a global scale, there still appear to be specific patterns of regional and national distribution and preponderance. This is partly related to the places of origin and activity of individual scholars, as well as to varying abilities to spread their influence abroad, which are at times determined by the existence or lack of state support. Yet, also local cultural and political factors are certainly parts of the equation in different localities. It may thus be worthwhile investigating whether, first, we find a higher permeation of the various manifestations of Salafī Islam and Salafism by local cultural elements than one is currently prepared to concede, and, second, whether these developments are restricted to the non-Arab countries, or whether – and here the cases of al-Shinqīṭī and al-Albānī seem instructive – they can also be identified in the Arabic-speaking world.

Accounting for Inconsistencies and Dynamics: The Context Milieu

So far, most scholars involved in the discussion over a useful typology have developed their pros and cons with regard to one category or the other; moreover, they usually argue on the basis of statements by the adherents of any given orientation within the broad spectrum of Salafī Islam and its politically infused form (i.e. Salafism). While this textual approach undoubtedly has many advantages, one significant disadvantage is that it appears to lead to the

84 This is presently most obvious in the practice of co-signing fatwas. See Roy Parviz Motahedeh, *The Quandaries of Emulation: The Theory and Politics of Shi'i Manuals of Practice – The Ninth Farhat J. Ziadeh Distinguished Lecture in Arab and Islamic Studies* (Washington, DC: University of Washington, 2011), 13f. There have of course been isolated cases of fierce opposition between contending *marājiʿ*, such as between Rūḥallāh Khumaynī (d. 1409/1989) and Abū l-Qāsim al-Khūʿī (d. 1413/1992). See Elvire Corboz, "Khomeini in Najaf: The Religious and Political Leadership of an Exiled Ayatollah", *WI* 55:2 (2015), 221–48. Moreover, in post-revolutionary Iran the institutionalization of the former's doctrine of *wilāyat al-faqīh* (mandate of the jurist) into the "monistic authority structure of the nation-state was directly detrimental to the traditional pluralism of the institution of *marjaʿiyya*". Saïd Amir Arjomand, *Sociology of Shi'ite Islam: Collected Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 429.

rather inflexible categories that we have critically engaged with already above.⁸⁵ It appears, thus, that fundamentally distinct approaches are useful to complement the insights based purely on a textual approach; in the following, these insights could then be modified and refined. One alternative approach, which has already yielded useful new insights, is proposed by Michael Farquhar in his work on the *International Islamic University of Medina* (IIUM) – namely, to regard Salafi Islam and Salafism as “discursive traditions”, a concept he adopted from the paradigmatic considerations of Talal Asad in this regard.⁸⁶

For Farquhar, “Salafism” constitutes a “tradition within a tradition”, meaning that the overarching religious tradition “Sunnī Islam” is made up of a comprehensive repertoire of terms and themes, and their literary expression. “Traditions within that tradition” would then be characterized by a highly selective and limited repertoire that was derived from the all-encompassing stock of the overarching religious meta-tradition: Šūfīs, for instance, derive their lexicon and corresponding practices from the same grand repertoire as Salafīs who, however, take a firm stand against many concepts and practices of the former.⁸⁷ Yet, going beyond Farquhar’s analysis, and consistent with our above deliberations, we propose to regard “Salafism” as a specifically Sunnī tradition, for which both Salafī Islam and Islamism function as major constitutive elements.⁸⁸ Whereas the latter has been developed in both Sunnī and Shī‘ī circles, as well as through direct engagement between the two, Salafī Islam, and thus also its

85 One recent example is the introduction of the concept “fusionist Salafism” by Daniel Lav, *Radical Muslim Theonomy: A Study in the Evolution of Salafī Thought* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University Jerusalem, 2016), which aims at highlighting the hermeneutics behind Wiktorowicz’s and Wagemakers’ “jihādī Salafism(s)”, namely the creative confluence of the *Ahl al-Ḥadīth*/Ḥanbalī heritage and twentieth-century Islamist core concepts. We argue here instead that the label “Salafism”, as we understand it, already carries the tools and materials to ideologize Salafī Islam, or, in other words, to coin a kind of Islamism based on constituents as well as the technical language of Salafī Islam.

86 See Farquhar, *Circuits of Faith*, 5f.; Talal Asad, *The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam* (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, 1986), 14.

87 Østebø, *Localising Salafism*, 34f., makes an important intervention in this regard, stressing that what is “practiced, perceived and legitimised as integrated to the local religious universe by the adherents” is, in fact, more often than not devoid of their “sanctioning ... with reference to either an Islamic or a non-Islamic tradition”. In fact, our point is also somewhat argued by Bustanov/Kemper, *Islamic Authority*, e.g. 24f., 165–293.

88 On a systematic attempt to define “Islamism” as the Islamic grand-ideology, see Jan-Peter Hartung, *A System of Life: Mawdūdī and the Ideologisation of Islam* (London: Hurst / New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); also Yohanan Friedmann, “Quasi-Rational and Anti-Rational Elements in Radical Muslim Thought: The Case of Abū al-ʿAlā Mawdūdī”, in *Rationalization in Religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, ed. idem and Christoph Markschies (Berlin and Boston, MA: de Gruyter, 2019), 289–300.

politicized expression in the form of Salafism, has remained a purely Sunnī phenomenon challenging both the wider prevailing Sunnī and Shīʿī expressions of Islam.⁸⁹ As such, Salafism draws on a reduced repertoire of Sunnī Islam, accepting only a very narrow canon of medieval and modern scholars perceived to have been guardians of the unadulterated way of the *salaf* in creed, religious practice and politics. Consequently, a similar reduction operates in the Salafists' reception of Islamism, which excludes or – as most visible in the case of the *Islamic State* (IS) – even demonizes Islamist thinkers of Shīʿī and non-Salafī Sunnī background, as well as contending Salafis deemed to subscribe to an impure *ʿaqida* or deficient *manhaj*.⁹⁰

A major advantage of a refined "discursive tradition" approach is that it allows for the context-bound permeation of "Sunnī Islamic traditions" without requiring scholars to either cast, for instance, the Indonesian adherents to the *Salafiyya-Madkhaliyya*, which Sunarwoto presents, out of the folds of "Salafī Islam" or "Salafism" for their blurring the lines between *manhaj* and *madhhab* by faithfully following the interpretations of a contemporary scholar, or to operate with problematic analytical categories such as "syncretic" or "liminal". Rather, it forces one to analyze social, political, economic, cultural and other context-related factors in order to understand why a certain lexicon is adopted, or a particular scholarly reference deployed to a certain end, at a particular time, in a distinct local environment, or why certain positions, which may appear incompatible on the surface, are in reality less so. We may thus, for instance, be better able to explain why the conceptual universe of radical Egyptian Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb (executed 1386/1966) is even for many Salafists not necessarily part of their repertoire, while that of Ibn Taymiyya seems to be. Moreover, we may be better able to grasp why a certain Salafī or Salafist literary canon has evolved that exhibits differences depending on the respective context. As emblematically demonstrated in Bruckmayr's contribution, this will also help us, for instance, to discern different paths in the appropriation of a select vocabulary from Ibn Taymiyya, in order to develop a distinct jargon that allows Salafis and Salafists to dissociate themselves from other

89 This said, the diagnosed emergence of a Salafī quasi-*marjaʿiyya* appears even more striking.

90 A text book example for the demonization of all three mentioned groups is "The Murtadd Brotherhood", *Dabiq* 14 (Rajab 1437), 28-43. Other Salafist groups are exhibiting a less reductive and selective appropriation of Islamism with much more appreciation towards thinkers from the radical wing of the Muslim Brotherhood or those influenced by them.

traditions within the Sunnī Islamic one,⁹¹ as well as from those who adhere to a slightly different interpretation of faith and orthopraxy.⁹²

Similarly, we may be better able to explain the very selective reading of ostensibly core texts in the literary canon. Aliyev, for instance, presents a picture in which Salafi Islam (and soon also Salafism) has emerged, against the backdrop of a long regional history of dominance by Imāmī Shīʿī Islam, as a minority reaction. The opposing positions advocated especially by Azerbaijani Salafists express also their resentment against what they perceive as their own socio-economic marginalization in the expressly secular post-Soviet Republic, which, in their view, still privileges members of the Imāmī Shīʿī majority in all arenas.

Likewise, Bruckmayr shows that the wider interest in refuting the Māturīdī-Ḥanafī nexus owes much to the systematic critique of Shams al-Dīn al-Salafī al-Afghānī (b. 1372/1952), which, in turn, was informed by the prevalence of this concatenation of speculative theology and jurisprudence in the author's native context of the Indo-Afghan region. Shams al-Dīn's extensive refutations of Māturīdī *kalām* and Ḥanafī jurisprudence⁹³ formed the blueprint for subsequent works with the same thrust, composed by authors of various regional backgrounds.

As these three examples from the present collection of essays indicate, also the bogeymen of Salafīs and Salafists are naturally bound to temporally and spatially shifting contexts, be it that they do only occur in certain regions and at certain times, or that the intensity in which they are highlighted either increases or decreases. This, in turn, implies that – other than suggested by authors like Meijer, Gauvain or Lohlker⁹⁴ – “Sufism”, which, in order to avoid the use of yet another questionable “ism”, we are calling here by its unequivocal Arabic term *taṣawwuf*,⁹⁵ is not inevitably an antithesis to all things *salafiyya*.

91 See here, for example, Bonnefoy, “Quietist Salafis”, 209.

92 See here, for example, Lav, *Radical Islam*, 86–119; Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi*, 214–36; Justyna Nedza, *Takfīr im militanten Salafismus: Der Staat als Feind* (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2020), 124–35.

93 See al-Afghānī, al-Shams al-Salafī, *Adā' al-māturīdīyya li-l-'aqīda al-salafiyya*, 3 vols. (al-Ṭāʾif: Maktabat al-Ṣiddīq 1419/1998, 2nd ed.); idem, *Juhūd 'ulamā' al-ḥanafīyya fī ibtāl 'aqā'id al-qubūriyya*, 3 vols. (Riyadh: Dār al-Ṣamīʿī li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1416/1996).

94 See above, note 8, also Gauvain, *Salafism in Modern Egypt*, 805 n.6; Lohlker, *Die Salafisten*, 133f.

95 While commonly not concerned with its relation to questions of politics, scholars such as Carl Ernst, Nile Green and lately Pieter Coppens have challenged the use of the term Sufism and its status as an “ism”. The latter notes, for instance, that some “have argued that the “-ism” suffix reifies *taṣawwuf* as a mystical trend that has an existence separate

As indicated in Hartung's contribution, the stance towards *taṣawwuf* is determined by how its protagonists frame it. While it can give way to excessive rituals well outside the general understanding of orthopraxy, or to philosophemes difficult to sustain by standard interpretations of the Qur'anic revelation, it also facilitates – contingent in time and space – intra-*taṣawwuf* criticism of exactly such beliefs and practices.⁹⁶ At least for earlier periods in the development of the *salafiyya* phenomenon the existence of a "Salafī approach to Sufism" has been noted in which individual scholars have subscribed to major elements of Ibn Taymiyya's critique of *taṣawwuf*, while at the same time ardently defending some of its aspects and major exponents such as Ibn 'Arabī – something often lost on conventional scholarship presupposing clear-cut divisions. Accordingly, Sirry regards it as problematic 'that this turn toward Ibn Taymiyya is often described in the literature as superceding the Salafis' earlier attachment to Sufism'.⁹⁷

Similarly, the *taṣawwuf* promoted by the adherents of the *Ṭarīqah-yi Muḥammadiyyah* in early nineteenth-century northern India neither created any obstacle in the positive appraisal of this phenomenon in Saudi Arabian historiography,⁹⁸ nor caused the Indian *Ahl-i Ḥadīṣ* to refrain from regarding them as their direct precursor.⁹⁹ Such dynamics are also highlighted by a striking connection between the contributions of Hartung and Bruckmayr. Indeed, the above-mentioned Shams al-Dīn al-Salafī al-Afghānī, one of the latter's chief protagonists, eventually came to denounce – in a clear shift in emphasis on different aspects of a largely shared repertoire – his former teachers from among the local Pashtun heirs to the *Ṭarīqah-yi Muḥammadiyyah*'s "Salafī reduction", as misguided due to their perceived attachment to Naqshbandī and

from Islam". Pieter Coppens, *Seeing God in Sufi Qur'an Commentaries: Crossings between This World and the Otherworld* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 7. Similar to our usage of Salafī Islam, Nile Green has proposed to employ "Sufi Islam" rather than "Sufism" to emphasize its embeddedness in Islamic tradition, even though "convention prevents it". Nile Green, *Sufism: A Global History* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 8.

96 See Bernd Radtke, "Warum ist der Sufi orthodox?", *Der Islam* 71:2 (1994), 302-07; Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke (eds.), *Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics* (Leiden, Boston, MA and Cologne: Brill, 1999).

97 Mun'im Sirry, "Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī and the Salafī Approach to Sufism", *WI* 51:1 (2011), 75-108, here 106.

98 Even though not explicitly highlighted, see here Jörg Matthias Determann, *Historiography in Saudi Arabia: Globalization and the State in the Middle East* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014),

99 See, for instance, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Mīr Siyālkoṭī, *Tārīkh-i Ahl-i Ḥadīṣ* (New Delhi: al-Kitāb Intarneshnal, 1995; reprint from 1932), 419-22; also Preckel, *Islamische Bildungsnetzwerke*, 94-104; Riexinger, *Sanā'ullāh Amritsarī*, 103-08.

Ḥanafī-Māturīdī tradition. What is more, this can hardly be regarded as a debate on the fringes of the Salafī and Salafist nexus. Apart from the fact that Shams al-Dīn fostered a strong relationship with the IIUM, it must be remembered that the establishment of the *Islamic Emirate of Kunar*, which arose in the same intellectual environment, has conventionally been treated as one of the key developments in the ‘emergence of Salafī-Jihadism’.¹⁰⁰

As far as contextual factors are concerned, the question of different domestic political environments, as well as transnational sociopolitical dynamics, is a major one. Knysh has observed profound changes in the membership patterns and recruitment dynamics among Salafī and Salafist organizations in the Caucasus in times of war,¹⁰¹ something which the present war in and over Syria has – due to the major influx of foreign fighters and the unprecedented media attention to “Salafism” – reflected on a global scale. Moreover, the transformations of the Arab Revolts in 2011 have heralded widespread political engagement of groups hitherto regarded as “quietist”.¹⁰² Earlier, Saudi domestic and foreign policies first decisively influenced the politicization of the *salafīyya* at home and abroad through the recruitment of figures such as Muḥammad Qutb and others from the Muslim Brotherhood milieu, and then strongly assisted the global spread of the *Madkhalīyya* by putting it in charge of the IIUM to counter the thus-created Salafist opposition.¹⁰³ As shown in the contribution of Pall and Pérez Pereiro, the combination of two seemingly unrelated factors was the driving force behind the spread of Salafī Islam in Cambodia: First, the political climate in post-civil war Cambodia provided transnational NGOs in general with unhindered access to the local population. Second, a specific well-funded Islamic charity with high stakes in Kuwaiti politics and society emerged as a chief player in Cambodia’s post-war Islamic reconstruction.

Socio-economic factors cannot be discounted either, both in the emergence of Salafī Islam and Salafism and in its internal differentiations. In Daghestan, Knysh has observed the existence of a ‘Wahhabism [i.e. Salafism] of the poor’, adopted by the rural marginalized youth, and a ‘Wahhabism of the rich’, appealing to ‘well-to-do mercantile and entrepreneurial elements’ disaffected with pervasive corruption and a failing state, which both speak to other cleavages.¹⁰⁴ While not using such terminology, many of the contributions

100 Bernard Rougier, “Le jihad en Afghanistan et l’émergence du salafisme-jihadisme”, in *Qu’est-ce que le salafisme?*, 65–86, here 77.

101 See Alexander Knysh, “Contextualizing the Salafī-Sufi Conflict (from the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt)”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 43:4 (2007), 503–30, here 526.

102 See Bonnefoy, “Quietist Salafis”; Meijer, “Conclusion”.

103 See Farquhar, *Circuits of Faith*, 105–07.

104 Knysh, “Contextualizing”, 526.

assembled here point to religions differentiation along socio-economic lines, inter alia. In Cambodia (Pall and Pérez Pereiro), Salafī Islam – as opposed to the numerically more successful *Tablīghī Jamā'at* – is associated with upward mobility. In the Indonesian case, Sunarwoto describes the *Madkhaliyya*'s schools, in contrast to the institutions of contending Salafī groups, as characterized by their poor infrastructure and quality of education.

If the context and, moreover, the context milieu, is given such an exalted importance, we have, of course, to reflect on whatever that context relates to. This, finally, takes us back to our terminological deliberations above, and brings our argument somewhat full circle. After all, what is required before we can relate a certain context to the emerging terminology, are robust and sharp definitions, alongside a model of types of social action which can account as comprehensively as possible for the various context-bound expressions of the phenomena "Salafī Islam" and "Salafism". This, in fact, is what we attempt to contribute to, in the light of the existing wealth of studies on the matter, as well as against the backdrop of the research presented in this special thematic issue. In the following paragraphs, we wish to present exactly such a heuristic framework, one that takes all these considerations into account.

Moving Towards a Refined Taxonomy

Just to reiterate, the model we propose is based not on presumably stable collective identities but rather on positions, as this would allow us to account much better for the contingencies that result from individuality, as well as for the contingency which determines the choice of one position over another. As paramount categories present themselves two Weberian ones which have been productively utilized already in 1992 by Ahmed Mukarram and, subsequently, Hartung: "guidance-orientation" and "governance-orientation" (or in German, *Lebensführung* and *Herrschaftsorientierung*, respectively).¹⁰⁵ The former, which, for us, is the position solely representing "Salafī Islam", is commonly characterized by a comparable indifference towards all matters political.

¹⁰⁵ See Ahmed Mukarram, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Islamic Thought: Guidance and Governance in the Work of Mawlana Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi and Mawlana Abul Aala Mawdudi* [sic] (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Oxford, 1992); Hartung, *Viele Wege*, 123-25. The concepts have been adopted from Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1972, 5th ed.), 267f., 355-59.

Yet, “guidance-orientation” can either refer to an “introverted attitude”, which is perhaps closest to resembling the original meaning of “quietism”, or an “extraverted” one, which plays out in solely religious *da‘wa* (*da‘wat al-tawhīd*), as was perhaps paradigmatically exemplified by Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī. We contest the use of the label “purist” here simply for the ideological implications that this further “ism” carries; yet, “puritan” or “puritanical” seems to be a good choice to avoid this inadvertent ideologization, as indicated in the contribution of Pall and Pérez Pereiro. However, because it requires activities in the public space, the latter position, encapsulating the public outreach of the Salafi *da‘wa*, already forms some sort of a convergence zone with its closest neighbour of “governance-orientation” – namely, religious *da‘wa* in strong conjunction with the propagation of political obedience (*da‘wat al-ṭā‘a*), that is so emblematic for the above discussed famous student of al-Albānī, Rabī‘ al-Madkhālī, and his followers across the Muslim world.

On the other end of the spectrum of “governance-orientations” stand those various positions associated with *jihādiyya* – that is, positions which require a forced change of the political structures by all possible means. Yet, depending on circumstances, these can fall into the uncompromising position of *khurūj*, or militant rebellion, or its deference (*irjā’*) until more promising prospects arise. The latter position is exemplarily represented by the Egyptian Sayyid Imām al-Sharīf (b. 1369/1950) in his revisionist writings during his imprisonment after September 2001, in which he calls for armed *jihād* against political regimes regarded as infidel to be postponed until the Muslim *umma* is sufficiently strong.¹⁰⁶ The position labelled as *khurūj* could be further divided along the polemical terms used by their representatives against one another. Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī, for example, is denounced in internal debates for representing the *manāhijīyya*, a position understood as the uncompromising adherence to a particular *manhaj*. He himself, in contrast, regards those who advocate a more flexible approach to *manhaj* in the light of the respective circumstances, as guilty of “dilution” (*tamayyu*), and blames fellow Jordanian Abū Qatāda al-Filasṭīnī (b. 1379/1960) for emblematically advocating this stance.¹⁰⁷

106 See al-Duktūr Faḍl, *Wathīqat tarshīd al-‘amal al-jihādī fī Miṣr wa’l-‘ālam* (November 2007), URL: <www.eprism.org/images/TARSHID_AL-JIHAD.pdf> (accessed 28 April 2009); for a see discussion Nedza, *Der Staat als Feind*, 56–58, 148f., 175–77, 201–03 and 213–16.

107 See Cole Bunzel, “Jihadism on Its Own Terms: Understanding a Movement”, *Hoover Institution Analysis*, URL: <www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/jihadism_on_its_own_terms.pdf> (accessed 11 December 2018), esp. 10f. A similar, though more detailed, taxonomy to that of Bunzel has also already been presented by scholar-activist

In between the propagation of political loyalty and the strict rejection of acknowledging existing political regimes stand all those positions associated with "ḥizbiyya". They can either be expressed in the acknowledgement of democratic frameworks and the subsequent participation in the parliamentary context, or, leaning more towards positions associated with "jihādiyya", in extra-parliamentarian action.

Just to emphasize: also the categories presented here are ideal-typical. Yet, we are convinced that they allow for a better recognition of the context-bound fluidity of these positions, which can also help to dissolve seemingly paradoxical labels such as "quietist jihādī". Yet, we still need to acknowledge that, while positions are taken mainly on an individual basis, we need to account for the social dynamics that often underlie shifts in one's positions.¹⁰⁸ What is therefore needed is a second layer in our model, one that takes into account the social embeddedness of Salafīs and Salafists, which is central to the taxonomy introduced by Wiktorowicz and refined by Wagemakers and others. This, in fact, is done in the respective contributions of Aliyev and Pall/Pérez Pereiro, in which the Salafiyya phenomenon is cast as a "social movement", reflecting thereby Wiktorowicz's overall perspective.

Still, we would argue that his and, subsequently, Wagemakers' categories, as they stand, are too static to allow for a more appropriate explanation of reality. We would therefore like to propose that these categories be reconsidered as clusters in quite dynamic social networks, which, depending on context and opportunity structures, increase or decrease in size, density and composition.¹⁰⁹ In fact, it is frequently such dynamics in social networks that can account for regionally specific interpretations of Salafī Islam and Salafism: these networks result in regionally rather closed communication contexts – that is, interpretations which are not measured against a benchmark in far-away Saudi Arabia but are formed and negotiated against the backdrop of the local context.

Ṭāriq 'Abd al-Ḥalīm (b. 1367/1948). Hartung wishes to thank Tore R. Hamming (European University Institute Florence) for bringing the latter to his attention.

108 We are especially indebted to Zoltan Pall for raising this matter in the discussion of an earlier draft of this introduction, and thus helping to reconsider our then perhaps too emphatically position-oriented model.

109 The fruitfulness of applying Social Network perspectives on subject matters of the Study of Islam has been impressively demonstrated by the studies that resulted from the initial deliberations of Roman Loimeier and Stefan Reichmuth, as well as the Junior Research Group "Islamische Bildungsnetzwerke im lokalen und transnationalen Kontext (18.–20. Jh.)" at the Ruhr-University of Bochum, Germany, funded by the Volkswagen Foundation between 1998 and 2004. For a comprehensive summary, see Thomas Eich, "Islamische Netzwerke", *EGO – European History Online* (3 December 2010), URL: <www.ieg-ego.eu/eicht-2010-de> (accessed 14 December 2018).

Moreover, within such clusters, distinct bodies of literature are produced, oftentimes in the dominant local idioms. This, of course, has a decisive impact on their distribution, in contrast to literature produced in Arabic, which strategically aims at a wider circulation, beyond regional confines.¹¹⁰ In this regard it is also important to pay attention to the selection of individual Arabic works for translation into the respective local idioms. All these processes of literary production contribute to the emergence of distinct canons, canons that are characterized by their distribution in particular regions and/or social networks, in which distinct interpretations of the Salafī world view are maintained, and which therefore show only partial overlaps.

This point of regional situatedness is, in fact, highlighted in each of the five studies assembled here, although to varying degrees: they all represent a respective regional vantage point, so far widely underrepresented in the extant literature on the subject, be it solely academic or intended for a wider popular audience. In addition, they all reflect a focus on connected histories rather than on the maintenance of still pervasive Arabo-centric perspectives. Hartung's contribution makes a strong case for the decentring of the genealogies of Salafī Islam by tracing the development of its indigenous, distinctively Pash-tun expression in the borderland of Afghanistan and Pakistan since the early nineteenth century. His analysis not only highlights the limited role of Arab influence in the process but also shows that the conventional narrative of a natural antagonism between Šūfī and Salafī Islam is hardly sustainable in certain contexts, neither for past nor present times. Contrastingly, Sunarwoto's contribution revolves around an Indonesian group which does have a prime scholarly reference based in the Arab world – the local followers of Rabi' al-Madkhali. Therefore, his study clearly speaks to the questions of authority construction discussed above. Additionally, it draws attention to the problems faced by local adherents as they seek to hold on to their eponym's teachings of mandatory obedience to the rulers in Indonesia's democracy, a context which differs widely from that of al-Madkhali's Saudi Arabia. As such, it also prompts the problematization of labels such as "quietist".

In Pall and Pérez Pereiro's case study of Cambodia, the key Middle Eastern influence comes not from Saudi Arabia but from Kuwait. Whereas their strongly politically engaged Kuwaiti patrons, *inter alia*, strive to turn their publicized charity works among Cambodian Muslims into electoral gains at home, the

¹¹⁰ Again, Shams al-Dīn al-Salafī al-Afghānī's two above-mentioned voluminous Arabic heresiographies are a case in point here: their publication in Saudi Arabia provides actors there with the opportunity to take charge of religious debates grossly detached from the Saudi Arabian context.

local Salafis exhibit a pragmatic endorsement of the ruling party in the minority context, thereby drawing our attention to the potential flexibility and diverse context-bound manifestations of different currents within Salafi Islam. Subsequently Aliyev discusses the emergence and evolution of Salafi Islam in overwhelmingly Shīʿī Azerbaijan. Initially strongly influenced by Arab actors and debates, including intra-Salafi ones, the locally evolving groups reacted differently to their heavily secularized and politically repressive environment, with responses ranging from outright militancy to conciliatory approaches. The latter even includes modest overtures towards the Shīʿī other, something which is hardly associated with contemporary Salafi Islam, let alone Salafism, and thus again clearly hints at processes of indigenization. Finally, Bruckmayr's contribution once more questions the unidirectionality of Salafi discourse as radiating from the Arab lands, and particularly Saudi Arabia, across the globe. His analysis of anti-Māturīdī literature clearly points to the paramount role of South Asian experiences and authors in the genesis of this genre. He also shows how Arab writers and institutions have utilized the expertise of scholars from other regions to strengthen the Salafi *daʿwa* on a global scale.

Based on these case studies, we hope that this collection will open up new perspectives for the study of the different manifestations of Salafi Islam. In addition, we hope to have provided scholars in the field with a fruitful supplementation of the existing models and a point of departure for further research on the complex and diverse nature of the contemporary "Salafiyya" phenomenon.

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The romanization of non-Latin scripts follows the standard convention for each language. Only in cases where these systems might collide with those for Arabic, additional explanation is provided at the beginning of the respective contribution.