Supersapientia: Berthold of Moosburg and the Divine Science of the Platonists

History of Metaphysics: Ancient, Medieval, Modern

Edited by

Olivier Boulnois (*École Pratique des Hautes Etudes*)

Dragos Calma (*University College Dublin*)

Wouter Goris (*Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität*)

Pasquale Porro (*Università di Torino*)

VOLUME 1

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/hmtp*

Supersapientia

*Berthold of Moosburg and the Divine
Science of the Platonists*

By

Evan King

BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, which permits any non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided no alterations are made and the original author(s) and source are credited. Further information and the complete license text can be found at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

The terms of the CC license apply only to the original material. The use of material from other sources (indicated by a reference) such as diagrams, illustrations, photos and text samples may require further permission from the respective copyright holder.

The publication of this volume has received the generous support of the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme through the ERC Consolidator Grant *NeoplAT: A Comparative Analysis of the Middle East, Byzantium and the Latin West (9th-16th Centuries)*, grant agreement No 771640 (www.neoplat.eu).

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at <http://catalog.loc.gov>
LC record available at <http://lcn.loc.gov/2021019204>

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: "Brill". See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 2666-9307

ISBN 978-90-04-46490-2 (hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-46548-0 (e-book)

Copyright 2021 by Evan King. Published by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau Verlag and V&R Unipress.

Koninklijke Brill NV reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος.

PLATO, *Timaeus*, 29e

Contents

Preface IX

List of Figures and Tables XII

Introduction 1

1 Life and Contexts 1

2 Toward a Reconstruction of Berthold's Library 14

3 The Commentary on Proclus: Background, Purpose, and Exegetical Methods 40

PART 1

Non secundum nos. *Platonism as Philosophical Revelation*

1 Prologus 68

1 Hermes Trismegistus and Thomas of York 70

2 Hermes Trismegistus and Albert the Great 81

3 Approaching and Entering the House of God 94

2 Expositio tituli 103

1 Plato's Theorems 104

2 The Three Motions of the Soul 108

3 The Two Orders of Providence 133

3 Praeambulum libri 159

1 Theology as a Science 161

2 "Our Divinising Theology" 176

PART 2

Providere cum diis. *The Philosophical Principles of the Expositio*

4 Exstasis divini amoris

The Macrocosm 193

1 Plato and Aristotle on the One and the Good 194

2 Creation 203

3 The Trinity and the Gods 214

4 Limit and the Unlimited 238

5 Determination, Generation, and Light 248

5 Epulatio entis

The Microcosm 268

- 1 Human Nature and the Spiritual Body 272
- 2 Between Being and Becoming 288
- 3 The Goodness of Silence: Deification and Providential Cognition 297

Conclusion 323

- 1 Legacy 323
- 2 Lady Philosophy's Vesture 346

Translation

Prologue 362

Exposition of the Title 399

Preamble of the Book 417

Bibliography 437

Index of Manuscripts 469

Index of Authors (Ancient) 470

Index of Authors (Modern) 474

Preface

The study that follows is a revised and expanded version of a doctoral dissertation completed in 2016 at Clare College, Cambridge, devoted to the aims and argument of Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio* on the *Elementatio theologica* of Proclus ("*Supersapientia*. A Study of the *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli* of Berthold von Moosburg"). The final stages of this work were accomplished within the framework of the ERC Grant NeopLAT CoG 771640. I beg the reader's pardon that such an unrelenting grip on the text, perhaps more excusable for a dissertation, has been retained here. The understanding of Berthold's thought in its complexity is still under construction. To contribute something to this ongoing inquiry, it seemed safest to proceed by keeping close attention on Berthold's arguments as well as to his modifications of his sources, in order to begin to appreciate the uniqueness and coherence of his project.

Like the dissertation, this book's division in two parts is intended to reflect the distinct methodological traits of Berthold of Moosburg's commentary on Proclus. It seemed to me that a phrase from Dionysius the Areopagite often cited by Berthold, that theology must proceed "not according to ourselves" (*non secundum nos*), had at once an exegetical and a philosophical significance for his commentary on Proclus. These words encapsulate, to my mind, his attitude toward the history of philosophy and his views about the place of his own project within it: the study of the beatifying wisdom of the Platonists would be undertaken in the form of a commentary that distilled an entire tradition – a work Berthold himself described as a "compilation". Dionysius' phrase was also used by Berthold to underscore the necessity for a Platonic understanding of universals when reasoning about the divine: God and the separate substances are to be understood not according to our abstractions but by attending to what is causally operative independently of our thinking.

The Introduction gathers the extant information about Berthold's life, library, and intellectual contexts, attempting to produce a coherent account of his career where this is permissible, while also acknowledging the gaps in the record. Part 1 takes its inspiration from the two-sidedness of Berthold's commentary project, as exegesis and as philosophy. It is structured as a guided tour through Berthold's three prefaces to the commentary (*Prologus*, *Expositio tituli*, *Praeambulum*). This sequential reading pauses at various stages to allow us to tunnel into the decisive instances of Berthold's synthesis and transformation of his sources as they occur. This will allow us to glimpse the unwitting

originality of the Platonism he articulated in his attempt to revive the divinising philosophy he glimpsed in the distant golden age of antiquity. Special attention is given in these chapters to the relationship between paganism and Christianity in Berthold's thought. Along with the translation of the three prefaces at the back of the volume, it is hoped that this portion of the book will introduce the reader to the spirit animating the *Expositio*.

Part 2 ranges more freely through the commentary to provide a more systematic and doctrinal picture of Berthold's Platonism. Its two chapters are structured around Berthold's Hermetic motif of the macrocosm and microcosm, which provides a natural framework for ordering the major themes of Berthold's cosmology and anthropology. After setting out his understanding of the discord between Plato and Aristotle in terms of their philosophical approaches to first principles, it examines how an ecstatic and realist reasoning about universality has its objective correlate in every level of Berthold's cosmology, from the spontaneously creative activity of the Good, through the essential order of separate substances, to the physical laws of the diffusion of light. The discussion of Berthold's anthropology in the final chapter focuses on the relation of the individual to the ideal human nature (the *imago Dei*) that subsists at the lower limit of the essential order of causes. Here we understand how, for Berthold, the awakening of "the one of the soul" (*unum animae*), which is the goal of Platonic philosophy and the *Expositio*, can bring the individual into harmony with human nature and, through it, with the providential Good, and so be raised to an operative union with God.

This study can only see the light of day thanks to the guidance of several teachers, colleagues, and friends. To my supervisor at Clare College, Douglas Hedley, for his ready council and unconditional support, and to my doctoral examiners, Stephen Gersh and Loris Sturlese, for their precious insights and inspiration, I give my sincere thanks. For his loyalty and patience, I am profoundly grateful to Dragos Calma, without whom this work would have remained doubly undone. Along the way I have received crucial assistance from Alessandra Beccarisi, Hjördis Becker-Lindenthal, Álvaro Campillo Bo, the CETEFIL team in Lecce, Luke DeWeese, Jonathan Greig, Alexander Hampton, Paul Hellmeier OP, Ezequiel Ludueña, John Marenbon, the NeopLAT team in Dublin, Fiorella Retucci, Joshua Robinson, Iulia Székely, Caterina Tarlazzi, Matthew Vanderkwaak, and Daniel Watson. What faults remain are entirely my own. To my teachers and friends at the *schola Haligoniensis*, and especially Wayne Hankey, I shall always be grateful. For the means of undertaking this project at all, it is a pleasure to acknowledge the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Cambridge Commonwealth,

European, and International Trust, and the European Research Council (ERC Grant NeoplAT).

To Elizabeth, Silas, and Anna – dedicated with affection.

Rosemount, Nova Scotia

9 October 2020

The Feast of St. Denis

Figures and Tables

Figures

- 1 Glosses on Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* (1.14.6-7). MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 17r 41
- 2 Gloss on Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* (1.17.5). MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 20r 41
- 3 Marginalia on Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam* (q. 10, §64). MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 59ra 41
- 4 Marginalia on Proclus, *De providentia et fato* (c. 8, §32). MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 64rb 41

Tables

- 1 Berthold of Moosburg's Proclean Glosses on Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* 16
- 2 Berthold of Moosburg's Proclean Glosses on Proclus, *Tria opuscula* 25
- 3 Berthold of Moosburg's Marginalia to the *Clavis physicae* 34

Introduction

1 Life and Contexts

The fundamental documentation for establishing the trajectory of the life of Berthold of Moosburg (c. 1290 – c. 1361/1363) has changed little from what is gathered in Loris Sturlese's introduction to his critical edition of Propositions 184–211 of the *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, published in 1974.¹ These documents trace the outlines of the career of a successful teacher and pastor in the Dominican order, who was involved with some of the most active centres of learning and literature in 14th-century Europe. The biography of Berthold of Moosburg that follows attempts to bring this portrait into a slightly higher resolution by making use of more recent scholarly discoveries that shed light on the contexts in which he lived and worked.

The first and most essential documentary addition to our knowledge of Berthold's life came as a fragment, published by Thomas Kaeppli in 1978, of the proceedings of a Dominican chapter meeting in Friesach, informing us that in 1315 Berthold was to be sent to Oxford for his studies.² This gives us some clues about the date of Berthold's birth. Typically, after a two- or three-year novitiate, with teenagers no younger than 15 allowed to enter, Dominican friars in the German-speaking provinces would have progressed through three years of study in the schools of logical arts (*studia logicalium*) and two to three years in the schools of natural philosophy (*studia naturarum*).³ Those selected for advanced studies in the schools of general theology (*studia generalia*) may

1 See L. Sturlese, "Introduzione" in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*. 184–211. *De animabus*, ed. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), p. xv–xxii; and H. Boese, *Wilhelm von Moerbeke als Übersetzer der Stoicheiosis theologie des Proclus. Untersuchungen und Texte zur Überlieferung der Elementatio theologica* (Birkenau: Bitsch, 1985), p. 69–83. See also W. Eckert, "Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik im Spätmittelalter", in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 65(1957), p. 120–133, at p. 122–124.

2 Th. Kaeppli, "Ein Fragment der Akten des in Friesach 1315 gefeierten Kapitels der Provinz Teutonia", in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 48(1978), p. 71–75, at p. 72: [...] *guerrarum strepitum, quibus quasi tota ian<vensis> provincia affligitur et gravatur. Hoc anno intermisimus studia artium et philosophiae, volumus <tamen> et inponimus prioribus universis qui in suis conventibus habent aliquos juvenes ap<tos et> habiles ad profectum, quod ipsis aliquem fratrem preficiant qui eis aliquid de naturis <...>bus legere teneatur, quos etiam volumus a discursibus suportari. [...] Mictimus <in Ang>liam fr. Berchtoldum de Mospurg.*

3 W. Senner, "Dominican Education", in J. Hackett (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 711–723, at p. 712–714.

have been asked first to lecture on logic for two to three years. As Oxford housed one of the Dominican order's schools of general theology, counting back from 1315 we may infer that Berthold was likely born around or before 1290. Since he was sent to Oxford by a chapter meeting in Friesach, we can be quite certain that his birthplace was the town of Moosburg located on the Isar river before Landshut, northeast of Munich, and that he was educated within that region of the Dominican province of Teutonia. The character of his early education is unknown; the formative influences on his thinking can only be guessed. We shall see that Berthold was more familiar with the works of Dietrich of Freiberg, his elder confrere, than any other medieval author known to date. The last extant record of Dietrich's activities indicates that he served as provincial vicar to Teutonia in 1310–1311,⁴ and scholars surmise that Dietrich may have lived until 1318 or 1320.⁵ But whether Berthold had any personal contact with his most esteemed contemporary master remains a matter of speculation.

The impact of the intellectual life in Oxford in the mid-1310s on Berthold's formation is also a matter of conjecture. The most significant recent development in our understanding of Berthold's thought came as a result of Fiorella Retucci's advance on the discovery made by Françoise Hudry, who indicated that Berthold made use of a rare commentary on the Hermetic *Liber xxiv philosophorum*, which was also known to the English Franciscan, Thomas of York (c. 1220 – d. before 1269).⁶ Retucci then went on to demonstrate the enormous extent of the Dominican's debt to Thomas' magnum opus, the *Sapientiale* (written sometime before 1256), which has been called the first *summa* of metaphysics in the 13th century.⁷ Thomas was given a controversial exemption to bypass the standard requirement for an degree in arts before advancing to theological studies, and this is no surprise, for the *Sapientiale* is an ample demonstration of his staggering command of ancient and medieval philosophical

4 L. Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen zu Leben und Werke Dietrichs von Freiberg* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 58–63.

5 L. Sturlese, "Alle origini della mistica speculativa tedesca. Antichi testi su Teodorico di Freiberg", in *Medioevo* 3(1977), p. 21–87, at p. 41–43; K. Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg. Philosophie, Theologie, Naturforschung um 1300* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2007), p. 31.

6 Françoise Hudry first signalled the influence of Thomas on Berthold in Hermes Latinus, *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum*, ed. F. Hudry (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997). On the 12th-century origins of the *Liber*, see Z. Kaluza, "Comme une branche d'amandier en fleurs. Dieu dans le *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum*", in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), *Hermetism from Late Antiquity to Humanism. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Napoli, 20-24 Novembre 2001* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), p. 93–123.

7 E. Longpré, "Fr. Thomas d'York, O.F.M. La première somme métaphysique du XIII^e siècle", in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 19(1926), p. 875–930. On Thomas' life, see p. 876–881.

theology. It is natural to suppose that Berthold first encountered the *Sapientiale* in Oxford.⁸ Certainly, when he began writing the *Expositio* almost a decade or more later, Thomas of York remained ever near at hand.⁹ Berthold not only used the *Sapientiale* as his direct source for many of the classical and medieval authorities cited in the *Expositio*, but looked to it for inspiration when he announced the dignity and goal of philosophical wisdom itself. We will see in more detail how completely Berthold adopted Thomas' maximal endorsement of the attainments of the non-Christian sages of antiquity in their knowledge of God and how he incorporated it into a model relating theology and philosophy that came from his German Dominican predecessors (Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strassburg, and Dietrich of Freiberg).

Further research may reveal the extent to which the *Sapientiale* circulated in 14th-century England. One factor leading to Berthold's encounter with the text may have been the association of Thomas' name with the political tensions that began in 1303 between the mendicants and secular clergy in Oxford as to whether, among other things, a dispensation from the University was required in every case for a student to proceed directly to the theology doctorate after studying arts outside the University.¹⁰ This conflict significantly destabilised the Dominican *studium* in Oxford. Between 1312 and 1320 the fallout between the friars and the University had so escalated that the regular stream of Dominican friars to the *studium* was often substantially interrupted.¹¹ In 1314, the English Dominicans appealed to King Edward II, and again in 1317 to

8 Retucci, F., Goering, J., "The *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York, OFM. The Fortunes and Misfortunes of a Critical Edition", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 52(2010), p. 133–155, at p. 150.

9 F. Retucci, "Magister Thomas Anglicus minor. Eine neue Quelle der *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam* Procli Bertholds von Moosburg – das ungedruckte *Sapientiale* des Franziskaners Thomas von York", in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam* Procli. Propositiones 136–159 (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), p. xxii–xxxix; ead., "Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone", in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), p. 79–111; ead., "Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor. Tommaso di York fonte dell'*Expositio* di Bertoldo di Moosburg", in F. Amerini, S. Fellina, A. Strazzoni (eds), *Tra antichità e modernità. Studi di storia della filosofia medievale e rinascimentale* (E-THECA: On Line Open Access Edizioni, 2019), p. 1–41; ead., "Between Cologne and Oxford. Berthold of Moosburg and Thomas of York's *Sapientiale*", forthcoming.

10 See the synthesis in H.G. Gelber, *It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 39–43.

11 A.B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957–59), p. 95 and p. 987.

Pope John XXII, requesting the repeal of the Statute of 1253 which resolved “the affair of Thomas of York”, whose exceptional case had set the precedent for the contested arrangement.¹² There would be no lasting resolution to the conflict until 1320, by which time Berthold was probably no longer in Oxford.

By the mid-1310s, Oxford witnessed the emergence of thinkers whom scholars have come to identify as “the classicising friars”.¹³ Among the precursors of this group was the Dominican Nicholas Trevet (1257/65 – c. 1334), one of the English province’s most distinguished scholars.¹⁴ In 1314 Nicholas was called back to Oxford to preside as master of theology of the Dominican convent. He appointment was likely meant to bring some degree of stability to the troubled situation. By this time, among other writings, Nicholas had composed a commentary on Boethius’ *Consolation of Philosophy*, using the glosses of William of Conches, and a commentary on Seneca’s tragedies. Between 1317 and 1320 he produced a commentary on the Psalter. Another Dominican member of the “classicising” group was Thomas Waleys, who began lecturing on the *Sentences* in Oxford in 1314, which itself represented a relative return to normality for the Preachers.¹⁵ Waleys later would make use of Proclus’ *Tria opuscula* in his

-
- 12 See the literature cited in Retucci, Goering, “The *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York, OFM”.
 - 13 B. Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960); J.B. Allen, *The Friar as Critic. Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971).
 - 14 F. Ehrle, “Nikolaus Trevet. Sein Leben, seine Quodlibet und Quaestiones Ordinariae”, in *Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festgabe Clemens Baeumker* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1923), p. 1–63; Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, p. 1902–1903; R.J. Dean, “Cultural Relations in the Middle Ages. Nicholas Trevet and Nicholas of Prato”, in *Studies in Philology* 45(1948), p. 541–564; ead., “The Dedication of Nicholas Trevet’s Commentary on Boethius”, in *Studies in Philology* 63(1966), p. 593–603; Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity*, p. 58–65; J. Catto, “Theology and Theologians 1220–1320”, in J. Catto (ed.), *The Early Oxford Schools* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 471–517, at p. 513–517; Minnis, A.J., Nauta, L., “*More Platonic loquitur*. What Nicholas Trevet really did to William of Conches”, in A.J. Minnis (ed.), *Chaucer’s Boece and the Medieval Tradition of Boethius* (Woodbridge: Brewer, 1993), p. 1–33; L. Nauta, “The Scholastic Context of the Boethius Commentary by Nicholas Trevet”, in M.J.F.M. Hoenen, L. Nauta (eds), *Boethius in the Middle Ages. Latin and Vernacular Traditions of the Consolatio philosophiae* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), p. 41–67; J.G. Clark, “Trevet, Nicholas (b. 1257x65, d. in or after 1334)”, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 349–351; Gelber, *It Could Have Been Otherwise*, p. 62–64.
 - 15 S. Tugwell, “Waleys [Wallensis], Thomas”, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 800–801. See B. Smalley, “Thomas Waleys O.P.”, in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 24(1954), p. 50–107, at p. 86–98, on his connections with Trevet.

own commentary on the Psalter, written in 1326–1327 in Bologna.¹⁶ Berthold's arrival to the *studium generale* in Oxford around or after 1315 would certainly have brought him into contact with these leading figures of the early classicising movement.

The next record of Berthold's activity indicates that, after Oxford, he was occupied with teaching natural philosophy and was already making use of Dietrich of Freiberg's works in this domain. A friar tasked with teaching natural philosophy three years after studying theology would be following the typical pattern. Without the expectation that they would obtain a degree, especially in Oxford during these unsettled years for the Dominicans, most friars spent only two years in advanced theological studies before they would begin serving as lector in one of the order's conventual schools.¹⁷ Berthold's teaching of natural philosophy is attested in two glosses now preserved in MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.30, f. 56v–57r, which appear alongside the text of Dietrich's *De iride et radialibus impressionibus*, and have been published by Loris Sturlese.¹⁸ They report a commentary given by Berthold in 1318 on Aristotle's *Meteorology* III.5, 375b16–377a28, in which the friar provided a geometrical analysis of Aristotle's discussion of the pole of the rainbow. Sturlese has observed that the geometrical figures that accompany the glosses were probably not the work of Berthold. The explanation of the figures, which is ascribed to Berthold in the glosses, demonstrates a degree of geometrical proficiency to elucidate Aristotle's argument (although Berthold relied on Dietrich's calculations).¹⁹ The next chronological witness of Berthold's activity comes in the form of glosses on the *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* by Macrobius, which can be dated to before 1323. These are studied more closely

16 Commenting on Psalm 2:12, Waleys cited q. 8 of *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam* three times, for examples of philosophers who restrained their anger; on Psalm 9:25 he cited the same question on the way divine justice metes out punishment. See Averroes, *La béatitude de l'âme*, eds M. Geoffroy, C. Steel (Paris: Vrin, 2001), p. 85 and 87. According to Marc Geoffroy and Carlos Steel, these citations indicate that Waleys used a text deriving from another branch of the manuscript tradition than Berthold's copy. See also Smalley, "Thomas Waleys O.P.", p. 80–81.

17 M.M. Mulchahey, "First the Bow is Bent in Study ...". *Dominican Education Before 1350* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998), p. 130 and 383–4.

18 L. Sturlese, "Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P., scienziato e filosofo", in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), p. 249–259, at p. 250: *Descriptio figurae, in qua explicatur intentio Philosophi in III Meteororum, cum textus expositione inventa a fratre Bertoldo de Mosburch ordinis praedicatorum anno Christi 1318*. This is followed by the gloss that gives the geometrical explanation of the figures. On the manuscript, see Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen*, p. 69–72.

19 Sturlese, "Note su Bertholdo di Moosburg O.P.", p. 252–253.

in section 2, below, but can be noted here as further confirmation of Berthold's engagements with natural philosophy at this period.

A document from April 1327 names Berthold as a lector at the Dominican convent in Regensburg, which was one of the larger schools in his native region of Bavaria.²⁰ We cannot know for certain which subjects he taught there. In the 1280s, before the Dominicans divided their province of Teutonia in 1303 into Teutonia and Saxony, Regensburg housed one of its nine schools of the logical arts. By the mid-14th century, it served as a school of particular theology (*studium particularis theologiae*), which typically had the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard as its focus, and was subordinate to the more elite *studium generale*, in which the *Sentences* and Scriptural exegesis were taught.²¹ By that time, as David Sheffler has noted, the library holdings of the Dominican convent would have been ill-suited to support the teaching of natural philosophy.²² Thus it appears likely that Berthold taught theology in Regensburg, having previously served as a lector in a *studium naturarum*, which would again follow a typical pattern.

At least one of Berthold's confreres in Regensburg shared his philosophical interests. In the same document that attests to Berthold's lectorship, we have mention of another Dominican, Henry of Ekkewint, who served as prior of the convent between 1321 and 1326.²³ The sample of Henry's preaching preserved in his four (perhaps five) extant sermons shows him appealing to the authorities of Augustine, Dionysius, the *Liber de causis*, Gregory the Great, Origen, Avicbron, and Jerome.²⁴ Henry employed the broadly Neoplatonic

20 See the references in Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xvi–xvii, n. 6–7.

21 Mulchahey, *First the Bow is Bent in Study*, p. 336–340.

22 D. Sheffler, *Schools and Schooling in Late Medieval Germany. Regensburg, 1250–1500* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 60–67.

23 L. Sturlese, *Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), p. 138. See also K. Ruh, "Heinrich von Ekkewint (Eckbuint, Egwint, Egwin)", in K. Ruh et al. (eds), *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, vol. 3 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1980), p. 718–720; id., *Geschichte der abendländischen Mystik, Band III. Die Mystik des deutschen Predigerordens und ihre Grundlegung durch die Hochscholastik* (München: Beck, 1996), p. 408–410.

24 Four sermons are edited in F. Pfeiffer, "Predigten und Sprüche deutscher Mystiker", in *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum* 8 (1851), p. 209–258, at p. 223–234. A fifth sermon attributed to *der von Egwin*, of uncertain authenticity, is found in MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, B.XI.10, f. 129v–145r. A divergent version of the same sermon is attributed to Eckhart in A. Jundt, *Histoire du panthéisme populaire au Moyen Âge et au seizième siècle* (Strasbourg: Fischbach, 1875), p. 270–274, but has not been incorporated into the critical edition of Eckhart's works. For literature on this question, see Meyer, G., Burckhardt, M., *Die mittelalterlichen Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Basel. Beschreibendes Verzeichnis. Abteilung B: Theologische Pergamenthandschriften. Bd. 2: Signaturen B VIII n – B XI 26* (Basel: Verlag der Universitätsbibliothek, 1966), p. 937; D. Gottschall, "Eckhart

doctrines of procession and return and of the soul's natural yearning for God, which finds satisfaction only by turning inward and looking beyond itself, away from transient goods and its own will.²⁵ Since like can be known only by like, Henry insisted, so the soul can only know God by being conformed to God. At one point he cited several lines from the *Fons vitae* of Avicbron on the means by which the soul can "avoid death" and reach "the fount of life", that is, by turning away from the instability of the sensible world and by rising, with its highest part, toward things that are changeless and beyond time.²⁶ In Henry's sermons one can also find reflections on the Trinity and the divine essence or groundless abyss (*grundelôse abgründe*) reminiscent of Meister Eckhart.²⁷ Perhaps most striking, in anticipation of what we will see with Berthold of Moosburg, is Henry's anthropology. For both Dominicans, the soul is in some sense all things, which corresponds to its location at the middle of the universe.²⁸ According to Henry, the highest principle in the soul is a tiny spark (*der funke oder der glinster der sêle*), whose activity is experienced as a kind of ethical counsel that implies a metaphysics of human nature: the spark constantly advises a person that "you should let go of each man", that is, one's proper will and attachment, "so that you may be free of him, as if all of human nature was enclosed within you and your nature was the essence of all people, and as if you could see yourself in every man and every man in you".²⁹ This, Henry continued, amounts to seeing Christ in "his pure humanity". We will see that Berthold's synthesis of the Proclean notion of the one of the soul (*unum animae*) and the exemplarist doctrine of human nature transmitted in the Eriugenian *Clavis physicae* would amount to a very similar position.

The next recorded appearance of Berthold connects him to the Dominican convent of Heilig Kreuz in Cologne and sheds some light on his pastoral

and the Vernacular Tradition. Pseudo-Eckhart and Eckhart Legends", in J. Hackett (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart*, p. 509–551, at p. 514.

25 Henry of Ekkewint, *Predigt 1*, p. 223–224.

26 Henry of Ekkewint, *Predigt 4*, p. 232. This paraphrases the conclusion of the text: Avicbron, *Fons vitae, ex Arabico in Latinum translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino*, ed. C. Baeumker, 2 vols (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1892), vol. 1, lib. v, c. 43, p. 338, l. 8–27.

27 Henry of Ekkewint, *Predigt 2*, p. 227.

28 Henry of Ekkewint, *Predigt 3*, p. 230: *dâ von spricht der meister des buoches von der êrsten sache, das diu sêle geschaffen sî in dem orte zwischen zît und êwikeit.*

29 Henry of Ekkewint, *Predigt 2*, p. 227: *das ist der funke oder der glinster der sêle, der uns alle zît rätet das dû einem ieglichen menschen erlässest des dû von ime wilt vrî sîn, als ob aller mensche nâtiure in dir begriffen sî unde dîn nâtiure aller liuten wesen si unde dû dich selber ansehest an ieklichem menschen und einem ieklichen menschen in dir.*

responsibilities. After 7 April 1335, when he was nominated as a co-executor of the will of Bela Hardevust, a beguine from a prominent family in the city, his name appears sporadically in the city's records over the subsequent decades (1343, 1353 and 1361) in matters relating to her last will and testament.³⁰ There was at least one hiatus in Berthold's residency in Cologne over these years, when a conflict between the Dominicans and the secular authorities led to the expulsion of the friars from the city from 1346 to 1351 owing to a dispute regarding lands held by the order in perpetuity or "mortmain". During this time, in 1348, Berthold is identified as vicar in Nuremberg, but the beginning and duration of his post is unknown.³¹ It has been widely assumed by scholars that Berthold served as lector in Cologne for many years in these decades, and perhaps even directed the *studium generale*.³² This seems to infer too much from the evidence. The only document associating him with the *domus Coloniensis* is the first mention of his executorship of Hardevust's will in 1335. His lectorship is attested in the colophon of the Vatican manuscript of the *Expositio*. Without further information, we can only conclude that, at some point between 1335 and 1361, and perhaps nearer to 1335, Berthold served as a lector at the Cologne *studium*.³³

It is an altogether separate question whether his commentary on the *Elementatio theologica* was undertaken in Heilig Kreuz while Berthold served there in another capacity. We know very little about the nature of Berthold's connection with the community after 1335 that is not the result of inference from the pedagogical norms of the order and the fact that, as we shall see, much of his library remained there after his death. His lectorship, whatever its duration, would have certainly followed the standard requirements. At the time, Heilig Kreuz was the major *studium generale* of Teutonia, where as many

30 The texts are included in Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xvi-xvii. On the beguines of Cologne in this period, see L. Böhlinger, "Kölner Beginen im Spätmittelalter – Leben zwischen Kloster und Welt", in *Geschichte in Köln* 53(2006), p. 7–34.

31 Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xviii.

32 Th. Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, 4 vols (Roma: Santa Sabina, 1970–1993), vol. 1, p. 240; E. Meuthen, *Kölner Universitätsgeschichte, Band I. Die alte Universität* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1988), p. 44–45; I. Zavattero, "Berthold of Moosburg", in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), p. 163–165, at p. 163; A. Saccon, *Intelletto e beatitudine. La cultura filosofica tedesca del XIV secolo* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2012), p. 353.

33 This point was first emphasised by W. Senner, *Johannes von Sterngassen OP und sein Sentenzen-Kommentar*, 2 vols (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), vol. 1, p. 137–138. See Introduction, section 3, n. 179, below.

as 56 students were sent to study theology.³⁴ The curriculum of these schools throughout the order was highly regulated and under the constant supervision of the general chapter.³⁵ Daily lessons had the Bible and Peter Lombard's *Sentences* as their subjects. The lector would give detailed "ordinary" lectures on Scripture, after which the *cursor Sententiarum* would lecture on the whole of Peter Lombard's text. This pattern would carry on over the course of the year. By the first quarter of the 14th century, the structure and personnel of these *studia* had become codified. The titular lector at the school denoted the friar who gave the ordinary lectures on the Bible and presided over *disputationes*.³⁶ Thus, if any of the works we find attributed to Berthold in the 16th-century catalogue of Albert de Castello relate to this lectorship, which include the *Expositio* and several other texts, it would be the *Summa theologiae*, whose existence, however, like several others listed in the catalogue entry, has been questioned by scholars.³⁷

In any event, it seems unlikely that the *Expositio* was directly related to Berthold's lectorship in Cologne. Although the *Expositio* touches upon topics that also belong to the domain of Christian theology (i.e., the Trinity, the Resurrection), these are treated in the text because Berthold believed that they fall within the purview of philosophical reason as such. As we see below, the order of "natural providence" presupposes and articulates a form of causality based on the principle that "the good is diffusive of itself and being" (*bonum est diffusivum sui et esse*) – in Berthold's view this principle necessarily requires a Trinitarian form of causality. Natural providence, moreover, extends so far as to include a notion of a natural, universal Resurrection that Berthold found propounded in the *Clavis physicae*, the 12th-century abridgement of John Scotus Eriugena's *Periphyseon*. Considerations of the authority of Scripture, the Incarnation, the sacraments, merit and punishment, all belong to a methodologically distinct domain identified as the order of "voluntary providence". Following Dietrich of Freiberg, in a significant phrase, Berthold stated that the latter was "the completion and consummation" of natural providence.³⁸ The

34 G. Löhr, *Die Kölner Dominikanerschule vom 14. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert* (Köln: Kölner Universitätsverlag Balduin Pick, 1948), p. 15.

35 Mulchaey, *First the Bow is Bent in Study*, p. 352–384.

36 Senner, *Johannes von Sternqassen*, vol. 1, p. 128.

37 See Introduction, section 2, n. 109–111, below.

38 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, ed. F. Retucci, 129F, p. 182, l. 299–302. The *Expositio* is cited according to the eight-volume critical edition in the *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi* (CPTMA): Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984); id., *Expositio super*

Expositio, then, if it fit anywhere into the curriculum of studies, would have been more suited to establish the foundational and preparatory science for the study of Christian theology, insofar as it articulates the divinely-infused nature that voluntary providence would presuppose. If there was a pedagogical purpose and intended audience for Berthold's *Expositio*, it would not have been students of general theology, but those progressing in the study of natural philosophy (*studium naturarum*).³⁹

The four dates (1335, 1343, 1353, and 1361) relating to the executorship of Bela Hardevust's will introduce us to the pastoral dimension of Berthold's life and vocation. As Humbert of Romans had put it, the care of souls was understood to be the goal of study itself: study is ordered to preaching, and preaching to the salvation of souls, which is the ultimate end (*studium enim est ordinatum ad praedicationem; praedicatio, ad animarum salutem, quae est ultimus finis*).⁴⁰ Berthold certainly remained occupied with these ultimate matters while the Dominicans were expelled from Cologne between 1346 and 1351, as we see in his identification as vicar to Bavaria in Nuremberg in 1348. Appointed by the provincial of Teutonia, a vicar was expected to travel widely and visit the priories and convents of the region.

Within this area was the famous community of Dominican nuns in Engelthal, which was a prolific centre of spiritual literature in its day.⁴¹ Traces

Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 14-34, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 35-65*, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66-107*, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108-135*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136-159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160-183*, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184-211*, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014).

39 In this respect, Berthold's project would hearken back to the efforts of the founder of Cologne's *studium generale*, Albert the Great. Albert's even more ambitious aim of commenting on the entire Aristotelian corpus, and supplying original treatises when any part was lacking from that purported whole, was undertaken in Cologne. Mulchahey (*First the Bow is Bent in Study*, p. 261–262) has made the compelling suggestion that the pedagogical purpose of these commentaries was to support the nascent curriculum in natural philosophy that was being encouraged by the Master General, Humbert of Romans.

40 Humbert of Romans, *Expositio magistri Humberti super constitutiones fratrum Praedicatorum*, ed. J.J. Berthier, *Opera de vita regulari*, 2 vols (Roma: Befani, 1888), vol. 2, p. 28.

41 See S. Ringer, *Viten- und Offenbarungsliteratur in Frauenklöstern des Mittelalters* (München / Zürich: Artemis-Verlag, 1980); L.P. Hindsley, *The Mystics of Engelthal. Writings from a Medieval Monastery* (London: Macmillan, 1998); S. Bürkle, *Literatur im Kloster. Historische*

of Berthold's pastoral activities can be found, even if the historical details cannot be so easily discerned, in three writings from this monastery that appear to describe related, or even the same, pastoral visit(s). First, there is the Engelthal sister-book attributed Christina Ebner (b. 1277 – d. 1356), which relates, through the lens of “the overburden of grace”, the history of the monastery and the exemplary lives and deaths of many holy women and men who belonged to the community, and which was written sometime between 1328 and 1346.⁴² Next are the so-called *Revelations* (*Offenbarungen*) of Adelheid Langmann (c. 1305 – 1375), which were written approximately between 1330 and 1350, and likely underwent further redaction.⁴³ Finally, there is the hagiographical biography or so-called *Gnadenvita* of Christina Ebner, a work that is still unpublished and whose intricate layers of composition and authorship are objects of ongoing research.⁴⁴

Philipp Strauch was the first to note the resemblance between the sister-book and *Offenbarungen* regarding the episode in question.⁴⁵ Amid a series of events datable to 1344 in the narrative, Adelheid recounted a mass celebrated by “brother Berthold of Moosburg”, during which she had a vision “with her bodily eye” of Christ standing “above the altar in his person” while the celebrant received the sacrament, but Christ did not see him and gave the final blessing himself.⁴⁶ In the Engelthal sister-book, Strauch observed, there is

Funktion und rhetorische Legitimation frauenmystischer Texte des 14. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: Francke, 1999); J. Thali, *Beten – Schreiben – Lesen. Literarisches Leben und Marienspiritualität im Kloster Engelthal* (Tübingen: Francke, 2003).

- 42 Christina Ebner, *Der Nonne von Engelthal Büchlein von der Gnaden Überlast*, ed. K. Schröder (Tübingen: Laupp, 1871).
- 43 Adelheid Langmann, *Die Offenbarungen der Adelheid Langmann, Klosterfrau zu Engelthal*, ed. P. Strauch (Strassburg: Trübner, 1878).
- 44 See U. Peters, *Religiöse Erfahrung als literarisches Faktum. Zur Vorgeschichte und Genese frauenmystischer Texte des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1988), p. 155–176; S. Bürkle, “Ebner, Christine”, in W. Köhlmann (ed.), *Killy Literaturlexikon*, vol. 3 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), p. 163b–165b.
- 45 Adelheid Langmann, *Die Offenbarungen*, ed. P. Strauch, p. 110. Willehad Eckert argued that the two passages were written independently of one another and dated them to approximately 1350. See Eckert, “Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik”, p. 124; id., “Berthold von Moosburg”, in K. Ruh et al. (eds), *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, vol. 1 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1978), p. 816–817, at p. 816.
- 46 Adelheid Langmann, *Die Offenbarungen*, p. 73, l. 13–17: *Ains mols do sprach ein prister mess, der hiez prueder Perhtolt von Mosburk. do sah si mit leiplichen augen do er ndern herren enpfink, daz under herre stunt ob dem altar in seiner person, und sah des pristers niht und er gab dem convent den seggen.* Bürkle, *Literatur im Kloster*, p. 119, interprets the text to say that Adelheid saw Christ standing before the altar, and that it was the celebrant himself who appeared to her *in persona Christi*.

also mention of a mass celebrated by one from Moosburg (*dez Mosburgers messe*), but here it was recorded as an event in the life of Anna of Weitersdorf, who has a vision of Christ as a 30-year-old man as she went on her way to the liturgy, for at that time “there was such abundant grace here”.⁴⁷ Siegfried Ringler then noticed striking similarities between this passage in the sister-book with another from the *Gnadenvita* of Christina Ebner and, most recently, Susanne Bürkle has made a thorough comparison of all three passages.⁴⁸ The *Gnadenvita* narrative recounts a mass celebrated by an anonymous master of learning (*lesmeyster*) in the octave after Epiphany, which was assisted by a large crowd, which included Anna of Weiterstorf. Several details in the narrative resemble those found in the Engelthal sister-book’s account of Anna’s life, but in the *Gnadenvita* her vision of the 30-year-old Christ was received during the liturgy, where he appeared standing at or upon the altar, and not while she made her way to the chapel. The account of the mass itself in the *Gnadenvita* is also more elaborate: the *lesmeyster* was so overcome that, during the *Confiteor*, instead of asking for the prayers of “you, sisters”, he referred to the sisters as “you, innocents”, implying that he presumed the efficacy of their prayers. Grace abounded, the narrator recalled, for everyone who heard that mass. The celebrant’s admiration for the sanctity he encountered in Engelthal carried over into a sermon preached in the early hours of the following morning, in which he announced that all sins had been forgiven, that all those present were regenerated as children of God, and that all lost time had been restored. Several months later, the same *lesmeyster* would visit Engelthal once again, this time for ten days during Ascensiontide. This stay brought such joy to the convent that the sisters composed a song in remembrance of the occasion that, when recited, brought its singers into an ecstasy.

The relationship between these three narratives is difficult to establish. Following the internal chronologies of the narratives themselves, Adelheid’s vision of Christ during the mass celebrated by Berthold would have occurred in the year 1344. Susanne Bürkle has indicated that, in terms of the sister-book’s account of events, the narrative context of *dez Mosburgers messe* would date it either to 1313/1318 or shortly before 1340. Bürkle has argued that the latter is the more likely.⁴⁹ The remarkable events recounted in the *Gnadenvita*, however, again according to Bürkle, must recall a much earlier time, probably in 1325,

47 Christina Ebner, *Büchlein von der Gnaden Überlast*, ed. K. Schröder, p. 28, l. 17–18.

48 Ringler, *Viten- und Offenbarungsliteratur*, p. 89; Bürkle, *Literatur im Kloster*, p. 121–122; J. Theben, *Die mystische Lyrik des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts. Untersuchungen – Texte – Repertorium* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), p. 91–92.

49 For what follows, see Bürkle, *Literatur im Kloster*, p. 123–127.

for they are recounted amid a series of episodes that can be dated between 1324 and 1328. As historical evidence these internal chronologies cannot count for much, since one must yet take into account complicated questions concerning the literary character of these works: the order in which the narratives themselves were written, their interdependence, and the presence of later embellishments (*Legendarisierung*) that are typically found in such literature. Siegfried Ringler, following the narrative chronology more closely, maintained the priority of the *Gnadenvita* relative to the other two texts, with the sister-book and Adelheid's *Offenbarungen* following each other in close succession. In this view, the later texts would have distilled the *Gnadenvita*'s lengthier narrative of the events to focus on their impact on individual sisters in the convent and to name the *lesmeyer*. According to Susanne Bürkle, this is "not implausible" as far as the variants surrounding *dez Mosburgers messe* are concerned. However, having taken a broader and comparative approach to other passages from the prologue of the *Gnadenvita*, where she observes that the prologue used materials already circulating in Engelthal as its foils, Bürkle argues that the sister-book narrative was likely the earliest composition. If so, the *lesmeyer* episode could be regarded as an elaboration of this earlier event, and as such would exhibit literary techniques typical of the writings from Engelthal and other communities of religious women in the 14th century, in which a historical figure (such as Berthold of Moosburg) is reduced to his office (*lesmeyer*) as the event is creatively transformed into legend. Despite their divergent views about the ordering of these narratives, Ringler and Bürkle concur that all three passages stem from a single historical event: sometime in the 1320s or 1340s, Berthold of Moosburg visited Engelthal, celebrated mass, and preached.

For our purposes, it is enough to include these narratives and the questions raised by them without deciding in favour of one scholarly hypothesis or another. Even if these narratives relate to separate visits, which has not been ruled out,⁵⁰ what they tell us is that Berthold's pastoral responsibilities associated him with this important centre of mystical literature in his native region, and that his relationship with the convent made a remarkable impression in the communal memory of Engelthal and finally was assimilated to an extraordinary period treasured from its history. The dating of these events also suggests that Berthold's association with the monastery preceded the mention of his vicariate in 1348. Perhaps his relations with the community began around the time of his lectorship in Regensburg attested in 1327, or even earlier. We may note in passing that Henry of Ekkewint, the prior of the Regensburg convent

50 Thali, *Beten – Schreiben – Lesen*, p. 83.

from 1321 to 1326, was also known to the community at Engelthal, where his sermons were being read.⁵¹

After Berthold's resignation of his executorship of Hardevust's will in 1361 in Cologne, likely due to his age, we have no further documentation about his activity. Not long after this, in 1363, some of his library, which seems to have been bequeathed to Heilig Kreuz, began to disperse. And so, from the formation and the pedagogical and pastoral activities of this son of Dominic, we turn now to reconstruct what we can of Berthold's library, following, as far as we are able, the chronology of his life and career.

2 Toward a Reconstruction of Berthold's Library

A manuscript used by Berthold early in his career, as can be established with a high degree of certainty, was his copy of Macrobius' *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, preserved now in MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31 (henceforth B), f. 1r-44r.⁵² The text of Macrobius is accompanied by numerous glosses written in different inks. Among the vast majority that was written in a darker ink is a gloss that refers to *frater* Thomas Aquinas, which would date the glosses prior to 1323, the year of Aquinas' canonisation.⁵³ We will see that several other manuscripts used by Berthold can be dated to the same period, insofar as they either seem to have been used for the composition of these glosses or were

51 Bürkle, *Literatur im Kloster*, p. 105–118; Thali, *Beten – Schreiben – Lesen*, p. 43. Henry of Ekkewint is named in the *Gnadenvita* of Christina Ebner and a document from Engelthal in 1323.

52 This section presupposes what remains the indispensable study of Berthold's library in Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xxiii–lix. It will provide more details about some of Berthold's marginalia, take into account more recent scholarship, and propose different conclusions about what Berthold's library tells us about the dating of the *Expositio*. On MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, see Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xxiv–xlii; id., *Dokumente und Forschungen*, p. 73–76; Boese, *Wilhelm von Moerbeke*, p. 76–77. The *ex libris* of Berthold, whose name is visible after erasure, appears on the final folio of Macrobius' *In Somnium Scipionis* (f. 44r): *Iste liber est fratis* [Bertholdi de Mosburch] *ordinis Praedicatorum provinciae Theutoniae*.

53 *In Somn. Scip.*, I.21.6, f. 25v: *CONSTAT ENIM NVLLAM INTER EAS CELERIVS CETERIS TARDIVSQUE PROCEDERE. Nota omnes planetas esse eiusdem velocitatis, secundum auctorem. Idem videtur sentire Boethius in Musica, libro I, cap. 2, ubi dicit: 'Namque alii excelsiores, alii inferiores feruntur atque in omnes aequali incitatione volvuntur, ut per dispares inaequalitates ratus cursuum ordo ducatur.' Sed frater Thomas super II De caelo et mundo arguit oppositum. Quod expresse concluditur de sole, Venere et Mercurio, quorum idem est tempus medium.*

copied by the same scribe responsible for the text of Macrobius. As for the content of glosses, Irene Caiazzo has shown that many of them are copied from a commentary on Macrobius that circulated anonymously, but which scholars have attributed to William of Conches.⁵⁴ Berthold sometimes modified these glosses, as in the case of the *accessus* (see table, below), and added many more of his own.

After the *Elementatio theologica*, which was cited ten times in the glosses, the text cited most frequently was the *De musica* of Boethius, in glosses clustered at beginning of Book II of Macrobius' *Commentary* (27v, 28r, 28v, 29r, 30v, 31r, 31v, 32v). Other authorities mentioned include Albert the Great (*De caelo*: 22r; *De natura loci*: 32r, 33r; *Meteora*: 35r), Al-Farghani (19r, 19v, 25r, 32r), Apuleius (12v), Aquinas (*De caelo*: 25v), Aristotle (22r, 39r, 40v, 41r), Averroes (13v), Avicenna (17r), Boethius (5r, 6v, 13r, 17v), Cicero (3r, 4r, 18r, 32r), Geber (32r), "Gregory of Nyssa" or Nemesius (40v), Homer (5v), Isidore (30v), the *Liber de causis* (17r), Moses Maimonides (27v), Ovid (15r), Plato (3r, 4v, 18r), Plotinus (38r), Porphyry (5v), Ptolemy (25r, 32r), Pythagoras (6r, 6v, 9r), Robert Grosseteste (*De sphaera*: 32r), Thabit ibn Qurra (19v, 25r, 30v, 32r), Valerius Maximus (3v), and Virgil (5v, 6r, 11v, 13v, 32r). Berthold also referred to Dietrich of Freiberg's *De entium universitate*, a treatise that is no longer extant but is attested in the early catalogues.⁵⁵

The following table contains all of Berthold's glosses that mention Proclus or the *Elementatio theologica*. Its columns indicate the text from Macrobius being commented upon, then Berthold's gloss, and finally any passages in the *Expositio* where the same passage from Macrobius was cited.

Most of these glosses cluster around *In Somn. Scip.*, I.14.6-9, where Macrobius explained what Cicero meant when he wrote that "minds [*animi*] have been given to human beings from those eternal fires", and thus in what sense human beings have mind in common with the stars. To do this, Macrobius set out an

54 See I. Caiazzo, "Mains célèbres dans les marges des *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* de Macrobie", in D. Jacquart, C. Burnett (eds), *Scientia in margine. Études sur les marginalia dans les manuscrits scientifiques du Moyen Âge à la Renaissance* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 2005), p. 171-189, who observes (p. 179) that Berthold used what is known today as the *versio longior* of the glosses, and either had access to a better witness of it than any extant copy or corrected the text himself. A partial edition of the glosses can be found in H. Rodnite, *The Doctrine of the Trinity in William of Conches' Glosses on Macrobius. Texts and Studies*, PhD diss. (Columbia University, 1972).

55 *In Somn. Scip.*, I.17.5, f. 20r: QVOD QVIDEM TO PAN, ID EST OMNE, DIXERVNT. *Pan enim non est aliud quam mundus ipse; nota de ratione universitatis ex tractatu magistri Theoderici qui intitlatur De entium universitate*. For the catalogues, see Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen*, p. 130-134. For this gloss, see figure 2, below.

TABLE 1 Berthold of Moosburg's Proclean glosses on Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis*

Macrobius, <i>In Somnium Scipionis</i>	Gloss	<i>Expositio</i>
<i>Accessus</i>	(f. 3r) Titulus talis est: Macrobi Ambrosii oriniocensis <i>In Sompnium Scipionis</i> commentum incipit. Macrobius dictus est quasi longa via [sic], utpote quia a celo incipiens usque ad terram extendit, et de ea etiam tractavit; sic vocatus est a macros, quod est longum, et bios, quod est via. Ambrosius autem nuncupatus est quasi deorum cibus, quia ambrosia est quedam herba, que in sacrificiis deorum apponi solebat, quasi cibus deorum sic appellata. Contraxit autem hoc nomen ab eventu, quia de immortalitate deorum et animarum, quod est quasi cibus eorumdem tractavit; quilibet enim spiritus ab antiquis, et maxime causalia entium principia, ut patet in <i>Elementatione theologica</i> , appellati sunt dii. [...]	Cf. 176C, p. 163, l. 206 – p. 164, l. 218 ^a
(I.9.1) Animarum originem manare de celo	(f. 13r) Proclus in <i>Elementatione theologica</i> 206 propositione et usque ad finem prosequitur istam materiam.	206F, p. 223, l. 245
(I.12.6) Et hec est essentia quam individuum eandem que dividuam Plato in <i>Thimeo</i>	(f. 15v) Quia secundum 190 elementum <i>Elementationis theologice</i> omnis anima media est impartibilium et specierum circa corpus partitarum.	193E, p. 103, l. 121–123
(I.14.6) Deus, qui primus causa est et vocatur	(f. 17r) Per 11 Procli.	Cf. 22C, p. 103, l. 190– 193; 157B, p. 178, l. 41–47

TABLE 1 Berthold of Moosburg's Proclean glosses on Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* (cont.)

Macrobius, <i>In Somnium Scipionis</i>	Gloss	<i>Expositio</i>
(I.14.6) Qua parte Patrem inspicit, plenam similitudinem* servat auctoris, animam vero de se creat posteriora respiciens	(f. 17r) Nota processum intelligentiarum et animarum celorum et orbium ex Avicenna, que positio tamen rudis est in comparatione dictis Procli in sua <i>Elementatione theologica</i> . *De hoc Avicenna <i>sup. lin. manu Bertholdi</i>	Cf. 20A, p. 67, l. 99
(I.14.7) Habet ergo et purissimam ex mente, de qua nata est, rationem	(f. 17r) Omnis enim, secundum Proclum, anima ab intellectu proxime subsistit.	207E, p. 229, l. 151 – p. 230, l. 188
(I.14.7) Quod logycon vocatur	(f. 17r) Quia anima est divina, intellectualis et animalis ex Proclo et 3 propositione <i>De causis</i> .	
(I.14.7) Sed ex his primum [...] sunt caducis	(f. 17r) Nota ex Proclo et <i>De causis</i> tria esse genera animarum: quedam enim sunt divine et intellectuales, quedam intellectuales non divine, quedam animales tantum.	
(I.14.8) Sapientes de Deo HWYH nominant ex illo mero ac purissimo fonte mentis	(f. 17v) Nota de hoc Proclum 180 propositione.	
(I.14.9) Immo partem eius vix solis humanis corporibus convenire	(f. 17v) Et ideo anima humana in Proclo vocatur partialis (<i>partialia cod.</i>) circa finem libri.	

^a Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 27–30.

account of procession, describing how the hypostases of Intellect, Soul, and Body arise sequentially from God.⁵⁶

According to Macrobius, God, the first cause (here Berthold noted Proposition 11 of the *Elementatio*), produces Intellect from himself with the overflowing fecundity of his power. This Intellect retains a perfect likeness of its cause or father as long as it contemplates him (here Berthold compared Avicenna and Proclus) but produces Soul when it turns to what comes after it. Soul in turn is filled by its own father as long as it contemplates him (Berthold commented [f. 17r]: as long as “it is noble”), but degenerates to produce bodies when it turns away. Therefore, the rational part of Soul (*logikon*) derives from Intellect (here Berthold noted Proposition 193 of the *Elementatio*), but its sensitive (*aisthetikon*) and nutritive (*phytikon*) parts come from itself (Berthold noted Proposition 201 of Proclus and Proposition 3 of the *Liber de causis*). The rational part of the soul is joined with the divine, but the lower parts are bound to mortality (here Berthold noted Proposition 184 of the *Elementatio* and the *Liber de causis* on the three kinds of soul, perhaps thinking again of Proposition 3). When Soul creates bodies, it begins from the purest contemplation of Intellect it had from its birth, and thus produces the heavenly bodies and endows them with mind (here Berthold cited Proposition 180, where Proclus explained how every intellect is a whole but each in a different way: the unparticipated Intellect is an unqualified whole, while every partial intellect is a whole-in-parts). For Macrobius, Soul’s power degenerates as it inclines further toward the earth and finds that the mortal realm is incapable of bearing the pure divinity of Intellect. Ultimately, only the human body can receive the rational power. Here Berthold focused on the word “part” and associated it with the propositions “around the end of the book” of the *Elementatio*, where Proclus called the human soul a “partial” soul.

These glosses offer some precious hints about Berthold’s attitude toward the relation between Christianity and pagan philosophy at this stage of his career. He scorned the attempts of certain interpreters to identify the hypostases of God, Intellect, and Soul with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, when he felt it was clear that the philosophers – not just Macrobius – were referring to God and a plurality of separate intelligences and heavenly souls.⁵⁷ In this he was almost

56 For a translation and analysis of this passage, see S. Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition*, 2 vols (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), vol. 2, p. 526–527. For some of the marginalia, see figure 1, below.

57 See *In Somn. Scip.*, I.14.6, f. 17r: HEC MENS QVOD NOYS VOCATVR. *Nota quidam (quosdam cod.) mentem apud philosophos a Deo creatam dicunt esse Filium seu Verbum Dei a Patre genitum, et anima<m> ab utroque manantem esse omne [?] Spiritum Sanctum, quod tamen derisorium est, sicut ex intentione eorum in libris suis theologicis patet, loquebantur enim de Deo, de intelligentiis, de animabus celorum.*

certainly inspired by William of Conches' criticism, found in the Chartrian's glosses on the same passage (*In Somn. Scip.* 1.14.6), of those interpreters who draw the parallel so directly that they endorse the heresy of subordinationism. Berthold's judgement, however, made no exception even for William's own proposal, which was to substitute *genuit* and *mittit* for Macrobius' *creavit* and *creat* to make the analogy more acceptable.⁵⁸ Now, it is true that in the *Expositio* Berthold will appeal to the Hermetica (*Asclepius*, the *Liber xxiv philosophorum*) and to Patristic testimony (Augustine, ps.-Augustine or Quodvultdeus) for evidence of Trinitarian doctrine among the ancient pagan theologians and Platonists.⁵⁹ But such intimations and achievements were not his concern here. His criticism in the glosses was not intended to define the boundaries of paganism and Christianity, but to safeguard the existence of the plurality of intelligences and heavenly souls as they were posited by the philosophers (*loquebantur enim de Deo, de intelligentiis, de animabus celorum*) and, thus, the integrity of what he will come to call natural providence (*providentia naturalis*). The assimilation of the three hypostases of the philosophers to the persons of the Trinity would undermine the entire edifice of mediation that Berthold regarded as essential to philosophical cosmology. Berthold's Trinitarianism in the *Expositio* was guided by precisely the same concern: God, the gods (or primordial causes), the intelligences, and heavenly souls must be Trinitarian principles, because this interior dynamism (of persons in God and of activities in the separate substances) is what accounts both for their causal fecundity and, accordingly, the continuity of procession. Rather than resolving all ranks of creatures into their Trinitarian principle, Berthold would identify each separate substance as an expressed image of the Trinity. These principles,

58 MS Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. lat. 1140, f. 80r-v: HIC, *id est Deus, CREAVIT ex se MENTEM. Si dixisset 'genuit', bene dixisset, sed hoc verbum 'creavit' hereticum est. Forsitan autem 'creavit' posuit pro 'genuit'. Mens [causa] Dei et Filius ab ipso genitus est. Mentem enim divinam in hoc loco vocat Dei Filium qui est secunda persona in Trinitate, ut iam apparebit in sequentibus in ipsis verbis. [...] ANIMAM VERO. Sic habemus de creatore ipso qui Pater est nec creatus nec genitus. Ergo subiungit de anima mundi que secundum quosdam est Spiritus Sanctus ex utroque procedens, qui omnia in mundo movet et vivificat [...]. DE SE CREAT. <Si> (secundum cod.) hoc dicatur de Spiritu Sancto, hereticum est quod creat. Non enim ex se creat Spiritum Sanctum, sed mittit. Sed forsitan ponit 'creare' pro 'mittere'. This manuscript contains a 15th-century copy of the *versio longior* of William's Macrobius glosses. See É. Jeauneau, "Gloses de Guillaume de Conches sur Macrobe. Note sur les manuscrits", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 27 (1960), p. 17–28; I. Caiazzo, *Lectures médiévales de Macrobe. Les Glosae Colonienses super Macrobius* (Paris: Vrin, 2002), p. 65–67.*

59 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40C, p. 39, l. 127 – p. 42, l. 234; 131B, p. 191, l. 46 – p. 194, l. 117. See 1.1 and 4.3, below.

in his view, can be most accurately understood only once one has read “the theological books” of the philosophers and interpreted them on their own terms.

These glosses on Macrobius exhibit Berthold's facility with the *Elementatio theologica* and the *Liber de causis*. They also display a certain concordism in his approach to philosophical cosmology, as when he noted basic agreements between the philosophers – Macrobius, Avicenna, Proclus, and the *Liber de causis* – concerning the four major *genera* of the universe (God, Intellect, Soul, Body). By the time we reach the *Expositio*, however, we will see a very different account of the history of philosophy that would have us separate this group into two camps. We may note that this outlook is anticipated here in one gloss, where Berthold unfavourably compared Avicenna's account of procession with that of Proclus (*rudis est in comparatione dictis Procli*).⁶⁰

The content of these glosses exerted a limited influence on the Proclus commentary. Looking to the right column of the table we find only one reference to the *Elementatio theologica* in the glosses (1.9.1-3) that matches a citation of the same passage of Macrobius in the *Expositio* (206F). Three additional non-Proclean parallels may be noted: (1) a citation of the *In Somn. Scip.*, 1.12.6, in 193E that is followed by a reference to Proposition 190 of the *Elementatio*, which was also cited in the gloss to that passage in Macrobius (15v);⁶¹ (2) a quotation from Ovid's *Metamorphoses* is included in 206E as part of a lengthy series of citations from Macrobius (1.12.1-8) and appears next to the same passage in the manuscript (f. 15r), but in the *Expositio* the quotation is longer;⁶² (3) a description of *mundus* attributed to Apuleius in a gloss on *In Somn. Scip.*, 1.8.4 (the world is “the ordered collection of elements with their adornment”), which does not correspond precisely to any passage from that writer, matches a citation of Apuleius in 164D of the *Expositio*, included in a list of various

60 This remark looks ahead to Berthold's comparison of “Peripatetic” and “Platonic” accounts of procession in his commentary on Proposition 5 of the *Elementatio theologica*. On this, see 4.2, below. Berthold may also have had in mind Proclus' elaborate account of mediation between cosmic series in Propositions 108-112 of the *Elements*.

61 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 193E, p. 103, l. 121-123: *Unde et Macrobius loquens de anima sic dicit: 'Et hoc est essentia, quam individuum eandemque dividuam – Plato in Timaeo' 'expressit', unde et media est impartibilium et partibilium per 190.*

62 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206E, p. 221, l. 178-183. The gloss (*In Somn. Scip.*, 1.12.1, f. 15r): DESCENSVS VERO IPSIVS, QVO ANIMA DE CELO IN HVIVS VITE INFERRA DELABITVR, SIC ORDO DIGERITVR. ZODIACVM ITA LACTEVS CIRCVLVS OBLIQUE CIRCVMFLEXIONIS OCCVRSV AMBIENDO COMPLECTITVR, VT EVM QVA DVO TROPICA SIGNA CAPRICORNVS ET CANCER FERVTVR INTERSECET. HAS SOLIS PORTAS PHYSICI VOCAERVNT. *Ovidius, 11 Metamorphoseos dicit quod 'biformes valve cingebant regiam solis', volens per illas valvas significare Cancrum et Capricornum.*

meanings of the word *mundus*;⁶³ in this case, the definition and attribution in fact derived from William of Conches' glosses on Macrobius.⁶⁴

It is nevertheless reasonable to suppose that Berthold continued to use this copy of Macrobius or one very similar to it while writing the *Expositio*, though this does not mean that every citation of Macrobius in the commentary must be corrected against the text of the Basel manuscript, as it has been in the critical edition, since many of Berthold's citations in fact depended on Thomas of York's *Sapientiale*.⁶⁵ After we set aside the citations deriving from Thomas, those that remain reflect the corrections or interlinear glosses we find in Berthold's hand in the manuscript.⁶⁶ Sometimes the text of Macrobius quoted in the *Expositio* differs from Basel, with no changes indicated in the manuscript, but none of these instances is so drastic that it could not reflect an *ad hoc* correction, elaboration, or scribal error.⁶⁷ This suggests either that the

63 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 164E, p. 34, l. 91–92: *dicatur mundus secundum Apuleium ordinata collectio elementorum cum ornatu eorumdem*. The gloss (*In Somn. Scip.*, 1.8.4, f. 12v): *PRVDENTIE VERO MVNDVM ISTVM ET OMNIA QVE MVNDO INSVNT DIVINORVM CONTEMPLATIONE DESPICERE*. *Apuleius: mundus <est> ordinata elementorum collectio cum ornatu eorumdem*. Cf. Apuleius, *De mundo*, ed. C. Moreschini, *Apulei opera quae supersunt. Vol. III. De philosophia libri* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1991), p. 148, l. 5–6: *mundus est ornata ordinatio dei munere, deorum recta custodia*.

64 See William of Conches, *Glosae super Platonem*, ed. É. Jeaneau (Paris: Vrin, 1965), p. 103, n. A. Here Jeaneau refers to MS Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. lat. 1140, f. 59v.

65 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 6B (*Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 3 and lib. VII, c. 2); 9B (1.6); 10A (v.21); 12C (v.21); 18A (1.6); 23E (1.20); 23I (v.16); 136A (1.6); 146L (v.21); 151A (1.14); 166G (VII.12); 176B (1.27); 176C (1.28); 184A (VII.15); 190B (VII.18); 199B (VII.6).

66 Corrections in B match citations in the *Expositio*: Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 14I (p. 12, l. 340=41r: *nisi*] *in* B); 17A (p. 33, l. 17=38v: *nec*] *ne* B); 17A (p. 34, l. 55=43v: *occasumque*] *occasuque* B); 17B (p. 35, l. 65=40r: *mouet*] *movetur* B); 17B (p. 35, l. 71=40r: *non*] *nec* B); 17B (p. 35, l. 94=40r: *exerces*] *exiret* B); 17B (p. 36, l. 108=40v: *audere*] *audire* B); 179A / 190A (p. 201, l. 61 / p. 79, l. 93=29v: *deinde*] *de* B); 179A / 190A (p. 202, l. 63 / p. 79, l. 94=29v: *mundo*] *modo* B); 206E (p. 221, l. 193=15v: *enim*). One exception: the correction at f. 42r (*actore*] *auctore* corr. sup. lin. manu Bertholdi) was not carried over in 17B (p. 36, l. 124).

Interlinear glosses in B also found in *Expositio*: 100I (p. 208, l. 169–171=4v: *togathon, id est summus. protopanton, id est primus sive princeps omnium*); in 151A, where Berthold used the *Sapientiale* for the same passage from Macrobius, he did not include this gloss. A gloss added by Berthold in the manuscript (f. 17r: *estheticon, id est sensualitas*) is found in his citation of Macrobius at 207E; however, just two words later, the *Expositio* has *phyticon, id est generatio*, which differs from the gloss (*vegetatio*).

Transliterations of Greek words in B also found in *Expositio*: 14I (p. 12, l. 311=40v: *antokineton*); 14I (p. 12, l. 325=41r: *antokineti*); 190A (p. 78, l. 61=9r: *thetrasim*); 206E (p. 221, l. 187=15r: *tirociniā*).

67 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 17A (p. 33, l. 23–24: *moveant*] *moveat* B); 17A (p. 34, l. 29: *de*] *ex* B); 179A (p. 201, l. 56: *sequitur*] *sequeretur* B); 190A (p. 78, l. 63: *etiam*] *et* B); 190A

Basel manuscript was Berthold's personal copy of Macrobius, which he corrected when a better text was at hand, or that he eventually stopped using the Basel copy when a better text came into his possession. Evidence in favour of the first possibility includes the parallels in Basel and the *Expositio* that diverge from variants in the apparatus of James Willis' edition.⁶⁸ Furthermore, some citations of Macrobius in the *Expositio* were introduced with a remark resembling a corresponding marginal note in the Basel manuscript.⁶⁹ Finally, there are Berthold's other interventions in the manuscript, such as the enumerations of arguments in the margins, trefoils, and interlinear divisions of the text, which sometimes correspond to citations in the *Expositio*.⁷⁰

The same Basel manuscript also contains Berthold's copies of Proclus' *Tria opuscula* (f. 46r-59r: *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*; f. 59v-68v: *De providentia et fato*; f. 70r-82va: *De malorum subsistentia*) and Proclus'

(p. 78, l. 66: *epyneticon*] *epymeticon* B); 190A (p. 78, l. 80: *hoc*] *hos* B); 206D (p. 220, l. 155: *rationem*] *ratiocinationem* B). In 206E, the critical edition follows B, although the Oxford and Vatican manuscripts share the same readings (p. 221, l. 173: *dirigitur*] *digeritur* B); (p. 221, l. 195: *materiae*] *modo* B); (p. 221, l. 198: *vocavit*] *notavit* B). The citation at 207E differs from B (p. 230, l. 185: *credique*] *crescendique* B), but Berthold then paraphrases the passage with *crescendi* instead of *credi* (p. 230, l. 193).

68 Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970). Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 132E (p. 203, l. 115–119: *ad unum meando*] *ad imum meandi* Willis), however (*expressius*] *pressius* B); 190A (p. 78, l. 71: *creata*] *generata* Willis); 190A (p. 79, l. 93–94: *competentiam*] *concordiam* Willis), but cf. 179A (p. 202, l. 63: *concordiam*); 190A (p. 79, l. 97: *hoc*] *quo* Willis); 190A (p. 79, l. 98: *quem*] *hoc quod* Willis); 206D (p. 220, l. 156: *theoricon*] *theoreticon* Willis); 206D (p. 220, l. 163: *animal*] *animalis* Willis); 206D (p. 220, l. 165: *arcae sita*] *arcessita* Willis); 206D (p. 220, l. 166: *hoc*] *haec* Willis). When the word order in B varies from the manuscripts considered by Willis, the *Expositio* follows B: e.g., 17B (p. 35, l. 100), 179A (p. 201, l. 48; p. 203, l. 124); 190A (p. 79, l. 100); 206D (p. 220, l. 162–163); 206E (p. 221, l. 185). Some variants are identical in both manuscripts of the *Expositio* and in B, but do not appear in the critical edition: 179A (p. 203, l. 120–121: *Diocles*] *et add. O V B*); 179A (p. 203, l. 121: *septem*] *septimos O V B*); 179A (p. 203, l. 124: *quiddam*] *quoddam O V B*).

69 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 17A, p. 33, l. 13–16: *sicut recitat Macrobius Super Somnium Scipionis libro II circa finem et colligitur ex verbis Tullii Ciceronis I libro Tusculanarum quaestionum extractis ex Phaedrone Platonis, ubi disputant de animae immortalitate*; cf. *In Somn. Scip.*, II.13.1, f. 38v: NAM QVOD SEMPER MOVETVR. Hic incipit loqui de anima et eius immortalitate. See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 199E, p. 159, l. 250–253: *Macrobius enim libro II inducens Plotinum sic inquit [...]*; cf. *In Somn. Scip.*, II.12.8, f. 38r: IN HOC ERGO LIBRO PLOTINVS. Nota commendationem Plotini cum titulo libri sui.

70 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 17B (p. 34, l. 57–62: 39r); 17B (p. 34, l. 63 – p. 35, l. 99: 40r). Beside the passage quoted at 132E (see n. 68, above), Berthold wrote in B (*In Somn. Scip.*, I.14.15, f. 17v): *Nota de chathena aurea*. Similarly, he cited Macrobius on the world soul at 190A (p. 78, l. 68–78), and in B (*In Somn. Scip.*, I.6.45–46, f. 9v): *Nota de anima mundi*.

Elementatio physica (f. 82vb-84ra).⁷¹ The corrections and glosses to the *Opuscula* were made by Berthold, as was the copy of the *Elementatio physica*, at least up to Proposition 5. Even though Berthold's *ex libris* appears only after Macrobius (44r), and we know that that manuscript itself was probably bound in its current form only in the late 14th century, it has been argued convincingly by Loris Sturlese that the texts of Macrobius and the *Opuscula* were in fact copied at approximately the same time: a fragment of the beginning of *De decem dubitationibus*, found at the end of the manuscript (85r-v), which is part of the same quire beginning at 80r, appears to have been copied by the same scribe responsible for the Macrobius text and for the anonymous fragment on optics at 45r-v.⁷²

There are some clues about the chronology of Berthold's use of these texts. Throughout this copy of the *Tria opuscula*, we find Berthold using sequences of dots and Arabic numerals, written above the line, that clarify the word order and sense of William of Moerbeke's *verbum de verbo* translation from the Greek. One would hardly expect this of a reader already familiar with its contents. When Berthold was reading these texts, he was studying them seriously for the first time. These interventions therefore offer us a precious window onto Berthold's process of discovery as he made his way through this new Proclean material. Given the importance of Proclus' *De malorum subsistentia* for Berthold's *Expositio* on Proposition 206 (on the doctrine of the soul's cyclical descent and re-ascent), where he will combine Proclus' doctrine with passages from Macrobius on several points, it is intriguing that the *Tria opuscula* were never mentioned in the glosses on the *In Somnium Scipionis*, even though the *Elementatio* and Proposition 206 are. This suggests that Berthold studied the *Tria opuscula* sometime after completing the glosses on Macrobius.

In the manuscript of the *Opuscula*, compared to *In Somnium Scipionis*, one finds more corrections and interventions in the text but far fewer marginal glosses or references to other authorities. Apart from the *Elementatio*

71 Proclus, *Tria opuscula* (*De providentia, libertate, malo*). *Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeke vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta*, ed. H. Boese (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960); Proclus, *Elementatio physica*, ed. H. Boese, *Die mittelalterliche Übersetzung der Stoeicheiosis physike des Proclus* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1958). Also in the manuscript are four remedies written in Berthold's hand (44v), an anonymous fragment on optics (45r-b), and the fragment identified by Loris Sturlese as Dietrich of Freiberg's *De subiecto theologiae*, copied by Berthold (69v). The fragment on optics is edited in Sturlese, "Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P.," p. 254–256. The fragment *De subiecto theologiae* is edited by Loris Sturlese in Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia*, vol. 3. *Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, eds J.-D. Caviglioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), p. 277–282.

72 Sturlese, "Introduzione," p. xxxiv–xxxv and xxxviii–xl.

theologica, which Berthold cited 17 times and with the same proficiency we find in the Macrobius glosses, only Plato (52v), Pythagoras (58r), Aristotle (60r), and the Manichaeans (78v) are mentioned in the *Opuscula* manuscript. Berthold's glosses that mention the *Elementatio* are listed in the following table (asterisks indicate interlinear references to the text in Berthold's hand). The third column does not list all citations of the relevant passage from the *Opuscula* in the *Expositio*, which are often numerous, but only those cases where the specific proposition noted in the gloss and the proposition containing the citation of the *Opuscula* in the later commentary correspond.

Four of these 17 references to the *Elementatio theologica* directly correspond to citations of the *Opuscula* in the *Expositio*, with one additional, though more distant, parallel (120H). Apart from these, there are many trefoils,⁷³ manicules,⁷⁴ and other *notabilia*⁷⁵ corresponding to passages cited in the *Expositio*. These correspondences range throughout the *Expositio* but are, of course, clustered around the propositions where one would expect to find them, on the gods and their providence. They cannot, therefore, readily provide clues as to the order in which Berthold wrote his *Expositio*. They do, however, suggest that he continued to use this copy when composing his commentary. The variants in the manuscript, as well as Berthold's corrections, match what we find in

-
- 73 E.g., Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prologus* 17 (p. 26, l. 702 – p. 27, l. 719) and 197G (p. 136, l. 139 – p. 137, l. 172=64ra-b); 1F (p. 79, l. 283–293=48ra); 13C (p. 214, l. 174–176=70vb); 48A (p. 95, l. 41–48=61vb); 62A (p. 181, l. 17–27=49va); 63E (p. 189, l. 102 – p. 190, l. 119=71rb); 88A (p. 147, l. 43–48) and 124B (p. 141, l. 86–90=46vb); 102H (p. 221, l. 137–155), 121K (p. 109, l. 148 – p. 110, l. 170), 170G (p. 101, l. 223–237), and 197H (p. 138, l. 188–206=47ra); 102I (p. 221, l. 170 – p. 222, l. 171=49rb); 120G (p. 102, l. 363–372=46va); 121H (p. 108, l. 121–125=48ra); 122B (p. 116, l. 72–81=48vb); 122D (p. 117, l. 116–121=49rb); 122E (p. 118, l. 127 – p. 119, l. 161=49rb-vb); 124E (p. 114, l. 191–198=47rb); 124F (p. 144, l. 207 – p. 145, l. 220=47rb); 141E (p. 50, l. 165–178=49rb); 142C (p. 56, l. 120–127=49ra); 143F (p. 64, l. 146–161=79vb–80ra); 143F (p. 65, l. 185–199=81vb); 143F (p. 65, l. 200 – p. 66, l. 207=82va); 164A (p. 31, l. 16–19) and 186G (p. 38, l. 293 – p. 39, l. 201=61vb); 206C (p. 218, l. 78–89=74va).
- 74 E.g., Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 6 (p. 13, l. 268–277), 26H (p. 158, l. 202 – p. 159, l. 213), and 161C (p. 12, l. 46–52=72vb–73ra); *Prol.* 15 (p. 23, l. 584–587), 20H (p. 71, l. 245 – p. 72, l. 249), 120H (p. 102, l. 383 – p. 103, l. 396), 188E (p. 65, l. 227–230), and 193E (p. 103, l. 130 – p. 104, l. 132=59ra); *Prol.* 18 (p. 27, l. 719–726), 114B (p. 44, l. 135–140), 121M (p. 111, l. 209–215), and 129B (p. 178, l. 167–177=64rb).
- 75 E.g., Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expositio tituli* B (p. 38, l. 49 – p. 39, l. 67), 44C (p. 75, l. 80 – p. 76, l. 111), and 185L (p. 26, l. 413 – p. 27, l. 435=62ra-b); 93B (p. 168, l. 57–67=47vb); 122F (p. 119, l. 163–190=50rb); 124D (p. 143, l. 138–150) and 127B (p. 162, l. 58 – p. 163, l. 62=46rb); 143C (p. 61, l. 45–58=80va); 143C (p. 62, l. 79–109=81va-b); 143F (p. 66, l. 209–214=72ra); 164D (p. 32, l. 58–59=79rb); 170M (p. 105, l. 363–374) and 180O (p. 219, l. 257 – p. 220, l. 266=46rb); 185H (p. 24, l. 350–355) and 206F (p. 223, l. 254–260=75ra); 185L (p. 27, l. 436 – p. 28, l. 455=62rb–62va); 206D (p. 220, l. 132–139=74rb).

TABLE 2 Berthold of Moosburg's Proclean glosses on Proclus, *Tria opuscula*

Proclus, <i>Tria opuscula</i>	Gloss	<i>Expositio</i>
(<i>De decem dub.</i> , 1.3) Hec quidem simul omnium et simpliciter	(f. 46rb) De hoc habemus in <i>Elementatione theologica</i> 170 propositione.	170M, p. 105, l. 363-374
(<i>De decem dub.</i> , 3.9) Quomodo discerneret in cognitione	(f. 47va) Eodem 176 propositione in commento.	
(<i>De decem dub.</i> , 3.11) Que ante ipsum* finitum	(f. 47vb) *Per 93	93D, p. 169, l. 98-102
(<i>De decem dub.</i> , 5.27) Que enim ex hiis que ab ipsa, et ab ipsa	(f. 51ra) Per 56.	
(<i>De decem dub.</i> , 10.62) Quod utique diis existentiam characterizare dicimus*	(f. 58va) *Per 120	Cf. 120H, p. 102, l. 374-381
(<i>De decem dub.</i> , 10.63) Omnis equidem deus, ut dictum est a me etiam prius,* secundum le unum habet** esse deus, quod utique ante intellectum*** dicimus existere	(f. 58va-b) *114 **114 ***Per 115	
(<i>De decem dub.</i> , 10.63) Duplicibus autem unitatibus* entibus sive etiam bonitatibus	(f. 58vb) *Per 64	64F, p. 197, l. 155-161.
(<i>De mal. subs.</i> , 1.2) Quia* omnia [...] bonum appetunt.	(f. 70rb) *Per 7	
(<i>De mal. subs.</i> , 1.5) Propter quod et appetitus boni omnibus	(f. 70vb) Per 8.	
(<i>De mal. subs.</i> , 2.13) Omnibus procedentibus [...] per similitudinem est	(f. 72va) Hoc valet ad intellectionem 6 theologicis Procli.	6F, p. 135, l. 294-303; cf. 21F, p. 87, l. 417-420; 64C, p. 194, l. 66 - p. 195, l. 73

TABLE 2 Berthold of Moosburg’s Proclean Glosses on Proclus, *Tria opuscula* (cont.)

Proclus, <i>Tria opuscula</i>	Gloss	<i>Expositio</i>
(<i>De mal. subs.</i> , 3.14) Oportet enim utique processus totorum continuum facere	(f. 72vb-73ra) Per 28.	
(<i>De mal. subs.</i> , 10.31) Neque enim duo* prima: unde enim totaliter, monade** non ente?	(f. 76va) *Per 22 **Per 21	
(<i>De mal. subs.</i> , 10.31) Ubique gentium assimilari amat ad* generans	(f. 76va) *Per 28	
(<i>De mal. subs.</i> , 11.37) Quid enim ultra naturam boni?*	(f. 77vb) *Per 8	

the *Expositio*. What readings differ between Basel and the extant copies of the *Expositio* could be explained either as an editorial decision on Berthold’s part or a scribal error. In light of the foregoing, we may conclude that Berthold began using this copy of the *Tria opuscula* around 1323, probably after he had annotated Macrobius, and continued to use it throughout the period in which he wrote the *Expositio*.⁷⁶

Two, perhaps three, other manuscripts used by Berthold could be associated with this period of his career, since they may have been the source of certain citations found in the Macrobius glosses that are securely datable to 1323. The strongest connection of the three relates to the autographs of Albert the Great now in MS Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. Vindob. 273.⁷⁷ As Loris Sturlese first observed, a citation of Albert’s *De natura loci* in the Macrobius glosses (32r) matches a trefoil and manicule next to the same

76 As Helmut Boese observed, Berthold corrected this copy against an exemplar related to the best extant witness of the *Tria opuscula* (MS Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, lat. 473), which belonged to the library of the Augustinians in Paris. This is not, however, sufficient evidence to assert that Berthold made these corrections during an otherwise unattested “stay in Paris”. See C. Steel, “William of Moerbeke, translator of Proclus”, in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 247–263, at p. 252.

77 On the manuscript, see Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen*, p. 120–126, and on its transmission, see n. 112, below.

passage in the Vienna manuscript (145v).⁷⁸ As Berthold would have known it, the manuscript contained the autographs of Albert's commentaries on the *Physics* (from lib. viii, tr. 3, c. 1 to the end), on the *De caelo*, and his *De natura loci*, and *De causis proprietatum elementorum* (ending at lib. ii, tr. 2, c. 6), which the younger Dominican annotated sparingly.⁷⁹ These texts probably belonged to the Dominican library in Cologne, where Albert originally wrote them in close succession, approximately between 1251 and 1254, as he began his commentaries on the entire Aristotelian corpus.

Another manuscript used by Berthold (though leaving no trace in the *Expositio*) and linked to the library in Cologne is now ms Dresden, Sächsische Landesbibliothek, Db. 87.⁸⁰ On its final folio we find an *ex libris* and a table of contents in Berthold's hand (268v), and in three places (1r, 103r, 268v) the *ex libris* of the Dominican convent in Cologne. This suggests that the works originally belonged to the library and were only bound together after they came into Berthold's possession. The manuscript contains the only extant witness of Ptolemy's *Almagest* in the translation of 'Abd al-Masīh of Winchester (1r-71r);⁸¹ the *Liber introductorius Ptolomei* of Geminus of Rhodes (listed in the table of contents as *Introductiones Ptholomaei in Almagesti*), which is Gerard of Cremona's translation of Geminus' *Elementa astronomiae* (72r-102v);⁸² an anonymous fragment on geometry (102v-103r; not listed in the table of contents); the *Almagesti minor*, which is a summary of Books I-VI of the *Almagest* but reorganised on a Euclidean model, which is attributed to Campanus of Novara in the table of contents but in fact it is by Walter of Lille

78 Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. lv and Table vi. The gloss at *In Somn. Scip.*, II.5.12, f. 32r: INTER EXTREMOS VERO ET MEDIVM DVO MAIORES VLTIMIS, MEDIO MINORES, EX VTRIVSQUE VICINITATIS INTEMPERIE TEMPERANTVR, IN HISQVE TANTVM VITALES AVRAS NATVRA DEDIT INCOLIS CARPERE. *Nota de hoc in Spera Lynconiensis qui ostendit versus Austrum non esse habitationem. Sed Albertus libro De natura locorum, d. i, cap. 7, concedit ipsam habitabilem et habitari.*

79 Some of Berthold's annotations on Albert's *De caelo* are transcribed in Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen*, p. 124. At the time of writing, I have not compared the few citations of Albert's *Physica* and *De caelo* in the *Expositio* with the Vienna manuscript.

80 Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xlvii-xlix and Table iv.2.

81 D. Grupe, *The Latin Reception of Arabic Astronomy and Cosmology in Mid-Twelfth-Century Antioch. The Liber Mamonis and the Dresden Almagest*, PhD diss. (The Warburg Institute, 2013), p. 77-78.

82 For the Greek text and a short transcription from the Dresden manuscript, see Geminus, *Elementa astronomiae*, ed. K. Manitius (Leipzig: Teubner, 1898). For an English translation from the Greek, see J. Evans, J.L. Berggren, *Geminus' Introduction to the Phenomena. A Translation and Study of a Hellenistic Survey of Astronomy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

(104r-161v);⁸³ and, finally, the *Liber super Almagesti* of Geber (Jābir ibn Aflāḥ) in Gerard of Cremona's translation, which is listed in the table of contents as *Flores ex Almagesto* (162r-268r).⁸⁴ Berthold's hand is discernible clearly in one gloss (184r) and possibly in another (196v), both accompanying the text of Geber.⁸⁵ Berthold's two references to Ptolemy in the Macrobius glosses (MS Basel, UB, F.IV.31, f. 25r, 32r) or his single reference to Geber (32r) might reflect his study of these texts. We cannot, however, be certain of this, since he may have relied on other direct sources, such as Albert the Great's and Thomas Aquinas' commentaries on the *De caelo*, which are cited elsewhere in the Macrobius glosses. At any rate, this manuscript is further evidence of Berthold's interest in astronomy, even if his expertise in the subject cannot be gleaned from the sparse traces of his reading left in these rare and technical works.

In the same Macrobius gloss that mentions Albert's *De natura loci* (32r), we find Berthold's sole reference to the *De sphaera* of Robert Grosseteste in the Basel manuscript. Loris Sturlese has made the interesting proposal that MS München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14448, shows signs of Berthold's use, particularly in its table of contents (100r), whose hand seems to match the *ex libris* and table of contents from the Dresden manuscript, and in two notes indicating prices of sale (28v, 50r), and in at least one interlinear gloss (70r).⁸⁶ In the table of contents, we find listed the *De sphaera* of Robert Grosseteste,⁸⁷ the *Compotus* of Grosseteste,⁸⁸ and the *Elements* of Euclid, while the prices of sale are found at the end of the commentary on Ludolphus of Luco's *Flores grammaticae* (2r-28v) and the beginning of the *De sphaera* (50r). Sometime before 1347, the manuscript eventually was bound in its current form in Regensburg, where it was conserved at the Benedictine abbey of St. Emmeram. It could therefore shed more light on Berthold's activity in Regensburg. However, on the basis of the handwriting alone, without the *ex libris* we find in Dresden or

83 H. Zepeda, *The First Latin Treatise on Ptolemy's Astronomy. The Almagesti minor* (c. 1200) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018).

84 D. Juste, "Geber, *Liber super Almagesti*" (update: 29.01.2018), *Ptolemaeus Arabus et Latinus. Works*, URL = <http://ptolemaeus.badw.de/work/70>.

85 The first gloss is transcribed in Sturlese, "Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P.", p. 254, n. 31. Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xlix, also attributed the second gloss to Berthold, but the resemblance is not as clear.

86 Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. lvi-lix.

87 Robert Grosseteste, *De sphaera*, ed. L. Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1912), p. 10–32.

88 Robert Grosseteste, *Compotus*, eds A. Lohr, P.E. Nothaft (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

the parallel gloss and marginalia found in the Vienna autographs, I am hesitant to affirm that the interventions mentioned by Sturlese are Berthold's without further analysis. Be that as it may, all the evidence of Berthold's activity at this stage – the glosses on Dietrich's *De iride* from 1318, the glosses on Macrobius with the authors cited in them before 1323, the autographs of Albert's works on natural philosophy, and possibly the treatises in the Dresden and Munich manuscripts – suggests that he was engaged in teaching natural philosophy after his theological studies in Oxford, and had procured manuscripts to this end, probably in Cologne, and possibly in Regensburg.

Another text of Albert the Great that certainly came from Cologne and was used by Berthold, although we do not know when, is MS Köln, Historisches Archiv, W 258a, which is entirely made up of Albert's autograph of the *De animalibus* that he wrote between 1258 and 1262/1263, and included the treatises *De natura et origine animae* and *De principiis motus processivi*.⁸⁹ In it we find Berthold's *ex libris* (f. <I>r) and numerous interventions (*notabilia*, trefoils, and crosses) that have been convincingly attributed to him, which demonstrate the friar's extensive and careful study of the text. This reading of *De animalibus* was clearly undertaken independently of the commentary on Proclus, although a trefoil does appear beside the only unambiguous citation of the *De animalibus* in the *Expositio*.⁹⁰ Of course, the subject matter of *De animalibus* is quite remote from "the invisible things of God" considered in the *Elementatio theologica*. Even so, for a more relevant treatise like the *De natura et origine animae*, which was cited slightly more often in the *Expositio* in clusters around Propositions 17–18, 41, and 205–206, we find that only one of these citations corresponds to the marginalia in the Cologne manuscript.⁹¹

A far more important text for Berthold's *Expositio* was the *Clavis physicae* of Honorius Augustodunensis. Scholars have tended to assume that Berthold

89 Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xlvi–xlvii and Table IV.1; id., "Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P.," p. 257–259.

90 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18B, p. 48, l. 139–150 = f. 335v.

91 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 41C, p. 49, l. 103 – p. 50, l. 109 = f. 310r–v. No markings correspond to the series of citations at 17E (f. 314v–315v) or the citation at 206B (f. 320v). There are trefoils beside the passages from *De natura et origine animae*, tr. 1, c. 2–6, which are paraphrased at 205A–C (f. 308v–313r), but they do not correspond to the precise expressions that Berthold copied from Albert.

Another manuscript of Albert (not an autograph) that Berthold may have used is MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.1.21, which contains Albert the Great's *Ethica* (his second commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, from around 1262–1263) and his *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, and was copied in the 14th century. Two trefoils align with the only citations of Albert's *Ethica* in the *Expositio*: 13B (p. 210, l. 48 – p. 212, l. 100 = f. 5rb) and 13B (p. 212, l. 119 – p. 213, l. 143 = f. 8va).

discovered the *Clavis* sometime around 1327, when his lectorship was attested in Regensburg, since we know that the text circulated in two manuscripts in the city by 1347.⁹² This view was largely influenced by Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny's study of the manuscript used and lightly annotated by Berthold (MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 6734), which traced its origins to the abbey of St. Emmeram on the outskirts of the city, where Honorius may have once resided.⁹³ From this it seemed natural to conclude that one of these two manuscripts was in fact the text used by Berthold, which would account for his consequential misattribution of the *Clavis* to a Greek abbot, Theodorus (even though the *Clavis* is listed anonymously in the library catalogues in question). However, in a review of Paolo Lucentini's *Platonismo medievale* published nearly 30 years later, d'Alverny announced that, after more a careful inspection of the manuscript and in consultation with other experts, she had revised her hypothesis about the manuscript's Bavarian origins: the scribal hand would rather locate the text in the region around Cologne, while the extraordinary frontispieces and illustrations adorning the manuscript that provoked Berthold's misattribution follow a style more characteristic of the Mosel valley.⁹⁴

This has important consequences for the dating of the *Expositio*, since the most convincing *terminus post quem* had been proposed by Loris Sturlese in 1974 on the assumption that Berthold's *Clavis* came from Regensburg. If this were the case, and by 1327 Berthold already had at his disposal the texts that would become the foundations of his commentary (the *Elementatio theologica*, the *Tria opuscula*, at least some of Dietrich's works, and the *Clavis physicae* and, we would now add, the *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York), then all the conditions would be in place to begin the *Expositio* as we know it.⁹⁵ Now, however, we must share d'Alverny's reservations, and ask with her why Berthold could not have found the *Clavis* in "Cologne or its environs".⁹⁶ This in turn revises the dating of the *Expositio*, since we have seen that by 1323 Berthold probably already had access to at least one very valuable manuscript from Cologne (the autograph treatises on natural philosophy by Albert the Great) and possibly

92 Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xxi-xxii, xliii-xlv; P. Lucentini, "Introduzione", in Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, ed. P. Lucentini (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), p. ix-xv.

93 M.-Th. D'Alverny, "Le cosmos symbolique du XII^e siècle", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 20(1953), p. 31-81, at p. 34, n. 1 and 36, n. 1.

94 M.-Th. D'Alverny, "Paolo Lucentini, *Platonismo medievale. Contribua per la storia dell'Eriugenismo*", in *Scriptorium* 36/2(1982), p. 348-351, at p. 349.

95 Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xxii.

96 D'Alverny, "Platonismo medievale", p. 350.

the astronomical works now in Dresden. It is conceivable that he had also encountered the *Clavis* at that time.

It is undeniable that the Eriugenian contents of the *Clavis physicae* would play a pivotal role in the execution of Berthold's commentary on the *Elementatio theologica*. Eriugena's thought came to Berthold from four sources: (1) the *Clavis physicae*, which was by far its most important conduit, which Berthold attributed to a Theodorus, "the abbot of Constantinople";⁹⁷ (2) the glosses appended to the famous Parisian *Corpus Dionysiacum* (MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 17341) which derived from Eriugena but, by the mid-13th century, were indiscriminately attributed to Maximus – all of which Berthold knew only second-hand through Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strassburg, and Thomas of York;⁹⁸ (3) the *Liber de causis primis et secundis et fluxu quod ad ea consequitur*, which Berthold called *De causa causarum* and attributed to Al-Farabi;⁹⁹ and (4) Eriugena's *Homily on the Gospel of John*, which like many other medieval authors Berthold attributed to Origen.¹⁰⁰ The doctrinal and verbal correspondences between these texts did not escape Berthold's notice. In a more detailed analysis of Berthold's use of these sources, I have argued that he proceeded as if texts 1 and 2, written by Theodorus the abbot and "Maximus the monk", as he was named in the *Clavis*, belonged to the same Greek tradition of commentary on Dionysius the Areopagite.¹⁰¹

97 Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, ed. P. Lucentini (Roma: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1974); Honorius Augustodunensis, *La Clavis physicae (316–529) di Honorius Augustodunensis*, ed. P. Arfé (Napoli: Liguori Editore, 2012).

98 On this manuscript and its influence, see H.-F. Dondaine, *Le Corpus dionysien de l'université de Paris au XIII^e siècle* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1953), p. 69–71, 88–89, 101, and 118.

99 R. de Vaux, *Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin aux confins des XII^e-XIII^e siècles* (Paris: Vrin, 1934), p. 83–140. See also M.-Th. D'Alverny, "Une rencontre symbolique de Jean Scot Érigène et d'Avicenne. Notes sur le *De causis primis et secundis et fluxu qui consequitur eas*", in J.J. O'Meara, L. Bieler (eds), *The Mind of Eriugena* (Dublin: Irish University Press for the Royal Irish Academy, 1973), p. 170–181. Berthold used no chapter divisions for this text, and sometimes referred to it only by its *incipit* (*Principium principiorum Deus est gloriosus*, at 56D and 99B) or cited it only with the attribution to Al-Farabi (170H).

100 See John Scotus Eriugena, *L'Homélie sur le prologue de Jean*, ed. É. Jeauneau (Paris: Cerf, 1969), p. 53–54.

101 E. King, "Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Vol. 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 394–437, at 395–414. On Berthold's reception of Eriugena's doctrine of the primordial causes, see the extensive and fundamental study of E. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia* (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013).

It was under the banner of Dionysius, then, that Berthold received two crucial doctrines that enabled him to navigate the most difficult passages of the *Elementatio theologica* for a Christian to accept. The notion of the primordial causes (*causae primordiales*) made by God the Father in the Word became the key to Berthold's interpretation of the gods, unities, or goodnesses (*unitates, bonitates*) located between the One and beings, which could be assimilated to the divine processions of Dionysius and the divine ideas of Augustine. Similarly, the Eriugenian doctrine of the spiritual body, which belongs to the human as the image of God (*imago Dei*) in Paradise, along with Eriugena's concomitant teaching about the resurrected body, became Berthold's only Christian guides for interpreting Proclus' notion in Proposition 196 of the indestructible spiritual body or "vehicle" (ὄχημα, *susceptaculum*) that is always united to the soul. Notwithstanding his initial hesitations, as we will see, Berthold included the doctrine of the spiritual body transmitted in the *Clavis* partly because it came to him with the Patristic authority of Dionysius, Gregory (=Gregory of Nyssa), and Maximus,¹⁰² and also because it could be explained using the ontology of individuation he inherited from Dietrich of Freiberg.

In the *Expositio*, Berthold cited passages from 93 different chapters of the *Clavis* (out of 529) for a total of 132 citations.¹⁰³ In his lengthier citations, he identified the speakers in the dialogue, the *Magister* or *Discipulus*, who were depicted on one of his manuscript's frontispieces as Theodorus the abbot of Constantinople and John the Monk. As was his custom with older sources, Berthold's citations of the *Clavis* were almost always explicit, although he sometimes copied the text without attribution for teachings from even earlier authorities like Dionysius or Maximus (e.g. 119E).

In light of the distribution of citations in the *Expositio*, one can note that Berthold looked to the *Clavis physicae* principally in relation to the two challenging topics just mentioned: the gods and the spiritual body. The most extensive and sustained concentration of citations (25) falls between Propositions 120–129, on the gods and their providence. The most intensive concentrations

¹⁰² See 5.1, n. 30, below.

¹⁰³ I follow the enumeration of the chapters of the *Clavis* in the critical editions of Paolo Lucentini and Pasquale Arfé, but it must be noted that the subject headings in the margins of the manuscript used by Berthold do not always correspond to them. Berthold referred to the *Clavis physicae* as a continuous whole. He used the same relative references for citations that are clustered close together (e.g., 2A: *parum supra, aliquantulum infra*), and passages which were far apart (in 196F, *bene infra* signals a leap from chapters 105 to 272, but in 3A only from 137 to 142). Sometimes (e.g., 80G) he referred both to the approximate location in the manuscript (*circa medium*) and gives a vague reference to the subject heading in the margin.

are found in Propositions 196 (seven) and 210 (12), with other citations clustered nearby, which are the central passages in the *Elementatio* on the doctrine of the soul's imperishable, immaterial body or vehicle.

The following table, in the first column, indicates the marginal crosses and *notabilia* written by Berthold in his manuscript (with any brief glosses in his hand). The second column includes references to the critical editions of Paolo Lucentini and Pasquale Arfé. Finally, in the third column are any passages in the *Expositio* where these texts from the *Clavis* were used.¹⁰⁴

Unlike the Macrobius and Proclus glosses in the Basel manuscript, here there are only the briefest of *notabilia* and no references to any other authorities. Nevertheless, there is a clear correspondence between roughly half of the marginal trefoils and the citations from the *Clavis* in the *Expositio*. As Berthold studied the *Clavis*, it seems from his marginalia that certain ideas especially caught his attention, all of which would feature later in his commentary on Proclus: the theory of the invisible "universal" elements mediating between what is entirely spiritual and what is entirely corporeal (*Clavis*, c. 43, 76, 83, 221, 273, 440, 442); the doctrine of the spiritual body (*Clavis*, c. 102, 103, 105, 272, 273, 486, 487); the primordial causes (*Clavis*, c. 16, 86, 91, 170); the return of all things to their causes (*Clavis*, c. 308, 441, 459); human nature as *imago Dei* (*Clavis*, c. 94, 242); the goodness of creation and its substantiality (*Clavis*, c. 361, 451); and theophany (*Clavis*, c. 13). Now, it is true that the Eriugenian doctrine of the primordial causes also came to Berthold in the glosses on Dionysius and the *De causis primis et secundis*. But what the *Clavis* had that these texts lacked were its considerations of bodies that are invisible (the pure elements) and spiritual (the Paradisal body). The *Clavis* thus provided doctrines that could relate the highest (primordial causes) and lowest (invisible and spiritual bodies) cosmological realities studied in the *Elementatio theologica* to other disciplines, whether to Christian theology or to the disciplines of natural philosophy that seem to have especially interested Berthold (optics, astronomy, the theory of the four elements, meteorology).

The *Expositio*, it must be said, represents the most extensive reception of Eriugena's thought known to date. Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that, unlike most of the medieval authors influenced by the Irishman,¹⁰⁵ Berthold

¹⁰⁴ A *conferre* indicates that a citation occurs in the *Expositio* that is closely related to, but not identical with, the text marked in the manuscript. This table omits the corrections to the text and the transliterations written in the margins by Berthold, which are listed by Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xlv-xlv.

¹⁰⁵ P. Lucentini, *Platonismo medievale. Contributi per la storia dell'eriugenismo* (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1980); J. Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre. Logic, Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); É. Jeaneau, *Études érigéniennes* (Paris: Études augustinienes, 1987).

TABLE 3 Berthold of Moosburg's marginalia to the *Clavis physicae*

Paris, BnF, lat. 6734	<i>Clavis physicae</i>	<i>Expositio</i>
f. 7v	13 (p. 10, l. 4-7)	----
f. 9r	16 (p. 12, l. 6-10)	----
f. 16v	43 (p. 27, l. 14-17)	----
f. 31r	76 (p. 54, l. 8)	129A, 210E, 210I
f. 35r	83 (p. 60, l. 18)	----
f. 35v	86 (p. 61, l. 1-2)	Cf. <i>Prol.</i> 4
f. 38v	91 (p. 66, l. 30-31)	126B
f. 38v	91 (p. 66, l. 39-40)	126B
f. 39v	94 (p. 68, l. 21-22)	196F
f. 42v	102 (p. 74, l. 28-29)	196F
f. 42v-43r	102 (p. 74, l. 37)	196F
f. 43r	103 (p. 75, l. 10-11)	196F
f. 43v	105 (p. 76, l. 4-6)	196F
f. 78r	170 (p. 135, l. 9-10)	Cf. 140D
f. 97v	221 (p. 172, l. 2-3)	----
f. 106v	242 (p. 191, l. 8-9)	----
f. 120v	272 (p. 219, l. 2-4)	196F, 210E
[<i>de corpore spirituali</i>]		
f. 121r	273 (p. 221, l. 18-19)	Cf. 196F, 210C, 210M
f. 140v	308 (p. 261, l. 17-18)	----
f. 158v	360 (p. 94, l. 1000-1002)	18C
f. 159r	361 (p. 95, l. 1039-1040)	18C
f. 200v	440 (p. 168, l. 3507-3509)	----
[<i>catholica elementa</i>]		
f. 200v	441 (p. 168, l. 3522-3528)	----
f. 201v	442 (p. 170, l. 3591-3598)	----
[<i>prima materies</i>]		
f. 202r	442 (p. 170, l. 3599-3601)	----
[<i>secunda materies</i>]		
f. 208v	451 (p. 181, l. 3991-3993)	----
f. 212r	459 (p. 188, l. 4206-4207)	----
f. 228v	486 (p. 215, l. 5162-5163)	----
f. 229v	487 (p. 216, l. 5223-5224)	----

seemed to be unaware that these ideas we would classify as Eriugenian derived from one author. To this rule there is only one exception, and it is related to the fact that the name *Ioannes Scotus* appears in the list of Doctors of the Church, “from whose books and teachings the commentary of the *Elementatio theologica* that follows was compiled”.¹⁰⁶ In fact, the name *Ioannes Scotus* is found in the table of only one of the two extant manuscripts of the *Expositio*, having been inadvertently or deliberately omitted from MS Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2192. Whatever the reasons for this omission may have been, it is very unlikely that Berthold regarded John Scotus as the author behind the doctrines transmitted in the *Clavis physicae* or as the source behind his other three Eriugenian texts. The only explicit mention of *Ioannes Scotus* in the *Expositio* appears in a passage taken from Albert the Great’s *Summa theologiae* on God’s condescension to the created intellect in veils and theophanies that are required at the beginning of the intellect’s ascent. Here, John the Scot is mentioned alongside John the Saracen (*Ioannes Saracenus*) as commentators on the Areopagite.¹⁰⁷ Since both figures are mentioned together in the table of Doctors of the Church, it could be that Berthold included them in that list simply because he believed they belonged to a tradition of commentary on Dionysius; since for Berthold the authority of Dionysius was upheld by “infallible reason”, this fact alone could make both commentators worthy of membership.¹⁰⁸

In the 16th-century chronicle of Albert de Castello, the *Brevis et compendiosa cronica de magistris generalibus et viris illustribus ordinis praedicatorum*, at least five works are attributed to Berthold of Moosburg:

Father Berthold of Moosburg wrote a large volume on the philosophy of Plato, a commentary on the *Elements* of Proclus, another on the pole of the rainbow that explains Aristotle’s obscure meaning in the third

106 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1-13*, p. 3, l. 21. Since there is no evidence to the contrary, I assume two tables of authors were written by Berthold himself and appended to the *Expositio*.

107 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 16, p. 25, l. 665–671. See Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. Libri I, pars I. Quaestiones 1-50A*, ed. D. Siedler (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), pars I, tr. 3, q. 13, c. 1, p. 40, l. 3–11: *Quod verbum Ioannes Scotus et Ioannes Saracenus in Commentis [...]*.

108 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159C, p. 193, l. 142–143: *cum secundum Dionysium, cuius auctoritas praevalet, cum innitatur infallibili rationi, angeli sint immateriales*. A notable exception to this, however, would be Thomas Gallus, who was cited at *Expositio, Prol.* 4 (*secundum Vercellensem*), but was not included among the Doctors of the Church.

book of the *Meteorology*, a *Summa theologiae*, and many things on astronomy.¹⁰⁹

Apart from the *Expositio*, the other four works are otherwise unattested. It is interesting to observe, with Helmut Boese, that the works listed by Albert de Castello correspond quite closely to the materials we know independently to have been related to Berthold's library and teaching.¹¹⁰ It is indeed difficult to imagine that Albert de Castello was writing with direct knowledge of Berthold's works, and that there existed a "large volume" on Platonic philosophy greater than the Dominican's vast commentary on the *Elementatio theologica*. The "large volume on the philosophy of Plato" might, therefore, refer to a collection of Neoplatonic works that could have included Macrobius, the *Tria opuscula*, and the *Elementatio physica*, that are now bound in MS Basel, UB, F.IV.31. The commentary on the pole of the rainbow could be a conjecture based on the glosses to Dietrich of Freiberg's *De iride* in MS Basel, UB, F.IV.30. The existence of Berthold's *Summa theologiae*, which if anything would have been the product of his undated lectorship at Heilig Kreuz, has been questioned by Boese. Loris Sturlese has shown that Berthold had access to a manuscript of the *Summa theologiae* of Albert the Great superior to any other known witness and made use of both of its major parts.¹¹¹ Since, of all the works of Albert used in the *Expositio*, the *Summa theologiae* was cited most, we might assume that this lost manuscript of the *Summa* also bore Berthold's *ex libris*. Finally, the "many works on astronomy" could refer to the treatises in the Dresden manuscript bearing Berthold's *ex libris*.

109 Albert's chronicle appeared in three editions (1504, 1506, 1516), the last of which is published in R. Creytens, "Les écrivains dominicains dans la chronique d'Albert de Castello (1516)", in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 30(1960), p. 227–313, at p. 283, and Kaeppeli, *Scriptores*, vol. 1, p. 240: *Fr. Bertoldus de Moysborch scripsit magnum volumen in philosophia Platonis. Item super librum elementationem Procli. Item de polo yridis, exponens intentionem Aristotelis obscuram in tertia methaurorum. Item summam theologie. Item in astronomia plura*. Berthold's name, listed among other German friars under the year 1355, was added in the edition of 1516, when the number of authors included by Albert increased from 75 to 275.

110 Boese, *Wilhelm von Moerbeke*, p. 73–74.

111 L. Sturlese, "Super Dionysii Mysticam theologiam et Epistulas, ed. P. Simon (Alberti Magni Opera omnia, t. XXXVII, pars 2) and Summa theologiae sive de mirabilia scientia Dei, Libri I pars 1, Quaestiones 1–50A, ed. D. Siedler (Alberti Magni Opera omnia, t. XXXIV, 1)", in *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia*, Series III, 10/4(1980), p. 1691–1698, at p. 1692–1697. On this evidence, we can only surmise that it is possible that the *Summa* attributed to Berthold was in fact Albert's, but not "certain" as Boese (*Wilhelm von Moerbeke*, p. 74) claims.

Sometime around the end of Berthold's life, or perhaps following his death, his library began to disperse from Heilig Kreuz in Cologne. In 1363, a Dominican from the Viennese convent, Jodocus of Gorizia, copied Dietrich of Freiberg's *De origine rerum praedicamentaliū* and Proclus' *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam* (the text ends abruptly before the treatise's tenth and final question) and took these from Cologne, along with the Albert autographs now in MS Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. Vindob. 273. Jodocus brought the texts either directly to Vienna or to the convent in Krems, whence they made their way to Vienna in 1395.¹¹² Helmut Boese has indicated that this copy of Proclus, clearly written by Jodocus himself, appears to depend directly on Berthold's personal text of the *Opuscula* that later came to Basel. He also surmises that the inexplicably abrupt ending of the *De decem dubitationibus* and Jodocus' premature departure from Cologne (assuming he had intended to copy all the *Opuscula*) may have been related to the disturbance caused by Berthold's death. According to Boese, then, since the colophon dates the copy of Dietrich's *De origine* to the eve of Pentecost 1363 (20 May), and since there would not have been much scribal work undertaken in Whitsuntide, Berthold's passing might have occurred sometime in late May or early June 1363.¹¹³ What is clear, in any case, is that Berthold's copy of the *Tria opuscula* remained in Cologne until the turn of the 15th century, perhaps as late as 1407, approximately when a copy of it was made there for the library of Amplonius Rating in Erfurt, and when the treatises were finally bound in their current form and made their way from Cologne to Basel.¹¹⁴

The two extant manuscripts of the *Expositio*, both made roughly a century after its composition, were copied in Cologne. The Vatican manuscript (MS Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2192) was made in 1437 by the Dominican Conrad Keller, who served as prior of the Rottweil convent.¹¹⁵ The

112 On this transmission, see I. Frank, "Zum Albertus-Autograph in der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek und zum 'Albertinismus' der Wiener Dominikaner im Spätmittelalter", in G. Meyer, A. Zimmermann (eds), *Albertus Magnus – Doctor Universalis 1280–1980* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag, 1980), p. 89–117. The *explicit* of Jodocus' copy of Dietrich and a summary of Frank's article can be found in Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen*, p. 120–126.

113 Boese, *Wilhelm von Moerbeke*, p. 72–73.

114 Boese, *Wilhelm von Moerbeke*, p. 76–79. Loris Sturlese's suggestion ("Introduzione", p. lix, n. 54) that Berthold's interventions can be detected in a manuscript of Dietrich of Freiberg's works now in MS Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf, CA. F 72, is stated more cautiously in Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen*, p. 94: "ob diese Korrekturen von der Hand Bertholds von Moosburg stammen, läßt sich nicht mit Sicherheit entscheiden".

115 Boese, *Wilhelm von Moerbeke*, p. 74, n. 19.

Oxford manuscript (MS Balliol College Library, Cod. 224B) was written by order of William Gray in Cologne in 1444, before he embarked to Padua on the next stage of his European tour.¹¹⁶ Having served as chancellor of the University of Oxford from 1440–1442, William had matriculated at the University of Cologne on 1 December 1442 along with his two assistants, masters Richard Bole and Nicholas Saxton.¹¹⁷ These two witnesses, and the obscure but significant reference to the *Expositio* in Nicholas of Cusa's *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, written in 1449, suggest that Berthold's work was receiving greater attention in the second quarter of the 15th century.¹¹⁸

Surveying the traces of Berthold's library, we may conclude that the only manuscripts whose use can be dated with any certainty are those of Macrobius and Proclus (MS Basel, UB, F.IV.31), with their glosses and annotations, and the Vienna autographs of Albert (MS ÖNB, Cod. Vindob. 273). These, and probably the astronomical works in the Dresden manuscript (MS SLB, Db. 87) and possibly the scientific treatises in Munich (MS BSB, Clm 14448), were known to Berthold around 1323. The Vienna autographs, the Dresden astronomical treatises, and the Cologne autograph of Albert's *De animalibus* (MS HA, W 258a), show that much of Berthold's extant library, which seems to have been particularly focused on natural philosophy, was closely related to and dependent upon the convent of Heilig Kreuz in Cologne. With the date of 1323 as our only anchor, we may suppose that Berthold's connection with Heilig Kreuz preceded his appearances in the city's records that began in 1335. As we can no longer associate his manuscript of the *Clavis physicae* directly with Regensburg and his lectorship there in 1327, and since we do not know whether Berthold discovered it in the region of Cologne, where it seems to have originated, or elsewhere, we must revise the most convincing *terminus post quem* for the *Expositio* in 1327 – not to mention the *terminus post quem* of 1335, which has been asserted on the assumption that Berthold's lectorship in Cologne would have had something to do with the commentary and the internal politics of the order as it responded to the trial of Meister Eckhart (d. 1328). In our study of the *Expositio*, we will indeed find some striking echoes of Eckhart's thought at crucial junctures of the commentary, but our survey of Berthold's career and library gives us no reason to connect his lectorship, whose character was probably traditional and whose dating is unknown, with the *Expositio*. While we

116 R.M. Haines, "Grey, William (c.1414–1478)", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004), online edition, May 2011.

117 H. Keussen, *Die Matrikel der Universität Köln. Erster Band: 1389–1475* (Bonn: Hanstein, 1928), p. 457.

118 See Conclusion, section 1, below.

may more strongly affirm that the commentary project was likely undertaken while Berthold made use of the resources of the Dominican library in Cologne, but we must admit now that it could have begun any time after 1323.

If the content of Berthold's marginal annotations reveals anything about the formation of his commentary project, it suggests that the *Tria opuscula* was, so to speak, the major and perhaps last piece of the puzzle to fall into place. If the texts of Macrobius and the *Opuscula* were copied roughly at the same time, and if the glosses on Macrobius were mostly written before 1323, and if we find that Berthold was only beginning to master the contents of the *Opuscula* at that time (as his system of dots and numerals to parse the translation would suggest), then it is conceivable that it was with the latter that a new perspective on Proclus and his achievements came into full view. In the Macrobius glosses, we find the *Elementatio theologica*, the *Liber de causis*, and Avicenna cited as if Berthold held them to be basically in agreement on central doctrines of cosmology, even if Proclus was the most sophisticated of the group. No special emphasis there was placed on the Good or any principles "beyond being" in Proclus or Dionysius. In the *Expositio* it was very much otherwise. We will see that Berthold's subordination of the *Liber de causis* and the entire Aristotelian tradition of the metaphysics to the Platonic science of the One and Good was only possible on the basis of the *Tria opuscula*, which showed Berthold a Proclus whose anthropology and account of the modes of knowledge and ignorance was in a deeper agreement with the *De mystica theologia* of Dionysius than his predecessors and contemporaries had realised. This gave an entirely new significance and even urgency to the correct understanding of the principles or "thearchy" that the best of the pagan and Christian Platonists located beyond thought and being. For this Proclean and Dionysian anthropology implied a fundamentally different approach to the divine that seeks union with God through supra-intellectual ignorance and through the awareness of a principle in the soul that is prior to intellect. In the Macrobius glosses, we see a Proclus of the *Elementatio theologica* whose doctrinal authority, even if Berthold cited it more than any other text, was approximately level with the Peripatetic metaphysical tradition; in the *Expositio*, we have a Proclus of a soteriological science of the Good, who has left us the *Elementatio theologica* as the rational and discursive ladder to the non-discursive apprehension of the divine and, within and beyond even that contemplative beatitude, to deification.¹¹⁹ As Proclus had described it in two of passages of the *Opuscula*, such was the goal of Platonic philosophy: a state of cooperative union with the

119 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Expos. tit. L*, p. 49, l. 408–414 and p. 51, 475–483.

divine providence in generative silence, in which the soul “lives the divine life” to the extent it is able.¹²⁰ Berthold drew attention to both passages in his manuscript of Proclus with manicules (see figures 3 and 4, below).¹²¹ It is perhaps in Berthold’s first encounter with these ideas that we discern the dawn of the *Expositio*.

3 The Commentary on Proclus: Background, Purpose, and Exegetical Methods

The features of the *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli* that first strike the reader are its length (amounting to eight volumes and approximately 1,900 pages in the critical edition of commentary on a text of less than 100 pages in length), its methodical composition and repetitive style of exegesis, and its critical attitude toward the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle and, especially, the *Liber de causis*. These characteristics suggest that the *Expositio* was intended to serve a pedagogical purpose within the Dominican order. In terms of its content, at the very least, Berthold leaves his reader with the impression that Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* has value exclusively as a logical consideration of being and its properties. This unusual but consistent portrayal of the *Metaphysics* would entail that, while its importance would be reassessed and relativised by the divine science of the Platonists, it would not be abolished or supplanted. Berthold’s attitude in the *Expositio* toward the *Liber de causis*, however, was entirely negative: he presented it both as an incomparably inferior realisation of the propositional or theorematic method in theology and as a baleful extrapolation of the logical consideration of being into the domain of the separate substances, as when it stated in Proposition 4 that the first of

120 Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §64, p. 106, l. 9–12; id. *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §32, p. 140, l. 1–9.

121 The other passages marked in this way in MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, are: f. 60rb (*De providentia*, c. 3, §5, p. 112, l. 11–12: “the demonic Aristotle”, *demonius Aristotiles*); f. 63rb (*De providentia*, c. 7, §24, p. 134, l. 10–11: Plato on virtue as a “voluntary slavery” to the gods that is the greatest freedom); f. 65rb (*De providentia*, c. 10, §38, p. 146, l. 3–5: the futility of prayer if human freedom is denied); f. 67rb (*De providentia*, c. 13, §52, p. 162, l. 12–15: souls desire to leave the body in order to enjoy deifying intelligence, *deificam intelligentiam*, superior to intellect, and hope to gain a supernatural and divine comprehension of all things, *supernaturali hac et divinali entium comprehensione*); f. 70va–b (*De malorum subsistentia*, c. 1, §4, p. 178, l. 23–25: the oppositions of good and evil found in the world first take root hiddenly in the soul when the higher and rational part of the soul is overcome by passions); f. 73ra (*De malorum subsistentia*, c. 3, §14, p. 194, l. 8–18: angels are revealers of the divine silence).

FIGURE 1 Glosses on Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* (1.14.6-7). MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 17r

FIGURE 2 Gloss on Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* (1.17.5). MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 20r

FIGURE 3 Marginalia on Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam* (q. 10, §64). MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 59ra

FIGURE 4 Marginalia on Proclus, *De providentia et fato* (c. 8, §32). MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 64rb

created things is “being” rather than “good”. If the *Liber de causis* was still being taught in the schools – and even this must remain hypothetical given our lack of documentation from the German provinces of this period – then we would assume that Berthold set out to enshrine the *Elementatio theologica* in its place. Since the *Expositio* is, however, silent about its pedagogical motives or intended audience, we can only surmise the ends this commentary could have served by looking to some thematically comparable projects among Berthold’s Dominican predecessors from the point of view, first, of content (exegeses of the *Liber de causis*) and then of form (philosophical compilations). Since the most striking parallels in both instances appear mostly, though not exclusively, among his German Dominican contemporaries and precursors, we must say a word about developments in the scholarly understanding of this context.

Following the path opened by Martin Grabmann in his studies on Ulrich of Strassburg in the 1920s, scholars have elaborated, criticised, and refined the historiographical notion of a “German Dominican school” that is thought to have spanned from the founding of the *studium generale* in Cologne in 1245 to the mid-14th century. When these paths were being charted, historians focused on the common authorities, questions, and debates that engaged many of the philosophers whose texts, for the most part, are now critically edited in the *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi* (Ulrich of Strassburg, Dietrich of Freiberg, John Picardi of Lichtenberg, Henry of Lübeck, Nicholas of Strassburg, and Berthold of Moosburg), with other figures like Meister Eckhart, John and Gerard of Sterngassen, Henry Suso, and John Tauler emerging out of this intellectual culture.¹²² When Albert the Great was held to be the founding figure in this current, “the German Dominican school” at times became synonymous with the notion of an *Albertschule*.¹²³ Gradually, the closer scrutiny of the texts

122 Sturlese, “Alle origini della mistica speculativa tedesca”; id., “Gottebenbildlichkeit und Beseelung des Himmels in den Quodlibeta Heinrichs von Lübeck OP”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 24(1977), p. 191–233; id., “Albert der Große und die deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 28(1981), p. 133–147; id., “Proclo ed Ermete in Germania da Alberto Magno a Bertoldo di Moosburg. Per una prospettiva di ricerca sulla cultura filosofica tedesca nel secolo delle sue origini (1250–1350)”, in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 22–33; id., “Il dibattito sul Proclo latino nel medioevo fra l’università di Parigi e lo studium di Colonia”, in G. Boss, G. Seel (eds), *Proclus et son influence. Actes du colloque de Neuchâtel, juin 1985* (Zürich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987), p. 261–285; A. Beccarisi, “Le Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi (CPTMA)”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57(2010), p. 425–430.

123 See the discussion in A. de Libera, “Albert le Grand et la mystique allemande”, in M.J.F.M. Hoenen, J.H.J. Schneider, G. Wieland (eds), *Philosophy and Learning. Universities in the Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), p. 29–42.

gave way to a sense of greater diversity among these figures, as Ruedi Imbach spoke of “three models of mystical theology” in the Dominican school associated with Henry Suso, Dietrich of Freiberg, and Berthold of Moosburg.¹²⁴ The opposed attitudes of these German authors to the thought of Thomas Aquinas has sometimes been used as a standard of further classification.¹²⁵ But even Dietrich of Freiberg, one of the most outspoken critics of Thomism in the late 13th century, differed from Albert on major doctrinal questions, as Kurt Flasch has shown.¹²⁶ Niklaus Largier has gone furthest to question the utility of the notion of a German Dominican “school” altogether, given that we often lack solid evidence of any direct institutional links between these generations of thinkers and, as had become increasingly clear, such a term can obscure important divergences among those authors.¹²⁷ If the notion of a “school” implies too much uniformity, it seems that some heuristic tool is still needed that is flexible enough to underline the similarities between these authors. Perhaps the more pliable “regional” approach, proposed by Loris Sturlese in another context, with its attentiveness to common sources, questions, and debates, can retain the heuristic value of a “school” without assuming or imposing doctrinal continuities.¹²⁸ But even here we must remain sensitive to the fact that, for

-
- 124 R. Imbach, “Die deutsche Dominikanerschule. Drei Modelle einer Theologia mystica”, in M. Schmidt, D.R. Bauer (eds), *Grundfragen christlicher Mystik. Wissenschaftliche Studientagung Theologia mystica in Weingarten vom 7.-10. November 1985* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1987), p. 157–172.
- 125 L. Sturlese, “Eckhart, Teodorico e Picardi nella *Summa philosophiae* di Nicola di Strasburgo. Documenti per una storia della filosofia medievale tedesca”, in *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 61(1982), p. 183–206; P. Porro, “Essere e essenza in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg. Note sulla prima ricezione del tomismo a Colonia”, in M. Pickavé (ed.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan. A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003), p. 226–245. See also the special issue of the *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57(2010).
- 126 K. Flasch, “Von Dietrich zu Albert”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), p. 7–28; id., *Dietrich von Freiberg*, 407–409; id., “Dietrich von Freiberg und Siger von Brabant. Eine Studie zur ‘Schule’ Alberts des Großen”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam*, p. 127–141. See also A. Beccarisi, “*Ex Germano in rebus divinis*. ‘Spekulative’ und ‘deutsche’ Mystik im Kontext”, in *Quaestio* 15(2015), p. 169–182.
- 127 N. Largier, “Die ‘deutsche Dominikanerschule’. Zur Problematik eines historiographischen Konzepts”, in J. Aertsen, A. Speer (eds), *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000), p. 202–213.
- 128 L. Sturlese, “Universality of Reason and Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages. Geography of Readers and Isograph of Text Diffusion before the Invention of Printing”, in A. Musco et al. (eds), *Universality of Reason, Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages. XII Congresso internazionale di filosofia medievale. Palermo, 17–22 September 2007* (Palermo: Officina di Studi Medievali, 2012), p. 1–22.

example, Dietrich of Freiberg was deeply influenced by his lengthy sojourns at the University of Paris, just as Berthold was by his more limited exposure to texts and ideas in Oxford.

We will see that the philosophical motivations for Berthold's valorisation of Proclus arose within the thematics and debates of his German Dominican milieu, above all in his inheritance of the thought of Dietrich of Freiberg, and that this reception also led Berthold to look outside his immediate context for resources and inspiration. His use of Thomas of York's *Sapientiale*, likely acquired in Oxford, is the most important in this regard. Another example is Berthold's acknowledged debt to Thomas Aquinas, whom he placed before Albert, Ulrich, and Dietrich in the list of Doctors of the Church affixed to the *Expositio* (*sanctus Thomas de Aquino*). We should not underestimate Aquinas' importance for any later medieval commentator on the *Liber de causis* or the *Elementatio theologica*, let alone a Dominican. Aquinas' erudite comparison of the *Liber de causis* with the *Elementatio theologica* and the writings of Dionysius, and his identification of the *Liber de causis* as in some sense a Platonic text because of its reliance on the *Elementatio*, was a watershed in this history.¹²⁹ The most comprehensive survey of the medieval commentary traditions on the *Elementatio* and *Liber de causis*, which are still being uncovered, tells us that "the Latin legacy of the *Elements of Theology* is bound up with Thomas Aquinas' commentary on the *Book of Causes*".¹³⁰ Berthold was undoubtedly a witness to this trend.¹³¹ Aquinas' methodical discussions of the *Elementatio* in the course of his commentary on the *Liber de causis* would have been one of the very few precedents Berthold could look to for insights into Proclus' text, apart from some scattered citations in Albert's *Summa theologiae* and Dietrich of Freiberg. To appreciate the novelty of Berthold's project when viewed from this angle, it is important that we have in the background the complex and ambiguous position Aquinas adopted throughout his career

129 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002), prooemium, p. 3, l. 7-10: *unde videtur ab aliquo philosophorum arabum ex praedicto libro Procli excerptus, praesertim quia omnia quae in hoc libro continentur, multo plenius et diffusius continentur in illo.*

130 D. Calma, "The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism. Considerations of a Recently Discovered *Corpus* of Texts", in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, I. New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250-1350)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 11-52, at p. 11 and 27-40. On Aquinas' commentary, see A. de Libera, "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin interprètes du *Liber de Causis*", in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 74(1990), p. 347-378; C. D'Ancona, "Saint Thomas lecteur du *Liber de causis*", in *Revue thomiste* 92(1992), p. 785-817.

131 See E. Ludueña, "The Gods and Causality. On Aquinas' Presence in Berthold's *Expositio*", forthcoming.

concerning the interrelation of the authorities of Plato, Aristotle, Dionysius, Proclus, and the *Liber de causis*.

Central to that question was the status of the separate substances. When he read Proclus, Aquinas re-enacted Aristotle's critique of Plato's doctrine of ideas in the *Metaphysics*, directing it against Proclus' notion of "gods" beneath the One by interpreting these gods as "intelligibles" subsisting outside the separate intellects. According to Aquinas, the *Liber de causis* avoided this error, which brought it closer to Dionysius, Aristotle, and the truth of things.¹³² Albert the Great had underscored the importance of the *Liber de causis* as the completion of the science pursued in the *Metaphysics*.¹³³ As Thomas stated in the prologue to his own commentary, citing Aristotle and John's Gospel, the *Liber de causis* complements the *Metaphysics* with a philosophical science of God and the separate substances. The contemplation of these realities amounts to the attainment of felicity in this life.¹³⁴ Thus the *Liber de causis* was understood to play no small role in mediating between the divine science of the philosophers and sacred doctrine.

¹³² Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 3, p. 19, l. 28 – p. 20, l. 8: *Et, quia deos appellabant primas formas separatas in quantum sunt secundum se universales, consequenter et intellectus divinos et animas divinas et corpora divina dicebant secundum quod habent quamdam universalem influentiam et causalitatem super subsequencia sui generis et inferiorum generum. Hanc autem positionem corrigit Dionysius quantum ad hoc quod ponebant ordinatim diversas formas separatas quas deos dicebant, ut scilicet aliud esset per se bonitas et aliud per se esse et aliud per se vita et sic de aliis.* See also Thomas Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis*, ed. Leonina, vol. 40/D (Roma: Santa Sabina, 1968), c. 1, p. 42, l. 112 – p. 43, l. 133: *Id autem quod primo est in intellectu, est unum et bonum: nihil enim intelligit qui non intelligit unum; unum autem et bonum se consequuntur: unde ipsam primam ideam unius, quod nominabat secundum se unum et secundum se bonum, primum rerum principium esse ponebat, et hunc summum Deum esse dicebat. Sub hoc autem uno diversos ordines participantium et participatorum instituebat in substantiis a materia separatis: quos quidem ordines deos secundos esse dicebat, quasi quasdam unitates secundas post primam simplicem unitatem. Rursus, quia sicut omnes aliae species participant uno, ita etiam oportet quod intellectus, ad hoc quod intelligat, participet eorum speciebus. Ideo sicut sub summo Deo, qui est unitas prima, simplex et imparticipata, sunt aliae rerum species quasi unitates secundae et dii secundi; ita sub ordine harum specierum sive unitatum ponebat ordinem intellectuum separatorum, qui participant supradictas species ad hoc quod sint intelligentes in actu.*

¹³³ Cf. Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, ed. W. Fauser (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), lib. 11, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 60, l. 3-5: *Propter quod et iste liber Philosophiae primae coniungendus est, ut finale ex isto recipiat perfectionem*; lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 24, p. 191, l. 17-23: *In hoc ergo libro ad finem intentionis pervenimus. Ostendimus enim causam primam et causarum secundarum ordinem et qualiter primum universi esse est principium et qualiter omnium esse fluit a primo secundum opiniones Peripateticorum. Et haec quidem quando adiuncta fuerint xi Primae philosophiae, tunc primo opus perfectum est.*

¹³⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, prooemium, p. 2, l. 5-13.

The development in Aquinas' thinking that culminated in the perspective adopted in his late commentary on the *Liber de causis* has been charted by Wayne Hankey.¹³⁵ Central to this development was Aquinas' understanding of the authority of Dionysius, which was second only to Scripture, and the character of his agreement with Aristotle. This concord became for Thomas the authoritative basis for his doctrine of God as *ipsum esse subsistens* and his anthropology of the rational soul as the substantial form of the body. In this respect, Aquinas was profoundly influenced by the reconciliation of Dionysius and Aristotle that he encountered as a student of Albert the Great at the *studium generale* in Cologne between 1248 and 1252.¹³⁶ But a significant difference between the two authors appears when we consider how they understood the writings of Dionysius, whom Aquinas gradually identified more and more as a Platonist. In his prologue to his *De divinis nominibus Expositio*, written after 1266, Aquinas acknowledged that one of the major difficulties for interpreters of Dionysius is that his "way of speaking" follows the Platonists, insofar as he seems to speak of the divine names (e.g., *per se bonum*) as if they were separate from God, who is *superbonum*, which is not consonant with the faith.¹³⁷ Ultimately, however, Aquinas insisted, Dionysius held that they are not diverse and separate principles. For Thomas this meant that Dionysius shared the Aristotelian position that the intelligibles are not outside the intellect.¹³⁸ Nevertheless, Aquinas also came to believe that the Platonic approach to the first principles contributed something essential that corrected a shortcoming in Aristotle. In the *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*, written in 1272, Aquinas explicitly stated that Dionysius "was in many respects a follower of Platonic doctrine", which took a correct view about the existence and number of demons.¹³⁹ The Platonic tendency to proliferate separate principles received a positive interpretation in Aquinas insofar as their approach to the invisible world, when it is balanced by the Aristotelian corrective, makes this domain of reality more intelligible because the Platonists do not subject it to the strictures of the sublunary realm. In the final reckoning, in the late treatise *De substantiis*

135 For what follows, see W. Hankey, "The Concord of Aristotle, Proclus, the *Liber de Causis* & Blessed Dionysius in Thomas Aquinas, Student of Albertus Magnus", in *Dionysius* 34(2016), p. 137–209, at p. 143–203.

136 Hankey, "The Concord", p. 204, gives a list of passages in Albert's commentaries on Dionysius where the *Liber de causis* is discussed.

137 Thomas Aquinas, *In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, ed. C. Pera (Torino: Marietti, 1950), prooemium, p. 1–2.

138 Thomas Aquinas, *In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. 5, lect. 1, §634, p. 235.

139 Hankey, "The Concord", p. 209.

separatis, which in many respects resembles the commentary on the *Liber de causis*,¹⁴⁰ Aquinas presented Dionysius as the Christian correlative and consummation of the authoritative and comprehensive philosophical agreement achieved through the mutual corrections of Plato and Aristotle precisely on this question of the status and number of separate substances.¹⁴¹

Albert's "Dionysian Peripateticism" also exerted a profound influence on Ulrich of Strassburg (b. 1220/1225 – d. 1277), who studied alongside Aquinas at Heilig Kreuz from approximately 1248 to 1254.¹⁴² It is intriguing to see that, almost exactly in step with Aquinas, Ulrich wrote a *summa* of theology (the *De summo bono*), that was also structured on explicitly Dionysian principles, and which also may have been intended for the nascent *studia particularis theologiae* in the Dominican order.¹⁴³ It seems there were movements afoot to develop pedagogical alternatives to the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard for theological study, which may have been inspired by Albert's focus on the Areopagite in his lectures in Cologne.¹⁴⁴ Like Aquinas, Ulrich had an innovative understanding of the relation between Plato and Aristotle on the question

140 H.D. Saffrey, "Introduction", in Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, p. xxxv.

141 Thomas Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis*, c. 18, p. 71, l. 3–12: *Quia igitur ostensum est quid de substantiis spiritualibus praecipui philosophi Plato et Aristoteles senserunt quantum ad earum originem, conditionem naturae, distinctionem et gubernationis ordinem, et in quo ab eis alii errantes dissenserunt: restat ostendere quid de singulis habeat christianae religionis assertio. Ad quod utemur praecipue Dionysii documentis, qui super alios ea quae ad spirituales substantias pertinent excellentius tradidit.*

142 On Ulrich, see most recently A. Palazzo, "Ulrich of Strasbourg's Philosophical Theology. Textual and Doctrinal Remarks on *De summo bono*", in A. Speer, Th. Jeschke (eds), *Schüler und Meister* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), p. 205–242. On Albert's "Dionysian Peripateticism", see A. de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand* (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 177–209, 239–244.

143 On the Dionysian structure of the *De deo* of Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*, see W. Hankey, *God in Himself. Aquinas' Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). On the Dionysian structure of the *De summo bono*, see G. Théry, "Originalité du plan de la *Summa de bono* d'Ulrich de Strasbourg", in *Revue thomiste* 27(1922), p. 376–397; on its institutional context, see A. Palazzo, "Philosophy and Theology in the German Dominican *Scholae* in the Late Middle Ages. The Cases of Ulrich of Strasbourg and Berthold of Wimpfen", in K. Emery, Jr., W. Courtenay, S. Metzger (eds), *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts. Acts of the XVth International Colloquium of the Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale, University of Notre Dame, 8–10 October 2008* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), p. 75–105, at p. 75–90. On the *studium particularis theologiae*, see Mulchahey, *First the Bow is Bent in Study*, p. 277–321.

144 L. Sturlese, *Storia della filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo. Il secolo XIII* (Firenze: Olschki, 1996), p. 162; A. de Libera, *Raison et foi. Archéologie d'une crise d'Albert le Grand à Jean-Paul II* (Paris: Seuil, 2003), p. 277–278.

of first principles that was inspired by Albert, according to whom Aristotle reasoned about the separate substances using necessary arguments, while the Platonists proceeded by probabilities and conjecture.¹⁴⁵ However, as Alessandra Beccarisi has shown, Ulrich reversed the connotations of Albert's judgement: whereas Albert immediately followed this remark by delimiting the procedurally distinct domains of theology and philosophy for the student of natural philosophy, Ulrich maintained that, on the question of the separate substances, reasoning by conjecture must begin where necessary arguments end.¹⁴⁶ This resembles Aquinas' own departure from Albert, as well as the harmony of Plato and Aristotle expounded in his *De substantiis separatis*.

In the commentary tradition on the *Liber de causis*, then, it seems that Albert (*via* Ulrich) and Thomas Aquinas would have been Berthold's two major interlocutors. Their influence on Berthold has only begun to be adequately recognised. Ulrich's *De summo bono* has been established as a major source for Berthold's doctrine of providence.¹⁴⁷ We may also note that Ulrich was often, but not always, the direct source for the many references to Albert's commentary on the *Liber de causis* that populate the *apparatus fontium* of the critical edition of the *Expositio*. And if, by the time we get to Berthold, it was simply taken for granted that Dionysius was a Platonist (*Dionysius Platonicus*), then this is because Berthold followed in the footsteps of Aquinas and, in light of new ideas available to him in Proclus' *Tria opuscula* that William of Moerbeke translated in 1280 (six years after Aquinas' death), took them to a radical conclusion.¹⁴⁸ Chief among these new ideas was the anthropology of the one of the soul (*unum animae*). Proclus introduced this principle by passing beyond Aristotle's doctrine of *intellectus* to a Platonic and pre-Platonic tradition that was aware of a more hidden union or divine frenzy (*divina mania*) beyond intellectual reflexivity.¹⁴⁹ A connection between the pagan Platonic tradition

145 Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1960), lib. XI, tr. 3, c. 7, l. 19–23: *aut via Platonis aut via Aristotelis oportet nos incedere in materia ista de qua loquimur. Platonis autem via fundatur super propositiones probabiles, non necessarias.*

146 A. Beccarisi, "La scientia divina dei filosofi nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Rivista di storia della filosofia* 61(2006), p. 137–163, citing Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 1–4*, ed. A. de Libera (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), lib. II, tr. 2, c. 2 (2), p. 31, l. 37 – p. 32, l. 49: *Sed quando coniecturando de divinis loquuntur, secundum quod ratio probabilis dictat, tunc bene ponunt primam causam efficientem sine motu, sicut et Platonicus posuerunt.*

147 T. Ferro, "Berthold of Moosburg, Reader of Ulrich of Strassburg. On Natural Providence", forthcoming.

148 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40C, p. 42, l. 214–223, where Proclus' gods are described as images of the Trinity.

149 Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §31–32, p. 139, l. 1 – p. 140, l. 9.

and the *De mystica theologia* of Dionysius, not to mention other passages in *De divinis nominibus* concerning the cognition “above the nature of the mind”, was thus revealed. This new accord lay at the basis of Berthold’s reassessment of Dionysius’ supposed agreement with the Peripatetic tradition and especially the *Liber de causis*, which called into question its status as the treatise devoted to the science whose study leads to philosophical felicity. Nowhere is this clearer than when he used the *De mystica theologia* to single out the *Liber de causis* for criticism, along with all the other “unlearned” who are “sealed off in beings”, having made the mistaken assumption that, since being is the first thing made by God, being must also be God’s primary name.¹⁵⁰

The problem these successors of Albert faced was to explicate the single truth that they assumed must exist beyond the apparent discord of natural philosophy and theology, and thus to secure the deeper continuity between the study of nature and the beatifying contemplation of the divine. Berthold took a stand in this lineage of interpreting Dionysius and the *Liber de causis* when he moved the *Elementatio theologica* and Dionysius on one side, and the *Metaphysics* and the *Liber de causis* on the other. In the divine science of the Platonists, Berthold found a conception of nature that is not “sealed off in beings” but grounded by and forever open to the *extasis* of self-communicative Goodness. This was motivated at once by Berthold’s diagnosis of the human condition (“we who sit, as it were, in darkness and the shadow of death”) and by his philosophy of nature: God, for Berthold, was chiefly to be invoked by the name of Light, most blessed and most simple (*beatissima [...] simplicissima lux*).¹⁵¹ His analysis of the nature and laws of physical light, as scholars have noted, was the centrepiece of his understanding of the entire process of procession and conversion. In the *Expositio*’s metaphysics of light, as it is fair to call it, we have a new basis for the meditation of the microcosm, the macrocosm, and the divine, and thus for establishing the bridge between natural philosophy and revealed theology.¹⁵² Once this Platonic anthropology and philosophy of nature had been retrieved (for Berthold, by going all the way back to Hermes Trismegistus), whatever differences remained between pagan and Christian Platonists had only secondary importance. From the standpoint of

150 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 71D, p. 35, l. 123–127: *Quem quidem firmati in existentibus et non opinantibus aliquid esse super entia dicunt fore esse, sicut dicit auctor De causis: ‘Prima rerum creaturarum est esse’. Esse autem est actus entis. Sed tales vocat Dionysius indoctos, in 1 cap. De mystica theologia, ubi dicit sic: ‘Istos autem dico (subaudi: indoctos), qui in existentibus sunt firmati nihil super existentia supersubstantialiter esse opinantes’.*

151 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 975 – p. 35, l. 977. For Berthold’s echo of Luke 1:79 (*qui in tenebris et in umbra mortis sedent*), see 4.5, n. 291, below.

152 See 4.5, below.

its content, then, the *Expositio* is best viewed as part of a Dominican exegetical tradition on the *Liber de causis* that held Dionysius in the highest authority, which Berthold emerged out of and attempted to reform.¹⁵³

The broader commentary tradition on the *Liber de causis* antedated Albert and Thomas, and continued well beyond the 14th century in the universities and in the *studia* of the mendicant orders.¹⁵⁴ Unfortunately, we know nothing about its use among Dominicans in 14th-century Germany since all relevant documentation from provincial chapter meetings has been lost.¹⁵⁵ Little information even survives from the other provinces of the order. In 1305, the Dominican general chapter in Genoa decreed that schools of natural philosophy (*studia naturarum*), the first of which was attested in the province of Provence in 1262, were to be instated in all provinces throughout the order.¹⁵⁶ The rationale behind the establishment and development of these schools in Provence at that time is not clear. Since Albert's commentaries on Aristotle were largely completed by 1262 and certainly all finished by 1271, the same year Provence ratified the program in natural philosophy for the province, it is tempting to ponder whether there was any link between the emergence of these schools and the progress of Albert's project "to make all these parts [of philosophy] intelligible to the Latins".¹⁵⁷ Outside of Provence, the establishment of these schools happened more gradually. The Roman province, for instance, after their initial hostility and then indifference to the teaching natural philosophy, only created its first eleven schools of natural philosophy in 1288.

According to the decree of the central authority in 1305, the *studia naturarum* had a two-year curriculum. By 1307 in the Roman province and by 1327 in

153 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Expos. tit.* K, p. 48, l. 401 – p. 49, l. 407: *Ex praemissis summam colligitur et forma seu modus procedendi in hoc libro et ratio nominis ipsius, quod a forma imponitur, scilicet elementationis theologiae, et quare non vocatur 'prima philosophia' seu 'metaphysica' aut 'de pura bonitate' aut 'de lumine luminum' vel 'de causis causarum' aut 'de floribus divinorum', sicut quidam alii consimilem tractantes materiam, sed in excelsum dissimiliter a praesenti auctore suas editiones vocare curarunt.* This list of titles derives from Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. II, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 59, l. 19 – p. 61, l. 68.

154 D. Calma, "Du néoplatonisme au réalisme et retour. Parcours latins du *Liber de causis* aux XIII^e – XVI^e siècles", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 54(2012), p. 217–276, at p. 227–238; id., "The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism", p. 13–26.

155 Palazzo, "Philosophy and Theology", p. 75–79.

156 For what follows in this paragraph and the next, see Mulchahey, *First the Bow is Bent in Study*, p. 252–277; Calma, "Du néoplatonisme au réalisme et retour", p. 229–233.

157 Albert the Great, *Physica*, ed. P. Hossfeld (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1987–1993), lib. I, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 1, l. 43–49.

the province of Toulouse (which the province of Provence became after 1303), it had been expanded to three years. In the Italian schools, one year was spent with the *Metaphysics*, the *De anima*, “and related texts”, perhaps the *Parva naturalia*, and another year with the *Physics*, *On Generation and Corruption*, “and certain works following these”, perhaps the *De caelo* and the *Meteorology*. Marian Michèle Mulchahey conjectures that, following the loose correlation that can be discerned between the Dominican curricula and the more extensive programme in arts at the University of Paris, the *Liber de causis* might have been taught alongside Aristotle’s biological treatises in the third year of study, but we have no direct evidence for this.¹⁵⁸ In Toulouse, we know that the *Liber de causis* was taught by William of Leus, but this occurred in its school of theology sometime between 1290/1291 and 1308.¹⁵⁹ As for its schools of natural philosophy, later records from Toulouse in 1327 placed Aristotle’s *Ethics* at the centre of their annual curriculum with a three-year rotation of his works on natural philosophy. This seems not to have included the *Liber de causis*, which was mentioned only as part of the curriculum of two newly founded *studia moralis philosophiae* in 1330, where it appeared alongside Aristotle’s *Ethics*, *Economica*, and the *Magna moralia*. So while we can be quite certain that the *studia naturarum* were established in Teutonia in the early 14th century, and definitely by the time Berthold began teaching there in the late 1310s, we cannot know whether the *Liber de causis* was part of the standard curriculum.

The *Summa* of Nicholas of Strassburg, written between 1315 and 1321 and preserved in only one manuscript (MS Vaticano [Città del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3091), offers some clues about the situation in the German Dominican schools of natural philosophy.¹⁶⁰ This encyclopaedic compilation was to be divided into four books, corresponding to the four causes (Book I: efficient cause; II: material cause; III: formal cause; IV: final cause), but it ends partway through the third book.¹⁶¹ In its prologue, Nicholas stated that

158 Mulchahey, *First the Bow is Bent in Study*, p. 271–272.

159 D. Carron, “A Theological Reading of the *Liber de causis* at the Turn of the Fourteenth Century. The Example of William of Leus”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages*, 1, p. 467–550.

160 See Nicholas of Strassburg, *Summa. Liber 2, tract. 1–2*, ed. G. Pellegrino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2009); id., *Summa. Liber 2, tract. 3–7*, ed. G. Pellegrino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2009); id., *Summa. Liber 2, tract. 8–14*, ed. T. Suarez-Nani (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990). The critical editions of Books I and III are in preparation.

161 For an edition of the prologue of the *Summa* and a detailed table of contents, see Imbach, R., Lindblad, U., “*Compilatio rudis ac puerilis*. Hinweise und Materialien zu Nikolaus von Strassburg OP und seiner *Summa*”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), p. 155–233, at p. 198–223.

one of his aims was to assist students who had been hindered by the lack of books (*defectus librorum*) in the conventual libraries of the provinces. As Ruedi Imbach and Ulrika Lindblad have observed, this resonated with concerns raised at Dominican general chapter meetings in 1308, 1315, and 1323 about the state of the friars' education in the provinces.¹⁶² Nicholas explained that his intention was to compile a work from the resources of the Dominican tradition, singling out Albert and Aquinas (*doctorum ordinis et specialiter venerabilium doctorum fratris Thomae de Aquino et domini Alberti*), though the *Summa* also demonstrates his familiarity with the writings of Dietrich of Freiberg, John Picardi of Lichtenberg, and Hervaeus Natalis.¹⁶³ In light of these declarations, and Nicholas' self-deprecating characterisation of the *Summa* as "an unskilled and childish compilation" (*compilatio rudis ac puerilis*), Imbach and Lindblad have insisted that the work should not be judged according to its innovations, but as "an encyclopaedic manual of philosophy".¹⁶⁴

Gianfranco Pellegrino has made an important qualification of this verdict by pointing out that the *Summa* was intended to be much more than a *florilegium* of juxtaposed sources: Nicholas sought to produce a coherent argument about the nature of wisdom itself.¹⁶⁵ Pellegrino draws attention to Nicholas' use of the commentary of William of Conches on Boethius' *Consolatio philosophiae* and, specifically, to his interpretation of the allegorical meaning of the garment worn by Lady Philosophy. The prisoner in the *Consolatio* learns that Philosophy sewed this garment for herself after it was torn apart in the sectarian divides that arose after the time of Plato. Pellegrino argues that this image must have resonated with the Dominican friar, who was confronted not only with the lack of books in the provincial *studia*, but also with the disaggregation of philosophical wisdom in the abundance of *compendia*, *florilegia*, tables, abbreviations, and concordances. What was needed for the reunification of wisdom was not another work in the style of *pro et contra*

162 See Imbach, Lindblad, "Compilatio rudis ac puerilis", p. 177–180, who argue that Nicholas likely had the *studia naturarum* in mind.

163 Sturlese, "Eckhart, Teodorico e Picardi"; Imbach, Lindblad, "Compilatio rudis ac puerilis", p. 180–187.

164 Imbach, Lindblad, "Compilatio rudis ac puerilis", p. 182.

165 G. Pellegrino, "La *Summa* di Nicola di Strasburgo (1315–1320). *Compilatio rudis ac puerilis* o *novus libellus*?", in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam*, p. 204–215; id., "Novus ex veteribus libellus. Guglielmo di Conches nella *Summa* di Nicola di Strasburgo", in C. Martello, C. Militello, A. Vella (eds), *Cosmogonie e cosmologie nel medioevo. Atti del Convegno della Società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Catania, 22–24 settembre 2006* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2008), p. 339–349.

Thomam, but a new book (*novum libellum*) that looked to the past as a source of renewal.¹⁶⁶

Berthold was educated within the order as it acknowledged and responded to the need for a reform of studies. In 1315, when Nicholas began composing his *Summa*, Berthold was dispatched to Oxford. Like Nicholas, Berthold would aim to consolidate a Dominican tradition of philosophical theology. Nicholas was engaged, sometimes critically, with the thought of Dietrich of Freiberg, but generally he opted for more concordist attitude.¹⁶⁷ Berthold, who was more influenced by Dietrich than any other contemporary author, shared more of Dietrich's combative spirit, and in fact redoubled and redirected Dietrich's criticisms beyond their original scope.¹⁶⁸ Both Nicholas and Berthold endeavoured to follow Albert's methodological principle that philosophy should proceed in the light of its own principles without theological intervention.¹⁶⁹ Both Dominicans referred to their works as "compilations".¹⁷⁰

-
- 166 Pellegrino, "La *Summa* di Nicola di Strasburgo", p. 205: "Secondo Nicola il rinnovamento culturale è possibile solo in continuità con il passato perchè gli *aurea tempora* sono passati, ma non per sempre".
- 167 On Dietrich in Nicholas, see Sturlese, "Eckhart, Teodorico e Picardi"; Imbach, Lindblad, "*Compilatio rudis ac puerilis*", p. 182–189; T. Suarez-Nani, *Tempo ed essere nell'autunno del medioevo. Il De tempore di Nicola di Strasburgo e il dibattito sulla natura ed il senso del tempo agli inizi del XIV secolo* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1989); U.R. Jeck, *Aristoteles contra Augustinum. Zur Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Zeit und Seele bei den antiken Aristoteleskommentatoren im arabischen Aristotelismus und im 13. Jahrhundert* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1994); N. Largier, "Time and Temporality in the 'German Dominican School'. Outlines of a Philosophical Debate Between Nicolaus of Strasbourg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Eckhart of Hoheim, and Ioannes Tauler", in P. Porro (ed.), *The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic Debate and Its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 221–253.
- 168 E. King, "Sapiens modernus. The Reception of Dietrich of Freiberg in Berthold of Moosburg", forthcoming.
- 169 Berthold effectively refers to his text as a *compilatio* in the two *tabulae auctorum* (*compilata est*). For Nicholas and Albert's methodology, see Imbach, Lindblad, "*Compilatio rudis ac puerilis*", p. 189: "Nikolaus bedient sich bei der Redaktion seiner *compilatio rudis ac puerilis* des albertschen Methodenprinzips einer scharfen Trennung von Philosophie und Theologie, um mit Hilfe von Texten aus dem Umkreis des Pariser Schulthomismus die Autonomie und Eigenart der deutschen Philosophie zu unterwandern und sie mit alternativen Denkmodellen zu konfrontieren."
- 170 With the *Expositio* Berthold included a table of authorities (*tabula auctorum*) comprised of two lists, "the doctors of the Church" and "the renown philosophers". Each list is prefaced with the heading, "from whose books and teachings the following *Exposition of the Theological Elementation* is compiled" (*de quorum libris et sententiis infra scripta expositio Elementationis theologiae compilata est*). In both extant manuscripts, the lists appear after the index. However, both lists in the Vatican manuscript read "*infra scripta*", while the Oxford manuscript has "*infra*" for the *doctores*, and "*supra*" for the *philosophi*. See the "Prolegomena" to Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1–13*, p. xlii.

Of Berthold it has been said that his “originality [...] often consists in the cutting and mixing of his sources so as to make them say what they originally did not”.¹⁷¹ In one sense, this is a profoundly accurate judgement that underscores the need to read Berthold intertextually, by making constant comparisons with his sources. Leaving things there, however, one would miss the forest for the trees. To discover the deeper coherence of Berthold’s philosophical vision, one must attend to the patterns of his modifications and juxtapositions in his commentary-as-compilation, for there was in his view a point where all these lines must converge. Like Nicholas, Berthold used Boethius’ *ekphrasis* of Lady Philosophy’s garment to describe the character of his project. Berthold, however, did not opt for a model derived from Aristotle (the four causes) to preserve it intact. The most important detail in the *ekphrasis*, in his view, was the image of the ladder emblazoned on her robe, which he used as a simile for the individual propositions of the *Elementatio theologica*, which, he believed, revived the pristine philosophy that Plato had once articulated in theorems (*theoremata*), and which would lead not only to bliss in this life, but even deification (*omnis beatus deus*).¹⁷² This was a Boethian amplification of the praises that Aquinas and others had bestowed upon the *Liber de causis*, as a science of the realities whose contemplation leads to felicity in this life. In terms of its form, practical utility, and its audience, the *Summa* of Nicholas of Strassburg is probably the closest parallel we have to the *Expositio*. For Berthold, however, the integrity and intricacy of Lady Philosophy’s garment was appreciated only by looking much further back than the *aurea tempora* of 13th-century achievements, but to the accord of her most ancient devotees.

After the loftier and exhortative prefaces to the *Expositio*, which are freer and more creative in their execution of traditional medieval literary forms, a reader of the commentary cannot help but notice, if not suffer, the repetitive style of Berthold’s exegesis of the *Elementatio* itself. He commented on each proposition using a basic and uniform structure. First, he always began by copying the proposition from the *Elementatio*, without Proclus’ proof. If the proposition in question is the first of what Berthold regarded as a thematic group, he would signal the subsequent stages of the argument (e.g., Proposition 1; Proposition 14). Most of the time, however, Berthold would briefly state how the proposition in question logically followed the preceding one. He would

171 C. Steel, “The Neoplatonic Doctrine of Time and Eternity and its Influence on Medieval Philosophy”, in P. Porro (ed.), *The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 3–32, at p. 29.

172 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Expos. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 14–29; *Expos. tit. L*, p. 49, l. 408–p. 51, l. 479.

then announce the division of his own commentary, which almost always fell in two parts, which he called the *suppositum* and the *propositum*, “what is supposed” and “what is proposed”. The *suppositum* and *propositum* almost always have tripartite subdivisions corresponding to distinct arguments. These two principal parts are comprised mostly of tacit and explicit citations, and they take up most of the *Expositio*. Finally, Berthold copied Proclus’ own *commentum* or demonstration, which he analysed by distilling the argument to syllogisms, with frequent cross-references to earlier propositions, and rarely made any appeal to external authority.

Berthold’s procedure in these three parts (*suppositum*, *propositum*, *commentum*) thus wove together two exegetical methods. Both can be said to reflect specifically on the literal sense of the *Elementatio theologica* and, accordingly, of the entire philosophical tradition that Berthold compiled upon its frame.¹⁷³ The first tendency was based more on tradition and authority. Berthold evidently wrote the *suppositum* with the individual terms and concepts of the proposition itself in view and sought to introduce the reader to the broader philosophical history presupposed by these terms and by Proclus’ argument in the proposition. Whether those sources were later than the *Elementatio* was of no significance. A typical example is the *suppositum* of Proposition 2 (“Everything, that participates one, is one and not one”):¹⁷⁴ first, Berthold offered one or more general definitions or descriptions of the notion of “participation” (*in generali*), which he synthesised explicitly from older sources (*Clavis physicae*, Augustine, Boethius, and Gilbert of Poitiers) and tacitly from contemporary ones (Dietrich of Freiberg); secondly, he enumerated the possible modalities of “participation” in particular (*in speciali*), which amounted to a kind of index of the orders of invisible substances; thirdly, he presented a synthesis of the general and particular that applied the background directly to the subject of proposition, by relating the particular modalities of participation to their common source in the One. The reader thus would be brought to see how succinctly this rich doctrinal background is presupposed and recapitulated in Proclus’ proposition. The second principal part or *propositum* often proceeded in a similar fashion but looked ahead to the terms and arguments

173 On Berthold’s concern to establish the literal sense of the *Elementatio* and his comparison of manuscripts to establish the correct text, see L. Sturlese, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, p. xi–xii.

174 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica, translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca*, ed. H. Boese (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), prop. 2, p. 3, l. 1: *Omne quod participat uno et unum est et non unum*.

found in Proclus' own demonstration of the proposition in the *commentum*. Finally, in the *commentum*, we find a second exegetical method, which was based on syllogistic analysis. Here, Berthold examined Proclus' demonstration, line by line, in order to elucidate its argumentative rigour and its conformity to the requirements of scientific procedure. Thus, with the *propositum* acting as a bridge, these three parts comprised a seamless process of commentary whose emphasis shifted from authority to reason, but never indulged in any flights of speculation or allegorisation that could not be immediately justified by the specificity of Proclus' technical language. Berthold's attitude here was clearly one of subordination and fidelity to the *Elementatio* and the tradition it allowed him to recapitulate: his task was to bring the reader to share in his vision of its luminosity.

As we know it today from the two extant manuscripts, the *Expositio* is a work that can be easily consulted and mined for arguments and authorities, without needing to be read from cover to cover. Even if its assumptions and conclusions would rarely satisfy contemporary scholars who have many more texts from Proclus and his contemporaries at their disposal, its literalism and attentiveness to philosophical terminology means that the *Expositio* can still serve quite well as a reference work for the entire Latin medieval Platonic tradition. Berthold noticed connections between authors that modern scholarship only gradually came to acknowledge (e.g., Boethius and Proclus on providence; Bernard of Clairvaux and the Eriugenian *Clavis physicae* on deification). The functionalisation of the commentary as a reference work is facilitated to a large extent by an alphabetical index of subjects and authors that amounts to over 160 pages in the critical edition.¹⁷⁵ This index presupposes a system of marginal pagination that divides the commentary on each proposition into sections that are designated with letters. For example, under the lengthy index entry for *Anima*, one finds a list of theses (e.g., "the soul is immortal because it is self-moved") with references to a particular proposition and, sometimes, to a particular section (e.g., 17A) of the *suppositum* or *propositum*.

The index as we have it is incomplete. There are several empty entries, which appear more frequently beginning with the letter "I".¹⁷⁶ Sometimes two entries for an identical term are separated by several other entries, with one left redundant and empty (e.g., *Operatio*; *Principium*). Most references do not take the alphabetical subdivisions of each commentary into account and

175 Berthold of Moosburg, *Tabula contentorum in Expositione super Elementationem theologiam Procli*, ed. A. Beccarisi (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2000).

176 Empty entries by letter: C (1); I (7); M (2); N (2); O (6); P (7); Q (2); R (1); S (9); T (2); V (2); Y (1); Z (1).

refer only to the proposition number or to the title of the relevant preface (*in prologo; in titulo; in praeambulo*). The more precise references that do provide both the proposition number and the subsection letter are distributed evenly throughout the index.

We should therefore entertain the possibility that the index and this system of subdivisions, with the functionalisation of the commentary that it would reflect, was either a later addition by Berthold, and was left unfinished at his death, or was the result of a later intervention. One indication that it was not part of the original plan is the fact that the internal references in the *Expositio* never make use of the alphanumeric system and are either vague (*ut supra / infra ostensum est*) or mention only the proposition number, where it would have been possible to give more precise information.¹⁷⁷ The first known explicit reference to the *Expositio* (from mid- to late 14th-century Regensburg) would seem to suggest that the commentary circulated at one stage without its index and the subdivisions of the text it presupposed.¹⁷⁸ This anonymous Dominican writer from Regensburg, commenting on Peter Lombard, referred to “theorem 8, the second principal article” (*theoremate 8, articulo secundo principali*), which, as is clear from the context, was a citation of 8D. The *suppositum*, from 8A–C, was regarded as a first principal article, and the *propositum* from 8D–F the second. What this suggests is that these “articles” – the *suppositum*, *propositum*, and possibly the *commentum* – were conceived as the primary building-blocks of the commentary, with their distinctive scholarly methods, and that the text was only eventually adapted to its use as a reference work. At any rate, by the time the extant manuscripts of the *Expositio* were copied, both the *Expositio* and the index were attributed to Berthold.¹⁷⁹ With these basic elements (its repetitive method, its ordering of knowledge on the frame of the *Elementatio*, its comprehensive treatment of the separate substances, its utility), the *Expositio* came to imitate the genre of medieval philosophical “encyclopaedism”.¹⁸⁰

177 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 3D, p. 97, l. 197–198: *in principio supra praemissa*; 11A, p. 187, l. 67: *ut supra 8 circa finem signatum est*.

178 See Conclusion, section 1, below.

179 MS Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2192, f. 362vb: *Explicit expositio cum tabula fratris Bertholdi de Mosburch ordinis fratrum predicatorum quondam lectoris Coloniensis province Theotonie super Elementatione theologica Procli completa etc.*

180 On this genre, see G. Guldentops, “Henry Bate’s Encyclopaedism”, in P. Binkley (ed.), *Pre-Modern Encyclopaedic Texts. Proceedings of the Second COMERS Congress, Groningen, 1–4 July 1996* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), p. 227–237; I. Draelants, “Le ‘siècle de l’encyclopédisme’. Conditions et critères de définition d’un genre”, in A. Zucker (ed.), *Encyclopédire. Formes de l’ambition encyclopédique dans l’Antiquité et au Moyen Âge* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013),

Throughout the commentary, by far the most frequently occurring first-person verb is *declarabo*, which is found in Berthold's introductory remarks to each proposition, usually with the direct objects *suppositum* and *propositum*. *Declarare* and *exponere* are practically synonymous terms in medieval pedagogical vocabulary.¹⁸¹ Inasmuch as *declarare* connotes the active intervention and understanding of the interpreter, it can be contrasted with *recitare*, the retention or rehearsal of opinions.¹⁸² This reflects precisely the kind of *compilatio* that Berthold undertook. For him, this intervention in the philosophical tradition amounted to demonstrating (*ostendam*) and positing (*ponam*) certain theses in triadic patterns – not to doctrinal innovation or novelty or, in almost every case except the doctrine of reincarnation, to sitting in judgement over Proclus.

As with Nicholas' *Summa*, one need not regard the compilation as a literary form as inherently antithetical to a coherent, if unwittingly original, philosophical vision. This is certainly the case for Berthold of Moosburg. For Berthold, it was clear that this scholarly and exegetical activity, which sought to reconstruct and revive the ancient wisdom of Plato and his predecessors, was intrinsically related to the fulfilment of human desire. Apart from his use technical pedagogical vocabulary, the only moment we glimpse something more of Berthold's self-understanding is at the conclusion of his *Prologus*, in his description of himself as a lowly contemplator (*humilis theoreticus*), who "with Plato and Boethius", and Lady Philosophy, acknowledges that, since the

p. 81–106; I. Ventura, "On Philosophical Encyclopaedism in the Fourteenth Century. The *Catena aurea entium* of Henry of Herford", in G. de Callatay, B. Van den Abeele (eds), *Une lumière venue d'ailleurs. Héritages et ouvertures dans les encyclopédies d'Orient et d'Occident au Moyen Âge. Actes du colloque de Louvain-la-Neuve, 19–21 mai 2005* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Centre de recherche en histoire des sciences, 2008), p. 199–245; ead., "Encyclopédie et culture philosophique au Moyen Âge. Quelques considérations", in A. Zucker (ed.), *Encyclopédire. Formes de l'ambition encyclopédique dans l'Antiquité et au Moyen Âge* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), p. 107–123. On philosophical *florilegia*, see J. Hamesse, "Les florilèges philosophiques. Instruments de travail des intellectuels à la fin du moyen âge et à la Renaissance", in L. Bianchi (ed.), *Filosofia e teologia nel trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 1994), p. 479–508; L. Sturlese, "Philosophische Florilegien im mittelalterlichen Deutschland", in K. Elm (ed.), *Literarische Formen des Mittelalters. Florilegien, Kompilationen, Kollektionen* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000), p. 39–72, reprinted in id., *Homo divinus*, p. 155–167.

181 M. Teeuwen, *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), p. 245–246.

182 J. Hamesse, "Approche terminologique de certaines méthodes d'enseignement et de recherche à la fin du moyen âge. *Declarare, Recitare, Conclusio*", in O. Weijers (ed.), *Vocabulary of Teaching and Research between Middle Ages and Renaissance. Proceedings of the Colloquium, London, Warburg Institute, 11–12 March 1994* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), p. 8–28, at p. 16–17.

divided cannot unify itself, when seeking to know things above itself, it is most appropriate to supplicate the most divine light with prayer if the seeker is to attain unto the paternal fount of light that is at once “the principle, conveyance, guide, path, and boundary”:

And therefore, with Plato and Boethius, I deem it good that the lowly contemplator should resolutely implore the most divine light with supplicant prayers, saying: O most blessed, most excellent, most revered, most honourable, most complete, most omnipotent, most free, most sovereign, most virtuous, most simple Light; remove from those who seek you the innate restriction of nature, the crooked habitual ways, the indolent discipline, the ignorance of the measure of intellectual capacity, the aversion to the light of intelligible lucidity, the dread of such subtlety, the degree of remoteness, the presumption of familiar intelligibility, the search for too much provability and demonstrability!

‘And grant, Father, that our minds may climb to your august throne, Grant the sight of the Fount of good, and grant light to fix upon you the mind’s unblinded eye! Disperse the clouds and weight of this earthly concretion; shine in the splendour that is yours! For you are serenity, you are untroubled rest for worshippers, to see you is the end, you, the principle, conveyance, guide, path, and boundary – the same.’¹⁸³

It was not with innovations that Berthold intended to dazzle his reader but by redirecting their vision to the same light that Plato and Boethius had once implored and beheld by its condescension. For the *humilis theoricus*, then, the philosophical apprehension of that light, and the exegetical search for the truth of the luminous ancient tradition that was its familiar, had to proceed by the only method that awakens the one of the soul (*unum animae*): by coming to know divine things “not according to ourselves”.

183 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 974 – p. 35, l. 989: *Igitur cum Platone et Boethio bonum esse reor humilem theoricum obnixè lucem divinissimam votis supplicibus invocare dicendo: O beatissima, excellentissima, reverendissima, honorabilissima, totalissima, omnipotentissima, liberalissima, dominantissima, virtuosissima, simplicissima lux, aufer a te quaerentibus innatam naturae deminutionem, pravam assuefactionem et pigram exercitationem, ignorantiam mensurae intellectualis capacitatis, aversionem a luce intelligibilis claritatis, horrorem tantae subtilitatis, distantiam longinquitatis, praesumptionem propriae cognoscibilitatis, inquisitionem nimiae probabilitatis et demonstrabilitatis! ‘Et da, Pater, augustam menti conscendere sedem, / da fontem lustrare boni, da luce reperta / in te conspicuos animi defigere visus! / Dissice terrenae nebulas et pondera molis / atque tuo splendore mica! Tu namque serenum, / tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis, / principium, vector, dux, semita, terminus idem.’*

PART 1

**Non secundum nos. *Platonism
as Philosophical Revelation***

Ah, beloved, that a pagan has understood this and arrived there, while we remain so far from it and so unlike it, is to us a disgrace and a great shame. Our Lord attests to it when he says, “The kingdom of God is within you”.¹

In a sermon preached on the Gospel for Trinity Sunday, the Dominican John Tauler (c. 1300 – 1361) began by introducing the feast as the end and goal of all celebrations in the liturgical year, just as Trinity is for the rational creature. It is impossible, he admitted, to speak of its dignity in adequate terms, for the feast receives its meaning entirely from the Trinity it celebrates, and no created intellect can comprehend the dynamic equality and distinction of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the joy that is theirs. For this reason, Tauler told his hearers, it is better for us leave the finer points of doctrine to the clerics who must defend the faith – better for us to experience or feel it (*ze bevindende*) than to speak about it, to have Trinity “come to birth in the ground” not in a rational way, but “essentially”, not in speech, but in reality.²

Notwithstanding these cautionary remarks, the preacher did not shy away from offering rational and self-critical guidance along the path.³ Continuing to develop the parallelism of celebration and celebrant, Tauler insisted that our approach toward the Trinitarian mystery must be through the image of God (*imago Dei*) in the soul. Just as the feast celebrating the Trinity is ineffable because of what it celebrates, so too for Tauler the image of God was not a way of making God manifest; it was rather the principle of an apophatic anthropology, according to which the ground of the soul is drawn up into the same darkness in which the Trinity dwells: “no one can speak in appropriate terms about the nobility of this image”. With this as his measure, Tauler invited his audience to consider three different descriptions of

1 John Tauler, *Predigt 6od* (Trinity Sunday), in *Die Predigten Taulers. Aus der Engelberger und der Freiburger Handschrift sowie aus Schmidts Abschriften der ehemaligen Strassburger Handschriften*, ed. F. Vetter (Berlin: Weidmann, 1910), p. 301, l. 1-3: *Kinder, das ein heiden dis verstunt und darzuo kam, das wir dem also verre und also ungelich sint, das ist uns laster und grosse schande. Dis bezúgete unser herre do er sprach: ‘das rich Gottes ist in úch’.*

2 John Tauler, *Predigt 6od* (Trinity Sunday), p. 298, l. 10 – p. 299, l. 34.

3 John Tauler, *Predigt 6od* (Trinity Sunday), p. 300, l. 5-27.

the *imago Dei*. The first, not attributed to any authority, claims the image consists in the powers of memory, intellect, and will, by which the soul is capable of receiving the Trinity. This is inadequate, argued Tauler, because it simply reiterates what is apparent to everyday experience. Such potentiality and transience are inadequate expressions of God. The second view, attributed to Thomas Aquinas, improved upon this, insofar as he stated that the image is only perfect when the powers are in act (*würklich*). But Tauler was not satisfied with this either, apparently for the same reasons. Finally, he continued, there are other masters whose opinion is “unspeakably superior”. They hold that in the soul’s deepest ground (*grunde*), the soul has the Trinity “essentially, actually, and subsistently” (*wesentlichen und wirklich und isteklich*). According to their view, God has an eternal covenant (*ewigen ordenunge*) with this ground, and he can no more be separated from it than he can be from himself. Grace arises in the soul in the extent to which a person abandons oneself to this ground and turns toward it, and so, Tauler concluded, that is what we must do.

Now, the preacher asked, how is one to approach this ceaseless activity? Even if it is beyond speech, by what tokens can it be recognised? At this point, on Trinity Sunday of all days, Tauler introduced the authority of Proclus. He paraphrased one of the *Tria opuscula*, the *De providentia et fato* (8.30–32), as follows: as long as we are occupied with images below us, we are incredulous that there is such a ground within us; if you want to experience this (*daz bevinden*), leave all multiplicity and cultivate the singular focus of intellect, and then abandon even this and “become one with the One” (*wurt eins mit dem einen*). In other words, follow the guidance of Proclus, who called this ground and its activity “a still, silent, dormant, divine, and frenzied darkness” (*eine stille swigende sloffende goetteliche unsinnige dúnsternisse*).⁴

This was not an aberrant turn in Tauler’s preaching. There are five references to Proclus in Tauler’s sermons (*Predigten* 60d, 61, twice in 64, and 65). All of them, as Loris Sturlese has shown, provide clear evidence of his acquaintance with Berthold’s interpretation of the *Tria opuscula*.⁵ Indeed, Tauler’s valorisation of Proclus, and his placement of him ambiguously alongside the best of the Christian teachings about the *imago Dei* (that is, Dietrich of Freiberg’s

4 John Tauler, *Predigt 60d* (Trinity Sunday), p. 300, l. 27 – p. 301, l. 1.

5 L. Sturlese, “Tauler im Kontext. Die philosophischen Voraussetzungen des ‘Seelengrundes’ in der Lehre des deutschen Neuplatonikers Berthold von Moosburg”, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* 109(1987), p. 390–426, at p. 415–421, reprinted in id., *Homo divinus*, p. 169–197.

interpretation of Augustine) corresponds closely to the tensions we will find in Berthold's anthropology. Beyond these doctrinal convergences noted by Sturlese, one may also say that Tauler's sense of the ramifications of the acknowledgement that Proclus has achieved what he did, as "a disgrace and a great shame" to Christians of his time, was also in profound continuity with the spirit of Berthold's *Expositio*.⁶ In Berthold as in Tauler we find something much more volatile than the domestication of a pagan philosopher for a Christian audience or, for that matter, an argument about pagan philosophy as a *praeparatio Evangelii*. Instead, both Dominicans presented Proclus' achievement as a challenge for Christian self-understanding. The dignity of the soul that was known to Proclus and had been forgotten since the time of the ancient sages was regarded by these preachers as a more adequate expression of the truth of Christianity than what they saw around them in their own day. In other words, they used Proclean description of God's hidden and abiding presence in the soul, his "eternal ordinance", in an operation of reform directed at the Christian understanding of the human as *imago Dei*.⁷

6 See the parallel verdict in John Tauler, *Predigt 61* (Nativity of John the Baptist), ed. F. Vetter, p. 332, l. 21 – p. 333, l. 2: *Aber do kamen die grossen meister als Proculus und Plato und gaben des ein klor underscheit den die dis underscheit als verre nüt vinden enkonden. Sant Augustinus sprach das Plato das ewangelium In principio al zemole hette vor gesprochen bis an das wort: 'fuit homo missus a Deo'; und das was doch mit verborgen bedekten worten, und dise fundent underscheit von der heiligen drivalentikeit. Kinder, dis kam alles us disem inwendigen grunde: dem lebent si und wartent des. Das ist ein gros laster und schande das wir armen verbliben volk, die cristen sint und als grosse helfe hant, die gnade Gotz und den heiligen glouben und das heilig sacrament und als manig grosse helfe, und gont recht umbe als blinde huenr und erkennen unser selbes nüt das in uns ist, und erwissent dannan ab ze mole nüt: das machet unser grosse manigvaltikeit und uswendikeit, und das wir als vil mit den sinnen wúrken [...]*. ("But there came the great masters like Proclus and Plato, and they gave a clear discernment to those who were not able to discern it so well on their own. Saint Augustine says that Plato had plainly explained the Gospel, *In principio*, as far as the phrase, *fuit homo missus a Deo*, which was however written there in hidden words. They also discovered the distinction in the Holy Trinity. Ah, beloved, all of this came from the inner ground, for whose sake they lived and which they waited upon. It is a disgrace and a great shame that we, humble successors that we are, who are Christians and have such great aids at our disposal, the grace of God, the sacred faith, the holy sacrament, and so many other great aids – that we go around in circles like blind hens, without knowing ourselves nor what is within us, and never know anything about it. This is the result of our great manifoldness and outwardness, and that we are much too occupied with the works of the senses [...]").

7 Cf. K. Flasch, *Meister Eckhart. Philosoph des Christentums* (München: Beck, 2011), p. 190, 227, 249–250. English translation: K. Flasch, *Meister Eckhart. Philosopher of Christianity*, trans. A. Schindel, A. Vanides (New Haven / London: Yale University Press, 2015), p. 158: "[Eckhart] possessed the typical education in philosophy and theology of any Dominican of his time; he took up the intellectual certainties and methods of his contemporaries, reshaped them, and, equipped with his philosophical reform, set out to redefine the main concepts of the

The spirit of Berthold of Moosburg's own scholarly attitude to ancient wisdom and his views about the content of the Platonic philosophy which was the crowning achievement of that wisdom, can be summarised in a phrase from Dionysius he often cited:

one must see that our mind has a certain power for knowing, through which it examines things intelligible, but a union exceeding the nature of the mind (the other translation says: 'a unity superexalted beyond the nature of the mind'), through which the mind is conjoined to those things that are above it. Therefore, it is necessary to think divine things according to this, not according to ourselves [*non secundum nos*], but our whole selves placed outside our whole selves and deified wholly. For it is better to be God's and not our own; thus, divine things will be given to those made to be with God.⁸

For Berthold, the teaching that united the greatest philosophers and theologians (Plato, Paul, Dionysius, Augustine, Boethius) was that theology must proceed "intellectually", by turning away from multiplicity and images, and by gazing upon the simple Form or Good forming all things. This intellectual progression was understood to culminate, only after great labour and even then not automatically, in a "divine frenzy" beyond the mind and in a union with the divine providence. At the same time, since the golden age of philosophy that had perfectly articulated the relation of the human to the divine world above

Christian doctrine of faith and life for his contemporaries and to make them comprehensible to academics and laypeople alike"; p. 191: "while the commentary on John is primarily focused on a reform of metaphysics and the consequent reform of Christianity, as well as on a new philosophy of nature, it contains reflections on ethics that make it easier for the reader to understand Eckhart's German sermons. [...] The grounds of reason, Eckhart writes, convince us that the good man, the *homo divinus*, is not an isolated individual but rather exists in a community. Eckhart's theory of sociality presupposes his philosophical theory of wholeness. According to this, every member of the community simultaneously serves itself and others. Everything that Christians do or suffer pertains to all of them. Everything belongs to them in common, *omnibus sanctis aut bonis sunt omnia omnium bona communia* (LW 3, n. 386, 329.6–7). This social aspect lies in the idea of the Good itself: someone who loves the Good loves the good in all others"; see also p. 211.

- 8 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeambulum* C, p. 64, l. 408–413: *oportet – inquit – videre mentem nostram habere quidem virtutem ad intelligendum, per quam intelligibilia inspicit, unionem autem excedentem mentis naturam* (alia translatio dicit: 'unitatem autem superexaltatam super mentis naturam'), *per quam coniungitur ad ea, quae sunt supra ipsam. Secundum hanc igitur divina oportet intelligere, non secundum nos, sed totos nos ipsos extra totos nos ipsos statutos et totos deificatos. Melius est enim esse Dei et non nostri ipsorum; ita enim erunt divina data cum Deo factis*. Cf. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.1, 865C–868A.

it was entirely in the past, “not according to ourselves” became an exegetical principle. Philosophy and exegesis were deeply intertwined in Berthold’s project of reform.

In the three prefaces to the commentary (*Prologus*, *Expositio tituli*, *Praeambulum*), Berthold used literary forms that gave him more freedom to articulate the larger aims of his project. In what follows, we will consider each preface in turn. We will find that, when they are interpreted in light of their sources, the same pattern appears in all of them. Berthold took concepts, arguments, and praises traditionally associated only with Christian theology and extended them into the domain of Platonism as such. But this was no revolutionary overthrow or demotion of Christian doctrine. Rather, it was a contribution to a reform of Christian philosophical theology through the recovery of an understanding of nature (the macrocosm) and humanity (the microcosm) that was held in common by the ancient pagan and Christian inheritors of Plato. Platonism was for Berthold in the fullest sense a natural or “philosophical revelation”;⁹ guiding the human toward something in its nature that it is naturally disposed to ignore. We recall the words of Proclus, cited approvingly by Tauler: as long as we are occupied with images below us, we are incredulous that there is such a ground within us. Turning then to the first preface, the *Prologus*, we will find nature presented as the outward manifestation of the inner, “supersubstantial world” or “house of God”. At its conclusion, we will find the contemplator (*theoricus*) seeking to enter this abode, first by turning inward, and then by going above himself, through the *imago* or trace of the One in the soul.

9 The expression is that of L. Sturlese, “*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds von Moosburg und die Probleme der nacheckhartschen Zeit”, in K. Ruh (ed.), *Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), p. 145–161, reprinted in id., *Homo divinus*, p. 145.

Prologus

The first of the three prefaces to the *Expositio* is an academic sermon on Romans 1:20: “The invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are beheld, being understood through the things that are made”.¹ The academic sermon was a widely used exegetical introduction (*accessus*) first developed by theologians in the 12th century, and is known by scholars also as a “sermon type” prologue that displays the standard techniques of the preaching arts (*artes praedicandi*).² In these introductions, a Scriptural passage would be applied to the contents of the text under discussion, even a profane one, just as a preacher uses a pericope at the beginning of a sermon.³ Berthold followed this pattern closely, and even concluded the *Prologus* with the prayer found at the centre of Boethius’ *Consolatio philosophiae*.

Just as a medieval preacher would ruminate over each line or each word of their pericope, so Berthold divided the verse from Romans into three parts (*Invisibilia Dei / a creatura mundi / per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur*). Each part begins with an analysis of the phrase or lemma, and first unfolds several possible interpretations of its grammar: for instance, the genitive in *invisibilia Dei* can either be taken “intransitively”, such that it refers to the divine essence as Trinity and the divine ideas in the Word,⁴ or “transitively”, such that it denotes the procession of all things into being through those primordial causes.⁵ The second phrase, *a creatura mundi*, can mean that

1 This identification of its literary form was first made by Boese, *Wilhelm von Moerbeke*, p. 69–70.

2 B. Smalley, “Peter Comestor on the Gospels and his Sources”, in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 46(1979), p. 84–129, at p. 109–110; G. Dahan, “Les prologues des commentaires bibliques (XII^e–XIV^e siècle)”, in J. Hamesse (ed.), *Les prologues médiévaux. Actes du Colloque international organisé par l’Academia Belgica et l’École française de Rome avec le concours de la F.I.D.E.M. (Rome, 26–28 mars 1998)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), p. 427–470, at p. 438–443.

3 One could compare Berthold’s intricate *accessus* with the prologues of Nicholas Trevet, a Dominican master in the Faculty of Theology in Oxford whose regency, as noted above, coincided with Berthold’s studies there. On Trevet’s prologues, see M.L. Lord, “Virgil’s *Eclogues*, Nicholas Trevet, and the Harmony of the Spheres”, in *Mediaeval Studies* 54(1992), p. 186–273, at p. 193–205. Like Trevet’s *accessus* to his commentary on Virgil, Berthold followed his sermon prologue with an *Expositio tituli* modelled on the Aristotelian four causes.

4 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 3, p. 7, l. 77 – p. 9, l. 133.

5 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 4–6, p. 9, l. 134 – p. 14, l. 286. This grammatical distinction had its roots in Trinitarian theology, where it was used to explain relations of identity

“from which” the invisible things are seen, meaning the macrocosm, or that “in which” they are seen, which is the microcosm or subject who contemplates the invisible world.⁶ Finally, *per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur*, is taken to refer to the diverse means through which the invisible things are contemplated by philosophical reasoning.⁷

What makes the *Prologus* remarkable from a stylistic and cultural point of view is that, at the heart of the sermon, on the phrase *a creatura mundi*, Berthold included two citations of the *Asclepius* attributed to the pre-Platonic sage, Hermes Trismegistus. Berthold treated both passages as “descriptions” (that is, definitions that do not exhaust their subject), which he glossed by lemmata, using the same method he had adopted for Romans 1:20.⁸ The gloss on the Hermetic text applied to the macrocosm takes up 282 lines of the preface (*Prol.* 8–13),⁹ and that on the microcosm 310 lines (*Prol.* 14–19). Hence, over half of this academic sermon on Romans (989 lines) is devoted to interpreting Hermes Trismegistus. Berthold was evidently making a bold statement, especially when one recalls that, in Romans 1:22–31, Paul went on to reproach

(intransitive) and distinction (transitive). Cf. Alan of Lille, *Summa 'Quoniam homines'*, ed. P. Glorieux, in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 20 (1953), p. 113–364, at p. 253, l. 35–38: *Hoc autem quod dicitur Pater esse sapiens sapientia Patris, dupliciter potest intelligi: vel transitive vel intransitive. Intransitive ut sit sensus: sapientia Patris id est que est Pater; vel transitive sapientia Patris, id est que procedit a Patre. Si ergo intransitive signatur, verum est Patrem esse sapientem sapientia que est Pater. Si vero transitive, falsum.* See also the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae, vol. 1 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924), lib. 1, pars 1, inq. 2, tr. unicus, q. 1, tit. 2, c. 3, a. 2, p. 445: *Ad octavum dicendum quod spiritus intelligentiae potest dici dupliciter: transitive et intransitive. Intransitive, ut dicatur spiritus intelligentiae spiritus qui est intelligentia, et hoc modo accipitur ibi; vel transitive, et sic supponit vel pro persona Filii, cuius est Spiritus Sanctus tamquam ab ipso procedens, vel pro effectu in creatura, quia intelligentia in nobis est a Spiritu Sancto. Intelligentia etiam, secundum quod ponitur intransitive, potest accipi essentialiter et personaliter: essentialiter, convenit toti Trinitati, et etiam potest dici 'Spiritus Sanctus est intelligentia'; personaliter, sic appropriatur Filio.*

6 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 7, p. 14, l. 287–292. Furthermore, if the genitive in *a creatura mundi* is taken intransitively, then it refers to the entire universe of things; if taken transitively, it denotes only the created existence of certain things.

7 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 20, p. 32, l. 881–883: *sciendum, quod diversi sapientes et theologi et philosophi diversis viis in ista materia processerunt.*

8 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 8–9, p. 14, l. 296–300: *Macrocosmus, scilicet maior mundus, sic describitur per Trismegistum [...]. Circa istam descriptionem considerandum [...]; Prol.* 14–15, p. 23, l. 570–578: *Verum circa microcosmum, id est hominem, sciendum, quod per Trismegistum ubi supra sic describitur [...]. Circa istam descriptionem primo occurrit scire [...].*

9 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 8, p. 14, l. 296–299: *Mundus est opus Dei immutabile, gloriosa constructio, bonum multiformi imaginum varietate compositum, machina voluntatis Dei suo operi absque invidia suffragantis.*

the gentiles who turned away from the creator and became idolators, and who were thus “without excuse” because the invisible things had been made known to them. As we will see, Berthold did not ignore the passages in Hermes describing the manipulation of divine power and the animation of man-made statues. He addressed these much later in the commentary, where he did his utmost to present these doctrines as Hermes’ failure to live up to own philosophical principles. The overall impression Berthold makes on his audience here is somewhat different. If one were to read Paul after reading only Berthold’s *Prologus*, one could be forgiven for assuming that the Apostle’s judgement in fact bears on those who turn away from the Platonic consensus about the *invisibilia Dei*: if this is what God has revealed nature to be capable of, then those who turn away from it are indeed without excuse.

1 Hermes Trismegistus and Thomas of York

The centrality of Hermes Trismegistus in Berthold’s thought has been the subject or starting point for several studies on the *Expositio*.¹⁰ What has not received sufficient attention is how Berthold’s portrait of Hermes was in fact drawn from various direct and indirect sources. Before Françoise Hudry and

10 On Berthold’s reception of Hermes, see U.R. Jeck, “Die hermetische Theorie des Mikrokosmos in der Metaphysik Alberts des Grossen und im Prokloskommentar des Berthold von Moosburg”, in *Patristica et Mediaevalia* 20(1999), p. 3–18; A. Sannino, “Berthold of Moosburg’s Hermetic Sources”, in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 63(2000), p. 243–258; ead., “Il concetto ermetico di natura in Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), *Hermeticism from Late Antiquity to Humanism*, p. 203–221; ead., “Il Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum nella metafisica di Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam*, p. 252–272; A. Palazzo, “La ricezione di un passo ermetico (*Asclepius* 8) nel tardo medioevo. Ulrico di Strasburgo, Pietro di Tarantasia, Riccardo di Mediavilla, Bertoldo di Moosburg e Dionigi il Certosino”, in T. Iremadze, T. Tskhadadze, G. Kheoschvili (eds), *Philosophy, Theology, Culture. Problems and Perspectives. Jubilee Volume Dedicated to the 75th Anniversary of Guram Tevzadze* (Tbilisi: Nekeri / Arche, 2007), p. 104–25. For Hermes as an entry-point into studies on Berthold’s theory of intellect, see B. Mojsisch, “Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Berthold von Moosburg. Zur Proklosrezeption im Mittelalter”, in Th. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, O. Summerell (eds), *Selbst – Singularität – Subjektivität. Vom Neuplatonismus zum Deutschen Idealismus* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 2002), p. 175–184; I.J. Tautz, *Erst-Eines, Intellekte, Intellektualität. Eine Studie zu Berthold von Moosburg* (Hamburg: Kovač, 2002); T. Iremadze, *Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter. Dietrich von Freiberg – Berthold von Moosburg – Joane Petrizi* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 2004).

Fiorella Retucci demonstrated the extent of Berthold's reliance on Thomas of York,¹¹ whom the Dominican innocuously placed at the bottom of the list of Doctors of the Church as *frater Thomas anglicus minor*, it was believed that Berthold was thoroughly familiar with all three of the major philosophical-religious Hermetic texts available at the time: the *Asclepius*, the *Liber de vi rerum principiis*, and the *Liber xxiv philosophorum*.¹² Now, however, it is possible to demonstrate that Berthold relied entirely on intermediary sources for his citations of the *Asclepius* and the *De vi rerum principiis*, but made direct use of the *Liber xxiv philosophorum*. We begin with Thomas of York, because it was his *Sapientiale* that exerted the greatest influence on Berthold's attitude toward pagan and Christian antiquity in general, and probably inspired his decision to interpret Romans 1:20 through Hermes.¹³

Thomas of York cited the *Asclepius* extensively in the *Sapientiale* (193 times). By way of comparison, there are 87 citations of the text in Albert the Great's entire oeuvre.¹⁴ Thomas also cited the 12th-century *De vi rerum principiis*, which he attributes to Hermes, 28 times.¹⁵ Berthold cited the *Asclepius* 79 times (67 from Thomas; 6 from William of Auvergne; 4 from Albert;¹⁶ 1 from Ulrich; 1

11 See F. Hudry's edition of *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 18, which was a commentary on the *Liber xxiv philosophorum* that Thomas abandoned after the third maxim, in Hermes Latinus, *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum*, p. 87–96. For Fiorella Retucci's publications on Thomas, see Introduction, section 1, n. 9, above.

12 Sannino, "Berthold of Moosburg's Hermetic Sources", p. 247. On the medieval reception of these three texts, see P. Lucentini, "Hermes Trismegistus II. Middle Ages" in W. Hanegraaff (ed.), *Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism*, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 479–483, and Lucentini, P., Perrone Compagni, V., "Hermetic Literature II. Latin Middle Ages", in W. Hanegraaff (ed.), *Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism*, vol. 1, p. 499–529. On the *Asclepius* in particular, see P. Lucentini, *Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia nel medioevo* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2007), p. 71–105.

13 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437, f. 212va). I am very grateful to Fiorella Retucci for sharing these unpublished materials from the Archivum fratris Thomae Eboracensis (Thomas-Institut, Cologne). For the identification of Berthold's tacit borrowings from Thomas, I have also benefitted immensely from Retucci, "Between Cologne and Oxford". The first portion of the critical edition of the *Sapientiale* has been published. See Thomas of York, *Sapientiale. Liber III, cap. 1–20*, ed. A. Punzi (Firenze: SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2020).

14 D. Porreca, "Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York. A 13th-Century Witness to the Prominence of an Ancient Sage", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 72 (2005), p. 147–275, at p. 149. This study has been invaluable for what follows.

15 Porreca, "Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York", p. 151–152.

16 From Albert, Berthold used two unusual titles: *De natura deorum* (73A, p. 44, l. 28–29, apud Albert the Great, *De caelo et mundo*, ed. P. Hossfeld [Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1971], lib.

untraced¹⁷) and the *De vi rerum principiis* 35 times (all from Thomas).¹⁸

For Berthold, it was paramount that the *Liber xxiv philosophorum* be included alongside these texts in the Hermetic corpus.¹⁹ Medieval thinkers, however, were not unanimous on this attribution. Despite the fact that Thomas was the first author known to have quoted more than its first two maxims, and to have used the commentaries accompanying the maxims at all,²⁰ David Porreca regards Thomas' sole explicit attribution of the text to Hermes as a sign of hesitation,²¹ which anticipated Albert the Great's rejection of the attribution.²² Berthold, however, consistently maintained its Hermetic authorship, and cited the *Liber xxiv philosophorum* 52 times.²³ Although two or three of these citations are clearly connected to passages copied from the *Sapientiale*, Berthold was undoubtedly directly familiar with the text and its second commentary. Citing its prologue, he maintained that Hermes compiled the text and gave it its title, *De regulis theologiae*, and announced that he would insert passages from the text into the *Expositio* where the doctrines of Hermes and Proclus agree.²⁴ While he almost always referred to the text as Hermes'

1, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 4, l. 85–90) and *De causis* (52A, p. 119, l. 72, apud Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, pars 1, tr. 5, q. 23, c. 1, a. 1, p. 122, l. 30–33; *Hermes Trismegistus in Libro de causis*).

17 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 13, p. 22, l. 540–541; 199A, p. 152, l. 34–35: *mundus est 'quasi organum vel machina summa Dei voluntati subiectus'*.

18 Sannino, "Berthold of Moosburg's Hermetic Sources", p. 253–258, lists the citations of Hermes in the *Expositio*. One may now easily compare these with the citations from Thomas identified in Retucci, "Between Cologne and Oxford".

19 On this text, see P. Dronke, *Hermes and the Sibyls. Continuations and Creations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), reprinted in id., *Intellectuals and Poets in Medieval Europe* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1992); Z. Kaluza, "Comme une branche d'amandier en fleurs".

20 Lucentini, Perrone Compagni, "Hermetic Literature 11. Latin Middle Ages", p. 511.

21 Porreca, "Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York", p. 152; F. Hudry, "Introduction", in *Hermes Latinus, Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum*, p. xxvi. I interpret Thomas differently, both in light of a second citation in *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 27, which Porreca (p. 216, n. 304) related to *Asclepius* 36 but which seems closer to maxim 22 of the *Liber* (as Berthold observed, see below, n. 28), and because of the importance of the explicit reference to the *Liber* in *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 14, which established that the Trinity was known to Hermes.

22 L. Sturlese, "Saints et magiciens. Albert le Grand en face d'Hermès Trismégiste", in *Archives de Philosophie* 43(1980), p. 615–634, at p. 620–621.

23 This figure includes his use of a rare second commentary appended to the 24 maxims of the *Liber*, on which see Hudry, "Introduction", p. xxxvii–xlvi.

24 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 116A, p. 59, l. 9–16: *tempore Hermetis Trismegisti, 'congregatis viginti quattuor philosophis [...]'. Quas descriptiones ipse Trismegistus in unum compingens intitulavit ipsum libellum De regulis theologiae, ex quibus cogitavi quasdam huic operi inserendas, ubi maxime congruere videbatur.*

regulae or *De regulis theologiae* (e.g., 12E; 131B; 188B),²⁵ he also called it *De xxiv descriptionibus* (137A), a title which likely derived from *Sapientiale*, 1.18.²⁶ But his independence from Thomas is clear when, for instance, after copying out *Sapientiale*, 1.14, which contained Thomas' only explicit attribution of the text to Hermes, Berthold changed the title he read there, from *Viginti quattuor propositiones* to *De regulis theologiae*, and then embellished the maxim with its corresponding *commentum*.²⁷ Elsewhere we find Berthold specifying an imprecise reference to the *Liber xxiv philosophorum* that he found in the *Sapientiale*.²⁸

At first glance it is puzzling that Berthold appeared to use *De Deo deorum* as a title for the *Liber xxiv philosophorum*, since he would have known that this was a secondary title for the *Asclepius* used three times by Thomas of York.²⁹ In one instance, while citing Thomas, Berthold referred to the *Asclepius* by that title,³⁰ and elsewhere he repeated the attribution independently.³¹ One

25 This attribution is found in manuscripts P and V in Hudry's stemma, which belong to the group transmitting the second commentary used by Berthold (see Hudry, "Introduction", p. xxvii and xxix).

26 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 18, ed. F. Hudry, p. 87, l. 5: *Post haec ponam descriptiones uiginti quattuor [...]*.

27 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131B, p. 193, l. 85–88. This was Berthold's consistent practice with the *Sapientiale*, which he relied on principally as a thesaurus of ancient texts. For example, after copying portions of *Sapientiale*, lib. 111, c. 25, in *Expositio*, 12E, p. 202, l. 172 – p. 203, l. 209, Berthold added passages from Dionysius, the *Liber de causis*, and the *regulae* of Hermes.

28 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 178E, p. 196, l. 258–260: *apparet idem »per tres praepositiones, quas ponit Trismegistus« de prime Deo in Regulis suis. Nam secundum ipsum 'Deus est, in quo, per quem et ex quo omnia [...]'*. Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 27 and *Liber xxiv philosophorum*, ed. F. Hudry, maxim 22, p. 29, l. 1–3: *Deus est ex quo est quicquid est non partitione, per quem est non variatione, in quo est quod est non commixtione*.

29 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 117A, p. 68, l. 10–11: *quod vii regula Trismegisti De Deo deorum talis est: 'Deus est principium sine principio, processus sine variatione, finis sine fine'*.

30 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Expos. tit. K*, p. 47, l. 368–369: *sicut dicit Trismegistus ad Asclepium De hellera (hellera] hedera V), id est De Deo deorum*. Cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 5 (MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437, f. 5va): *sicut dicit Trismegistus Ad Asclepium. Vocat sermonem De edera, hoc est Deo deorum, omnium sermonum*. Porreca, "Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York", p. 189, attributes Thomas' use of this title to the influence of William of Auvergne (p. 150–151). The text from William (*De legibus*, c. 23) was cited independently by Berthold at 115B (p. 52, l. 65–66): *Hanc, inquam, adventionem extollit Mercurius Trismegistus dicens in libro, quem scripsit De hellera, hoc est De Deo deorum [...]*.

31 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114A, p. 40, l. 25 – p. 41, l. 29: *»Positio vero deorum non superstitiosa nisi nomine solum erat Platonis et Platoniam philosophiam veraciter sectantium, quippe secundum Hermetem multi dicti sunt dii participatione eius, qui omnium est maximus, scilicet deus deorum.« Unde et liber suus vocatur De Deo deorum, hoc est 'Deus magnus dominus et rex magnus super omnes deos' [Ps. 95:3]. Cf. Thomas of York,*

should not, however, conclude from these instances that Berthold read the *Asclepius* first-hand, or that he conflated the *Liber* and the quotations from the *Asclepius* he read indirectly and assumed that both belonged to a larger work, the *De Deo deorum*. Instead, it seems more likely that Berthold knew that the *Ad Asclepium*, the *De hellera* and *De Deo deorum* referred to the same work. In 117A he was not citing *De Deo deorum* as the title for the *Liber*, as the italics in the critical edition suggest, but rather was providing a description of its contents. Indeed, Berthold's custom with the *Liber XXIV philosophorum* was to take a maxim about God (*prime Deus*) and extend its application to the gods or primordial causes (*omnis deus*).³² Berthold's portrait of Hermes relied primarily on materials he found in Thomas of York and was elaborated by his own admiring use of the propositional theology of the *Liber XXIV philosophorum*. Whether or not Thomas or Albert regarded the *Liber* as an authentic work of Hermes, for Berthold this text served as a high-water mark in the development of ancient paganism. In 116A, as we saw, he stated that the *De regulis* as a compilation made by Hermes of an earlier tradition. Its philosophical achievement for Berthold consisted in both its traditional content and its rarefied theore-matic form.

This portrait of the Hermetic corpus in the *Expositio* was held together by internal tensions that shed light on Berthold's understanding of pagan antiquity: tensions between the philosophical religion of the *Asclepius*, notwithstanding some objectionable passages, and the more austere *Liber XXIV philosophorum*, on the basis of which he was able to argue that the pagans themselves had arrived to a philosophically sound henotheism. Berthold's opening commentaries on the propositions on the gods in the *Elementatio theologica*, which are the subject of Propositions 113 to 165, contain a high concentration of citations of the *Asclepius* and the *Liber XXIV philosophorum*. Especially instructive are Berthold's commentaries on Propositions 114–115, 120, and 131, where the *Asclepius* played a major role (17 citations from *Sapientiale* 1.10 and 1.14, and from William of Auvergne) and Propositions 116–117, 119, 123, 126 and 131, which include nearly half of Berthold's citations of the *Liber XXIV philosophorum* (27 citations).

Sapientiale, lib. 1, c. 10 (MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437, f. 10rb), which had just cited Hermes' *Ad Asclepium* explicitly.

32 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 116A–B, p. 59, l. 9–28; 117C, p. 69, l. 54–56; 119C, p. 84, l. 59–62; 126C, p. 157, l. 99–101, each beginning with *Omnis deus*. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 178E, p. 196, l. 258–259: *Secundo apparet idem per tres praepositiones, quas point Trismegistus de prime Deo in Regulis suis*.

Berthold inherited from Thomas of York a view of Hermes which placed him on both sides of the condemnation of idolatry.³³ Both Berthold and Thomas confronted Hermes' discussion in the *Asclepius*, c. 23–24, of man-made statues that were intended to channel divine influence. Berthold included additional and lengthy passages from William of Auvergne condemning Hermes, “a most prudent man”, for holding that “gods are made by human artifice and power” and that they are endowed with “wonderous powers”. Hermes, “though wise in many things”, was on this matter foolish beyond measure.³⁴ His idolatry stemmed from a failure to recognise that “the powers of God diffused in the world” participate in one God, and that if the human has any strength from itself, then even it must be greater than the work of its hands.³⁵ Both of these principles, according to Berthold, make the animation of statues unintelligible.

These criticisms, however, come immediately after Berthold, following Thomas, placed Hermes on the side of Plato and “the true philosophers” as advocates of a rigorous henotheism.³⁶ In Proposition 114, the first to begin with *Omnis deus*, Berthold agreed with Thomas about the false assumptions that led the ancients to mistaken beliefs about the gods.³⁷ He used arguments from Ulrich of Strassburg that associate the name *Deus* with providence to explain how this name can be extended participatively (*participative*) to the primordial

-
- 33 Cf. Porreca, “Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York”, p. 154–160; Sannino, “Berthold of Moosburg's Hermetic Sources”, p. 249–251. On the principal divisions in the Latin reception of the *Asclepius*, between Lactantius' favourable reception, Augustine's denunciation in *De civitate Dei* (vii.23–24, 26; xviii.29) and Quodvultdeus' more positive portrayal (which, because his text was transmitted with Augustine's sermons, was subsequently attributed to the bishop of Hippo), see Lucentini, “Hermes Trismegistus II. Middle Ages”.
- 34 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 115B, p. 52, l. 82–88: *Sed mirum est de errore istius prudentissimi viri, quo posuit statuas cum illis execrationibus, quas ipse vocat consecrationes, deos factitios esse et humano artificio atque potentia deos effici, attribuens illis virtutes divinas mirificas. [...] ut ipse dicit in multis sapiens, sed in hoc desipiens supra modum.* Cf. William of Auvergne, *De legibus*, ed. F. Hotot, *Opera omnia*, vol. 1 (Paris: Thierry, 1674), c. 26, p. 85aA and c. 23, p. 67aB.
- 35 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 115B, p. 53, l. 89–91: *Non enim advertit vel advertere voluit, quia 'omne datum naturaliter et magis est apud datorem et maius, et omne causatum naturaliter et magis et maius apud causantem [...].'*
- 36 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114A, quoted at n. 31, above, and 115A, p. 50, l. 10–14: *deorum quidam est Deus deorum, sicut dicitur in 11 parte Timaeus Platonis, qui 'opifex et pater' esset aliorum, et illum omnes vere philosophantes singulare posuerunt eo, quod ille per naturam superessentialiter et principaliformiter Deus est, de quo Plato et Trismegistus dicunt, quod vix attingitur ab homine, cum maxime a carne avertitur.*
- 37 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114A, p. 41, l. 30–39, citing *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 10.

causes and, through them, to creatures.³⁸ Plato and Hermes were in agreement with this doctrine, which found a consummate expression in Dionysius, as the arguments from Ulrich demonstrated.

Similarly, in Proposition 115, before presenting William's critique of Hermes the worshipper of graven images, Berthold appealed to the *De deo Socratis* of Apuleius as a witness to Plato's account of "the kinds of gods": from the ineffable God, who is scarcely comprehended even by the few wise who separate themselves from the body, through the threefold division of "highest, middle, and lowest" gods. According to Apuleius, Plato called the highest gods "incorporeal and living natures, without end or beginning", "oriented to supreme beatitude through a perfect natural endowment [*ingenio*]", and "good through themselves without participation in any outside good", which Berthold evidently understood to be an explication of Plato's doctrine of the "lesser gods" in the *Timaeus*.³⁹ Therefore, by the time we come to William of Auvergne's criticism of Hermes, we are disposed to read it as an internal critique that exposes the sage's betrayal of his own philosophical insight (*in multis sapiens, sed in hoc desipiens supra modum*). Berthold's interpretation of Proclus on reincarnation will adopt the same strategy, by framing the objectionable texts as failures to penetrate beyond mythical coverings to the philosophical truth that acknowledged the unknown God as the source of all things.

In these two very rare critical moments in the *Expositio*, we glimpse what Berthold held to be the true standard of Platonism beyond even what he read in Proclus. In general, however, he was most interested in illustrating the agreement between the pagan and Christian sages. The Hermes of the *Liber xxiv philosophorum*, who followed the theorematic mode most suited to theology, produced statements that for Berthold were entirely in agreement with Dionysius' strongest and most important declarations about divine ineffability, which echoed what Berthold read in Apuleius about Plato's own views: "God is known by the mind only through ignorance", and "God is the darkness that remains in the soul after every light".⁴⁰ For Berthold, this was the highest truth

38 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 41, l. 41 – p. 43, l. 109. For a comparison of this passage with Ulrich's *De summo bono*, see Ferro, "Berthold of Moosburg, Reader of Ulrich of Strassburg", forthcoming.

39 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 115A, p. 50, l. 10 – p. 51, l. 56. Cf. Apuleius, *De deo Socratis*, ed. C. Moreschini, *Apulei opera quae supersunt. Vol. III. De philosophia libri* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1991), c. 3, p. 11, l. 3-10; c. 1, p. 7, l. 1-9; and p. 10, l. 12 – p. 11, l. 2.

40 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123M, p. 135, l. 347–348: *Huic alludit Trismegistus xxiii regula, cum dicit: 'Deus est, qui sola ignorantia mente cognoscitur'*; 123M, p. 137, l. 393–394: *Huic alludit Trismegistus xxi regula dicens: 'Deus est tenebra in anima post omnem lucem relicta'*. Berthold summarised every argument about divine ineffability in this

about God that united the greatest philosophers of antiquity, and Hermes had stated it with perfect clarity.

Berthold adopted from Thomas one further motif regarding the concord of Hermes and Plato, which undergirded the Dominican's Christian henotheistic interpretation of Proclus: the notion that the *Liber XXIV philosophorum* and the *Asclepius* attest to the Hermes' knowledge of God as Trinity.⁴¹ The Trinitarian interpretation of the *Liber's* first maxim (*monas monadem gignens, in se unum reflectens ardorem*), which was frequently transmitted alone or alongside the second maxim on God as "the infinite sphere, whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere", began in the 12th century with Alan of Lille, who attributed the first maxim to Cicero, and with Alexander Neckam, who ascribed it to Hermes.⁴² Berthold's source in 131B, on the pagan knowledge of the Son and Holy Spirit, was *Sapientiale* 1.14, where Thomas developed Augustine's judgement about the fundamental agreement between the books of the Platonists (*libri Platoniorum*) and the first verses of John's Gospel using ps.-Augustine (Quodvultdeus) on the Sibylline oracles, as well as the *Asclepius* on the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. Thomas then expanded this dossier of materials, which resembles what we find first in Peter Abelard, to argue that the pagans (Hermes, Seneca, Porphyry, and Macrobius) also had genuine knowledge of the Holy Spirit.⁴³ Berthold adopted all of this but innovated from Thomas in two ways: first, by offering Trinitarian exegeses of other maxims in the *Liber XXIV philosophorum*;⁴⁴ and secondly, and more importantly, by interpreting this history through the philosophy of Dietrich of Freiberg, whom he followed for the remainder of his comments on Proposition 131. For Dietrich, the abundant causal overflow

proposition with maxims from the *Liber XXIV philosophorum*: the eminence of the super-unifical first principle (123K: maxim 16), how it is known through ignorance (123L: maxim 23), and the divine nothingness (123L: maxim 21). This alone is clear evidence of Berthold's commitment to the view that Hermes anticipated the Platonic theology of Proclus and Dionysius and showed his perfect apprehension of these mysteries by expressing his theology in a theorematized form. Maxim 21, incidentally, seems also to have been known to John Tauler, who referred to its author as a saint. See John Tauler, *Predigt 56* (Nineteenth Sunday after Trinity), ed. F. Vetter, p. 263, l. 31 – p. 264, l. 1: *ein heilig schribet: 'Got ist ein vinsternisse nach allem liechte, sunder dem vinsternisse siner unbekandtheit'*.

41 F. Retucci, "Einleitung", in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–135*, p. xiv–xviii.

42 Hudry, "Introduction", p. xxv–xxvi.

43 On Abelard's originality in combining these sources, see J. Marenbon, *Pagans and Philosophers. The Problem of Paganism from Augustine to Leibniz* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), p. 74–78.

44 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131B, p. 193, l. 89–91. Cf. 117A-B, p. 68, l. 10–28.

of God and the separate intelligences (their *ebullitio*) is understood to be a result of an internal Trinitarian dynamism (*quaedam interioris respectiva transfusio*).⁴⁵

On this second point, one should note that the lengthiest consideration of pagan knowledge of the Trinity in the *Expositio* is found here, in Proposition 131 ("Every god begins its proper operation from itself").⁴⁶ Berthold's basic assumption was that unless the best of the pagans already knew that the fecundity of the divine nature requires such an "interior transfusion", and that this is most fully realised in the Trinity and mirrored in lower principles, they could not have articulated the theology he found traced in Hermes and the *Timaeus*, and restored in the *Elementatio*. Hermes and Plato understood that there is a relation of subordination between God or the One and the gods that participate the divine providence. But it was Proclus who articulated the logic of proportionality that took what is said of God in Hermes' maxims and applied it analogously to the secondary principles. Thomas of York's account of the pagan knowledge of God in antiquity was thus put in the service of a theory of causality that, although it was only explicated by Berthold's German Dominican predecessors, was now presented in the *Expositio* as the truth known to these ancient philosophers. Berthold never alluded to any contemporary authorities for this theory; his central concern was to recover the ancient consensus and present it as such. He therefore concluded his commentary on Proposition 131 by suggesting that this had been Plato's intention all along: "Therefore, in this way, every god is a 'craftsman and begetter of its own universe', as Plato says of the primarily God in the *Timaeus*."⁴⁷

Returning now to the *Prologus*, we notice that Berthold's lengthy glosses on the Hermetic description of the macrocosm were also thoroughly indebted to Thomas of York, especially *Sapientiale* VII.1. For each lemma of the Hermetic text, Berthold copied from Thomas citations of authors including Hermes, Plato, Cicero, and Pliny, but added numerous texts of his own from Scripture, Dionysius, Proclus, the *Clavis physicae*. In Berthold's sermon, this cloud of witnesses praises the world as a perfectly crafted, immutable, and variegated work that is filled with divine glory.

45 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131D-F, p. 195, l. 128 – p. 198, l. 237.

46 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 131, p. 66, l. 1: *Omnis deus a se ipso propriam operationem orditur*.

47 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131F, p. 198, l. 236–237: *Sic ergo omnis deus est 'opifex et genitor propriae universitatis' sicut de prime Deo dicit Plato in Timaeo*.

Thomas of York thus provided the basic components for this section of the *Prologus*, with its reverential and awestruck attitude toward nature. But Berthold's modifications of the *Sapientiale* show that he was keen to emphasise how the visible world's splendour is a consequence of its rootedness in the intelligible and supersubstantial worlds. For example, early in his remarks on the macrocosm, Berthold stated that Hermes called the entire world a work (*opus*) rather than a creation (*creatura*), as Paul did, "perhaps because of the primordial causes" that precede the creation of the world, as Dionysius and his commentator, Maximus, agreed.⁴⁸ Plato and Boethius also concur that the visible world was drawn out of the invisible world.⁴⁹ The invisible world, for its part, is "immutable". The contemplator may ponder how immutability is communicated to the visible world when as the world is viewed as a whole, which is presided over by the world soul (*anima totalis*).⁵⁰ From this standpoint, the entire order is understood to be a glorious edifice (*gloriosa constructio*) that, as Cicero wrote, is the common abode and domicile of gods and human beings. Then, focusing on the terms "abode" and "domicile", Berthold proceeded to give an elaborate description of this house that "wisdom, the infinite sphere, whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere, has built for itself". This, he explained, is house that the Father has made first in the divine Word.⁵¹ The seven columns of wisdom's abode referred to in Scripture (Proverbs 9:1), continued Berthold, are in fact the seven intentions that comprise the primordial causes: goodness, infinity, being, life, intellectuality, animateness, and physicality. The final picture, then, is tripartite. These columns or primordial causes comprise are the "supersubstantial" foundations of the "substantial" invisible world, from which this visible world takes its origin.⁵²

At the end of each explanation of a syntagm from Hermes' description of the macrocosm, Berthold invited his audience to share in the philosophers' vision (*Ecce!*) of the splendour of this world and its archetype, each time using the words of Scripture to voice his praise.⁵³ Two instances of these Scriptural conclusions are especially illustrative of Berthold's attitude to pagan wisdom. The first, which we simply note in passing, is the final phrase of the section devoted to the macrocosm, where Berthold combined Psalm 92, the *Timaeus*,

48 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 9, p. 14, l. 300 – p. 15, l. 320.

49 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 9, p. 15, l. 328–337.

50 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 10, p. 16, l. 364 – p. 17, l. 385.

51 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 11, p. 17, l. 404 – p. 20, l. 476.

52 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 10, p. 16, l. 364–365.

53 On the role of Scripture in the *Expositio*, see also P. Hellmeier, "The Meaning of the Biblical Citations in the *Expositio* of Berthold of Moosburg", forthcoming.

and the *Asclepius* into one sentence.⁵⁴ But a more daring combination, and more typical of Berthold's procedure in the *Prologus* as a whole, was when he exclaimed with the Psalmist:

Oh, what "glorious things of you are spoken, city of God"! For your entire edifice rises up into a holy and wonderful temple, into which you too, primordial causes, have been built together for a habitation of God through the Holy Spirit.⁵⁵

The echo of Ephesians 2:20–22 is remarkable in its connotation.⁵⁶ Whereas the epistle referred to the Church as "the household of God", founded on Christ as its cornerstone, in whom the redeemed are built up and are made "fellow-citizens with the saints", Berthold addressed the same words directly to the primordial causes (*vos primordiales causae coaedificamini*), the foundations of the invisible and visible world that are in the divine Word. For Berthold, these divine principles were the means of deification for those seeking God. The Word remained the cornerstone, but the power of deification Berthold found refracted in the principles that inhabit it. For the soul to become God's temple, it must enter and conform itself to God's habitation. By extending the scope of Ephesians 2:20–22 from Christ, the saints, and the Church, to the Word and the primordial causes as the house or temple of God, Berthold moved within the exegetical possibilities opened by the motif of the macrocosm and microcosm: what is true of human nature (the saints) has its universal correlative in the cosmos (the primordial causes). Once again, we should assume that this interpretative extension was not intended as a denigration of the Church or an evacuation of its value, but rather as a testament to the splendour of these natural realities as the philosophers had apprehended them. Only such words sufficed to express that glory. The consequence of this extension, however, was to admit that the best of the pagans found the way to God's abode, simultaneously through nature and through the soul's own ground.

54 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 13, p. 22, l. 566–568: *'In operibus manuum tuarum exultabo', quia tu Deus, a quo omnis 'invidia longe relegata est; 'operi tui sine invidia suffragaris'.*

55 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 11, p. 19, l. 473 – p. 20, l. 476: *O quam 'gloriosa dicta sunt de te, civitas Dei!': omnis enim tui aedificatio crescit in templum sanctum et mirabile, in quo et vos primordiales causae coaedificamini in habitaculum Dei in Spiritum sanctum.*

56 Cf. Ephesians 2:20–22: *ipso summo angulari lapide Christo Jesu: in quo omnis aedificatio constructa crescit in templum sanctum in Domino, in quo et vos coaedificamini in habitaculum Dei in Spiritu.*

2 Hermes Trismegistus and Albert the Great

Hermes Trismegistus still held the central position of authority in Berthold's presentation of the microcosm (*Prol.* 14-19). Here again his remarks were structured as a lemmatic commentary on a passage from the *Asclepius*. This time, however, Berthold's direct source for Hermes was not Thomas of York, but Albert the Great. At the beginning of his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Albert assembled the following lines from the *Asclepius*, which for Berthold became a description of the microcosm:

The human is the nexus of God and the world [*homo est nexus Dei et mundi*], existing beyond the world through two kinds of scientific inquiry [*per duplicem indagationem*], namely, the physical and the quadrivial. Both are perfected through human reason. In this way the human is properly called the governor of the world [*mundi gubernator*]. He is, however, subjoined to God, receiving his beauties that are not immersed in the world, in extension and time, through a divine likeness, which is the light of the simple intellect, which he participates from the God of gods.⁵⁷

If Thomas provided the key to recovering the ancient pagan attitude toward the world as the manifestation of the hidden and Triune God, then Albert was equally instrumental in providing Berthold with an anthropology and a theory of intellectual, scientific progress that could explain how those philosophers achieved their discovery, and what the consequences of this realisation were for their activity within the world.

This anthropology located the *Expositio* firmly within the intellectual culture of Berthold's German Dominican predecessors, Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strassburg, Dietrich of Freiberg, and Meister Eckhart, and his contemporaries Henry Suso and John Tauler. Loris Sturlese has convincingly argued that

57 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 14, p. 23, l. 570–577: *Homo est nexus Dei et mundi super mundum per duplicem indagationem existens, physicam videlicet et doctrinalem, quorum utrumque virtute rationis humanae perficitur, et hoc modo mundi gubernator proprie vocatur. Subnexus autem Deo, pulchritudines eius non immersas mundo, hoc est continuo et tempori, accipiens per similitudinem divinam, quae est lumen simplices intellectus, quod a Deo deorum participat.* Cf. Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 2, l. 5-15. Albert used the Hermetic notion of man as the *nexus Dei et mundi* in three other works. See Albert the Great, *De animalibus*, ed. H. Stadler, 2 vols (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1916–1920), vol. 2, lib. XXII, tr. 1, c. 5, §9, p. 1353, l. 16–20; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, ed. A. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, vol. 9 (Paris: Vivès, 1890), lib. 11, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 517b; id., *Ethica*, ed. A. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, vol. 7 (Paris: Vivès, 1891), lib. x, tr. 2, c. 3, p. 627b.

a characteristic trait of all these authors was the urgency they felt to demonstrate the hidden, abiding dignity that belongs to the human as an intellectual creature or *imago Dei*.⁵⁸ At the origin of this tradition was Albert's synthesis of Hermes with the noetic doctrines of Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, in his theories of human nature, intellectual progress, and perfection, which can be summarised in the philosopheme taken from the *Asclepius*, *homo est nexus Dei et mundi*.⁵⁹

To the more familiar notion that the human being exists at the boundary of the eternal and the temporal, the immortal and the mortal, this image of a *nexus* added the further, dynamic connotation relating both to the ascent and descent of human activity to and from the divine. As the paean in chapters 6–11 of the *Asclepius* declared, to live in accordance with its twofold condition, humanity is called “to adore the heavens” through the sciences, the arts, ethical discipline, and above all, wonder, praise, and reverence for the immortal, and “to govern the earth”.⁶⁰ As Albert put it, the divinisation of the intellect attained through long study (*studium longum*) enables the human to realise its rightful dignity as governor (*gubernator*) of the world.⁶¹ Albert described the precise nature of this governance in different ways, sometimes emphasising its operative or magical aspects, such as the participated capacity to produce

58 L. Sturlese, “Intelletto acquisito e divino. La dottrina filosofica di Alberto il Grande sulla perfezione della ragione umana”, in *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 82/2(2003), p. 161–189, at p. 189; id., *Vernunft und Glück. Die Lehre vom intellectus adeptus und die mentale Glückseligkeit bei Albert dem Grossen* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 2005), p. 28–31; id., *Homo divinus*, p. 1–13.

59 Sturlese, “Saints et magiciens”; id., “Intelletto acquisito e divino”, p. 186–187. The phrase is described as a philosopheme by A. Palazzo, “Le fonti ermetiche nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), *Hermetism from Late Antiquity to Humanism*, p. 189–202, p. 196. Following Stephen Gersh, I understand “philosopheme” to mean a basic unit of philosophical discourse that differs from a “doctrine” in that it does not have to be employed entirely consciously by an author who uses it, and it does not, in principle, need to be capable of demonstrative formulation. See S. Gersh, “The First Principles of Latin Neoplatonism. Augustine, Macrobius, Boethius”, in *Vivarium* 50(2012), p. 113–138, at p. 116–117.

60 *Asclepius*, ed. C. Moreschini, *Apulei opera quae supersunt. Vol. III. De philosophia libri* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1991), c. 8, p. 47, l. 4–7: *Itaque hominem conformat ex animi et corporis, id est ex aeterna atque mortali natura, ut animal ita conformatum utraeque origini suae satisfacere possit, et mirari atque <ad>orare caelestia et incolere atque gubernare terrena*. Cf. Genesis 1:28.

61 Albert the Great, *De somno et vigilia*, ed. A. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, vol. 9 (Paris: Vivès, 1890), lib. III, tr. 1, c. 12, p. 195a–196b; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, lib. II, tr. unicus, c. 8–9, p. 514b–517b.

fascinations or to transform matter,⁶² while at other times he spoke of a kind of intellectual prophecy that follows upon perfection in the sciences.⁶³ Berthold will take up this second side of Albert.

Berthold's main concern in his exegesis of the Hermetic description of the microcosm was to establish the agreement between the anthropologies of Dionysius and Proclus, and especially relative to their notion of a "unity" or a "one of the soul" (*unum animae*) beyond intellect. To explain the structure and dynamics of this Platonic anthropology, Berthold constantly and tacitly made recourse to the works of his German Dominican forebears. As we proceed in our reading of his *Prologus* and *Expositio tituli*, we will see that Berthold united two distinct anthropological currents coming from his predecessors. With Albert the Great and Ulrich of Strassburg, he conceived of intellectual perfection in terms of an arduous scientific effort, which concurred with what he found in Proclus' *De providentia et fato* about the ascending modes of cognition from sense-perception and opinion to divine union beyond intellect. With Dietrich of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart, and like his contemporaries Henry Suso and John Tauler, he presented the restoration of the *imago Dei* alongside a critique of a lower form of rationality which cannot do justice to the inherent dignity of the spirit. Berthold's interpretation of the *De mystica theologia* tended to accentuate this element, although he found it in the *De providentia et fato* as well.

Both currents were already in play as Berthold began his lemmatic commentary on Albert's assembly of lines from the *Asclepius* describing the microcosm. He started by focusing on the hierarchical connotation of the term *nexus*, which implies relations to the lower and to the higher, and asserted that all conjunction occurs through likeness.⁶⁴ If the human is the nexus of God and the world, then it must resemble both terms. Accordingly, the human has four principal parts. The first three parts – body, soul, and intellect – are treated as self-evident (*tria manifesta sunt*) to everyday awareness. However, there is also a "one or unity" (*unum sive unitas*) in the soul that, as Proclus stated, is a "hidden vestige of the One" (*secretum unius vestigium*), which is more divine

62 Albert the Great, *De animalibus*, lib. xxii, tr. 1, c. 5, §9, p. 1353, l. 16–25; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, lib. ii, tr. unicus, c. 11, p. 519b. On Albert's complex and developing views about these magical and operative abilities, see A. Palazzo, "Albert the Great's Doctrine of Fascination in the Context of his Philosophical System", in L. Honnefelder, H. Möhle, S. Bullido del Barrio (eds), *Via Alberti. Texte – Quellen – Interpretationen* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 2009), p. 135–215.

63 This was the interpretation of Albert favoured also by Ulrich of Strassburg. See Palazzo, "Le fonti ermetiche", p. 195–196.

64 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 15, p. 23, l. 578–603.

than intellect. Berthold then cited Dionysius to add that this union (*unitio*) or unity (*unitas*) is lifted high above the nature of mind and is that through which the nature of mind is conjoined (*coniungitur*) to what is above it. Humanity resembles the macrocosmic realities below it through the body and soul, and those above it through the intellect and the *unum animae*.

In Berthold's treatment of the next lemma (*duplex indagatio*), Albert the Great's anthropology and noetics were his principal inspiration (*Prol.* 16). Berthold's remarks on the notion of scientific progression were mostly a tacit copy from Albert's *Metaphysica* I.1.1, which is summarised in what follows, though Berthold made three important modifications to his source that will be noted as we proceed. Albert began his *Metaphysica* by observing that the natural and quadrivial sciences had now been treated in other commentaries, and that each science has perfected the intellect in its own way: natural science perfected intellect insofar as it is related to time; quadrivial science perfected it in its relation to space.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the sciences can be arranged in a certain order. Natural sciences, because of their mutable objects, cannot achieve certainty and are inherently mixed with opinion. The quadrivial sciences produce stable knowledge because of the way they consider their objects, even though their objects are not in themselves separate from matter. With the latter sciences, Albert stated, one has reached the level of stable forms (*formae stantes*) and the threshold of metaphysics. Albert's main authority here had been the prologue of Ptolemy's *Almagest*. Berthold, however, at this point in his tacit paraphrase, moved from the *Metaphysica* to Albert's *Summa theologiae*, where Albert offered a similar argument about opinion and the physical sciences but attributed it to Plato's *Phaedo*. The reasons for this first modification, not to mention the facility with Albert's works it demonstrates, are obvious.

Before concluding his analysis of the *duplex indagatio* that prepares for the study of the divine science, Berthold touched on the term governor (*gubernator*) that he found in the description of the microcosm from the *Asclepius*. Albert had offered no explanation of this term in the *Metaphysica*, so once again Berthold had to depart from his principal source:

It is clear now that, through these sciences, and especially through astronomy and astrology, the human being is properly called 'the governor' of the sensible world. Among all who philosophise, to the astrologers alone it is granted by divine obligation to be inquirers of the celestial

65 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 16, p. 23, l. 604 – p. 24, l. 635.

decrees from the consideration of causes that are primary, natural, *per se*, essential, and sempiternal, and to be aware of things to come. For these thinkers never depart from the principles of nature and natural science, just as Haly in his *Commentary on the Quadripartitus* commends [us] to follow Ptolemy, and moreover because, according to Al-Farabi in *On the Origin of the Sciences*, the wise man is the measure of all things, dwelling among the elements and parts of the world, gaining the highest delights. And thus, according to Proclus in question 10 of *On Providence*, he rules the world with the gods.⁶⁶

At the summit of the *duplex indagatio* and at threshold of the divine science, then, is the science of the stars, whose practice is exemplified in Ptolemy. As the author of the mathematical *Almagest* and juridical *Tetrabiblos* (*Quadripartitus*), Ptolemy both had achieved perfection in the quadrivial sciences and had used this knowledge for action in the world – this is why for Berthold, following Ptolemy's commentator Haly ('Alī ibn Riḍwān, d. 1061), he was worthy of imitation. In Ptolemy, the two sides of the *nexus Dei et mundi* were brought together, demonstrating the intrinsic connection between the *duplex indagatio* and humanity's rightful role as *gubernator*. As Berthold explained, it is because the astrologer is familiar with essential and eternal causes that he can act in the world as its governor. This was high praise, but most remarkable was how Berthold described the practical activity of the astrologer by invoking one of the loftiest passages in the *Tria opuscula*, where Proclus, following Plato's *Phaedrus*, stated that a soul who travels with the gods through the heavenly circuit governs the world with them (*dispensat mundum cum diis*).⁶⁷ In our attempts to imagine how such a notion in Proclus would be understood by a 14th-century Dominican scholar, its presence in this

66 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 16, p. 24, l. 636 – p. 25, l. 646: *Ex praemissis satis patet, quomodo et physica et doctrinalia perficiantur virtute rationis humanae. Quod autem per eas et specialiter astronomiam et astrologiam homo mundi sensibilis vocetur proprie gubernator, apparet. Tum quia astrologis solis inter omnes philosophantes divino munere communicatum est decretorum caelestium ex consideratione causarum naturalium primarum per se et essentialium ac sempiternarum in futurorum eventibus scrutatores esse et conscios: Nequaquam enim a principiis naturae et naturalis scientiae discedunt, quemadmodum Haly in Commento Quadripartiti commendat procedere Ptolemaeum. Tum etiam quia secundum Alfarabium libro De ortu scientiarum sapiens est mensura omnium rerum, elementa et partes mundi inhabitans, summas delectationes acquires. Haec ille. Et sic secundum Proclum 10 quaest. De providentia dispensat mundum cum dis.*

67 The source was not *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, as Berthold recalled, but rather Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*, c. 7, §23, p. 201, l. 7 – p. 202, l. 10.

context is highly instructive. Throughout the *Expositio*, the phrase *dispensat mundum cum diis* will be associated with the providential cognition of the *unum animae*, the highest principle in human nature, which is to be awakened in the study of the subject matter treated in the *Elementatio theologica*. If this is somehow synonymous with the practice of the science of the stars, in both its mathematical and juridical aspects, then we must always keep this association in mind as we make our way through the commentary. In other words, the divine science of Proclus and the mystical theology of Dionysius do not lose their connection with the study of natural philosophy. This continuity must be preserved if the human is to be a *nexus Dei et mundi*.

These remarks on the *gubernator* signal that Berthold did not interpret the ecstatic cognition of the *unum animae* as a rejection of rational activity, but as identical to, or at least fundamentally continuous with, a kind of intellectual or natural prophecy.⁶⁸ Some clarity on this matter can be gained by looking to Berthold's source in Albert. Here he did not look to the *Metaphysica*, which did not gloss the term *gubernator*. Nor was it Albert's *De animalibus* XXII.1.5 (a text which Berthold knew in its autograph copy), which had discussed the Hermetic *nexus* and the term *gubernator*, since Berthold's notion of governance included none of the operative-magical abilities mentioned by Albert in that text. Berthold's source was very likely a passage occurring immediately prior to Albert's mention of the Hermetic *nexus Dei et mundi* in the *De intellectu et intelligibili*.⁶⁹ In this chapter, Albert presented his notion of the

68 On the notion of natural prophecy in Avicenna, who was a major source for Albert the Great on this question, see D.N. Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West. The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300* (London / Torino: The Warburg Institute / Nino Aragno Editore, 2000), p. 154–174. For a less positive verdict on the human capacity for certain prognostication, which is difficult to reconcile with *Prol.* 16, see Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120A, p. 91, l. 36–41: *futura contingentia nusquam habere possunt immobilem veritatem nisi in isto, qui est immobilis et simpliciter immutabilis, qui est Deus, sicut dicit Cicero De divinatione libro I cap. 23, quod 'futuræ res in causis' primordialibus 'sunt conditæ' sicut res 'in seminibus'; et ideo, qui tenet causas futurorum, tenet omnia futura; homo autem per signa potest scire futura, non per causas, et talis scientia dicitur potius coniectura.*

69 Albert the Great, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, lib. 11, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 517a: *Anima igitur humana concipiendo lumen cui applicatur intellectus agens in ipsa illustratus, applicatur lumen intelligentiarum, et amplius clarescit in illo: et sicut dicit Alfarabius, in ipso efficitur sicut stellæ coeli, et intellectus huic lumini beate et pure permixtus, peritissimus efficitur astrorum, et prognosticationum quæ sunt in astris. Et ideo dicit Ptolemaeus, quod 'scientia astrorum facit hominem pulchritudinem coelestem amare'. In illo autem lumine confortatus consurgit intellectus in lumen divinum, quod nomen non habet et inenarrabile est: quia proprio nomine non innotescit: sed ut recipitur, innotescit: et primum in quo recipitur, est intelligentia quæ est primum causatum: et cum enarratur, nomine illius enarratur et non*

assimilative intellect (*intellectus assimilativus*), which is the level of scientific perfection that follows after the already exalted state of the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*).⁷⁰ The latter denotes the stage at which, after long study, one attains or “acquires” their own intellect, inasmuch as one possesses the totality of intelligibles that the possible intellect is naturally disposed to receive through the unified light of the agent intellect. Since, for Albert, the human, insofar as it is human, is intellect itself, the acquired intellect corresponds to self-knowledge.⁷¹ The assimilative intellect signifies the next stage, in which the human ascends gradually, to the extent permitted to it, to the divine intellect through the simpler lights of the separate intellects.⁷² Here it becomes united with the ever simpler and more comprehensive forms of the

nomine proprio, sed nomine sui causati. Et ideo dixit Hermes 'Deum deorum non proprie percipi nomine proprio, sed vix mente attingitur ab his qui a corpore per longum studium separantur': iungitur igitur illi ultimo et lumini suo, et mixtus illi lumini aliquid participat divinitatis. Propter quod dicit Avicenna, quod aliquando illi lumini vere permixtus intellectus futura praeordinat et praedicat, et quasi Deus quidem esse perhibetur. Iste igitur est intellectus assimilativus.

- 70 On the acquired intellect, see also Albert the Great, *De anima*, ed. C. Stroick (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1968), lib. III, tr. 3, c. 11, p. 221, l. 6 – p. 223, l. 38. On the development of Albert's doctrine of the acquired intellect, see C. Steel, “Medieval Philosophy: an Impossible Project? Thomas Aquinas and the ‘Averroistic’ Ideal of Happiness”, in J. Aertsen, A. Speer (eds), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1998), p. 152–174; id., *Die Adler und dieachteule. Thomas und Albert über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 2001); H. Anzulewicz, “Entwicklung und Stellung der Intellekttheorie im System des Albertus Magnus”, in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 70(2003), p. 165–218, at p. 188–198; De Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique*, p. 196–200 and 300–344; Sturlese, *Vernunft und Glück*; J. Müller, “Der Einfluß der arabischen Intellekt Spekulation auf die Ethik des Albertus Magnus”, in A. Speer, L. Wegener (eds), *Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006), p. 545–568.
- 71 Albert the Great, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, lib. II, tr. unicus, c. 8, p. 514b–515b: *Adeptus igitur intellectus est, quando per studium aliquis verum et proprium suum adipiscitur intellectum, quasi totius laboris utilitatem et fructum. [...] Et ideo dixit Plato, quod verissima philosophiae definitio est suiipsius cognitio. [...] in illis maxime intellectus invenit se secundum naturam propriam, eo quod homo in quantum solus est intellectus*. On Albert's use of the formula *homo in quantum homo solus est intellectus*, see H. Anzulewicz, “Anthropology. The Concept of Man in Albert the Great”, in I.M. Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 325–346, at p. 340–344.
- 72 Albert the Great, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, lib. II, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 516a: *Est autem intellectus assimilativus, in quo homo quantum possibile sive fas est proportionabiliter surgit ad intellectum divinum, qui est lumen et causa omnium. Fit autem hoc cum per omnia in effectu factus intellectus perfecte adeptus est seipsum et lumen agentis, et ex omnium luminibus et notitia sui extendit se in luminibus intelligentiarum ascendens gradatim ad intellectum simplicem divinum.*

world (*formae mundi*), which have been compared to laws of nature,⁷³ until it eventually reaches union with God (*intellectus divinus*). That this passage was Berthold's inspiration for his comments on the microcosm as *gubernator* is clear from a comparison from the authorities used by both Dominicans. Whereas Albert had cited Al-Farabi, Ptolemy, Hermes, and Avicenna on the assimilative intellect, Berthold described the astrologer's scientific and operative knowledge using Al-Farabi, Ptolemy, and Proclus, with Hermes of course in the background.

Before considering the significance of Berthold's substitution of the *unum animae* for Albert's *intellectus assimilativus*, we should briefly note Berthold's third and final transformation of Albert's *Metaphysica* in *Prologus* 16. In his prologue to the *Metaphysica*, Albert had spoken of the divine science pursued by Aristotle using a phrase from *Ethica Nicomachea* x.7, that the life of contemplation, the activity that has no further goal beyond itself, belongs to the human, not as human, but insofar as something divine exists in him.⁷⁴ Berthold, however, consistent with his central claim that the human resembles the world above it by virtue of the intellect and the "one" that is hidden from everyday awareness, made the distinction between the human and "the divine in him" hinge on the difference between intellect and the *unum animae*:

These two kinds of scientific inquiry form the steps and conveyances to divinising wisdom [*sapientiam divinalem*], which belongs to the human, not as human, but as divine. For, according to Proclus in the text mentioned above, the human is divine through the one that is more divine than intellect: "the soul, attaining this and settling itself within it, is divine and lives by divine life, to the extent permitted to it".⁷⁵

The same pattern appears in all three of Berthold's modifications of Albert. Wherever possible, he sought Platonic alternatives for the authorities used by Albert in his account of the order and progression of the sciences (the *Phaedo* for the *Almagest*; Proclus for Avicenna on intellectual prophecy; Proclus for Aristotle on "the divine in us"). This comparison of *Prol.* 16 with its sources illustrates both the aims and limitations of Berthold's criticism of the Peripatetic divine science: Berthold approached Proclus through an Albertist

⁷³ On the notion of *forma mundi*, see Sturlese, *Vernunft und Glück*, p. 18–23.

⁷⁴ Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, lib. I, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 1, l. 57 – p. 2, l. 4.

⁷⁵ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 16, p. 25, l. 647–649. The "text mentioned above" refers to the incorrect citation of *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam* for the phrase *dispensat mundum cum diis*. See n. 67, above.

lens and understood the novel concept of the *unum animae* in such a way that it could be made to substitute fairly seamlessly for and improve upon Albert's doctrine of the stages of intellectual perfection (*intellectus adeptus*, *intellectus assimilativus*).

In one sense, it is not difficult to appreciate the resemblance Berthold saw there, especially if we compare the Proclean *dispensat mundum cum diis* with Albert's Avicennian view of natural prophecy: both describe the capacity for prognostication and action in the world achieved by a person whose intellect is conjoined with the immutable laws or principles of the cosmic order. But if we were to reduce Berthold entirely to his tacit sources or dismiss the result as a garbled pastiche, we would miss the point of his substitution. For Berthold, at least, it could not be that Avicenna's and Proclus' teachings were simply identical. This is clear already from Berthold's insistence that "the divine in us" is precisely not the intellect that can be raised to higher stages of actualisation or perfection, but the *unum animae* that is already somehow "more divine than intellect". Now, a complete account this modification must await Berthold's elaborate theory of "the three motions of the soul" in the *Expositio tituli A-D*. There we will find the resources to explain what is still only implicit here: namely, that the exalted stage of self-knowledge (*intellectus adeptus*) must pass into a more fundamental, non-reflexive cognition, as the soul becomes established more and more in the cognition that is already underway in its own ground. The non-reflexive cognition of the *unum animae* is ultimately what will replace the Albertist *intellectus assimilativus*.

What immediately followed in *Prol.* 17, which is Berthold's commentary on the lemma "subjoined to God" (*subnexus autem Deo*), anticipated this larger shift. There he introduced the reader to the compatible doctrines of divine union he discerned in the *De mystica theologia* and the *De providentia et fato* by citing both texts at length.⁷⁶ The agreement of Proclus and Dionysius was predicated on the notion of the *unum animae* defined as a non-reflexive cognition above the mind. In the *De mystica theologia*, Dionysius advised Timothy to abandon all sense-perception and intellective activity, for in this way "the divine man rises up in ignorance" (*divinus homo ignote consurgat*) to union "with him, who is beyond all substance and knowing". This realises the peace of God that passes all understanding (*intellectus*) – the understanding, Berthold added, citing the *Timaeus* (51e), that is itself "only proper to God and a few chosen people". It is through the one or unity (*unitas*) that exceeds the nature of the mind that the soul "enters the divine darkness" (*intrat divinam caliginem*)

⁷⁶ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 17, p. 26, l. 675 – p. 27, l. 727.

or “the supersubstantial world” that is the primordial causes,⁷⁷ in which God is seen “by not seeing him” (*per ipsum non videre*). Berthold then cited Proclus’ account of the five modes of cognition, which culminates in a cognition higher than anything Aristotle ever insinuated, though it was known to Plato and the theologians before him, who called it a truly “divine frenzy” (*divina mania*). At the height of the intellectual ascent, Proclus wrote, the soul has one state in which it knows itself and its object through a kind of immediacy or contact, which is intellectual intuition (*intellectus*); it has another state where, “thinking, the soul is ignorant of itself and other things” (*et se ipsam et illa ignorat*) and, “because of that, casting forth its one, it loves to be at peace, enclosing itself from cognitions, having been made silent.”⁷⁸ Juxtaposing Dionysius and Proclus in this way, Berthold brought out their common teaching of an ascent from senses to the intellect, and finally to the abandonment of intellectual activity in an ignorance, peace, or silence that partakes of the divine knowing (*cognoscet solummodo, qualiter di omnia indicibiliter cognoscunt singuli*).

These modalities of self-knowledge and self-forgetting that “knows as the gods know” and thus becomes capable of a kind of natural prophecy were latent in Albert’s *De intellectu et intelligibili*. As noted already, Albert had described the *intellectus adeptus* as self-knowledge (*suiipsius cognitio*) and the *intellectus assimilativus* as an extension of the intellect out from all lights and self-knowledge (*ex omnium luminibus et notitia sui extendit se*). Berthold accentuated the difference between these two stages by drawing out the Dionysian resonances of Albert’s language.⁷⁹

77 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 19, p. 31, l. 845–46: *Suo enim uno ingreditur homo mundum supersubstantialem*.

78 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 17, p. 27, l. 713–719, citing Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §31, p. 140, l. 9–16: *Intelligens quidem anima et se ipsam cognoscit et quaecumque intelligit contingentia, sicut diximus; similiter intelligens [superintelligens Boese] autem et se ipsam et illa ignorat, quo adiacens le unum quietem amat clausa cognitionibus, muta facta. Et enim quomodo utique adiacet indicibilissimo omnium aliter quam soporans, quae in ipsa garrulamina? Fiat igitur unum, ut videat le unum, magis autem ut non videat: videns enim intellectualem videbit et non supra intellectum et quoddam unum intelliget et non le autounum. The abbreviation in Berthold’s copy of the *Tria opuscula* (MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 64rb: s^r) could be read either *similiter intelligens* or *superintelligens*, but from the manuscripts of the *Expositio*, it is clear Berthold read *similiter*.*

79 Albert’s allusions to Dionysius became even stronger later in *De intellectu et intelligibili*, lib. II, tr. unicus, c. 10, p. 518a–b: *Haec autem puritas [intellectus] ex quatuor efficitur, quorum unum est studium pulchritudinis. Secundum est acquisitio multae illuminationis. Tertium autem excessus separationis a continuo et tempore. Et quartum, applicatio cum lumine superioris ordinis. [...] Inter autem quatuor ista primum est purgatio ab impedimentis, et secundum illuminatio in his quae inferiora sunt homini proportionata. Tertium autem*

Albert: *Est autem intellectus assimilativus, in quo homo quantum possibile sive fas est proportionabiliter surgit ad intellectum divinum, qui est lumen et causa omnium.*

Berthold: *Divinus homo ignote consurgit, sicut est possibile, ad eius unionem, qui est super omnem substantiam et cognitionem.*

Whereas Albert was clearly describing two different states of intellectual perfection, Berthold's theory contained an additional layer of complexity in that he understood the *unum animae* as a principle in the soul that is deeper than intellect itself. To a large extent, this was a hallmark of Dietrich of Freiberg's influence, for whom the agent intellect was to be regarded as a substance and as the essential cause of the soul. The tension between these two models in Berthold's thought is nowhere clearer than in his choice in *Prol.* 17, which became his custom in the *Expositio*, to cite both the "new" and "old" translations of *De divinis nominibus* 7.1 on the union (*unitio*) or unity (*unitas*) – in Greek, ἕνωσις – beyond the nature of the mind. The unitive cognition that Berthold found in Dionysius and Proclus was both a state to be achieved only by the few (*unitio*), following Albert, and a fact about human nature as such (*unitas*), following Dietrich. But as we will see fully in Chapter 2, these two threads also crossed. Berthold will ultimately accept Dietrich's account of the conditions under which that union is achieved by the few (*raptus*). But insofar as he modified Dietrich's theory of God's abiding presence in the soul by construing the *unum animae* as a phase of intellect that is higher than self-knowledge, which Proclus called "the flower of the intellect", Berthold's *unum* resembled Albert's *intellectus assimilativus* more than anything we find in Dietrich.⁸⁰

By way of comparison with Berthold, we may note how Ulrich of Strassburg developed his own synthesis of the Dionysian and Peripatetic strands within Albert's theories of the intellectual ascent to God in Book I of *De summo bono*. There Ulrich outlined five ways by which the natural knowledge of God is attained: (1) by natural instinct; (2) by negation of the divine attributes known through philosophy or by negation of God's revealed names in Scripture; (3) by causality, when God's perfections are known through the creatures of the world;⁸¹ (4) by eminence, when the imperfect mode of these perfections

est purgatio ab impedimento quarto: quia nisi quis excedat mente continuum et tempus, non consurgit ad concipienda divina. Quartum est summa perfectio quae in hac vita contingere potest homini.

80 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 17, p. 27, l. 721.

81 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber I*, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989), lib. I, tr. 1, c. 5, p. 14, l. 9–11, anticipated Berthold's *Prologus* when he interpreted the lemma from Romans 1:20, *a creatura mundi*, through the notion of the *mundus minor*.

as they are found and named in creatures is negated of God; (5) by the stages of intellectual ascent outlined in Albert's *De intellectu et intelligibili*, which we have found in the background of Berthold's lemmatic commentary on the Hermetic microcosm. For Ulrich, the second, third, and fourth ways directly corresponded to the theologies pursued in three treatises by Dionysius: the *De symbolica theologia* (not extant), the *De divinis nominibus*, and the *De mystica theologia*, respectively.⁸²

It is clear that the first four ways, and possibly even the fifth, are related for Ulrich according to the interplay of affirmation and negation.⁸³ Ulrich likened the first, the way of instinct, to the innate but indeterminate or inchoate presence of the principles of scientific knowledge in the possible intellect. This confused knowledge (*notitia confusa*) is awakened by experience and becomes determinate. For Ulrich, the mere experience of causality is enough to arouse this instinctual knowledge of God. From this affirmative knowledge comes the second way, by negation, which goes further to determine, for example, that God is not a body but a spirit, not an accident, but a substance. Then, beginning from this negative standpoint, the third way affirms all the perfections of God that it is better to be than not (good, living, knowing, one, etc.). In the fourth way the imperfect mode by which these are known and named in creatures is negated of God who, for example, is not "substantial" but "super-substantial". Following Albert's commentary on the *De mystica theologia*, Ulrich held that this fourth way moves from the more evident to the more hidden, negating these perfections of God until our intellect is left "in a certain confused state" (*in quodam confuso*). This ignorance is the inverse of the *notitia confusa* with which a person began, in that one arrives to an indeterminacy and darkness that is beyond and not beneath thought. Ulrich described the fourth way in terms that evoked the beginning of the *De mystica theologia*: "in negations one must leave behind sense and intellect, insofar as all things are known to it in created things, and one must go beyond all beings, not only material but even intellectual beings. And thus by exceeding

82 On *De summo bono*, lib. 1, tr. 1, see A. de Libera, *La mystique rhénane. D'Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart* (Paris: Seuil, 1994), p. 104–114; A. Palazzo, "La sapientia nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Quaestio* 5(2005), p. 495–512; Beccarisi, "La scientia divina dei filosofi"; I. Zavattero, "Bonum beatitudinis. Felicità e beatitudine nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Memorie Domenicane* 42(2011), p. 283–313.

83 Cf. Hankey, *God in Himself*, p. 54–56, which finds another kind of progression from the indeterminate to the determinate in the *quinque viae* of Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 2, a. 3.

oneself, the intellect must be united to God, just as intellect and intellected are one".⁸⁴

But how does the fifth way, the way of intellectual progression modelled on Albert's *De intellectu et intelligibili*, relate to these four? The fifth way could be read as a summary of the entire process of affirmation and negation, since it begins with the actualisation of the possible intellect (as in the first way) and ends in union with God (as in the fourth way). Another, more plausible, interpretation would regard the fifth way as a continuation of the dialectic of affirmation and negation. For Ulrich, at the summit of the fifth way, God is known affirmatively by his likeness. This likeness is a light composed from three sources: the light of the human intellect, the light of the separate intelligences, and the divine light. In this knowledge through likeness (*per similitudinem*), one knows not only that God exists (*quia est Deus*) but something of his quiddity (*quidditas*), which Ulrich distinguished from the knowledge of God *per essentiam* that depends on grace. Here a person seems to have gone beyond the culmination of the fourth way, where the human intellect was left *in quodam confuso*, for it follows that if God's quiddity is somehow known in the likeness of intellectual light, then God is in himself an intellectual light beyond all negations.⁸⁵

84 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 6, p. 17, l. 52–56: *sed in negationibus oportet dimittere sensum et intellectum quantum ad omnia sibi in rebus creatis nota et oportet transcendere omnia entia, non solum materialia, sed etiam intellectualia, et sic excedendo se ipsum oportet intellectum uniri Deo, sicut intellectus et intellectum sunt unum.*

85 That the name "intellect" would be carried across the threshold of the negations of the *De mystica theologia* is consistent with a motif we find in the generation of German Dominican philosophers inspired by Meister Eckhart, who were willing to deny (determinate) being of God and affirm that he is pure intellect or intellectuality. Henry Suso stated this view succinctly in his *Little Book of Truth*, in which he set out to defend Eckhart's orthodoxy. In Suso's description of the divine nature near the beginning of the treatise, which explicitly appealed to the authority of Dionysius, the highest negative name for God, "an eternal nothing" (*ein ewiges niht*), passes over to the most satisfactory affirmation: God is "a living intellectuality" (*ein lebendú [...] vernúnftikeit*). See Henry Suso, *Daz buechli der warheit*, ed. K. Bihlmeyer, *Deutsche Schriften* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1907), c. 1, p. 329, l. 4–12: *wan waz man ime des in soelicher wise zuo leit, daz ist alles in etlicher wise falsch, und ire loeggenunge ist war. Und us dem so moechte man ime sprechen ein ewiges niht; aber doch, so man von eime dinge reden sol, wie übertreffenlich ald übermerklich es ist, so muoz man im etwaz namen schepfen. Diser stiller einveltikeit wesen ist ir leben und ir leben ist ir wesen. Es ist ein lebendú, wesendú, istigú vernúnftikeit, daz sich selber verstat, und ist und lebt selber in im selber und ist daz selb.* ("Whatever one can attribute to [God] in this [creaturely] manner is, in a sense, all incorrect, and its negation is true. Consequently one could call him an eternal nothing. And yet, if one is to speak of how unsurpassable or above comprehension something is, one still has to create names for it. The being of this calm simplicity is its life, and its life is its being. It is a living, existing,

Whereas Ulrich held that the positive knowledge of God through his intellectual likeness is the culmination of the mind's ascent, Berthold shifted the balance back toward Dionysius and the *De mystica theologia*, with its account of the soul's ascent to God in ignorance. Ultimately, in Berthold's view, as one passes beyond intellectual activity, one is left with no positive knowledge of God apart from his existence. Nor was this cognition of God attainable without some kind of divine condescension or grace. For this was a state of silence known to the philosophers that, Berthold argued, even the theologians should honour.⁸⁶

3 Approaching and Entering the House of God

Berthold's treatment of the third lemma of Romans 1:20 (*per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur*) that concluded the *Prologus* described "the diverse ways" by which "the diverse wise ones, both theologians and philosophers" ascended to the *invisibilia Dei*.⁸⁷ Within this proliferation of paths, Berthold's accounts of the diverse ways of knowing God reveal a common pattern: the movement from the senses to discursive reason, from reason to non-discursive intellect, and finally from intellect to non-reflexive union.

The first way mentioned by Berthold came from the *De mystica theologia*, where Dionysius taught Timothy the way of leaving behind sense and cognition and, as far as possible, approaching union with God through ignorance, and gave the example of Moses: when "the deiform soul arrives to the summit of contemplation" (*ad verticem contemplationis*), it "contemplates the place where God is" (*contemplatur locum, ubi Deus est*) and "enters into the darkness of ignorance". Berthold then turned to Augustine's report of the three ways, as

subsisting intellectuality, which understands itself, exists and lives in itself and is this self.") English translation: Henry Suso, *The Exemplar, with Two German Sermons*, trans. F. Tobin (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1989), p. 309, modified.

86 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 68, l. 555–556: *haec honorabilissima principia, per quae ascenditur in prime unius et prime boni unitatem, ne dicam quiditatem; 123K, p. 133, l. 271–276: Si ergo nemo sapientium inquit generaliter de omni superessentiali principio, quid sit, quoniam definiri non potest, sed ex proprietatibus suis, inter quas veluti terminos a sibi cognatis cognoscitur, ut supra dictum est, non quid sit, quis theologus interrogare praesumat de prime unius superuniali superessentia, quid sit, cum purissime intelligat ipsum exsuperare quasi in infinitum etiam indicibilia et incognoscibilia propter supersubstantiali unionem?*

87 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 20, p. 32, l. 880 – p. 34, l. 967.

it were (*quasi tribus viis*), by which “Plato and his followers arrived at knowledge of the invisible things of God”. These were ethics, natural philosophy, and logic. With an important qualification, Berthold noted that these were not really distinct ways at all; for Socrates, the Pythagoreans, and Plato, these were in fact three parts (*tres partes*) of perfect philosophy. This clarification cued Berthold’s lengthy citation of Augustine’s famous question *De ideis*, which merged the three paths into one. For Augustine, the turn away from the senses and the passions (ethics) belongs intrinsically to the mind’s laborious ascent to the vision of the divine ideas in the Word. These ideas are the principles of being (natural philosophy) and knowing (logic). Once it has become pure (*pura*), the soul beholds these ideas through its highest power, intelligence (*intelligentia*), and adheres to God in charity (*caritate cohaeserit*). This loving vision of the ideas, Augustine concluded, makes the soul most blessed (*quarum visione fit beatissima*).

In the extraordinary conclusion to the *Prologus*, Berthold doubled back to integrate these three parts of perfect philosophy with the path of the *De mystica theologia*. Here Augustine’s notion of a beatifying vision of the divine ideas by the pure soul in love was located in a more stratified account of the ascent to God. In this progression, the ocular metaphors of the *De ideis* are almost identified with, but ultimately subordinated to, a higher cognition characterised by the spiritual senses of hearing, touch, and taste. Here Berthold was likely inspired by the Dionysian account of the entry into “the darkness of ignorance” as the abandonment of sights and seers (*ab ipsis absolvitur visis et videntibus*). Augustine had concluded his *De ideis* by noting that, while many have named the ideas in various ways (*formae, species, rationes*, etc.), to very few has it been given to see them as they are in truth. Indeed, added Berthold, but among their number was the one who sang in Psalm 42:

Like as the hart desires the water-brooks, so longs my soul after you, O God. My soul is athirst for God, yea, even for the living God: when shall I come to appear before the presence of God? My tears have been my meat day and night, while they daily say unto me, Where is now your God? These things I remembered, and I poured out my soul within me: for I shall pass over into the place of the wonderful tabernacle, even to the house of God: with the voice of praise and thanksgiving, the sound of one who feasts.⁸⁸

88 The Coverdale translation is here modified after the Vulgate.

Berthold's focused on the final two verses, which he explained using the gloss of Peter Lombard, who had turned these verses into a miniature odyssey of the soul as it journeys from the exterior to the interior world, and from there finally to superior realities in its search of God. Berthold tacitly interpolated into this narrative the structure of "the six degrees of contemplation" from Richard of St. Victor's *Beniamin maior* 1.6, which Berthold partially modified using Boethius and Proclus.⁸⁹

Following Peter Lombard, Berthold explained the phrase "I remembered" (*recordatus sum*) or, alternatively, "I meditated upon" (*meditatus sum*) from Psalm 42 in terms of the search for the invisible things of God through the visible things of the world and then, when this proves unsuccessful, in the lower powers of the soul. Leaving the exterior instruments of the bodily senses, the mind begins to contemplate its powers and tries to see (*videret*) God within itself. This, Berthold added, is to seek God by the first two kinds of contemplation mentioned by Richard of St. Victor (in imagination according to imagination; in imagination according to reason). The mind then turns to reasoning (*noverit*) to seek God within itself. This corresponds to Richard's third and fourth degrees of contemplation (in reason according to imagination; in reason according to reason). This is what the psalmist meant by "I poured out, that is, I enlarged my soul within me" (*effudi, id est dilatavi, in me animam meam*). But still God is not found. Therefore, the soul must "pass over" and go "above itself" to think what is beyond it:

But because my mind finds God neither in exterior things nor within the soul, I shall pass over, that is, 'I shall go beyond myself', to things intellectual, as it were, in this sense: 'I have dilated my soul to know those things that are above it' (so that it might seek God in intelligence according to reason). For if the soul remains in itself, and does not go beyond itself, it will not see God, who is beyond. But why have I done this? Because in this way (that is, through intelligence, that eye, which according to Boethius, is higher than imagination and reason – 'for surpassing the boundary of

89 Richard of St. Victor, *De contemplatione (Beniamin maior)*, ed. J. Grosfillier (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), lib. 1, c. 6, 70B, p. 102, l. 5 – p. 104, l. 10. The way Berthold marked off the beginning and end of citations from the rest of gloss at *Prol.* 20, p. 34, l. 948–951, and his proficiency with the technical language Richard's treatise displayed at *Expositio*, 202A–B, p. 182, l. 55 – p. 184, l. 95, suggest to me that he added the sixfold model himself and did not find it in his source material from Peter Lombard. His citation of Bonaventure's *Itinerarium* that immediately follows the narrative also implies that he recognised the parallel structure between the *Itinerarium* and the *Beniamin maior*, which was one of Bonaventure's major sources.

the universe it views that simple Form by the pure apex of the mind' – in this way, I think,) I shall pass over or I shall enter (by the one of the soul) into the place of the wonderful tabernacle (that is, into light inaccessible, which is the primordial causes), even to the abode of God: 'with the voice of praise and of thanksgiving is the sound of one who feasts'. I know not what hymns or songs, sweet to one's heart, are resounding in that eternal festival. Here, one is taken up [*rapitur*] like a hart to the water-brooks and is soothed with the voice of exultation and eternal praise; here, there resounds to the mind the wondrous sweetness of the shouts of those who feast, of the banqueters calling out.⁹⁰

The first things to note about this passage are Berthold's modifications of Richard of St. Victor, who provided the basic structure of the ascent. Prior to the passage cited here, Berthold had directly incorporated the first four kinds of contemplation from Richard of St. Victor's treatise, but he modified the fifth and sixth by using more overtly Platonic alternatives. Richard identified the fifth kind of contemplation with what is above reason but not beyond reason (*supra rationem sed non praeter rationem*), while the sixth concerns what is above reason and apparently beyond reason (*supra rationem et videtur esse praeter rationem*). In the same passage from *Beniamin maior* 1.6, Richard had also stated that the six kinds can be arranged into three pairs (in imagination, in reason, and in intelligence). Berthold effectively merged the sixfold and threefold models when he identified the fifth kind of contemplation as *intelligentia*, but he departed from Richard by citing Boethius' *Consolatio (intelligentiae [...]) celsior oculus*). Richard's sixth kind, moreover, has clearly been replaced by the Dionysian and Proclean *unum animae*. The basic threefold and sixfold structures of the contemplative ascent, therefore, remained unchanged

90 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 20, p. 34, l. 953–67: *Sed quia nec in exterioribus nec in anima Deum invenit, transibo, id est super me ibo, scilicet ad intellectualia, quasi: dilatavi animam meam ad intelligendum supra se ipsam, (ut quaereret Deum intelligentia secundum rationem). Si enim anima in se maneret, se non excedens Deum non videret, qui ultra est. Sed quare hoc feci? Quoniam hoc modo, (scilicet per intelligentiam, cui celsior secundum Boethium oculus existit, quam imaginationis et rationis – 'superegressa namque universitatis ambitum illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur' –, hoc, inquam, modo) transibo vel ingrediar (per unum animae) in locum tabernaculi admirabilis (scilicet lucem inaccessibilem, hoc est primordiales causas) usque ad domum Dei in voce exultationis et confessionis sonus epulantis. De aeterna enim festivitate sonat, nescio, quid canorum vel sonorum et dulce cordi eius, unde rapitur sicut cervus ad fontes aquarum et mulcetur voce exultationis et laudis aeterna. Unde sonat ei mira suavitas ... sonus epulantium, id est sonantium epulantium.*

by Berthold. This will take on more significance later when we consider how the relation between nature and grace in Richard's contemplative doctrine influenced Berthold's understanding of Boethian *intelligentia* and the higher *unum animae*.

The transition between the fourth and fifth kinds of contemplation in Berthold's narrative occurs at the moment the mind passes from seeking God at its own level (in reason according to reason) to the apprehension of realities above reason. At the summit of the fourth degree, Berthold wrote, the mind has enlarged or dilated itself with the desire to ascend higher (*ad intelligendum supra se ipsam, ut quaereret Deum intelligentia secundum rationem*). In the fifth mode, intelligence alone is active. Its object, according to Boethius, is "the simple Form beyond the boundary of the universe". Strikingly, in Berthold's account, this fifth kind passes seamlessly into the sixth (*per intelligentiam [...] transibo vel ingrediar per unum animae*). We may nevertheless note some clear differences in Berthold's descriptions of their activities: one is ocular (*celsior oculus existit*), and the other is a state of ignorance better described using metaphors of sound, touch, and taste that merge synesthetically (*nescio, quid canorum vel sonorum et dulce cordi eius [...] mulcetur voce exultationis; sonat ei mira suavitas*); one is the beginning of self-transcendence, which still beholds the simple Form as something extrinsic to itself, while the other marks the entry into the house of God (*in lucem inaccessibilem*), and the partaking of the exuberance of the banquet celebrated there. This subtle but clear distinction between two phases of the soul's highest power (*intelligentia*) will be consistent throughout the *Expositio*, although different passages in the commentary will contribute new features to this basic structure. Finally, one should note that the verb *rapitur*, appearing at the conclusion of the narrative, would apply to both phases of *intelligentia*, since the mind cannot ascend above its own station of reason (the fourth degree) by its own power. Thus "the blessed vision" achieved by pure *intelligentia* in Augustine's *De ideis* was unfolded by Berthold into a more detailed recital of the soul's ascent that finds in that vision a higher element of excess or ignorance, perhaps already anticipated by Augustine's phrase *caritate cohaeserit*, which marks the approach and entry to the house of God.

Comparing this passage from the *Prologus* with the original gloss on Psalm 42 by Peter Lombard, we find that Berthold has made the same modification as that noted already with the *habitaculum Dei* of Ephesians 2:21-22, where he extended a passage that originally referred to the saints and the Church founded on Christ the cornerstone and applied it to the primordial causes in the Word. Here, similarly, Peter Lombard had glossed the verses from Psalm 42:5 (*transibo in locum tabernaculi admirabilis, usque ad domum Dei*), relative to the

Church, the image of the heavenly Jerusalem.⁹¹ Berthold, however, looked to two other verses to offer a different portrayal of God's habitation: God dwells in light inaccessible (1 Timothy 6:16) and has made the shadows his hiding place (Psalm 18:12).⁹² These "shadows" are the supersubstantial unities. They are the place of God (*locus Dei*), which Moses contemplated, according to Dionysius, before he ascended into the darkness of ignorance (*ad caliginem ignorantiae intrat*).⁹³ This model of ascent, cited shortly before the gloss on Psalm 42, no doubt informed Berthold's modifications of Richard of St. Victor: Moses, in other words, proceeded from an extrinsic apprehension of the primordial causes as a group, which itself is achieved only with great difficulty, to an active union with them, which would occur following the cessation of intellectual activity.⁹⁴

The *Prologus* thus returned at its end to its beginning, with the *invisibilia Dei* that Paul, after his rapture into the third heaven (*in tertium caelum raptus*), declared the best of the pagans knew through a natural revelation.⁹⁵ The vivid impression left by the whole *Prologus* is that any difference between the pagans referred to by Paul and the greatest Christian theologians like Augustine, Boethius, and Dionysius, is relativised by the dignity of the lofty principles they pursued and reached: the *invisibilia Dei*. Berthold's goal in this

91 Peter Lombard, *Commentaria in Psalmos*, In Ps. 41:4, PL 191, 417B: 'In locum tabernaculi admirabilis; id est in praesentem Ecclesiam, quae est quaedam imago et species futurae Jerusalem, quae, dum videtur, amplius illa desideratur, et amplius in ista gemit. Ideo digit ingrediari in locum tabernaculi, quia extra locum tabernaculi huius aliquis quarens Deum, errat.

92 These two verses are discussed in Albert the Great, *Super Dionysii Mysticam theologiam et Epistulas*, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), *Epistula* v, p. 493, l. 21–26.

93 Berthold regularly used these verses to identify the primordial causes as God's abode. See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 9, 16, 17, and 19. See also 115E, 123L, and 162F.

94 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 20, p. 32, l. 888–893: *Item per sui ipsius excessum et ab omnibus absolutionem et sursum actionem, et ponit exemplum de Mose. Et tunc, scilicet quando deiformis anima ad verticem contemplationis pervenerit, contemplatur locum, ubi Deus est, et tunc ab ipsis absolvitur visis et videntibus et ad caliginem ignorantiae intrat*; Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 968–969: *cum quanta difficultate anima etiam deiformis effecta in hac vita ascendat ad conspectum fontis paternae lucis, cuius splendor gloriae est Verbum.*

95 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 1, p. 5, l. 5–8: *Summus divinalis sapientiae theologus Paulus secretorum Dei conscius utpote in tertium caelum raptus loquens de mundanae philosophiae sapientibus, postquam dixerat: 'Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis: Deus enim illis revelavit', subiungit: 'Invisibilia Dei' etc.* Cf. 2 Corinthians 12:4: *quoniam raptus est in paradisum: et audivit arcana verba, quae non licet homini loqui.* It may be that Berthold understood the threefold movement (exterior, interior, superior; imagination, reason, intelligence) through Psalm 42 as a figure of Paul's ascent.

academic sermon was to direct his audience's attention to principles that are by definition hidden from everyday awareness and rationality. These are the primordial causes at the level of the macrocosm, and the *unum animae* in the microcosm. For the soul to become a temple of God, to fulfil its nature the *nexus Dei et mundi*, it must be raised to enter that "place" where God always dwells. In the language of the *invisibilia Dei* "transitively understood", this was simply another way of saying that the soul is to be conformed to the Word. As Berthold presented it in the *Prologus*, that was the common enterprise of the best ancient philosophers.

Berthold's method in the *Prologus* was deliberately more rhetorical than demonstrative, marshalling a tide of pagan and Christian authorities, whose words he interwove with Scripture and used to explicate the inspired utterances of the ancient sage Hermes. Behind its complex form, the real novelty for his audience, as Berthold surely would have realised, would have been the *Tria opuscula* of Proclus, which were almost as unknown to his contemporaries as the principles they divulged. The most important passages in the *Prologus*, therefore, were those in which Berthold showed how Proclus' texts explicated and revived the authoritative doctrines of Paul's disciple Dionysius. Berthold made it abundantly clear that the final goal of their common philosophy, which he called *divinalis sapientia*, was beatitude and deification. This, of course, was not something the rhetoric of the *Prologus* could bring about. But the sheer impact of these combined authorities would at least make the audience aware that these hidden principles in themselves and in the cosmos were real, even if forgotten.

God's abiding and actual presence in the soul's ground, as Tauler put it, was his "eternal ordinance". But as one learns in his sermon on Trinity Sunday, of the theologians, only an unnamed master (Dietrich of Freiberg) and Proclus properly understood this – even Thomas Aquinas was found wanting on this question. Berthold and Tauler followed Proclus and Dionysius when they insisted that, even though this dignity belongs to human nature in itself (and the macrocosm, Berthold would add), it is forgotten and concealed as individuals busy themselves with the rabble of multiplicity.⁹⁶ Neither Tauler nor Berthold denied the need for some form of divine assistance to raise the soul to its full realisation. Paradoxically, humankind intrinsically stood in need of a

96 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 17, p. 27, l. 724–728: *Donec autem circa ea, quae deorum, volumur, increduliter habemus circa haec omnia divino cognoscente impartibiliter et superaeternaliter. Haec ille. Ad idem consentit Dionysius 1 et 2 cap. Mysticae theologiae. Cf. Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 968–973: [...] a qua longe est mens hominis sollicitudinibus distracta, phantasmatis obnubilata, taceo autem de carnalibus voluptatibus implicata.*

revelation, but what was revealed to it was its own nature. As Tauler declared immediately before citing Proclus, grace arises in the soul to the extent it abandons itself to its own ground. Like Berthold, as we will see, Tauler was fully aware that the ancient Platonists had a doctrine of grace. Berthold ended the *Prologus* by acknowledging, “with Plato and Boethius”, that since the divided cannot unify itself, prayer was required if the mind was to be raised by the simplest Light (*simplicissima lux*) to see that Light, which is at once “the principle, conveyance, guide, path, and boundary”.⁹⁷ The common prayer of the Platonists supplicates the Good to accomplish its own action in and through the soul, which amounts to raising it from reason to intelligence (*intelligentia*):

Remove from those who seek you the innate restriction of nature, the crooked habitual ways, the indolent discipline, ignorance of the measure of intellectual capacity, the aversion to the light of intelligible lucidity, the dread of such subtlety, the degree of remoteness, the presumption of familiar intelligibility, the search for too much provability and demonstrability.⁹⁸

The innate restrictions of nature must be removed so that one may come to a truer sense of the limits of one's own intellectual capacity. The prayer implies that the tendency of human thinking, when it proceeds “according to itself”, is to seek after what is familiar, and to assume that discursive reason can resolve every question beginning from familiar principles (“the search for too much provability and demonstrability”). The *Prologus* has attempted to orient the mind toward more hidden principles by turning back to the consensus of the ancient theology, by acknowledging the difficulty of the endeavour, and by admitting the soul's present condition of distraction and weakness. After this

97 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 974 – p. 35, l. 989, following Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, ed. C. Moreschini (München / Leipzig: Saur, 2005²), lib. 111, prosa 9, p. 79, l. 94–97. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 44, l. 120–140: *Per gratiam, secundum quod dicit Dionysius 12 cap.* Angelicae hierarchiae [...]. *Ad idem facit auctor De fato et providentia 8 cap. circa finem* [...]. While discussing the *intellectus assimilativus*, Albert the Great had stated that the philosophers ordered their supplications and prayers toward the illumination from the higher intelligences. See Albert the Great, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, lib. 11, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 516b: *et haec est irradiatio de qua multum locuti sunt Philosophi, et ordinaverunt propter illam supplicationes et orationes.*

98 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 21, p. 35, l. 977–982: *aufer a te quaerentibus innatam naturae deminutionem, pravam assuefactionem et pigram exercitationem, ignorantiam mensurae intellectualis capacitatis, aversionem a luce intelligibilis claritatis, horrorem tantae subtilitatis, distantiam longinquitatis, praesumptionem propriae cognoscibilitatis, inquisitionem nimiae probabilitatis et demonstrabilitatis!*

diagnosis, the *Expositio tituli* will show that Proclus is the supreme philosophical guide into *divinalis sapientia*, with the *Elementatio theologica* serving as the ladder for discursive reason that leads the mind toward that most simple Light. The *Elementatio* can do this, Berthold will argue, precisely because it functions as a kind of intellectual exercise that assists the soul that has now started to reverse its habitual ways of reasoning about itself and the world. Only by this reversal can the mind be raised from its dividedness and begin to apprehend the Light that is at once “the principle, conveyance, guide, path, and boundary”.

Expositio tituli

Only to these worthy people should the dignity of wisdom contained in this *Theological Elementation* be uncovered. And so are they led into these theorems as into a certain byway that is beyond the common path of reasonings.¹

Berthold's *Expositio tituli* is an analysis of the *incipit* of the *Elementatio theologica* according to the four causes (efficient, material, formal, and final). Like the *Prologus*, it is a sophisticated example of a traditional literary form, in this case the *accessus ad auctorem*.² Berthold's *accessus* can be categorised, following the taxonomy of Richard Hunt, as a "type C" introduction, which treats some combination of a text's *intentio*, *materia*, *finis*, *modus agendi* (*ordo*), *nomen auctoris*, *titulus*, or *utilitas*.³ By the mid-12th century this kind of introduction was commonly employed.⁴ The Aristotelianised version modelled on the four causes and adopted here by Berthold developed from it.⁵ Berthold would have encountered several examples of this, probably in the work of Nicholas Trevet in Oxford and certainly in Albert the Great's commentaries on Scripture and

- 1 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Expos. tit.* K, p. 48, l. 390–393: *Hi soli digni sunt, ut eis sapientiae, quae in ista Elementatione theologica continetur, dignitas exeratur; et ideo in quoddam quasi diversorium extra publicam rationem viam in ista theoremata perducuntur*. Cf. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecii librum de bonorum ebdomade*, ed. N. Häring, *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1966), prol., §7, p. 184, l. 32–38. The literal rendering of *Elementatio theologica* in my translations of Berthold follows from his speculations about the meaning of the title in *Expos. tit.* I–K.
- 2 See A.J. Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship. Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages* (Aldershot: Wildwood, 1988²), p. 40–58, and Dahan, "Les prologues", p. 433–438.
- 3 R. Hunt, "The Introductions to the Artes in the Twelfth Century", in *Studia mediaevalia in honorem R.J. Martin* (Brugge: De Tempel, 1948), p. 84–112.
- 4 N. Häring, "Commentary and Hermeneutics", in R. Benson, G. Constable (eds), *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 173–200, at p. 185–190.
- 5 Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship*, p. 9–39 and 76.

on the Dionysian corpus.⁶ Like Albert and Nicholas, Berthold placed his *accessus ad auctorem* after a “sermon-type” prologue.

The *Expositio tituli* took the broader discussion of the Hermetic macrocosm and microcosm from the *Prologus*, and the diagnosis of the human condition it implied, and presented Proclus as the exemplary divine man whose texts can lead the desirous soul to the vision of God. In this second preface, Thomas of York and his discussion of pagan knowledge of the universe and God continued to be a major source for Berthold, especially in his analyses of the text’s efficient cause (Proclus himself and the ways by which he came to know God) and the final cause (the goal of the *Elementatio* is to bring to fruition the innate desire for beatifying wisdom). As for the material cause of the *Elementatio theologica*, Berthold now looked to another German Dominican source, Dietrich of Freiberg, and his version of the distinction of natural and voluntary providence, which Ulrich of Strassburg had first developed from Augustine’s *De Genesi ad litteram*. Dietrich’s doctrine of the *intellectus adeptus* will also be taken up by Berthold as he articulated the precise stages of the contemplative life that Proclus fully realised. Finally, regarding the formal cause or structural principle of the *Elementatio*, Berthold drew upon Boethius and the 12th-century commentary tradition on his *De Trinitate* and *De hebdomadibus*, for their account of why theology should proceed according to a theorematic form.

1 Plato’s Theorems

The seeds for Berthold’s discussions of the efficient and formal causes were sown in the miniature history of the Platonic tradition that opened the *Expositio tituli*:

Proclus exceeded by far [*procul excellebat*] all the followers of Plato and thus surpassed everyone in ability [*praepollebat*], such that there emanated forth from him most of all, as it once had from Plotinus, ‘the very voice of Plato,’ which, as Augustine attests in Book 3 of *Against the Academicians*, ‘is the purest and most lucid in all of philosophy, after the clouds of error have been cleared away’ and all the coverings [*integumentis*], with which the first Platonists and especially the Academicians had

6 On Nicholas, see Lord, “Virgil’s *Eclogues*”, p. 198 and 204. On Albert, see Dahan, “Les prologues”, p. 437–439.

concealed Plato's wisdom. For it was customary among them, as Cicero says and Augustine recounts in the same work, 'to conceal his doctrine and not reveal it to anyone, except to those who had lived with them up to old age'. And thus Proclus, like Plotinus, as is recounted in the same text, 'was deemed to be so similar' to Plato 'that one would have supposed that they lived at the same time; but since so many centuries had elapsed, one had to suppose that Plato was reborn in him'.⁷

In this brief history, Berthold combined two separate passages in Augustine's *Contra Academicos* and, in so doing, drastically altered their original meaning, because he associated Cicero's report about concealment within the Academy (for Augustine this concerned the avowed skepticism of the Academy which, in his view, hid a more positive form of knowledge) with Augustine's own verdict about the errors that accrued to Plato's doctrines over the centuries, until Philo and, finally, Plotinus regained their pristine origin.⁸ In Berthold's rendering, any interpretation of Plato that would take the myths literally has not reached the esoteric truth of Plato's teaching.

Berthold's reasons for reading Augustine in this way have to do with his more fundamental assumptions about the ideal method and goal of theology. These assumptions only become apparent over the course of the *Expositio*

7 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 14–24: *Ipse enim omnes Platonis sectatores procul excelebat et in philosophia sic omnibus praeepollebat, ut emicaret maxime in eo sicut et in Plotino 'os illud Platonis, quod – sicut testatur Augustinus III libro Contra Academicos – in philosophia purgatissimum est et lucidissimum demotis nubibus erroris' et integumentis omnibus, quibus Platonici primi et maxime Academici suam sapientiam obvolvebant. Mos enim fuit eis, ut dicit Cicero, prout recitat Augustinus ubi supra, 'occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam, nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixisset, aperire consueverunt'. Ita enim ipse Proclus sicut et Plotinus, prout recitatur ibidem, Platonis 'similis iudicatus est, ut simul eos vixisse, tantum autem interest temporis, ut in hoc ille revixisse putandus sit'. Cf. Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, III.18.41 and III.20.43. For a complete picture of Berthold's understanding of the Platonic tradition, see also *Expos. tit. G-H*, p. 43, l. 212 – p. 45, l. 275.*

8 As we will see later in Berthold's criticism of Macrobius and Proclus on reincarnation, Berthold seems to have thought of these coverings (*integumenta*) in terms of mythical fables. In his glosses on Macrobius, he copied William's statement that pagan myths were *integumenta* which concealed philosophical truth. In MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, *In Somn. Scip.*, I.2.17, f. 4v: SED QVIA SCIVNT INIMICAM ESSE NATVRAE APERTAM NV DAM-QVE EXPOSITIONEM SVI. Si quis enim diceret rusticis quid re vera sit Ceres et alia que de ea sub integumentis figurantur, scilicet quod Ceres non est aliud quam naturalis vis terre produ-cendi segetes. Item quod non alia de causa nec aliter vannus ei adtribuitur nisi quod pertinet ad purgationem frumenti nullum incuteret eis terrorem. On the theory of *integumenta*, see É. Jeuneau, "L'usage de la notion d'*integumentum* à travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 24(1957), p. 35–100.

tituli. We glimpse them already in Berthold's description of the two causes of Proclus' excellence or, in other words, the two ways in which the voice of Plato spoke through him. First was the fact that "he gave order to Plato's very own theorems in the present book". The notion that Plato originally transmitted his philosophy in theorems (*theoremata*) seems to have been, in part, based on Berthold's extrapolation of a remark made by Eustratius that "Plato passed on theorems concerning the first Good that are above contempt".⁹ In his revision of Augustine's history, then, Berthold wanted us to understand that Plato's originally theorematic philosophy was transmitted secretly in the Academy, concealed with mythical coverings, and was eventually restored in its definitive form, first by Plotinus, and then by Proclus in the *Elementatio theologica*.¹⁰ This achievement is directly related to the second cause of Proclus' excellence, which is discussed at length momentarily. This consisted in the fact that, as the *Tria opuscula* attest, Proclus exhaustively traversed the three spiritual motions of the soul described by Dionysius. The *Elementatio theologica* represented only one of these motions.¹¹

In addition to Eustratius' passing remark, in his account of the first cause of Proclus' excellence Berthold evidently had in mind a tradition of theology that associated the theorematic method with secrecy. This tradition went back to Boethius' *De hebdomadibus* and was invoked later in the *Expositio tituli*.¹² The *De hebdomadibus* was structured with a prologue followed by seven propositions, which served as the rules (*regulae*) for the remainder of Boethius' argument explaining how created substances are good in virtue of their very existence without being substantial goods. In his prologue, Boethius mentioned two kinds of "common conceptions of the mind": the truth of some common conceptions is self-evident and is acknowledged immediately by whoever understands the terms, while the truth of other common conceptions

9 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 26–29. See S. Gersh, "Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino as Historians of Philosophy", forthcoming.

10 Berthold held that Augustine was familiar with this esoteric tradition. In Thomas of York (*Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 16), he would have found some of Augustine's descriptions of God distilled into a theorematic form. Thomas made the same reduction with descriptions of God coming from the pagan *sapientes mundi* (lib. 1, c. 17), before beginning a commentary on the *Liber xxiv philosophorum* (lib. 1, c. 18). This was anticipated at *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 1, cited by Berthold at *Expos. tit. E* (p. 41, l. 163–166), where Thomas stated that Augustine recited Plato's propositions (*propositiones Platonis, quas recitat Augustinus*), and gave examples of the theorems (*Deus est lumen omnium; Deus est veritatis illustrator*, etc.) that would reappear in *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 16.

11 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. A-D*, p. 37, l. 30 – p. 41, l. 147.

12 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. K*, p. 47, l. 343 – p. 49, l. 407.

is recognised only by those who have received prior training. The seven *regulae* would belong to this second category. As Boethius explained, the theorematic method is useful both as a personal aid to memorisation and private contemplation, and as a way of warding off ridicule or misunderstanding by the unlearned. Since the obscurity of brevity is itself “the faithful guardian of a secret”, the theorems will speak only to those who are worthy to receive them.¹³ The commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers on the prologue of *De hebdomadibus*, also cited by Berthold, described this secrecy in terms of veiling and unveiling: these theorems of Boethius’ treatise, or for Berthold the propositions of the *Elementatio theologica*, should be revealed only to those who “are less carried away by the fickleness of praise than attracted by the most longed-for, unveiled image of truth itself” (*veritatis ipsius revelata desiderantissimaque imagine*). Only to the worthy (*digni*) should the worthiness (*dignitas*) of the theorems be uncovered (*exeratur*).¹⁴ Boethius therefore belonged to the same Platonic tradition described by Augustine, with its use of coverings and its custom of secrecy. Here, however, the propositional form was the veil, not the mythical *integumenta*. Berthold evidently judged that the difficulty of propositional theology was enough to deter any who do not resolutely desire the truth.

Berthold’s interpretations of Augustine and Gilbert were finally brought together using Boethius’ programmatic remark in the *De Trinitate*: “In physics one must apply oneself rationally, in mathematics scientifically, and in theology intellectually, not being led astray by imaginings, but rather by looking into the Form itself, which is a true form and not an image”.¹⁵ One must turn away from the multiplicity of images, to which our thinking inclines, and look to the single Form or unified image of the truth. The truth of intellect, so we are to understand, is expressed in propositions, whose apprehension requires the abandonment of images. It was this Boethian tradition, projected back onto Augustine’s history of Platonism that was corroborated by Eustratius, that led Berthold to regard the *Elementatio theologica* as a kind of spiritual exercise that leads the mind along “a certain byway beyond the common path of reasonings

13 Boethius, *Quomodo substantiae in eo, quod sint, bonae sint, cum non sint substantialia bona*, ed. C. Moreschini, p. 186, l. 11 – p. 187, l. 14: *Prohinc tu ne sis obscuritatibus brevitatis adversus, quae cum sint arcani fida custodia tum id habent commodi, quod cum his solis qui digni sunt conloquuntur*. See also J.-L. Solère, “L’ordre axiomatique comme modèle d’écriture philosophique dans l’Antiquité et au Moyen Âge”, in *Revue d’histoire des sciences* 56/2 (2003), p. 323–345, at p. 328–334.

14 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. K*, p. 48, l. 388–391.

15 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. K*, p. 48, l. 394–398. The compatibility of such a view with that of Moses Maimonides was not lost on Berthold, who cited the parable of the king (*Dux neutrorum*, lib. III, c. 52) at precisely this point.

[*extra publicam rationum viam*].¹⁶ Along with Hermes Trismegistus (of the *Liber xxiv philosophorum*), Plato, and Boethius, then, the *Elementatio theologica* stood as the greatest representative of a venerable tradition of theorematic theology.¹⁷ The *Liber de causis*, however, along with other treatises purported to have discussed similar material, was relegated by Berthold to a rank definitively inferior to the *Elementatio theologica*.¹⁸

2 The Three Motions of the Soul

For Berthold of Moosburg, Proclus' achievement in the tradition of theorematism perfected only one of the three possible paths or "motions" by which the soul could come to know God. Berthold would have us view the *Elementatio theologica* as a kind of philosophical rite of passage, by recalling us to the fact that Proclus, as the *Tria opuscula* show, had gone even further. The discursive knowledge of God attained in the *Elementatio* was not seen by him as an end in itself but as a ladder to a higher goal.

In *De divinis nominibus* 4.8-9 (704D-705B), Dionysius spoke of three motions exercised both by souls (circular, direct, spiral), as they ascend to God, and by angels, in their knowledge of God and their providential operations. In Thomas of York's *Sapientiale* (lib. 1, c. 6), this remark was unfolded into a generalised theory about the three ways the pagans ascended to a knowledge of God. Inspired by Thomas, Berthold then applied this model directly to Proclus and the three ways he ascended to the knowledge of the highest Good by the

16 See also D. O'Meara, "La science métaphysique (ou théologie) de Proclus comme exercice spirituel", in A.-P. Segonds, C. Steel (eds), *Proclus et la théologie platonicienne. Actes du Colloque International de Louvain (13-16 mai 1998) en l'honneur de H.D. Saffrey et L.G. Westerink* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000), p. 279-290.

17 Berthold used other theorematic works in the *Expositio*. He was directly familiar with Alan of Lille's *Regulae caelestis iuris* (*Expos. tit. K, Praeamb. A, 21D, 21F, 176 commentum*). He seems to have known Nicholas of Amiens' *De arte catholicae fidei* through Thomas of York (7E, 9B, 11F, 12E, 18D, 20A, 35B, 137E, 150B, 150D, 162D, 168B). Berthold also knew first-hand the *Liber de intelligentiis* of Adam Pulchrae Mulieris (*Prol. 19, 21E, 36C, 36E, 143K, 143L, 183A*), which he sometimes attributed to Alan (*Prol. 19, 143K*), but elsewhere he expressed his uncertainty about the attribution he found in the manuscript (183A, p. 236, l. 80-81: *libellus De intelligentiis intitulus, nescio, cuius auctoris, libet ascribatur Alano*), perhaps because the *Liber* cited Alan by name. See the *Liber de intelligentiis*, ed. C. Baemker, *Witelo. Ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrhunderts* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1908), prop. 20, p. 26, l. 15-17.

18 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. K, p. 48, l. 401 - p. 49, l. 407*, cited at Introduction, section 3, n. 153, above.

natural light of intellect (*Expos. tit.* B-D): the circular motion is introspective; the direct motion is an immediate ascent from creatures to “the direct vision of God”; the oblique motion uses “common notions” and discursive reasoning.¹⁹

To have a complete picture of Berthold's position on the modalities of the soul's knowledge of God, one needs to combine these central passages from *Expos. tit.* B-D with other texts from the *Expositio*. Read on their own, these passages in the *Expositio tituli*, which speak of the Proclus ascending to the knowledge of God “by the guidance of the natural light of the intellect” (*ductu luminis naturalis intellectus*), and then summarise each motion without implying any order between them, could easily give the impression that all three motions are equally and immediately available to the soul and can be perfectly achieved by a person's natural powers, independently of divine assistance. But this was not Berthold's view, as will become clear when *Expos. tit.* B-D is supplemented with other passages that either treat the three motions explicitly (131A, 185G-M), which show there is an order among the three motions, or those that discuss the Proclean proof-texts Berthold associated with those motions in greater detail (123D, 202A-F), which show how divine grace is operative in the ordered ascent through the motions.²⁰ Since Berthold's aim in the *Expositio tituli* was to demonstrate that Proclus had in fact exercised all three motions, these nuances were not necessary. But they are required for a full account of his understanding of Platonism. Already before Proclus, according to Berthold, “Plato pursued the cognition of God and the highest craftsman by all of these ways”, such that in Proclus we find nothing that is not a restoration of Plato's philosophy to its complete and original form.²¹ As we will see, Berthold's commitment to Dietrich of Freiberg's noetics led him to depart from Thomas of York. In sum, we may say that, according to Berthold, the circular motion belongs approximately to the same level as the direct motion, and each

19 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.* A, p. 37, l. 30 – p. 38, l. 34: *in hoc apparet excellentia eius, quod per triplicem motum, quos ascribit divinus Dionysius 4 cap. De divinis nominibus K [...] ascendendo pervenit, quantum fuit possibile homini mortali ductu luminis naturalis intellectus, in notitiam summi boni*. Cf. 131A, p. 190, l. 11-13: *qualiter sapientes mundi per triplicem motum [...] ascenderunt, ut cognoscerent Deum esse*. On Berthold's modifications of Dionysius, see L. Sturlese, “Berthold of Moosburg, the *unum animae*, and Deification”, forthcoming. Later, in *Expos. tit.* E-F, we find that Berthold even borrowed Thomas' praises of wisdom itself (*Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 1 and 3) and applied them directly to Proclus!

20 See also I. Zavattero, “La figura e il pensiero di Proclo in Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in *ARKETE. Rivista di studi filosofici* 1(2005), p. 51–67, at p. 60, who has rightly emphasised that, in the *Expositio tituli*, Berthold treats Proclus as a pagan enlightened by grace (“un ‘infedele’ toccato dalla ‘grazia’”).

21 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.* D, p. 40, l. 134-135.

of these higher motions either follows from a special grace or following the perfection of the oblique motion, which makes the mind more receptive to that divine gift.

In the *Expositio tituli* (unlike the more faithful reproduction of Thomas' doctrine of the three motions we will see in 131A), the circular motion begins not with the senses but by seeking God through introspection and by directly beholding the soul's innate content. Here Berthold cited Proclus on how, quieting its lower activities, the soul beholds "the harmonic reasons" from which it is constituted, the "many lives of which it is the completion", and "recollects that it is itself a rational world" and an image of that from which it has come. Then, returning to its highest intelligence (*summa intelligentia*), the soul gazes upon its "sister souls" in the world, the intellectual substances above them and, prior to these, the unities of the gods.²² According to Berthold, Boethius' definition of *intelligentia*, which we encountered already in his gloss on Psalm 42, expressed the same doctrine in a summary form: "there exists a higher eye of intelligence, for surpassing the bounds of the universe it views that simple Form by the pure apex of the mind [*pura acies mentis*]"²³ The principal distinction here, therefore, is between *ratio* and *intelligentia*, the former conceived as proper to the soul, while the latter is the higher mode by which it looks beyond itself to the simple Form flowing through the universe.

In the *Expositio tituli*, the difference between the circular motion on the one hand, and the direct and oblique on the other, was that the direct and oblique begin from the senses. On this question Berthold followed Thomas closely.²⁴ The oblique motion begins from creatures regarded as "vestiges". By a process of laborious inquiry (*per laboriosam investigationem*), the soul divides, defines, uses common principles, passes from known to unknown, from things sensible to things intelligible, until it comes to the highest Good. This is the

22 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. B*, p. 38, l. 49 – p. 39, l. 71, using Proclus, *De providentia*, c. 6, §18-19. In Thomas' account, followed more closely in 131A, the self-conversion in the circular motion is related to the soul's inherent need for self-sufficiency that it finds only in God.

23 It is not necessary to modify the texts of the Oxford and Vatican manuscripts (*intellectivam* | *intellectivae*) after Basel (*intelligentiam* | *intelligentiae*). Berthold used both terms synonymously for a mode of knowing beyond *intellectus*. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 44C, p. 75, l. 100 – p. 76, l. 116: where *intelligentialem* is used interchangeably with *intelligentialis* and *intellectivialis* (p. 76, l. 112-116). Cf. 185L, p. 27, l. 436: *intelligentiae*; 186H, p. 39, l. 312 and p. 40, l. 337: *intelligentialis*; 202D, p. 186, l. 152: *intelligentiam*.

24 See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131A, p. 191, l. 28-30: *Motus autem animi praeter istum circularem est duplex, scilicet obliquus et rectus, quia potest inspicere ipsum creatum bonum tanquam vestigium aut tanquam exemplum*. Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 6.

path of discursive reason (*per ratiocinationem*). The *Elementatio theologica* itself, Berthold claimed, is proof that Proclus has ascended by this motion. He then gave Proclean proof-texts for each of the oblique motion's three starting-points (these starting-points were directly taken from the *Sapientiale*): Proclus ascended from "the condition of [God's] works", in the first 12 propositions of the *Elementatio*; from "the governance of what is created", in Proposition 120 and thereafter, as well as in *De decem dubitationibus*; and from "the reconciliation of contraries", as in Proposition 20 on the four genera (*maneries*) of being (Nature, Soul, Intellect, One), which are arranged insofar as the divided and lower presupposes the unified and higher, and in *De malorum existentia*.²⁵ The *De providentia et fato* was not mentioned here because, it seems, at least some of this treatise was more exemplary of the direct and circular motions.

In the *Sapientiale*, followed closely by Berthold in 131A, Thomas had explained the relation between the oblique and the direct motion as follows. He described how the few pagans (*infidelis*) capable of completing the oblique motion then commenced the direct motion (*motus directus*), which he intriguingly identified with a "direct vision of God" (*directa visio ipsius*).²⁶ The direct motion begins also with the senses, but sets out from creatures regarded as "tokens, images, and signs" rather than vestiges, ascending to God "intellectually" rather than "intelligibly", "unitively" rather than "digressively". One could say that the excellence of the direct motion is a function of the lucidity of the contemplator's vision, in which the creature has become semiotically transparent to its divine exemplar. In Berthold's terms, this would be identical to "the perspicacity of the mind" (*perspicacitas animi*) that the *Elementatio theologica* aimed to cultivate.²⁷

For his Proclean proof-text of the direct motion in the *Expositio tituli*, Berthold gave Proclus' summary of Platonic dialectic that is above scientific knowledge (*scientia*). Practicing dialectic, a person skilfully gathers and divides species, and ascends from the many to the One. At the summit of dialectic is the intuition (*intellectus, epibole*) of simple beings and the primary terms of demonstrations, beyond which, Proclus declared, Aristotle did not ascend. *Scientia* belongs properly to the soul as discursive and temporal in its activity, while *intellectus* belongs to it insofar as soul is an image of its prior

25 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. D*, p. 40, l. 110 – p. 41, l. 145. Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 7. As was his custom, Berthold specified and expanded Thomas' references, this time to Boethius' *Consolatio*.

26 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131A, p. 191, l. 28–44; *Expos. tit. C-D*, p. 39, l. 73 – p. 40, l. 118. See note 29, below.

27 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 7, p. 14, l. 291–292: *exercendum est animi perspicacitas*.

principle. Then there is the cognition above intellect, “which the theologians before Plato also divulged, calling it a truly divine madness”, and which Proclus identified as the activity of the one of the soul (*unum animae*). There, the soul “loves to be at peace, enclosing itself from cognitions, having been made silent, and keeping quiet with inward silence”. As Berthold showed more extensively in *Prolog.* 17, Dionysius’ teaching about the union (*unitio*) or unity (*unitas*) above mind, agrees (*concordat*) with this doctrine.²⁸ Therefore, whereas the oblique motion culminates with the knowledge of the highest Good, which is very much distinct from its discursive beginning-points, the direct motion for Berthold seems to be a more rapid progression through the same steps. It is possible that the means and the end in the direct motion are also more intimately related: perhaps the movement is so rapid precisely because the soul is firmly established in this hidden and unitary principle. Berthold’s notion of the *perspicacitas animi* would imply something like this unity of content and method. Certainly, the unitive cognition of the *unum animae* is integrated into the direct motion in a way it is not present in the oblique.

Both Thomas and Berthold maintained that the direct motion was “given” to the philosophers (*paucis datus est infidelibus*), who fell into two groups: those who were given it in its fulness by a special grace (*per gratiam specialem*) and those who received it after perfecting the arduous oblique motion of discursive reason.²⁹ How did Berthold understand this in terms

28 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. C*, p. 39, l. 73 – p. 40, l. 108.

29 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131A, p. 191, l. 40–44, citing *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 6 (MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.VI.437, f. 6vb): *Primus istorum duorum motuum [= motus obliquus] fuit in philosophis: Quod enim notum est Dei, manifestum est illis. Secundus autem motus [= motus rectus] paucis datus est infidelibus et, si quibus datus, hoc tenuiter propter hoc, quod iste motus non est datus multis in sua excellentia nisi per gratiam specialem aut non nisi propter praecedentem obliquam animi motionem et hoc perfectam, quod paucissimis datum est.* In *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 6, not cited by Berthold, Thomas went on to speak of a lesser “vestige” of the direct motion among those who, “by a simple reflection [*simplici speculatione*], rise from creatures to the creator through the contemplation of creatures” (*Attamen huiusmodi motus, quaecumque vestigium fuit in quibusdam, qui simplici speculatione surrexerunt a creaturis in creatorem per ipsarum creaturarum considerationem*). Thomas explained this vestige using passages from Cicero (*De natura deorum* 11.37) transmitting the parable from Aristotle’s *De philosophia* about the inhabitants of an ornate cave, who know of the gods only by report (*fama*). Suddenly, an earthquake splits its entrance, and they gaze upon an immense world of beauty, order, and power. Without any disputation (*remota omni disputandi facultate*) or discursive reasoning they recognize the existence of an intelligence that has made all things. Perhaps Thomas referred to this as a “vestige” of the direct motion as a way of separating this momentary intuition (*simplex speculatio*) from the more perfect exercise of the direct motion that is enabled either by a special grace (we might think of St. Paul) or after a *habitus* has been gained by laborious investigation.

of his own doctrine of the perfection of the oblique motion and the beginning of the direct motion? A glance at 131A has clarified that Berthold, like Thomas, maintained that the three motions fell into a certain order, despite the impression given by *Expos. tit. B-D*. The status of the circular motion, however, will require further explanation. To determine their precise order for Berthold, we must look to Berthold's reception of Dietrich of Freiberg's notion of the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). Dietrich's *intellectus adeptus* differed in several respects from Albert's, not least by placing the emphasis squarely on the necessity of grace for its attainment, for deferring its realisation until the beatific vision, and for describing its temporary enjoyment as a rapture (*raptus*). Berthold will incorporate Dietrich's *intellectus adeptus* into the *Expositio* relative to the culmination of the oblique motion and to the exercise of the circular and direct motions. However, as was noted already, Berthold's notion of the *unum animae* will also retain some features of Albert's higher stage of the *intellectus assimilativus* that cannot be derived from Dietrich's writings.

The central passage for this synthesis is 123D, where Berthold produced the most extensively glossed and schematised version of the proof-text (*De providentia et fato* 8.28–31) for Proclus' exercise of the direct motion used in *Expos. tit. C*.³⁰ Berthold arranged the modes of cognition presented by Proclus into five levels, and subdivided most of them into higher, lower, and medial operations. First and lowest is the exterior sense, whose objects are the extrinsic qualities of beings immediately present to it. The second, called the interior sense or imaginative power, is more intrinsic and spiritual because its objects are quantities and common sensibles that can be apprehended in the absence of the being in which they inhere. The third mode is the discursive or "particular" reason (*ratio particularis*). Its lowest function is related to the imagination and to the unstable objects of the physical world: through many "probable reasons" this lower function gives rise to "belief" and thus becomes opinion. In the superior function of the particular reason, when it is conjoined with the universal reason (*ratio universalis*), it is "scientific", and applies itself to pure mathematics. These provide the stability required for necessary knowledge. These stable principles are used by the particular reason in its medial operation, where it deals with mathematical objects applied to the physical world (*res mathematicas applicatas ad physicum*), for instance in the quadrivial arts and in sciences like optics. All of this recalls Berthold's adaptation of Albert's *Metaphysica* in the *Prologus* on the twofold inquiry (*duplex indagatio*)

30 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123D, p. 127, l. 94 – p. 129, l. 155.

that human reason has brought to perfection before it begins the study of metaphysics.

The fourth mode of cognition is exercised by the *ratio universalis*, which constitutes the quidditative being of a thing by apprehending its essential parts in definitional knowledge.³¹ This was effectively Dietrich of Freiberg's notion of the *intellectus possibilis*. Berthold elaborated this theory by giving the possible intellect three hierarchically ordered operations.³² Its lower function, which is related to the particular reason, deals with "logical intentions", which are presumably second intentions like "genus", "species", and so on. With its medial function it is occupied with "metaphysical intentions", which can perhaps be identified with extra-mental intentions like "human" or "horse". In the context of Berthold's citation of Proclus' *De providentia et fato*, these two operations of Dietrich's *ratio universalis* were associated with the composing and dividing activities of dialectic, and with the apprehension of the relationship of the principles of the quadrivial sciences to one another until it arrives to the unhypothetical first principle.³³ Finally, the higher operation of the universal reason no longer proceeds by analyses, divisions, demonstrations, but as "the intelligence of simple beings" it contemplates simple beings by simple intuitions (*epybolis simplicibus*) and with immediate visions (*antopticis*).³⁴ In Berthold's synthesis, the science of metaphysics as Aristotle pursued it was thus confined to the level of the possible intellect – the consequences of this will be felt when we consider his criticism of the doctrine of the transcendentals in Chapter 4, below.

Finally, with the fifth mode of cognition we have the first mention of the agent intellect and the culmination of the entire ascent, as far as human cognition is concerned:

31 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123D, p. 129, l. 129-131; *Praeamb.* C, p. 64, l. 389-390: *rationi universali, quam intellectum possibilem vocamus.*

32 Dietrich spoke of the cooperation of the particular and the universal reason in the formation of demonstrations. See Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, ed. B. Mojsisch, *Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), lib. III.27.1 – III.28.1, p. 200, l. 24 – p. 201, l. 59.

33 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123D, p. 129, l. 133-134: *Quoad ista duo ascendit ad unum primum principium et usque ad insuppositum.*

34 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123D, p. 129, l. 144-147: *Quoad sui autem superius non adhuc utimur methodibus et resolutionibus aut compositionibus aut divisionibus aut demonstrationibus, sed epybolis, id est adiectionibus, simplicibus et velut antopticis, id est per se visivis, entia speculantem, et vocatur simplicium intelligentia, quae etiam in nobis est melior omni scientia.*

The fifth level is the agent intellect, having become the form of this universal reason according to its higher part. This is called the acquired intellect [*intellectus adeptus*] and ‘the one’ of this part of our intellectual power, ‘no longer operating intellectually and joined to the One. For all things are known by like: the sensible by sense, scientific objects by science, the intelligibles by intellect, and the One by the unifical’. This is ‘the most divine cognition of God, which is known through ignorance according to the cognition above mind, when the mind, having departed from everything else, and then also sending itself away, is united with the super-resplendent rays, and is illuminated hither and yon by the inscrutable depth of wisdom’.³⁵

Berthold’s apparently straightforward identification here of the acquired intellect and *unum animae* is singular in the *Expositio*, and has led to some divergent recent interpretations of his thought on this important issue. In an earlier study, I made this passage from 123D central to an interpretation of Berthold’s thought that placed him fundamentally in continuity with Dietrich of Freiberg’s theory of the soul’s return to and intellectual union with God. The similarities between Dietrich’s *intellectus adeptus* and Berthold’s *unum animae*, and their agreement that a rapture is required for wayfarer to enjoy this highest form of cognition, seemed so strong that the divergence between the two authors was reduced there to a merely verbal difference: for Berthold, once a person has the acquired intellect, the cognition of the *unum animae* follows spontaneously.³⁶ In a more extensive consideration of this question in Berthold, Paul Hellmeier has argued that this apparent identification of the *intellectus adeptus* and *unum* in 123D should in fact be understood merely as a mistake on Berthold’s part. For Hellmeier, 123D is inconsistent with the clear

35 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123D, p. 129, l. 148–155: *Quintus gradus est intellectus agens factus forma praedictae rationis universalis secundum sui ipsius rationis superius, et vocatur intellectus adeptus et ‘unum’ ipsius partis nostrae intellectualis, ‘non adhuc intellectuale excitantem et hoc coaptantem uni. Omnia enim simili cognoscuntur: sensibile sensu, intelligibile intellectu, unum unial’.* Haec est ‘divinissima Dei cognitio, quae est per ignorantiam cognita secundum cognitionem super mentem, quando mens ab aliis omnibus recedens, postea et se ipsam dimittens unita est supersplendentibus radiis divinatorum, inde et ibi non scrutabili profundo sapientiae illuminata’. Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §31, p. 140, l. 6–9, and Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.3, 872A–B.

36 E. King, “Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the One of the Soul”, in *Dionysius* 36 (2018), p. 184–199.

subordination of intellect to the *unum animae* outlined in several other passages in the *Expositio*.³⁷

I would now maintain that the truth is somewhere in the middle of these interpretations. I continue to hold that 123D is crucial for understanding Berthold's intentions, not least because I do not believe that Berthold would make a mistake in the most elaborate discussion of the modes of cognition in the *Expositio*. Hellmeier is right to propose that there is a clear and consistent subordination of intellect to the *unum animae* in Berthold. But the ambiguity in 123D can be explained in another way without dismissing it as an error. If there is any problem with 123D, it was rather that Berthold was not being precise enough.

Berthold was consistent in maintaining that the *intellectus adeptus* and *unum animae* belong to the same mode or level of cognition – the attainment of the latter follows on the former. However, what Berthold did not make sufficiently clear was that he continued to apply a pattern of higher and lower subdivisions within this fifth mode. In other words, the acquired intellect should be understood as the lower phase and the *unum animae* the upper phase of the same level (*intelligentia*). Perhaps he did not separate them into distinct “operations” because, strictly speaking, one cannot exercise the *unum animae* independently of the *intellectus adeptus* and, again, as soon as the acquired intellect is reached, it passes spontaneously into the *unum animae*. If we entertain the possibility that the acquired intellect and the *unum* are related in this way, we can see that Berthold has not only synthesised the Albertine distinction of acquired and assimilated intellects with the theory of the acquired intellect derived fundamentally from Dietrich of Freiberg: as we shall see, by rendering the difference between Dietrich's *adeptus* and Albert's *assimilativus* in the language of Dionysius and Proclus, Berthold has produced a doctrine that in fact closely resembled a position on the nature of beatitude taken by Meister Eckhart.

The relationship between the agent intellect and the *unum animae* is sometimes presented very ambiguously in the *Expositio*. In two passages discussing the soul's most intrinsic and essential principle, which were inspired by Dietrich,³⁸ one has the impression that for Berthold the *unum animae* was nothing else than the *facies* of Augustine or the *intellectus agens* of Aristotle:

37 P. Hellmeier, “Der Intellekt ist nicht genug. Das proklische *unum in nobis* bei Berthold von Moosburg”, in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 126/2(2019), p. 202–226, at p. 219–221. Hellmeier very insightfully emphasises the influence of Albert on Berthold's theory, although I do not share the opinion that Albert was more important than Dietrich for Berthold's synthesis.

38 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.2.1 – 11.12.1, p. 147, l. 50 – p. 155, l. 81.

The rational soul not only lives animatedly, but also intellectually, and consequently has in itself the principle of its motion, namely ‘the one of the soul itself’, which some call ‘the deiform unity’, others ‘the hidden recess of the mind’ or ‘face’, but others call it ‘the agent intellect’.³⁹

However, this intellective power is the higher, essential part of the soul, which Aristotle calls ‘the agent intellect’, Augustine ‘the hidden recess of the mind’, and Dionysius ‘the union’ or ‘the unity’ (as the other translation says) ‘exceeding the nature of the mind’ [...] but the author calls it ‘the one of the soul’.⁴⁰

Like 123D, these passages show that Berthold did not want to posit a sharp divide between the agent intellect and the *unum animae*. Nevertheless, given his commitment to the subordination of Aristotle to Plato on this central question of anthropology, it is difficult to imagine that he would not want to establish some difference between the two, and this makes his apparent equivocations here rather perplexing. In isolation, these passages give us very little explanation. Fortunately, the ambiguity can be resolved by context. In both cases, Berthold was discussing the immediate and essential principle of the soul, and so we must be sensitive to the fact that, according to the law of mediation, the intellect and not the *unum animae* would be the proximate principle of its essence.⁴¹ By including the Proclean and Dionysian *unum* alongside the *intellectus agens* Berthold was in fact consistent in his view that for the Platonists the more universal cause is more active than the secondary cause. Although the two principles are placed at the same level, for Berthold the agent intellect is the immediate and essential principle of the soul only in virtue of the more causally efficacious *unum animae*.⁴²

Berthold’s lemmatic commentary in the *Prologus* on the phrase “light of the simple intellect” (*lumen simplicis intellectus*), from the Hermetic description

39 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 188E, p. 65, l. 204–207: *quae non solum vivit animealiter, sed etiam intellectualiter, et per consequens habet in se principium sui motus, scilicet ‘unum ipsius animae’, quod quidem vocant ‘deiformem unitatem’, alii vero ‘abditum mentis’ sive ‘faciem’, quidem autem ‘intellectum agentem’.*

40 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 193E, p. 103, l. 123 – p. 104, l. 134: *tale autem intellectivum existens pars animae essentialis superior, quod Aristoteles vocat ‘intellectum agentem’, Augustinus ‘abditum mentis’, Dionysius vero ‘unionem’ sive ‘unitatem’ (ut dicit alia translatio) ‘excedentem mentis naturam’, [...] sed auctor vocat ‘unum animae’.*

41 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 68E, p. 17, l. 93–95: *Similiter intellectus agens cum uno sui, qui etiam est totum in parte et pars totius potestativi ex partibus, quod est anima, continet in se virtute totam residuam substantiam animae, in qua convenit cum corde.*

42 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 24B, p. 130, l. 189–198; 162B, p. 17, l. 51 – p. 18, l. 60.

of the microcosm, presented the same doctrine.⁴³ Berthold had just explained how the human receives “through the *imago Dei*” the “beauties not immersed in the world”, which are the three levels of gods or separate substances (according to cause: God; according to essence: the gods; according to participation: their orders).⁴⁴ There is, he noted, a twofold similarity in the *imago*. In one respect, the human is an image of the primordial cause of intellect (*prime intellectus*) and is similar to intelligible beauties, and thus it is called “the simple intellect”. As an image of the One, however, the human resembles the first principle and the primordial causes themselves, and as such the *imago* is the *unum animae* or “the light of the simple intellect”.

Through the *unum animae*, the mind enters the supersubstantial world where, as Dionysius wrote, “the simple, absolute, and unchanging theological mysteries lie hidden away in the super-resplendent darkness of the silence teaching hiddenly, the darkness [...] that fills to excess with beyond-beautiful lucidities minds that are dispossessed of eyes [*non habentes oculos mentes*]”.⁴⁵ Berthold’s comments on this passage specified that the *oculus mentalis* is the agent or the simple intellect, “which is also light, as Aristotle says”. But the *unum* is more luciform (*luciformius*) than the simple intellect and, therefore, is more truly the *imago Dei*. However, following the semantic register of Psalm 4:7 (*Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine*), Berthold’s vocabulary immediately became Augustinian, when he added that the *unum animae* can be identified with the soul’s face (*facies sive vultus*), the hidden depth of the mind (*abditum mentis*), and the superior reason (*ratio superior*) that is always turned to the divine light. As with 123D, 188E, and 193E, we find that the agent intellect and the *unum animae* are brought closely together, though Berthold nevertheless maintained a decisive but subtle distinction between them: the agent intellect must be acquired and then “dispossessed”.

A similar distinction can be found in Propositions 185 and 202, which contain Berthold’s analyses of the same Dionysian and Proclean texts used already to describe the three motions of the soul. These passages are the most illustrative of the doctrine of the *intellectus adeptus* that was presupposed in 123D. In Propositions 185 and 202, William of Moerbeke’s intriguing translation of ψυχὰι ὁπαδοί (the souls participating intellect who are always “attendant” upon

43 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 19, p. 30, l. 838 – p. 32, l. 878.

44 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 18–19, p. 27, l. 729 – p. 30, l. 837. The phrasing at *Prol.* 17, p. 26, l. 691–693, indicates that Dietrich’s theory of the agent intellect as the *imago Dei* was a primary inspiration for this portion of the *Prologus*.

45 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 19, p. 31, l. 851–857. Cf. Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, 1.1, 997A–B.

the gods) as *animae contemplatrices* provoked Berthold to set out a theory of contemplation.⁴⁶ At the basis of this theory was Dietrich's doctrine of the acquired intellect, which Berthold adjusted to fit the demands of Proclus' distinction between the perpetual "attendance" or contemplation of divine and intellectual souls and the episodic "attendance" of human souls.

In the *De visione beatifica*, Dietrich had addressed certain arguments of "the philosophers", whose views on the relation of the agent and possible intellects seemed to resemble his own. He stated that they raised "the same, or at least a similar, question" as he had regarding the possibility of intellectual beatitude, although their answers will differ in a crucial respect.⁴⁷ The philosophers maintain that the agent intellect is sometimes (*aliquando*) united to the possible intellect or the essence of the soul as a formal cause in this life (*in hac vita*), since the agent intellect is both the primary efficient cause of cognition, making the possible intellect to know in act, and is the form or light of the possible intellect's intelligible objects, which are the secondary cause of its knowing.⁴⁸ Dietrich then summarised the philosophers' views about the determinate *ratio* that descends from the agent intellect and provides the possible intellect with its content. It is the principle by which the possible intellect is actualised and constitutes its quidditative knowledge of a thing. These *rationes* flow immediately from the eternal reasons in God into the agent intellect, where they are in some way determined or limited, and thence proceed into the possible intellect. According to Dietrich, the philosophers' position, if left here, would have the unacceptable consequence of making God the formal cause of every act of intellection.⁴⁹ Dietrich responded to this by underscoring the difference between thinking a thing by its *ratio* and thinking it essentially (*per essentiam*). Only the latter cognition, which belongs to the agent intellect, is a "likeness of the universe of being" and embraces all things in its essential activity. Therefore, the possible intellect does not enjoy the beatific vision whenever it knows any determinate *ratio* – it does not know God directly – but only when it receives a *ratio* that amplifies the scope of its cognition to this universal or "essential" extent, that makes it adequate to the cognition of the

46 In Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §65, cited at Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 134F, p. 218, l. 140, William transliterated the term and offered a more prosaic translation: *opadoy, id est assequentes*.

47 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 4.2.1 (1), p. 106, l. 40–43.

48 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 4.2.1 (2–7), p. 106, l. 44 – p. 107, l. 83. Dietrich shared the view he attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Al-Farabi, and Averroes that the actualised possible intellect is identical to the intelligible species.

49 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 4.2.1 (8–10), p. 108, l. 84–111.

agent intellect. Now, the possible intellect always uses a *ratio* to express the formal parts of a thing, which are the principles of a thing's being and its being-known. Since the human intellect always knows by these determinate *rationes*, it is incapable of knowing the simpler quiddities of the separate intellects, "if they exist".⁵⁰ All the more, then, must the possibility of beatitude through the *intellectus adeptus*, when the possible intellect will be united to the agent intellect by the amplitude of such a *ratio*, be understood as a Scriptural promise and not a natural fact.⁵¹

For Dietrich, therefore, the acquired intellect is attained only in heaven (*in patria*), when the blessed think by the divine mode of cognition that is perpetually active in the individuated agent intellects that are the grounding principles of their souls.⁵² Importantly for Berthold, Dietrich also acknowledged the possibility of a transitory enjoyment of this cognition, giving the example of St. Benedict who, according to Gregory the Great (*Dialogues* II.35) "saw the whole universe in a certain elevation of the mind" or rapture.⁵³ Dietrich likely found in this report a verification of his view that the *ratio* that beatifies the intellect comes directly from God and includes in its simplicity the ambit of the entire universe. It elevates or expands the possible intellect to the essential cognition of the agent intellect. But it is also clear from his passing reference to Benedict's vision (*sed qualiter hoc contigerit, Deo committendum iudico*), that this kind of transitory experience was not his primary concern in the *De visione beatifica*. Dietrich was more interested in articulating the necessary conditions of intellectual activity and beatitude than in verifying its exceptional historical realisations.

50 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 4.2.1 (13-14), p. 109, l. 131-145.

51 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 4.3 (1), p. 111, l. 29-31: *Aliter igitur procedendum ad propositum supposito hoc, quod per scripturam veritatis nobis promittitur, eo, quod per rationem solam hoc concludi non potest, videlicet quod in beata vita visuri simus Deum in claritate suae essentiae.*

52 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 4.2.1 (4), p. 107, l. 56-59: *Ex hoc enim nunc secundum statum huius vitae non intelligimus ea intellectione, qua ipse intelligit, quia secundum hunc statum non est nobis unitus ut forma, sed solum ut principium intellectorum in nobis.*

53 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 1.1.4 (5), p. 29, l. 27-33: *Et ex hoc arguit Commentator Super III De anima, quod, si intellectus agens, qui est intellectus per essentiam et semper in actu, aliquando uniatur nobis ut forma, per ipsum intelligemus omnia entia. Quod videtur aliquantulum concordare cum eo, quod legitur de sancto Benedicto, videlicet quod in quadam mentis elevatione vidit totum universum. Sed qualiter hoc contigerit, Deo committendum iudico.* On the interpretation of Benedict's vision in medieval thought and art, see M. Kupfer, "The Cosmic Vision of Saint Benedict, *e specula* and *in speculo*", in N. Bouloux, A. Dan, G. Tolias (eds), *Orbis disciplinae. Hommages en l'honneur de Patrick Gautier Dalché* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), p. 139-165.

Berthold understood the details of Dietrich's theory very well, and repeated his view that the acquired intellect is not a natural fact but must fall within the order of voluntary providence, "the completion and consummation of natural providence", for it pertains "only to God's grace and good merits".⁵⁴ This concluding passage from his commentary Proposition 202 most fully displays his agreement with Dietrich on this matter:

Now, although intellectual souls are below divine souls, yet they are expanded above partial [=human] souls. For these, although they participate intellect by intellectual activity, are unable to participate [their] proximate intellect or intellectual essence, the acquisition of which [*cuius adeptione*], such that it would be their form, they lack as long as they are in becoming; otherwise, they would not have inclined away from intellectual activity. For what acts essentially acts always, and souls who have acquired their essential intellect [*animae intellectum essentialem adeptae*] do exactly this. For this reason, [human souls] are more fittingly called "rational" than "intellectual". However, by a gift of God, at some moment [*aliquando*] even in this mortal life, they are elevated not only by their intellectual power, but even by their unificational power or one [*suo uniali seu uno*] to the height of contemplation, to a vision, not only of the gods, whom God has established as his dwelling-place, but even of him, the Lord God almighty and the great King above all gods.

But after this life, meritorious and well-pleasing souls by the grace of God (that is, by the light of glory), will have their own intellects formally united to themselves, and thus their blessed vision will be fulfilled insofar as they shall see God, Lord of gods, face to face – [having become] mirrors throughout all eternity. But intellectual souls do not lack this; indeed, they always have it by a gift of the primarily God.⁵⁵

54 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129F, p. 182, l. 288–302. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 4.3.2 (2-4), p. 114, l. 3-20.

55 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202F, p. 187, l. 217 – p. 188, l. 233: *Verum licet [animae intellectuales] sint inferiores divinis animabus, tamen superexpansae sunt partialibus, quae, licet participant intellectu per intellectualem operationem, non potentes intellectu proxime participare seu intellectuali essentia, cuius adeptione ita, quod sit eis forma, carent, quamdiu sunt in generatione, quia alias non deciderent ab intellectuali operatione – operans enim per essentiam semper operatur, sicut faciunt animae intellectum essentialem adeptae, propter quod et magis vocantur rationales quam intellectuales –, tamen dono Dei aliquando etiam in hac mortali vita, non iam suo intellectuali, sed etiam suo uniali seu uno altitudine contemplationis eleuantur in visionem non solum deorum, quos posuit prime Deus suum latibulum, sed etiam eius, qui est Deus magnus dominus et rex magnus super omnes deos. Sed post hanc vitam bene meritae animae Dei gratia (scilicet lumine*

While the relation of the *intellectus adeptus* and grace described here is perfectly consistent with Dietrich's teaching, Berthold has made the relation less hypothetical by transposing it into the cosmological framework of the *Elementatio*. For Berthold, heavenly or "intellectual" souls must already enjoy the same cognition that will belong to the blessed *in patria*. At the same time, and even more forcefully than Dietrich, Berthold emphasised the necessity of grace for the acquired intellect, and even reintroduced the notion of "the light of glory" (*lumen gloriae*) that had been explicitly rejected by Dietrich.⁵⁶ However, one should not rush to characterise this as a misreading of or radical departure from Dietrich; it was rather an attempt to reintroduce the *lumen gloriae* after Dietrich's criticisms. The intelligible species or *ratio* descending from God *in* which (rather than *under* which) the possible intellect knows the divine essence in its amplitude could easily be regarded as a gift enabling it to approximate the intrinsic vision of God that belongs inherently to the agent intellect as an *intellectus in actu per essentiam*. In this sense, Berthold would be attempting to safeguard Dietrich's theory from naturalistic misinterpretations by putting the emphasis squarely on the necessity of grace.

Berthold's reception of Dietrich on this score can be compared with the nearly identical conclusions drawn in the vernacular treatise *Ler von der selikeyt* (*The Doctrine of Beatitude*), written sometime between 1302 and 1323.⁵⁷

gloriae) habebunt sibi proprios intellectus formaliter unitos, et sic complebitur eorum visio beata, in quantum videbunt Deum deorum dominum facie ad faciem specula in aeterna. Tali autem unione non carent intellectuales animae, verum semper habent eam dono prime Dei. There are three options for interpreting the phrase *specula in aeterna*: (1) *specula*, the nominative plural of *speculum*, is in apposition to *animae* (as translated above); (2) *specula* is the ablative singular of "watchtower" ("from a watchtower"); (3) as a poetic word order, *in specula aeterna* ("in eternal mirrors"). *In aeterna* itself could signify either a temporal designation ("through all eternity") or, less likely, a multiplicity of objects seen (looking "in things eternal"). The sense of the passage is clearly that the beatific vision presupposes the *intellectus adeptus*, when the agent intellect, which could be described as a "mirror" of God's light in the rest of the soul, is now united with the soul in a new way (as thoroughly as form is united to matter). Since blessed souls could therefore be called "mirrors", I have translated following the first option. If this was Berthold's intent, he was likely evoking 2 Cor. 3:18 (*Nos vero omnes, revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes, in eandem imaginem transformamur a claritate in claritatem, tanquam a Domini Spiritu*) in addition to 1 Cor. 13:12 (*facie ad faciem*). It cannot be excluded that Berthold was also alluding to the Boethian notion of "the watchtower of providence", given that the *intellectus adeptus* is so closely related in the *Expositio cognitio providentialis*. See Conclusion, section 2, n. 96. For his patient discussion of this passage with me, I am very grateful to Paul Hellmeier OP.

56 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 3.2.3, p. 72, l. 39 – p. 73, l. 79.

57 The text is edited with a commentary in N. Winkler, *Von der wirkenden und möglichen Vernunft. Philosophie in der volkssprachigen Predigt nach Meister Eckhart* (Berlin: De

This treatise addressed the question of the primacy of the agent or possible intellect in the beatific vision. Its author advocated Dietrich's views above those of Thomas Aquinas and even above the doctrine of emptiness or passivity ascribed to Meister Eckhart (*daz saelicheit lige an got liden*). The text also went beyond anything we find in Dietrich to explore some of the ethical consequences of his noetics.

The anonymous author's central argument was that an intellectual substance like the agent intellect cannot be deprived of its natural operation. Following Dietrich's arguments about the agent intellect as an *imago Dei* that is always actually thinking God, itself, and the universe of beings, the author goes further than any declaration we have in Dietrich to state that the *imago* or *scintilla animae* is "blessed by nature" (*saelec sî von nâtûren*).⁵⁸ Such expressions come rather close to the fifth thesis attributed to the beguines and beghards censured at the Council of Vienne in 1311–1312: "that any intellectual nature in itself is naturally blessed, and that the soul does not need the light of glory to elevate it to see God and enjoy him blissfully".⁵⁹ For the anonymous author, however, this theory of natural beatitude was not inconsistent with the tenet that the possible intellect still requires divine grace in order to be transformed by the agent intellect.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, his position about the natural beatitude of the agent intellect led the author to develop certain original ethical theories, including a presentist understanding of hell as each mortal sin, which thereby becomes an "eternal middle" standing between the soul and the enjoyment of this immediate vision of God already underway but "hidden" in the

Gruyter, 2013). See also Sturlese, "Alle origini della mistica speculativa tedesca", p. 48–87; id., "Traktat von der Seligkeit", in K. Ruh et al. (eds), *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, vol. 9 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1995), p. 998–1002; N. Largier, "Das Glück des Menschen. Diskussionen über *beatitudo* und Vernunft in volkssprachlichen Texten des 14. Jahrhunderts", in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 827–855; A. Beccarisi, "Dietrich in the Netherlands. A New Document in the Lower Rhenish Vernacular", in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), p. 221–237; Saccon, *Intelletto e beatitudine*, p. 161–173.

58 *Ler von der selikeyt*, ed. N. Winkler, p. 42, l. 16 – p. 43, l. 2; p. 44, l. 9; and p. 45, l. 14.

59 Constitution *Ad nostrum qui*, in H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, ed. P. Hünermann (Freiberg / Basel / Wien: Herder, 2009⁴⁶), §895: *Quinto quod quaelibet intellectualis natura in se ipsa naturaliter est beata quod que anima non indiget lumine gloriae ipsam elevante ad deum videndum et eo beate fruendum*. See also R. Lerner, *The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 61–84.

60 *Ler von der selikeyt*, p. 41, l. 18 – p. 42, l. 7.

intellect.⁶¹ Although the anonymous author explicitly ascribed his doctrine of the natural beatitude of the *imago Dei* to Dietrich,⁶² it is important to bear in mind that he has made no recourse to the distinction of the orders of natural and voluntary providence, of nature and grace, that Dietrich was so careful to observe.⁶³ All the same, here and in the position censured by the Council of Vienne, one may discern the explosive potential in Dietrich's theory for a reform of Christian self-understanding through a philosophical account of the dignity of the intellectual creature. This potential was creatively harnessed by the anonymous author and, more carefully, by Berthold of Moosburg and John Tauler. For Dietrich, Berthold, and Tauler, this path of "natural beatitude" was definitively the road not taken. For Dietrich and for Berthold, beatitude for human beings is only beatitude when it is communicated to the entire person; it makes no sense to say a "part" of the soul is always blessed because it always gazes upon God or the divine ideas. What matters is how this cognition can be participated by the entire soul, and this necessarily depends on grace. The *Ler von der selikeyt* did not observe this intrinsic connection between beatitude and grace.

Berthold's integration of Dietrich's theory into a Proclean and Dionysian framework intensified both sides of this relationship, that is, the actuality of beatitude as well as the need for divine grace. Like the *Ler*, Berthold placed greater emphasis than Dietrich on the possibility of the soul's foretaste of beatitude in this life, rather than deferring it to the eschatological future. His doctrine of contemplation in Propositions 185 and 202 consistently maintained that a transitory enjoyment of divine union is in fact granted by a gift of God sometimes (*aliquando*) to human souls and always (*incessanter*) to heavenly souls. Berthold's focalisation of Thomas of York's interpretation Dionysius' three motions on the historical figure of Proclus demanded that it be so. In

61 *Ler von der selikeyt*, p. 44, l. 19 – p. 45, l. 11. These coincide with the author's use of an Eckhartian motif: to dispose oneself to receive divine grace, one's possible intellect must rid itself of all images. See *Ler von der selikeyt*, p. 45, l. 15 – p. 46, l. 7.

62 *Ler von der selikeyt*, p. 41, l. 8–11; p. 42, l. 8–15.

63 Sturlese, "Alle origini della mistica speculativa tedesca", p. 64–68. In his history of debates on the beatific vision, Christian Trottman correctly emphasised the importance of Dietrich's view about the intelligible species, derived from his reading of Alexander, Al-Farabi, and Averroes, for his rejection of the Thomistic *lumen gloriae*. However, his conclusion (*La vision béatifique. Des disputes scholastiques à sa définition par Benoît XII* [Paris: École française de Rome, 1995], p. 335) that "la thèse de Dietrich de Freiberg ne permet pas de penser la caractère surnaturel de la vision béatifique puisqu'elle ne procède pas d'une grâce" is an even less balanced account of Dietrich's own theory than what we have in the *Ler von der selikeyt*.

turn, the text of the *Elementatio* shaped the doctrine Berthold presented: contemplation must be an activity exercised equally by human and heavenly souls. With this came a stronger focus on the circular motion, which Berthold to be the contemplation characteristic of heavenly souls, than anything in Thomas of York.⁶⁴ Here we see once again how closely Berthold associated the highest level of intellect and the *unum animae*: in Proposition 185, he applied Dionysius' words ("it is granted [*conceditur*] to few souls to be admitted [*admittantur*] to such heights of contemplation") relative both to the *intelligentia* at the summit of the circular motion,⁶⁵ and to the union or unity above mind.⁶⁶ In Proposition 202, Berthold classified a series of passages from Bernard of Clairvaux, Richard of St. Victor, Dionysius, and Proclus, according to whether they pertain to contemplation in this life (*in via*), in heaven (*in patria*), or to both. As with Proposition 185, he made it clear that the difference between contemplation *in via* and *in patria* concerns not the quality but the stability of contemplation, when the *aliquando* changes to *incessanter*.⁶⁷ Even now, that is, the souls moving the heavens exercise steadfastly and unswervingly (*firme et indeclinabiliter*) the highest intelligence (*intelligentia*), which Berthold described with the same text used for the circular motion in *Expos. tit. B*, in which the soul looked within itself and above itself, to its "sister souls", the intelligences, and the divine unities. This in turn gives way to the cognition above mind of the *unum animae* that is the basis for their providential cooperation with God.⁶⁸ Thus, for Berthold, there is a certain beatitude in nature, but it belongs to these heavenly "contemplative" souls, which are already *in patria* through a divine gift.

In all these passages – the proximate essential cause of the soul (188E, 193E), the two dimensions of the *imago Dei* (*Prol.* 19), the modes of cognition (123D), the kinds of contemplation (185G-M, 202A-F), and also the figure of the

64 For *intelligentia* of the circular motion as the highest kind of cognition, see also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 44C, p. 75, l. 100 – p. 76, l. 120 (*operatio intelligentialis* is above, *supra*, the *operatio intellectualis*); 63C, p. 188, l. 62-66; 185L, p. 26, l. 412 – p. 28, l. 455 (*intelligentia* as the highest mode of cognition).

65 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185M, p. 28, l. 457–471: *quia anima non semper movetur motu circulari, ut fiat informis uniens se unitis virtutibus, nec semper est statuta se tota extra se totam et supra se totam in unionem excedentis mentis, per quam coniungitur diis per recursum sui ad summam intelligentiam, [...] ideo non semper contemplatur deos, licet aliquando. Quod tamen paucis conceditur animabus, ut ad tantam contemplationis eminentiam admittantur, iuxta illud, quod dicit Dionysius.*

66 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185I, p. 25, l. 369–379.

67 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202C, p. 185, l. 147 – p. 186, l. 172.

68 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202B, p. 184, l. 105–111.

astronomer (*Prol.* 16) – have shown how closely Berthold associated the agent intellect, or its state of formal union with the possible intellect, and the *unum animae*. The comparison of the model of the three motions of the soul in *Expos. tit.* B-D and 131A with Berthold's analysis of their Proclean proof-texts in 123D, 185G-M, and 202A-F lead us to conclude that Berthold remained fundamentally in agreement with Dietrich in his understanding of the conditions of possibility for this beatifying cognition to occur. However, he accentuated Dietrich's marginal reference of Benedict's rapture because of the need to account for the historical attainment of this cognition in its perfection in Proclus himself and, consequently, following the letter of the *Elementatio*, in heavenly or "contemplative" souls. Berthold's modifications of Albert the Great's *De intellectu et intelligibili* in *Prol.* 16 must, therefore, be interpreted in this light, so that the state of the *intellectus adeptus*, the summit of self-knowledge and the capacity for a kind of natural prophecy, would itself be understood as a transitory state.⁶⁹ If Berthold also intended to replace Albert's *intellectus assimilativus* with the *unum animae*, then this too should be interpreted through the lens of 123D and Berthold's adaptation of Dietrich: once the soul is unified with its own agent intellect (*intellectus adeptus*), permanently or temporarily, it is then sent forth into the divine light in ignorance (*intellectus assimilativus* / *unum animae*). It was in this sense, then, that Berthold presented the *unum animae* and its cognition through ignorance as the higher operation or phase of the fifth mode in 123D, while the *intellectus adeptus* is that same mode as directed toward the possible intellect below it. This is consistent with every case examined so far: the two always go together, whether they are enjoyed by a transitory *raptus* in this life, either by a special grace or after the accomplished habit of the oblique motion, or permanently *in patria*.

Berthold's transformation of Dietrich's doctrine of beatitude is also consistent with what we saw in 188E and 193E, where the agent intellect was still held to be the soul's proximate essential cause, with the *unum animae* added as its deeper phase. In one sense, there is very little difference between the *intellectus adeptus* and the *unum animae*: once a person has the cognition of the *intellectus adeptus*, they have the cognition of the *unum*. But by adding a deeper or higher modality to this cognition, directly under the inspiration of Proclus

69 Most scholars would see this as a significant departure from Albert, although M. Führer, "The Agent Intellect in the Writings of Meister Dietrich of Freiberg and its Influence on the Cologne School", in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, B. Stammkötter (eds), *Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven seiner Philosophie, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1999), p. 69–88, has argued that Dietrich was a true follower of Albert when he located the attainment of the acquired intellect only *in patria*.

and Dionysius, and perhaps also in line with Albert, Berthold definitively subordinated the reflexive character of the acquired intellect and its identification with self-knowledge to the non-reflexive knowledge through ignorance of the *unum*. Overall, however, the closest contemporary parallel one can find for the notion of a simultaneous identity and difference of reflexivity and non-reflexivity is not found in Albert or Dietrich, but in a passage from Meister Eckhart's sermon *Von dem edeln Menschen* (*On the Nobleman*):

I say that as man, the soul, the spirit, contemplates God, he also knows and perceives himself perceiving; that is, he perceives that he is contemplating and perceiving God. Now some people have thought, and it seems quite plausible, that the flower and core of blessedness consists in knowledge, when the spirit knows that it knows God. For if I possessed all joy, and I did not know it, how could that help me and what joy would that be to me? Yet I say certainly that this is not so. It is only true that without that the soul would not be blessed; but blessedness does not consist in this, for the first thing in which blessedness consists is when the soul contemplates God directly. From there, out of God's ground, it takes all its being and its life and makes everything that it is, and it knows nothing about knowing or about love or about anything at all. It comes to rest completely and only in the being of God, and it knows nothing there except being and God. But when the soul knows and perceives that it contemplates, perceives and loves God, this is in the natural order a going out and a return to the starting point.⁷⁰

70 Meister Eckhart, *Liber "Benedictus". Von dem edeln Menschen*, in *Die deutschen Werke*, ed. J. Quint, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963), p. 116, l. 21 – p. 117, l. 4: *Ich spriche: sô der mensche, diu sêle, der geist schouwet got, sô weiz er ouch und bekennet sich bekennende, daz ist: er bekennet, daz er schouwet und bekennet got. Nû hât gedunket etliche liute und schînet gar gelouplich, daz bluome und kerne der saelicheit lige in bekanntnisse, dâ der geist bekennet, daz er got bekennet; wan, daz ich alle wunne haete und ich des niht enwiste, waz hülfe mich daz und waz wunne waere mir daz? Doch enspriche ich sicherliche des niht. Aleine ist daz wâr, daz diu sêle âne daz doch niht saelic waere, doch enliget diu saelicheit dar ane niht; wan daz êrste, dâ saelicheit ane geliget, daz ist, sô diu sêle schouwet got blôz. Dâ nimet si allez ir wesen und ir leben und schepfet allez, daz si ist, von dem grunde gotes und enweiz von wizenne niht noch von minne noch von nihte alzemâle. Si gestillet ganze und aleine in dem wesene gotes, si enweiz niht dan wesen dâ und got. Sô si aber weiz und bekennet, daz si got schouwet, bekennet und minnet, daz ist ein üzslac und ein widerslac ûf daz êrste nâch natürlîcher ordenunge.* English translation: Meister Eckhart, *The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense*, trans. E. Colledge, B. McGinn (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1981), p. 245.

Eckhart did not deny that reflexivity is a necessary aspect of beatitude. Rather, he took issue with the argument that beatitude consists primarily in the reflexive knowledge whereby one knows that one knows God. In some sense, as Eckhart acknowledged, one can understand why a person would suppose that reflexivity alone is both necessary and sufficient for beatitude – if I had all the joy or riches in the world and was not aware of it, what good would that be to me? In other words, as we saw for Dietrich and Berthold in contrast to the *Ler von der selikeyt*, beatitude is only beatitude when it is communicated to the entire soul. But what Eckhart was arguing was that there is in beatitude a kernel of non-reflexivity in which the soul, in all of its powers, is completely oriented toward God and not to itself; this is the root of beatitude and the prior moment, so to speak, that makes possible the appropriation of that bliss to the self in reflexivity.

Eckhart made a similar argument and the same criticism in his commentary on the Gospel of John, where he referred to a fuller discussion of the issue in the *Opus quaestionum*, which is no longer extant.⁷¹ In his commentary on John 1:12 (“As many as received him, he gave power to become sons of God”), Eckhart began by noting that anything that “receives” or participates something else, insofar as it is receptive, is in itself empty and in a passive potency. The existence of this passive power is completely derived from and dependent upon its object. This is because a potency exists entirely in relation to its activity, and in this case the potency in act has the same act of existence as the object in act. Following Aristotle (*De anima* III.2, 425b26), Eckhart gave the example of a sense faculty and sense object: both the eye and the object seen become entirely identical in act.⁷² The disproportion in the analogy, which Eckhart thought applied more perfectly to intellectual realities, is that the object seen does not give existence to the eye insofar as it is an eye or a being. Nevertheless, the seeing-eye and the seen-object are intrinsically related to one another in this way. If you take away the seeing-eye, then there is no seen-object, and vice versa. “To see and to be seen” in act “are one and the same thing”. Their active union is logically prior to their distinction. The ethical consequences of the

71 Meister Eckhart, *Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem*, in *Die lateinischen Werke*, eds A. Zimmermann, L. Sturlese, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994), §106–108 (John 1:12–13), p. 90, l. 9 – p. 93, l. 8, and §679 (John 17:3), p. 593, l. 1 – p. 594, l. 2. These passages clarify the target of Eckhart’s criticism. For a discussion of Eckhart in the context of other responses to John of Paris’ argument about reflexivity in the beatific vision, see Th. Jeschke, *Deus ut tentus vel visus. Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320)* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 260–274.

72 Cf. K. Flasch, *Meister Eckhart. Philosopher of Christianity*, p. 37–44, 184–188, 210–213.

Gospel's natural philosophical truth, as Eckhart presented it, are captured in John 17:3 ("This is eternal life, to know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent"). That is, to "receive" the Word, a person become entirely like a potency related to its act or, in other words, one must be pure existence for God (*deo esse*). This is nothing else than to be ignorant of oneself and all else besides God himself and what exists in God that is God himself. This is effectively to participate in the life of the Incarnate Word and, as Eckhart indicated in his opening comments on John 1:12, to be conformed to "the same image". This, he concluded, is what Augustine meant in the *Confessiones*, when he exclaimed that, "Unfortunate is the person who knows everything else, but does not know you; blessed is the person who knows you, even if he is ignorant of all these things".

The same argument appeared again in a briefer form in Eckhart's commentary on John 17:3, where the two portions of the verse (*haec est vita aeterna / ut cognoscant te verum deum solum*, etc.) prompted him to discuss the kind of "eternal life" that is proper to the intellectual nature in beatitude.⁷³ Here we find one of Eckhart's rare references to the hidden depth of the mind (*abditum mentis*) of Augustine's *De Trinitate*, in which the mind always remembers, thinks, and loves God. Immediately after this, Eckhart reiterated the point that beatitude does not consist primarily in a reflexive act, since blessedness consists in being oriented to nothing apart from God.

Interestingly, in Eckhart's summary of his commentary on John's prologue, when he came to the same verse from John 1:12 ("As many as received him", etc.), which first prompted the criticism about reflexivity, he made the only mention in his entire corpus of the doctrine of the *intellectus adeptus*. He attributed this notion to "the philosophers", as example of how a lower intellectual principle is gradually conformed to a higher intellectual principle – that is, how a person comes to share in the complete relatedness to the Father that is characteristic of the Word: the light of agent intellect penetrates more and more into the imaginative power through a process of extrinsic efficient causality ("alteration"), until the lower is related to it as matter is to form, and the proper operation of the higher is communicated to the lower ("generation"), which has now been transformed "into the same image".⁷⁴

There are of course significant differences in the means by which Eckhart and Berthold arrived at their similar conclusions about non-reflexivity and

73 Meister Eckhart, *Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem*, §679 (John 17:3), p. 593, l. 1 – p. 594, l. 2.

74 Meister Eckhart, *Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem*, §155 (John 1:12), p. 128, l. 1–10.

beatitude. In Eckhart, the soul is oriented non-reflexively to God as being, whereas for Berthold the highest principle in the soul is an image of what is prior to being. For Eckhart, the soul's emptiness or receptivity corresponds to its complete directedness towards God, but for Berthold the *unum animae* is in each soul as a ceaselessly active principle. While Eckhart did not ignore the mediations or "alterations" that precede birth or "generation", his emphasis fell on their dialectical interrelation – one is temporal and finite, the other is eternal and infinite – which corresponded to his greater stress on the immediacy of the birth, even if it is almost infinitely distant from everyday experience. In the *Expositio*, however, Berthold located the *De mystica theologia* and the hidden cognition of the *unum animae* at the summit of a long and arduous progression of scientific understanding, that eventually reaches the comprehensive vision of the *intellectus adeptus* and finally moves beyond this into the divine darkness.

What the example of Eckhart does suggest, at least, is that some discussion about reflexivity in the beatific vision was underway in the German Dominican milieu in the mid-1310s and early 1320s, when Eckhart wrote the commentary on John and the *Liber "Benedictus"*.⁷⁵ Similar though their conclusions are, before we hurry to posit any influence, we must acknowledge that a sufficient explanation of Berthold's doctrine and his synthesis of Albert and Dietrich, who were clearly his direct sources, was provided simply by the texts of Proclus (*De providentia et fato* 8.31-32) and Dionysius (*De mystica theologia* 1 and 3; *De divinis nominibus* 7.1). As we proceed further into the *Expositio*, we will see how this distinction of reflexivity and non-reflexivity was integrated into Berthold's cosmology and theory of deification. Berthold understood Goodness and "the ecstasy of divine love" to be at the root of God's own Trinitarian life and creative will; likewise, an intellectual creature actively exercises providence with the gods in a state that is prior to reflexive understanding, which participates in that same spontaneous action.

As for the three motions of the soul, moreover, the passages on contemplation from 185K-M and 202C show us that the *unum animae* is a feature not only of the direct motion, but also of the circular motion, which in its perfection is also "immovably fixed on one and the same object" through "the highest intelligence".⁷⁶ Therefore, whenever Berthold used the term *intelligentia*, which he

75 On the dating of both works, see Meister Eckhart, *Das Buch der göttlichen Tröstung*, trans. K. Flasch (München: Beck, 2007), p. 120–121.

76 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185K-M, p. 25, l. 384 – p. 28, l. 471, especially p. 28, l. 457–460: *anima [partialis] non semper movetur motu circulari, ut fiat informis uniens se unitis virtutibus, nec semper est statuta se tota extra se totam et supra se totam in unionem excedentis mentis, per quam coniungitur diis per recursum sui ad summam intelligentiam;*

found in Proclus and Boethius, we should understand by it the combination of the *intellectus adeptus* and the *unum animae* or, in other words, the intellect in its providential operation. Notwithstanding his use of Thomas of York's description of the circular motion at 131A, where it was identified as the restless heart's search for God, Berthold seems have preferred the account he discerned in Proclus and Boethius, which made the circular motion identical in content to the direct motion, except for the fact that it does not begin from the senses. This interiority what makes it most appropriate for the heavenly souls. A human soul partakes of the circular motion to the extent that it can separate itself from the body, quieting itself and beholding its innate content that has been recollected through prior learning (the oblique motion). The direct motion then amounts to the rapid or possibly instantaneous progression along the same path charted arduously by the oblique motion, from creatures to their source in the supersubstantial world. The *unum animae* is more closely associated with the direct motion in the *Expositio tituli* and 131A because, when creatures have become transparent to their source, it is a sign that the *unum animae* has been awakened.

While for Berthold it is indisputable that Proclus exercised all three motions through "the guidance of the natural light of the intellect" (as is said the *Expositio tituli*), from 131A it has become clear that there is an order among these motions, and that the oblique almost always precedes the direct motion. Following 185 and 202, we may infer further that the circular motion, understood through Proclus rather than Thomas' account given in 131A, is not immediately accessible to the soul. We cannot deny that for Berthold Platonic philosophy was meant to be argumentatively defended and made available to the rational creature as such, rather than merely being founded on an inscrutable experience – for Berthold, that was the entire point of the *Elementatio theologica* and the oblique motion. But we should not conclude from 131A that the

202C, p. 186, l. 152–170: *Hae [animae totales] enim non recurrunt aliquando ad ipsam summam ipsarum intelligentiam, sed firme et indeclinabiliter secundum statum suum perpetuum in ipsa stant, per quam, ut dicit auctor loquens de una et singulari anima libro De fato et providentia, cap. 6 in fine, 'videt quidem sorores ipsius [...]' Haec auctor, qui licet loquatur de contemplatione possibili animae in vita praesenti, tamen nihilominus verum est de contemplatione aeternali, prout talis contemplatio stat fixa immobiliter et secundum unum et idem obiectum. Talis enim anima simplicem et beatum adeptam intellectum sive in sui in esse constitutione, sicut omnis anima totalis se habet, sive sui ab hoc ergastulo liberatione operans contemplatione divinissima, qualis est anima humana beata, omnis, inquam, talis anima non est quietans se ipsam ab exterioribus motibus vel interioribus, qui nulli ibi sunt, sed deus facta, ut animae possibile, cognoscet solum, qualiter dii omnia indicibiliter cognoscunt singuli secundum le unum, quod sui ipsorum.*

providential cognition of the *unum animae* in the direct or circular motion automatically follows from the perfection of the oblique motion. Berthold's stronger affirmation about the possibility of contemplation in this life, building on Dietrich's passing reference to Benedict's vision of the cosmos in a single ray of light, was conceived in terms of a *raptus* that coincided with the Dionysian and Proclean instructions about silencing every intellectual operation in order to be made receptive for God's activity in the soul.⁷⁷ While souls animating the heavens "possesses [*adepta*] a simple and blessed intellect" by nature through a gift of God, this possession comes to human souls only "by liberation from this prison-house", when the soul will achieve a stillness beyond striving.⁷⁸

Berthold read Dietrich and Thomas in light of each other: from Thomas he took the view that the philosophers had *in fact* arrived to a direct vision of God; following Dietrich, he understood this in terms of the transitory enjoyment in this life of the acquired intellect and, going beyond Dietrich to the Platonists, of its non-reflexive ground. Whether by a "special grace" to one who was seemingly unprepared, like Paul on the road to Damascus, or to one who has perfected the oblique motion, like Proclus, this transitory vision was given (*datus*). The difference, therefore, must consist in the fact that the perfected oblique motion, the work of laborious study and investigation into divine realities, better disposes the soul to receive that gift. But if we construe the transition from the oblique motion to the higher and deifying motions as only an automatic process, we risk obscuring the centrality of *raptus* in Berthold's contemplative theory. As we saw in Chapter 1, rapture so integral to his understanding of contemplative union that it featured at the beginning of the *Prologus*, with Paul (*summus divinalis sapientiae theologus Paulus [...] raptus*), and at its conclusion, with the final stage of the restless and arduous ascent to God found in Psalm 42, when the soul is lifted beyond itself to *intelligentia* and the *unum animae* as the hart is drawn up to the water-brooks (*rapitur sicut cervus*).⁷⁹

This relation of reason and grace can be clarified further if we consider the fundamentally Boethian character of Berthold's treatment of the goal or final cause of the *Elementatio theologica* in the *Expositio tituli*.⁸⁰ Using the *Consolatio philosophiae*, Berthold compared Proclus' propositions to the ladder depicted on Lady Philosophy's garment, by which the "contemplator" ascends from "the

77 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202B, p. 185, l. 132-144; 211E, p. 264, l. 222-228.

78 See n. 76, above.

79 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 1, p. 5, l. 5-6; *Prol.* 20, p. 34, l. 964-965. Cf. 211E, p. 263, l. 215-218: *non fit secundum habitum permanentem in hac vita, licet raptim et secundum quendam transitum fiat aliquibus*.

80 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Expos. tit.* L, p. 49, l. 408 – p. 51, l. 491.

divine by participation” to “the divine by essence” (the gods) and from there to “the divine as cause” (God). As Lady Philosophy taught, the contemplation of the fount of all goods, where all things are held together at once (*cuncta simul*), makes a person not only blessed (*beatus*), “but even god” (*sed etiam deus*) by participation. Berthold went on to relate the Π and Θ depicted on her garment, representing the practical and theoretical lives, to Augustine’s report that Plato’s philosophy strove both for moral and rational perfection (*opus et scientia*). Finally, citing Avicbron, Berthold declared that the “final cause of humankind” is “the striving to the higher world”, achieved through “knowledge and activity” (*scientia et operatio*), which “liberate the soul from the captivity of nature, [and] cleanse it from its darkness and obscurity”. This emphasis on intellectual and moral ascesis culminated with a brief prayer: “that we may ascend through this [the vision of the primordial causes] to contemplate the highest Good, the primarily Good, may we be carried across with his support, who is the mediator of God and humanity, Jesus Christ”. If we are to interpret these passages as something more than rhetorical ornamentation, which we certainly must do in view of Berthold’s allegiance to Dietrich of Freiberg’s conception of beatitude and the role of grace, then we must conclude that, for the passage from the dividedness of reason (the oblique motion) to the unified vision of the acquired intellect and the *unum animae* – the vision of the divine light as at once beginning, middle, and end of all things at the end of the *Prologus*; or the deifying vision of all goods *cuncta simul* here at the conclusion of the *Expositio tituli* – divine assistance is required for the natural light of reason to realise its hidden and natural operation. Just as, “with Plato and Boethius”, he understood that the divided cannot unify itself, and so too he could acknowledge that for Proclus deification occurs through grace.⁸¹ As Berthold saw it, then, the purpose of the *Elementatio theologica*, was to help the soul build the speculative habit, the discursive awareness and science of the primordial causes and the hidden depth in the soul’s own ground, that will dispose it to receive the vision of all goods *cuncta simul*.

3 The Two Orders of Providence

Berthold’s conception of a doctrine of grace that was internal to ancient Platonism is consistent with his transformation of the doctrine of double providence that he inherited from his German Dominican predecessors. The central text introducing this notion is *Expos. tit.* I, but once again we must supplement Berthold’s preface with other passages from his commentary for a

81 See 1.3, n. 97, above.

complete account. Berthold explicitly referred to either *providentia naturalis* or *providentia voluntaria* in 41 subsections of his commentary, and in all but ten he treated them as a pair. The brief entries for *providentia* and *providentia naturalis* in the *Tabula contentorum* (there is no entry for *providentia voluntaria*) helpfully point the reader to Proposition 120, where the theme of providence is first introduced by Proclus, and to Proposition 141 where, according to his commentator, Proclus “shows that providence is twofold”.

Berthold generally acknowledged that the origin of the distinction was found in Augustine (*De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.9.17). Only in 141A, however, did he provide a full quotation of the relevant text. Commenting on Genesis 2:15 (“And the Lord God took man, and placed him in the Paradise Eden, to work upon it and maintain it [*ut operaretur et custodiret illum*]”), and casting the mind’s eye upon the universe likened to a great tree of beings (*quamdam magnam arborem rerum*), Augustine distinguished between God’s “hidden governance” that “gives growth to trees and plants”, and that which governs voluntary agents, such as angels and humans.⁸² The heavens and the earth are ordered by the first, which extends to “anything that is borne by an interior natural motion”. The second pertains to agriculture, to the arts, and the ordering of societies both angelic and human. Berthold paraphrased the first as “the order and connexion of essential and substantial causes” (*ordo et conexio causarum essentialium et substantialium*).

This phrase shows the influence on Berthold of Dietrich of Freiberg (*causa essentialis*) and Ulrich of Strassburg who, following Albert the Great, used the Hermetic definition of fate as a *conexio causarum*.⁸³ The importance of Ulrich as the originator of this formative interpretation of Augustine in the German Dominican context has recently started to receive due attention from scholars.⁸⁴ This was not lost on Berthold, who began Proposition 120, the central passage signalled by the index, with a citation from Ulrich:

82 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141A, p. 45, l. 11–26.

83 The principal text in Albert the Great is *Physica*, lib. II, tr. 2, c. 19, p. 126, l. 25–40. See also Albert the Great, *De fato*, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1975), a. 2, p. 68, l. 1–4. On these texts, see A. Palazzo, “The Scientific Significance of Fate and Celestial Influences in Some Mature Works by Albert the Great. *De fato*, *De somno et vigilia*, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, *Mineralia*”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam*, p. 55–78; id., “Albert the Great’s Doctrine of Fate”, in L. Sturlese (ed.), *Mantik, Schicksal und Freiheit im Mittelalter* (Köln: Böhlau, 2011), p. 65–95; id., “*Regna duo duorum*. Berthold of Moosburg’s Theory of Providence and Fate”, forthcoming.

84 Beccarisi, “La scientia divina dei filosofi”; ead., “Einleitung”, in Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6*, ed. A. Beccarisi (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), p. xvi–xx; Ferro, “Berthold of Moosburg, Reader of Ulrich of Strassburg”, forthcoming.

Although the primarily Good, the God who is beyond-blessed beyond all things, makes all things primarily through himself and governs them through providence, nevertheless, in order that the dignity of causality and divine cooperation, which is the most divine of all works, be not absent from the universe (to which all levels of divine goodness that can possibly exist are communicated), God also works through causes that are second to himself, that is, through the primordial causes. And these are ordered in two ways according to the double mode of providence, which Augustine distinguishes in Book 8 of his *Hexaemeron*, saying that 'the twin activity of providence is found to be partly natural, and partly voluntary'.⁸⁵

Berthold then juxtaposed Augustine's vertical distinction with the horizontal subordination of fate to providence in Boethius and Proclus.⁸⁶ Boethius identified *providentia* with the order of causes as they are beheld in the simplicity and stability of the divine mind, and *fatum* with the explicated, manifold, and temporal disposition of causes in the sensible world. As Lady Philosophy instructed the prisoner in the *Consolatio*, to the extent that a person seeks satisfaction in inherently divided and transitory goods, they will remain subjected to fate. For Boethius and Proclus, entities nearer to the One are embraced only by providence, and are exempt from the fated, variegated connection of causes. A person will be free only to the extent that he draws nearer to the divine origin and mode of cognition that constitutes providence. Yet for Ulrich and Berthold, there is a sense in which the highest secondary causes, the primordial causes, are both fated, as explicated from the divine mind, and providential, in that they participate and cooperate directly

85 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120E, p. 100, l. 295–302. Cf. Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, ed. A. Beccarisi, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 18 (9), p. 145, l. 258 – p. 146, l. 265: *Licet prime bonum super omnia superbenedictus Deus per se principaliter omnia efficiat et per providentiam gubernet, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis, quae est divinisimum operum, non deesset universo, cui communicati sunt omnes gradus divinae bonitatis possibiles existere, operatur etiam per secundas causas a se, scilicet per primordiales. Et istae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae, quae distinguit Augustinus VIII Hexaemeron sui dicens, quod 'gemina operatio providentiae invenitur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria'.*

86 Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism*, vol. 2, p. 701–705, argues that while the extent of Proclus' influence on Boethius has been debated, on the question of providence and fate that influence is effectively beyond dispute. Berthold was perhaps the first scholar to note the connection at *Expositio*, 141B, p. 46, l. 42 – p. 48, l. 109. On this passage, see A. Palazzo, "Regna duo duorum".

in God's power.⁸⁷ One way to resolve this ambiguity between the two models would be to say that, for Berthold, fate and providence are only distinct where the operation of a thing differs from its essence – that is, either in the sensible world or among accidental and volitional agents like angels and human individuals. In this way, we may assume that Berthold intended to superimpose both the Augustinian and Boethian models of providence: the human being is subject to fate in becoming, but begins to exercise providence with the gods when it is capable of raising its contemplation to the stable order of being.

The other major source for Berthold's interpretation of *gemina providentia* was a fragment (MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 69va-vb), which Berthold himself copied. Loris Sturlese has identified it as a portion of a lost treatise by Dietrich of Freiberg, the *De subiecto theologiae* listed in the early catalogues of Dietrich's works, and there are no solid reasons to doubt this attribution.⁸⁸

The fragment appears to contain Dietrich's determination of a question concerning the unity of theological science.⁸⁹ Its references to "partial books" and "treatises" suggest that the fragment derived from a prologue to a larger theological work, perhaps a *Sentences* commentary.⁹⁰ It begins by using the example of the physical sciences in order to outline the different kinds of unity that a science may possess.⁹¹ Following "hearsay and probability" rather than "properties of the things themselves and the manifold truth of reflection", some have held "by a logical reflection" that things as diverse as the incorporeal and the corporeal can be treated under a single, univocal genus (i.e., substance). Dietrich rejected this approach and argued that the structural unity of a science must conform to the realities themselves. For,

87 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 92–94: *Inquantum tamen prime bonum explet providentiam suam per primordiales causas, sic actus providentiae primitus est in diis [...] et per consequens nomen Dei*. Cf. Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 16 (5), p. 110, l. 60–61: *Inquantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet per fatum, sic actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per consequens nomen Dei*.

88 Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xvi–xxxiv; Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, p. 277; Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 502.

89 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, ed. L. Sturlese, 2.2, p. 279, l. 10: *in proposito circa subiectum naturalis scientiae considerandum*; 3.1, p. 280, l. 33–34: *tertio sumendum in proposita quaestione*.

90 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, 3.3, p. 280, l. 44–58.

91 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, 2.2, p. 279, l. 10: *Sic in proposito circa subiectum naturalis scientiae considerandum*; 3.1–2, p. 280, l. 33–36: *Tertio sumendum in proposita quaestione proprium subiectum et ipsius unitatem, quo etiam ipsa scientia theologica unitatem habet. Ubi considerandum, quod sicut in his, quae gratia exempli seu manuductionis praemissa sunt in rebus naturae [...]*.

as Aristotle showed, physics cannot have a univocal and logical unity since one cannot subsume heavenly and sublunary beings univocally under one genus; as Averroes clarified, their properties stand in a completely equivocal relation to one another. Instead of a univocal and logical unity, then, Dietrich proposed a unity of proportionality (*proportionalitas*), where $A:B :: C:D$. That is, just as sublunary bodies are composed of their principles, so analogously heavenly bodies are composed of theirs. Motion and other natural properties are comparable only according to the notions of their respective principles within each genus.

Dietrich then made the distinction that Berthold would follow in the *Expositio tituli* between a science's subject (*subiectum*) and its matter (*materia*). Dietrich first discussed natural substance, and then reasoned about how the structure of the science should follow from this.⁹² Among natural beings, any one of the principles or components from which a substance is constituted may be considered by itself, such that it is understood to relate to its unifying substance as a kind of "matter". Alternatively, the aggregate of principles may be considered under the aspect of the whole, and thus as "something complete, existing in act according to one formal reason", which "is subject [*subicitur*] to an agent and the properties bestowed by the agent". Failing to observe this distinction between subject and matter in theology, Dietrich continued, the less circumspect (*minus considerantes*) have supposed its subject must be something particular like *totus Christus, res et signa*, "the works of creation and restoration", or even "God himself". For Dietrich, these are in fact the particular "matters" which are integrated into a more comprehensive whole or "subject" by virtue of "a notion common to all". These different "matters" are related by proportionality so that, as in the physical sciences, they must be reduced to the unity of proportion or attribution to some single term (*ad aliquod unum*). For example, just as rewards are due to the just, so penalties are to the wicked; just as God will judge the good, so he will judge the wicked. These proportionalities must be reduced to a common unity that is the basis for the analogy. As an example of this correct procedure, Dietrich cited Proposition 21 of the *Elementatio theologica*, on the four genera or *maneries* of nature, soul, intellect, and the One, and Proclus' reduction of all agreement to some one that is the primary analogate or root and principle (*radix et ratio*) of the order.⁹³

92 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, 3.1-4, p. 280, l. 33 – p. 281, l. 68.

93 See also Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione entium separatorum*, ed. H. Steffan, in R. Imbach et al. (eds), *Opera omnia*, vol. 2. *Schriften zur Metaphysik und Theologie* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980), 74.2-3, p. 237, l. 99-110.

In this science (*in hac scientia*), Dietrich continued, “the whole universe of beings” is treated, either according to the order of natural providence or voluntary providence.⁹⁴ The subject that unifies its various “matters” is divine being (*ens divinum*), which primarily, simply, and essentially belongs to God. Other things are and are said to be divine by analogical attribution. Examples of this kind of attribution come from Averroes (*In Metaphysicam* IV, comm. 2), who used the familiar example of health: plants and medicine are the efficient causes of health by attribution, that is, by virtue of their relation, to the art of medicine; exercise is called “healthy” because health is its final cause; finally, accidents are attributed to a substance as to a subject, as something “more formal” that properly has the notion of “being”, while the accidents themselves are “dispositions of being”. Thus, “beings are attributed to God” as their principle (efficient cause), as their end (final cause) and even in the third sense as accidents are to their subject, insofar as sacramental actions are performed *in persona Christi* with regard to the works of salvation and redemption.

Dietrich then introduced the two orders of providence to distinguish between two kinds of theology, the theology of the philosophers and “our theology of the saints”.⁹⁵ The philosophers, he observed, use precisely this kind of analogical consideration in their first philosophy, which they call “divine science or theology” rather than “metaphysics” because *ens divinum* belongs first to what is “divine by essence” and secondarily to the ordered universe in relation to it. Nevertheless, “our science, which truly and simply we call theology, is distinguished from the divine science of the philosophers”. For the philosophers’ divine science considers the universe only relative to “natural providence”, according to which the first cause governs things by their innate modes and natural properties. In this perspective, beings are not understood relate to an end beyond the order of nature. “Our divine science of the saints”, however, views beings under the order of “voluntary providence”, in which are found the notions of merit and reward, as well as matters bearing on a good and holy life and the attainment of eternal bliss. This divine science looks to an end beyond the limits of this world, “when the divine science of the wise of this world is destroyed”.⁹⁶

94 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, 3,5-7, p. 281, l. 69-91. See n. 122, below.

95 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, 3,8-10, p. 281, l. 92 – p. 282, l. 112.

96 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, 3,9, p. 281, l. 100 – p. 282, l. 109: *Scientia enim divina philosophorum considerat universitatem entium secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, quo videlicet res stant in sui natura et secundum suos modos et proprietates naturales gubernantur per principem universitatis, nec ultra hunc naturae ordinem aliquem ulteriorem finem attendit. Nostra autem divina sanctorum scientia attenditur in entibus, secundum quod stant et disponuntur sub ordine voluntariae providentiae, in quo attenditur*

Because of this final argument, the fragment has come to occupy an uneasy place in Dietrich's corpus. Without directly denying its authenticity, Kurt Flasch has argued that the short text displays internal and external inconsistencies.⁹⁷ The internal ones, "which the writer of the fragment did not notice",⁹⁸ appear relative to the unity of theology itself – a potentially devastating criticism, as this was ostensibly the text's primary concern. Flasch is right to note that Dietrich presented us simultaneously with a unified picture of theology (*in hac scientia*) embracing both orders of providence grounded in an analogical model culminating in *ens divinum*, alongside his claim that "our divine science of the saints" differs from pagan divine science. But this apparent inconsistency can be addressed, for we have seen already that Dietrich argue that several physical sciences (*in physicis*) can be placed under the singular heading of natural philosophy (*philosophia naturalis*) which, just as in the consideration of theology, is referred to using the phrase *in hac scientia*.⁹⁹ The fragment uses this formal model applied to both natural philosophy and theology, based on the distinction between matter and subject, in the rationalistic and combative way we would expect of Dietrich.¹⁰⁰ That is, it prefers a pagan philosopher's understanding of the formal structure theology to the models of "the less circum-spect", who would include no lesser authorities than Augustine, Cassiodorus, Hugh of St. Victor, and Thomas Aquinas! While Proclus' model of proportionality, in which various matters are analogically united by a common subject (*ens divinum*), is the most adequately conformed to the nature of things, the limitation of the content of his theology, according to the fragment, is that it does not see that human freedom and the ethical life relates to an order beyond the confines of natural necessity.

The concern about the apparent internal and external doctrinal inconsistencies in the *De subiecto theologiae* is, however, related to a larger question about its relation to the methodology of natural and voluntary providence in Dietrich's works as a whole.¹⁰¹ It is often assumed that the precedent for

ratio meriti et praemii et ea, quae attenduntur circa bonam et sanctam vitam et adeptionem aeternae beatitudinis et perventionem ad finem ulteriorem sive in bono sive in malo etiam post terminum huius mundi, quando scientia divina sapientium huius mundi destruetur, 1 Cor., 13.

97 Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 502–512. See also C. König-Pralong, *Le bon usage des savoirs. Scolastique, philosophie et politique culturelle* (Paris: Vrin, 2011), p. 250–252.

98 Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 509.

99 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, 2.2–3, p. 279, l. 10–29.

100 Cf. Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 563; König-Pralong, *Le bon usage des savoirs*, p. 248.

101 Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xxvi–xxxiv; id., "Il *De animatione caeli* di Teodorico di Freiberg", in R. Creyten, P. Künzle (eds), *Xenia Medii Aevi historiam illustrantia, oblata Thomae Kaeppli O.P.*, 2 vols (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1978), vol. 1, p. 175–247, at

Dietrich's methodology should be sought primarily in Albert's philosophical commentaries.¹⁰² As for the *De subiecto theologiae* itself, most scholars generally minimise its importance for Dietrich's thought, or use it only as a confirmation of Dietrich's commitment to the methodological autonomy of natural philosophy. Others have pushed in the opposite direction, and argued that Dietrich's philosophical works should rather be understood as preparatory and provisional in relation to his theology oeuvre which, alas!, is largely no longer extant. Dietrich's position, as I understand it, was somewhere in the middle of these two options. In my view, it is largely thanks to the *De subiecto theologiae* that we can appreciate one of the most fascinating aspects of Dietrich's methodology throughout his works: his hypothetical approach to the philosophy of the separate substances.

p. 183–197; R. Imbach, "Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik. Zur Diskussion zwischen Nikolaus von Strassburg und Dietrich von Freiberg über die Atrennbarkeit der Akzidentien", in *Theologie und Philosophie* 61(1986), p. 359–395; A. de Libera, "Philosophie et théologie chez Albert le Grand et dans l'école dominicaine Allemande", in A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989), p. 49–67; Sturlese, *Storia della filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo*, p. 204–213; C. Trottmann, "La théologie des théologiens et celle des philosophes", in *Revue thomiste* 98(1998), p. 531–561; K.-H. Kandler, "Theologie und Philosophie nach Dietrich von Freibergs Traktat *De subiecto theologiae*", in J. Aertsens, A. Speer (eds), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, p. 642–647; id., "Theologische Implikationen der Philosophie Dietrichs von Freiberg", in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, B. Stammkötter (eds), *Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven*, p. 121–134; T. Suarez-Nani, "Substances séparées, intelligences et anges chez Thierry de Freiberg", in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, B. Stammkötter (eds), *Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven*, p. 49–67; K.-H. Kandler, "*Anima beata vel homo glorificatus possit progredi in aliquam naturalem cognitionem*. Bemerkungen zu eschatologischen Gedanken des Dietrich von Freiberg, vor allem zu seinem Traktat *De dotibus corporum gloriosorum*", in J. Aertsens, M. Pickavé (eds), *Ende und Vollendung. Eschatologische Perspektiven im Mittelalter* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2002), p. 434–447; T. Suarez-Nani, *Les anges et la philosophie. Subjectivité et fonction cosmologique des substances séparées à la fin du XIII^e siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 2002); De Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique*, p. 344–349; Beccarisi, "La scientia divina dei filosofo", Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 191–193, 512–514, 573–584; C. König-Pralong, "Dietrich de Freiberg, métaphysicien allemand antithomiste", *Revue thomiste* 108(2008), p. 57–79; Führer, M., Gersh, S., "Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg", in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 299–317, at p. 308–309.

- 102 Cf. Albert the Great, *De generatione et corruptione*, ed. P. Hossfeld (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1980), lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 22, p. 129, l. 13–16: *Si autem quis dicat, quod cessabit voluntate dei aliquando generatio, sicut aliquando non fuerit et post hoc coepit, dico, quod nihil ad me de dei miraculis, cum ego de naturalibus disseram*; id., *Metaphysica*, lib. XI, tr. 3, c. 7, p. 542, l. 25–28: *Theologica autem non conveniunt cum philosophicis in principiis, quia fundantur super revelationem et inspirationem et non super rationem, et ideo de illis in philosophia non possumus disputare.*

The polemical agenda of the most relevant of Dietrich's writings on this question should be kept in mind.¹⁰³ In the triptych of treatises *De tribus difficilibus quaestionibus*, Dietrich mounted an assault on an anonymous group of *communiter loquentes* ("run-of-the-mill babblers") for their failure to observe the methodological distinction between natural and revealed theology: in *De animatione caeli*, he rejected the widespread claim that angels rather than souls move the heavenly bodies; in *De visione beatifica*, he targeted the thesis that the beatific vision occurs through the possible intellect; and in *De accidentibus*, he ridiculed the notion that an accident could subsist apart from its subject.¹⁰⁴ In each case, Dietrich implied that the promotion of a certain philosophical position out of theological scruples (the Scriptures do not mention heavenly souls, therefore angels must move the heavens; in the beatific vision, God stands in for the agent intellect, the noblest part of the soul; extended quantity serves as a surrogate substance for other accidents in the Eucharistic transformation) has detrimental consequences for reason itself. Dietrich held that if exceptions were made haphazardly to the assumption that the universe has a rational order, with intelligible rules and patterns, then the entire philosophical edifice would be compromised. Dietrich's rationalism was captured by the motto he ascribed to Augustine at pivotal points in his works, either at their outset or when fictive interlocutors challenged him for straying far beyond what is permitted by the letter of Scripture: "Whatever is to be posited by right reason, God should be said to have done" (*quidquid recta ratione ponendum est, Deum fecisse fatendum est*).¹⁰⁵ By allowing theological scruples to influence metaphysical argumentation, these thinkers effectively undermine the coherence and certitude of theological science. As Kurt Flasch has put it, Dietrich developed Augustine's notion of *gemina providentia* into a methodology that insulated "immanent-philosophical inquiries against

103 König-Pralong, *Le bon usage des savoirs*, p. 228–231.

104 Dietrich of Freiberg, *Tractatus de tribus difficilibus quaestionibus. Prologus generalis*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, p. 9, l. 4–6: *De tribus articulis de numero difficultium quaestionum importunitate requirentium cogor scribere, a quo supersedere debui propter communiter loquentes*.

105 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De animatione caeli*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, 1.2, p. 13, l. 7–9; id., *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 9.3, p. 176, l. 82–85; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.20.2, p. 160, l. 4–8; id., *De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 28.10, p. 329, l. 85–86. Cf. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, lib. III, c. 5, §13: *Quicquid enim tibi vera ratione melius occurrerit scias fecisse deum tamquam bonorum omnium conditorem*. Dietrich's phrasing has a precise parallel in Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, eds G. Wilson, G. Etzkorn (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2011), q. 10, p. 82, l. 186–187.

theological intervention".¹⁰⁶ Rather than isolating the two disciplines, this became an instrument of critique, "a metaphysical sublimation of revealed theology", in which metaphysics could correct theological doctrine.¹⁰⁷

These points are undeniable. But they must be balanced by another important aspect of Dietrich's methodology, namely, his self-critical approach to the use of these rules as he repeatedly noted the *hypothetical* character of reasoning according to *necessary* relations.¹⁰⁸ In over 40 different passages concerning the existence of the separate intelligences or the heavenly souls posited by the philosophers, Dietrich added some version of the caveat "if they exist".¹⁰⁹ Using a similar turn of phrase, Dietrich stated repeatedly that we "rationally conjecture" about such things as the existence of heavenly souls.¹¹⁰ In other words, following the dictates of reason and the principles of mediation and proportionality, their existence is necessary.¹¹¹ However, as Dietrich routinely

106 K. Flasch, "Einleitung", in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1-13*, p. xi-xxxviii, at p. xxxi; id., *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 191-193, 342, 506, 512-514.

107 Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 563; König-Pralong, *Le bon usage des savoirs*, p. 248.

108 This aspect has been noted by Sturlese, "Il *De animatione caeli*", p. 220-221, as well as Suarez-Nani, *Les anges et la philosophie*, p. 64; Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 204-206, 284, 299-300, 310; König-Pralong, *Le bon usage des savoirs*, p. 247-248.

109 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 1.3-4, 2.3, 3.1, 5.2-3, 14.1, 27.2-3, 36.2, 37.1, 37.8, 39.2, 39.4, 44.9, 86.6; id., *De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 2.2, 6.2, 9.1, 16.1, 18.2, 19.3, 23.4, 28.4; id., *De animatione caeli*, 7.5, 9.1, 11.4, 15.1; id., *De visione beatifica*, 3.2.9.2 (4), 3.2.9.8 (1), 4.2.1 (14); id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.34.1, 111.25.1, 111.30.2; id., *De mensuris*, ed. R. Rehn, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, 2.11, 2.43, 8.3; id., *De origine rerum praedicamentaliu*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, 1.14, 3.37; id., *Quaestio utrum in Deo sit aliqua vis cognitiva inferior intellectu*, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, 1.1.4, 1.3.4; id., *De dotibus corporum gloriosorum*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 2.4.5; id., *De accidentibus*, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, 8.2.

110 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De animatione caeli*, 5.3, p. 16, l. 20: *rationabiliter conicimus*; 20.1, p. 30, l. 78: *rationi, qua conicimus*; id., *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 44.9, p. 210, l. 101: *rationabiliter conicitur*; 81.4, p. 243, l. 97: *rationabiliter conicitur*; id., *De dotibus corporum gloriosorum*, 13.3, p. 279, l. 30: *rationabiliter conicitur*; id., *De magis et minus*, eds R. Imbach, H. Steffan, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 14.3, p. 58, l. 75: *rationabiliter conicitur*; id., *De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*, 11.1, p. 311, l. 76-77: *possumus et de eis conicere tamquam a simili ex tertia manerie entium conceptionaliu*; 14.1, p. 313, l. 13-14: *aliqua conicere possumus de locis dictorum entium realium*; id., *De visione beatifica*, 4.1 (6), p. 106, l. 33-34: *tamen circa hoc probabiliter ex ratione conicere*.

111 On the law of mediation (*lex divinitatis*), see Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, proem. (2), p. 13, l. 14-27. Cf. Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De caelesti hierarchia*, eds P. Simon, W. Kübel (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), p. 2, l. 19: *Haec enim est lex divinitatis, ut per prima media, et ultima per media reducantur*.

acknowledged, even though the existence of these separate principles was regarded by reason as necessary, it cannot not be asserted with certainty.

We should give these claims their full weight when attempting to situate the *De subiecto theologiae* within Dietrich's larger corpus.¹¹² The hypothetical character of Dietrich's thought on these matters explains why he would use metaphysics to critique certain theologians while simultaneously subordinating the theology of the philosophers to "our theology of the saints", and even go so far to speak of the eschatological destruction of worldly wisdom. Prioritising the concluding Pauline passage of the *De subiecto theologiae*, Karl-Hermann Kandler has responded to Kurt Flasch's interpretation by arguing that Dietrich's philosophical treatises should be understood as preparations for his lost theological works.¹¹³ The major difficulty here is that we cannot assess a theological corpus that barely exists. Kandler's emphasis would do justice to the hypothetical nature of Dietrich's philosophical theology, but it does not sufficiently capture the critical edge of the rational necessity it wielded against the *communiter loquentes*. Dietrich was very willing, for instance, to promote several theses that were censured in 1277 (e.g., in the numbering of Denifle and Chatelain, articles 30, 43, 44, 54, 64, 70, 73, 84, 85, 92, 94, 95, 102, 115, and 138–141).¹¹⁴ But this does not mean was he using the Augustinian model of providence for purely naturalistic ends. Dietrich found support for his rationalism in Augustine and Aristotle together. For him, it is necessary to suppose that God acts according to reason, and to grasp the essentially ordered totality of the universe by beginning with the Aristotelian principle that each thing exists for the sake of its proper operation.¹¹⁵ In sum, while advocating for an integral and coherent pursuit of natural divine science according to its own lights, which can even challenge theological theses, Dietrich retained a scepticism that acknowledged the provisionality of its conclusions; they are necessary from our standpoint, they are the best the wayfarer has at their disposal, but there will come a time when this reasoning by conjecture will pass away. As his citation of 1 Corinthians 13:8 at the end of the *De subiecto theologiae*

112 According to Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 205, the contradiction involved in positing necessary beings as hypotheses did not occur to Dietrich. I would instead propose that we regard it as one of Dietrich's most provocative methodological innovations.

113 Kandler, "Theologie und Philosophie"; id., "Theologische Implikationen".

114 K. Flasch, *D'Averroès à Maître Eckhart. Les sources arabes de la 'mystique' allemande* (Paris: Vrin, 2008), p. 96–97; D. Calma, "La connaissance réflexive de l'intellect agent. Le 'premier averroïsme' et Dietrich de Freiberg", in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg*, p. 63–105, at p. 76.

115 E.g., Dietrich of Freiberg, *De animatione caeli*, 1.2, p. 13, l. 10–14; 5.3, p. 16, l. 19 – p. 17, l. 30; 20.1, p. 30, l. 78–86; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 1.1.1, p. 137, l. 3–10.

implies ("Charity never fails; but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there is knowledge, it will be destroyed [*scientia destruetur*"]), it is in ethical life that a person is in direct contact with the reality that abides. In this respect, it is unfortunate that more attention has not been given to the influence of Albert's theological works on the *De subiecto theologiae*, for these seem to offer closer parallels to Dietrich's argument than Albert's commentaries on Aristotle.¹¹⁶

The uncompromising rhetoric of this Pauline conclusion was consistent with milder remarks made elsewhere in Dietrich's corpus, even though on first glance it might seem otherwise. Kurt Flasch has noted a tension between the *De subiecto theologiae* and a passage in the *De cognitione entium separatorum*, where Dietrich stated that separated souls retain some of the knowledge they acquired during their embodiment, in addition to their innate knowledge.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, as Dietrich made clear in *De visione beatifica*,

116 An exception to this is Trottman, "La théologie des théologiens et celle des philosophes", p. 542–544, who has argued the *De subiecto* was also in agreement with Albert's account of the relation of metaphysics and theology in his theological works, according to which the reasoning about God as the first cause gives way to the free movement toward God and eschatological beatitude: "[Dietrich] est en cela fidèle à l'essentiel de l'enseignement de son maître". If this fragment indeed was related to Dietrich's lectures on the *Sentences*, then he may have been influenced by Albert's verdict that Aristotle did not pursue divine science in relation to a beatifying end beyond creatures. See Albert the Great, *In I Sententiarum*, ed. A. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, vol. 25 (Paris: Vivès, 1893), d. 1, a. 4, p. 18b. In Albert's discussion of the transcendentals in the same commentary, he argued that Aristotle understood *ens* only as the final conception reached by an intellectual resolution and *bonum* only as a property of moving being, whereas the saints (*sancti*) treated being and the other transcendentals insofar as they flow from the first cause. See Albert the Great, *In I Sententiarum*, ed. A. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, vol. 26 (Paris: Vivès, 1893), d. 46, a. 14, p. 450a, and the analysis of J. Aerts, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 183–186.

117 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 95.2–3, p. 259, l. 73 – p. 260, l. 86: *Habitum est enim supra, quod anima separata habet eorum memoriam, quae experta est in vita. Sunt autem quidam habitus scientiales, in quibus adipiscendis indiget experientia sensuali, ut sunt multae medicinae et perspectiva et aliae quaedam scientiae naturales. Hae scientiae seu habitus earum manent in anima separata virtute experientiae praecedentis, eadem ratione saltem, qua notitia aliarum rerum, quas expertae sunt, manent in eis, immo multo fortius ex eo, quod adiuncta ratione scientiali cum experientia fortificatur talis notitia in eis. De his autem scientiarum habitibus, qui sunt pure intellectuales, ut sunt scientiae arithmeticae et geometriae vel similes, sive habuerint eas in hac vita sive non habuerint, dicendum, quod huiusmodi habitus ex integro habent animae separatae secundum statum naturae suae non solum quoad talium artium principia, sicut aliquis possit dicere, verum etiam quoad ipsarum artium conclusiones.* See Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 511.

voluntary providence is “the completion and consummation” of natural providence,¹¹⁸ and not its destruction. Here, as Flasch rightly observes, voluntary providence plays “a secondary role” in relation to the affirmations of natural providence.¹¹⁹

If we foreground Dietrich’s hypothetical approach to the natural divine science of the philosophers, these apparent tensions can be resolved. We may begin by recalling a passage from the *De dotibus corporum gloriosorum* that echoed the argument about voluntary providence from the *De visione beatifica* and clarified its meaning:

As to what pertains to the beatific vision of those who have glorified bodies, something must now be said that presupposes what has been said elsewhere and perhaps in more detail. Here one must first consider how the blessed soul or the glorified human being, with their beatific vision intact and unhindered, could progress toward some new natural cognition. The response to this is plain and clear because that blessed vision exceeds every natural cognition and differs from it generically. But those things that differ generically can exist together in the same thing, because they are not opposed to one another as contraries, just like quantity and quality that exist in the same subject.¹²⁰

118 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 4.3.2 (3–4), p. 114, l. 8–21, cited in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129F, p. 182, l. 288–302: *Et ad hoc, quod talis ordo causalis salvetur ex integro, quo formalitas causaliter determinetur ab una in aliam, rationabile est totam huius ordinis dispositionem inveniri in uno aliquo, et hoc est ens, quod participat intellectu, quo apprehendit quidditates rerum in suis propriis rationibus, quo intellectu secundum genus nihil est superius nisi intellectus separatus, qui intelligit per suam essentiam. Et in hoc attenditur quaedam immediatio inter hunc intellectum et illum. Unde possibile, immo rationabile est hunc superiorem fieri formam huius inferioris. Et dico rationabile esse hoc et non dico necessarium esse, quia huiusmodi non fit ex necessitate ordinis, qui attenditur in providentia naturali, sed contingit ex sola Dei gratia et bonis meritis, quod pertinet ad ordinem voluntariae providentiae, qui est complementum et consummatio ordinis providentiae naturalis, quem duplicem ordinem in universo distinguit Augustinus VIII Super Genesim.*

119 Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 574, n. 30.

120 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De dotibus corporum gloriosorum*, 23.1–3, p. 286, l. 66–74: *De eo autem, quod pertinet ad beatam eorum [hominum habentium corpora gloriosa] visionem, nunc ultimo aliquid dicendum, salvis his, quae alibi dicta sunt, fortassis magis exquisite. Et primo hic considerandum, quomodo salva et non intercepta illa beata visione anima beata vel homo glorificatus possit progredi in aliquam novam naturalem cognitionem. Ad hoc patet responsio et est in promptu, quia illa beata visio excedit omnem naturalem cognitionem et differt etiam genere. Sed ea, quae differunt genere, compatiuntur se in eodem, quia sibi invicem non opponuntur contrarie, ut quantitas et qualitas, quae sunt in eodem subiecto.*

This plainly affirms that natural knowledge will persist and even progress for the saints after the Resurrection and will not interfere with their enjoyment of the beatific vision – an even stronger affirmation of the preservation of natural knowledge than what we saw in *De cognitione entium separatorum*.

This text also helps us reconcile the other two passages with the *De subiecto theologiae* because it shows that it is necessary to make distinction in Dietrich's views about natural knowledge, between the divine science of the philosophers (the target of the *De subiecto*) and natural knowledge in general (the subject of the passages from *De cognitione* and *De dotibus*). As the latter two passages show, the stable knowledge that the soul acquires while in its mortal frame will abide after death, as will its innate content that is recollected in its embodiment. What passes away is only the soul's imperfect and conjectural knowledge about the realities that are above its ken. For Dietrich, the soul's knowledge of the simple substances is imperfect because they do not have a quiddity or a definition,¹²¹ and thus cannot be known with the certainty of a demonstrative syllogism. The *De subiecto* is arguing that charity is more important for the wayfarer in this life than this partial knowledge, important though it is and even necessary within its own domain. Dietrich, in other words, was pleading for the deferral of the authority that the theologians would prefer to exert imminently on the divine science of the philosophers by suspending the laws and patterns of reason. His habitual caveats about the existence of separate intelligences and heavenly souls ("if they exist") are not a contradiction Dietrich failed to notice, but rather are a sign of his self-critical awareness of the greater framework within which natural and necessary reasoning about the separate substances occurs.

Berthold used the *De subiecto theologiae* fragment only once in the *Expositio*. He modified its terminology to describe the subject of Proclus' science and replaced some of the authorities cited by Dietrich with others.¹²² The universe

121 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De quidditatibus entium*, eds R. Imbach, J.-D. Caviglioli, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, 3.1–4, p. 101, l. 3 – p. 103, l. 64.

122 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Expos. tit. I*, p. 46, l. 319 – p. 47, l. 341 Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, 3.5–6, p. 281, l. 69–87: *Et quia totus iste liber tractat de rerum divinarum universitate secundum processum eius a summo bono et regressum in ipsum, et hoc secundum dispositionem et proprios modos earum inditos ipsi rebus divinis ab eo, quod est divinum principaliformiter sive secundum causam, et hoc secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, non iam proprie voluntariae, iuxta distinctionem Augustini VIII Super Genesim ad litteram, necesse est omnia convenire, de quibus hic tractatur, in una ratione subiecti, propter quam etiam ista philosophia est una scientia. Quod subiectum vocetur, sicut et vere est, bonum divinum, quod simpliciter et absolute causaliter seu principaliformiter convenit omnium primo principio, reliquis autem bonis, puta divinis per essentiam et per participationem, in attributione ad ipsum, et hoc quantum ad modos attributionis,*

of divine things (Dietrich had written: “the universe of beings”) proceeds from and returns to God according to the orders of natural and voluntary providence. For Berthold, the *Elementatio theologica* concerns the domain of natural providence (as Dietrich himself implied) and, therefore, treats *ens divinum* according to the three modes of an essential order: God (*bonum absolute causaliter seu principaliformiter*), the gods (*bonitates per essentiam*), and their subordinate participants (*bonitates per participationem*). Instead of Dietrich's examples relating to health to explain the analogy of attribution (efficient, final, substantial) between creatures and God as *ens divinum*, Berthold cited two “rules” (*regulae*) of Hermes and two chapters from Avicbron's *Fons vitae*, which establish that God is the true foundation or *ratio subiecti*, for he is a “principle without principle”, and “in comparison to him all substances are like accidents, and every accident is as nothing”.¹²³ This modification was not only doxographical. As we will recall, Dietrich gave only the examples of sacramental actions *in persona Christi* for the analogical relation of accidents to substance, forcing Berthold to give an argument from the natural order to explain the substantial dependency of created goods on the Good itself.

At first glance, it seems that Berthold has merely transposed Dietrich's argument into a Proclean context. Behind these more superficial modifications, however, was a more profound departure from his source. Berthold construed the difference of natural and voluntary providence in terms that he derived entirely from his reading of the *Elementatio theologica* and Dionysius, rather than follow Dietrich's elegant separation of pagan philosophy and revealed theology. In the *Praeambulum* especially we will see how Dietrich's mark of ownership (*theologia nostra*) in Berthold passed from Christian theology to the divine science of the Platonists. For Berthold, the ambitions of Dietrich's

quos distinguit Averroes super principium iv Metaphysicae, scilicet ut ad efficiens primum et finem ultimum nec non ut accidentia ad subiecti, cum Deus, qui est summum bonum, non solum sit 'principium sine principio, processus sine variatione, finis sine fine', ut dicitur 7 regula Trismegisti, verum etiam 'Deus est, cuius comparatione substantia est accidens, accidens vero nihil' per 6 ibidem. Dicit autem substantiam quamcumque esse accidens ratione dependentiae eius ad primum, cui soli competit ratio subiecti, non ut existentis ratione loquitur Avencebrol libro III Fontis vitae cap. 36 et 54. Ex praedictis apparet, quod bonum divinum secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis est subiectum huius libri.

- ¹²³ The same pairing of Hermes (*Liber xxiv philosophorum*, maxim 6) and Avicbron (*Fons vitae*, lib. III, c. 36 and c. 54) appears elsewhere: *Expositio*, 2B (p. 84, l. 74–77), with the *regulae* of Boethius, and 150G (p. 127, l. 250–52). The agreement of Avicbron and Boethius in 2B might have reinforced Berthold's strange stipulation that the *De unitate et uno* of “Boethius” (actually Gundissalinus) was completely excerpted from the *Fons vitae* (1D; 137B).

philosophical theology could only be realised when it was translated back into the ancient Platonic science of the One and the Good. The influence of Thomas of York, who showed Berthold that the pagans had achieved a robust knowledge of God, meant that this focalisation of Dietrich's thought on Proclus necessarily entailed the abandonment of Dietrich's sceptical and hypothetical approach to reasoning about *ens divinum* within natural providence. If this Platonism demanded that we reason about the separate substances "not according to ourselves", then its rational conclusions had to receive the mind's assent if the exercise was to have its effect of liberating the soul from its captivity to its own abstractions. Berthold, in other words, sought not to elaborate a hypothetical cosmology, but to recover its perfect realisation in the distant past. This more fundamental shift was presupposed when, as we will see, Berthold rebranded Augustine's two orders of providence with Platonic equivalents: *antarkia* for natural providence and *hierarchia* for voluntary providence.

At the first mention of the twin orders of providence (*gemina providentia*) in the *Expositio*, without explaining the sources or meaning of the distinction, Berthold signalled that the familiar boundaries of nature and grace, of natural and voluntary providence, were breaking down:

These are the invisible things of God taken transitively, which are discussed most subtly in this *Theological Elementation* within the domain of natural providence. For there are also the invisible things of God of voluntary providence, such as the angels, which, as Proclus says in *On the Existence of Evils*, chapter 3, are 'the class that is the interpreter of the gods, existing in continuity with the gods. This class knows the mind of the gods and brings the divine will to light [...]'.¹²⁴

Where a reader of Ulrich or Dietrich would expect to find a Scriptural or Christian authority invoked to explain the nature of the entities in the order of voluntary providence, Berthold went directly to Proclus, who not only spoke about angels but identified them explicitly as those who reveal the divine will (*elucidat divinam voluntatem*), uttering forth the silence of the gods (*pronuntians illorum silentium*). For Berthold, what Dionysius and Proclus

¹²⁴ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 5-6, p. 13, l. 264-270: *Ista sunt invisibilia Dei transitive accepta, de quibus in ista elementatione theologica subtilissime pertractatur, quantum pertinet ad providentiam naturalem. Sunt praeterea invisibilia Dei providentiae voluntariae, puta angeli, qui, ut dicit Proclus De malorum existentia 3 cap., sunt 'genus interpretativum deorum continuum existens dis. Et intellectum novit deorum et elucidat divinam voluntatem [...]'*. Cf. Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*, c. 3, §14, p. 194, l. 8-18.

taught about the angels was effectively identical.¹²⁵ In two other passages (Propositions 26 and 161), Berthold in fact clarified Dionysius using Proclus, to say that the angels, which are highest in the order of voluntary providence, immediately follow upon the primordial causes or “gods” rather than God himself. According to natural providence, wrote Berthold, the order of infinities (*infinitates*) immediately follows the gods, while in voluntary providence “the order of angels and especially the first and highest [the order of seraphim] is immediately conjoined outside the gods”, as Proclus made clear and Dionysius implies (*huic alludit Dionysius*).¹²⁶ An argument in 26H explains why Berthold used this verb *alludit*. Here he gave a number of references to passages in Dionysius that place the seraphim directly beneath the thearchy (*thearchia*); however (*autem*), he remarked, “If I cast the eye of consideration to natural providence, then the angels are continuous with the gods and not God himself, according to Proclus’ intent in *De malorum existentia*”.¹²⁷ For Berthold, therefore, the seraphim are of course the highest in the order of voluntary providence. But these remarks also suggest he understood this order to be ontologically embedded within the order of natural providence.¹²⁸ What this means is that, within the perspective of voluntary providence, the gods are regarded as effectively one with the Trinity. Dionysius could be said to “imply” this doctrine since, in Berthold’s view, the term “thearchy” designates God and the primordial causes collectively.¹²⁹ From the standpoint of natural providence, however, the gods are regarded as a separate phase of an essential order – they are the divine “according to essence”, subordinate to God “according to cause” – and in this

125 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 16E, p. 28, l. 168–170.

126 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 161C, p. 12, l. 34 – p. 13, l. 62: *Verum quoad voluntariam providentiam ordo angelorum et specialiter primus et supremus immediate iungitur extra diis, sicut dicit auctor libro De malorum existentia [...]. Huic alludit Dionysius [...].* In the passage cited, however, Dionysius described the angelic order as *circa Dei substantiam semper, et attente ipsi et ante alios sine medio unitum* (*De caelesti hierarchia*, 6.2, 200D).

127 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 26H, p. 158, l. 192 – p. 159, l. 213: *Si autem ad providentiam naturalem oculum considerationis coniecero, tunc angeli sunt continui diis, non iam prime Deo secundum intentionem auctoris 3 cap.* *De malorum existentia* [...]. The phrase is reminiscent of Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.9.17 (*oculus cogitationis attollitur*), and is echoed elsewhere (e.g., *Expositio*, 9F, p. 175, l. 307–310).

128 On the ambiguous place of the angels in Dietrich’s doctrine of *gemina providentia*, see Suarez-Nani, *Les anges et la philosophie*, p. 146.

129 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 4, p. 11, l. 201 – p. 12, l. 217; 10A, p. 178, l. 61–66: *Quem etiam ordinem Dionysius II Epistula ad Gaium vocat ‘thearchiam’ et ‘boni principatum’, super quem est prime Deus, qui et prime bonum*; 113A–B, p. 34, l. 45–52 and p. 35, l. 82–83: *Ista deitas thearchiae secundum Platonicos inexistit divinis per essentiam. [...] Unde etiam talis ordo sive numerus divinus a Dionysio vocatur thearchia.*

more discursive standpoint the seraphim would immediately follow “the gods”, and God only mediately.

We have already noted the second and more striking example of Berthold's use of Proclus as an authority in the domain of voluntary providence. This is found in Proposition 114, the first subsection of which (114A) was discussed above relative to the philosophically acceptable and non-superstitious doctrine of polytheism shared by Hermes and the true followers of Plato. In 114B, Berthold turned to Ulrich's doctrine of divine providence to account for the different senses of the words *deus* and *deitas*: the Good unfolds its providence through the primordial causes (Ulrich: *per fatum*), and thereby shares “the dignity of causality and of divine cooperation” with secondary causes.¹³⁰ Berthold then brings us immediately to the two domains of providence, since *deus* is said of participants “either by nature or by grace, according to the order of twofold providence”.¹³¹ Discussing the order of grace or voluntary providence, Berthold first provided a lengthy citation of Dionysius (*De caelesti hierarchia* 12.3, 293B), on the saints who become participants of the divine by seeking to imitate God as much as possible. Immediately following this, Berthold argued that Proclus “makes the same point” (*ad idem facit auctor*) when he spoke about the cognition beyond intellect in *De providentia et fato* 8.32.¹³² Both passages on Proclus

130 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 92–100.

131 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 44, l. 117–119: *Dicitur tamen hoc nomen ‘deus’ esse de participantibus aliquam proprietatem divinam, et hoc sive per naturam sive per gratiam, secundum ordinem duplicis providentiae, naturalis videlicet et voluntariae*. The first two clauses come from Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, lib. 1, tr. 6, q. 29, c. 1, a. 1, p. 216, l. 61–64. In this passage, Albert discussed acceptable meanings of participated divinity in Scripture, “the poets, and certain philosophers”, namely, in Apuleius, the *Liber de causis*, Hermes, and the *Timaeus*. It is noteworthy that Berthold interpolated the distinction of natural and voluntary providence into Albert's mention of nature and grace.

132 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 44, l. 117–128 and 135–140: *Per gratiam, secundum quod dicit Dionysius 12 cap. Angelicae hierarchiae: ‘Invenies autem, quod et deos theologia vocat et caelestes et super nos substantias, et apud nos Dei amicissimos mirabiles et sanctos viros (alia translatio: et quidem divinum secretum superessentialiter simul omnibus et remotum et supercollocatum et nullum ab eorum, quae sunt, simile nominari proprie et omnino valet. Verumtamen quaecumque et intellectualium et rationalium ad unitatem eius et qualiscumque virtus universaliter convertitur et ad divinas ipsius illuminationes, quantum possibile, incessabiliter extenditur secundum virtutem, si iustem dicere, divina imitatione et divina univocatione digna facta est) [...]’ Ad idem facit auctor De fato et providentia 8 cap. [...] ubi loquitur de cognitione animae super intellectum: ‘Hanc, o amice, divinissimam enter operationem animae aliquis operans, soli credens sibi ipsi, scilicet flori intellectus, et quietans se ipsum non ab exterioribus motibus, sed ab interioribus, deus factus ut animae possibile, cognoscet solummodo, qualiter dii omnia indicibiliter cognoscunt singuli secundum li unum.’*

as a theologian of voluntary providence (on angels and deification), we may note, were among the few singled out by Berthold with manicules in his copy of the *Tria opuscula*.¹³³

Berthold's textual basis for bringing the pagan and Christian Platonists together on the doctrine of grace and deification was their common appeal to the notion of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, likeness to God as far as possible (Dionysius: *convertitur ad divinas illuminationes quantum possibile* [...] *divina imitatione et divina univocatione digna facta est*; Proclus: *deus factus ut animae possibile*).¹³⁴ Berthold would have found this caveat (*ut animae possibile*) in each of the *Tria opuscula*.¹³⁵ Along with this verbal agreement we may recall their shared doctrine of contemplation Berthold presented in Proposition 202, which was defined in terms of the ceaseless striving for the divine, the unification of the self, and conjunction with God through the *unum animae*.¹³⁶

Contemplation is the steadfast and unswerving extension of an intellectual substance, exceeding itself and all beings and non-beings unrestrainably, into the supersubstantial ray of divine shadows, as is meet and right.¹³⁷

Loris Sturlese has observed that the standard ways of conveying the mediation of grace, in the Church and the sacraments, were not emphasised, let alone even mentioned by Berthold, and that the Dominican's stress in the *Expositio* fell rather on the difficulty of the philosophical effort involved in the ascent to God through the oblique motion.¹³⁸ Berthold's passing references to the order of voluntary providence did not touch on these themes of sacramental grace. But in light of the foregoing considerations of the three motions of the soul and the two orders of providence, it seems we must admit yet again that for Berthold the philosophical effort itself, if it was to pass from discursivity of the

¹³³ See Introduction, section 2, n. 74, above.

¹³⁴ Plato, *Theaetetus*, 176b. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 161C, p. 12, l. 31–34, defined deification using Dionysius: *deificatio sit ad Deum, sicut est possibile, assimilatio et unio*.

¹³⁵ Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §64; *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §32; *De malorum subsistentia*, c. 7, §24.

¹³⁶ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202B, p. 184, l. 97–117. For Proclus, see *Expositio*, 202C, p. 186, l. 152–171.

¹³⁷ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202A, p. 181, l. 22–24: *Contemplatio est substantiae intellectualis se ipsam et omnia existentia et non existentia excedentis irretentibiliter, firma et indeclinabilis ad supersubstantialem divinarum tenebrarum radium, sicut decet, extensio*.

¹³⁸ Sturlese, *Homo divinus*, p. 146–147.

Elementatio to its higher end, required a form of divine assistance.¹³⁹ The laborious investigation of the oblique motion is available to everyone, although Berthold has made it clear that following Plato's theorems earnestly will take a person along "a certain byway that is beyond the common path of reasonings". Returning briefly to Proposition 202, where all the proof-texts for the direct and circular motions are found, we will see that this definition of contemplation held for all three spiritual motions. By way of summary, then, let us return to Berthold's account of contemplation to see how the three motions and the two orders of providence are unified within a single progression.

Before citing the relevant passages from Dionysius and Proclus on contemplation, Berthold included the six kinds of contemplation discussed by Richard of St. Victor, which he had used tacitly in the gloss on Psalm 42 at the conclusion of the *Prologus*. He then cited several passages from Book v of the *Beniamin maior*, in which Richard outlined a threefold order of contemplation and subdivided each stage into the three causes that give rise to it and bring it to perfection.¹⁴⁰ First is the enlarging of the mind (*dilatatio mentis*), which does not pass beyond the limit of human industry, and is subdivided into teaching, mental exercise, and attention (*traditio, exercitatio, attentio*), which are its causes. Second comes the lightening of the mind (*sublevatio mentis*), corresponding to the liveliness of intelligence (*intelligentiae vivacitas*), when the mind is inspired and illumined by heavenly light, and is sometimes (*aliquando*) elevated above knowledge, above human industry, and above nature (*supra scientiam, supra industriam, supra naturam*). Here the mind sees realities that are above it, but cannot yet free itself from its habitual weight.

The third and highest stage is the dispossession of the mind (*alienatio mentis*), which is brought about by the abundance of devotion, wonder, and exultation (*magnitudo devotionis, admirationis, exultationis*). The abundance of devotion, through the interplay of the soul's fervent desire and divine assistance, makes it receptive to a divine gift: "when the mind burns excessively with the flame of heavenly desire, it becomes worthy to see something from a divine revelation, so that it is helped to reach those theoretical ecstasies".¹⁴¹

139 This was not itself entirely novel. According to Thomas Aquinas, God, if he pleases, grants sanctifying grace to the pagan philosophers in view of their realisation of a natural capacity as rational creatures to love God above all else. See A. Oliva, "La contemplation des philosophes selon Thomas d'Aquin", in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 96(2012), p. 585–662, at p. 605–612.

140 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202B, p. 183, l. 64 – p. 184, l. 95.

141 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202B, p. 183, l. 79–81, citing Richard of St. Victor, *Beniamin maior*, lib. v, c. 8, 177D–178A, p. 266, l. 59–61: *saepe enim in mente humana agitur, ut, dum*

The abundance of wonder is kindled by the vision it receives of a reality that is beyond all hope and conception (*aestimatio*); this wonder arouses attention, and with attention comes thinking (*cognitio*). In this attentiveness, as the mind climbs to higher and higher realities (*dum mens humana semper ad altiora crescit*), it eventually reaches a point where it leaves the bounds of human capacity altogether (*dum diu crescendo tandem aliquando humanae capacitatis metas excedit*). This is finally perfected in the abundance of joy and the exultation in which the mind goes out of itself entirely.

In Proposition 202, Berthold juxtaposed Richard's two classifications of contemplation, the six "genera" and the three "modes" (*dilatatio*, *sublevatio*, *alienatio*), without explicitly establishing any correlation between them. For more recent interpreters of Richard, there is a sense in which the three modes describe the qualities common to all six genera. As Jean Châtillon has put it, the sixfold division describes the objects of contemplation and the faculties that apprehend them, whereas the three modes correspond to the different states of the mind as it contemplates its object.¹⁴² But there is another sense, as Châtillon also observed, in which the end of the *Beniamin maior*, with these three modes, returned to the sixfold classification from its beginning, such that *dilatatio* would refer to the first four degrees (in imagination and according to imagination; in imagination according to reason; in reason according to imagination; in reason according to reason), which are all contemplative activities within the bounds of human effort; *sublevatio* to the fifth (above reason, but not beyond reason), when the mind is inspired and illumined by God, but it has not yet left its habitual ways behind; and *alienatio* to the sixth (above reason, and seems to be beyond reason), when the mind is totally absorbed in devotion, wonder, and praise.¹⁴³

Both interpretations are available to a reader of the *Expositio* from the materials taken from Richard in 202A-B. The second option gains additional confirmation in view of the meditation on Psalm 42 in the *Prologus*. We can now see just how perceptively Berthold merged the sixfold and threefold models around the precise terms used by the Psalmist and in Lombard's gloss.¹⁴⁴

nimio caelestis desiderii incendio uritur, aliquid ex divina revelatione videre mereatur, unde ad illos theoricus excessus adiuvetur.

142 J. Châtillon, "Les trois modes de la contemplation selon Richard de Saint-Victor", in *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique* 41(1940), p. 3–26, at p. 23; see also p. 14 and 16, and the studies cited there.

143 Châtillon, "Les trois modes", p. 23–26. This interpretation is followed by J. Grosfillier, "Introduction", in Richard of St. Victor, *De contemplatione (Beniamin maior)*, p. 46.

144 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 20, p. 34, l. 953–963. See 1.3, n. 90–91, above.

According to Berthold, *effudi, id est dilatavi, animam meam* corresponds to the summit of the search for God in the fourth kind of contemplation and the desire to pass over into the fifth (*dilatavi animam meam ad intelligendum supra se ipsam*). The fifth kind or the eye of intelligence that beholds the simple Form would align with the second mode, the *sublevatio mentis*, when the intelligence is inspired and illuminated with a revelation (202B: *intelligentia humana divinitus inspirata et illo caelesti lumine irradiata*), and sometimes passes beyond knowledge, human industry, and nature. Nevertheless, it remains weighed down to some extent because it is still reflexive (*Prol. 20: ut quaereret Deum intelligentia secundum rationem*). The sixth kind of contemplation, the entry into the primordial causes or “house of God”, would align with the three causes of third and highest mode (*alienatio mentis*), especially wonder (*ingrediar per unum animae in locum tabernaculi admirabilis*) and praise (*in voce exultationis*).

If we read this synthesis from the *Prologus* back into the citations from Richard in 202B, we can see clearly how the dynamics of nature and grace unfold in the soul’s ascent to God through a continuous process of contemplation that embraces the distinct activities of all three spiritual motions. Berthold’s penultimate citation from Richard remarked that some have tended to speak about “contemplation” and “speculation” as if they were synonymous. Strictly speaking, however, contemplation occurs when one no longer sees the truth through a mirror (*per speculum*) but unveiled and without any trace of shadow.¹⁴⁵ Speculation, then, corresponds to the first four kinds of contemplation which, in the gloss on Psalm 42, relate to the search for God in the material world and in the soul. We might say that these speculative stages are presupposed by the science of the *Elementatio*, as Berthold’s discussion of physics and quadrivial science (*duplex indagatio*) from Albert’s *Metaphysics* commentary implied, and do not fall within its purview in the strict sense. The mode of *dilatatio mentis*, however (corresponding to the fourth kind), when the mind has prepared itself to the extent it is able and yet still desires to pass from knowing “in reason according to reason” to *intelligentia*, would correspond precisely to the laborious study of Proclus’ propositions in the oblique motion, which constitute a spiritual exercise leading the soul “beyond the common path of reasonings”. The Platonic theorems, in other words, prepare the mind for the passage from speculation, integuments or veils, to contemplation in the strict sense. Berthold insisted that these theorems should be revealed only to those

145 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202B, p. 183, l. 90–92, citing Richard of St. Victor, *Benjamin maior*, lib. v, c. 14, 187A–B, p. 558, l. 108–111: *aptius tamen et expressius speculationem dicimus, quando per speculum cernimus; contemplationem vero, quando veritatem sine aliquo involucro umbrarumque velamine in sui puritate videmus*.

who have been attracted by the most longed-for unveiled image of truth.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, the oblique motion pursued through the *Elementatio* should be seen as the highest activity a person can undertake by their own effort – that is, the highest kind of “speculation” or *dilatatio mentis* that “enlarges” the soul through the three causes of teaching (*traditio*, where Richard had “art”, *ars*), exercise (*exercitatio*), and attention (*attentio*). It is a form of contemplation in the broad sense that prepares the way for imageless contemplation in the strict sense.

As Berthold’s final citation of Richard in 202B stated, the two higher modes (*sublevatio* and *alienatio*), unlike *dilatatio*, should both be understood as gifts from God:

No one from their own powers expects such an exultation or lightening of the heart or ascribes it to their merits. It is certain that this is the result not of human merit, but of a divine gift.¹⁴⁷

These two highest modes, which correspond to contemplation in the strict sense because they are beyond veils and images, align with the fifth and sixth levels identified in the *Prologus* as the activities of *intelligentia* and the *unum animae*. Berthold thus invited his reader to interpret the Proclean and Dionysian proof-texts for the circular and direct motions of the soul, cited in the remainder of the commentary on Proposition 202, in light of Richard of St. Victor’s theory of contemplation. At no point did he express any hesitation about Richard’s theory, nor did he indicate that it diverged from the shared view of Proclus and Dionysius: on the contrary, all of them were describing contemplation as it can be realised in this life (*contemplatio viae*).

We may deduce from this that the vision of pure Form by *intelligentia* in the *sublevatio mentis* corresponds to the *intellectus adeptus* of 123D. If the

146 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. K*, p. 48, l. 389–391: [...] *veritatis ipsius revelata desiderantissimaque imagine pertrahuntur. Hi soli digni sunt, ut eis sapientiae, quae in ista elementatione theologica continetur, dignitas exeratur*. Cf. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecii librum de bonorum ebdomade*, prol., n. 7, p. 184, l. 32–38.

147 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202B, p. 184, l. 93–95, citing Richard of St. Victor, *Beniamin maior*, lib. v, c. 15, 187C, p. 558, l. 4–6: *Nemo autem tantam cordis exultationem vel sublevationem de suis viribus praesumat vel suis meritis ascribat. Constat hoc sane non meriti humani, sed muneris esse divini*. This is not inconsistent with Richard’s earlier statement that *sublevatio* occurs through the combination of human industry and grace (*Beniamin maior*, lib. v, c. 2, 170B, p. 508, l. 17–19). Châtillon, “Les trois modes”, p. 19, observes, that the passive verbs used to describe this mode at *Beniamin maior*, lib. v, c. 4, 172D (*inspirata* and *irradiata*) clearly put the initiative on the side of grace.

intellectus adeptus should indeed be regarded as the lowest phase of this highest level of the human modes of knowing in 123D, its activity was identified clearly as such in the gloss on Psalm 42 in the *Prologus* as the fifth kind of contemplation, “in intelligence according to reason”. This would follow inasmuch as the immediate relation of agent and possible intellects still implies the downward facing operation of *intelligentia* as it relates to the *ratio universalis* or possible intellect. Finally, *alienatio* corresponds to the non-reflexivity of the *unum animae*, which is the higher phase of the same level in 123D. Therefore, whereas the oblique motion corresponds to the *dilatatio mentis*, the circular and direct motions, each in their own way, culminate in the *sublevatio* and *alienatio mentis* – one begins from within, the other from without, but both depend on a concourse of the mind’s attention and enlargement, fervent desire, and both are received as a divine gift or grace. This, for Berthold, was the unanimous doctrine of contemplation shared by Proclus, Dionysius, and the Christian doctors.

This incorporation of both registers of nature and grace in the Platonic divine science on the basis of their common contemplative doctrine was assumed by Berthold when he translated the doctrine of natural and voluntary providence into the Platonic terminology of self-sufficiency (*antarkia*) and hierarchy (*hierarchia*). According to Berthold, in Proposition 9 Proclus proved the existence of self-sufficient (*antarkes*) principles that are perfect through themselves. This corrected the view of Avicenna and Al-Ghazali, who placed self-sufficiency beneath perfection because they defined sufficiency as something that is acquired after a prior state of imperfection.¹⁴⁸ With Eustratius and Dionysius, Berthold maintained that what is self-sufficient always has its inherent good perfectly (*cui bonum perfecte ingenitum est*), requiring nothing outside itself. These self-sufficient principles will play a pivotal role in Berthold’s cosmology, where “secondary founts”, as recipients of “the superperfect”, “supersufficient”, “superabundant” efficient causality of the Good, have in and from themselves “the plenitude of their own goodness” as formal causes, and therefore can exercise proportional “superabundant” causality within their own order.¹⁴⁹ In Proposition 10, Berthold coined the term *antarkia* to define precisely (*stricte*) the order of gods or “*per se* goodnesses”.¹⁵⁰ The immaterial orders beneath the gods are self-sufficient to greater or lesser degrees;

¹⁴⁸ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 9A, p. 167, l. 18 – p. 168, l. 36.

¹⁴⁹ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 9B, p. 169, l. 102–105: *supersufficiens bonum est duplex, quia vel est tale simpliciter vel in genere, quod etiam magis proprie dicitur supersufficiens virtus vel ens vel vita etc., cum talia determinant bonum ad quoddam bonum.*

¹⁵⁰ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 10A, p. 177, l. 31–35.

they are all regarded as beings that exist like species (*entia secundum speciem*), spanning “the order of infinities” down to “intellectual hypostases”, which are all “self-sufficient by themselves entire but not entirely” (*se totis licet non totaliter*), meaning that they are self-sufficient in substance, power, and operation, but are constituted out of a plurality of formal principles. Souls, finally, are self-sufficient in their substance but not in their operation. All these entities are self-sufficient (*antarkes*) by analogy to the gods.¹⁵¹

According to Berthold, *hierarchia* is to God and the gods in voluntary providence what *antarkia* (the order of self-sufficient, *per se* principles) is in natural providence.¹⁵² When commenting on the term *deificatus* in the *Elementatio* and, more rarely, when confronted with Proclus’ mentions of *intellectus divinus* (e.g., 181D), Berthold relied principally on a pair of Dionysian texts which associate “hierarchy” with “deification”:

De ecclesiastica hierarchia 1.3, 376A: ‘Deification is assimilation and union with God, as far as possible’ or, according to the other translation, ‘likeness and unity’ (*‘Deificatio est ad Deum, sicut est possibile, et assimilatio et unio’ vel secundum aliam translationem ‘similitudo et unitas’*).

De caelesti hierarchia 3.2, 165A: The goal of hierarchy is assimilation and union with God, as far as possible (*Intentio igitur hierarchiae est ad Deum, sicut est possibile, assimilatio et unio*).¹⁵³

Thus it was certainly not the case that Dionysius for Berthold was only an authority in voluntary providence, although he sometimes spoke like “a theologian”,¹⁵⁴ or that Proclus only had insights into the order of natural providence: Dionysius transmitted the Platonic doctrine of the Good and the primordial causes as the “thearchy”; Proclus, more rarely, discussed the angels and the outlines of a notion of hierarchy and deification by participation. This unification of both orders of *gemina providentia* in the Platonic divine science

151 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 9B, p. 170, l. 129 – p. 171, l. 147; 9E, p. 173, l. 214–218, and p. 174, l. 281 – p. 175, l. 295.

152 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 10A, p. 179, l. 99–102: *Ex praedictis apparet differentia inter antarkiam et hierarchiam, quia antarkia est ordo divinus secundum condiciones supra positas in description emanans a Deo iuxta dispositionem providentiae naturalis; hierarchia vero est ordo divinus emanans a Deo iuxta dispositionem providentiae voluntariae*.

153 The adjective *deificatus* occurs in Propositions 135, 138, 153, 160. Berthold cited *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, 1.3, 376A, in the following propositions: 121B, 129B (Proclus: *ἐκθεοῦμένης*]), 134B, 135G, 138C, 160B, 160E, 161C, 161D, 181C, 181D. He cited the passage from *De caelesti hierarchia*, 3.2, 165A, three times: 10A, 145A, 153F.

154 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 115, l. 98 – p. 116, l. 130.

also had an exegetical advantage, which we have just witnessed. The relationship of proportionality between the two orders enabled Berthold to apply texts from Dionysius about hierarchy to the order of natural providence.¹⁵⁵ Even if the *Elementatio theologica* did not concern voluntary providence, Berthold went out of his way to show that Proclus' authority extended there as well, just as Dionysius did to the order of natural providence, and that Platonism itself transcended the divide of pagan and Christian, nature and grace.

¹⁵⁵ See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 140E, p. 41, l. 103-136; 156A, p. 169, l. 12-21; 156D, p. 172, l. 130 – p. 173, l. 166; 158A-B, p. 184, l. 10 – p. 185, l. 35; 162G, p. 21, l. 159-171; 163D, p. 28, l. 131-137; 165F, p. 41, l. 114 – p. 44, l. 175; 177I, p. 185, l. 386.

Praeambulum libri

The habit of our divinising beyond-wisdom exceeds every other habit, not only of the sciences, but even the habit of intellect that is wisdom, through which Aristotle receives the principles of his first philosophy, which is merely of beings.¹

Berthold has moved from the consensus of authorities in the *Prologus* to the focalisation of ancient wisdom on Proclus and his works in the *Expositio tituli*. The third and final preface to the *Expositio* is a *Praeambulum* to the first thirteen Propositions, and establishes the rational and scientific validity of the knowledge transmitted in the *Elementatio theologica*. In sequence, the three prefaces thus display roughly the same pattern found in each of Berthold's commentaries (*suppositum*, *propositum*, *commentum*), which move from the general and authoritative background to the textual specificity of the *Elementatio*, and finally to demonstration alone.

In Berthold's view, Proclus' first thirteen propositions formed a coherent group, which established the existence of the One and the Good, demonstrated that the two names refer to the same first principle, and showed that everything that is one or is good derives from that principle. The *Praeambulum* aimed to account for the two "complex principles" or propositions that Proclus assumed in these arguments. Since these propositions are so fundamental for the remainder of the *Elementatio*, these two principles can be regarded as "the foundations" of Proclus' philosophy. According to Berthold, Proposition 1 (*Omnis multitudo* etc.) assumed "that there is multitude" (*multitudinem esse*) and moved from the many to the One, while Proposition 7 (*Omne productivum* etc.) presupposed that "the productive exists" (*productivum esse*) and established the existence of the Good. At Proposition 13, after six Propositions each,

1 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 65, l. 454 – p. 66, l. 458: *Igitur habitus istius nostrae divinalis supersapientiae excedit omnem alium habitum, non solum scientiarum, sed etiam habitum intellectus, scilicet sapientiam, per quem Aristoteles in sua prima philosophia, quae solum est entium, quia entis in eo, quod ens, accipit sua principia.*

Proclus showed that “the Good is identical with the One” (*bonum uni idem*). Since Proclus’ arguments in his proofs for Propositions 1 and 7 take these principles for granted, Berthold felt compelled, somewhat surprisingly, to address doubts as to whether the science of the *Elementatio theologica* is a true science at all:

Proclus assumes these two principles, upon which the edifice of this entire philosophy depends as upon its own foundations, as if they are grasped through the reception of the senses and in no way are intellect, known, or apprehended by any other scientific habit, but only are believed, just as the theology that concerns the divine Good according to the order of voluntary providence is founded upon principles that are believed, which are the articles of the Christian faith.²

The argument of the *Praeambulum* will be that a science founded on principles that are only believed (*credita*) is nevertheless a science in the genuine sense.³ Berthold divided the *Praeambulum* into three sections, discussing (A) scientific principles in general, (B) the three kinds of scientific principles, as well as the properties and character of these principles in particular, and (C) the true and properly scientific procedure of Proclus’ theology.

The way Berthold has presented the analogy between Proclus’ science and Christian theology (both begin from believed principles, but with the distinction of natural and voluntary providence), following so soon after his use of Dietrich of Freiberg’s *De subiecto theologiae* in the *Expositio tituli*, have understandably led commentators to assume that Berthold’s *Praeambulum* remained faithful to Dietrich’s strict and methodological separation of the divine science of the philosophers and revealed theology.⁴ Having looked at

2 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* A, p. 53, l. 15–22: *Ista duo principia, quibus totius istius philosophiae structura sicut propriis fundamentis innititur, auctor supponit sicut per sensus acceptionem nota et nullo modo vel intellecta vel scita vel aliquo alio habitu scientiali apprehensa, sed solum credita, sicut et theologia, quae est de bono divino secundum ordinem providentiae voluntariae, fundatur in principiis creditis, quae sunt articuli fidei Christianae. Propter quod a plerisque dubitari solet de utraque theologia et sapientiali et divinali, an sit scientia secundum veram scientiae rationem.*

3 The notion that the articles of faith are genuine principles of the science of theology begins with William of Auxerre. See M.-D. Chenu, *La théologie comme science au XIII^e siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 1957³), p. 12–13.

4 See most recently R. Imbach, “Au-delà de la métaphysique. Notule sur l’importance du *Commentaire* de Berthold de Moosburg OP sur les *Éléments de théologie*”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Vol. 1*, p. 376–393, at p. 380–381.

the broader intertextual patterns in the *Prologus* and *Expositio tituli*, we have found that Berthold decidedly and repeatedly blurred these boundaries in light of the textual evidence that confronted him. The *Praeambulum* was no exception to this pattern. Now, it is clear that Berthold held that the articles of faith are the principles of the science of Christian theology, which holds sway over the domain of voluntary providence. But through a consideration of the *Praeambulum* with a view to its tacit sources, I will suggest that Berthold conceived of that theology under the banner of a broader Platonic divine science that united both orders of providence. Unlike Dietrich, who had maintained a clear subordination of “the divine science of the philosophers” to “our theology of the saints”, Berthold’s confrontation with the soteriological Platonism of Proclus and Dionysius made this position impossible. Both sciences of natural and voluntary providence begin from belief and both terminate in a deifying apprehension of God. The dignity that Berthold’s predecessors and contemporaries reserved for Christian theology and the habit of faith that it cultivated was thus extended to the natural revelation of *supersapientia* and the *unum animae* awakened through speculation and contemplation.

1 Theology as a Science

Like the *Prologus* and the *Expositio tituli*, Berthold wrote the *Praeambulum* with the *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York near at hand. And, like those two prefaces, Thomas was synthesised with the anthropology and noetics of a German Dominican authority, and both were finally transformed and subordinated to the definitive philosophical concord of the Platonists (Dionysius, Proclus, and Boethius). This time, however, we must proceed carefully because Berthold’s German Dominican source is, it seems, no longer extant. As Loris Sturlese first observed, the final phrase of the introductory passage just cited, and perhaps also a good deal of the *Praeambulum*, echoes Dietrich of Freiberg’s lost treatise, *De theologia, quod sit scientia secundum perfectam rationem scientiae*, as it was listed in an early catalogue of his works.⁵ Now that Berthold’s reliance on

5 See the text cited in n. 2, above. Sturlese, “Il *De animatione caeli* di Teodorico di Freiberg”, p. 194, n. 84: “che Bertoldo dipenda da tale *quaestio*, o comunque da posizioni teodoriciane, è mia netta impressione: ma non posso per ora dimostrarlo”. See also L. Sturlese, “Introduction”, in Berthold of Moosburg, “Commentaire des Éléments de théologie de Proclus. Préambule du livre”, in R. Imbach, M.-H. Méléard (eds), *Philosophes médiévaux. Anthologie de textes philosophiques (XIII^e-XIV^e siècles)* (Paris: Union générale d’éditions, 1986), p. 335–346, at p. 342–343: “[...] surtout on peut envisager l’éventualité que derrière le texte du *Préambule* se camoufle un extrait de la *Question* perdue de Thierry de Freiberg *Quaestio utrum theologia sit*

Thomas of York has been recognised, the range of material that could derive from Dietrich has now been considerably narrowed. Indeed, what remain are the pivotal epistemological passages in sections B and C that explain how a legitimate science can begin from belief. If we entertain the possibility that Dietrich was the source of these arguments and transpose them back into the Parisian context within which Dietrich would have written such a treatise on theology, certain puzzling aspects of the *Praeambulum* are clarified. The surprising doubt raised “by many” about the scientific credentials of the *Elementatio theologica* can be explained: this remark was copied from Dietrich’s defence of the scientific status of theology in Paris. There were not in fact “many” who doubted the legitimacy of the *Elementatio theologica*, though there were who questioned the scientific status of Christian theology in the late 13th century. I will propose that the *Praeambulum* followed Dietrich’s *De theologia* by drawing an important analogy between the scientific procedure of revealed theology and that of every other science (except the purely mathematical), including metaphysics. Berthold would have found in this analogy the resources to show that metaphysics or, in this case, Proclus’ philosophy, even though it begins from believed principles (because it begins from the senses), is still a genuine science. But since Berthold’s soteriological Platonism was not Dietrich’s divine science of the philosophers, this meant that the central element of disproportion in the analogy of metaphysics and revealed theology that may also have been present in the *De theologia* was left unaddressed by Berthold – I will suggest that this disproportion would have concerned the relation between natural and voluntary assent or belief.

Let us first imagine what the context for Dietrich’s lost *De theologia* might have been. While Dietrich was in Paris as a *baccalaureus* and lecturing on the *Sentences*, sometime between 1282–1292,⁶ debates concerning the scientific status of theology conceived according to the model derived from Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* reach “a fever pitch”.⁷ Followers of Thomas Aquinas invoked the deductive model of Aristotle’s text and argued that theology is a science in the strong sense, in that our theology is subalternated to the higher science

scientia secundum perfectam rationem scientiae. The lost treatise is listed in the Stams catalogue, compiled sometime before 1330, perhaps as early as 1312–1314. On the Stams catalogue, see Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen*, p. 128–131.

6 Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen*, p. 4; Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 30.

7 S. Brown, “Duo Candelabra Parisiensia. Prosper of Reggio in Emilia’s Portrait of the Enduring Presence of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines regarding the Nature of Theological Study”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, p. 320–356, at p. 323.

possessed by God and the blessed. They often drew an analogy with the human sciences: an expert geometer knows demonstratively what the practitioner of optics assumes – that is, the geometer knows the reason why (*propter quid*), while the optician knows the fact that (*quia*) – but this does not undermine the scientific status of optics.⁸ Among the most innovative and polarised reactions to Aquinas in this debate came from Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) and Godfrey of Fontaines (d. 1309). Both went back to the *Posterior Analytics* to criticise the subalternation theory on its own grounds. For Henry of Ghent, we must look beyond Aristotle to Christian authorities in order to ground the subalternation theory. Henry proposed his famous notion of the middle light (*lumen medium*), which the theologian possesses between the obscure light of faith, which every believer has, and the clear light of glory of God and the blessed.⁹ Godfrey of Fontaines also went back to Aristotle but opposed both Henry and the Thomists. Godfrey argued that we simply must give up calling theology a science in the strict sense. In his fourth and eighth *Quodlibets* from 1287 and 1292,¹⁰ which probably coincided with Dietrich's baccalaureate,¹¹ he argued against the subalternation theory, contending that any science that receives its principles from a higher science through mere belief cannot be a science in the strict sense of the term:

Therefore, to say that the principles of theology or the knowledge of anything in theology itself [are merely believed], or that in the one who is said to be knowledgeable in theology [these principles] are merely believed and are not known or intellectuated [*sunt solum credita et non scita vel intellecta*], and thus merely possess the certitude of adhesion, and nevertheless produce the certitude of knowledge in the conclusions reached from them, is to say that the conclusions would be better known

8 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 1, a. 2. On this doctrine and its reception, see J.-P. Torrell, "Le savoir théologique chez les premiers thomistes", in *Revue thomiste* 97 (1997), p. 9–30, at p. 16–19 and 26–29.

9 See, for instance, Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, ed. J. Decorte, *Opera omnia* XVI (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), q. 2, p. 14, l. 20 – p. 15, l. 23.

10 For the chronology, see J. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), p. xxvii–xxviii. On Godfrey and his criticisms of Henry, see König-Pralong, *Le bon usage des savoirs*, p. 111–123.

11 Dietrich's *De origine rerum praedicamentalium* seems to use Godfrey's *Quodlibet* 11 (1286) and Henry's *Quodlibet* XIV (1290/1291). See L. Sturlese, *Storia della filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo*, p. 185–188; Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 162–165; P. Porro, "Res praedicamenti e ratio praedicamenti. Una nota su Teodorico di Freiberg e Enrico di Gand", in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg*, p. 131–143, at p. 142–143.

than the principles, and so have a twofold certitude, whereas the principles would have but one [kind of certitude]. This is to say contradictory things and greatly to dishonour sacred theology and its teachers, by propagating such lies about theology to those drawn to it.¹²

Godfrey based this argument on a distinction between the certitude of evidence, which belongs to *scientia*, and the certitude of adhesion, which belongs to faith. The latter comes from assent to authority and, he maintained, is weak and imperfect compared to the certitude of scientific evidence.¹³ According to Godfrey, one cannot deduce stronger conclusions from weaker principles.¹⁴ Therefore, since theology relies on principles that are only believed, which are grounded on certitude of adhesion to authority, Godfrey concluded in 1293/1294 (after Dietrich had left Paris) that “theology is less properly a science than natural science”.¹⁵

The ensuing debate lasted well into the 14th century, with important responses to Godfrey coming from Duns Scotus, James of Metz, Hervaeus Natalis, and Bernard of Auvergne.¹⁶ What concern us are not these details but

- 12 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines*, eds M. de Wulf, A. Pelzer, (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'Université, 1904), IV, q. 10, p. 262: *Dicere ergo quod principia theologiae [...] sive apud illum qui dicitur esse sciens theologiam sunt solum credita et non scita vel intellecta et sic solum certitudinem adhaesionis habentia, et tamen efficiunt certitudinem scientiae in conclusionibus ex ipsis elicitis, est dicere quod conclusiones sint notiores principii, scilicet duplicem certitudinem habentes, cum principia non habeant nisi unam. Et hoc est dicere contradictoria et multum derogare sacrae theologiae et doctoribus ipsius, tales fictiones de ipsa theologia attractantibus ipsam propalare.*
- 13 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Le huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. J. Hoffmans (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'Université, 1924), VIII, q. 7, p. 73: *notitia debilis vel imperfecta ad evidentiam, sed firma quantum ad adhaesionem, quia innotuit auctoritati solum et non rei in se vel ostensae per rationem evidentem.*
- 14 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets*, IV, q. 10, p. 262.
- 15 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Le neuvième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. J. Hoffmans (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'Université, 1928), IX, q. 20, p. 292: *Ergo videtur quod theologia sit minus proprie scientia quam naturalis non tantum propter hoc, quia scilicet habet evidentiam quae requiritur ad scientiam, sed minorem quam naturalis, – immo etiam quia nec habet evidentiam quae requiritur ad illam scientiam quae debet dici proprie scientia. Propter quod dicendum esset illis, qui dicunt modo supradicto theologiam esse scientiam proprie dictam, dicentes hoc se credere, quia infinitae auctoritates sanctorum quibus in hoc credendum est videntur hoc dicere, quod non est ita. Immo nec una sola auctoritas viri magnae auctoritatis invenitur per quam possit hoc evidenter persuaderi.*
- 16 J.-P. Torrell, *Recherches thomasiennes. Études revues et augmentées* (Paris: Vrin, 2000), p. 173, n. 4. For the subsequent debate, see J. Leclercq, “La théologie comme science dans la littérature quodlibétique”, in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 11 (1939), p. 351–374; S. Brown, “Late Thirteenth Century Theology. *Scientia* Pushed to its Limits”,

simply the fact that after Godfrey no one held that theology is a science in the strictest demonstrative sense. Those who continued to regard it as demonstrative had to admit some flexibility into their notions of what constituted a demonstrative science. The *Praeambulum* was no exception to this pattern.

If the key passages from sections B and C of the *Praeambulum* are read as traces of Dietrich's lost treatise on the scientific status of theology, we can surmise that Dietrich largely accepted the way in which Godfrey had framed his own position in terms of the certitude of evidence and the certitude of adhesion. But Dietrich's original response would have been to focus on the role that belief plays in every particular science that begins from without (*quasi ab extrinseco*), including metaphysics and theology, and indeed every science except the purely mathematical disciplines. In a sense, this argument would have amounted to an intensification of Godfrey's focus on subjective certitude, but in so doing it redefined what constitutes a true science: the stability of first principles is to be found within the cognitive process by which the subject grasps universal propositions.¹⁷

With this background in mind, we will proceed gradually through the *Praeambulum*. All of section A, which serves as a terminological dossier for

in R. Berndt, M. Lutz-Bachmann, R.M.W. Stammberger (eds), *Scientia und Disciplina. Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), p. 79–90; P. Porro, "Tra l'oscurità della fede e il chiarore della visione. Il dibattito sullo statuto scientifico della teologia agli inizi del XIV secolo", in L. Bianchi, C. Crisciani (eds), *Forme e oggetti della conoscenza nel XIV secolo. Studi in ricordo di Maria Elena Reina* (Firenze: SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2014), p. 195–256.

- 17 C. König-Pralong, "Expérience et sciences de la nature chez Dietrich de Freiberg et Berthold de Moosburg", in L. Bianchi, C. Crisciani (eds), *Forme e oggetti della conoscenza nel XIV secolo*, p. 107–133, compares the *Praeambulum* with Dietrich of Freiberg's extant treatises, and offers some valuable insights on the status of experimental sciences in Dietrich's works, especially through comparison with Roger Bacon. König-Pralong rightly underscores an important innovation in the scientific epistemology of the *Praeambulum*, which autonomises purely mathematical sciences and the experimental-inductive sciences which, for the first time, are distinguished not according to their objects but according to the mode of apprehending the truth of the propositions comprising these sciences (p. 125, 128–129). However, I do not find the differences between the *Praeambulum* and Dietrich's works noted in her study substantive enough to rule out the possibility that the central portions of the *Praeambulum* derived from Dietrich. To be sure, the division between analytical and experimental sciences was presented austere in the *Praeambulum*, but its argument would still make room for the mixed methods that we find mentioned in the prologue of Dietrich's *De iride*. Moreover, it obscures the purpose of the *Praeambulum* to conclude, as König-Pralong suggests, that for Berthold Platonic science has the same certitude as mathematics (p. 129, p. 132–133). The argument of the *Praeambulum* becomes clearer if we read it as a theological text, and when its sources and interlocutors are sought in that domain.

Berthold's argument, was taken from *Sapientiale* III.23.¹⁸ These passages explained how every science uses its rules and principles as its "proper foundations". These principles are already known and assumed (*ex praecognitis*) as the basis for syllogistic reasoning and are "the most certain propositions received from common teachings". These propositions, although they are commonly called simply "by the name of principles", in fact receive different names in each science, as Alan of Lille explained.¹⁹ Following Eustratius, we may divide principles into three kinds:

Axioms (*dignitates*): believed (*credita*) through self-evidence.

Hypotheses (*suppositiones*): lack self-evidence; belief in them is conceded following teaching or demonstration.

Postulates (*petitiones*): lack self-evidence; their truth is not conceded but is granted for the sake of the argument.²⁰

These principles are used in different ways in demonstrative syllogisms. The truth of an axiomatic proposition is grasped immediately because of the identity of subject and predicate or, in the case of a syllogism, because of the identity of the middle term with either extreme. A second group called theses (*positiones*) is subdivided into hypotheses (*suppositiones*) and definitions (*definitiones*). In general, a thesis is someone's opinion that is gathered from their philosophy. It is not grasped by all and its necessity is not immediately understood. If it is presented as having been demonstrated in a higher science, as in optics one appeals to geometry, and if it seems probable to a student of the subalternated science, it is called a hypothesis (*suppositio*). If it does not seem probable, it is a postulate (*petitio*). Unlike axioms and theses, definitions do not predicate one thing of another; they are neither affirmative nor negative but are a simple understanding regarding one explicated thing (*intellectus quodammodo simplex cadens super unum explicitum*).²¹

18 For an edition of passages from *Sapientiale*, lib. III, c. 23, see F. Retucci, "Nuovi percorsi del platonismo medievale. I commentari bizantini all'*Etica Nicomachea* nel *Sapientiale* di Tommaso di York", in *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 24(2013), p. 85–120.

19 Here Berthold added a reference to *Expos. tit. K*, p. 47, l. 349–367.

20 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* A, p. 54, l. 53–63.

21 One need not situate Berthold among his contemporaries John Buridan and Gregory of Rimini who held that science concerns propositions and not things (cf. König-Pralong, "Expérience et sciences de la nature", p. 123). Berthold received this view from Thomas of York.

Berthold began Section B with an outline of the three properties or proper modes that the three kinds of principles presented in section A can assume. He arranged these modes in terms of the various degrees of commonality found among principles: some principles descend into every science, others only into some sciences, while those in the third group are proper only to one science. Once these modes of commonality have been explained, this classification will be used to discuss the different modes of certitude proper to each kind of principle.

The “most-common” principles, by virtue of their universality, descend into every science: for example, there is the principle of non-contradiction or the principle that words (*voces*) have determinate significations. The “modes or conditions” of such principles are to be “the most secure of all” and beyond deceit; they are true for everyone, everywhere, and always (*omnibus ubique et semper*), and thus are present by nature and not by instruction. Berthold tells us that these principles concern “being as being”, since being (*ens*) is “the most universal of all formal intentions” – however, he added cryptically, “according to Plato it is otherwise”.²²

The second group comprises “common” principles. These are proportionately taken up by some, though not all, sciences. Examples come from Euclid’s “common conceptions of the mind”: “the whole is greater than the part” or “if equals are subtracted from equals, then the remainders are equal”.²³

The third group includes principles proper to particular sciences that have no proportional or analogical commonality across diverse sciences. For example, it is a principle only in geometry that “all right angles are equal”, only in optics that “light and colour move sight”, or only in physics that there is movement in nature.

22 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 56, l. 116-119: *ens, quod est universalissima omnium intentionum formalium secundum Aristotelem, licet aliter sit secundum Platonem*. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentarium*, 1.25, p. 144, l. 239-241: *intention enim entis prima et formalissima est omnium intentionum*; 3.8, p. 159, l. 40 – p. 160, l. 48: *ratio entis [...] est prima et formalissima omnium intentionum*; 5.36, p. 191, l. 351-358: *ens, quae est prima et formalissima omnium intentionum*. Cf. id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.15.1, p. 156, l. 9-10: *quantum ad primam et simplicissimam et universalissimam intentionem, scilicet esse*.

23 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 56, l. 123-126: *quas communes animi conceptiones vocant et ponuntur in principio Euclidis, puta, ‘si ab aequalibus aequalia demas’, etc., et ‘omne totum est maius sua parte’*. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De iride et de radialibus impressionibus*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia, vol. 4. Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft, Briefe*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1985), 1.4.8, p. 128, l. 58-59: *per communem animi conceptionem, scilicet ‘si aequalia ab aequalibus demas’ etc.*; 1.4.10, p. 128, l. 80-81; 11.24.8, p. 186, l. 93-94.

We then come to the various modes of certitude found in these three kinds of principles. The most-common and common principles are known through intellect (*intellectus*). Here Berthold used Thomas of York to explain how the habit of intellect differs from the other habits presented by Aristotle in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But the most important point, around which the argument of the *Praeambulum* hinges, concerns the principles unique to particular sciences. Only in some sciences (the purely mathematical), are particular principles apprehended by intellect. The particular principles of all other sciences, as we shall see, have a different mode of certitude and truth. The notion of a veritable science will have to have sufficient latitude to include these, which by far comprise most disciplines normally regarded as sciences.

Therefore, each science must be considered separately to determine, first, whether it is purely mathematical and, if not, how it relates to the physical world. Purely mathematical sciences like geometry and arithmetic have the same certitude as the most-common and common principles, for their principles are known through intellect and not sense-experience. In such cases, exemplified by Euclid, the orders of nature and our knowledge are parallel: “we apprehend the proper principles of such sciences by intellect in the first steps in the progress in these sciences”.²⁴

Sciences relating to the physical world apprehend truth in another way and have a different degree of certitude. These sciences include physics and ethics, where what is prior by nature comes later in the order of knowing because the sciences begin with sense-perception. Here Aristotle’s dictum holds true: every art and intellectual discipline begins from the prior cognition of the senses.²⁵ The principles in these sciences are universals derived from sense, memory, and experience. For example, in physics sense-perception establishes “that there is motion” and, in medicine, experience establishes “that scammony purges bile”. In optics and astronomy an instrument is used to capture an *experimentum*. In these sciences, there is no necessary relation between experience and the universal proposition or principle derived from it.²⁶ Therefore, whereas intellect apprehends the principles of purely mathematical sciences as well as most-common and common principles, which have an intrinsic mode of certitude and truth, the principles of every other particular science “have their cause and reason as it were from the outside” (*quasi ab extrinseco*).²⁷ Belonging

24 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 58, l. 177-178.

25 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 59, l. 204-209.

26 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 62, l. 331-334.

27 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 241.

to this second group are “the principles of metaphysical or divine sciences”.²⁸ It is relative to this domain of exteriority that the text will make the decisive argument that extends the true notion of a science to disciplines founded on believed principles (*credita*).

Any proposition or principle derived from sense-experience in sciences in this second group is “only believed and in no way known or intellected” (as Godfrey had said of revealed theology), since it lacks the necessity of intellect.²⁹ These principles, insofar as they are believed, are “apprehended under the certitude of the ‘true’, [which] cannot possibly be otherwise”. This apprehension has three components: (1) the “apprehended” is what reason objectively deals with in thinking, such as “this, which is moved, exists”;³⁰ (2) it is “true” by the equality of the thing apprehended and intellect, which occurs through “a combination or composition of speech”;³¹ finally, (3) “certitude” is “the firm and unshakeable assent of reason” concerning the thing apprehended as true.

28 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 271-274: *alia est cognitio principiorum communissimorum, communium et priorum in scientiis pure mathematicis, quia intellectus, alia vero metaphysicorum seu divinorum, physicorum et ad physica relatorum, quia acceptio secundum sensum.*

29 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 59, l. 217-229: *Sic igitur procedente indagatione per viam sensus et experientiae in praemissis scientiis sumptum est unum universale pro ipsarum scientiarum principio, quod principium in quacumque huiusmodi scientia solum creditum est et nullo modo scitum nec intellectum, quia nec ex propria ratione terminorum cognitum est, quod esset intelligere, nec ex aliquibus principiis aliis seu causis conclusum et ita nullo modo scitum, sed, ut dictum est, solum est creditum, et sic apprehensum sub certitudine veri, quod impossibile est aliter se habere. Dico autem [1] ‘apprehensum’ id, circa quod obiective negotiatur ratio per cognitionem, ut hoc, quod est motum, esse; [2] ‘verum’ autem hic intelligo ipsam aequalitatem sive consonantiam rei apprehensae et intellectus, quae quantum ad rationem et modum attenditur circa complexionem sive compositionem locutionis; [3] ‘certitudo’ autem de ipsa veritate rei apprehensae est firmus et indeclinabilis assensus rationis in rem sic apprehensam.* For Godfrey, see n. 12-13, above.

30 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 249-250, clarifies that these are first intentions. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentaliu*, 5.47, p. 194, l. 463-468: *Circa quaedam enim entia sic negotiatur intellectus [...];* 5.54, p. 197, l. 566-568: *Unde huiusmodi entia proprie dicuntur res rationis, non autem ea, quae sunt primae intentionis, quae important aliquam rem naturae et circa quae negotiatur intellectus tamquam circa res naturae.*

31 Presumably by affirmation and negation, and second intentions. This rare expression, *complexio locutionis*, appears also in Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentaliu*, 5.54, p. 197, l. 559-562: *Possunt enim non entia, sicut et entia, in complexionem locutionis et in praedicationem affirmativam vel negativam venire [...];* id., *De natura contrariorum*, ed. R. Imbach, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 13.1, p. 93, l. 44-55.

Within this framework, the *Praeambulum* then compared mathematical and physical sciences. What is known demonstratively (*scitum*) by intellect is also “apprehended by reason under the certitude of truth”, but the principle that is believed (*creditum*) differs from it in two respects: (a) by its mode of certitude and (b) in the order of apprehension. (a) *Scientia* takes its certitude from the intrinsic evidence of the thing, that is, from the intention and rational relations that the terms have to one another in a complex proposition, whether immediately in the case of first principles, or mediately when a conclusion is deduced from prior principles. By contrast, the certitude of faith derives not from intrinsic evidence but has its cause and reason from without (*quasi ab extrinseco*), such as “from the clear authority of an expert, from whose truth the intellect cannot reasonably dissent”.³² At this stage one should note how closely *scientia* and *fides* align with what Godfrey called the certitude of evidence, where knowledge begins with *per se* principles that lead to clear conclusions, and the certitude of adhesion, which begins from authority.

(b) The second difference between *scientia* and *fides* concerns the order of apprehension. In *scientia*, the evidence of the thing arises from the intention and rational relation of the terms which are, so to speak, “the intrinsic principle of cognition found in the thing”.³³ The thing itself is by nature apprehended first, prior to truth or falsehood, which both arise from the combining activity of intellect. By contrast, in belief, the authority of an expert comes first, “in whose truth reason declares our trust must absolutely be placed and the will inclines to it”.³⁴ In belief, the order of apprehension begins with truth as such and not with the intrinsic evidence of the thing. Any necessity lacking in the evidence of the terms is supplied by the authority of an expert, which provides the secure foundation of truth.

At this point, Berthold gave a summary of what has been concluded so far concerning principles in general. No principle is ever demonstrated; wisdom declares (*manifestare*) but does not demonstrate principles. The habit of

32 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 241-242: *puta ex evidenti auctoritate alicuius experti, a cuius veritate intellectus rationabiliter dissentire non potest.*

33 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 248-250: *quae sunt quasi intrinsecum cognitionis principium repertum apud rem ipsam, prout est ens et res primae intentionis.* Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De accidentibus*, 8.4, p. 64, l. 110-113: *universitas entium, quae sunt res primae intentionis et vere res naturae, in duplicem maneriem rerum distinguitur secundum duas differentias entis in eo, quod ens, quae est prima et simplicissima omnium formalium intentionum repertarum in rebus; id., De visione beatifica*, 3.2.9.1 (3), p. 86, l. 26-33.

34 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 254-56: *Quia enim causam et rationem suae certitudinis non habet a re ipsa, sed ab auctoritate alicuius experti, cuius veritati omnino standum esse dicit ratio et inclinat voluntas [...].*

principles of first certitude (which would correspond to most-common, common, and purely mathematical principles) is innate. For Aristotle, this habit is only in potency before being actualised by sense-cognition, but for Plato, according to Boethius, there is already in us “the seed of truth”, which is always active, even if it “is aroused by instruction fanning the ember”.³⁵

What remains to be determined is whether there can be a true science (*vera scientia*) which begins from belief. Section C of the *Praeambulum* argues in the affirmative, and proceeds by establishing an analogy between theology and natural science. Godfrey refused to accept such a comparison. But the argument in the *Praeambulum* allows for it insofar as it has found a role for belief in the physical sciences. Berthold will then argue that Platonic wisdom (*divinalis sapientia*) has the same scientific structure, proportionately speaking (*proportionaliter loquendo*), as the other genuine sciences, except the purely mathematical.³⁶ That is, it uses most-common principles (e.g., non-contradiction) and common principles (e.g., “the whole is greater than the part”), which are apprehended by the intellect. As for the two principles unique to this science, “there is multitude” and “there is producer and produced”, Berthold will affirm that Proclus assumes them and “proceeds perfectly following the scientific mode”. In this most divine science (*divinissima scientia*), these two principles are known in a way analogous (*proportionaliter*) to the sciences concerning things conjoined to motion or change. Although Berthold did not make this clear, we should assume that we need to understand both the elements of similarity and difference in the analogy of (Platonic) theology and the natural sciences.

In terms of their similarity, this theology resembles the physical sciences in which there is no intrinsic or necessary connection between sense-experience and the universal proposition that serves as its principle: these principles must

35 Thomas of York, following Eustratius, had also criticised Aristotle in the name of the Platonists regarding our knowledge of first principles. See *Sapientiale*, lib. 111, c. 24, in Retucci, “Nuovi percorsi”, p. 93–94. According to Eustratius, the need for sense-perception is not intrinsic to humanity but is a result of the Fall. See M. Trizio, “Neoplatonic Source-Material in Eustratios of Nicaea’s Commentary on Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*”, in C. Barber, D. Jenkins (eds), *Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 71–110, at p. 99–101; id., “On the Byzantine Fortune of Eustratios of Nicaea’s Commentary on Books I and VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*”, in B. Bydén, K. Ierodiakonou (eds), *The Many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy* (Athens: The Norwegian Institute at Athens, 2012), p. 200–224, at p. 209–216.

36 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 61, l. 307–309: *omnino eodem modo proportionaliter loquendo secundum proprium modum scientiae procedit haec divinalis sapientia sicut praedictae scientiae solis pure mathematicis exclusis.*

be believed. The *Praeambulum* explains this with an important account of the cognitive structure of belief which, however, differs subtly from the account of the secure foundation provided by belief in authority in section B:

Therefore, in taking this universal principle from sense-experiences there is nothing but a conjectural inference under the aspect of the true and not under the aspect of being, as has been said. Accordingly, it is received as believed, not as intellected or known [*ut creditum, non ut intellectum vel scitum*]. As has been said, it is taken by a certain conjecture, but still with the firm and unwavering assent of reason. This firmness and unwavering assent arises from a certain natural instinct founded in the power that at once distinguishes, collects, and gathers, which we call the cogitative. In and through this power the simple and pure intentions of things, separated from their images, to use the phrase of Averroes, are apprehended, distinguished, collected, and gathered.³⁷

The production of the conjectural inference and the firm belief in it both occur entirely in and through the cogitative power. The “true” as such, rather than the thing itself, is still primary, but its stability comes not from authority, as section B argued, but from the cogitative power, which separates the intentions stored in memory and acquired by sense-perception. Its activity, in other words, is at once rational and natural or automatic. The parallels between the *Praeambulum* and Dietrich’s extant works are strongest here, especially in the description of the cogitative power and its close association with the estimative faculty,³⁸ in its

37 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 62, l. 340-349: *Igitur in sumptione talis universalis principii ex sensibilibus experimentis non est nisi quaedam coniecturalis illatio sub ratione veri et non sub ratione talis entis secundum praemissa, et ideo solum accipitur ut creditum, non ut intellectum vel scitum, et, ut dictum est, sumitur secundum quandam coniecturam, cum firmo tamen et indeclinabili assensu rationis. Quae firmitas et indeclinabilis assensus surgit ex naturali quodam instinctu fundato in virtute distinctiva et collectiva simul et collativa, quam cogitativam dicimus, in qua seu per quam apprehenduntur, distinguuntur, colliguntur, conferuntur simplices et purae rerum intentiones separatae a suis idolis, ut verbo Averrois utar.*

38 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 111.27.2, p. 200, l. 26-32: *Ratio particularis, quam etiam aestimativam seu cogitativam vocant, est vis distinctiva, quae componit et dividit et versatur circa intentiones rerum, etiamsi sint res universales, universales, inquam, secundum considerationem, inquantum videlicet considerat rem aliquam absque principii secundum considerationem individuans seu particulantibus eam. Et hoc est, quod ille commentator Averroes dicit, scilicet quod denudate rem a suo idolo, id est ab accidentibus, sub quibus imaginativa rem considerat.* See also id., *De origine rerum praedicamentaliu*, 5.26, p. 187, l. 224 – p. 188, l. 228; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 111.7.5, p. 182, l. 112 – p. 183,

phrasing,³⁹ and its terminology of conjecture.⁴⁰ A mechanism like this could serve as the beginning of a reply to Godfrey of Fontaines, in that it has effectively extended the certitude of adhesion beyond the domain of revealed theology to all physical sciences. There is an act of belief in all non-mathematical scientific habits.

This account of induction, appealing to Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* II.19 and *Metaphysics* I.1, also resembles Dietrich's presentation of dialectical demonstrations in *De intellectu et intelligibili*. The reference in the *Praeambulum* to "the weaker mode of argumentation" that proceeds "by induction or by example" recalls Dietrich's description of how from "sense, memory, and experience" there arises "a sort of logical or dialectical universal" that properly speaking pertains to "our cogitative power". If, Dietrich continued, a definition is made from such terms, and from these definitions propositions are developed to reach conclusions, this is called a demonstration only in an attenuated sense.⁴¹ For a dialectical universal is not truly universal; it is only an intention stripped of individuating, particular components so that, for example, "human" or "horse" subsequently can be predicated of many things, rather than the individual "Socrates", which can be predicated only of one.⁴² Similarly, we read in the *Praeambulum* that the universal arising from this weaker mode of argumentation or induction – from many sense-perceptions, from memory, and from experience – is "beyond the particulars but not really separate" from them (*praeter particularia non quasi separatum*).

The *Praeambulum* will not, however, leave us with only dialectical demonstrations for all non-mathematical sciences – nor, for that matter, would Dietrich.⁴³ For Dietrich, the basis for necessary and demonstrative knowledge

l. 120; III.17.1, p. 190, l. 3-9; III.33.1-2, p. 204, l. 28-53; id., *Quaestio utrum in Deo sit aliqua vis cognitiva inferior intellectu*, I.4.2.2 (11), p. 302, l. 78-88; id., *De visione beatifica*, 3.2.9.7 (4), p. 98, l. 21-33; 4.3.2 (9), p. 115, l. 40-54; id., *De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*, 4.6, p. 306, l. 96-101.

39 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, prooem. (4), p. 14, l. 40; I.2.2.1 (8), p. 47, l. 51: *ut verbo eius [Augustini] utar*; 3.2.4 (10), p. 75, l. 48: *ut verbis eius [Aristotelis] utar*; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, III.2.1, p. 179, l. 21; id., *De magis et minus*, II.4, p. 55, l. 68; id., *De animatione caeli*, 9.1, p. 20, l. 48-49; 10.4, p. 22, l. 96-97; id., *De iride et de radialibus impressionibus*, IV.23.5, p. 265, l. 112: *ut verbis Philosophi utar*; id., *De intelligentiis et motoribus caelorum*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 5.10, p. 360, l. 94-95: *ut verbis philosophorum utar*.

40 See 2.3, n. 110, above.

41 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 62, l. 334-339. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, III.33.1, p. 204, l. 28-36; id., *De natura contrariorum*, 56.2, p. 123, l. 31 – p. 124, l. 37.

42 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, III.27.2-3, p. 200, l. 26-42.

43 On Dietrich's theory of demonstration, see W. Wallace, *The Scientific Methodology of Theodor of Freiberg. A Case Study in the Relationship between Science and Philosophy*

is the *ratio definitiva* that is constituted in the possible intellect, which apprehends the quiddity of a thing through the parts of its definition or its causes.⁴⁴ This *ratio* is apprehended in different ways in the sciences, depending on the number of causes taken into account, whether formal causes alone (as in metaphysics and mathematics) or all four causes (as in the other physical sciences).⁴⁵ In some cases, for example in the study of the rainbow and other radiant meteorological phenomena, these procedures will yield mixed demonstrations, since the properties being studied are physical but the middle terms of the demonstrations are mathematical and are derived from optics.⁴⁶ Certain entities like accidents, however, cannot be understood independently of the substance in which they inhere (“snub” cannot be understood independently of “nose”; inversely, “nose” is the more formal element in the definition of “snub” that makes it intelligible).⁴⁷ Since their definition includes something extrinsic to the thing defined, accidents do not have a quiddity in the strict sense. They do, however, have a quiddity in our way of understanding them – that is, one can give an answer to the question “What is an accident?” or “What is the colour white?”, even though these have no reality apart from the substance in which they inhere. Dietrich would call the answers to such questions “logical definitions” or universals, and a demonstration founded on such a definition is “logical” or “dialectical”. In his view, the failure to observe this difference has led many to suppose that accidents are in fact separable from their substances simply because we can understand them in this logical fashion. For Dietrich the same rules also impose themselves on the other end of the ontological spectrum: we have already noted that for Dietrich the separate substances, because they are simple, also do not have a quiddity in the strict sense. For this reason, we can infer that the part of metaphysics that reflects on the existence of such substances, rather than the part that studies

(Fribourg: University Press, 1959), p. 38–76; De Libera, *La mystique rhénane*, p. 361–373. On the cogitative power, see especially A. de Libera, “D’Averroès en Augustin. Intellect et cogitative selon Dietrich de Freiberg”, in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg*, p. 15–62, at p. 52–62.

44 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentarium*, 5.26, p. 187, l. 221–226; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, III.28.1, p. 201, l. 45–59.

45 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentarium*, 5.60–67, p. 199, l. 630 – p. 201, l. 698. Metaphysics and mathematics differ in how they conceive the formal *ratio*: metaphysics considers being as being, while metaphysics looks only to a determinate genus of being; mathematics considers its subject according to the quiddity and form found concretely in nature; mathematics considers the form as abstracted.

46 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De iride et de radialibus impressionibus*, prol. (5), p. 122, l. 35–38; 1.2, p. 124, l. 57 – p. 125, l. 86.

47 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De accidentibus*, 12.1–15.5, p. 68, l. 3 – p. 74, l. 60.

the attributes and properties of being as being, would also remain at the level of probability and dialectics.⁴⁸

Now, at this point, Dietrich would have to offer an account of how, even though a person begins with a “logical universal”, one nevertheless arrives in some non-mathematical sciences to attain the necessary knowledge of proper demonstration. Dietrich’s reflections on this subject, limited though they are, can be presented as follows. In the formation of a speculative habit, there are two active principles: the agent intellect and, in relation to the cogitative power, the heart. We act primarily in this process through our cogitative power, by which we reflect on the universal intentions of things, but these are only completely realised in the possible intellect.⁴⁹ The cogitative power, by “denuding” the intention of the substance from its images and accidental “idols”, places the possible intellect in a disposition to receive the intelligible species directly from the agent intellect.⁵⁰ For Dietrich, in other words, the agent intellect does not abstract the species from the imaginative or cogitative power. Instead, the possible intellect emanates from the agent intellect (*procedit enim ab eo intelligendo ipsum*), first by thinking the agent intellect as its productive principle under the aspect of a determinate *ratio*, and then it thinks that determinate intention as such.⁵¹ The contracting disposition produced in the cogitative is related to the determinate intelligible species as matter is related to the form.⁵² That is, although the possible intellect and the cogitative are turned toward the same object, they are not turned toward one another: the possible intellect never turns away from the agent intellect, and relates to its object by the intelligible species, while the cogitative relates to its object by the intentions it separates from the “idols”. This means that the cogitative can apprehend an object that is in itself self-evident and necessary, even though it does not apprehend the object as such.⁵³ In this life, the possible intellect always depends on the disposition it receives from the cogitative

48 See 2.3, n. 121, above.

49 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De habitibus*, ed. H. Steffan, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 11.3–4, p. 15, l. 16–24.

50 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentaliū*, 5.26, p. 187, l. 226 – p. 188, 232: *alioquin non differret intellectus a virtute cogitativa, quae etiam sic intentionem substantiae denudare potest, ut nuda apud ipsam maneat denudata ab omnibus imaginibus, ut Averroes loquitur, et appendiciis accidentalibus. Et sic est intentio substantiae in ea dispositione, ut secundum eam fiat virtute intellectus agentis forma in intellectu possibili, qua ipsi formae seu rei secundum suam formam determinantur sua principia. Et ex hoc iam habet forma rationem quiditatis et ipsa res esse quiditativum.*

51 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 111.36.1–2, p. 208, l. 25–41.

52 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 4.3.2 (9), p. 115, l. 48–54.

53 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 111.33.2, p. 204, l. 45–53.

and, therefore, it never knows without phantasms.⁵⁴ Presumably this is how Dietrich would explain the way in which a demonstrative scientific habit is formed from premises that are initially believed. Unfortunately, Berthold does not provide us with any further clues in the *Praeambulum* or elsewhere in the *Expositio* about how this process occurs.

2 “Our Divinising Theology”

A more obvious and unresolved ambiguity in the *Praeambulum* relates to its assumption that we can draw a valid analogy between what we might call, echoing Godfrey’s language, the certitude of adhesion to authority and the certitude of adhesion to a conjectural inference. The *Praeambulum* has maintained that, in the order of apprehension, both kinds of certitude in some sense come from without (*quasi ab extrinseco*), and both are grasped primarily as true with enough firmness to serve as a basis for scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, if this argument originally derived from a theological debate, we would expect to find an explanation of the element of difference in the analogy, namely, how theology is as scientific as natural philosophy and yet retains its exalted position as the noblest of the disciplines. Berthold will take one route to establish this conclusion, but he will not appeal to a mechanism of belief or to notions of authority and conjecture to do so. One can easily conceive another path to a similar result relative to Christian theology in particular that would also clarify the ambiguous relationship between authority and inference: one, for example, proceeds automatically (the conjecture) and one is voluntary (assent to authority).

If Berthold was indeed using Dietrich’s *De theologia*, then at this point he would have had to diverge, in his characteristic way, from his source. For if we accept the reconstruction of a Parisian context for Dietrich’s *De theologia*, and recall his Pauline discussion of the two orders of providence in the fragment *De subiecto theologiae*, we can easily imagine one way to resolve the ambiguity between authority and conjecture: the natural, automatic assent of the cognitive power would pertain to what the *De subiecto* called “the divine science of the philosophers”, whereas the free assent to sacred authority would relate to our science (*nostra scientia*), theology as such (*theologia simpliciter*), our divine science of the saints (*nostra divina sanctorum scientia*).⁵⁵ Up this point

54 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 111.36.3–4, p. 208, l. 42–54.

55 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, 3.8–10, p. 281, l. 92 – p. 282, l. 112, cited at 2.3, n. 96, above.

in the *Praeambulum*, “the principles of metaphysical or divine sciences” had been spoken of as if they were on equal footing, where it was possible to move between belief in authority to belief in the conjectural inference for the sake of the argument. But we know from the *De subiecto* that such an undifferentiated sense of theology (*in hac scientia*) with *ens divinum* as its unifying subject must be divided, in an eschatological perspective, into the two orders of providence: the divine science of the saints looks and will abide beyond the limits of this world, whereas the divine science of the philosophers is as finite as the order of nature. While the philosophers’ theology, like every natural science, begins from believed principles, and nevertheless is a legitimate science, the free assent to the authority of the highest truth surpasses it in certitude. Metaphysics, as the study of being and as theology, begins with principles deriving from sense, memory, and experience in the cogitative power. But even though the cogitative gives spontaneous, firm assent, it is not infallible,⁵⁶ especially where no quidditative knowledge is available to our intellect. While it is entirely conceivable that Dietrich would place metaphysics as ontology on the solid ground of demonstrative knowledge that reasons about formal causes, he consistently maintained that our natural knowledge of the separate substances remains tentative, even though our conclusions can reach a level of hypothetical necessity. For Dietrich, as we have seen, only in ethics and the order of voluntary providence do we reach the things themselves, for faith begets charity, and charity does not fail.

Berthold, however, took the difference in the proportion between theology and the other sciences, including metaphysics, in another direction. His departure from the spirit of Dietrich’s *De subiecto theologiae* is clear simply from the fact that the mark of ownership for the highest science has passed from the theology of the saints to the “science”⁵⁷ achieved by Proclus:

Praeamb. A, p. 53, l. 29: *in ista sapientia divinali seu theologia sapientiali*
Praeamb. B, p. 62, l. 321: *haec sapientialis scientia*

56 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De habitibus*, 9.1-2, p. 14, l. 62-72: *veniemus ad aliquid magis intimum, et hoc eo intimius, ut ita loquamur, quo spiritualius, et est phantasticum nostrum expoliatum idolis et corporalibus rerum similitudinibus retinens apud se rei intentionem. Et istud vocamus cogitativum nostrum. Et hic oritur aestimativa et per consequens ratio particularis. Et operatio boni vel mali hinc surgit; consequenter autem ratio et proprietas virtutis operativae. Sine hac vi spirituali daemon numquam fuisset lapsus. Ruina enim sua fuit eo, quod inclinavit se in aestimatum bonum, quod non fuit verum. Intellectus autem semper verorum est.*

57 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Praeamb. A*, p. 53, l. 3-4 and 21-29; *Praeamb. C*, p. 68, l. 539.

Praeamb. C, p. 61, l. 308-309: *haec divinalis supersapientia*
 p. 65, l. 426-429: *habitus divinalis seu supersapientialis*
 p. 65, l. 444-445: *nostrae divinalis theologiae*
 p. 65, l. 454 – p. 66, l. 455: *nostrae divinalis supersapientiae*
 p. 67, l. 514: *nostrae supersapientialis et divinalis sapientiae*
 p. 68, l. 539: *habitus supersapientialis scientiae Platonicae*
 p. 69, l. 566: *nostram divinalem philosophiam*

With Berthold, the disproportion no longer fell between the divine sciences of the saints and the philosophers, but between Platonic *supersapientia* and Aristotelian first philosophy: “above the mode common to it and the other sciences, [Proclus’ science] has something more in the reason and cause of its certitude and unshakeable assent in these principles”.⁵⁸

Berthold made the comparison between Aristotelian metaphysics and Platonic *supersapientia* in two parts: (1) by an inspection of the cognitive principle used in theology (p. 63, l. 375 – p. 65, l. 425), and (2) by a consideration of the supersapiential and divinising habit through which Platonic theology receives its principles (p. 65, l. 426 – p. 69, l. 569). While Berthold’s argument proceeds mostly by compiling citations from Proclus, Dionysius, and Boethius, and tacitly *Sapientiale* III.23, its structure was clearly still indebted to theological discourse – these are the sort of distinctions one would expect to find relative to (2) faith, the habit perfecting (1) the intellect under the free movement of the will, as we find for example in Thomas Aquinas.⁵⁹ On these same lines, Ruedi Imbach has observed that Berthold’s procedure in this part of the *Praeambulum* recalls Aquinas’ discussion of sacred doctrine as a wisdom surpassing human wisdom.⁶⁰ If Berthold indeed has been using Dietrich’s *De theologia*, then this structural parallel between sacred doctrine and *supersapientia* should be interpreted in the maximal sense: Berthold has subordinated Aristotelian *sapientia* to Platonic *supersapientia* as Dietrich had subordinated pagan philosophy to Christian theology. This was possible because, as we have seen, notions like revelation and deification through grace have been extended

58 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 63, l. 371-374: *immo supra modum communem sibi et aliis scientiis aliquid amplius habet in ratione et causa suae certitudinis et indeclinabilis assensus in ipsa talia principia.*

59 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IIa IIae, q. 4, a. 2.

60 Imbach, “Au-delà de la métaphysique”, p. 389: “Ce modèle qui postule au-delà de la reine des sciences philosophiques une science supérieur rappelle d’une certaine façon le rapport que Thomas d’Aquin envisage, notamment au seuil de la *Summa theologiae*, entre la sagesse philosophique et la science théologique, la *sacra doctrina*.” Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 1, a. 6.

to Hermetic and Platonic theology and anthropology, in no small part under the inspiration of Romans 1:19: “What was known of God is manifest to them; for God revealed it [*revelavit*] to them”.⁶¹ Unlike Dietrich’s divine science of the philosophers, Berthold’s Platonism was soteriological.

Berthold was led to this remarkable conclusion by the texts. In Proclus he found parallels to passages from Dionysius that his predecessors had used to characterise the superiority of faith over natural philosophical reason. As with *Prologus* 17, here the crucial source was Proclus’ *De providentia et fato* on the modes of cognition. Berthold appealed to Proclus now to explain (1) the nature of the cognitive principle used in theology. Contrasting the certitude of the lower sciences with that of Platonic science, Berthold now shifted from speaking of the cogitative power – the basis for belief in natural science – in the first-person (*quam cogitativam dicimus*), which (perhaps citing Dietrich) he had used when describing mechanism of belief in natural science, to the third-person (*ratio particularis, quam quidam cogitativam vocant*).⁶² As in 123D, he subdivided the *ratio particularis* into three functions (*triplex officio*): turning below to imagination (*phantasia*), it is “opinionative” and is occupied with the intentions of physical things; turning above itself, it is “scientific” and treats pure mathematics; in its middle operation, it considers mathematics applied to physical beings (harmonics, perspective, astronomy), which would be the domain of mixed demonstration mentioned already. The cognitive principle of Platonic science, Berthold continued, also exceeds the universal reason (*ratio universalis*) or possible intellect that “apprehends the thing in its reason” that, turned below, concerns logical intentions, whether first or second intentions; toward itself, “metaphysical” intentions;⁶³ and above, “it reflects beings as such” (*simpliciter entia speculatur*). With the possible intellect we reach the level of metaphysics as the study of being and its properties.

In 123D, Berthold had expanded the description of the lower function of the cogitative by tacitly drawing from a passage in Albert’s *Summa theologiae* that

61 The same verse in the Vulgate reads: *Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis: Deus enim illis manifestavit*. As the editors of the *Expositio* indicate, Berthold’s source here at the beginning of the *Prologus* was Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. I. Brady (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971–1981³), lib. 1, dist. 3, cap. 1, §35, on the knowledge of God from creatures.

62 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 63, l. 378–379. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 111.27.2, p. 200, l. 26: *Ratio particularis, quam etiam aestimativam seu cogitativam vocant*. Cf. 67C, p. 11, l. 100–101, and 177H, p. 182, l. 297.

63 Instead of *mathematicas*, as is found in the Vatican manuscript, here the reading in the Oxford manuscript (p. 64, l. 392: *metaphysicas*) should be followed in light of 123D (p. 129, l. 134: *metaphysicas*).

distinguished between conviction (*fides*), that must be placed below *scientia*, from the theological faith (*fides*) that is above knowledge.⁶⁴ Albert's text, not cited by Berthold, continued as follows:

But faith in theological matters is not this kind of faith, which occurs through a medium, but is a light that, like a medium without a medium by which would be proved, locates the faithful in the first Truth through assent and certitude.⁶⁵

Albert here echoed a phrase from Dionysius that he had just cited, which also featured prominently in the question concerning the scientific character of theology at the beginning of the *Summa*:

Dionysius in chapter 7 of his book *On the Divine Names* says that faith is a light locating the faithful in the first Truth and the first Truth immutably in them. And likewise, under this light, things are received that cannot be received under the natural light.⁶⁶

When Berthold moved beyond the possible intellect to establish the superiority of the Platonic divine science over Aristotle's metaphysics, we find him appealing to Dionysius for an account of (1) the *unum animae* and (2) the cognitive habit belonging to it (*supersapientia*) that has a structurally identical role to *fides* in Albert:

Indeed, these cognitive principles relate only to beings, although according to different reasons. However, many divine things are above being, as is evident in the case of things divine according to essence and what is divine according to cause, which is 'above all beings', as Dionysius attests in chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names* B. For this reason, in chapter 1 of the

64 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123D, p. 128, l. 113-117. For a similar notion of supra-intellectual faith among the pagan Platonists, see P. Hoffmann, "Erôs, Aletheia, Pistis ... et Elpis. Tétrade chaldaique, triade néoplatonicienne", in M. Delgado, C. Méla, F. Möri (eds), *Orient-Occident. Racines spirituelles de l'Europe* (Paris: Cerf, 2014), p. 63-136.

65 Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, pars 1, tr. 3, q. 15, c. 3, a. 1, p. 78, l. 69-72: *Fides autem in theologicis non est talis fides, quae per medium fit, sed est lumen, quod ut medium non habens medium, quo probetur, credentes locat in prima veritate per assensum et certitudinem.*

66 Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, pars 1, tr. 1, q. 1, p. 7, l. 53-57: *Et Dionysius libro De divinis nominibus cap. VII dicit, quod fides est lumen locans credentes in primam veritatem et primam veritatem in ipsis immobiliter. Et ideo sub lumine illius accipitur, quod sub lumine connaturali accipi non potest.*

Mystical Theology, he calls ‘unlearned’ those ‘who are sealed off in beings and believe that there is nothing supersubstantially beyond beings, but they presume to know, with that cognition that is according to themselves, him, who makes the shadows his hiding place’. Consequently, it is impossible that we should receive those things that are above us according to our ownness [*iuxta proprietatem nostram*] and thus compare things divine with a reason that has been reared on the senses, with which we are deceived by appearances, as he says there in chapter 7 of *On the Divine Names*. Dionysius adds an explanation for this, when he describes the cognitive principle in us of things divine, which we are seeking here: ‘one must see that our mind has a certain power for knowing, through which it examines things intelligible, but a union exceeding the nature of the mind (the other translation says: “a unity superexalted beyond the nature of the mind”), through which the mind is conjoined to those things that are above it. Therefore, it is necessary to think divine things according to this, not according to ourselves, but our whole selves placed outside our whole selves and deified wholly. For it is better to be God’s and not our own.’⁶⁷

This is (1) “the cognitive principle with which the theologian is occupied concerning divine things to be apprehended”.⁶⁸ Here Berthold speaks only of the theologian (*theologus*) and posits no distinction between the pagan Proclus or the Christian Dionysius. The key doctrine that unites both theologians is the principle that divine things must be known in a divine mode, for like is only known by like, and that this knowledge is inherently disposessive – it is not according to the creature’s ownness (*proprietas*).⁶⁹ Indeed, the major attributes of the *unum animae* mentioned here by Berthold correspond to those used, for example, by Thomas Aquinas relative to the nature of faith, and the distinction between knowing divine things “according to our mode”, as the philosophers do, and knowing them “according to the mode of divine things”

67 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 64, l. 395-415.

68 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 63, l. 375-377: *Quod patet primo ex principii cognitivi inspectione, quo theologus in divinis apprehendendis versatur, quod est eminentius et sic perspicacius omni alio principio cognitivo, quo circa alia quaecumque scibilia occupamur.*

69 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 65, l. 419-420: *quomodo divina tractantes efficiuntur di et cognoscunt divina*; p. 65, l. 453: *anima se totam in ipso [uno] statuens efficiatur quasi Deus.*

through infused faith.⁷⁰ Similarly, Aquinas' commentary on the *De divinis nominibus* implied that the "union above the nature of the mind" should be identified with knowledge of divine things by grace.⁷¹ The crucial passages from *De divinis nominibus* c. 7 on the unity exalted above the nature of the mind and faith locating the soul in the highest Truth find a direct correlate in Proclus' statement in *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, that "this *unum* is more divine than intellect", and "locates" the soul in the divine life.⁷² Berthold would entirely accept the way Albert and Aquinas had used Dionysius to describe this supra-intellectual perfection of the intellect they identified as faith. The only difference was that he realised that the same principle had to be extended to the pagan Proclus and, through him, to the Platonic tradition.

Finally, Berthold contrasted (2) the cognitive habits of Platonic *supersapientia* and Aristotelian *sapientia* in terms of their (a) certainty, (b) complexity, and (c) nobility. Berthold's source for the citations of Aristotle was *Sapientiale* III.23, where Thomas of York had focused on the dignity of wisdom in relation to all the other intellectual habits discussed in *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.⁷³ Berthold's arguments involved primarily *a fortiori* comparisons, which followed quite naturally from the name he invented for the habit of Platonic theology: if Aristotelian *sapientia* is so noble, how much nobler must Platonic *supersapientia* be! (a) Wisdom, according to Aristotle, demonstrates not only from the principles of things, but is a "veridical science" of the principles themselves. The examples taken from Eustratius of "distances, length, breadth, depth" as the principles of geometry then accomplishes an important transition in the

70 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, ed. P.-M.J. Gils (Roma: Commissio Leonina, 1992), q. 2, a. 2, p. 95, l. 65-77: *Et secundum hoc de divinis duplex scientia habetur: una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensibilibus principia accipit ad notificandum divina, et sic de divinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam primam scientiam divinam dicentes; alia secundum modum ipsorum divinorum, ut ipsa divina secundum se ipsa capiuntur, quae quidem perfecte in statu viae nobis est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu viae quaedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inheremus ipsi primae veritati propter se ipsam.*

71 Thomas Aquinas, *In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. VII, lect. 1, n. 705, p. 262: *secundo vero, habet quamdam unionem ad res divinas per gratiam, quae excedit naturam mentis nostrae, per quam unionem, coniunguntur homines per fidem aut quamcumque cognitionem, ad ea quae sunt super naturalem mentis virtutem.*

72 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 16, p. 25, l. 650-652: *per unum, quod est intellectu divinius, in quod consummans anima et locans se ad ipsam divina est et vivit divina vita, secundum quod huic est licitum.*

73 Retucci, "Nuovi percorsi", p. 91-92. On Berthold's ambiguous stance toward Aristotle here, see W. Goris, "Metaphysik und Einheitswissenschaft bei Berthold von Moosburg", in *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 85(2018), p. 239-258.

Praeambulum from the earlier epistemological account of principles as propositions to an ontological conception of principles as objects.⁷⁴ This shift made possible Berthold's ensuing argument, citing Proclus, that the Platonic ascent through dialectic and the principles of the various sciences (the point in geometry, the monad in arithmetic, etc.), rising to the unhypothetical first principle, reaches a domain beyond what Aristotle had considered. To this extent must the principles of Platonic wisdom surpass Aristotle's in certitude.⁷⁵ These are precisely not the arguments we would expect to find in Dietrich, for they imply that our knowledge of the separate substances can in fact be more certain than our knowledge of being and its properties.

(b) Whereas *sapientia* is a combination of *intellectus* and discursive *scientia*, the habit of "our super-sapiential wisdom" is, in the words of Boethius, "the simple inspection of the Form forming all things as such" (*simplex inspectio formae simpliciter omnia formantis*).⁷⁶ In other words, *supersapientia* is the non-discursive apprehension of the entire universe as it is enfolded in the Form forming all things. This would correspond to the content of the *intellectus adeptus* as Berthold inherited it from Dietrich of Freiberg, as implied in Dietrich's citation of Gregory the Great on St. Benedict's vision of the entire universe in a single ray of light. But, as we saw, the Boethian notion of *intelligentia* for Berthold includes a deeper cognition prior to reflexivity. This fundamental dimension of intelligence emerges in Berthold's subsequent citation of Dionysius on the capacity of rational souls who, "by enveloping the many into one" become "worthy of intellections equal to the angels", insofar as this is possible for the soul. The angels, Dionysius continued, are capable of a unitive, uniform contemplation and are "figured [*figurata*] after divine *supersapientia*". In other words, to know the simple, the soul itself must become simple. The "most divine cognition of God" for angels or for souls, Berthold concluded with Dionysius, is "through ignorance according to the union above mind, when the mind, having departed from everything else, and then also sending itself away, is united with the super-resplendent rays, and is illuminated hither and yon by

74 This elision was noted by S. Gersh, "Berthold of Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy", in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, p. 493–503, at p. 499–500.

75 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 66, l. 488: *certissima et altissima cognitio hominis deificati*.

76 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 67, l. 521–523: *intelligentiae vero celsior oculus existit, supergressa namque universitatis ambitum illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur*. This is a combination of syntagms from Boethius' *De Trinitate* (c. 2), on the intellectual mode of theology, and the *Consolatio philosophiae* (lib. v, prosa 4), on *intelligentia*.

the inscrutable depth of wisdom [*inde et ibi non scrutabili profundo sapientiae illuminata*].⁷⁷ These are the same texts Berthold used later in the *Expositio* to describe the circular and the direct motions of the soul and the doctrine of contemplation. If we are to assume a coherent doctrine behind it all, we must again conclude that the habit of *supersapientia*, though it is first cultivated in the oblique motion, is only perfected in these two higher motions, which are given by God.

(c) The nobility of this science surpasses Aristotelian metaphysics in its subject and in its form. Whereas Aristotle's metaphysics treats "being as being, its parts and properties", Plato's divine science concerns "the universe of divine things": God, the primordial causes, and their orders. The latter science is comprised of "principles" through which the mind ascends to the contemplation of the existence (*anitas*), but not the essence (*quiditas*) of God. Berthold once again relies chiefly on the authority of Dionysius: the mind cannot know God simply from his nature, for God exceeds all reason, "but from the ordering of all things, placed out before him".⁷⁸ For Berthold, in a phrase redolent of Dietrich, this is a necessity recognised by the philosophers in the domain of natural providence that must be respected by theologians reasoning within the sphere of voluntary providence: "if none of the wise inquires generally after the essence [*quid est*] of the superessential principle of all [...] what theologian presumes to inquire after the superunifical superessence of the primarily One?"⁷⁹

Here yet again, the Platonic consensus, which united the best of the pagans with the doctors of the Church, has transcended the boundaries of natural and voluntary providence in the *Praeambulum*. Nevertheless, just as we saw with Berthold's incorporation of the terminology of *antarkia* and *hierarchia*, this did not amount to a confusion of the two orders. Berthold had clearly asserted that the articles of faith are the first principles in the theology of voluntary providence. If questioned further about the difference between the two theologies, perhaps he would draw on the unused resources of the *Praeambulum* to

77 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 67, l. 523 – p. 68, l. 538.

78 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 1, p. 5, l. 15–16. Commenting on the same passage (*De divinis nominibus*, 7.3, 869C–D), Albert denied that even the blessed know the *quid est* of God, but only the *quia est*. Cf. Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1972), 7.25, p. 356, l. 32 – p. 357, l. 55, as well as 1.21, 1.24, 1.62, 5.3, 6.9, 7.30, 13.27; id., *Super Dionysium De mystica theologia*, c. 1; *Super Epistulas I* and V. F. Ruell, *Les "Noms divins" et leurs "raisons" selon saint Albert le Grand commentateur du De divinis nominibus* (Paris: Vrin, 1963), p. 98–101, has argued convincingly that, for Albert, there are degrees of knowledge of the divine *quia est* in the beatific vision according to the various apprehensions of the *rationes* of the divine attributes.

79 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123K, p. 133, l. 271–274, cited in 1.2, n. 86.

explain that they are believed through the free assent to authority rather than through the spontaneous assent of the cogitative power. But whether he would follow this route or not, it is clear that the habit of Platonic theology has not replaced faith. Berthold has rather extended the dignity that had exclusively belonged to faith, as Albert and Aquinas had understood it through Dionysius, to the habit of *supersapientia*: the cognition of the *unum animae* is deifying and salvific, it is given by a divine gift, and the difference between contemplation, in the strict sense, *in via* and *in patria* is simply one of degree rather than kind.

There was for Berthold some doctrinal overlap between the articles of faith and *supersapientia*. Following Thomas of York, Berthold held that the Trinity was known to the philosophers reasoning to the *invisibilia Dei*; building on the *Clavis physicae*, he held that the general Resurrection accords with the laws of natural providence. This of course left out the doctrine of the Incarnation and the sacramental means by which the restoration achieved through Christ is communicated to individuals who are members of his body. As we will see in Chapter 5, Berthold's Eriugenian conception of human nature and the Fall, as set out in his commentary on the final propositions of the *Elementatio theologica*, brings the reader as close to the Incarnation of the Word as the order of natural providence allowed. Sacred history and matters relating to the fate of individuals would fall within the study of the order of voluntary providence, which presupposes and consummates the order of natural providence.⁸⁰ The precise character of this consummation can only be surmised in its barest outlines from the *Expositio*. What seems clear is that no proponent of the methodology of *gemina providentia* held that an individual, as an individual, could somehow stand outside the order of voluntary providence. Even though, as we have seen, the ontological constitution of angels embeds them in the order of natural providence, we must assume for Berthold that the study of the order of natural providence through the *Elementatio theologica* is something a person undertakes who is always embedded within the voluntary order.

The astonishing thing about Berthold's position is that the study of Platonic philosophy through a pagan text and the development of the habit of *supersapientia* makes a person more receptive to divine grace. This is possible because, as we will see in further detail in Part Two, Berthold understood deification to consist in the restoration of the human individual to the dignity that belongs to human nature (the microcosm), which is itself a recapitulation of the

80 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129F, p. 182, l. 299-302.

macrocosm. This pushes the dialectical relation between natural and voluntary providence in Berthold's doctrine of the *unum animae* even further: the highest freedom for the human individual consists in living in conformity with the human nature that always abides in the Word. In other words, it seems from the *Expositio* that the "consummation" of natural providence by voluntary providence is for the individual to become adequate to the hidden depth of its nature where God already dwells.

What difference remains between *supersapientia* and faith, then, must chiefly concern the means by which the perfecting habit dispossesses, unifies, and locates its subject in the first truth. Both would begin from the outside, both would begin with belief, and would both go beyond the mundane wisdom of the (Aristotelian) philosophers. One follows the arduous way of reasoning by the theorems of Platonic philosophy, which united knowledge and action, the study of nature and ascesis, to the apprehension of the primordial causes and the awareness of a more hidden depth in the soul. This enlarges the mind and prepares it to be elevated to a non-discursive but reflexive vision of those hidden mysteries through the acquired intellect (the *sublevatio mentis* that occurs through human industry and grace) and, within and beyond that, to an operative union with the plenitude of the Word (the *exultatio mentis*). As Tauler succinctly put it, to the extent that a person abandons themselves and turns to the ground of the soul, grace is born within them.⁸¹ Thoroughly in agreement with the spirit of Berthold's teaching, Tauler acknowledged that the pagans were familiar with this ground through their knowledge and ascesis, while we Christians, he lamented, are strangers to it.⁸² Tauler perfectly expressed the cultural ramifications of Berthold's extension of the dignity of faith to Platonic *supersapientia*. For Berthold, this was nothing else but the consequence of his realisation that the *De mystica theologia* of Dionysius and the *Tria opuscula*

81 John Tauler, *Predigt 60d* (Trinity Sunday), p. 300, l. 25-28: *Also verre sich der mensche in den grunt liesse und kerte, do würt die genode geborn und anders nüt eigentlich in der hoesten wisen. – Hievon sprach ein heidenscher meister Proculus [...]*.

82 Cf. John Tauler, *Predigt 6i* (Nativity of John the Baptist), p. 332, l. 16-21: *Der nu in sinen innigen grunt dicke kerte und dem heimlich were, dem würde manig edel blik von dem inwendigen grunde, der im noch klorer und offener were (das Got ist) denne sinen liplichen ougen die materieliche sunne. Disem grunde woren die heiden heimlich und versmochten ze mole zergengliche ding und giengen disem grunde nach.* ("Whoever turns often into his inner ground and becomes familiar with it, will receive many noble sightings of the inner ground, which will reveal to him that God exists in a clearer and more manifest way than the material sun is present to his bodily eyes. The pagans were familiar with this ground and they abstained from material things and pursued this ground.") For the rest of the passage, see Part One, n. 6, above.

of Proclus transmitted the same doctrine of divinising wisdom (*sapientia divinalis*) that proceeds “not according to ourselves, but our whole selves placed outside our whole selves and deified wholly”.

As for the way of faith, if the sermons of Tauler can still serve as a guide, it would follow the more immediate but no less difficult path of reaching the divinity of the incarnate Word, whose lower and higher powers were constantly tending to the Father,⁸³ by a dispossessive conformity to his humanity, by humility, and by the recognition of one’s own nothingness.⁸⁴ In both paths, we might say, the propensity of the old Adam for appropriation and familiarity is gradually curbed as one begins to live by God’s life (*dispensat mundum cum dis; vivit divina vita*), through whom the soul’s many works become a single work (*so ein guot werk mag heissen alle die manigvaltikeit*).

83 John Tauler, *Predigt 39* (Fifth Sunday after Trinity), ed. F. Vetter, p. 157, l. 13 – p. 158, l. 23: *Die edele minnekliche sele, unser herre Jhesus Christus, die was nach iren obersten kreften ane alle underlos gekert fürwürlchen in die gotheit, [...] und was denne aber als selig und gebruchlich als si ietzunt ist. [...] Die im aller gelichest nu nachvolgent an den goetlichen fürwürfen, in dem wirken und gebruchen ein wirt, die süllent im aller glichest her nach sin in weselichem gebruchen eweklichen. [...] Also tuot der inwendige verklerte mensche: der ist inwendig in sinem gebruchende, und mit dem liechte siner redelicheit so übersicht er gehelingen die uswendige krefte und berichtet die zuo irem würllichem amte, und inwendig ist er versunken und versmolzen in sinem gebruchlichen anhangende an Gotte, und blibt in siner friheit ungehindert sins werkes. Doch disen inwendigen dienen alle die uswendigen werk, das enkein so klein werk enist, es diene alles her zuo. So ein guot werk mag heissen alle die manigvaltikeit.* (“The noble and adorable soul, our Lord Jesus Christ, which was in its higher powers without interruption objectively turned toward the divinity, [...] was then as blessed and joyful then as it is now. [...] Those who now follow him in all things as closely as possible in their objective orientation to the divine, in whom to act and to enjoy are one – these people should be as close to him as possible in essential and eternal joy. [...] This is what an inwardly illumined person does: he is inward in his enjoyment, and with the light of his discernment he thus surveys at once the outer powers and directs each of them to their task, and inwardly he is engulfed and melted away in his joyful dependency on God, and remains in his freedom unhindered by his works. Rather, all these outward works serve the inward joy, such that there is no work so small that it does not contribute to all. Thus, one may call all the multiplicity one good work.”).

84 John Tauler, *Predigt 45* (Thirteenth Sunday after Trinity), ed. F. Vetter, p. 197, l. 1-2: *Das eine das ist das du bekennest din nicht, das din eigen ist, was du bist und wer du bist von dir selber.* (“The one thing necessary is that you recognise your nothing, which is proper to you, is what you are, and is who you are in yourself.”).

PART 2

Providere cum diis. *The Philosophical
Principles of the Expositio*

Wherever there is found a one in actuality, there providence is necessarily found.¹

As was clear from Berthold's sermon on Romans 1:20, the Hermetic conception of the macrocosm and microcosm, and their dynamic interrelation, was for him the framework within which the entirety of philosophical theology could be recapitulated. In what follows, this Hermetic motif will be used to frame a systematic overview of metaphysical and anthropological themes in Berthold's commentary on the *Elementatio theologica*. As Berthold interpreted Proclus within a commentary tradition deeply informed by the *Liber de causis*, it was held as a basic principle that a higher or more primary cause has a wider amplitude of causal influence than a lower or secondary cause (Propositions 56–57). Diversity or multiplicity arises as lower causes restrict or limit the causal influence of the higher: each lower cause presupposes both the power of the immediately prior cause and the effect or substratum that this prior cause has produced or elaborated (Propositions 71–72). In this way, complexity increases towards the centre of the cosmic order, where we find the human, who is “the horizon of simple and composite beings”.² The particularity of the human's place in the order, therefore, is not its status as an image of God (*imago Dei*), for the plethora of principles above it, and especially the primordial causes, are also *imagines Dei*.³ The human is set apart because it alone receives the gifts of all the gods.⁴ In this sense, one might call it an *imago deorum*, which amounts to saying that the human reflects within itself the totality of primordial causes in the divine Word. Because it concentrates within itself the diversity found in the cosmos, “composed from the primary parts of this greater world”, it is a *minor mundus* and, accordingly, is every creature (*omnis creatura*).⁵

1 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120H, p. 102, l. 372–373: *Necessario, ubicumque invenitur unum secundum actum, ibi et providere invenietur*.

2 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 72C, p. 39, l. 53–67.

3 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 32E, p. 211, l. 166 – p. 212, l. 201; 177C, p. 175, l. 81 – p. 176, l. 93. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.34.1–3, p. 172, l. 31 – p. 173, l. 51. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 93, a. 3.

4 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 162C, p. 18, l. 75–79.

5 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 164D, p. 34, l. 88–90.

Following this order, then, we will begin with the macrocosm, descending gradually to the human, who is “the most composite”, and finally consider the dynamic relation between the two worlds – that is, how individuals are made adequate to the abiding dignity of the microcosm, and how the microcosm in its entirety is harmonised with the macrocosm.⁶

6 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 59D, p. 168, l. 184-185; 58F, p. 161, l. 159-162.

Exstasis divini amoris

The Macrocosm

Broadly speaking, following Propositions 20–21, Berthold demarcated four internally ordered ranks (*maneries*) within Proclus' cosmology of natural providence: (1) that of the One, which includes the gods or primordial causes; (2) of Intellect, which includes everything beneath the primordial causes down to and excluding heavenly souls; (3) of Soul, including both heavenly ("whole") and human ("partial") souls; (4) and of Body or Nature, embracing the world of generation or becoming.¹ He largely but not exclusively interpreted the interactions within and between these levels through a theory of causality he adapted from Dietrich of Freiberg, who had distinguished between three kinds of causes (essential, substantial, and accidental).² Directly in line with Dietrich, Berthold also maintained that, in any of these three kinds of causes, one finds that an "interior transfusion" is the principle of any activity directed to the outside – this is true of all four *maneries*, of bodies as much as of the Trinity.³ But in a significant departure from Dietrich, Berthold maintained that only a Platonic perspective on causality and universality, which places the One and the Good at the foundation of the cosmos, can adequately account for this interior dynamism and the order that flows from it. Therefore, we must first grasp the fundamental distinction in Berthold's view between the Aristotelian and the Platonic understandings of first principles in metaphysics and theology, with which he began his remarks on Proposition 1 of the *Elementatio*. Upon that basis we shall find that the philosophy of the *Expositio* can indeed be regarded, as Loris Sturlese remarked, as a "thinking through" of Dietrich's metaphysics within the context of the *Elementatio theologica* and Berthold's understanding of the revision of first principles it required.⁴ The result of this, as we glimpsed in Berthold's subtle but decisive transformation of Dietrich's

1 On the political and literary origins of the term *maneries*, see D. Calma, "Maneries", in I. Atucha et al. (eds), *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach* (Porto: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2011), p. 433–444.

2 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 3.2.9.4, p. 90, l. 2 – p. 93, l. 104.

3 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 1.5.1 – 1.9.2, p. 139, l. 59 – p. 142, l. 93.

4 Sturlese, *Homo divinus*, p. 143: "Als Berthold die Entscheidung traf, die Philosophie Dietrichs in Form eines Prokloskommentars zu durchdenken [...]."

methodology and theology in the *Expositio tituli* and the *Praeambulum*, was a philosophy that placed the ecstatic before the substantial and the non-reflexive prior to reflexivity both in the cosmos and in the human soul.

1 Plato and Aristotle on the One and the Good

By the end of the *Praeambulum* it became clear that Berthold was less interested in drawing a boundary between Christianity and pagan Platonism than between the Platonic divine science and Aristotelian metaphysics. This contrast between the two traditions is carried on as a leitmotif of the *Expositio*.⁵ The problem, as we will now see, was not with Aristotle's philosophy as a whole, but rather with its account of the immaterial world.⁶ Berthold largely accepted Aristotelian natural philosophy as it applies to the world of becoming. But when the relationship of potency and act in that domain was extended to apply to the order of the separate substances, according to Berthold the consequences were dire: metaphysics became content to function as a sort of logical game that had jettisoned any attempt to reach the realities themselves or to make its practitioner disposed to receive them. For Berthold, realising Aristotle's ambitions for a science of the separate substances, whose transitory contemplation is the highest felicity in this life, required a revision in first principles.

At the outset of his commentary on Proposition 1 ("Every plurality in some way participates the One"),⁷ Berthold announced that Plato and Aristotle have opposed ways of accounting for the origin of distinction and plurality (*ratio distinguendi*).⁸ According to Berthold, Aristotle's mistake was not that "act separates and distinguishes" (*Metaphysics* VII.13, 1039a7) but the belief that this was universally the case. As the Dominican presented it, Aristotle arrived at this position through a thoroughly physicalist orientation to the question of substance: "in the foundation of nature, namely prime matter, nothing is

5 Passages may be classified according to the following themes: on abstract metaphysics and real divine science (1A, 11A); on abstract and separate universals (16D, 67C, 135K, and 136D-E); on the soul as self-moving (17A-B); on the ideas (177H and 178B).

6 For a similar criticism of Aristotle made by Proclus, unbeknownst to Berthold, see C. Steel, "Why Should We Prefer Plato's *Timaeus* to Aristotle's *Physics*? Proclus' Critique of Aristotle's Causal Explanation of the Physical World", in *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement* 78(2003), p. 175–187.

7 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 1, p. 3, l. 1: *Omnis multitudo participat aliquoties uno*.

8 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 72, l. 48 – p. 74, l. 125.

distinct". If act always determines potency, then prime matter must be "one by privation" of act.

In Berthold's reconstruction of the Aristotelian approach, we move from this assumption about act and potency to a metaphysical reduction to being as the first principle. Since act is in some sense "opposed" to potency, Berthold presented what he described as a summary of Aristotle's arguments in *Metaphysics* x about the most fundamental opposition or contradiction, from which arise the notions of act and potency as well as "one" and "many".⁹ His tacit and direct source here was Dietrich of Freiberg's *De natura contrariorum*, which used Aristotle's text extensively to explain the nature of contraries that are the basis of physical change in the elements apprehended by our senses.¹⁰

According to Aristotle, the opposition of potency and act is logically dependent on the more fundamental opposition of privation and positive possession (*privatio et habitus*). To understand what Berthold meant by this, we can look more closely at Dietrich's analysis of Aristotle's arguments.¹¹ Contraries are what differ maximally within a genus, which is "the common nature" that the notion of contrariety presupposes as the basis for comparison. While a genus as a common nature implies some kind of formal content, it is also capable of further determination by differentiae that are more formal than it; the genus thus becomes "the subject", broadly speaking, of affirmation and negation. The genus in this perspective is an aptitude for either affirmation or negation; or, in other words, it is what positively relates to the common term in question (*habitus*) or what is remote from it (*privatio*). This is what Berthold assumed when he wrote that this "first contrariety" of privation and *habitus* has "originated from the first opposition as such" which (following Dietrich) he identified as contradiction (*contradictio*) or affirmation and negation in a given subject. "Contradiction" is more absolute than "contrariety" because the latter admits of degrees and intermediary states, and these presuppose contradiction as their measure. With contradiction, then, we arrive at the "first and original reason of every distinction", namely, "the contradictory opposition of being to non-being as such". Tellingly, Berthold did not include the portion of Dietrich's argument emphasising that affirmation and negation must not be understood in a strictly propositional or logical sense, but as "real, simple intentions concerning being" – for Dietrich, only in this way can they give rise to the real

9 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 73, l. 88–89.

10 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De natura contrariorum*, 1.1, p. 83, l. 2–3: *Considerandum de vocatis elementis, inquantum invenitur in eis principium transmutationis physicae [...]*.

11 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De natura contrariorum*, 2.1–3.5, p. 83, l. 12 – p. 85, l. 91.

intentions of “one” and “many”.¹² But this was not the Aristotle Berthold was resisting.

Berthold continued to rely on Dietrich to explain how, for Aristotle, the notions of “one” and “many” are “the primary modes of being” deduced from the absolute opposition (that is, the contradiction of affirmation and negation or of being and non-being). The notion of “one” (*ratio unius*) removes the distinction (*removetur distinctio*) that occurs between being and non-being as such, since what is one is simultaneously “indistinct in itself and distinct from anything else”.¹³ That is, what is indistinct in itself contains no division or distance (*remotio*). In this sense the distinction that is effected by the opposition of being and non-being is removed or negated. But when the *ratio unius* is presupposed and the distinction of affirmation and negation is posited (*ponitur distinctio*), then we have the notion of “many” (*ratio multi*). For “many” implies that there is one thing and another thing, and that this one is not that one.

Again following Dietrich, Berthold clarified that the opposition of affirmation and negation is found in every intention of being. Therefore, it is not “exceeded by being itself” but is coterminous with it, for being is not a genus. So too the first modes that arise from the opposition of “one” and “many” do not divide any “common intention” but are “a simple enumeration of beings”. This implies that the amplitude of the *ratio unius* is coextensive to that of the *ratio entis*. However, in any determinate genus of being, the modes that arise from the opposition of privation and *habitus* are themselves determinate. Three examples of this are given by Berthold in 1A. (1) If the formal intention of the genus is something analogically common, as “healthy” is said of an animal and of urine, then we speak of the determinate modes of identity and diversity (*diversitas*). Dietrich had argued that this term “diversity” is appropriate because, in the case of analogical commonality, the intention of being is not truly one (*non tamen vere una*), since the terms do not really and truly share the common nature.¹⁴ (2) If the formal intention of the genus is univocally common, then we have a clear case of the privation and *habitus* of a common nature, whose modes are identity and “difference” (*differentia*). For example, plants and animals univocally share the identical genus of “animated body”

12 Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De natura contrariorum*, 13.1, p. 93, l. 47–55. Cf. V. Decaix, “Les transcendants et l’un. Dietrich de Freiberg à l’école de Thomas d’Aquin”, in *Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 16(2013), p. 146–162, at p. 154–160, on the similarities of Dietrich’s derivation of the notion of “one” to the approach taken by Aquinas.

13 Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De natura contrariorum*, 16.2, p. 95, l. 30–35.

14 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De natura contrariorum*, 19.2–20.1, p. 97, l. 105 – p. 98, l. 10.

but “differ” in species.¹⁵ (3) Finally, if privation is somehow intrinsic to one pair of the opposition, as the colour black is inherently the privation of the colour white, then we speak of the determinate modes of “likeness” and “contrariety” (*similitudo, contrarietas*).¹⁶

Berthold included these examples of determinate genera and their modes because they provided a catalogue of the kinds of unity and plurality that populate a world in which act or *habitus* always determines potency. Plato, however, followed another path (*via*) concerning the origin of plurality:

Although [Plato] conceded that distinction is the formal cause of plurality, yet according to him act only distinguishes in material things, and not everywhere, that is, not in the entire universe of things.¹⁷

In material things, it is indeed the case that what is more common – either in reality (prime matter) or in reason, whether it be analogical (being as such) or univocal – is more potential and is distinguished or “determined” by act and specific differentiae. But it is otherwise in the immaterial order, where the more common or “more universal” is more actual (*activius*); here, we are in the domain of the universality of separation (*universalitas separationis*) or the theological universal (*universale theologicum*), while regarding material things we speak only of the universality of predication (*universalitas praedicationis*) or the logical universal (*universale logicum*).

This is the fulcrum around which the discord of Plato and Aristotle turns in the *Expositio*. Berthold explained that Aristotle, failing to observe this distinction of universality, understood being (*ens*) as a transcendental (*transcendens*) and “the first of all intentions”, which does not have existence outside the soul (*non habens esse in rerum natura extra animam*). He reached the priority of *ens* by a logical abstraction according to the dictates of the universality of predication. Now, a transcendental is an intention that is not confined to a particular genus or category.¹⁸ As we have seen, since the notions of “one” and “many” are not confined to any determinate genus, they too for Aristotle must be transcendentals, which do not exist outside the soul (*transcendentia, quarum esse etiam*

15 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De natura contrariorum*, 21.1–23.2, p. 98, l. 16 – p. 99, l. 42.

16 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De natura contrariorum*, 24.1–3, p. 99, l. 50 – p. 100, l. 71.

17 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 73, l. 90–94: *Plato vero alia via incedit circa multitudinis originem, qui, licet concedat distinctionem esse formalem causam multitudinis, tamen actus secundum eum non ubique, hoc est in tota rerum universitate, distinguit nisi in solis materialibus.*

18 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11A, p. 185, l. 24–25; 136E, p. 7, l. 140 – p. 8, l. 161.

non est extra animam). The entire deduction of the modes of the opposition of affirmation and negation – metaphysics as the science of being and its properties – was thus regarded by Berthold as a purely logical exercise, which remains valid if its application is restricted to those boundaries. For Berthold, unlike for Dietrich, Aristotle's deduction in *Metaphysics* x tells us nothing about the real origin of diversity. This is why it was necessary to follow Plato's more counter-intuitive approach. As Eustratius reported, Plato posited the ineffable Good as the common cause of all things, prior to the difference of being and non-being (*super ens et non ens*). Distinction arises from the fact that what comes from the principle (*principiatum*) is less actual than its source, and to that extent it falls short (*recessum*) of the first principle as such.¹⁹

In Proposition 11 (“All beings proceed from one first cause”),²⁰ we find a convergent account of the Aristotelian approach to first principles. This time the transcendentals were more directly Berthold's focus. According to Berthold, Aristotle held that being (*ens*) is “the first and most formal of all intentions” because it is the last in “resolution”.²¹ As Wouter Goris has shown, Berthold's notion of the resolution to *ens* moved through two levels: the first followed the argument of the *Posterior Analytics* to reach the principle of non-contradiction, and another taken from Avicenna that led to the non-complex first principle of knowing.²² As in Proposition 1, Berthold aimed to prove that Aristotle arrived to the primacy of *ens* through a reflection on the first principles of logical analysis, always with the assumption that act determines potency. With this logical primacy of being, the other transcendentals, “one, good, true, thing, and something” are seen further determinations of or additions to the notion of *ens*. These additions, Berthold never tired of repeating, are purely rational and have their reality only in the understanding.

Berthold then drew the critical conclusion that haunts Aristotle throughout the *Expositio*, turning against him the words of Averroes' commentary on

19 A similar argument about act and potency, which used the language of *accessus* and *recessus* and appealed explicitly to the *Elementatio theologica*, was made by Godfrey of Fontaines in favour of the real identity of essence and existence in the separate substances. See Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, p. 90–97.

20 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 11, p. 8, l. 1: *Omnia entia procedunt ab una causa prima*.

21 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11A, p. 185, l. 28 – p. 186, l. 53. This terminology derived from Dietrich: *De ente et essentia*, ed. R. Imbach, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 1.2.2, p. 28, l. 78–78; id., *De natura contrariorum*, 15.1, p. 94, l. 3–4; id., *De quidditatibus entium*, 1.3, p. 99, l. 12–13; id., *De origine rerum praedicamentalium*, 1.7, p. 139, l. 75–76.

22 W. Goris, “Das Gute als Ersterkanntes bei Berthold von Moosburg”, in W. Goris (ed.), *Die Metaphysik und das Gute. Aufsätze zu ihrem Verhältnis in Antike und Mittelalter*, Jan A. Aertsen zu Ehren (Leuven: Peeters, 1999), p. 139–172, at p. 151–156.

Metaphysics x: “being” and “one” are “universal categories which do not have being outside the soul”.²³ In the judgement of Jan Aertsen, this is the most remarkable aspect of Berthold’s account of Aristotle.²⁴ When confronted with Aristotle’s explicit declaration that “good” and “bad” are in things (*bonum et malum sunt in rebus*), Berthold conceded that, while this is true of things subjectively (*subiective*), the transcendental notions of “good” and “bad” themselves for Aristotle still exist only in the soul as concepts (*conceptibiliter sunt in anima*). What he likely meant was that “good” and “bad” are attributes that “subjectively” presuppose something already constituted in actual being. Berthold perhaps had in mind *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.6, where Aristotle rejected the existence of any ideal Good that would be distinct from its different meanings in the various genera of being; any universal Good apart from these instances could only be an abstraction. Indeed, Berthold immediately cited Eustratius’ criticism of this argument as “sophistic”, given that Aristotle himself affirmed at the beginning of the *Ethics* that “the Good is what all things desire”.²⁵ For Dionysius, as Berthold noted, this universal desire is precisely one of the reasons the Good should be placed beyond the difference of being and non-being, because it extends its causal power to both what is and what is not.²⁶

Therefore, according to Berthold, when Proclus stated in Proposition 11 that being is the immediate effect of the first cause, he meant something very different from Aristotle, for Proclus has understood being as being (*ens in eo, quod ens*) in the “Platonic” way. In Berthold’s view, Aristotle worked with two meanings of *ens*. It either referred to being in its generality, insofar as it abstracts both from motion and change (physical being) and from mathematical being (this is what Aristotle studied in the *Metaphysics*) or it referred to being as it is constituted from its intrinsic principles, that is, after one has removed the extrinsic principles of efficient and final causality from one’s consideration of being (this is what Aristotle studied in *Metaphysics* XII, where he focused only on the intrinsic principles of matter and form in substance).²⁷ The Platonists, however, gave “being as being” three additional senses, each of which referred

23 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 77, l. 218-19: *Ens et unum praedicamenta universalis sunt, quae non habent esse extra animam*.

24 Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, p. 548.

25 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11A, p. 187, l. 68-80.

26 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11A, p. 187, l. 81-86.

27 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11B, p. 188, l. 100-117: [...] *Et secundum hanc generaliore[m] entis rationem Aristoteles prosequitur de ipso in sua Metaphysica. [...] Et istum modum entis ponit Aristoteles XII Metaphysicae, ubi etiam dicit Commentator, quod res habet rationem entis in eo, quod ens, inquantum subsistit ex his intrinsecis suis principiis, scilicet materia et forma*.

to the ordered series of real intentions that are found in the universe. In the broadest sense, it refers to the entire order of being and the higher principles that constitute it (goodness and infinity); more strictly, it refers to the primordial cause of being; finally, most strictly, it refers to anything contained within the order generated by that primordial cause.²⁸ According to Berthold, Proposition 11 could be interpreted relative to all three Platonic senses of “being as being”, but more properly it should be understood to the final sense. Either way, Proclus was describing being as it really is in the nature of things, where what is more universal in its influence or more indeterminate is prior to what is more determinate or less universal. By indicating a more adequate interpretation of the proposition, in which the phrase “from one first cause” (*ab una prima causa*) would refer to the order of beings descending from the primordial cause of being, Berthold was signalling how thoroughly Proclus differed from the later standpoint of the *Liber de causis* and its unequivocal affirmation that the first of created things is being (Proposition 4: *prima rerum creatarum est esse et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud*).

For the remainder of the *Expositio*, whenever Berthold explicitly compared Plato and Aristotle, it was most frequently on the question of abstraction and separation or, in other words, on the logical universality of predication and the theological universality of separation (see, e.g., 16D, 67C, 135K, and 136D-E). Berthold’s source for this distinction once again was Dietrich of Freiberg, who maintained that “abstraction is the work of reason” but “separation is the work of nature”.²⁹ But with Berthold, especially owing to his interpretation of Dionysius’ *De mystica theologia* through Proclus, this distinction took on a soteriological valence entirely absent in Dietrich. As Berthold has presented it, the metaphysics of being is founded on a physicalist approach to the relation of act and potency that ultimately accounts for the origin of diversity through a merely logical reflection: in the physical world, act determines potency; in metaphysics, the most formal intentions and the categories of our understanding are merely notional additions to being. The kinds of plurality we are left with are catalogued only according to the different kinds of predication.

To reason only according to logical universals was, therefore, to remain in the familiar order of what is “according to us”. From this point of view, lurking behind the metaphysics of being is the spectre of solipsism. The assumption was never far from Berthold’s mind that Proclus and Dionysius were talking

28 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11B-C, p. 188, l. 118 – p. 189, l. 166.

29 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De animatione caeli*, 36.1, p. 42, l. 64-67.

about the same thing when Proclus subordinated Aristotle to Plato while outlining the hierarchy of modes of cognition in *De providentia et fato*, and when Dionysius introduced the mode of mystical theology:

Indeed, these cognitive principles relate only to beings, although according to different reasons. However, many divine things are above being. For this reason, in chapter 1 of the *Mystical Theology*, [Dionysius] calls ‘unlearned’ those ‘who are sealed off in beings and believe that there is nothing supersubstantially beyond beings, but they presume to know, with that cognition that is according to themselves, him, who makes the shadows his hiding place’. Consequently, it is impossible that we should receive those things that are above us according to our ownness [*iuxta proprietatem nostram*] and thus compare things divine with a reason that has been reared on the senses.³⁰

The Platonists attend to the things established in nature (*res rata in natura*) rather than logical categories (*esse in anima*).³¹ Their orientation to reality is, in other words, primarily an ecstatic one. The fundamental boundary between doing theology “according to ourselves” and “not according to ourselves” corresponded to the difference between logical and theological universals. To think the immaterial, the categories of thinking that are at home in the physical world must be reversed. But it is important to bear in mind that, for all of this, Berthold did not denigrate the material world or natural philosophy. The invisible things of God are always sought first of all through the creation of the world, whether the world is regarded as an obscure “vestige” of them or a more transparent “sign”. It would be better to say that, for Berthold, Aristotle’s natural philosophy would in fact be better served by grounding it in the divine science of the Good.

Here Berthold owed something further to Dionysius, and his notion that the divine light or “thearchic ray” reaches the human mind through

30 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 64, l. 395 – p. 65, l. 421: *Verum quia ista principia cognitiva non sunt nisi entium, licet secundum diversas rationes, pleraque autem divinorum sunt superentia [...] unde et in Mystica theologia cap. 1 indoctos vocat, ‘qui in existentibus sunt firmati nihil super existentia supersubstantialiter esse opinantes, sed putantes scire ea, quae secundum ipsos, cognitione eum, qui ponit tenebras latibulum suum’. Cum ergo hoc sit impossibile, scilicet quod iuxta proprietatem nostram ea, quae sunt super nos, accipiamus et hoc comparantes divina rationi connutritae sensibus.* Cf. *Expositio*, 71D, p. 35, l. 123–127, cited above in Introduction, section 3, n. 150.

31 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 74, l. 106–109; 11A, p. 186, l. 54–55; 16D, p. 28, l. 143; 51A, p. 113, l. 19; 64D, p. 196, l. 120.

the material world precisely to lure it outside itself. When commenting on what Dionysius meant when he says that the divine science proceeds “not according to ourselves”, Berthold cited this famous dictum from *De caelesti hierarchia*:

It is impossible for the thearchic ray to illumine us from above unless it envelops itself, in order to elevate us, with various sacred veils that are according to us [*quae sunt secundum nos*], arranged naturally and familiarly by the paternal providence.³²

These veils include the spectacles (*theorias*) spoken of by two commentators on Dionysius, John the Scot and John the Saracen. These are summoners (*appellantes*), beckoning to the created intellect through “lights” scattered in creatures in the mode of “vestiges, images, and signs” (as in the oblique and the direct motions) to draw it to God. The final ascent to God, however, as Berthold made clear by turning from this tacit citation of Albert’s *Summa theologiae* to the *De mystica theologia* itself, is only attained by those who go beyond these veils and theophanies into the divine darkness.³³ This, for Berthold, is God’s way of drawing the soul out of the solipsism to which it so instinctively inclines, and that has expressed itself detrimentally in the metaphysics of being. Berthold’s interpretation of Proposition 1 thus was a first and decisive indicator of the path for the desirous soul to follow through the veils.

32 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 16, p. 25, l. 660–664: *Et notandum, quod [Dionysius] dicit ‘non secundum nos’ etc. (hoc est in quantum humani), quia ‘neque possibile est aliter nobis supersplendere thearchicum radium nisi varietate sanctorum velaminum sursum active circumvelantur et his, quae sunt secundum nos, providentia paterna connaturaliter et familiariter apparantur’*. Cf. Dionysius, *De caelesti hierarchia*, 1.2, 121B–C.

33 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 16, p. 25, l. 671–674: *‘solum non velate et vere apparet’ omnia transcendentibus et introeuntibus caliginem*. In this respect, Berthold anticipated the interpretation of Dionysius we find in authors like Denys the Carthusian (d. 1471), who criticised earlier commentators, including Aquinas, for holding too narrowly to the principle that God only appears to the created intellect in veils and for passing over precisely these passages from *De mystica theologia*. See K. Emery, “*Sapientissimus Aristoteles and Theologicissimus Dionysius*.” The Reading of Aristotle and the Understanding of Nature in Denys the Carthusian”, in A. Speer, A. Zimmermann (eds), *Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992), p. 572–606, at p. 579–590; id., “A Complete Reception of the Latin *Corpus Dionysiacum*. The Commentaries of Denys the Carthusian”, T. Boiadjev, G. Kapriev, A. Speer (eds), *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), p. 197–247, at p. 229–231.

2 Creation

The former [existence] is for the sake of the latter [order], because an isolated essence does not properly have the notion of 'good' unless it is ordered.³⁴

Therefore, goodness is the essential mode or intention of any given thing.³⁵

Berthold often illustrated the most fundamental principles of Proclus' philosophy using analogies from the physical world. For him it seems that the fundamental metaphysical registers of unity and goodness could each be illustrated through a specific metaphor or image, and each image required the other to be properly understood. In the register of unity, we can see that Berthold preferred the analogies of the containment of all numbers in the monad or of all radii of a circle in its centre.³⁶ In the register of goodness, he used the analogy of the spontaneous generative activity of the sun as the clearest example of the self-diffusivity of the Good, in its action that is prior to the finite division of choice and necessity.³⁷ One image without the other would give the impression of either stasis (numerical relations without dynamism) or chaos (generative power without order). Therefore, it was fitting that in the commentary on Proposition 30 ("Everything that is produced immediately from another, remains in the producer and proceeds from it"),³⁸ which in effect summarised the entire process of procession and return, the two analogies were combined in Berthold's only explicit citation of Eriugena's *Homilia* on the Prologue

34 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 25H, p. 148, l. 389-394: *Quod omne perfectum citra primum agat per intentionem diffundendi bonitatem suam et sic procedat in generationem secundum ultimum potentiae suae, patet ex eo, quod bonum in recipiente est duplex, scilicet absolutum, quod est esse, et respectivum sive bonum in ordine. Et primum est propter secundum, quia absoluta essentia non habet rationem boni proprie, nisi prout est ordinata.*

35 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7A, p. 141, l. 96: *Bonitas igitur est uniuscuiusque rei essentialis modus sive intentio.*

36 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1F, p. 79, l. 296 – p. 80, l. 308; 2A, p. 82, l. 34 – p. 83, l. 35; 2C, p. 86, l. 144-145; 3A, p. 92, l. 27 – p. 93, l. 32; 9E, p. 173, l. 230-232.

37 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5C, p. 119, l. 222-224; 8E, p. 163, l. 224-236; 18A, p. 44, l. 26-29; 18B, p. 47, l. 135 – p. 48, l. 152; 18D, p. 52, l. 297 – p. 53, l. 323; 22A, p. 102, l. 140-145; 23E, p. 119, l. 250-256; 25I, p. 149, l. 436 – p. 150, l. 440; 152C, p. 142, l. 70. On this conception of freedom in Berthold, as he extracted it and amplified it from Albert the Great and Ulrich of Strassburg, see W. Goris, "Metaphysical Freedom. From Albert the Great to Berthold of Moosburg", forthcoming.

38 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 30, p. 20, l. 1-2: *Omne quod ab aliquo producitur immediate manet in producente et procedit ab ipso.*

of John (which he attributed to Origen).³⁹ When employing either image, Berthold would often introduce it as an “elegant”, “careful”, or “beautiful” illustration of a metaphysical argument.⁴⁰ He of course found the comparison of God to the sun in numerous sources including Dionysius, Proclus, Avicenna, Albert the Great, and Ulrich of Strassburg, and although he was not familiar with Plato’s famous analogies of the Sun, Line, and Cave in the *Republic*, he nevertheless recognised the principle that “the Good is diffusive of itself and being” had its origin in Plato, who wrote in the *Timaeus* that “jealousy is far removed from what is best” (*ab optimo porro invidia longe relegata est*) – this principle, he maintained, “must be pondered with diligence”.⁴¹

Berthold also found it necessary to use both images in his commentary to Proposition 125 on the spontaneous causal activity of the gods:

Every god, from wherever it begins to show itself in an order, proceeds through all secondaries, and indeed always multiplies and distributes its outflowings, but always retains the characteristic of its own hypostasis.⁴²

Evidently the term that stood out to him here was *emicare*, “to appear suddenly” or “to break forth”, since he devoted the entire discussion of the *suppositum* (the authoritative, doctrinal background presupposed by Proclus) to “the conditions of light” and how “these are found in the divinising nature”.⁴³ He argued that the three conditions of light were described in the analogy of the sun from Dionysius. (1) Light acts through its essence: “our sun does not reason

39 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 30D, p. 196, l. 206-215: ‘*Conspice, quomodo omnium rerum, quas mundi huius sensibilis globositas comprehendit, causae simul et uniformiter in isto sole, qui est maximum mundi luminare, subsistunt, quomodo numerositas herbarum et fructuum in singulis seminibus simul continentur, quomodo multiplices rerum in arte artificis unum sunt et in animo disponentis vivunt, quomodo infinitus linearum numerus in uno puncto unum subsistit! Et huiusmodi naturalia perspice exempla, ex quibus vel physicae theoriae pennis poteris arcana verbi mentis acie inspicere et, quantum datur humanis rationibus, videre, quomodo omnia, quae per verbum facta sunt, in ipso vivunt et facta sunt!*’ This is a collection of phrases from chapters 9 and 10 of the *Homily*.

40 For example, beside the text of Proclus’ *De decem dubitationibus* cited at *Expositio*, 122F, p. 119, l. 175-180 in MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 50rb, Berthold has written *puta pulchrum exemplum*.

41 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7A, p. 139, l. 17-23; 13B, p. 212, l. 111-112.

42 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 125, p. 63, l. 1-4: *Omnis deus, a quocumque inceperit ordine emicare se ipsum, procedit per omnia secunda, semper quidem plurificans suas derivationes et partiens, servans autem proprietatem proprie ypostaseos*.

43 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 125, p. 147, l. 11-13.

or choose” but shines by virtue of its very being. (2) Light shines universally: “it illumines all things capable of participating its lights”, each according to their capacity. (3) Light shines unceasingly.⁴⁴

These were not only metaphors for Berthold, who held that there was a deeper continuity between the laws describing the diffusion of physical light and the principles of the diffusion of the highest Good. As he noted here, since every essence flowing into another (*influens in aliam*) either is light or has the nature of light, and since the Good is self-diffusive, “the Good therefore is light or has the nature or characteristic of light”.⁴⁵ We are then given several passages from Dionysius where the Good is likened to the sun, whose causal activity Berthold described as a *exseritio*, a “revealing” or a “stretching-forth”.⁴⁶ The light of the Good redounds through the primordial causes or gods, the rays of goodness (*radii bonitatis*), who imitate its causal activity within their own domains.

This account of divine diffusion and manifestation was then balanced in Proposition 125 by a discussion of the gods’ remaining.⁴⁷ Here Berthold used metaphors from the *Clavis physicae* to illustrate his point: the first causes in themselves are one and are not separated from one another, but they are divided in their effects; “just as in the monad all numbers are one [and] simple”, so all the primordial causes are one individual in the divine Word.⁴⁸ We should not marvel, the *Clavis* continued, that this escapes the finest point of our mind (*mentis nostrae aciem fugiat*) which is already overwhelmed by instances of this in the concentrated and generative power of seeds, which burst forth into variegated forms, colours, and fragrances.

Elsewhere, following the same lead from the *Clavis*, Berthold extended this principle about the ineffable abundance found among things in his comments to Proposition 121 (“Everything that is divine has an essence that is goodness, a unifical potency, and a cognition hidden and incomprehensible to all

44 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 125A, p. 147, l. 16 – p. 148, l. 31. Cf. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.1 and 4.4.

45 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 125B-C, p. 148, l. 33 – p. 149, l. 78.

46 The verbal form of this noun (*exsero*, *exserere*) was used in a similar context by Albert the Great. See, for example, Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. 1, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 27, l. 22-58. It was taken up by Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 1-2,7*, ed. S. Pieperhoff (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), lib. IV, tr. 1, c. 5 (5), p. 28, l. 42-50.

47 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 125D-F, p. 149, l. 83 – p. 152, l. 176.

48 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 125F, p. 152, l. 164-173, cited Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 5.6 for the same analogy.

secondaries altogether”),⁴⁹ to declare that any essence (*usia*), creaturely or divine, is incomprehensible:

In all things that exist, *usia* is altogether incomprehensible in itself, not only to sense, but even to intellect. ‘For just as God, as he is in himself beyond every creature, is not comprehended by intellect, so likewise the creature in its hidden depths is known to be incomprehensible. Whatever is perceived by bodily sense or considered by intellect in any creature is nothing other than some accident of some incomprehensible essence. What is known through quality, or quantity, or form, or matter, or any accident is not what it is, but that it is.’⁵⁰

Berthold did not explain precisely how he interpreted the *Clavis* on this point, though a comparison with other passages in the *Expositio* can offer some further clarification. To be sure, he did not view it within the broadly Aristotelian perspective of the ten categories, even though these were integral to Eriugena’s original argument in *Periphyseon* I and remained central to the *Clavis*. Rather, it seems likely that Berthold would have understood this assertion within the context of his doctrine of participation, according to which the essences of creatures are constituted by different formal intentions.⁵¹ Of these intentions, he identified goodness or unity as the deepest or most essential mode.⁵² It is

49 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 121, p. 60, l. 1-3: *Omne divinum existentiam* [Berthold: *essentiam*] *quidem habet bonitatem, potentiam autem unialem et cognitionem occultam et incomprehensibilem omnibus simul secundis.*

50 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 121E, p. 107, l. 68-75, citing Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, c. 6, p. 5, l. 12 – p. 6, l. 19: *Usia in omnibus, quae sunt, omnino per se ipsam incomprehensibilis est non solum sensu, sed etiam intellectu. ‘Quia sicut Deus ultra omnem creaturam in se ipso nullo intellectu comprehenditur, ita etiam in secretis suis creatura incomprehensibilis cognoscitur. Quidquid autem in omni creatura vel sensu corporeo percipitur vel intellectu consideratur, nihil est aliud nisi quoddam accidens unicuique incomprehensibili essentiae, nam aut per qualitatem aut quantitatem aut formam aut materiam vel quodlibet accidens cognoscitur, non quid est, sed quia est.’*

51 See the centrality of goodness in the citations of the *Clavis* at Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2A, p. 82, l. 12 – p. 83, l. 38. The notion that the essence of the first cause is diffused intentionally (*intentionaliter*) through the universe likely came to Berthold through Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 79.3, p. 242, l. 36-46. See 4.5, n. 268, below.

52 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 3D, p. 97, l. 192-198: *ea, quae fiunt unum per creationem, sic fiunt unum, ita, quod ipsum fieri unum est eis esse unum, cum in quantum huiusmodi sint unum tantum, quod est uniuscuiusque eorum essentia*; 5B, p. 118, l. 190-192: *licet, ut solum a primo procedunt, stent sub unitate intentionis (scilicet boni), quae etiam est cuiuslibet essentia*; 7A, p. 141, l. 70-73 and p. 143, l. 170-171.

as good or one that a creature is related immediately to the creative activity of God.

To understand this point, we may begin by looking at his comments on Proposition 7 (“All that is productive of another is greater than the nature of that, which is produced”),⁵³ which Berthold regarded as “almost the foundation of the whole edifice of this science”.⁵⁴ Its proof must establish that what is produced depends on the producer not only for its existence but also for whatever causal power it has. The celebrated maxim of Dionysius, which Berthold traced to the *Timaeus*, served that purpose well. The Good is not only diffusive of existence (*esse*) but also itself (*sui*) – in other words, the Good communicates the very power of self-diffusivity. Explicating the notion of “good” (*ratio boni*) any further was, however, no straightforward matter. Since it cannot be defined through anything prior to itself, it must be known through its effects or proper modes.⁵⁵ Even the name “the Good” does not capture its quiddity, if it even has one, but rather reflects how we bless (*sanctificamus*) the origin of all with the noblest name at our disposal. Berthold’s description, rather than definition, of the Good was this:

‘Good’ is the essence of any given thing according to the reason by which it primarily subsists formally from the universally first cause, [subsisting] either as such or according to some determinate mode participated from that, which subsists as such.⁵⁶

Berthold glossed this description extensively.⁵⁷ By “the essence of any given thing”, he had in mind the arguments made by Dionysius, that if you remove the good from something, you remove the thing altogether. According to the Areopagite, even privation and non-existence depend upon the Good. In this respect, “good” is the most formal or essential aspect of a thing because all other determinations presuppose it,⁵⁸ just as “being” was regarded as fundamental

53 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 7, p. 6, l. 1-2: *Omne productivum alterius melius est quam natura eius quod producitur.*

54 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7A, p. 139, l. 9-10.

55 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7A, p. 140, l. 40 – p. 141, l. 69.

56 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7A, p. 141, l. 70-73: *bonum est uniuscuiusque rei essentia secundum eam rationem, qua primo formaliter a causa universaliter prima subsistit vel simpliciter vel secundum aliquem determinatum modum participatum ex eo, quod subsistit simpliciter.*

57 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7A, p. 141, l. 74 – p. 143, l. 167.

58 A parallel argument at *Expositio*, 21D, p. 84, l. 295-312, makes it clear that here he was extending Averroes’ critique of Avicenna, who held that a thing is one by an addition to its common nature. “One” and “good”, Averroes argued, are not accidental to a thing.

from the standpoint of the universality of predication. This priority of “good” is not so clear if we take as our starting point a given object of everyday experience, in which the notions of “being”, “one”, and “good” indeed seem to coincide. But if we consider these notions “absolutely” or in themselves, according to Berthold, then we see that “good”, in its orientation to the final cause or end as intended by the principle, can precede the subject in which it inheres.⁵⁹ Berthold at this stage would invoke the creative etymology of *bonitas* as a derivation from the Greek *boo-boas*, meaning, “I call out, you call out” (*clamo-clamas*).⁶⁰ The Good calls all things immediately into being. Where there are necessarily lower traces of this causality that are unable to subsist as good *simpliciter* (as only the gods or primordial causes can), the Good determines or contracts its causal power through these gods or primordial causes, which are nearer to it, in order to strengthen the lower to realise its perfection.

Although we find ourselves at metaphysical bedrock of the *Expositio* and can only rely on descriptions and metaphors instead of precise definitions, it is important nevertheless to be as clear as possible about what Berthold was aiming for. It was not, as these statements from Dionysius initially could be taken to imply, that the creative activity of the Good was responsible for a thing’s potential for existence. According to Berthold, that very potentiality for existence is a function of the subsequent limitation of the causality of the Good through the primordial cause of power (*virtus*) or infinity (*infinitas*), which is the principle immediately subordinate to the Good.⁶¹ Even the orientation toward existence presupposes a more spontaneous creative activity. One way to clarify this difficult notion is to consider that the effect of the primordial cause of power or infinity, for Berthold, is a *determinate* potentiality for subsistence. What this presupposes is the more holistic causality of the Good, which is perhaps better understood as providing the relational context or the dynamic universal structure within which the essence will exercise its function.⁶² A thing exists for the sake of its function, which is its perfection.⁶³

59 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7A, p. 141, l. 97 – p. 142, l. 133.

60 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7B, p. 146, l. 276–282. On the use of this etymology in Eriugena, Albert the Great, and Ulrich of Strassburg, see De Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique*, p. 186–187.

61 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 3B, p. 94, l. 77–92. See 4.4, n. 193, below.

62 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7A, p. 144, l. 181–182: *boni determinatio non est aliud nisi boni diversa in diversis participatio*.

63 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 13F, p. 218, l. 307–312. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, I.1.1, p. 137, l. 3–6: *Sicut dicit Philosophus in II De caelo et mundo, unaquaeque res est propter suam propriam operationem. Cuius dicti ratio est, quia propria operatio est pertinens ad perfectionem rei et habet rationem boni et finis, propter quem res est, sine quo omnis res esset frustra*.

But this perfection is not entirely self-serving. Berthold gave a strong interpretation of Dietrich of Freiberg's declaration that a separated and isolated essence (*absoluta essentia*) does not have the notion of the good (*ratio boni*), but only insofar as it is ordered to something outside itself.⁶⁴ In this view, at the level of the singular or the individual, relationality precedes substantiality; the totality is prior, and the parts have their function and possibility only with respect to the whole.

We have seen already how, in Berthold's view, Plato's theorems direct the soul outside itself to the things in nature (*res rata in natura*) and away from the abstractions that have their reality only in the soul (*esse in anima*) that the mind exclusively clings to so long as it is "sealed off in beings". The progress of intellectual perfection culminates in the non-discursive and operative union with the One. We glimpse now, in Berthold's commentaries on Propositions 1 and 7, how the habit of *supersapientia* is already underway as one sets out along the oblique motion from rational starting points that are oriented toward the One and the Good. That is, the soul's adjustment of its thinking to the realities outside it, even at these initial stages, anticipates that divinising end precisely because it mirrors the most fundamental disposition of the One or Good itself. In Proposition 1, when Berthold first explained the Platonic perspective on the origin of plurality, he stated that it must be sought ultimately with reference to "the disposition of the first cause" that led it to produce.⁶⁵ For this he turned directly to Dionysius: the first cause is drawn out of itself by "the ecstasy of divine love" (*exstasis divini amoris*), which disposes the cause to communicate not just one but all possible modes of its goodness.⁶⁶ This generative ecstasy at the ground of reality "necessarily" institutes a plurality, because only diverse gradations of unity and goodness are "the perfect demonstration of wisdom". Similarly, in Proposition 7, Berthold argued that his description of goodness as the essential mode of any given thing was compatible with the Platonic understanding of creation as "the immediate procession of plurality from the first cause".⁶⁷

64 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 25H, p. 148, l. 389-394, cited at n. 34, above. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 1.10.3, p. 143, l. 22-38.

65 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1C, p. 75, l. 151 – p. 77, l. 208.

66 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1C, p. 76, l. 197-200: *exstasis divini amoris est causa multitudinis rerum creaturarum, exstasis, inquam, quae non sinit ipsum esse sine germine, sed disponit ipsum ad communicandum se omnibus modis, quibus est possibile communicare bonitatem suam*. This was a tacit citation of Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, ed. A. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, vol. 32 (Paris: Vivès, 1895), pars 11, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 1, p. 25a, which Berthold embellished with Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.13, 712A-B.

67 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7A, p. 143, l. 162-163.

The Platonic account of creation is discussed at greatest length in Proposition 5 ("Every plurality is set beneath the One").⁶⁸ Berthold began there by outlining the Peripatetic doctrine of the procession of all things from the One.⁶⁹ His major Peripatetic authority was Avicenna's *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* IX.4. Avicenna was frequently cited in seminal works by William of Auvergne and Thomas Aquinas as an example of an erroneous doctrine of mediated creative causality, according to which God creates the highest separate intelligence, which then creates the second separate intelligence, the first heavenly soul, and the first heavenly body, and so on, until we reach the world of generation and corruption. In this view, since a simple one can only produce a simple effect, diversity must arise through the distinct, comparative activities of the first created intellect. Using Ulrich of Strassburg's *De summo bono*, Berthold explained the logical ordering of these activities as follows. (1) The first created intellect contemplates the completely necessary existence (*necesse esse*) of God, from whom it proceeds. It then contemplates itself as having come from the necessary existent and thus understands itself as *necesse esse*, for it beholds itself in the light of God's intellect. In so doing, the intellect constitutes another intellectual substance beneath itself as an intellectual light, which however is diminished because it does not possess the abundance of the first light. (2) The first created intellect then contemplates itself insofar as it is in act, and thus the light of God's intellect falls (*occumbit*) within it. The intellect then extends its light to another being below it, and thereby constitutes the first heavenly soul and the immediate mover of the outermost sphere. (3) The first created intellect then contemplates itself according to the possibility that exists within it, which it receives from itself and not from the necessary existent. As it thinks itself as possible, it produces the heavenly body of the outermost sphere.

The Platonists, according to Berthold, with Dionysius as their chief representative, would not be satisfied with this account.⁷⁰ Although they hold even more strictly to the unicity of the first principle, which is not only "one *per se*" but is "the One as such and absolutely self-identical", they are still able to

68 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 5, p. 4, l. 1: *Omnis multitudo secunda [Berthold: submissa] est ab uno*.

69 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5A, p. 113, l. 13 – p. 115, l. 70. Berthold's explanations of Avicenna's position resemble passages from Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 2, 8-14*, ed. A. Palazzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2012), lib. IV, tr. 2, c. 9 (1), p. 27, l. 20 – p. 28, l. 49.

70 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 115, l. 72 – p. 118, l. 192.

maintain that plurality is an immediate effect of the One. Giving a catena of citations from Dionysius on the divine differentiation (*discretio*), Berthold had to concede that here he was relying principally on texts about God as the Good and not as the One, and he reminded the reader that they will ultimately find that these two designations of the first principle are brought together in Proposition 13. Now, the passages from Dionysius all assert that God remains one while acting within plurality, but they do not explain precisely how this is so. First, then, Berthold decided to confront an objection, which he seems to have invented, that called Dionysius' authority on these matters into question: since Dionysius has spoken as "a theologian", these texts should be reserved for matters pertaining to voluntary providence and God's direct interventions in history. However, the objection continued, following "the theologising philosophers or philosophising theologians", one must hold that in the order of natural providence things proceed from the One in a mediated and linear fashion, just as Avicenna has proposed. Berthold responded that, on this question of the origin of multiplicity from the One, it makes no difference which order of providence was being considered. The Platonists do not even have to abandon the principle that from a simple one only one can come.⁷¹ The purpose of this objection and response, it seems, was to show that Dionysius, a theologian, argued according to the same necessary and rational assumptions as the theologising philosophers and philosophising theologians. The greatest of the Platonists, therefore, did not abrogate from the laws of natural reason. This also means that the fuller explanation that follows in Berthold of how the divine differentiation (*discretio*) immediately produces a plurality can be read back into Dionysius' texts. Berthold must show how the One can be an immediate source of plurality without denying the principle that from a simple one only a one can come.

Although he does not use these terms, his response appealed to something like the notion of enfolding and unfolding.⁷² Berthold first established that for the Peripatetics (Aristotle, Avicenna) and the Platonists (Plato, Dionysius, Boethius), God is as an intellective and volitional principle. The "archetypical world" in God is one in form and in reality and, similarly, his will is "one and immutable". According to the Peripatetics, since plurality is completely unlike the simple and immutable principle, what comes immediately from God must be a mediating principle or "singular one" (*unum singulare*), that is, the first

71 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 116, l. 108-111: *ab uno singulariter existenti non debeat procedere nisi unum, et idem eodem modo manens semper natum est facere idem.*

72 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B-C, p. 116, l. 112 – p. 120, l. 240.

created intellect.⁷³ According to the Platonists, Berthold insisted, this conclusion does not follow:

Notwithstanding these doctrines, the position of Platonic philosophy is that, from the One, which is One as such and absolutely, remaining self-identical in every way, plurality proceeds immediately, in such a way that it operates itself [*agens se ipsum*] in plurality and thus multiplies, as was put forward earlier by Dionysius. By ‘plurality’, I mean not only the partial [plurality] of the unities themselves, which is immediately related to the primarily One, but also the total [plurality] of the universe, insofar as the universe subsists in the intention of ‘one’ and ‘good’. This intention in the First as such is not only the exemplary reason but also the efficient and final reason.⁷⁴

The divine wisdom or art, full of “living, unchangeable reasons”, is a principle of order. An order is both one and many. A “singular one”, therefore, cannot adequately represent the archetypal world. In Albert’s *Summa theologiae* these arguments were meant to establish the agreement between Aristotle (with his metaphor of the general and the army in the *Metaphysics* XII.10) and Dionysius concerning the procession of creatures. Berthold, however, having framed a debate between the Platonists and Peripatetics, intervened in Albert’s text to reinforce the distinction of formal intentions, and emphasised the priority of “good” as the essential mode or intention of any given thing.⁷⁵ Insofar as the universe, or anything in it, subsists in the intention of “one” or “good”, it has come immediately from the One, and does so according to an ordered series.

It is here that we observe how the register of unity complements and corrects the one-sidedness of an exclusive focus on the Good. While the Good provides the dynamic and relational context within which an entity will receive

73 Here Berthold was summarising objections to the immediate procession of plurality presented in Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, pars II, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 1, p. 23a-b. This was the same article Berthold had used on the *exstasis divini amoris*.

74 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 116, l. 130 – p. 117, l. 137: *His autem non obstantibus positio Platonicae philosophiae est, quod ab uno, quod est simpliciter unum et absolute et omnino eodem modo manens, procedit immediate multitudo ita, quod ipsum est agens se ipsum in multitudinem et sic multiplicans, ut supra positum est ex Dionysio; multitudinem, inquam, non solum partialem ipsarum unitatum, quae est immediata ad ipsum prime unum, sed etiam totalem universi, inquantum ipsum universum solum subsistit in intentione unius et boni, quae intentio in simpliciter primo non solum est ratio exemplaris, sed effectiva et finalis.*

75 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 118, l. 190-192; 5C, p. 119, l. 206-207.

its possibility and its existence, the essential order of invisible and separate substances must be defined by the structure of number and proportion. This was a principle Berthold accepted from Book II of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: "a causal order requires a first, a middle, and a last".⁷⁶ As we saw already in 7A and now in 5B, Berthold divided the ordered unities that arise immediately from the One into two groups, in accordance with Proposition 64 ("Every primordial unity establishes a twofold number: some of hypostases that are perfect in themselves; others of illuminations having their hypostasis in others").⁷⁷ In his commentary on Proposition 64, Berthold began by repeating the contrast between the Aristotelian understanding of unity as a transcendental notion identical with being, which has only *esse in anima*, and the Platonic view of unity as a *res extra animam*.⁷⁸ For the Platonists, unity as a principle contains all that comes from itself in potency or virtually (*virtualiter*). This potency is either (1) active or (2) passive. These in their extreme instances apply to the One and to prime matter, respectively. The active potency is in turn subdivided, such that it can apply (1a) *simpliciter* to God, (1b) to a primordial cause, or (1c) to the trace of the One in any spiritual substance that requires further determination in order to subsist.⁷⁹ This yields the distinction in Proposition 64 between the "the primordial unities" that subsist through themselves (1b) and their "illuminations" that require further determination in order to subsist (1c and 2).

Berthold at this point referred the reader to Proposition 62 ("Every plurality nearer to the One is fewer in quantity, but greater in power, than more remote pluralities")⁸⁰ for his account of the precise number of the

76 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 118, l. 178-179; 62B, p. 182, l. 57-61. For a passage known to Berthold that brought together both registers of proportional structure and causal dynamism, see Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, prooem. (1-2), p. 13, l. 2-27.

77 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 64, p. 34, l. 1-3: *Omnis primordialis unitas duplicem substituit numerum, hunc quidem per se perfectarum ypostaseon, hunc autem illustratum in aliis ypostasin habentium*. In the *Tria opuscula*, he found this principle applied to the register of unity. See Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 3-7: *Duplicibus autem unitatibus entibus sive etiam bonitatibus, quas bonum illud produxit ens causa utrorumque et altero modo unum, et huius quidem autotelon (id est per se perfectis), huius autem dispersis in participantibus causis*.

78 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 64A-B, p. 193, l. 14 – p. 194, l. 54.

79 The trace of the One (1c) should be subdivided again because it must include (1c α) the separate substances that are mentioned at 64F and (1c β) human souls, which are not discussed there. On the illumination or vestige of the One in the human soul as an active potency, see Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 24B, p. 129, l. 162-198, 162B, p. 17, l. 32-58.

80 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 62, p. 33, l. 1-2: *Omnis multitudo propinquius uni ens quantitate quidem est remotioribus minor, virtute autem maior*.

self-subsistent principles (1b and 1c α). Here, he produced what he regarded as a remarkable (*miranda*) table enumerating the principles populating the essential order of natural providence (from the One down to, and including, heavenly souls).⁸¹ The smallest possible essential order, he maintained, and therefore the order nearest to the One, is necessarily composed of the numbers 1 (first), 2 (middle), 3 (last). This corresponds to the six formal intentions of the primordial causes of unity, infinity, being, life, intellect, and soul. Berthold then assigned each primordial cause a number from 1 through 6 as its root (*radix*). For example, the number 6 corresponds to the soul. The soul is comprised of six formal intentions (goodness, infinity, being, life, intellect, soul). This root is then increased by the same proportion found in the highest order – 6 (first), 12 (middle), 18 (last) – to reach the sum of 36. In other words, in the essential order of the cosmos, there must be 36 heavenly souls. So persuaded was Berthold by this deductive reasoning that he used it to resolve an ancient debate about the exact number of heavenly movers: 36 falls almost in the middle of the figures proposed by Eudoxus (26) and Calippus (47)!⁸² As amusing or naive as this approach must seem, we should bear in mind that Berthold was convinced that the ecstasy of divine love has expressed itself in a supremely orderly way, and that only a model like this can explain how a plurality immediately unfolds from the One and how that One enfolds within itself the archetypal world.

3 The Trinity and the Gods

In accordance with his views about the knowledge of God attained by the best of the pagan philosophers of antiquity, Berthold's interpretation of Proclus was thoroughly Trinitarian. Berthold held that a Trinitarian theology could and should be extrapolated from the text of the *Elementatio theologica*, not because this would extrinsically grant it the Christian form its final and perfect truth required, but because its own coherence as a revival of Plato's thought demanded it. For Berthold, the Platonists had harmonised the registers of unity and goodness, of order and fecundity, in a Trinitarian understanding of the first principle.

In one of the longest treatments of Trinitarian theology in the *Expositio*, Berthold argued that, since generation (the procession of the Son from the

81 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 62B-C, p. 181, l. 20 – p. 184, l. 138.

82 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 203F, p. 195, l. 177-196.

Father) is “the communication of nature, it most of all befits that, which is most communicable”. And since the first Good is most communicable, this is what Dionysius meant when he said that “the ecstasy of the love of the highest Good does not leave it without seed” (*sine germine*) – for, Berthold explained, “to sprout forth [*germinare*] is to generate”.⁸³ The spontaneous communication of the divine nature in the Trinity (*bullitio* or “boiling”) is thus the precondition for God’s spontaneous creative activity (*ebullitio* or “boiling-over”).⁸⁴ Both dynamics are the result of what Berthold, commenting on the same passage from *De divinis nominibus* 4.10, called the amorous motion (*motus amorusus*) that moves the Good to communicate itself.⁸⁵ For the principle to communicate itself in an orderly way, it must already be order itself or, in other words, as Berthold wrote in the *Prologus*, it must be the primarily Beautiful (*prime pulchrum*).⁸⁶ The Trinity is the Beautiful because it is “the cause of the agreement and lucidity of universes, calling everything to itself, and gathering all in all into the same”.⁸⁷ From “this Beautiful there comes to all beings their beauty according to their proper measure; on account of the Beautiful there arise the concords, friendships, and communions of all things”.⁸⁸ The relational context created by the Good or Beautiful was thus understood by Berthold as the Holy Spirit unfolding the interrelations present implicitly in the archetypal world or divine Word that is coeternal with the Father.

83 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40C, p. 41, l. 203-207: *quia generatio communicatio naturae est, illi maxime conveniet, quod est maxime communicabile; sed prime bonum est maxime communicabile seu communicativum sui; ergo sibi maxime conveniet generatio. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius 4 cap. De divinis nominibus, exstasis amoris summi boni non sinit ipsum sine germine esse; germinare autem generare est. Cf. Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, pars I, tr. 7, q. 30, c. 1, p. 227, l. 21-29.*

84 On the theme of *ebullitio*, see M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, “A propos du néoplatonisme d’Albert le Grand. Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d’Albert dans le Commentaire sur Proclus de Berthold de Moosburg”, in *Archives de Philosophie* 43(1980), p. 635–654. For Albert see, for example, Albert the Great, *De animalibus*, lib. xx, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 1306, l. 34 – p. 1307, l. 8: *Luminosum enim ita ebullit lucis quod continue videtur moveri motu ebullitionis si ipsum est fons lucis sicut est sol [...]. Et sic est in fontali universitatis causa, a qua ebullitione procedunt bonitatum ipsius lucis et formae quae in rebus distantibus receptae diversum esse accipiunt secundum diversam recipientium potestatem.*

85 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 16A, p. 24, l. 23-25: *Haec Dionysius, ubi clare exprimit motum amorousum esse in prime bono, quo se movet in sui multiplicationem et ad intra propriam naturam per emanationem originalem et ad extra per causalem.*

86 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 19, p. 29, l. 781: *prime pulchrum, superbenedicta Trinitas.*

87 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 19, p. 29, l. 778-779: *causa consonantiae et claritatis universorum et ad se ipsum omnia vocans et tota in totis congregans ad idem.*

88 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 18, p. 28, l. 766-769.

This Trinitarian philosophy of creation was first outlined in *Prologus* 9 and 11. As Berthold stated there, the world is made by wisdom, who has built its house upon seven pillars (Proverbs 9:1).⁸⁹ Following the *Clavis physicae*, he explained that the paternal intellect has fashioned or “hewn out” these pillars or primordial causes in the Word, which is the divine art (*ars*), and these are divided and multiplied by the Holy Spirit in its effects.⁹⁰ As we have seen, Berthold’s response to the Peripatetic arguments about the procession of the cosmos from the simple One in 5B was based on the assumption shared by Platonists and Peripatetics that the first principle acts through intellect and will. In Berthold’s view, these immanent operations of knowing and willing could be assimilated to the begetting of the Son and the mutual spiration of the Holy Spirit.⁹¹ Such a passage from the immanent operations to the distinction of persons in God was not something Thomas Aquinas, or many Dominicans who succeeded him in the 14th century, would accept; but it does find some precedent in the more emanationist Trinitarian theology of the Franciscan school that followed Bonaventure and, interestingly, in the theology of German Dominicans like Ulrich of Strassburg and Hugh Ripelin of Strassburg.⁹²

89 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 11, p. 18, l. 439 – p. 19, l. 471. The seven pillars are those mentioned in 62C, along with the lowest primordial cause of nature or body. Presumably, it was not included in 62 because its effects belong to the domain of becoming or generation, and therefore cannot be enumerated according to the patterns of an immutable essential order. At Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 101B, p. 211, l. 26–30, Berthold spoke of seven “formal perfections”. For other instances, see, e.g., 8D, 23D, 58A, 71D, 99B, 133E, 140D, 155D.

90 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 9, p. 14, l. 300 – p. 15, l. 320; 126B, p. 155, l. 44 – p. 157, l. 97. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40C, p. 41, l. 177–179: *Plato ponit in prime bono paternum intellectum formantem ex se verbum, quod est ratio omnium faciendorum, imago, Filius et ars Patris et mundus archetypus, hoc est principalis mundi typus.*

91 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 28B, p. 173, l. 77–81; 42F, p. 61, l. 201 – p. 63, l. 279.

92 See R. Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University. The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans 1250–1350*, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2013), vol. 1, p. 171. According to the more emanationist approach, which Russell Friedman traces back to Richard of St. Victor, the persons of the Trinity are distinguished according to the ways in which they originate or receive divine being. Chapter 6 of Bonaventure’s *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* can be regarded as a *locus classicus* for this approach, where Bonaventure read Dionysius through Richard, and used the principle that the Good diffuses itself as a way to establish the threeness of persons that must be conceived simultaneously with the divine unity as Being. Friedman distinguishes between the emanationist model and the more relational approach, which emphasised that the persons are defined by already fully formed relations of filiation and mutual spiration. The relational model, favoured by many Dominicans after Aquinas, therefore posited a sharper divide between the creaturely “psychological” intimations of the Trinity in

We have seen already that Berthold's inspiration for his account of pagan knowledge of the Trinity came from a Franciscan, Thomas of York (*Sapientiale* I.6) in Proposition 131A-C ("Every god commences its proper operation from itself"). No less important was Dietrich of Freiberg's thorough integration of Augustine's psychological image of the Trinity into the Peripatetic cosmology of the separate intellects,⁹³ which Berthold relied on in 131D-F. Accentuating Dietrich's argument, Berthold identified the *ratio boni* as the basis of the active overflow of any intellectual principle, whether in God or in intellects that are active through their essence (*intellectus in actu per essentiam*). Dietrich had already argued that the spontaneous diffusion or boiling-over (*ebullitio*) of a cause derives its fecundity from a hidden interior transfusion or boiling (*bullitio*).⁹⁴ In God, this interior transfusion constitutes an "order of nature" of distinct persons. In all essentially active intellectual principles below God (the primordial causes down to the highest portion of the human soul), it results only in a relational distinction within a single supposit.⁹⁵ Thus in a spontaneous and free act of Trinitarian overflow, the One produces within itself simple principles (*imagines Trinitatis*) that are able to carry on the further work of determining the "ones" or "goods" ("vestiges") it has created.⁹⁶

The continuity in this analogy between the creative and unbounded causality of the One or Good as Trinity and the bounded or determinate causality of the primordial causes was established through Berthold's interpretation of Proclus' notion of the self-constituted (τὸ αὐθυπόστατον; *antipostatōn*).⁹⁷ The origins of this notion went back at least to Iamblichus (d. c. 325), who used it

the immanent operations of the human soul and its full reality in God, which is known only by revelation.

93 A. Colli, *Tracce agostiniane nell'opera di Teodorico di Freiberg* (Genoa: Marietti, 2010).

94 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 125D, p. 149, l. 83-91.

95 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131E, p. 196, l. 176 – p. 197, l. 198.

96 On the gods as images of God, see Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 32E, p. 210, l. 156-158 and p. 211, l. 183 – p. 212, l. 201; 28C, p. 175, l. 150-151; 177E, p. 178, l. 165-169. Berthold's source was Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 1.2.1.1.6-7, p. 41, l. 2 – p. 44, l. 46. See also the studies by K. Flasch, "Procedere ut imago. Das Hervorgehen des Intellekts aus seinem göttlichen Grund bei Meister Dietrich, Meister Eckhart und Berthold von Moosburg", in K. Ruh (ed.), *Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposium Kloster Engelberg 1984* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), p. 125-134; id., "Converti ut imago – Rückkehr als Bild. Eine Studie zur Theorie des Intellekts bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart", in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 45(1998), p. 130-150.

97 On self-constitution in Proclus, see S. Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), p. 125-137; C. Steel, "Proklos über Selbstreflexion und Selbstbegründung", in M. Perkams, R.M. Piccione (eds), *Proklos. Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p. 230-255; D.G. MacIsaac, "The Origin of Determination in the Neoplatonism of Proclus", in M. Treschow, W. Otten, W. Hannam (eds), *Divine Creation in Ancient*,

to account for the freedom of the rational soul.⁹⁸ Proclus generalised the idea of self-constitution by relating it to substantial self-reversion (Propositions 42 and 43), which enabled him to apply it to almost all immaterial realities. In Proposition 40 (“Everything that proceeds from itself has a self-constituted essence and precedes those things that subsist from other causes”),⁹⁹ the first passage in the *Elementatio theologica* devoted to the subject, Proclus connected the notions of self-sufficiency and self-constitution, and definitively located both in principles beneath the Good, since its simplicity is beyond self-sufficiency.¹⁰⁰

For Berthold, however, although the Good is above self-sufficiency because of its superabundant power, it is not above self-reversion or self-constitution.¹⁰¹ On the contrary, according to Berthold’s interpretation of Proclus in the context of Dietrich’s metaphysics, the Good is superabundant or “boils over” precisely because of its self-reversion or interior transfusion (*bullitio*), which is also true of the gods proportionately in their own domains. When Berthold finally confronted Proclus’ refusal of self-reversion in the One in the proof of Proposition 40, he did so carefully:

This [refusal] was disproved above in the declaration, unless perhaps the author wishes to say that, just as the primarily Good is better than self-sufficient principles, namely the *antarkes*, so also it is better than the *per se* subsistent, namely, the *antipostaton*.¹⁰²

Medieval, and Early Modern Thought. Essays Presented to the Rev'd Dr Robert D. Crouse (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 141–172, at p. 157–166; E. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena*, p. 150–154.

98 Henry of Ghent used the theorems of the *Elementatio* on self-reversion for the same purpose. See P. Porro, “The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century. Proclus and the *Liber de causis*”, in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 264–298, at p. 269–275.

99 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 40, p. 24, l. 1–2: *Omnia que ab alia causa procedunt precedent que a se ipsis subsistunt et habentia essentia authypostaton*.

100 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 40, p. 24, l. 17–18: *Si autem bonum authypostatum, ipsum se ipsum producat non unum erit*. There was a lacuna Moerbeke’s translation after this line that omitted Proclus’ brief explanation of his assertion: what proceeds from the One is not one; but if the One were self-constituted it would proceed from itself; therefore, the One would be both one and not one.

101 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 10F, p. 183, l. 229 – p. 184, l. 255. Cf. 9B, p. 169, l. 102–105.

102 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40 *commentum*, p. 45, l. 341–344: *Istud est reprobatum supra in declaratione, nisi forte auctor velit dicere, quod, sicut prime bonum est melius sibi sufficientibus, scilicet antarkes, ita etiam sit melius per se subsistentibus, scilicet antipostaton*.

In other words, if Proclus only meant that the Good is above the self-sufficient goods or primordial causes (the *antarkia* described in Proposition 9) and in this sense is above “self-constituted principles”, then this more qualified statement is correct. Now, although Proclus posited a kind of self-sufficiency among the gods in texts unknown to Berthold (e.g., *Platonic Theology* 1.19), modern interpreters of Proclus doubt whether self-constitution would apply at that level, given the doctrine’s intrinsic relation to self-reversion.¹⁰³ So committed was Berthold, however, to Dietrich’s Augustinian and Peripatetic metaphysics that it was unthinkable that self-reversion would not be at the root of all fecundity in the cosmos.

The *Elementatio theologica* provided several opportunities to address the theme of self-reversion (Propositions 15-17, 42-44, 82-83). Beginning his commentary on 15A, Berthold invoked Dietrich’s conception of the intrinsic formal unity of the cosmos, which consists in “the redounding of one part into another”, and in whose dynamism each part acquires the *ratio boni*.¹⁰⁴ It is necessary to posit “essential relations” inherent in the nature of each part of this essential order, which preserve this dynamic hierarchy without compromising the simplicity of the parts.¹⁰⁵ The essences that comprise such an order are completely identical with their operation.¹⁰⁶ In other words, these essences are inconceivable apart from their intrinsic relation to the rest of the order;¹⁰⁷ their operation of self-reversion is simultaneously the return to their principle and is nothing else but the outward expression of the first principle within the cosmos.¹⁰⁸

This basic background helps us to understand Berthold’s strategy for navigating Proposition 40. In 40A, he first described two kinds of procession that correspond to the general division of all things into the absolute and the relational (*respectivum*).¹⁰⁹ These correspond to the “causal” (absolute) and “original”

103 See MacIsaac, “The Origin of Determination”, p. 157–159, and the literature cited there.

104 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 15A, p. 15, l. 12–24. Cf. 6C, p. 130, l. 103–126.

105 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 15A, p. 15, l. 39–46. Cf. 16A, p. 24, l. 14–31.

106 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 15B, p. 17, l. 102–103.

107 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 32B, p. 207, l. 52–57.

108 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 15C, p. 18, l. 134 – p. 19, l. 139: *Potest [se ipsum conversum] tamen habere partes ante totum, quae non ponunt in numerum, et sic motu amoroso, qui est virtus concretiva seu unitiva naturalis, festinat ad se ipsum ut ad principium formale suae propriae subsistentiae, et sic continet et figit se ipsum in esse transfundens se ipsum in se ipso se ipsum in alio esse respectivo generando.*

109 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40A, p. 36, l. 11–14. The relational (*respectivum*) is a more general term than the relative (*relativum*), since the latter is confined to the category of relation, whereas the former is found in things outside that category. By this Berthold seems to mean that an essence can be intrinsically defined by its tendency (*habitus*) toward something. See *Expositio*, 15A, p. 15, l. 31 – p. 16, l. 38.

(relational) orders described in 21A-B and 29A.¹¹⁰ A causal order proceeds to the outside (*ad extra*) and into a multiplicity of absolutely ordered, distinct natures, whereas the Trinitarian, originative “order of nature” proceeds to the inside (*ad intra*) and does not result in any inequality of natures. Following Dietrich’s interpretation of Augustine, Berthold maintained that this originative order is also found in intellectual creatures as images of God, where it results not in a distinction of persons but in three relationals (*tria respectiva*) within a single supposit.¹¹¹ Berthold underscored that this original “order of nature” in God and in the images of God does not multiply their essences.¹¹²

In 40B, Berthold then provided definitions of generation and spiration as “emanations” that are general enough to apply to the Trinity or to its images in subordinate principles.¹¹³ From this general perspective, Berthold then moved to consider the specific differences in the proportion by rehearsing the grades of self-sufficiency he had outlined first in Proposition 9.¹¹⁴ The self-sufficient is defined as “that which has from itself and in itself the fullness of its proper goodness” as a formal cause. In this sense, God, and the gods in a secondary way, subsist by themselves whole and wholly (*subsistunt se totis et totaliter*), meaning that both are constituted only by one formal intention: “one” or

110 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 21B, p. 78, l. 84-99; 29A, p. 182, l. 12 – p. 184, l. 76.

111 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 21A-B, p. 77, l. 40-41, p. 78, l. 89-90, and p. 79, l. 122-124.

112 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40A, p. 37, l. 43-53. In 21B, Berthold gave a fuller account of what he meant by “order of nature” by relying on Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, pars I, tr. 9, q. 41, c. 2, a. 1, p. 317, l. 87-97. In the background of Albert’s text was Dionysius’ statement (*De divinis nominibus*, 2.7, 645B), that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are “sproutings of the divine nature” (*pullulationes divinae naturae*). Here, Albert argued, “nature” must not be understood in the primary sense to mean “essence”, because then Dionysius would have asserted that the divine essence is multiple. “Nature” must rather be understood in a secondary sense, as defined by Aristotle: “the power, from which the coming-forth comes forth” (*vis, ex qua pullulat pullulans*). In this sense, in the Trinity, “nature” stands for “person” (*supponit pro persona*) with the added connotation of a specific notion of coming-forth (*consignificando notionem determinantem modum pullulationis*), by which that nature is communicated from one person to another (e.g., paternity, generation, or spiration). In the self-constituted principles below the Trinity, Berthold added, “nature” stands for the relational (*pro respectivo*) and not for “person”, but with the same added connotation of a specific notion of coming-forth.

113 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40B, p. 37, l. 57 – p. 39, l. 125; 42F, p. 61, l. 201-296. Berthold’s sources here are not indicated in the *apparatus fontium*. His general definitions are taken from Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 1.3.2, p. 53, l. 2 – p. 56, l. 86. From John of Damascus, through Ulrich of Strassburg, Berthold also took a less general definition of *generatio* that clearly sets it apart from the mutable and temporal kind of generation found among creatures. See Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 1-3*, ed. S. Tuzzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2004), lib. III, tr. 1, c. 2 (3), p. 10, l. 50 – p. 12, l. 103.

114 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 9B, p. 170, l. 124 – p. 171, l. 147; 40C, p. 39, l. 127 – p. 40, l. 161.

“good”. The gods are only “formally” self-subsistent since they receive their unity or goodness from the One, and therefore depend on the One as their efficient cause. Here Berthold would look to Proposition 65 to say that the One subsists as “one” according to cause, and the gods subsist as “ones” according to “essence”.¹¹⁵ Invoking Proposition 64, Berthold described the gods as supremely self-sufficient as wholes and wholly (*secundum se totum et totaliter*) by virtue of their simplicity and their superabundant power to originate their unique formal determinations. In other words, as “essential” goods or ones the gods are “wholly” self-sufficient as formal causes, which allows them to act as prisms refracting the causality of the Good into their own orders. Next come entities constituted from at least two principles, which are self-sufficient “as a whole but not wholly”: they are self-sufficient as wholes (*sufficiunt sibi se totis per se*) because they are essentially and always active, but since they are constituted out of more than one formal intention, they cannot be called “one” or “good” in every way (*totaliter*). Such entities are also known as beings existing as a species (*entia secundum speciem*). They are composite but not in such a way that they could be called “individuals”; their composition comes only from their essential or formal parts. These comprise the greater population of the invisible world below the gods in Berthold’s Platonism: infinities, true beings, lives, and intellectual hypostases. Next, heavenly souls are independent or self-sufficient by their divine and intellectual operation, but their animating (*animalis*) operation is fulfilled only in a body. Rational or human souls, finally, have self-sufficiency only in virtue of their supreme part that is not conjoined to the body.¹¹⁶ This catalogue of self-sufficient principles may be summarised as follows:

115 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 9B, p. 170, l. 108–112; 40C, p. 39, l. 132–137. For this crucial distinction between the primordial causes as subordinated to God (*qua* efficient cause) and as *per se* subsistent (*qua* formal causes), Berthold may have been inspired by Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on the *Liber de causis*. See E. Ludueña, “The Gods and Causality”.

116 In Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43A, p. 66, l. 21 – p. 67, l. 42, Berthold extended the self-constituted or self-conversive all the way from the One and to the possible intellect which, considered as a conceptional being (*ens conceptionale*) – that is, according to the mode of being that embraces the subject, object, and mode of its knowledge in act – exercises its independence by constituting the quiddities of things. What all these principles share is that they are, at least in their activity, independent (*per se standi*). On the possible intellect as *ens conceptionale*, see Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, III.8.1–9, p. 183, l. 3 – p. 184, l. 51, and B. Mojsisch, “Sein als Bewußt-Sein. Die Bedeutung des *ens conceptionale* bei Dietrich von Freiberg”, in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 95–105. The possible intellect, however, is not (as

God: *per se subsistens absolute*

Gods: *sufficiunt sibi/subsistunt et secundum se totas et totaliter*

Entia secundum speciem: sufficiunt sibi/subsistunt secundum se totas sed non totaliter

Heavenly and human souls: *sufficiunt sibi/subsistunt non se totis*

Having recalled this order of principles, Berthold then proceeded to outline their dynamic interrelation in his comments on Proposition 40. He appealed to Augustine's acknowledgement that the Platonic doctrine of the divine "art" or "archetypal world" was equivalent to the Christian understanding of the coeternal and only-begotten Word.¹¹⁷ Following Dietrich of Freiberg, Berthold pushed this agreement to the limit by extending the Platonic doctrine of the divine art to principles beneath God.¹¹⁸ Finally, he went beyond even the letter of Dietrich's text toward a more complete account of the Trinitarian activity of these principles by identifying the role of the spirit (*spiritu producentis vehente*) in the conveyance of the form within the principle into its effect.¹¹⁹ Using a remarkable and singular epithet in the entire *Expositio*, Berthold then introduced two passages from Dionysius the Platonist (*Dionysius Platonicus*). One was the familiar passage we have seen several times already describing the Trinitarian emanations as "sproutings of the divine nature". The second follows it in the *De divinis nominibus*:

Every divine paternity and filiation is given to us and to the supercelestial powers from the primary paternity and primary filiation separated from all things. From these the supercelestial powers become gods, and the sons of gods, and deiform fathers, and are named minds, being perfected

ens naturae) an image of the Trinity because it is not essentially active. See Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 1.2.2, p. 46, l. 3 – p. 53, l. 41.

117 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131B, p. 191, l. 46 – p. 194, l. 117.

118 Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 1.8.1-3, p. 141, l. 46 – p. 142, l. 74.

119 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40C, p. 41, l. 193-194. The phrase *spiritu vehente* was likely taken from Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. IV, tr. 1, c. 5 (6), p. 29, l. 64-82, where Ulrich rejected the view of certain philosophers, like Hermes, who posited an intermediary spirit bearing the forms of the *fluxus* from the source to its recipients. Cf. Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. I, tr. 4, c. 1-2, p. 44, l. 50 and 57, and p. 44, l. 33. Ulrich criticised Arius for identifying this intermediary with the Holy Spirit and argued that the role of such a *spiritus* should be restricted to corporeal forms. For Berthold, on the contrary, following Thomas of York, the Hermetic *spiritus* was among the several acceptable witnesses to the pagan knowledge of the Holy Spirit. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 6E, p. 132, l. 202 – p. 133, l. 208, and 131B, p. 193, l. 81 – p. 194, l. 117, citing *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 14 and lib. VII, c. 6.

spiritually (that is, incorporeally, immaterially, and intelligibly) by this paternity and filiation.¹²⁰

As Berthold presented it, then, Augustine and Dionysius *Platonicus* authorised this extension of Trinitarian theology to subordinate principles and “gods”. His singular use of the epithet Dionysius *Platonicus* in the entire *Expositio* displays the deeper assumptions that were at work here, which can be detected elsewhere in the commentary where we find these Trinitarian passages in the Areopagite cited almost in the same breath as phrases from the Hermetic *Liber XXIV philosophorum*.¹²¹ There was no opposition here between pagan and Christian Platonists on the question of first principles; in other words, for Berthold the Platonists held to a Trinitarian account of the divine as Platonists and only incidentally, in certain cases, as Christians.

This Platonism that Berthold held to be so profoundly in accordance with Christian doctrine evidently marked a significant departure from Proclus. Berthold, however, proceeded as if his interpretation conformed to the original Platonic doctrine. This is clearest when Berthold, perhaps anticipating Proclus’ refusal of self-reversion in the One, presented an anonymous objection: “if the Good is itself producing itself”, that is, if it is self-constituted, “it is not One”.¹²² Berthold’s response was a brief and standard assertion of Trinitarian divine simplicity – relations do not multiply the divine essence – with little further explanation. More interestingly, he followed this with what he seems to regard as an undesirable consequence of that argument, which even the objector

120 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40C, p. 42, l. 214–223: *Omnis paternitas divina et filiatio data est et nobis et supercaelestibus virtutibus ex patriarchia ab omnibus segregata et filiarquia: ex qua, et di et deorum filii, patres et deiformes fiunt, et nominantur mentes, spiritualiter videlicet tali paternitate et filiatione perfecta, hoc est incorporaliter, immaterialiter, intelligibiliter [...].* Cf. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 2.8, 645C.

121 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40C, p. 42, l. 214–227: *Hoc expresse vult Dionysius Platonicus 2 cap. De divinis nominibus, ubi dicit: ‘Pater quidem est fontana deitatis [...].’ Hermes etiam Trismegistus in prima regula theologica idem videtur intendere [...].* Cf. *Expositio*, 21F, p. 86, l. 374–381: *Ex praedictis verbis Dionysii manifestum est in thearchica processione divinarum personarum ordinem naturae sive naturalis originis incipere sive principiari, si ita licet dicere, in supraeterna emanatione a Patre, qui est fons supersubstantialis deitatis sive fontana deitas, qui etiam secundum Trismegistum et Alanum dicitur unitas in eo, quod Pater est principium, non de principio. Et sic ‘unitas (scilicet Pater) gignit monadem (id est Filium, qui est principium de principio) et in se suum reflectit ardorem (scilicet Spiritum sanctum, qui est amor et nexus Patris et Filii).’* Dionysius is also cited alongside the Hermetic *Liber* in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 64C, p. 194, l. 56–59; 137A, p. 15, l. 24 – p. 16, l. 36; and 141D, p. 48, l. 122 – p. 49, l. 143.

122 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40C, p. 42, l. 235–236: *Nec valet instantia, qua posset dici, quod bonum, si est ipsum se ipsum producens, non est unum.*

would want to avoid: if respective distinction removes unity in the Good, so must it also compromise the unity of the gods.¹²³ Perhaps his imagined interlocutor was an interpreter of Proclus who, like Dietrich of Freiberg, had identified the gods with the separate intellects.¹²⁴ Such an interpreter would indeed be unwilling to compromise the real simplicity of the separate intellects (even though they are constituted out of multiple formal intentions), for this would undermine the identity of their essence with their operation. Berthold and anonymous objector shared the assumption that the gods and/or the separate intellects are simple and self-reflexive. Both sides of the dispute would agree that self-reflexivity is so intimately related to the fecundity of the separate principles that the objection must be ruled out.

Once it is granted that God and the primordial causes can be triune and yet simple, Berthold considered another objection arguing that, since he has affirmed a respective distinction in the gods but a distinction of persons in the Trinity, he has effectively made the gods simpler than the Trinity.¹²⁵ This led Berthold to posit a basic but nevertheless crucial explanation of the difference between God and the gods that undergirds the entire metaphysics of first principles in the *Expositio*. He replied by pointing out that this respective distinction in the gods is in fact a sign of each their limitation: each god has a nature that is “supposed” (*suppositata*) because it depends on the Good as an efficient cause, and thus receives from outside itself its causal power to produce. It is in this sense, at the conclusion of 40F, that he will argue that the notion of the self-constituted “primarily” pertains to the self-sufficient gods, which are self-sufficient and limited as “good” but superabundant in their unique formal intentions, and not to God himself who is the superabundant Good.¹²⁶ This was the basis for Berthold’s attempt in the *commentum* to offer an acceptable interpretation of the letter of Proposition 40 in the face of Proclus’ outright denial of self-constitution to the One.¹²⁷

123 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40C, p. 42, l. 237-239: *Et praeterea, si distinctio respectiva adimeret unum in prime bono, ergo et in bonitatibus, quarum quaelibet est unum et bonum per essentiam secundum auctorem.*

124 See n. 170-172, below.

125 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40C, p. 42, l. 239 – p. 43, l. 251. Cf. *Expositio*, 28B, p. 175, l. 136-138: *In prima [Trinitas], natura est ratio producendi, sed ipsum respectivum est produciens; in secunda productione natura absoluta suppositata est produciens, sed bonum est ratio producendi.*

126 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 40F, p. 44, l. 283-288.

127 Berthold incorrectly attributed to Proclus the notion that the archetypes exist in the mind of the Good. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 164D, p. 32, l. 58-9: *Huic etiam alludit illud auctoris libro De malorum subsistentia cap. 15, ubi dicit ‘apud conditorem universi*

As much as Berthold relied on Thomas of York, Dietrich of Freiberg, and his Hermetic sources for his understanding of Platonic Trinitarian theology, he was equally indebted to his Eriugenian sources like the *Clavis physicae*, the glosses on Dionysius that he attributed to Maximus, the *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, and the *Homilia* on John's Prologue for his explanation of how the gods arose within the Word and in what sense they are subordinate to the One. The doxographical outlook of the *Expositio* was thoroughly informed by Berthold's assumption that the author of the *Clavis*, supposedly Theodorus the abbot of Constantinople, was heir to a tradition of Dionysian theology that included commentators like Maximus, who transmitted teachings handed down from the Apostles.¹²⁸ This tradition, in Berthold's view, had reconciled the divine names of Dionysius with Augustine's doctrine of the divine ideas.¹²⁹ With this pedigree, Eriugena's synthesis of the Greek Fathers with Augustine in his doctrine of the primordial causes, which both remain within and proceed from the Word, became the Platonism that would unite Dionysius, Augustine, Proclus, and Boethius in Berthold's *Expositio*.¹³⁰

esse omnes species et specierum numerum! For Proclus, the *conditor* is the Demiurge, who belongs to the lowest triad of intellectual gods.

128 Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, c. 69, p. 48, l. 4-5: *Maximus philosophus tradit a successoribus apostolorum omnium que sunt quinquepartitam divisionem [...]*.

129 E.g., John Scotus Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, ed. É. Jeuneau (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996-2002), lib. II, 616C, p. 125, l. 3168-3191: *Sunt igitur primordiales causae, quas rerum omnium principia diuini sapientes appellant, per se ipsam bonitas, per se ipsam essentia, per se ipsam uita [...]. Sed ne quis aestimet quae de primordialibus causis diximus nullius auctoritatis munimine fulciri, quaedam ex libro sancti patris Dionysii De diuinis nominibus huic operi inserere non incongruum duximus*. Cf. Gersh, "The Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy", p. 497: "Clearly Berthold could not have worked out so successfully the rapprochement between Proclean noetic principles, Pseudo-Dionysian divine attributes, and Augustinian eternal reasons without recourse to the Eriugenian doctrine of primordial causes and their effects". That Eriugenism was so instrumental in bridging the Platonisms of Dionysius and Proclus confirms the verdict of J. Trouillard, "Érigène et la théophanie créatrice", in J.J. O'Meara, L. Bieler (eds), *The Mind of Eriugena* (Dublin: Irish University Press for the Royal Irish Academy, 1973), p. 98-113, at p. 98: "Quand on a le bonheur de lire Jean Scot Érigène, on est surpris de découvrir [...] une telle puissance de pensée et d'expression. Celle-ci lui de réinventer, à travers des documents mineurs, plusieurs des intuitions les plus originales du néoplatonisme".

130 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 176C, p. 163, l. 206 – p. 164, l. 213: *Verum ut ista diuersitas [specierum] excludatur, sciendum, quod principale exemplar simplex est intra omnium causam, scilicet prime Deum sive eius mentem secundum Dionysium, Augustinum, Boethium et Platonem cum suis sequacibus, ut iam diffuse ostensum est, exemplaria vero sub primo principali exemplari, quae et ipsa dicuntur et sunt causae primordiales rerum sicut ipsi dii, non quod prime Deus ad extra respiciat in universum producendo, sed quia in eis et per ea determinat suam causalitatem utens eis quasi pro instrumento operationis suae*.

When Berthold read William of Moerbeke's translation of the *Elementatio theologica*, he found a text inherently amenable to this doctrine of the primordial causes. Moerbeke used the adjective *primordialis* eight times to translate ἀρχικός, ἀρχηγικός, and πρωτουργός.¹³¹ Of these eight cases, seven resulted in the syntagm *primordialis causa* or *primordialis unitas*. Berthold was attentive to these occurrences and sometimes cross-referenced the relevant propositions,¹³² and used Eriugenian sources for four of them (Propositions 64, 97, 121, and 125). In seven of the eight propositions, Dionysius also featured prominently in Berthold's comments, even though the terms *primordialis causa* and *primordialis unitas* were completely absent from the *Corpus Dionysiacum*.¹³³ As Robert Crouse has shown, this terminology in Eriugena derived from Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* (lib. VI, c. 10, §17) and from Bede's *De natura rerum*.¹³⁴ Augustine was likely the source for the syntagm *primordialis causa* in Hugh of St. Victor,¹³⁵ Peter Abelard, and Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (lib. II, d. 18, c. 5), and, through them, in the works of Alexander of Hales, Albert the

131 Propositions 64, 70, 71, 97, 113 *comm.*, 115 *comm.*, 121 *comm.*, 125 *comm.*

132 For example, *Expositio*, 70D and 113F.

133 In certain editions of the *Corpus*, these terms would have appeared through Thomas Gallus' *Extractio*, in *Dionysiaca*, ed. P. Chevallier, 2 vols (Brugge: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937-1950), vol. 1, *In De divinis nominibus*, c. 5, p. 693, l. 340-1: *Et quod de his dixi, de aliis ideis sive archetypis (scilicet aeternis rationibus Verbi) sentiendum est: verbi gratia, per se bonitas, per se veritas, per se aeternitas, per se ipsa virtus, et similia quae simpliciter et aeternaliter consistunt in Verbo Dei et primordialiter causant omnia existentia. Inter antiquas autem causas primordialior est ipsum esse per se. [...] Et invenies ipsas participationes primordialius fundari in ipso esse.* Cf. Thomas Gallus, *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, ed. D. Lawell (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), p. 152, l. 953 – p. 153, l. 960: *ET VT NOSTRIS. Quia primordiales causalitates mentes nostras excedunt nec sufficimus effectus creatos ad illarum causarum infinalitatem digne conferre [...];* p. 462, l. 115-126: *quia in Verbo Dei summe simplici continentur unitiue et simpliciter omnia exemplaria, et ita omnia exemplarium causata in eodem Verbo uniuntur [...]. ET illud VNVM, id est eterni Verbi unitas, EST ELEMENTATIVVM, id est primordialiter causatiuum, OMNIVM.*

134 R. Crouse, "Primordiales Causae in Eriugena's Interpretation of Genesis. Sources and Significance", in G. Van Riel, C. Steel, J. McEvoy (eds), *Iohannes Scottus Eriugena. The Bible and Hermeneutics. Proceedings of the Ninth International Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies Held at Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve June 7-10, 1995* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), p. 209-220.

135 See Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis Christiane fidei*, ed. R. Berndt (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 2008), lib. I, pars 2, c. 1-3, 205B-207D, p. 59, l. 2 – p. 62, l. 7, and Hugh's earlier *Sententiae de divinitate*, translated in B.T. Coolman, D. Coulter (eds), *Trinity and Creation. A Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard, and Adam of St Victor* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), p. 140-154. These texts are quite suggestive of an Eriugenian influence, and even criticise "some" who (wrongly interpreting Eriugena) would see the primordial causes as eternal creatures located between God and the rest of creation (*Sententiae*, p. 141).

Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas. After Eriugena and Thomas Gallus, Albert, Aquinas, and Ulrich of Strassburg were among the few later authors to employ the terms explicitly in their treatments of Dionysius.¹³⁶ With Berthold, this Eriugenian synthesis of Augustine and Dionysius reached a new degree of fruition.

Prologus 3-5 set the tone for every subsequent discussion of the primordial causes in the *Expositio*. In these passages, Berthold first introduced his readers to the notion of primordial causes and went to great lengths to demonstrate how this terminology was faithful to Dionysius. According to Berthold, “the invisible things of God” can be taken in two ways, intransitively or transitively (*intransitive vel transitive*).¹³⁷ Regarding their intransitive sense, Augustine and Dionysius were clearly in agreement. For Augustine, these invisible things are the eternal, unchangeable reasons in the Word (*rationes aeternae et incommutabiles in Verbo Dei Patris*), which Dionysius called “exemplars pre-existing in God”.¹³⁸

The situation for the *invisibilia Dei* understood transitively was more complex. Berthold framed the discussion around *De divinis nominibus* 11.6, where Dionysius responded to a letter requesting clarification about what he meant when he sometimes said that God is life itself (*per se vita*) and, at other times, that God is the substantiator (*substantificator*) of life itself.¹³⁹ Berthold will bring two more passages into play momentarily: *De divinis nominibus* 5.5 (read alongside the glosses of Maximus) and *Epistula 11*, which also treats the problem raised in the letter mentioned by Dionysius. Berthold began, however, by citing Thomas Gallus, the Eriugenian *De causis primis et secundis* (which he attributed to Al-Farabi), and finally Maximus. All three texts referred explicitly to Dionysius and, satisfying the demands of Berthold’s literal method, all three used the term *invisibilia*:

But if the invisible things of God are taken transitively, in this sense, according to Thomas Gallus commenting on chapter 11 of *On the*

136 Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, 5.24, p. 316, l. 64 – p. 317, l. 11; id., *Summa theologiae*, pars I, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 560a; Thomas Aquinas, *In librum De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. 1, lect. 2, §72, p. 21; c. 2, lect. 1, §113, p. 39; c. 9, lect. 1, §807, p. 301.

137 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 3, p. 7, l. 78.

138 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 3, p. 8, l. 105 – p. 9, l. 120. Albert the Great presented the same dossier (Dionysius, Maximus, and Augustine): *Summa theologiae*, pars I, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 559b-561b; id., *Summa theologiae*, pars II, tr. 1, q. 4, m. 1, a. 2, p. 72a-77a; id., *In I Sententiarum*, d. 35, a. 7, p. 189a-191b.

139 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 11.6, 953B.

Divine Names, 'the divine Good is said to be the Substantiator', namely, 'of his invisible things, which are the rays, so to speak, of superunified Goodness, such as *per se* being, *per se* life, and so on'. Al-Farabi discusses these invisible things in his treatise *On the Cause of Causes*, which begins, 'The Principle of principles', and states the following: 'Therefore, there are exemplars, the primary causes of things'. And below: 'The first causes, because of their infinite diffusion over all things and the incomprehensible height of the ineffable purity of their excellence, are not perceived by intellect, because they are not outside the First, who formed them in the principle.' And below: 'The invisible things are hidden away in the shadows of his excellence, but in their effects – brought forth, as it were, into a certain light of cognition – they ceaselessly appear'. Thus Al-Farabi. Concerning these primordial causes, which Dionysius calls '*per se* power', '*per se* being' or 'being-itself', etc., and 'the principles of beings', Dionysius himself says the following in chapter 5 of *On the Divine Names*: 'and being-itself is more ancient than *per se* life, and more ancient than *per se* wisdom'.¹⁴⁰

Like Thomas Gallus, Berthold clearly stated that the Good is the cause of these principles or processions; we have already seen Berthold discuss this in terms of efficient causality. In *On the Divine Names* 5.5 he found the precedent for positing a rank among the primordial causes. But once again he will elaborate this beyond anything he would find explicitly in Dionysius.

Before this, however, Berthold cited the first Eriugenian text of the *Expositio*, the *De causis primis et secundis*. This text, in addition to explicitly harmonising Augustine and Dionysius (notwithstanding its attribution to Al-Farabi, which Berthold never questioned) offered the crucial description of

140 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 4, p. 9, l. 134-149: *Si vero accipiantur invisibilia Dei transitive, quorum secundum Vercellensem super 11 cap. Dionysii De divinis nominibus 'divina bonitas dicitur esse substantificatrix', scilicet 'suorum invisibilium quasi radiorum superunitate bonitatis, ut sunt per se esse, per se vita, etc.' – de quibus invisibilibus prosequitur Alfarabius in libello De causa causarum, qui incipit: 'Principium principiorum', sic inquires: 'Sunt igitur exempla causae rerum primariae'; et infra: 'Causae primae propter infinitatem super omnia diffusionem et incomprehensibilem altitudinem ineffabilis puritatis suae excellentiae nullo percipiuntur intellectu eo, quod non distant a primo, qui eas in principio formavit'; et infra: 'Invisibiles res in tenebris excellentiae suae absconditae sunt, in effectibus autem suis veluti in quandam lucem cognitionis prolatae non cessant comparere': haec ille –, de istis causis primordialibus, quas Dionysius vocat 'per se virtutem', 'per se esse' seu 'secundum se esse', et huiusmodi et 'principia existentium', sicut dicit ipse Dionysius 5 cap. De divinis nominibus: 'Et est ipsum secundum se esse senius eo, quod est per se vitam esse, et eo, quod est per se sapientiam esse'.*

the two-sided and transitional nature of these exemplars.¹⁴¹ The passage he cited from the treatise derived ultimately from *Periphyseon* II (550C-551A and 552A), which contained Eriugena's commentary on the meaning of the "shadows" and "abyss" in Genesis 1:2. A briefer version of this passage was taken over into the *Clavis physicae*, which Berthold marked with a marginal cross (MS Paris, BnF lat. 6734, f. 35v). Berthold's text of the *De causis primis et secundis*, however, as Ezequiel Ludueña observed, evidently included a phrase not found in the modern edition of Roland de Vaux or, for that matter, in the *Clavis*: the *invisibilia* are shadows and abysses diffusing through and above all things, and are unknowable "because they are not distant from the first" (*eo, quod non distant a primo*).¹⁴² This final clause allowed Berthold to account for the identity and distinction between the primordial causes and God, and to harmonise Dionysius with what he found, for example, in Propositions 123 and 162 of the *Elementatio theologica*, which speak of the gods as hidden in their superior or unitive aspect but manifest in the character of the pluralities they produce. That is, as "good", the primordial causes remain hidden in their source; as the cause of infinity, being, life, and so on, they are known from their effects.

Berthold gave a longer citation of the *De causis primis et secundis* in Proposition 56 ("Everything that is produced by secondary causes, is produced more eminently by prior and more efficacious causes, from which the

141 Al-Farabi must have been a complex figure in Berthold's mind. As the supposed author of *De causis primis et secundis*, he deserves the highest praise for describing the relation of the primordial causes to God in precise terms. However, as the supposed author of the *Liber de causis*, which categorically affirms that the "first of created things is being", he must belong with "unlearned" who are "sealed off in beings". See the table of *Philosophi famosi* in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, p. 4, l. 40-41: *Alfarabius De causa causarum / item De causis*; and 71D, p. 35, l. 123-127, cited above in Introduction, section 3, n. 150. Cf. *Expositio*, 57B, p. 150, l. 94-96: *Licet etiam ista sint subtilius dicta prius et secundum intentionem auctoris De causis, tamen non sunt de absoluta consideratione istius auctoris, qui non ponit causas primarias proprie nisi ipsas bonitates propter earum simplicitatem*.

142 Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena*, p. 328-338. Cf. Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, c. 86, p. 61, l. 3-6: *que abyssus dicuntur propter incomprehensibilem altitudinem infinitamque sui per omnia diffusionem, que nullo percipitur sensu, nullo comprehenditur intellectu, tenebre autem propter ineffabilis sue puritatis excellentiam*. See also *De causis primis et secundis et de fluxu qui consequitur eas*, ed. R. de Vaux, *Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin aux confins des XII^e-XIII^e siècles*, c. 2, p. 92, l. 12-16: *cause rerum prime propter infinitam sui diffusionem et incomprehensibilem altitudinem et ineffabilis puritatis excellentiam, nullo percipiuntur intellectu, excepto illo qui eas in principio formavit*. Since Berthold could have modified the parallel passage in the *Clavis* to suit this purpose, one can assume that the phrase was found in his copy of *De causis primis et secundis*.

secondary causes were produced”),¹⁴³ which clarified his interpretation of this passage:

After Al-Farabi shows that [1] the exemplars of all things exist in the first wisdom, in which all things are known as in their first exemplars, just as things caused are known in their first causes, he immediately says what these are: [2] ‘The exemplars are, therefore, the first causes of things’. And below: [3] The first cause was never ‘without the first causes of things that were made in it’. And shortly thereafter: ‘The first causes, because of their infinite diffusion over all things and the incomprehensible height of the ineffable purity of their excellence, are not perceived by intellect, because they are not outside the First, who formed them in the principle’. [4] This is because in their effects or in their processions into intelligible forms, only their existence is known, not their essence, and [5] thus the primary causes come forth in those things, of which they are the causes, and they do not leave the first, namely, wisdom.¹⁴⁴

This specifies [1] that the exemplars of all things exist in the divine mind, [2] that these exemplars are the first causes of things, and [3] that the first cause was never without these primordial causes made in it.¹⁴⁵ All of this would apply to the intransitive sense of *invisibilia* that denotes the living, eternal reasons of things existing in the Word. Their transitive aspect came into view when Berthold wrote [4] that from the phenomenal world of intelligible forms, species, and definitions, one can only infer that these causes exist without grasping their quiddity. [5] Therefore, the primary causes are manifest in their effects but do not depart from the wisdom or mind of God. The epistemological point

143 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 56, p. 30, l. 1-3: *Omne quod a secundis producitur et a prioribus et a causalioribus producitur eminentius, a quibus et secunda producebantur.*

144 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 56D, p. 144, l. 137 – p. 145, l. 148: *Postquam ostendit [Alfarabius] [1] in prima sapientia esse omnium rerum exempla, in quibus sicut primis exemplis sciuntur omnia sicut causata in primis causis, statim subinfert, quid sint talia exempla dicens: [2] ‘Sunt igitur exempla causae rerum primariae’. Et infra: [3] Causa primae numquam fuit ‘sine prioribus rerum causis in se factis’. Et parum infra: ‘Causae primae propter infinitam super omnia diffusionem et incomprehensibilem altitudinem ineffabilis puritatis suae excellentiae nullo percipiuntur intellectu eo, quod non distant a primo, qui eas in principio formavit’. [4] Quod autem in effectibus, hoc est in processionibus earum in formas intelligibiles cognoscuntur solummodo, quia sunt, non autem, quid sunt, et [5] sic principales causae in ea, quorum sunt causae, proveniunt, et primum, id est sapientiam, non reliquant.*

145 See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 99H, p. 202, l. 152-159, where the primordial causes were described as “uncreated”.

at [4] brings us to the cusp of the transition from the intransitive, archetypal world and the transitive procession of creatures. In this way, the *De causis primis et secundis* has provided the basic insight about the primordial causes that Berthold will elaborate with principles derived from Propositions 64 and 65.¹⁴⁶ The Good (*causaliter*) is properly diffusive only of goods (*bonitates per essentiam* and *bonitates per participationem*) while these goods are in turn the causes that strengthen the irradiations of the Good that are too weak to subsist by themselves. Like the Good, the gods are only known imperfectly by their processions.¹⁴⁷ But since each god generates its own more limited “universe” by a superabundance of a formal intention, it is in fact better known than the Good.¹⁴⁸ According to Berthold’s theory of formal intentions, a primordial cause is one *in re et intentione* with what it essentially participates, namely, the Good itself.¹⁴⁹ The notion of a *unitas* or *bonitas per essentiam* thus can serve the transitional function of being both a transcendent principle as a formal cause (identical with the One-Good as *unum* or *bonum*) but, insofar as it is an effect of the One-Good as an efficient cause (a god is not *bonitas per causam* but *per essentiam*), it has a limited or supposit nature. This duality explains how each god initiates its own characteristic intention from itself – the nearer a *bonitas per essentiam* is to the One, the greater the influence of its causal

146 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 13.3 was Berthold’s preferred text for showing that Dionysius held that intention of “one” or “good” subsists in three modes. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 113E, p. 37, l. 157 – p. 38, l. 160: *Et attende diligenter, quod sic enucleate distinguit [Dionysius] triplex unum, scilicet prime unum, quod vocat supersubstantiale unum et omnium causam, et existens unum, scilicet primo et per se unum, supra quod dicit esse prime unum sicut terminans ipsum, et quod est participans unum*. See also, for example, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 77, l. 226 – p. 78, l. 246; 5D, p. 120, l. 245 – p. 121, l. 282; 64F, p. 197, l. 149–154.

147 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 162L, p. 21, l. 183 – p. 22, l. 188.

148 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123L, p. 133, l. 295 – p. 135, l. 348.

149 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2B, p. 84, l. 97–9: *Quoddam enim participans et quo essentialiter participat, id est participans et participatum, sunt unum re et intentione. Et est summus modus participandi conveniens solum primordialibus causis*. See also *Expositio*, 125D, p. 149, l. 83–120: *omne activum prius natura transfunditur in se ipso, quam redundet ad extra [...], ideo interior emanatio in ipsis diis est ratio et causa emicationis sive processus causalis, qua de occulto supersubstantialis unionis quilibet deus emicat se ipsum. [...] Sic ergo ‘omnis deus existens unitas per se perfecta’ per 114 et ‘primordialis causa’ per 97 tradendo ‘universo ordini’ suo propriam ‘proprietaem’ [...]. Et hoc est, quod dicit Theodorus in Clave loquens de primordialibus causis: ‘Primae causae in se ipsis unum sunt et simplices nullique cognitio ordine definitae aut a se invicem segregatae: haec enim in effectibus suis partiuntur. [...] primordiales causae in principio omnium, scilicet in Verbo Dei, unum simplex atque individuum sunt, dum vero in effectus suos in infinitum multiplicatos procedunt’; 117C, p. 69, l. 54 – p. 70, l. 61.*

efficacy.¹⁵⁰ By distinguishing each primordial cause (e.g., *per se esse*, *per se virtus*) as good from its intention as causal primordial principle, Berthold found an elegant account of the relation of God's wisdom to its processions that did not reify one apart from the other but preserved their dynamic relationship.

After citing the *De causis primis et secundis* in *Prologus* 4, Berthold cited a lengthy Eriugenian gloss to *De divinis nominibus* 5.5, in which the primordial causes are identified with the divine ideas and the processions.¹⁵¹ This comment, under the authority of Maximus, provided the crucial terminological equivalency between *causae primordiales*, *ideae*, *formae aeternae*, *principalia exempla*, situated these in the Word prior to the multiplying work of the Holy Spirit, and concluded by placing the entire doctrine under the shared authority of Dionysius and Plato.¹⁵² Not only was the Triune nature of God known to Plato, but so was the view that there are primordial causes that arise within the Trinitarian processions that will refract its causality.

Berthold then turned to *De divinis nominibus* 11.6 and the question of God's relation to these causes or *per se* principles.¹⁵³ A feature of Dionysius' text prudently omitted by Berthold was the critique of the view that the cause of life, for example, is "a deity besides the super-divine life". Dionysius had explicitly denied that these principles of beings are "creative substances and persons, which [some] called the gods of beings and *per se* active creators".¹⁵⁴ Berthold

150 The *Clavis* had not emphasised the internal division in each primordial cause into a creative and a created aspect. See S. Gersh, "Honorius Augustodunensis and Eriugena. Remarks on the Method and Content of the *Clavis Physicae*", in W. Beierwaltes (ed.), *Eriugena redivivus. Zur Wirkungsgeschichte seines Denkens im Mittelalter und im Übergang zur Neuzeit. Vorträge des V. Internationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums, Werner-Reimers-Stiftung, Bad Homburg*, 26.-30. August 1985 (Heidelberg: Winter, 1987), p. 162–173. Berthold's interpretation of the *De causis primis et secundis* and its phrase *eo, quod non distant a primo* thus brought him closer to Eriugena himself than the *Clavis* could.

151 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 4, p. 10, l. 155–174. Cf. Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, lib. 11, 615D–617A, p. 124, l. 3142–3188, and Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, c. 116, p. 85, l. 4 – p. 86, l. 39. Another portion of *Clavis* c. 116 was used concerning participation at 2A, but it is only cited in full at *Expositio*, 128A, p. 166, l. 12 – p. 167, l. 57, alongside *De divinis nominibus*, 5.8–9 on the exemplars in God.

152 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 4, p. 10, l. 165–169: '*Ideae a philosophis divinae voluntates appellari solent et praecipue a Platonis, quoniam quaecumque voluit Deus facere, in ipsis principaliter et causaliter fecit. Et infra: 'Has formas sive ideas Dionysius ceterique sancti appellant per se ipsam bonitas, per se ipsam essentia [...].'*

153 Coincidentally, in *Periphyseon*, lib. 11, 617A–C, immediately following the passage that became the source for the scholium just mentioned, Eriugena also appealed to the authority of Dionysius and cited *De divinis nominibus*, 11.6 at length. This was not taken over into the *Clavis*.

154 For this reason, Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, 11.27, p. 424, l. 80 – p. 425, l. 36, placed Dionysius with Aristotle against the idolatrous "followers of Hesiod"

preferred to cite and slightly modify Dionysius' positive statement that immediately followed: being itself (*per se esse*) can be said divinely and causally (*divine et causaliter*) of God himself, and divinely and participably (*divine participabiliter*) of the providential powers of the unparticipable God.¹⁵⁵ This would correspond neatly to Berthold's own distinction of intransitive and transitive *invisibilia*. The primordial causes as intransitive are the divine wisdom or the archetypical world and are one (*unum in re*) with the divine essence. But as causes, they are transitive, and are the Good as "divinely participable". In this passage, Dionysius had reported the teaching of some of his "divine, holy masters":¹⁵⁶ they called the *substantificator* of *per se bonitas* and *per se deitas* "the Beyond-good" (*superbona*) and "the Beyond-deity" (*superdea*), and called *per se bonitas* itself "the beneficent and deifying gift coming from God".¹⁵⁷ As Berthold interpreted him, Dionysius had thus posited some form of a subordination of these principles to God. Berthold presented this interpretation as consistent with Dionysius' *Epistula II* to Gaius, which outlined how God is above the "thearchy" – taken as a synonym for the primordial causes, deities, goodnesses and beneficent, deifying gifts of the unparticipable God.¹⁵⁸

and the Platonists. Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. 11, lect. 4, §931-933, p. 346, also interpreted this passage as a critique of the Platonists. See V. Boland, *Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Sources and Synthesis* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), p. 299-303; Hankey, "The Concord", p. 163-169.

155 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 4, p. 10, l. 179-180. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena*, p. 343-7, has noted a crucial variant: where Saracen's translation reads *participaliter autem datas ex deo imparticipabili provisivas virtutes*, Berthold has *divine vero participabiliter datas*. As Ludueña indicated, *participabiliter* appears in Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, 11.27, p. 424, l. 74 and p. 425, l. 41. Berthold's only other citations of *De divinis nominibus*, 11.6 – in *Expositio*, 63B, p. 187, l. 35 – p. 188, l. 52; and 113A, p. 34, l. 35-44 – both read *particulariter*, although this may be the result of a copyist's error. Berthold's passing reference to *De divinis nominibus*, 11.6 at *Expositio*, 23A, p. 113, l. 55-57 suggests that he generally intended *participabiliter* as the correct reading.

156 Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, 11.29, p. 425, l. 66-68, and Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. 11, lect. 4, §938, identified these individuals with Hierotheus and other disciples of the Apostles.

157 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 4, p. 11, l. 186-196.

158 Albert's comments on the *Epistle* focus on the problem of deification, and how *deitas* can be regarded as both created and uncreated. His solution distinguishes between the formal and efficient senses of "the principle of deification". God is said to be above the formal principle which is "the [created] participation of deity assimilating to God through grace or glory", while he is identical with the thearchy as the efficient cause of deity. See Albert the Great, *Super Dionysii Epistulas*, *Epistula II*, p. 483, l. 49-58. For Berthold, *Epistula II* referred to the self-sufficient gods (*deus per essentiam*) as formal causes and to their dependency on God as their efficient cause (*deus per causam*).

Since Berthold was of course aware of Dionysius' outright rejection of any deity besides (*praeter*) God, he knew he must tread lightly. He would explicitly invoke the Proclean term "gods" for the first time only after citing the Psalms 95:3 and 97:9 that praise God as "far exalted above all gods", and in Psalm 50:1 as the Lord of gods (*Deus deorum dominus*), and after citing Paul, who subordinated "the gods in heaven and earth" to "our one God and Father, from whom are all things and we in him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and we through him" (1 Cor. 8:5-6).¹⁵⁹ The same gods mentioned by Paul (*isti di*), Berthold declared, are for Proclus "beyond beings and the measures of being, for every being is in them as number is in the monads, though beings proceed from them". Then there followed the pivotal text from *De decem dubitationibus* 10.63, where Proclus used the same principle found in Proposition 64 to establish that "one" and "good" exists in three ways: according to cause, existence, and participation.

Berthold anticipated that his readers would be uncomfortable with admitting the existence of "gods by essence". He invoked Boethius' remarkable argument in the *Consolatio philosophiae* that everyone in bliss is god (*omnis beatus deus*) to illustrate how there can be one God "by nature" and many gods as you please "by participation". "If you object", Berthold remarked, "that therefore there are [still] no gods by essence, I say that this does not follow, since every god by essence participates deity because it does not have deity in its superabundance".¹⁶⁰ The gods are subordinate to the immediate efficient causality of the Good – they participate or limit its superabundance – and do so in such a way that they are not distant from the first. That is, as formal causes constituted out of the single intention of "one" or "good" they refract the divine Light by proportionately exercising the same spontaneous and generative activity of the Good. In this way, Berthold's original interpretation of his Eriugenian sources (especially the *Liber de causis primis et secundis*) in terms of the distinction of formal intentions ("good", "infinite", etc.) and the relation between formal and efficient causality established the accord of Proclus and Dionysius on one of the central themes for the *Elementatio theologica* that would be most difficult for his contemporaries to accept: the existence of primordial causes that are divine by their essence.

At the heart of Berthold's determinedly Platonic approach to the separate substances was Proposition 65 ("Everything that subsists in any way, subsists *principaliformiter* according to cause, or according to essence, or according to

159 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 4, p. 12, l. 218-226.

160 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 4, p. 13, l. 248-250. In 2A, p. 83, l. 48-53, this limitation of the higher by the lower is called the third "mode" of participation.

participation in an exemplary way").¹⁶¹ The same idea appeared also in Proclus' proof to Proposition 140, which Dietrich of Freiberg had cited as the exhaustive enumeration of the possible modes of any essential order.¹⁶² For Berthold, the principle is "so obvious that it is in no need of proof".¹⁶³ Berthold's elaboration of Dietrich's theory, after it has been subjected to the Platonic critique of the universality of abstraction and the metaphysics of being, would be impossible without this principle, which provided the law of proportionality that captured the way in which the separate substances must be truly ordered among themselves, independently of our thinking.

It was with these principles from Propositions 62-66, having established for the first time in the *Prologus* that the primordial causes or gods were in fact posited by both Proclus and Dionysius, that Berthold schematised the array of separate substances.¹⁶⁴ As the final link in his catena of citations from Gallus, the *De causis primis et secundis*, the glosses of Maximus, Dionysius, the Scriptures, and Proclus, Berthold gave a heavily glossed citation of *De divinis nominibus* 11.6 and interpolated the entire population of natural providence into the Areopagite's text, from the six primordial causes, to their orders, to the self-subsistent members of those orders, and finally their participants. Despite his efforts to show that this simply was the common teaching of Proclus and Dionysius, Berthold's proportional reasoning about the relationship between God's unlimited causal influence and the limited influence of primordial causes in their partial universes was the teaching for which he himself will be cited in an anonymous commentary on the *Sentences* from 14th-century Regensburg.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 65, p. 35, l. 1-3: *Omne quod qualitercumque subsistit aut secundum causam est principaliformiter aut secundum existentiam aut secundum participationem exemplariter.*

¹⁶² Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.1.2, p. 146, l. 14-19: *Plures modos non invenimus in essentialiter ordinatis*; 11.7.4, p. 151, l. 66-73. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 65F, p. 204, l. 109-114, concluded by finding this logical triad also in Dionysius, *Epistula* IX.2, 1108B.

¹⁶³ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 74C, p. 54, l. 137-142: *Ubi primo notandum et quasi pro fundamento ponendum, quod omne, quod qualitercumque subsistit, aut secundum causam principaliformiter aut secundum essentiam aut secundum participationem exemplariter per 65. Sed species, de qua agitur, subsistit tam in causa principaliformiter quam in participantibus exemplariter, et hoc vere et secundum rem. Hoc enim ita manifestum est, quod etiam non indigent probatione.*

¹⁶⁴ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 4-5, p. 12, l. 227 – p. 13, l. 263. Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §63 yields Propositions 64 and 65 (l. 231-242); Berthold applied Proposition 65 to Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. 111, prosa 10 (l. 243-250), and Propositions 62 and 66 to Dionysius (l. 254-263).

¹⁶⁵ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 8D, p. 162, l. 178-209. See Conclusion, section 1, below.

Just as Berthold used these Eriugenian sources to establish the subtle boundary between God and the highest of his works, so he also employed the *Clavis* to account for the dynamic presence of the Good as it moves through these causes or instruments of its causality:

Divine goodness and essence and life and wisdom and everything, which are in the font of all, first flow forth into the primordial causes and make them to be, then through the primordial causes into their effects in an ineffable way.¹⁶⁶

That is, the same Good courses through all things providentially. Since these causes, insofar as they are unities or goodnesses, are not strictly other than God, “in a broad sense” God is said to become (*fieri*) through them in his providential and creative procession (*processus seu exitus*). The procession of a cause “from the secrets of its eminence into an effect” is said not only of the primordial causes, “which are said to be made [*fieri*], since they essentially multiply themselves in their effects,” but also of “God by his providence [...] as Dionysius says in the *Letter to Titus*.”¹⁶⁷ In this respect, Dionysius’ twofold usage of the term “procession” (effects proceed *from* a cause; a cause proceeds *into* its effects),¹⁶⁸ was transmitted to Berthold through his Eriugenian sources. This is what undergirded his view about the ineffability at the depth of each thing (*usia*) by virtue of its immediate relation to the Good.¹⁶⁹

166 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18B, p. 47, l. 112-5 = Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, c. 126, p. 94, l. 13-6.

167 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 3A, p. 92, l. 14-19: *tunc est processus seu exitus rei existentis in actu ex secretis suae eminentiae in effectum, et sic non solum causae primordiales dicuntur fieri, cum se ipsas per essentiam multiplicant in effectus, sed etiam Deus ipse sua providentia, quae ‘perfecta est’, ut dicit Dionysius in Epistula ad Titum, quae est causa, ut sint omnia, et ad omnia procedit et in omni fit et continet omnia.*

168 S. Gersh, “Ideas and Energies in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite”, in *Studia Patristica* 15(1984), p. 297–300.

169 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120D, p. 98, l. 255 – p. 99, l. 268: *Non est autem alia providentia omnium et alia causa omnium, sed unus atque idem Deus, qui in omnia procedit et in omni fit [...]. Lux ineffabilis omnibus intellectualibus oculis semper praesens et a nullo intellectu cognoscitur, quid sit, per omnia diffusa in infinitum et fit in omnibus omnia;* 120E, p. 100, l. 306-8: *Deus ex superessentialitate suae naturae, qua dicitur non esse primum descendens, in primordialibus causis a se ipso creatur et fit principium omnis essentiae;* 123M, p. 136, l. 367-382: *Dum ergo incomprehensibilis intelligitur, per excellentiam nihilum non immerito vocatur; atvero suis theophaniis incipiens apparere, veluti ex nihilo dicitur aliquid procedere, et quae proprie super omnem essentiam existimatur, proprie quoque in omni essentia cognoscitur. [...] Ipse factor omnium in omnibus factus.* On the ineffability of *usia*, see 121E, cited at 4.2, n. 50, above.

This Platonic consensus on the Trinity and the primordial causes was the standard Berthold used when he incorporated Dietrich of Freiberg's notion of the essentially active intellect (*intellectus in actu per essentiam*) as an *imago Trinitatis* into his commentary. Dietrich had used this notion explicitly to interpret what Proclus meant by the gods in the *Elementatio theologica*.¹⁷⁰ According to Dietrich, when Proclus spoke of "gods" he simply appropriated the term to "inferior substances, namely the intelligences", in order to indicate that the One was beyond the names "intellect" and "god".¹⁷¹ Berthold departed from Dietrich by assimilating Proclus' gods to the primordial causes or divine processions of Dionysius and not to the intelligences of the *Liber de causis*.¹⁷² This coincided with Berthold's extensive elaboration of one of Dietrich's own conceptual inventions, the notion that a certain set of separate substances can be understood ontologically as beings existing as a species (*entia secundum speciem*). Adopting this notion, Berthold will argue for the subordination of the separate intellects to the gods considered in terms of their constitutive formal intentions: the gods are constituted by one formal intention ("one" or "good"), and the intelligences out of many ("good", "power", "being", "life", and "intellect"). But this clear subordination of intelligences to the gods according to the dictates of Platonic reasoning came at the cost of a proliferation of separate principles that then must exist between the gods and intelligences (the orders of separately subsisting "infinities", "beings", and "lives"). These we found enumerated in the table at 62C, but now we will look more closely at Berthold's justification for positing their existence.

170 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 1.7.1, p. 140, l. 21-28: *illae intellectuales substantiae, quas philosophi intelligentias vocabant, de quibus agitur in Libro de causis et in libro Procli, quas in pluribus locis illius libri deos nominat, quamvis secundum diminutam et imperfectam rationem deitatis, sicut etiam Philosophus in XII Metaphysicae approbat dictum illorum, qui vocabant principia moventia caelos, vocabant, inquam, deos secundum diminutam et imperfectam rationem deitatis.*

171 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 9.2, p. 175, l. 70 – p. 176, l. 81: *Unde attendendo hanc Dei immensitatem Proclus in libro suo superordinavit omnibus intellectibus et secundum substantiam et secundum operationem quadam inexplicabili positiva nominis proprietate essentiam divinam dicens propositione 20: '[...] et omnibus intellectualibus hypostasibus superius ipsum unum'. Ecce, caruit nomine positivo, quo exprimeret illam summam essentiam, quae Deus est, caruit, inquam, secundum intentionem suam, nec suffecit sibi nomen intellectus, immo nec nomen Dei, quae duo nomina appropriate inferioribus substantiis, id est intelligentiis, in processu eiusdem libri sui propositione 121[125], 130[134], 136[140], 141[145], et ibi in commento, ubi dicitur: 'Plena autem sunt omnia diis, et quod unumquodque habet secundum naturam, inde habet'.*

172 E. Ludueña, "Creatio y determinatio en la Escuela Renana. De Alberto Magno a Bertoldo de Moosburg", in *Principios. Revista de Filosofía*, 22/37(2015), p. 77–97, at p. 87–94.

4 Limit and the Unlimited

Moving below the thearchy (God and the gods) to the numerous orders of entities that Berthold posited in the realm of being (from infinities to human nature) above the realm of becoming (nature and human individuals), we are immediately confronted with the question of the relationship between the creative causality of the One and the determinative causality exercised by the first of the primordial causes. Berthold identified this primordial cause – the *prima unitas* as distinct from the *prime unitas* or “the primarily God” – as “infinity” or the Unlimited. In so doing, he proposed a solution to a puzzle that has vexed Proclus’ medieval and modern interpreters, namely, how to produce a coherent account of the relationship between the pair of Limit and the Unlimited (πέρας-ἄπειρον), discussed mostly in Propositions 89–92, and the gods. Proclus’ most explicit statement about their relation in the *Elementatio theologica* at Proposition 159 (“Every order of gods is from the first principles, Limit and the Unlimited, but some relate more to the causes of Limit, others to the causes of the Unlimited”),¹⁷³ has left his commentators from the time of Nicholas of Methone (d. 1160/1166) somewhat baffled, since it would seem to locate these two principles somewhere between the One and the gods, whose relation to the One was supposedly immediate.¹⁷⁴

As the situation has been recently described by Jonathan Greig, there are two problems that confront Proclus’ interpreters on this point.¹⁷⁵ The first concerns the reconciliation of two apparently distinct causal models: one in which each supersubstantial god unites a series of entities that emerge from it and share its unique characteristic, and another in which Limit and the Unlimited are the immediate causes of the mixture of Being. The second problem is to avoid an undesirable consequence that could be drawn from in Proposition 159: if the orders arising from the gods are composed of Limit and the Unlimited, this would entail at least some composition in the gods themselves as principles of those orders. If so, this would mean that the gods are not in fact pure unities.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 159, p. 78, l. 1–2: *Omnis ordo deorum ex primis est principijs, fine et infinitate; sed hic quidem ad finis causas magis, hic autem ad infinitatis.*

¹⁷⁴ See E.R. Dodds’ commentary to Proposition 159, in Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963²), p. 281.

¹⁷⁵ See J. Greig, “Proclus on the Two Causal Models for the One’s Production of Being. Reconciling the Relation of the Henads and the Limit/Unlimited”, in *The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* 14(2020), p. 23–48, at p. 23–28.

¹⁷⁶ Greig, “Proclus on the Two Causal Models”, p. 28–31.

Let us call the first the “integration” problem, and the second the “simplicity” problem.

Although Berthold did not directly raise these questions, we will see that they nevertheless provide a helpful way of summarising the advantages and shortcomings in his interpretation of Proclus on the Limit and the Unlimited. Berthold’s proposal, in short, was that the One (*prime unitas*) should be identified as the Limit that produces a series of limits, which are the gods or primordial causes, and that the first primordial cause (*prima unitas*) should be identified as the Unlimited. This allowed him to avoid the integration problem altogether by maintaining that Proclus was in fact not outlining two different models of causality. There was one causal pattern derived from the principles of essential order and proportionality in Propositions 62–66, and this applied as much to the gods as to all other members of the essential order of natural providence. Each primordial cause generates a series from its own characteristic intention – in the case of the Good, this produces the intermediary principles (*bonitates per essentiam*) that, since they are substantial goods, refract its causal power. Each primordial cause also leaves a trace of its intention in every principle and order subordinate to it. This allowed Berthold to say that the primordial cause of being (*prime entitas*) and order arising from it, which follows immediately after the order of *infinitas*, is indeed constituted by Limit and the Unlimited (Proposition 89) precisely because Limit and the Unlimited leave a trace of their influence in every order of the gods (Proposition 159).

This proposal, however, led Berthold into some difficult territory relative to the “simplicity” problem. Berthold would want to maintain that his account of formal intentions did in fact preserve the unicity of each god as constituted from only the intention of “one” or “good”, even though each god is subordinate to the One according to its own degree of “contraction”.¹⁷⁷ We may again recall the table of six formal intentions in 62C, whose number at other times expanded to include the seven “pillars” or formal perfections of the house of God (*unitas/bonitas, virtus, entitas, vita, intellectualitas, animealitas, and naturalitas*). All that was required was to show that the first two intentions could be assimilated to the Limit and the Unlimited. But as soon as Berthold made this assimilation, he introduced a linear structure of subordination among the primordial causes. The One (*prime unitas*) or Limit was the immediate cause of the entire order of the gods as “ones” or “limits”. The highest member within that order (*prima unitas*), the primordial cause of infinity or power (*virtus*), as

177 Berthold received the terminology of “formal intentions” and “contraction” from Dietrich, who used it to interpret the *Liber de causis*. See Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.16.1, p. 157, l. 28–35.

both an essential unity (*unitas secundum essentiam*) and an originary formal cause (*infinitas secundum causam*), would fit Berthold's desired model perfectly. However, every subordinate primordial cause within that order beginning with *prime ens* must be, in Berthold's words, "almost" (*quasi*) composite, insofar as it presupposes the activity of both the One and infinity, which he identified as an "auxiliary cause" (*concausa*) within the order of gods.

Readers of Proclus today would no doubt see this very linear model as a major departure from Proclus' own more sophisticated henology, even though it was so advantageous for Berthold's articulation of a coherent theory of causality in Proclus relative to the integration problem.¹⁷⁸ Proclus in his commentary on Plato's *Parmenides* advanced an important but nevertheless obscure distinction between the way in which the gods arise from the One, "according to union" (καθ' ἑνωσιν), and the way entities arise from the gods, by sameness and difference.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, for Proclus, since the precise number of henadic principles can only be known to the gods,¹⁸⁰ it would seem preposterous to fix their number to six or seven. But this is exactly what Berthold was invited to do under the guidance of Proposition 135, which established a direct correlation between the number of gods and the number of the genera of being.¹⁸¹ In the spirit of Dietrich, Berthold would hold that the entire exercise of the oblique motion would be undermined if one could not reason necessarily about the invisible things of God beginning from the creation that was suffused with divine order and beauty.¹⁸² Ultimately, however, and perhaps

178 For the positions of C. D'Ancona, E. Butler, G. Van Riel, and an original solution to the problem in Proclus, see Greig, "Proclus on the Two Causal Models", p. 31–46.

179 Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria*, ed. C. Steel, 3 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007–2009), vol. 1, lib. I, p. 644, l. 9–10; lib. II, p. 745, l. 14–23; vol. 3, lib. VI, p. 1049, l. 26–27.

180 Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–1906), vol. 3, p. 12, l. 27–30.

181 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 135M, p. 230, l. 301–303. At 139D, Berthold addressed the possible confusion arising from his interpretation, which places between the gods and the "genus of beings" an intermediate "order of infinities", according to the order of formal perfections. With a citation from *Clavis*, c. 119, Berthold explains that the infinities can be spoken of as *non*-beings. This equivocation appeared to satisfy the commentator.

182 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 109B, p. 13, l. 29 – p. 14, l. 37: *qui cum constituatur ex sex unitatibus, ut per declarationem 62 demonstratum est, necessarium est, quod in ipso tali ordine partes ipsius distributae sint secundum partes senarii aliquotas ita, quod primum sit unum tantum, 2 secunda et 3 tertia; 126F, p. 158, l. 146–147: ponatur sub exemplo descriptionis ordinis deorum, qui necessario constat ex sex diis; 139D, p. 35, l. 76–81: Hanc enim negare non possumus secundum intentionem auctoris, quia ad hoc praeter alia supra praemissa enumerata motiva cogit nos natura ordinis essentialis, quem necessarium est, sicut et in aliis, immo prae omnibus aliis in multitudine unali deorum saluum esse. Quod non esset, nisi*

more in accordance with Proclus' own intent, Berthold understood that the oblique motion was itself the means to a higher apprehension. The content of this apprehension Berthold found described, not in Proclus' commentaries on Plato, but, as we will see, in the *Clavis physicae*, which taught him that reason necessarily divided what was in itself the unified movement of God as the beginning, middle, and end of all things.¹⁸³

Berthold's interpretation of the propositions on the absolute Limit and Unlimited followed from his views about the six-fold order of the gods. His first lengthy discussion of the subject is found in Proposition 90 ("The first [*prima*] Limit and the first [*prima*] Unlimited exist prior to everything constituted out of limit and the unlimited").¹⁸⁴ Berthold's first inclination would no doubt have been to use the well-established distinction in the *Expositio* between the adverb *prime* (πρώτως) and the adjective *primus* (πρωτός), as it was first occasioned by Proposition 8. In such a view, the *prima finitas* mentioned in Proposition 90 should refer to the first effect of the primordial cause (e.g., *prime finitas*). However, in a rare departure from the letter of the *Elementatio*, Berthold proceeded directly to identify the One as *prime finitas* which, he argued, was what Dionysius had in mind when he spoke of the One limiting all things, including infinity (*omnem quidem infinitatem terminans*).¹⁸⁵ He further associated the causality of Limit with God's orderly arrangement of all things according to measure, number and weight.¹⁸⁶ Using the law of proportionality in Proposition 65, he argued that the order of gods is in fact an order of limits (*finitates*), who would exercise the same dispositive power within their own domains.¹⁸⁷

sex unitates contineret; 149F, p. 116, l. 165-172: *Hoc igitur positio, cui non potest intellectus contradicere* [...].

183 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 125D, p. 150, l. 103-109: *Primae causae in se ipsis unum sunt et simplices nullique cognito ordine definitae aut a se invicem segregatae: haec enim in effectibus suis partiuntur*. See also n. 216, below.

184 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 90, p. 46, l. 1-2: *Omnibus ex finitate et infinitate constantibus preexistit secundum se prima finitas et prima infinitas*.

185 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 90A, p. 154, l. 16 – p. 155, l. 39: [...] *Praemissis diligenter perspectis apparet ex sententia Dionysii prime unum, quod simpliciter omnia finit et terminat, esse prime finitatem*. See also *Expositio*, 159H, p. 198, l. 291-298, citing Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 13.1 and 13.3.

186 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159H, p. 199, l. 308-311; 123K, p. 133, l. 271-287.

187 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 90C, p. 156, l. 90 – p. 157, l. 91. Incidentally, we may note that Proclus sometimes wrote that the Limit is more like the One. See Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, eds H.D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink, vol. 3 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978), lib. 11, c. 8, p. 33, l. 1-2; id., *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, vol. 1, p. 176, l. 11-12; id., *In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria*, vol. 1, lib. 11, p. 738, l. 18-34; vol. 3, lib. VI, p. 1124, l. 6.

According to Berthold, the first unity (*prima unitas*) among these gods or limits is power or infinity (*prime virtus, infinitas*). He presented this as the shared doctrine of Proclus, Dionysius, and the *Clavis physicae*.¹⁸⁸ The Unlimited or “infinity” is the naturally consequent determination to arise after “limit” because, he argued, “it is necessary that every determining [principle] be of an opposed *ratio* to what it determines”.¹⁸⁹ He does not explain how this rule would apply to lower formal intentions. For example, one might say that *entitas* determines infinity understood as *non-entitas*, and it may be that life would determine *entitas* as “not-life”, but this is not clear from the text.

The “extremes of the universe”, the gods and prime matter, share the common feature of being produced “by the primarily Good alone”.¹⁹⁰ To explain the relation of prime matter to the subsequent determinative causality of *prime infinitas*, Berthold staged a confrontation between Plato and “others” (in this case, Dietrich of Freiberg) regarding the question of whether matter is “something one and simple through its essence”. Opposing this thesis, Dietrich argued that matter is “many and essentially multiple” because of the plurality of its inherent capacities to receive different forms.¹⁹¹ To present Plato’s alternative and correct position, Berthold took arguments from Ulrich of Strassburg stating that matter has a threefold being: (1) as simple in its substance, it is without composition and prior to “the first inchoation of form”; (2) as a “being of potency”, it is subject to motion and change, insofar as it has “the inchoations of form”, although it remains one by privation of any form in act, “and thus nothing yet is distinct in it”; (3) as “actual being”, it is “determined by the act of form”.¹⁹² This threefold distinction of matter, presented here as an exegesis of the *Timaeus* (which was not clearly stated in Ulrich) would correspond for Berthold to a precise sequence of causal influence, from (1) the Good, (2) to

188 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 90B, p. 155, l. 41 – p. 156, l. 77; 60B, p. 172, l. 66 – p. 173, l. 75, followed immediately by *De divinis nominibus*, 5.5 on the priority of *per se esse* relative to the other processions; 60D, p. 173, l. 98–107: *Ubi notandum, quod hic [Dionysius] vocat ‘totam’ et ‘per se ipsam virtutem’ primam bonitatem intra ordinem unialem*; 3B, p. 94, l. 77–92. For the agreement of all three authorities, see *Expositio*, 139D, p. 34, l. 60 – p. 36, l. 117, where *non ens* in the *Clavis* is identified with the order of infinities.

189 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 89B, p. 151, l. 58–67.

190 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 59C, p. 166, l. 106–115.

191 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 59C, p. 166, l. 124 – p. 167, l. 148. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De miscibilibus in mixto*, ed. W. Wallace, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, 3.1–4, p. 32, l. 3 – p. 33, l. 28.

192 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. IV, tr. 2, c. 7 (2–6), p. 120, l. 18 – p. 124, l. 153. Berthold identified the inchoation of forms with Augustine’s notion of the seminal reasons. See *Expositio*, 138 *commentum*, p. 31, l. 246–248: *secunda illustratio est infinitas ipsius materiae per inchoationes omnium formarum in ea, quas quidam vocant rationes seminales, quas certum non esse eiusdem essentiae cum materia*.

power (*virtus*),¹⁹³ and finally (3) being, for “prime matter, although it is a one when considered by itself, is yet unable to stand in the things of nature without [something] determining it”.¹⁹⁴

As for the troublesome Proposition 159, Berthold maintained that it must be read in light of the Propositions 151-156, which concern “the properties of the gods, in comparison with one another and with their effects or orders”. From this standpoint, Proposition 159 should be understood with reference to “a general property belonging to every order caused by the gods”.¹⁹⁵ In other words, he read the phrase “order of the gods” (*ordo deorum*) in the text as a subjective genitive, “the order that comes from the gods”. In Berthold’s view, this connected Proposition 159 both to Proposition 89 (the first result of Limit and the Unlimited is true Being), in that the order of being is clearly subordinate to the order of the primordial causes, and to Proposition 102, which stated that *prime ens* (the primordial cause of Being) bestows the mixture of Limit and the Unlimited.¹⁹⁶

Berthold’s commentary on Proposition 102 began by confronting an interpretation which, considering Proposition 89, would restrict the communication of Limit and Unlimited to true beings (*enter entia*) that alone participate “extensive infinity”, either insofar as they are eternal in an atemporal sense or as perpetual through temporal succession.¹⁹⁷ To avoid this result, Berthold introduced a distinction among the gods themselves. The primordial cause of being (*prime ens*) can be considered in two ways: as *amethectum*,¹⁹⁸ it is

193 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 57G, p. 154, l. 224: *materia prima, quae substantivatur per posse*. Cf. Averroes, *De substantia orbis*, in *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, vol. 9 (Venezia: Junta, 1562-1574), c. 1, f. 3vL.

194 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 89B, p. 151, l. 53-54. See also *Expositio*, 71D, p. 35, l. 128-138: *Verbi gratia: prime (prime) primae ed.) virtus determinat essentiam materiae primae, quae procedit a solo primo, per commentum 59, ad esse in potentia, puta ad virtutem receptivam formae, et sic essentia materiae subicitur virtuti; sed quia uterque effectus tam prime boni quam prime virtutis stat adhuc in quadam indeterminatione, ideo prime ens praesupponens effectum utriusque determinat et informat ipsum entitate, scilicet essentia formae; formae, inquam, talis, quae tantum dat esse*.

195 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159, p. 189, l. 5-7: [...] *unam generalem proprietatem omnibus ordinibus a diis causatis convenientem*. See also *Expositio*, 159D, p. 194, l. 172-176.

196 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159F-G, p. 196, l. 229 – p. 197, l. 243.

197 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102A, p. 217, l. 14-26.

198 William of Moerbeke inexplicably transliterated ἀμέθεκτον in Propositions 99-102, 123, 161, which he had translated elsewhere as *imparticipatum* (Propositions 23-24, 63 *comm.*, 69 *comm.*, 162 *comm.*). At *Expositio*, 99C, p. 200, l. 69-81, Berthold inventively distinguished between *imparticipatum* and *amethectum*, arguing that the latter denotes a loftier kind of independent subsistence. That is, *amethectum* combines the senses of “the unparticipated”, “the indivisible”, and “the not-participating” (*imparticipans*). It is not only exalted above its effects, but it is “independent as such”. In this sense, *amethectum* is equivalent

“unbegotten”;¹⁹⁹ however, “as a unity included within the unificial order, it proceeds from two causes, namely, the primary cause and the auxiliary cause [*concausa*]”.²⁰⁰ Such a distinction within each primordial cause, as uncaused insofar as it is *amethectum* and yet dependent on the One, was a straightforward combination of Propositions 99 and 100. The gods are self-sufficient *qua* unities but are above self-sufficiency *qua* the super-plenitude of their distinctive intention.²⁰¹ In one sense, this aligned with Berthold’s characteristic distinction between the self-originating character of each god as a formal cause, coupled with its dependency on the Good as an efficient cause. However, we see here that Berthold has added another layer of complexity: the god of *entitas* (*prime ens*) depends both on the One and on *prime infinitas* as an “auxiliary cause”. Berthold was careful to observe the difference between the more rarefied notion of the *amethectum*, which applies only to the gods, and the wider amplitude of the self-sufficient (*antarkes*).²⁰² Yet this technical precision had to be abandoned to address the problem at hand, for Berthold finally conceded that *prime ens* “is, as it were, composed” from Limit and the Unlimited, which both “act in *prime ente* itself and with it”.²⁰³ Only this can explain how all beings are recipients of the mixture of Limit and the Unlimited (according to Propositions 89 and 102). But the internal composition required to account for the serial order among the gods has compromised the pure simplicity of every god below *prime infinitas*.²⁰⁴

The conclusion drawn from Proposition 102 – that *prime ens* is “quasi-composite” because Limit and the Unlimited “act in *prime ente* itself and with it” – was used in Berthold’s commentary on Proposition 159 to address

to the restricted senses of *imparticipatum* presented in *Expositio*, 23A, p. 112, l. 15 – p. 113, l. 54. However, at 161F, he was forced to admit that there is also a “less proper” sense of the term *amethectum*.

199 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 23E, p. 117, l. 191–201, where Berthold presented this notion as the teaching of Dionysius.

200 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102B, p. 218, l. 33–38: *licet prime ens inquantum amethectum non sit ab alia causa, sed ingenitum per 99, tamen, inquantum est unitas quaedam intra ordinem unialem conclusa, procedit a duabus causis, scilicet principali et concausa. Principali, quod est prime unum, quod etiam directe est causa et totalis ipsius prime entis. Concausa, scilicet prima unitate intra ordinem, scilicet prime infinitate, quae est intermedia prime unius et prime entis per 92 in commento.*

201 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 99B, p. 199, l. 55–67; 100G, p. 208, l. 145–154.

202 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 99A, p. 198, l. 13 – p. 199, l. 41.

203 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102B, p. 218, l. 43–48.

204 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 23C, p. 115, l. 126–128: *participatorum quaedam sunt simul, licet non secundum idem, participata, participantia et imparticipata, ut bonitates et unitates.*

“a controversy among the wise” concerning the origin of plurality and, more specifically, whether the dyad proceeds immediately from the One. From Thomas of York, who accepted their arguments, Berthold cited Avicbron, Gundissalinus, and Hermes on the dyad as the immediate product of the One and the root of plurality, which Avicbron and Gundissalinus identified as first matter and first form.²⁰⁵ Opposing such views were Dionysius, “whose authority prevails, since it is supported by infallible reason”, and Boethius, who maintained that the angels and all things incorporeal are immaterial. Berthold resolved the controversy by distinguishing (or equivocating) between four different senses of the word “matter”.²⁰⁶ (1) In “the strict sense”, matter is what is “mixed with privation”; (2) in its “less proper sense”, matter as it is found in the celestial bodies is identical with “the subject” of place and extension; (3) in its “wide sense”, matter can mean anything that is subjected to act, such as rational souls and angels, which pass from intellection to non-intellection; (4) finally, in its “widest sense”, matter can mean “an actual determining potency”. The latter refers to the notion we have encountered already in section 4.1 in Berthold’s account of “theological universality”, according to which a more actual formal intention is determined or contracted by a more potential formal intention. In this fourth sense, one could say that “matter” is found in all beings beneath the gods as far as heavenly souls, in which there is a gradation of increasing formal determination and composition, but where the result nevertheless remains a single nature (*unum in re*). In this sense, then, everything proceeds from the dyad, which is “far better and more fittingly named the Limit and Unlimited”.²⁰⁷ Nevertheless, when Berthold treated “the origin of these two principles” in themselves, he sought no compromise and rejected the arguments of Gundissalinus and Avicbron outright, using the principle from 5B that *idem manens idem semper natum est facere idem*, and the principle of procession by similitude. Since “nothing is the cause of its contrary”,²⁰⁸ the One causes *per se* unities. Since two equally first principles

205 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159B, p. 191, l. 75 – p. 193, l. 137. Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 11, c. 11. On Thomas’ hylomorphism, see D.E. Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century* (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 63–64 and 83–85.

206 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159C, p. 193, l. 139–167.

207 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159D–F, p. 194, l. 174 and p. 196, l. 229–233.

208 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159G, p. 197, l. 249. This does not contradict his argument for the derivation of the Unlimited from the Limit in *Expositio*, 89B, p. 151, l. 58–59: *omne determinans esse oppositae rationis ad illud, quod determinat*, which referred to the emergence of new formal determinations that are unlike their cause owing to their distance or contraction of the cause’s power.

cannot emanate immediately and causally (*causaliter*) from the One, they are necessarily reduced to two principles or springs (*scaturrigines*): the *prime unitas* and the *prima unitas*.²⁰⁹

With the notion that infinity or *prima unitas* is the auxiliary cause (*con-causa*) of the order of the gods,²¹⁰ Berthold maintained that the order of unities is subject to the same rational laws as the rest of the invisible world: the highest member of any order acts as an auxiliary cause of its subordinate members.²¹¹ This determination of the causality of the One by *prime virtus* affects not only prime matter and prepares it for subsequent determinations, but “in some sense leaves a trace of its intention in the goodnesses following it”.²¹² Nevertheless, Berthold did not overlook the more speculative interpretative possibility that his Eriugenian sources offered him: a model of the primordial causes or gods in which they are not so easily defined by linear structures. Commenting on Proposition 140, where Proclus alluded to the sympathy (*compatientia*) that is found in everything owing to the total presence of the higher principles in the lower, Berthold explained how each god not only leaves a vestige of its intention in the lower gods, as we would expect by now, but also that a lower god leaves a vestige of its intention in the order arising from a prior god. In other words, because *prime intellectus* leaves a vestige of its causal power in *prime anima* and *prime natura*, it “consequently” leaves a vestige “in the order

209 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159G, p. 197, l. 263-264. Berthold frequently referred to the primordial causes as “springs”, see 17A; 18B; 18C; 99B; 100D; 123H; 131E; 140D; 143D; 153B; 177F.

210 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 152B-C, p. 141, l. 57 – p. 142, l. 81. An auxiliary cause is the summit (*summitas*) within a particular order and is itself subordinated to a primordial cause. See, for example, *Expositio*, 22B, p. 103, l. 180-186.

211 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159G, p. 198, l. 278-286: *immo [prime infinitas] relinquit vestigium suae principiationis etiam in ipsis diis. Sic ergo omnis ordo deorum, quem dii instituunt, est ex principiis primis fine et infinito formaliter et a primis principiis prime finitate et prime infinitate causaliter et originaliter, quorum unum est simpliciter primum, puta prime unum, aliud autem est secundario primum, a quo etiam tamquam a summo sui totus ordo deorum dependet; non iam proprie causaliter, sicut a primo simpliciter principio, sed suo modo, inquantum intra unum et eundem ordinem superius est concausa inferioris stans sub ordine principalis principii, quod principale per ipsum et cum ipso et in ipso sequentia producit.*

212 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 57G, p. 153, l. 209-214: *Talis autem bonitas determinans et quasi informans causalitatem prime boni, ubi ipsa causalitas non valet in se ipsa subsistere, hoc est secundum gradum determinatae distantiae a primario boni actu, transcenso videlicet ordine bonitatum, quae sunt effectus simpliciter prime boni, incipit suam actionem in ordine virtutum, licet aliquale vestigium suae intentionis relinquat in sequentibus se bonitatibus.*

of infinities, true beings, and lives”.²¹³ This implies that the primordial causes in the Word act in concert.²¹⁴ The enfolded order of the archetypical world is the basis for the unfolded sympathy of the cosmic order.

In one sense, of course, this example of *prime intellectus* was a convenient choice for this kind of mutual implication of intentions, inasmuch as it allowed Berthold to extrapolate Dietrich’s notions of *intellectus in actu per essentiam*, essential causality, and the ontology of being according to species (*ens secundum speciem*) to higher principles that are not, strictly speaking, intellectual hypostases. But these passing acknowledgements of the relativity of a strictly linear model are consistent with Berthold’s Eriugenian interpretation of Dionysius that we have noted already, where the strict divisions of reality according to the laws of proportion and analogy were resolved into a unified perspective that finds the first principle itself coursing through or being made in all things (*ad omnia procedit et in omni fit*).²¹⁵ It was not by chance that, shortly after offering the example of *prime intellectus* leaving its vestige in the higher orders, Berthold cited the *Clavis* for the notion that God “descends from himself and creates himself in all things”, and that the division of this providential act into a beginning, a middle, and an end, “are one in him, but are

213 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 140D, p. 40, l. 95-101: *Sicut verbi gratia potentia prime intellectus non incipit ubi potentia prime boni vel prime infinitatis vel prime entis vel prime vitae, sed desursum, scilicet in ordine intellectuum, ubi primum manifeste apparet eius causalitas, licet aliquale vestigium suae intentionis relinquat et in prime anima et in prime natura et per consequens in ordine infinitatum, enter entium et vitarum. Et sicut dixi de prime intellectus potentiae inchoatione, ita intelligendum est de aliorum deorum potentiis suo modo.* This follows a citation of the *Clavis physicae*, c. 167 and 170, on the descent of all things from the Father of lights, and how “all things are from God and God is in all things [...], since from him and through him and in him all things are made”.

214 On occasion Berthold would speak about the unique causality that belongs to each god: *prime ens* (161A); *prime vita* (53B, 101E); *prime intellectus* (156E-F); *prime anima* (129D); *prime natura* (20A, 34D-F). Berthold’s notion of a primordial cause of nature (*prime natura*) signaled a modification of Proclus who, in Proposition 21, carefully used “first” for the monadic One, Intellect and Soul, but “whole” for Nature. See M. Martijn, *Proclus on Nature. Philosophy of Nature and its Methods in Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p. 49. In 129D, Berthold identified the *prime anima* with the world soul (*anima totius*), which extends immaterially from the centre of the earth to the heights of heaven and directs particular souls to their proper places. He identified *prime natura* with Avicbron’s notion of *natura universalis* (*Fons vitae*, lib. III, c. 45), the unified principle that brings together and sustains the composite parts of bodies because it acts upon “the universal body”. All things that proceed from *prime natura*, according to Berthold’s enigmatic statement, do so naturally (*naturaliter*). The world soul and *natura universalis* share the attributes of being unified principles whose activity is providential.

215 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 3A, p. 92, l. 14-19.

diverse in the minds of those contemplating”.²¹⁶ The prayer at the end of the *Prologus*, we recall, was intended to lift the contemplator (*theoricus*) from the mode of dividedness to the unified vision of the divine light as the principle, the guide, and the goal of all things. For Berthold, then, the rational divisions of the order of natural providence according to the laws of proportionality, with the proliferation of separate substances they entailed, were meant to prepare the mind for this vision.

5 Determination, Generation, and Light

The intention of ‘good’ cannot subsist by itself.²¹⁷

If Berthold relied on the distinction of efficient and formal causality to hold together the superabundant causality of the gods in the Word alongside their subordination to the One, he had to introduce a further level of differentiation to account for the constitution of principles in the essential order below “the thearchy”. To this end, he adapted two interrelated doctrines from Dietrich of Freiberg to the framework of the *Elementatio theologica*: the ontological theory of beings existing according to species (*entia secundum speciem*), and the theory of the mode of causality that is constitutive of and exercised by them (“determination” or “information”).²¹⁸

Berthold inherited directly from Dietrich of Freiberg the notion of “being according to species” or “being as such” (*ens ut simpliciter*).²¹⁹ Dietrich had

²¹⁶ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 140E, p. 42, l. 151-158: *super omnia Deus invisibilis et incorporealis et incorruptibilis potest a se ipso descendere et se ipsum in omnibus creare, ‘ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus’ et usque ad extrema rerum [...]. Deus totius universitatis conditae principium sit et medium et finis: principium, quia ab ipso procedunt omnia, medium, quia in ipso et per ipsum currunt omnia, finis, quia ipsum appetunt omnia, in quo quiescunt, quia nihil ultra quaerunt. Et haec tria in ipso unum sunt, in animis contemplantium diversa. Cf. Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, c. 167, p. 132, l. 7-10 and c. 171, p. 135, l. 2-7. See also *Expositio*, 125D, p. 150, l. 103-109, cited above at n. 183, as well as the citation of the *Clavis* in n. 213, above.*

²¹⁷ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 136E, p. 10, l. 208: *Intentio boni non potest ipsa subsistere.*

²¹⁸ On *determinatio* and *informatio*, see Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. 11, tr. 1, c. 17, p. 81, l. 43-44 and lib. 11, tr. 3, c. 13, p. 150, l. 44-63; Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. IV, tr. 2, c. 1 (3-4), p. 58, l. 28-46; Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 18, p. 104, l. 1-17; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De animatione caeli*, 11.1-5, p. 22, l. 2 – p. 23, l. 28; id., *De quidditatibus entium*, 1.4, p. 99, l. 21-30.

²¹⁹ On the synonymy of *ens secundum speciem* and *ens ut simpliciter*, see Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.33.5, p. 172, l. 22-28; id., *Quaestio utrum substantia spiritalis sit composita ex materia et forma*, ed. B. Mojsisich, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, 11.20, p. 333,

invented this notion as a way of accounting for the hierarchical subordination of separate substances within an essential cosmic order, in which the essence of every separate principle is identical with its operation. But the range of entities to which Dietrich applied it was more limited (intelligences and heavenly souls) than what we find in Berthold. Following the lead of the *Elementatio*, Berthold extended the range of *ens secundum speciem* upwards, into the order of infinities, and downwards, past the order of heavenly souls, to human nature as a species.

For both Dominicans, some kind of composition was required to explain the derivation or creatureliness of these separate substances without compromising the essential activity that was predicated upon their simplicity. The basic intuition that Dietrich and Berthold would not abandon was the assumption that the universe is an intrinsic unity (*unum per se*), and therefore it must be constituted out of an essential order, in which entities proceed from and return to their principles according to stable and necessary patterns.²²⁰ This essential order unfolds between the cosmological genera (*maneries*) of the One, the separate intelligences, as far as the heavenly souls and their bodies, which use the sublunary elements as instruments in order to produce their effects in the realm of becoming. This intrinsic order of the whole can be ensured only by the intrinsic and essential constitution of its parts. As Berthold put it, everything intrinsically related to something else in the order of essential causes is “a certain whole”, but the relation of this whole to its own parts determines what place in the essential order it holds.²²¹ The notion of *ens secundum speciem* was introduced to account for the intrinsic composition that distinguishes secondary causes from God without undermining the essential bonds of the order of natural providence.²²²

l. 181-204. See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2D, p. 87, l. 204-208: *Si autem est unum, in quo est numerus secundum rem, hoc est dupliciter, quia vel facientia numerum sunt unum in esse vel plura. Si unum, tunc vel taliter unitum est ens ut simpliciter et secundum speciem tantum absque proprietate individuali vel est ens hoc et particulare et individuum.*

220 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De animatione caeli*, 2.2-5.3, p. 13, l. 25 – p. 17, l. 30; id., *De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*, 1.1-5.2, p. 303, l. 2 – p. 307, l. 17. For Berthold, see *Expositio*, 6B, p. 129, l. 75 – p. 130, l. 126, as well as 33A, p. 214, l. 12 – p. 215, l. 36. Cf. Flasch, “Einleitung” to Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1-13*, p. xxxiii-xxxiv.

221 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 66E-F, p. 5, l. 100 – p. 6, l. 130.

222 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 44A, p. 73, l. 15-21: *unaquaeque res est propter suam propriam operationem, ideo sola rei substantia seu essentia, si secundum se et absolute accipitur, scilicet quantum ad solum esse, non sufficit intentioni naturae, nisi ipsa essentia sit operatio. [...] Absoluta enim essentia secundum se non habet rationem boni nec est de reali ordine universi, inquantum est unum totum perfectum specie et partibus, de cuius ordinis*

To explain this kind of composition, Dietrich looked to Aristotle (*Metaphysics* VII.10–11) for the distinction between formal parts (*partes ante totum*), which are simultaneously the principles of a simple form in the order of being and the parts of a definition in the order of knowing, and quantitative or qualitative parts (*partes post totum*), which are extraneous to the essential features of the thing.²²³ According to Aristotle, formal parts are “before the whole” insofar as they constitute the quiddity or definition of a thing and make it known in such a way that the whole can be said to depend on those parts. Parts “after the whole” have the nature of matter, meaning that they are the parts into which a thing is divided when it is viewed as a “this” and not in its universal definition. These material parts can be corporeal (flesh and bones, in the case of “this animal”) or intelligible (the semicircle is part of “this circle”).²²⁴ Dietrich used these arguments to characterise the created separate substances in the order of natural providence. In his view, separate substances exist more like a species, *ens secundum speciem* (=ES), because they have only “parts before the whole”. An ES is not an individual but a “singular”. For an “individual” in the proper sense is what has “parts after the whole” or is an *ens hoc* (=EH).²²⁵

For Dietrich and for Berthold, the parts of a singular ES are principles. In an ES, these principles “retain their nature as principles”, which explains why the essence, power, and operation of ES are one.²²⁶ That is, insofar as an essence does not require these extrinsic, accidental relations to realise its activity, it is incorruptible, its activity has no contrary, and as such the ES belongs to the

ratione est, ut una res fluat in aliam aliqua virtute activa. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 1.1.1, p. 137, l. 3–10, 1.10.3, p. 143, l. 18–28; id., *De accidentibus*, 18.8, p. 79, l. 121 – p. 80, l. 135.

223 See especially Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentaliū*, 5.26, p. 187, l. 221–224, 5.62, p. 200, l. 650–662; id., *De luce et eius origine*, ed. R. Rehn, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, 10.1–12.2, p. 17, l. 79 – p. 19, l. 46; id., *Quaestio utrum in Deo sit aliqua vis cognitiva inferior intellectu*, 1.1 (6–7), p. 294, l. 36–48; id., *Quaestio utrum substantia spiritualis sit composita ex materia et forma*, 11.25, p. 335, l. 252–269. See also id., *De dotibus corporum gloriosorum*, 2.3–4, p. 270, l. 12–23; id., *De corporibus caelestibus quoad naturam eorum corporalem*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 3.2, p. 381, l. 98 – p. 382, l. 102; id., *De accidentibus*, 3.5, p. 57, l. 88–95; id., *De quidditatibus entium*, 7.5, p. 110, l. 60–71; id., *De mensuris*, 4.17, p. 231, l. 106–125; id., *De magis et minus*, 11.4, p. 55, l. 64–68.

224 As Berthold explained at *Expositio*, 76K, p. 70, l. 209 – p. 71, l. 220, a substance, unlike an essence, has parts after the whole. These parts, when they are brought together by the form of the whole (*forma totius*), such as humanity (*humanitas*), have the mode of matter. Humanity considered in itself is an essence, but when it is determined in such and such parts (*in has vel has partes*), a substantial individual is constituted.

225 Suarez-Nani, *Les anges et la philosophie*, p. 56–73; Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 314–319.

226 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 34C, p. 229, l. 290–311.

essential structure of the cosmos.²²⁷ At the lower range of the essential order are heavenly souls. These, however, are called substantial rather than essential causes. Each heavenly soul is an EH because its activity partially depends on the heavenly body to which it is united.²²⁸ Finally, in the realm of becoming, there is no essential order. This is the domain of individuality and accidentality properly speaking, insofar as all spiritual or corporeal principles, whether angels, human individuals, or bodies, realise their activity in partial or total dependency upon accidental, extrinsic relations founded on quantity and quality.²²⁹

These ontological conditions are related to distinct kinds of causality. EH come forth by generation, whereas ES come forth by “simple emanation”, “determination”, or “information”.²³⁰ What comes forth by generation passes from potency into act, and accordingly is first an EH before it is ES (which is accomplished by the universalising activity of the possible intellect). For example, nature produces a succession of individual horses, but the species “horse” is only reached through abstraction. As for what comes forth by determination, its “formal principles” are first ES by nature (*prius natura*). Certain entities, like heavenly souls or the agent intellects of human beings, are first ES and then, by a logical ordering, they are individuated and are EH.²³¹

In one of the lengthiest discussions of this topic in the *Expositio*, Berthold contrasted ES and EH insofar as their principles are capable of union with one another (*unibilia*).²³² That is, he proposed that we consider the opposing ways the constitutive principles of ES and EH, insofar as they are principles, have simplicity, spirituality, and infinity. His argument proceeded from what is more known to us to what is unknown. “Imperfect” unitable principles, such as matter and form in a composite, are in “qualitative potentiality” and are, “so to speak, material” because their simplicity is inferior to the composite in which they must be united in order to exist in act. This union of matter and form in act has “spirituality” because they mutually conjoin in their

227 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, II.26.1-4, p. 164, l. 29 – p. 165, l. 57; id., *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 21.1-4, p. 185, l. 30-60.

228 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 25C, p. 142, l. 166-172. Cf. *Expositio*, 44D; 50C; 51A; 76D.

229 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De animatione caeli*, 8.2-3, p. 19, l. 6 – p. 20, l. 30, 15.1-2, p. 26, l. 38-53; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, III.21.2, p. 193, l. 103 – p. 194, l. 110.

230 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 3A, p. 93, l. 37-38: *Et tale fieri dicitur determinatio vel informatio, ut quidam dicunt, vel compositio*. See also n. 218, above.

231 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 3B, p. 95, l. 116-121. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De luce et eius origine*, 10.1, p. 17, l. 79-88.

232 For what follows, see Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 4B, p. 105, l. 129 – p. 108, l. 242; 76D, p. 66, l. 55 – p. 67, l. 94.

essence (*se mutuo penetrant penetratione essentiae*), as is most evident in the “spirituality” of the simple and universal elements, which unite to form the four elements perceptible to the senses. Insofar as these individual principles, as principles, exist in potency, their “infinity” consists only in their indeterminacy. Accordingly, they cannot bring themselves to union in act, but require a higher agent (e.g., an artificer, a heavenly mover). The activity of this agent, in turn, presupposes these potential principles that it brings into substantial being by a process of generation. Since generation is preceded by motion and alteration, the principles themselves must be mutable and, for this reason, must exist first as individuals both in time and by nature before they are a species. Therefore, unlike the particular (angels; the human agent intellect prior to individuation)²³³ or the singular (ES),²³⁴ the individual constituted from such principles is measured by time; it comes to be and passes away due to the disproportion between its principles and the stable motion of the heavens.

As for the principles of unchangeable things or ES, Berthold asserted that they have a “simplicity” that is greater than any composite, whereas the simplicity of the principles of EH is subordinate to the composite they form. It follows from this that their “spirituality” is also greater, for what is simpler is capable of greater compenetration. Finally, unlike the principles of EH, the “infinity” of the principles of ES consists in their actuality rather than potentiality. This actuality, however, still stands in relation to a higher active “efficient” principle. But rather than being brought into act by that agent, these lower principles actively limit, contract, or “determine” the power of the immediately higher cause and act upon the “elaborated” substrate that the higher cause has produced. In this way, we have a process of “determination” that occurs by an order of nature and not by a temporal order (unlike “generation”); that is, determination unfolds by simple emanation into being (*per simplicem emanationem in esse*). Every principle that comes forth by determination, even

²³³ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 51C, p. 115, l. 98 – p. 116, l. 111.

²³⁴ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 84B, p. 128, l. 20 – p. 129, l. 44. An individual is corporeal and has quantitative *partes post totum*. A “particular” has qualitative *partes post totum*, and through them it is determined within “the most specific species”, and yet it remains “one in being” and is not numbered by its parts. The “singular” subsists “singularly *per se*”, having *partes ante totum* that retain their nature as principles. In *Expositio*, 10B, p. 180, l. 122–132, we read that the members of the order of *antarkia* (ES), whose essence is identical with their power and operation, differ from one another specifically (*specifice*), until we reach heavenly souls, which are “individuated” by their operation. In a *hierarchia* comprised of angels, the substance, power, and operation of each member differ, and each member is a particular (*particularis*).

if it is limited or contracted, is nevertheless identical with its operation.²³⁵ As Berthold put it in a succinct and remarkable turn of phrase, their possibility is their existence (*in eis sit idem posse et esse*).²³⁶ We might say that, for Berthold, the domain of ES, from the order of infinities to heavenly souls (prior to individuation) and to human nature as a species, corresponds to the contents of “the archetypal world” and is, in some sense, nothing else than its unfolding from the divine Word.²³⁷

For Berthold, this process of determination could only be understood if one adopted a Platonic rather than Aristotelian perspective on universality. This is most apparent in his commentary on Proposition 74 (“Every species is a certain whole, for it subsists from many [parts], each of which complete the species, but not every whole is a species”).²³⁸ Following Eustratius, he held that there are fundamentally only two kinds of species: one is the result of abstraction, the other is separate by nature.²³⁹ The first is constituted by the actualised possible intellect from the parts of the form.²⁴⁰ It is through this process that natural beings pass from the state of EH to ES, since the possible intellect is what makes the universality in such things (*intellectus agit universalitatem in rebus*). The second kind of species exists *in rerum natura* apart from any activity of our intellect. Berthold argued that since the participant (*participans*) exists in reality, so must the greater entity in which it participates (*participatum*): “many human beings are one human being by participation in the species”. Every species of the second kind, then, is an ES belonging to essential order of the cosmos. Some things belong to the intrinsic order of the universe only as species (ES), while others do firstly as species, and secondly as individuals, as is the case for angels and human souls. For the

235 See Berthold's analysis of the seven *regulae* from Boethius' *De hebdomadibus* in *Expositio*, 2A, p. 83, l. 54 – p. 84, l. 93.

236 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 4B, p. 108, l. 238.

237 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 10, p. 16, l. 364 – p. 17, l. 385. A comparison can be made on this point with Henry of Ghent, who held that the number of creaturely essences and that of the divine ideas were equal and finite. See P. Porro, “*Ponere statum*. Idee divine, perfezioni creaturali e ordine del mondo in Enrico di Gand”, in *Mediaevalia* 3(1993), p. 109–159.

238 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 74, p. 39, l. 1–3: *Omnis quidem species totum quoddam est: ex pluribus enim subsistit, quorum unumquodque complet speciem; non omne autem totum species*.

239 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 74A–C, p. 51, l. 44 – p. 55, l. 185. See also *Expositio*, 67C, p. 9, l. 60 – p. 12, l. 134; 176D, p. 165, l. 242–253; 177I, p. 183, l. 335 – p. 184, l. 349.

240 See Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentarium*, 5.26–33, p. 187, l. 209 – p. 190, l. 311. See also Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 3.2.9.7 (3), p. 98, l. 11–18; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, III.36.1–III.37.5, p. 208, l. 25 – p. 209, l. 70.

latter group, the species is “more truly and more really in the nature of things than its individuals”.²⁴¹

Berthold corroborated this argument about the two kinds of species with Anselm’s famous denunciation of “the heretical dialecticians” who say that universals are only “vocal sounds”, and who therefore suppose that colour is nothing other than the body in which it inheres and that wisdom is nothing other than the soul of the person in whom it is found.²⁴² According to Anselm, such confusions arise when reason is covered over with bodily imaginings (*in imaginationibus corporalibus obvoluta*), a judgement that Berthold shared based on his own interpretation of the *De mystica theologia* of Dionysius as a guide to the discord over universals. For Anselm, the heretical consequences of this contemplative failure are felt in the domains of Trinitarian theology and Christology. Without real universals, Anselm contended, one cannot even begin to understand how three persons in the Trinity are one God, or how it was that Christ assumed human nature and not a human person. Berthold’s only addition to these points was a lengthy citation from the *Clavis physicae*, that explained how humanity (*humanitas*) is both simple in its cause and “more than infinite” in individuals, as an example of a Platonic species.

This theory of the two kinds of species was closely related to Berthold’s theory of form, which also assumed the ontology of ES and EH, but proposed a greater continuity between the two domains. As Sylvain Roudaut has observed in a recent synthesis, Berthold’s doctrine of form and formal causality expanded the application of these terms far beyond their more limited place in Proclus’ *Elementatio theologica*, which in Proposition 74 located forms at the level of intellect and thus subordinated them to the levels of being and wholeness.²⁴³ Berthold was more influenced in this regard by Albert the Great, who distinguished between separate or forming form (*forma formans*) and immanent or informing form (*forma informans*).²⁴⁴ At other times he followed Ulrich of Strassburg, who delineated the grades of form from God to accidental, inanimate form.²⁴⁵ With Albert, Berthold presented the ranks of animate forms in terms of their gradual approximation of the first mover and its capacity to

241 See Suarez-Nani, *Les anges et la philosophie*, p. 60, for an illustrative comparison of Thomas Aquinas and Dietrich of Freiberg on the subordination of individuals to species in the cosmic order.

242 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 74C, p. 55, l. 186 – p. 56, l. 227.

243 S. Roudaut, “Founding a Metaphysics of Light in Proclus’ Universe. Berthold of Moosburg’s Theory of Forms”, forthcoming.

244 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 41C, p. 49, l. 73 – p. 51, l. 148.

245 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 112D, p. 27, l. 73 – p. 30, l. 165.

constitute and govern an articulated whole.²⁴⁶ Heavenly souls, followed by human souls, are the highest rank of *forma informans*, since they are partially related to the bodies they move. A *forma formans*, by contrast, subsists in itself and remains outside what it determines (*foris manens*). These include all *es* beneath the gods as far as intellectual hypostases, which are “formed” by *determinatio*, in that the subject elaborated by the higher principle is “informed” or determined by lower, primordial “forms” or causes.

In his account of *determinatio*, Berthold combined Dietrich of Freiberg’s theory of causality with the doctrine of flux (*fluxus*) developed by Albert the Great (*De causis et processu universitatis* 1.4) and Ulrich of Strassburg (*De summo bono* IV.1.5), who was his preferred source on the theory of *fluxus*.²⁴⁷ Berthold discussed *fluxus* extensively in his commentary on Proposition 18 (“Everything deriving being to others is primarily that, which communicates the derivation to the recipients”),²⁴⁸ where William of Moerbeke’s translation of χορηγῶν as *derivere* brought Proclus’ text directly into the semantic field of the metaphysics of flow. Berthold’s definition of derivation (“derivation is both a simple and continuous causal emanation, preserving the identity of essence of the flowing form in the entire flow”) depended on Ulrich’s treatment of *fluxus*.²⁴⁹ As Berthold explained it, “derivation” conserves the identity of form or intention between the cause and effect (unlike equivocal causality), while remaining unaffected by its action (unlike univocal causality) and, unlike causes that are principles (*principatio*), it does not enter the being (*esse*) of what is derived.

246 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 205A-C, p. 209, l. 12 – p. 212, l. 121.

247 De Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique*, p. 190–191, has explained how Ulrich’s modifications of Albert’s doctrine of flux anticipated the doctrine of essential causality articulated by Dietrich and Berthold. With Albert, Ulrich affirmed (1) that form is what flows, because the origin of *fluxus* is the form of the light of the first universally active Intellect; (2) form is said to flow insofar as it goes out from the first principle, and not insofar as it comes from a material potency; (3) the origin of *fluxus* is the Giver of Form (*dator formarum*), since anything that bestows form on anything else does so by virtue of the abundance of this source. To these views, Ulrich added (4) what flows is essentially identical and differs only in being; (5) the differentiation of being comes from the diverse realities into which the form flows; (6) this differentiation is comparable to the multiplication of a genus in its species, which does not multiply the essence of the genus but only its being. Dietrich’s synthesis of these ideas with those of Proclus, according to De Libera (p. 204), allowed him to elaborate the doctrine of essential causality in its definitive form.

248 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 18, p. 12, l. 1–2: *Omne derivans esse aliis ipsum prime est hoc quod tradit recipientibus derivationem*.

249 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18C, p. 50, l. 245–246: *derivatio est emanatio causalis simplex et continua conservans identitatem essentiae formae fluentis in toto fluxu*.

Following Albert and Ulrich, Berthold took one of his preferred examples of *fluxus* from the activity of an artificer. The art in the artificer's mind "flows" through the body's limbs and its tools, and through these the form is gradually determined until it is realised in the artefact.²⁵⁰ The same form is found in the art and in the artefact (*idem essentia*) and differs only in the mode of its existence (*secundum aliud esse*). To break through the materiality of the metaphor to a more adequate understanding of the process of *determinatio*, one should conceive the art itself as capable of producing artifacts by its simple intellectual light, without the need of bodily limbs, instruments, and matter.²⁵¹ To this effect, in Proposition 18, Berthold used the example of the sun. For the sake of argument, he noted, we might suppose that the sun is an essential cause (though in fact it is a heavenly body that acts as an instrument of an intellectual principle). He then proposed we make a twofold comparison between the sun and its effects. (1) Compared with the sun's essence as such, the effect is identical with the cause, for the sun not only contains the effect in its power, but precontains (*praehabet*) its effect in a nobler and more eminent mode than the effect exists in itself. Considered simply as essence, the sun is "identical with all its gifts", indeed "is itself its gift", but in a more eminent mode. However, (2) compared with "the essential modes or properties of the sun", in which the substance of the sun is founded (*fundatur*), such as "incorruptibility, luminosity, moving in this particular way", the effect is counted as something distinct from the sun in both being and essence.²⁵² Only (1) where there is an identity of essence within a diversity of being or nature, can we speak of derivation. The second comparison (2) falls within the domain of causality in the strict sense, in which effects differ from causes in being and in essence.²⁵³ Dietrich of Freiberg, who had inspired this distinction of derivation and causality, explained that the difference in being and in essence in the second comparison means that the efficient power of the heavens does not retain its "proper intelligibility" when it is found in its effect,²⁵⁴ because the stable disposition of celestial power is received only imperfectly in sublunary matter.

250 Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. 1, tr. 4, c. 6, p. 49, l. 80 – p. 50, l. 11; Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. IV, tr. 1, c. 5 (2), p. 27, l. 16 – p. 28, l. 27. Albert also compared the *ebullitio* of the sun and of the first cause to the practical intellect in *De animalibus*, lib. XX, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 1307, l. 11 – p. 1308, l. 30.

251 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 174A, p. 137, l. 39–45.

252 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18D, p. 52, l. 300 – p. 53, l. 323.

253 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18D, p. 53, l. 324–341. We should assume that Berthold took the second comparison as the statement of the fact.

254 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, III.21.1–2, p. 193, l. 100 – p. 194, l. 110.

(1) The first comparison brings us directly into the domain of determination and the kind of causality that characterises ES. According to Berthold, there are three kinds of determination.²⁵⁵ (1a) In a logical consideration, the potential genus is determined into act by the species through the differentia; (1b) among material beings, a potency for form is determined in the act of form; (1c) in derivation, the more actual is determined by the more potential. In all three cases, the determinable, “existing in the determinate”, maintains its proper essence, intention, and property, and is numbered only according to being. While it is clear what the subject of determination is in (1a) and (1b), either the genus or the material potential for form, what is the subject of the (1c) third kind determination, which evidently was most important for Berthold? The answer to this is not forthcoming in Proposition 18 and requires us to look elsewhere in the *Expositio*.

According to Proposition 64, the One immediately produces two kinds of unities: those that subsist in themselves (the gods), and those that subsist in another. The members of the latter group are the subject of either determination or generation – determination in the case of ES (immutable species, forming forms, or true forms), and generation in the case of EH (informing forms, and the images of true forms). In a remarkable passage, Berthold explained how, in every ES below the gods, we find “unities” that are unable to subsist by themselves (*non valens subsistere*) as they are in their immediate relation to the One, owing to their “distance” in the procession that unfolds necessarily according to an essential order.²⁵⁶ These unities are nothing else than the “unities exalted above the nature of the mind” described by Dionysius or, as Proclus called them, “vestiges of the One” (the expression *unum animae* would be inappropriate here for the numerous principles prior to souls). These unities are illuminated by principles subordinate to the One, which strengthens them to

255 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18D, p. 53, l. 342-354. See also *Expositio*, 3E, p. 97, l. 206 – p. 98, l. 247. At *Expositio*, 167E, p. 65, l. 210-220, following Dietrich, Berthold distinguished between the principles of the essence of an *intellectus in actu per essentiam*, and the parts of the form that are gathered in the definition.

256 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 12A, p. 198, l. 39-67: *In separatis [...] similiter aliqua de praedictis causarum generibus, licet secundum aliam rationem a praefatis, inveniuntur. [...] Causa autem subiectiva et quasi materialis accipitur penes intentionem causalioris principii, quae, cum in se et per se non possit subsistere propter distantiam sui a prime sua causa, per aliam intentionem proximi subordinati producentis quasi informatur, determinatur et singularizatur*. On the role of determination in strengthening these vestiges that cannot subsist on their own, see also *Expositio*, 3E, 30A, 41C, 59D, 64B, 65F, 90C, 137F, and 138B. The role of “proximity” and “distance” in any essential order was emphasised already in 1C, after Berthold spoke of the ecstasy of divine love that leads God to create the universe.

subsist – this is what occurs through determination.²⁵⁷ A lower god determines with its own irradiation the immaterial substrate already elaborated by one or more prior principles. At the root of all of these substrates among spiritual substances is the *vestigium unius*.²⁵⁸ But, Berthold stated clearly, at least in the case of the determination of an ES, “the subjective cause” of determination is still more actual than the subsequent determination it receives.²⁵⁹ This is how the ES enumerated in the table at 62C arise.

We may locate this account of the *determinatio* or *derivatio* of ES within a larger framework of the modes of procession that Berthold systematised from Dietrich of Freiberg in his commentary on Proposition 29 (“Every procession is made through the likeness of the secondaries to the primaries”).²⁶⁰ Following Dietrich, Berthold made a distinction between what proceeds (1) from reason (*a ratione*) and (2) what proceeds according to reason (*secundum rationem*).²⁶¹ (1) When something proceeds “from reason”, the reason itself is the productive principle, such that no other power is required to bring about the procession; it would be as if the art of playing the lute were to play the lute by itself. Dietrich identified this as the mode according to which “the images of God”, that is, every *intellectus in actu per essentiam* from the separate substances to the human agent intellect, proceed insofar as they are *imagines Dei*. By contrast, (2) to proceed “according to reason” means that the reason is in the producer who has an additional power (*virtus elicitiva*) that brings about the production.

257 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 162B, p. 17, l. 33–46: *Et tales unitates sunt divinissima, quae sunt in essentiis entium, vitarum, intellectuum et ceterorum, et sunt supposita traditionibus aliorum deorum, quorum illustrationes pertingunt ad ipsa sicut a prime uno elaborata, et sunt susceptiva omnis processus, qui est ab ipsis diis, et praecedunt simpliciter omnes donationes ipsorum deorum per 71. Hae enim sunt illae unitates, de quibus aliquantulum dictum est super 135, et sunt in nobis excedentes secundum Dionysium 7 cap. De divinis nominibus ‘mentis naturam’, et vocantur unitates superexaltatae. Sicut igitur in nobis sunt illud intimum et supremum, quod Deus in natura nostra plantavit, quod etiam est ‘vestigium’ et illustratio solius prime ‘unius’, quod determinatur ulterius aliis illustrationibus, puta virtutis, entitatis, vitae, intellectualitatis et ceteris, ita est proportionaliter in omnibus enter entibus supra hominem et citra deos, quod videlicet solius prime unius, super quam fundant aliae causae primordiales suas illustrationes secundum ordinem totalitatis earum.*

258 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 4B, p. 107, l. 231–234.

259 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 41E, p. 51, l. 169–179; 71E–F, p. 36, l. 140–153; 98B, p. 193, l. 85–86.

260 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 29, p. 19, l. 1–2: *Omnis processus per similitudinem secundorum ad prima efficitur.*

261 For what follows, see *Expositio*, 29B–C, p. 184, l. 78 – p. 185, l. 127, which relies on Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.32.1–11.36.3, p. 170, l. 104 – p. 175, l. 115. For a fuller account of Dietrich’s position, see also *De visione beatifica*, 1.2.1.1.1–1.2.1.1.5, p. 37, l. 10 – p. 41, l. 69.

What proceeds in this way are the determinate species of things (e.g., the species “horse”) that have (2a) an exemplary form (*forma exemplaris*) in God. EH properly speaking also proceed (2) “according to reason”, but in addition to requiring (2a) the specific determination that comes from the exemplary form, they have a further determination that God knows in their (2b) ideal form (*forma idealis*). ES, however, proceed both (1) as an image and (2a) according to an exemplary form. This accounts for their self-subsistent “singularity”, which is simpler than “individuality”, but which is nevertheless determinate because it corresponds to an exemplary form in the divine mind. According to Dietrich, their mode of procession as (1) images predominates over (2a) that determinacy, since each *intellectus in actu per essentiam* is “a likeness of the totality of being” because it understands all being as such, and not just of some part of being. For Berthold, who was able to refine Dietrich’s position on this point, the true realisation of (1) is found in the gods, whereas every ES below the gods as far as the separate intelligences proceed according to both (1) and (2a). Berthold also clarified that, in the case of heavenly souls and human beings, we must be dealing with some combination of (1), (2a), and (2b), since their relation to body makes them individuals, even though their highest part is an essentially active intellectual principle. Finally, Berthold noted, generable and corruptible things proceed only according to (2a) an exemplary form and (2b) an ideal form.

Berthold elsewhere made similar refinements of Dietrich’s order of essential causes or *intellectus in actu per essentiam*.²⁶² Dietrich had elaborated a theory of three kinds of causes: (i) essential, (ii) substantial, (iii) and accidental causes. In this model, God and ES are essential causes. An essential cause is an essence that produces another essence through a simple outflowing (*per simplicem defluxum*), without motion or change. The only difference between God’s activity and that of the ES from this point of view corresponds to the amplitude or determination of the causal activity – that is, how many formal intentions are presupposed by the ES. Berthold was not satisfied with this generic description of essential causality and thus subdivided it into three levels: (ia) the unbounded causality of the Good; (ib) the limited, but relatively unbounded causality of the gods; (ic) and the determinate and contracted causality of the ES. Each god produces an entire cosmic series, whose intention is equally present to all, but this is contracted within the order by the auxiliary cause (*concausa*) at the order’s summit, which makes each member of that

262 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7B, p. 146, l. 265 – p. 151, l. 447, supplemented with *Expositio*, 51A, p. 113, l. 11 – p. 114, l. 33.

order a singular.²⁶³ From here, Berthold simply summarised Dietrich's account of substantial and accidental causes. In a substance, the essence is contracted (*contrahitur*) to being either in potency or in act, and with this comes all the extraneous instruments and attributes that are needed for the substance to be realised in act. In this way, the substance is "contracted further to individuals" or EH possessing "parts after the whole". A thing can vary in its substance, insofar as it passes from an imperfect to a perfect state, but it cannot vary in its essence. Heavenly souls with their bodies are the paradigm of substantial causes. They presuppose the essences of generable things that have been constituted by ES and draw them out of potency into actuality through their motions and with celestial heat and light, as far as the imperfection of sublunary matter will allow.²⁶⁴ Finally, accidental causes presuppose substance, and act upon the extrinsic features of the thing.

As we descend from the realm of being (ES) into becoming (EH) we see that the entire procession, from God to the material world, is related in Berthold's understanding of formal perfections or "intentions". The One existing according to cause produces only "ones", either according to essence or participation, which are immediately related to it. Each entity in its ground, insofar as it is one or good, is immediately dependent upon the creative causality of the One. Each of the six gods originates from itself a unique formal intention reflecting its rank within the order of primordial causes. We have seen how this model forced Berthold to admit both that a higher god leaves a vestige of its formal intention in the lower god and that a lower god leaves a vestige of its formal intention in the order arising from the higher gods. This reminds us that the gods, despite falling into a rank when viewed from their effects, remain ineffably in the divine Word insofar as they are substantial goods that are "made" and not "created", and that creation proceeds from God according to the modalities latent in the archetypical world.²⁶⁵

A series arises from each primordial cause according to "a causal procession", which Berthold defined as "an emanation of a nature from another nature that preserves the natural distinction within an intentional identity".²⁶⁶ This description of the intelligible unity of a causal order as "intentional" came from Dietrich of Freiberg, who had used it relative to Propositions 21 and 97 of

263 Compare Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7B, p. 147, l. 306-316, with *Expositio*, 38B, p. 28, l. 49-51.

264 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 25C, p. 142, l. 177-186; 72C, p. 39, l. 53 – p. 40, l. 82.

265 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 9, p. 14, l. 300 – p. 15, l. 320.

266 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 29A, p. 183, l. 54-55: *emanatio naturae a natura salvans distinctionem naturalem in identitate intentionali*.

the *Elementatio theologica*.²⁶⁷ Dietrich argued that the unity of the universe derives from the fact that “the essence of the first principle” is diffused “intentionally” by its causal power.²⁶⁸ That is, the same essence is found in the effects of the first principle, but it exists in each according to the recipient’s mode of being.

Berthold included these passages from Dietrich in his commentaries on Propositions 21 and 97,²⁶⁹ but he only explained exactly what he understood by the term “intention” in Proposition 71.²⁷⁰ There Proclus had outlined the important principle that each lower cause presupposes the causal power of the higher cause as well as the substrate that the higher cause has elaborated. Berthold’s discussion of the meanings of *intentio*, it must be noted, was not prompted by the presence of the term in the *Elementatio*, but rather by Proclus’ use of the word “illuminations” (ἐλλάμψεις, *illustrationes*) to describe the causality exercised by the gods.²⁷¹ In one sense, Berthold explained, “intention” can refer to what exists indifferently in the soul or outside the soul. Such intentions are either “the six transcendentals according to Aristotle” (*ens, res, aliquid, unum, verum, bonum*), which “are identical in reality, but distinct in reason”, or are the parts of a definition (genus, differentia, and species). In another sense, “an intention is distinguished from the thing in the soul”, and this again has two senses. If it “implies an imperfection”, we say that “the existence colour in the [transparent] medium” is intentional (*intentionale*), which presumably means that the illuminative power of colour is weaker or imperfect compared to that of light. If “intention” denotes something that brings about a perfection, then it refers to the formal intentions of “good”, “infinite”, “being”, and so on, as they exist in the primordial causes or, in a more contracted way, in the

267 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 74.2-5, p. 237, l. 99-118.

268 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 79.3, p. 242, l. 36-41: *De ista autem unitate seu una intentione, de qua tot et talia dicta sunt, ut apparet intuenti, potest expressius dici sic, videlicet quod ipsa est essentia primi principii in se ipsa existens secundum proprietatem substantiae suae, sed intentionaliter secundum virtutem suam diffusa per rerum universitatem, quo tota rerum universitas non solum ab ipso tamquam a causali primo principio, verum etiam inter se secundum partes suas causaliter dependeat.*

269 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 21, p. 91, l. 531-539; 97B, p. 186, l. 42-53.

270 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 71, p. 38, l. 1-9: *Omnia que in primordialibus causis totaliorem et superiorem ordinem habentia in effectibus secundum eas que ab ipsis illustrationes supposita aliquantulum fiunt partialiorum traditionibus; et que quidem a superioribus illustrationes suscipiunt eos qui a secundis processus, ille autem in hiis locantur; et ita procedunt participationes alie alias, et illustrationes alie super alias desuper ad idem pertingunt subiectum, totalioribus preoperantibus, partialioribus autem super illorum operationes sui ipsorum traditiones elargientibus participantibus.*

271 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 71A, p. 32, l. 21 – p. 33, l. 47.

higher members of their orders and in their participants. Berthold then went on to contrast the Platonic and Aristotelian understandings of what it means to be a “common” intention. For Aristotle, it had to do with the universality of predication or signification. For Plato, intentions were understood to be common in reality (*intentiones communes secundum rem*), and it was of course this approach that Proclus adopted in Proposition 71.²⁷² These contrasts are familiar enough. What was new in Berthold’s account was the close association of the *intentio extra animam*, the irradiation or illumination of the primordial causes, with the natural phenomena of light and colour.

The top and bottom of Berthold’s cosmology are connected seamlessly in his theory of the diffusion of light. It is here that we come full circle and understand why the metaphor of the sun served so well to illustrate the ecstatic creative activity of divine love. This went beyond a commonplace association. In Propositions 36, 37, 125, and 143, we find that Berthold not only used light as a metaphor to describe the procession and conversion of all things. He understood the dynamics of these orders by extrapolating from specific principles concerning the nature and diffusion physical light that had been propounded by the perspectivists: Alhazen (*De aspectibus*, translated c. 1200), Roger Bacon (*De multiplicatione specierum* and *Perspectiva*, early and mid-1260s), Witelo (*Perspectiva*, mid-1270s), and John Peckham (*Perspectiva communis*, c. 1280).²⁷³ Berthold may have known the works of all these 13th-century perspectivists. He was certainly familiar with Alhazen’s *De aspectibus*²⁷⁴ and Dietrich of Freiberg’s *De iride et radialibus impressionibus* (after 1304).²⁷⁵

²⁷² Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 71D, p. 33, l. 51–62.

²⁷³ This natural scientific dimension of Berthold’s metaphysics been recognised since Barbara Faës de Mottoni’s analysis of Propositions 36 and 37; see B. Faës de Mottoni, “Il problema della luce nel Commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all’*Elementatio theologica* di Proclo”, in *Studi medievali* 16(1975), p. 325–352. Alain de Libera concluded his fundamental study of the German Dominicans with Berthold’s theory of light as a way of summarising the characteristic motifs of that intellectual culture; see De Libera, *La mystique rhénane*, p. 410–423. Most recently, Sylvain Roudaut has examined Berthold’s synthesis of Dietrich of Freiberg’s theory of perfectional form and his incorporation of other sources like Avicbron and Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, and has demonstrated that we can indeed speak of “a metaphysics of light” in the *Expositio*; see Roudaut, “Founding a Metaphysics of Light”, forthcoming.

²⁷⁴ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 143O, p. 72, l. 435 – p. 73, l. 460.

²⁷⁵ We may recall here the glosses on Aristotle’s *Meteorology* attributed to Berthold that appear in the margins of Dietrich’s *De iride* (in MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.30, f. 56v–57r) and the fragment on optics (in MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 45r–v) that was copied by the same scribe responsible for Berthold’s text of Macrobius’ *In Somnium Scipionis* and the fragment of Proclus’ *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*. The

Berthold's discussions of light in Propositions 125 and 143 were guided by his standard procedure of basing his comments on the precise terminology used by Proclus (125: *emicare*; 143: *a divino lumine*).²⁷⁶ These passages, however, should be read alongside his more systematic exposition of a theory of light in his commentaries on Proposition 36 ("Of all things that are multiplied through procession, the primaries are more perfect than the secondaries, and the secondaries are more perfect than those that come after them, and so on in the same way") and Proposition 37 ("Of all things subsisting through conversion, the primaries are more imperfect than the secondaries, and the secondaries are more imperfect than those that follow them, but the last things are the most perfect").²⁷⁷ These commentaries marked a flagrant departure from his exegetical method, since in Propositions 36 and 37 Proclus had made no reference to light or illumination. Berthold's decision to give a summary of the entire metaphysics of the *Elementatio theologica*, as it can be recapitulated in the pattern of procession and return, through a theory of light allows us to glimpse some of the deepest assumptions he brought to the text. Perhaps the only comparable passage in this respect was Berthold's presentation of the astrologer as a paradigmatic example of the human vocation to be a *nexus Dei et mundi*, mediating between the stable realm of being and the changeable realm of becoming, according to the Proclean notion of "ruling the world with the gods".²⁷⁸ Both passages not only clarify Berthold's interpretation of the philosophical principles of the *Elementatio* as a representative text of the Platonic tradition, but also hint at his broader assumptions about how this divine science was continuous with the philosophy of nature.

Berthold's approach to Propositions 36 and 37 moved across three levels of light (the physical, the intellectual, and the supersubstantial). For both commentaries, even though Proposition 36 begins, so to speak, "from above" and Proposition 37 "from below", Berthold started out from the laws of physical light, and from there moved to treat intellectual light and, finally, supersubstantial light. His preferred authorities for describing the level of intellectual

glosses and the fragment on optics are edited in Sturlese, "Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P.", p. 249–256.

276 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 125, p. 63, l. 1–4, cited in n. 42, above; prop. 143, p. 71, l. 1–3: *Omnia deteriora presentia deorum subsistunt; et si ydoneum sit participans, omne quidem quod alienum a divino lumine fit, illustratur autem omne subito a diis.*

277 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 36, p. 22, l. 1–3: *Omnium eorum que secundum processum multiplicantur prima sunt perfectiora secundis et secunda hiis que post ipsa, et consequenter eodem modo; prop. 37, p. 23, l. 1–3: Omnium secundum conversionem subsistentium prima sunt imperfectiora secundis et secunda hiis que deinceps; ultima autem perfectissima.*

278 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 16, p. 24, l. 636 – p. 25, l. 646.

light were Aristotle, the *Liber de intelligentiis* of Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, and Avicenna; on supersubstantial light, Berthold turned to Dionysius and again to Adam. For the foundational analysis of physical light, Berthold appealed to “the perspectivists” in general (probably Alhazen and Dietrich), all of whom were indebted to Aristotle’s *De anima* 11.7 and chapter 3 of his *De sensu et sensato*.²⁷⁹

Berthold’s analysis of physical light centered on radiant forms (*formae radiosae*) and the process of propagation or radiation (*radiatio*).²⁸⁰ Light and colour are radiant forms. Unlike a physical form such as heat, which exclusively inheres in its subject, a radiant form is an inherent quality that informs its subject “in a certain order towards the outside”, by which it diffuses and multiplies itself. According to Berthold, three things coincide in the process of radiation: (1) the principle, (2) the medium, and (3) the mode of propagation. His account of (1) the principle was basically Aristotelian.²⁸¹ The transparency (*diaphanum*) as such is unbounded (*interminatum*). Light (*lumen*) is a quality received into the transparent as a form is received by its subject. Light in the transparency constitutes the transparency in act (*perspicuum*).²⁸² The *perspicuum* is either bounded (*terminatum*), and as such is colour, or is compressed (*conculcatum*), and as such is visible light (*lux visibilis*); in other words, colour exists at the boundary of the transparent, while light exists in the transparent.

Berthold devoted more attention to (2) the medium and (3) mode of radiation. (2) The transparency is said to be “transmissive” of any form “because of a certain ejection of its parts from one another”, and thus it is ordered to the outside (*ad extra*). At this point, Berthold appealed to Dietrich’s notion of essential causality and stated repeatedly that a radiating form retains its nature but takes on a different mode of being (*secundum aliud esse*) outside its subject. Visible light thus “proceeds according to its essence outside itself, making itself

279 For an overview of perspectivist optics in Alhazen and its Western reception, see A.M. Smith, *Alhacen’s Theory of Visual Perception. A Critical Edition, with English Translation and Commentary, of the First Three Books of Alhacen’s De aspectibus, the Medieval Latin Version of Ibn al-Haytham’s Kitāb al-Manāẓir*, 2 vols (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2001), vol. 1, p. lii–cxii.

280 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 36A, p. 15, l. 13 – p. 17, l. 80; 37A, p. 22, l. 11 – p. 24, l. 79.

281 Aristotle, *De anima*, 11.7, 418a26–419b2; id., *De sensu et sensato*, 3, 439a12–440b25.

282 *Diaphanum* and *perspicuum* were generally treated as synonyms, the latter being the Latin translation of the former, which was a transliteration from the Greek. Berthold, however, seems to have followed Dietrich (*De iride* 11.4) who used *diaphanum* for the transparency in its potential state and *perspicuum* for its actualised state.

be outside itself according to its essence, but according to another mode of being".²⁸³

As for (3) the mode of radiation, Berthold stated that visible light diffuses itself over a spatial distance. As such, he argued, it relates by nature first to what is more distant, and consequently only to what is proximate (*per prius re ipsa et ordine naturae respiciat magis distans*). From this principle we could infer, for example, that prime matter is an immediate effect of the Good, whose intention would pass immediately through the entire universe as "one" or "good" until it reached the term most distant from it. Berthold underscored the point that light diffuses itself in a linear fashion, because linear movement implies the pure extrapolation of part after part (*per eiectionem in distantia ut distantia inquantum huiusmodi*) without the connotation of return (*reditus*). Such an assertion might lead us to expect that Berthold will focus more on circularity in Proposition 37, which concerns the order of conversion. But that is not what we find. He reaffirmed that the linear radiation of light indeed corresponds to procession; but for Berthold the paradigmatic example of conversion is the perpendicular incidence of a ray on a reflective surface, so that the ray is reflected directly back to its source.²⁸⁴

The Neoplatonic cosmological structure of procession and return is probably most frequently imagined in terms of nested circular patterns, where each moment of procession is extrinsic to each moment of conversion. According to Berthold's proposal that it be likened to the linear diffusion of a ray reflected upon itself, every moment of procession is also a conversion. This defies our temporal imagination. It is, however, a perfect analogy for the dynamics of essential causality that Berthold developed from Dietrich of Freiberg.²⁸⁵ Indeed, when Berthold discussed the "reflection" or conversion of "intellectual light" in 37B, he cited this crucial passage from Dietrich's *De visione beatifica*:

In the order of things that is intrinsic with regard to the disposition of essential causes and effects, the posterior are not found without the prior, nor any of those that are last without the absolutely first. Likewise, these acts, which are concepts [*conceptus*] that are always essentially in act,

283 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 36A, p. 16, l. 46-50: *ut eadem lux secundum substantiam sit secundum esse nature in proprio subiecto, sit autem et alibi et extra se secundum aliud esse non solum secundum aliquem effectum, sed etiam secundum suam essentiam procedens ad extra se et faciens se extra se secundum suam essentiam, sed secundum aliud esse in concernendo per se distantiam localem eorum, in quae se diffundit.*

284 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 37A, p. 22, l. 30 – p. 23, l. 60.

285 De Libera, *La mystique rhénane*, p. 419–423.

and which, in each degree of their order, remain fixed by the conception [*conceptione*] which is their own essence, do not conceive anything without this very conception by which they conceive their productive principle, and would have no existence without it. And thus, since such things both proceed and subsist by their conception, by which they conceive their principle (and this conception is nothing else but a certain essential reflection or conversion into their very principle), it is necessary that all such principles are subsistences according to conversion, even though procession and conversion are the same in reality, just as radiation is in its own way.²⁸⁶

As Berthold well understood, at the level of *ES*, whose essence is identical with their operation, every moment of procession is equally a moment of conversion. The only difference between this mode of “radiation” and that of the Good relates to the medium. Whereas these intellectual radiant forms are diffused through a medium, which in the analogy is equivalent to the subject elaborated by the primordial causes above it, the superintellectual light of the Good presupposes no medium at all, but simply multiplies itself (*multiplicans se suis processibus in omnia*), and yet remains one in its multiplication (*unum in multiplicatione et unum in processione*). In this linear optical model, the self-communication of the Good in procession is timeless and identical with the conversion of intellectual creatures to the Good.

The linear diffusion and reflection of light was therefore the most adequate illustration of the *exstasis divini amoris* that is at the ground of the universe. As Berthold’s comments on Propositions 125 and 143 reaffirm, the name “light” befits God in several ways, but most of all God’s essence as Goodness.²⁸⁷ For just as light is the most formal and noblest of all sensible forms, and has the

286 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 37B, p. 24, l. 91-97: *Sicut in ordine rerum, qui est per se quantum ad dispositionem essentialium causarum et causatorum, posteriora non inveniuntur sine prioribus nec aliquid eorum, quae sunt post, sine simpliciter primo, ita isti actus, qui sunt quidam conceptus per essentiam semper in actu, quorum quilibet in aliquo gradu sui ordinis figitur sua conceptione, quae est eius essentia, nihil concipiunt sine ea conceptione, quae concipiunt suum principium productivum, sicut et nullam entitatem haberent sine eo. Et sic, cum huiusmodi res ex sua conceptione, qua concipiunt suum principium, et procedant et subsistant, ipsa autem conceptio non est nisi quaedam in ipsum suum principium essentialis reflexio sive conversio, necessarium est omnia talia principia esse subsistentia secundum conversionem, licet conversio et processio sint idem secundum rem, sicut etiam suo modo in radiatione.*

287 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 143L, p. 69, l. 312-314: *Et ideo Dionysius in idem ponit haec duo, scilicet bonum et lumen. Pulchrum autem mediante lumen reducitur ad rationem boni, cum pulchritudo sit consonantia cum claritate.*

perfections of all visible qualities in itself in a unified and simpler way than they are in themselves, so “the Goodness of the gods” embraces all of their formal perfections or colours within itself.²⁸⁸ For this reason, the primordial causes can be likened to prisms refracting the Good into their respective orders.²⁸⁹

It may be that the image of the linearity of the diffusion of Goodness in Berthold's thought ran even deeper. We have already seen that, for Berthold, of the soul's three motions, the direct or “linear” was the highest. For the soul that moves in this way, the creatures of the world have become transparent to their divine ideas, allowing the mind to ascend rapidly through the modes of cognition until it reaches a transitory enjoyment of the *intellectus adeptus* and, within that reflexivity, apprehends God through non-reflexive ignorance above the mind. This ignorance, as Berthold read in Dionysius (*De divinis nominibus* 7.3), occurs “when the mind, having departed from everything else, and then also sending itself away, is united with the super-resplendent rays, and is illuminated hither and yon [*inde et ibi*] by the inscrutable depth of wisdom”.²⁹⁰ This is how the minds of those “who sit in darkness and the shadow of death” are illumined and filled by the rays of truth.²⁹¹ When the soul is raised to the cognition of the *unum animae*, it becomes united to this same linear progression of the Good to and from itself by non-reflexively mirroring (*inde et ibi*) the paternal and providential light. In this way the microcosm will be harmonised with the macrocosm.

288 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 143L, p. 68, l. 301-308: *Sicut enim lux est maxime formalis et nobilis inter omnes formas sensibiles et habet in se unite et simpliciter et excellenter perfectiones omnium qualitatum visibilium adeo, quod etiam sit hypostasis, id est formalis subsistentia, omnium colorum, ita bonitas deorum consistit in hoc, quod ipsa sola ratione suae supersubstantialitatis est pura et immixta et sic omnino formalis nihil habens vel de materia vel materiae condicionibus sibi permixtum, immo nec de aliis intentionibus formalibus essentialiter.*

289 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 125B, p. 149, l. 61-64: *ita dii, qui sunt per se bonitates, radios bonitatis, quos copiosissime sicut supremas et provecitissimas essentias suscipiunt ad instar prime boni omnibus suis intentionibus subiectis, copiosius largiuntur essentialiter, universaliter et impausabiliter infundendo.*

290 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123D, p. 129, l. 152-155. The only other citation of this text is in *Expositio*, *Praeamb.* C, p. 68, l. 533-538.

291 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 143L, p. 70, l. 352-357: *Prime enim Deus est simpliciter prima, purissima, simplicissima et superperfectissima veritas et ratio incommutabilis omni- quaque diffundens radios suos in omne verum, licet per prius superimpleat ipsos deos super- intellectuali lumine et consequenter omnes supercaelestes mentes, et sic descendat usque ad illuminationem nostri, ‘qui’ etiam quasi ‘in tenebris et umbra mortis sedemus.’ Cf. Luke 1:79: illuminare his qui in tenebris et in umbra mortis sedent.*

Epulatio entis

The Microcosm

Here there resounds to the mind the wondrous sweetness of the shouts of those who feast, of the banqueters calling out.¹

Berthold of Moosburg's commentary on the final proposition of the *Elementatio theologica* ("Every partial soul, descending into becoming, descends entire; it is not the case that one part of it remains above while another part descends") recapitulated the central themes of his reconstruction of Platonic philosophy and related them directly to the life of human individuals in the realm of becoming.² As the concluding words of his *propositum* indicate, he regarded Proclus' doctrine of the soul's descent as the logical culmination of the entire argument of the *Elementatio*:

For although something of [the human soul] always stands in the light of actual intelligence, thinking itself and its principle from which it intellectually and cognitively emanates, yet this cognition belongs to the whole soul only accidentally. Therefore, nothing of the soul is said to remain above, insofar as it is soul, but the whole descends into becoming according to the Platonists. And, thus, the intention of the element and of the entire book is manifest.³

1 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 20, p. 34, l. 966-967: *Unde sonat ei mira suavitas sonus epulantium, id est sonantium epulantium*. Cf. Peter Lombard, *Commentaria in Psalmos*, In Ps. 41:4, PL 191, 418A.

2 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 211, p. 103, l. 1-3: *Omnis partialis anima descendens in generationem tota descendit et non hoc quidem ipsius sursum manet, hoc autem descendit*.

3 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211F, p. 264, l. 246-251: *Quamvis enim aliquid eius semper stet in lumine actualis intelligentiae intelligendo se ipsum et suum principium, a quo intellectualiter et cognitive emanat, tamen ista cognitio non est totius animae nisi per accidens. Ideo nihil animae dicitur sursum remanere, inquantum est anima, sed apud generationem secundum Platonicos tota descendit. Et sic etiam apparet intentio elementi et totius libri*.

The entire mechanism of invisible principles, from the thearchy through the manifold orders of *entia secundum speciem*, finds its end in the descent of the human (“partial”) soul into becoming.⁴ Compressed into this brief passage were several conclusions that Berthold has reached through a reflection on the final propositions of the *Elementatio*. These were devoted to the nature and ranks of “total” and “partial” souls (Propositions 184–205) and, finally, to the origin and properties of the incorruptible “vehicle” or body (*susceptaculum*) that is always united to total and partial souls (Proposition 196) and accompanies a partial soul in its descent from being into the material body (Propositions 206–210). As Berthold saw it, once Proclus had established the properties and endurance of that spiritual body and described its descent with the partial soul into the world of becoming, he had traversed the entire order of natural providence, in which each member is identical with its operation. What is left for theology would presuppose and consummate that essential order.

For Berthold, this meant that the human soul and its incorruptible body belong to the subject matter of the *Elementatio theologica*, the invisible things of God within the order of natural providence. The coherence of his decision to centralise the Hermetic motif of the macrocosm and microcosm, both of which contain the four *maneries* of One, Intellect, Soul, and Body, depended

4 Adopting the terminology of Proclus, Berthold distinguished between three kinds of soul: (1) “whole” or heavenly souls, (2) “partial” or human souls, and (3) the images of souls (*indalmata seu idola animarum*; cf. Proposition 64), which are the souls of animals and plants. Their names correspond to their degree of separation from the body. According to 111E: (1) are participated separably (*separabiliter*); (2) separably and inseparably; (3) inseparably. Separability denotes the extent to which a soul has the principle of its vital motion independently of the body and, therefore, is immortal. According to 183E: (1) are intellectual as a whole but not wholly (*non totaliter*); (2) are not intellectual as a whole nor wholly (*nec se totis nec totaliter*); (3) have only a trace of reason. Furthermore (1) have two parts, the intellective and vegetative, and their name reflects the fact that they are at once conjoined and separated from their bodies as a whole (*se totis coniunctae et separatae*); (2) have three parts, the intellective, sensitive, and vegetative, and their name reflects how they are partly conjoined and partly separated (*partim coniunctae et partim separatae*). The status of (1) “whole” souls is clarified at 201B: as intellectual, they receive intelligible species directly from the separate intelligences and, as vegetative, they relate directly to “universal nature” insofar as they prepare a heavenly body, through exercising their operation (*per potestativam expansionem*), to receive this intellectual influence seamlessly through circular motion. This completes the flow (*fluxus*) of form that began with the Good and proceeded through its instruments that determine its causality. In 184E, Berthold subdivided the second group: after (1) “divine” heavenly souls, which participate a divine unity through their divine intellect, come (2a) “intellectual” souls, which are partial souls that exist in being (*in ente*) and (2b) souls that are “receptive of change” (*transmutationis susceptivae*), which are partial souls that exist in becoming (*in generatione*) and pass from intellection to non-intellection.

on this. According to Berthold, as was noted already, the human's unique place in the cosmos derives not from its status as an *imago Dei* but rather, as it were, as an *imago deorum*: only the human, the most composite creature, focalises all the gifts of the gods found in the macrocosm. In one sense, this is a function of the human's weakness; the active vestige of the One in the human soul is so feeble that it needs all the assistance the gods can offer. Yet this weakness becomes its glory, for as an image of all the gods, human nature mirrors the totality of the archetypal world. In this sense, the rival to human nature is not any one of the principles above it but instead the entire macrocosm as the most adequate image of God. The plenitude of the Word is unfolded in both. This is how the microcosm as the "most composite" creature is also the *nexus Dei et mundi* – it is at once "every creature" and the centre-point of the creation.

This vision of human nature receiving all the gifts of the gods is precisely what we find detailed in Berthold's commentary on Proposition 211,⁵ where he forged an extraordinary synthesis of some of his most important sources (Proclus, Macrobius, the *Clavis physicae*, and Dietrich of Freiberg) to outline a theory of the human soul's "double descent" from God into the world of becoming. The soul's first descent is from God into its substantial union with human nature as a species, the second is from human nature to the soul's individual existence in becoming. Both, Berthold insisted, occur atemporally – their divisions are a reflection of our understanding.

In his account of the first descent, which corresponds to the constitution of human nature as a species and as the microcosm, Berthold presupposed his earlier arguments about the priority of the Good over being, the doctrine of the gods as an ordered series of primordial causes, and the ontology of *ens secundum speciem*. This synthesis went beyond anything we find in Dietrich, whose notion of *ens secundum speciem* was never applied to human nature or to a narrative of "descent".⁶ Here Berthold's interpretation of the exemplarist anthropology of the *Clavis physicae* through Dietrich's ontology will provide the decisive means for navigating these passages in the *Elementatio theologica*. Through his synthesis of these sources, Berthold maintained that, even now, human nature in its singularity "imitates the presiding gods" because it is constituted in being as almost (*quasi*) an *ens secundum speciem*.⁷ Human

5 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211C, p. 260, l. 90 – p. 261, l. 124.

6 The major source for this narrative structure in Berthold was Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, 1.11.10–1.12.18, p. 47, l. 9 – p. 51, l. 17.

7 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211C, p. 261, l. 113–116: *ubi [anima partialis] perfecte stat in humanae naturae totalitate et integritate, in qua sunt omnes homines, unus homo formatus*

nature itself, in other words, must be a member of the “world” that includes every separate being standing in the eternal enjoyment of God (*in aeterna Dei fruitione*).⁸

Yet Berthold was careful to avoid the autotheistic implications such a position might entail. Regarding the second descent, which relates directly to the passage cited above, Berthold again followed Dietrich. Both Dominicans maintained that there is a principle (*intellectus agens*) within the human soul that “always stands in the light of actual intelligence”.⁹ But as Berthold clarified, and Dietrich would concur, this does not save the soul from having to begin its return to God from the senses and with phantasms – in Proclus’ terms, no part of the soul “remains above” (*sursum manet*). Nevertheless, as both authors recognised, their arguments about the ongoing operation of the agent intellect in the soul’s ground entailed a doctrine of recollection, at least relative to the immutable reasons that cannot be derived from experience. Once again, Berthold made this more explicit than Dietrich’s passing reference to the Platonic doctrine.¹⁰

Berthold’s narratives of the first and second descents placed the *unum animae* prior to the agent intellect both in the constitution of human nature and in the individual. As we have seen, the *vestigium unius* is presupposed by the gods in the determination of any *ens secundum speciem*. In the individual, the *unum animae* grounds the individuated agent intellect’s essential activity and ecstatically relates the person to that nature and, thus, to its perpetual imitation of “the presiding gods”. The final matter for us to consider, then, will be the significance of this modification of Dietrich’s anthropology for Berthold’s theory of deification. In accordance with the atemporal, exemplarist view of human nature Berthold inherited from the *Clavis physicae*, which he advanced in his rejection of Proclus on the soul’s temporal pre-existence, Berthold understood deification in terms of the return of the human individual to the state that belongs to it insofar as it is a species, and from which it is never entirely alienated (*sic in ente supra loca et tempora collocatur, ubi etiam deos praesides imitatur*). Ultimately, we will see that Berthold, partly inspired by Bernard of Clairvaux, understood the transitory enjoyment of such a state (*intelligentia* or, in other words, *intellectus adeptus* and the *unum animae*) as, so to speak, “the intellect in love” or as an operative union with the divine will.

ad imaginem et similitudinem prime boni. Et sic in ente supra loca et tempora collocatur, ubi etiam deos praesides imitatur. See also *Expositio*, 208E, p. 237, l. 181–187.

8 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 164D, p. 33, l. 76–80.

9 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 1.1.1.3.6 (2) – 1.1.2.3 (3), p. 22, l. 110 – p. 25, l. 76.

10 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 94.6–10, p. 258, l. 35 – p. 259, l. 67.

Berthold's notion that the individual is related to the human species through the *unum animae* can also provide the necessary groundwork to begin drawing comparisons with his contemporaries like Meister Eckhart, Henry of Ekkewint, and John Tauler.¹¹ All four Dominicans share the view that an individual participates in the same human nature that has been ennobled by the Word to the extent that a person leaves off what makes them a "this" or a "that". As they understood it, this dispossession is nothing else than the exercise of charity. All of this was entailed in Berthold's theory of the soul's double descent into becoming. If such a doctrine was "the intention of the entire book", then we can infer that, for Berthold, the purpose of the *Elementatio theologica* was to recall the soul to its intrinsic and vital connection to the divine providence, exercising its oblique motion by providing the rational means for the soul in the realm of becoming to make itself aware of that abiding dignity and receptive to the ecstatic operation for which it is already inherently worthy.

1 Human Nature and the Spiritual Body

Observe: what Proclus calls the vehicle, the Apostle calls the house or habitation.¹²

The doctrine of the incorruptible vehicle (*susceptaculum*) of the soul appears for the first time explicitly in Proposition 196 ("Every participable soul uses a first, perpetual body that has an ingenerable and incorruptible hypostasis").¹³ The term "participable soul", as Berthold saw, applied generically to total and partial souls. However, at this stage of the *Expositio*, he applied Proclus' argument to heavenly and human souls separately, at 196D-E and 196F, respectively. When treating heavenly souls, his main sources were Dietrich of Freiberg and Averroes' *De substantia orbis*, and for human souls, the *Clavis physicae*. But Proposition 196 had clearly required that a unified account of the incorruptible vehicle be given for both kinds of soul. We will see that the disparate tendencies in Berthold's sources for Proposition 196 gave rise to ambiguities and

11 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211C, p. 261, l. 119-120: *in quo descensu determinatur intra ipsam humanam naturam ad hanc singularem unitatem*. See 5.3, below.

12 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 210C, p. 249, l. 102-103: *Et attende: Quod auctor vocat susceptaculum, Apostolus vocat domum seu habitaculum*.

13 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 196, p. 95, l. 1-2: *Omnis anima participabilis corpore utitur primo perpetuo et habente ypostasim ingenerabilem et incorruptibilem*.

tensions in his commentary, which were not addressed before Propositions 206–210 on the incorruptible vehicle of the partial soul.

It is a principle for Proclus that from a transcendent, unparticipated monad there arises a group of immanent, participated terms (Proposition 23). The multiplicity of that participated group is in turn a function of the diversity of participants. In the case of souls proceeding from the monadic and unparticipated Soul, the differentiation of “participable souls” must occur simultaneously with bodies to participate them.¹⁴ These participants or bodies, therefore, are required to account for a soul’s distinction from the unparticipated Soul. If participable souls depend on a body for their individuation, that body must be imperishable if the participated soul’s identity and immortality is to be preserved. For this reason, Proclus posited a permanent “astral” body that would guarantee the immortal soul’s identity throughout the great cycle of death and rebirth, as well as a semi-permanent “pneumatic” body that is subject to divine reprobation or reward between reincarnations.¹⁵ This pneumatic vehicle, in turn, is what pervades the third body, which is entirely corruptible. For both metaphysical and theological reasons, then, Proclus held that each participable soul is eternally individuated by its own spiritual body.

Berthold’s main guides while navigating Proclus’ more simplified account of the single incorruptible body in Proposition 196 were Dietrich of Freiberg and the *Clavis physicae*. In 196F, Berthold drew upon twelve chapters in the *Clavis*, citing 115 lines of the text, to offer a concise presentation of Eriugenian anthropology. As Berthold presented it, the question of the nature of spiritual body in the *Clavis* arose from a reflection on the status of the human as *imago Dei*. The *imago*, as he read in the *Clavis*, includes everything in human nature that is substantial and abiding in the eternal present of God’s creative Word.¹⁶ Accordingly, the *imago* does not include the corruptible body that is

14 This argument was made explicitly in Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria*, vol. 1, lib. 1, p. 707, l. 8–26. See also R. Chulp, *Proclus. An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 99–105.

15 The difference between astral and pneumatic bodies is only implied in Proposition 209, and was not detected by Berthold, who read this text in terms of the accretion of materiality to a single incorruptible body. For a fuller account of the doctrine in light of Proclus’ other works, see E.R. Dodds, in Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, p. 313–321; J. Finamore, *Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1985), p. 85–88; J. Opsomer, “Was sind irrationale Seelen?”, in M. Perkams, R.M. Piccione (eds), *Proklos. Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik*, p. 136–166, at p. 148–151.

16 On time and eternity in Eriugena, see R. Crouse, “Predestination, Human Freedom and the Augustinian Theology of History in Eriugena’s *De divina praedestinatione*”, in J. McEvoy, M. Dunne (eds), *History and Eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and His Time. Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies*,

extraneous to the intelligible essence of the human, but rather the spiritual body that was created in Paradise, which abides even now and will exist after the Resurrection.¹⁷

That essential body was established in Paradise; but it was yet only in reason that it and the soul were created in that general and universal human, who was made after the image of God, in whom all humans in body and soul were altogether and at once established only in possibility, and in whom they all sinned before they might have proceeded into their own substances – that is, before any could have appeared in discrete diversity in their rational soul or spiritual body. This body would have adhered to the incorruptible soul, had it not sinned. And in this body all humans will be resurrected.¹⁸

A single spiritual body belongs to “the general and universal human” in Paradise, prior to any divisions of time or place, prior even to human history and the division of the sexes, both of which are the result of the Fall. In this universal human, individuals were present only in possibility and did not yet go forth into their proper substances, into distinct souls and spiritual bodies by angelic reproduction.¹⁹ Since Adam turned towards himself rather than to

Maynooth and Dublin, August 16-20, 2000 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), p. 303–311, at p. 307–309.

- 17 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 196F, p. 127, l. 148–152: *Corpus autem dico hoc corruptibile carnalis adhuc animae merito suae inoboedientiae superbiaeque diversisque calamitatibus involutae hospitium, non illud caeleste et spirituale, quod in paradiso cum animae creatum est, quale et post resurrectionem futurum erit. Cf. Expositio*, 210M, p. 255, l. 321–324: *Ibi enim intellectus, ibi ratio, ibi sensus, ibi seminalis vita, ibi corpus, non hoc corruptibile merito peccati superadditum, sed spirituale et caeleste ante delictum datum et in resurrectione futurum.*
- 18 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 196F, p. 128, l. 171–178: *Primum illud essenziale corpus in paradiso est conditum; sola tamen ratione et anima in ipso generali et universali homine ad imaginem Dei facto creata est, in quo omnes homines secundum corpus et animam simul et semel in sola possibilitate conditi sunt et in ipso omnes peccaverunt, priusquam in proprias substantias prodirent, id est antequam quisquam in discreta differentia in anima rationali et spirituali corpore appareret, quod corpus incorruptibili (incorruptibili) incorruptibile Clavis) animae aeternaliter adhaereret, si non peccaret; et in hoc omnes homines resurrecturi sunt.*
- 19 The *Clavis* omitted the more precise designation of this unrealised multiplication as a form of angelic reproduction. Cf. Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, lib. II, c. 582B, p. 362, l. 3975–3985: [...] *priusquam in proprias substantias prodirent, hoc est, antequam unusquisque secundum angelicam multiplicationem in sua discreta differentia in anima rationali et spirituali corpore appareret.*

God, humanity in its fall simultaneously constitutes for itself corruptible bodies appropriate to that lower life and receives them as the tunics of skin fashioned by God (Genesis 3:21).²⁰

Berthold undoubtedly discerned some similarities between Proclus and the *Clavis* on these points: the spiritual body is caused by an immobile substance (Proposition 207), while the lower body is superadded to accompany the soul's fall from being into becoming (Propositions 209–210).²¹ But the differences between the two authorities are even more striking. One problem concerns the numerical status of the spiritual body. In the Eriugenian perspective of the *Clavis*, the spiritual body as one and universal because it belongs to the “universal human”.²² Individual corporeal bodies arise as bundles of properties or accidents in the realm of temporal and spatial division.²³ These particular bodies are not, properly speaking, the natural bodies of their souls but rather are garments “superadded” to common humanity.²⁴ In this sense, as John Marenbon has noted, for Eriugena there was really no question about the individuation of substance as such, since individuals are nothing but “concourses of accidents”.²⁵

Eriugena followed the consequences of this reasoning about the Fall in his account of the general Resurrection, when the diversity of fallen humanity will be restored to itself as it has always existed substantially in the divine Word.²⁶ Material differentiation falls away entirely. In the Resurrection, souls who in Paradise existed in possibility in the universal human will be differentiated

20 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 196F, p. 127, l. 154: *ostendit animam sibi ipsi causare corpus materiale*. See also *Expositio*, 207E, p. 229, l. 151 – p. 230, l. 190, where Berthold cited Macrobius (*In Somnium Scipionis*, 1.14.3).

21 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 207E–F, p. 229, l. 151 – p. 231, l. 213.

22 Eriugena also called the universal human “the plenitude of humanity” (*plenitudo humanitatis*), following Gregory of Nyssa: *Periphyseon*, lib. IV, 759A–B; lib. V, 922A–C, 942B–C, 953A–B, and 957C. On Eriugena's ontology of human nature, see C. Erismann, *L'Homme commun. La genèse du réalisme ontologique durant le haut Moyen Âge* (Paris: Vrin, 2011), p. 149–292.

23 See the citations of the *Clavis* at *Expositio*, 74C, p. 55, l. 206 – p. 56, l. 227, as well as Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, lib. V, 941D–944B.

24 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 196F, p. 129, l. 202–214, citing *Clavis*, c. 272. Cf. Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, lib. IV, 801C.

25 J. Marenbon, “Eriugena, Aristotelian Logic and the Creation”, in W. Otten, M. Allen (eds), *Eriugena and Creation. Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Eriugenian Studies, held in honor of Edouard Jeuneau, Chicago, 9–12 November 2011* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), p. 349–368, at p. 362–363.

26 C. Steel, “The Return of the Body into Soul. Philosophical Musings on the Resurrection”, in J. McEvoy, M. Dunne (eds), *History and Eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and his Time*, p. 581–609.

only by their merits and virtues, but not by any vices or by any individual body.²⁷ As Tullio Gregory observed, Eriugena was less concerned with the status of individual souls than with the unity and future integrity of humanity,²⁸ and with situating this general return within the rhythm of nature's return to the primordial causes.²⁹

Berthold's comments on Proposition 196 indicate that he was aware that further clarification was going to be needed on this subject, both to elucidate the doctrine of the *Clavis* and to show that the *Elementatio theologica* agrees with it. His lengthy series of citations of the *Clavis* in 196F was bookended with two cautionary remarks:

To be sure, concerning this body that the rational soul is said to use first and that it always animates by its being, I will define nothing rashly, for it should follow that it is perpetual, since it has an ingenerable, incorruptible, and unchangeable subsistence; for just like the heavenly bodies, it does not receive any outside 'impressions', if these are thought to be 'wandering'. Let us hear, however, what Theodorus judged about this body in the *Clavis*. [...]

These things may be brought forward without prejudice only to be clear about what the doctors of the Church judged regarding the matter at hand.³⁰

Berthold concluded his catena of citations by reassuring his readers that the *Clavis* conveyed "the most sound and catholic faith of the divine theologians, Gregory and Maximus," which itself was based on "unshakeable arguments".³¹

27 Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, lib. v, 983B and 987A-D.

28 T. Gregory, "L'eschatologie de Jean Scot", in R. Roques (ed.), *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie. Laon 7-12 juillet 1975* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1977), p. 377–392.

29 Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, lib. v, 978D.

30 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 196F, p. 126, l. 128 – p. 127, l. 31 and p. 130, l. 252-3: *Sane de corpore, quo anima rationalis primo uti dicitur et quod semper animat esse suo, nihil habeo temere definire, cum oporteret esse perpetuum sicut habens subsistentiam ingenerabilem et incorruptibilem et inalterabilem, cum ad instar corporis caelestis impressiones non recipiat, si esse ponitur peregrinas. Audiamus tamen, quid Theodorus in Clave sentiat de hoc corpore [...]. Haec sine praeiudicio sint adducta ad hoc solum, ut clarescat, quid circa praesentem intentionem doctores ecclesiastici senserint.*

31 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 196F, p. 130, l. 228-231: *Sanissima namque et catholica fide credimus divinorum virorum theologi, videlicet Gregorii et Maximi, de talibus inconcussas rationes reddentium dogmate imbuti, quod Conditor humanae naturae totam simul eam creavit nec animum ante corpus nec corpus ante animam condidit. Cf. Eriugena, Periphyseon, lib. v, 884B-C.*

The tone of Berthold's cautionary remarks should be understood less as a note of disapproval than an acknowledgment that he has introduced views from reliable authorities that would be unfamiliar or possibly scandalous. He would also have realised that he had not yet explained how to relate the account of the bodies of heavenly souls in 196D-E with the incorruptible *susceptaculum* of human nature of 196F. Thus far, he has only given hints to the unified account that we find, for example, in his interpretation of Proposition 210 ("Every vehicle connatural to the soul always has the same shape and size, but it appears greater or smaller and in dissimilar shapes because of the additions or removals of other bodies").³² But it would fall to Propositions 207-210 to clarify the ontology of the spiritual body of the partial soul, where, as we will now see, Berthold adapted the metaphysics of Dietrich of Freiberg that he had used relative to the incorruptible bodies of heavenly souls at 196D-E.

According to Dietrich, heavenly and earthly bodies are constituted in inverse ways.³³ In the case of corruptible bodies, privation and "the indeterminate dimensions" in matter precede the form, so that the intrinsic principles of a body are not principles as such (as Berthold will say, they do not retain their nature as principles, with the properties of simplicity, spirituality, and infinity),³⁴ but are first "individual natures" rather than "beings existing as species". The situation is otherwise for incorruptible bodies: a heavenly body is by nature intrinsically and fully ordered to its act without any privation. It is by nature first an *ens secundum speciem* – it is a heaven as such (*caelum*) – before it is this heaven (*hoc caelum*) and an individual. As we have seen, for Dietrich, an *ens secundum speciem* is a being which proceeds from God "from reason" (that is, as an image) and "according to reason" (from a *forma exemplaris* or *ratio specifica*) in the divine mind. This latter *ratio* is a determining formal cause, giving it its definitional content, and situating it as a singular

32 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 210, p. 102, l. 1-4: *Omne anime susceptaculum connaturale et scema idem semper et magnitudinem habet, maius autem et minus videtur et dissimilis scematis propter aliorum corporum appositiones et ablationes*. See the citations of the *Clavis physicae*, c. 272-273 at *Expositio*, 196F, p. 129, l. 212-214: *Universaliter autem in omnibus corporibus humanis una eademque forma communis omnium intelligitur et semper in omnibus incommutabiliter constat*; and 210C, p. 250, l. 104-113: *nec me existimes duo corpora naturalia in uno homine docere. Unum corpus est, quo connaturaliter et consubstantialiter animae compacto homo conficitur; illud autem materiale superadditum rectius vestimentum quoddam mutabile et corruptibile veri ac naturalis magis accipitur, quam verum corpus [...]*.

33 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 196D, p. 125, l. 89 – p. 126, l. 103. See Dietrich of Freiberg, *De corporibus caelestibus quoad naturam eorum corporalem*, 8.1-2, p. 384, l. 66-80, which drew on the *De substantia orbis* of Averroes.

34 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 4B, p. 104, l. 125 – p. 108, l. 242.

entity within the universe as a *per se* element of its order.³⁵ For something to be an individual *ens hoc* before it is an *ens secundum speciem* means that the universality inherent to the species is achieved only through the succession of individuals in becoming and through intellectual abstraction. However, an entity like a separate intelligence is an *ens secundum speciem* as such, without ever becoming an *ens hoc*, and serves a necessary function in the order of nature by its singular existence alone.³⁶ The heavenly bodies are located at the boundary of these two orders: by a natural, not a temporal order, a heavenly body belongs first to the *per se* order of things before it is an individual or *ens hoc*. The heaven only becomes “this” heaven when it acquires parts posterior to the whole (*partes posteriores toto*) such as quantitative dimensions.³⁷

Berthold juxtaposed the essential outlines of this argument with the human spiritual body at the beginning of 196F (*ad instar corporis caelestis*) and went no further. By Proposition 207 (“Every vehicle of a partial soul is established from an immobile cause”),³⁸ he began establishing the analogy directly.³⁹ This coincided with a greater reliance on Dietrich’s treatises on spiritual bodies and the Resurrection (*De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis* and *De dotibus corporum gloriosorum*). Finally, in Proposition 208 (“Every vehicle of a partial soul is immaterial, indivisible in its substance, and impassible”),⁴⁰ he placed the human spiritual body together with the heavenly bodies as a *quasi ens secundum speciem*:

The vehicle itself is first the essence of body as such before it is a qualified body, and its form (that is, the partial soul) is first united to the

35 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentarium*, 5.17, p. 184, l. 117 – p. 185, l. 131; id., *De visione beatifica*, 1.2.1.1.3, p. 38, l. 42–80; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.33.5, p. 172, l. 22–28; id., *Quaestio utrum substantia spiritualis sit composita ex materia et forma*, 11.20, p. 333, l. 181–203. See also 4.5, above.

36 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentarium*, 3.24, p. 164, l. 182–186: [...] *ens ordinabile in genere simpliciter et per se est ens completum secundum speciem; cuius complementi ratio consistit in eo, ut sit ens per se in habendo suam formam substantialem ab agente per se in ordine ad finem per se intentum a natura*.

37 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De luce et eius origine*, 10.1–13.3, p. 17, l. 79 – p. 20, l. 89. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 209B, p. 248, l. 49–65.

38 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 207, p. 101, l. 1–2: *Omnis partialis anime susceptaculum a causa immobili conditum est*.

39 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 207F, p. 231, l. 207–213: [...] *susceptaculum partialis animae, cum hanc habeat rationem ad susceptaculum divinae animae, quam habet anima partialis ad divinam, sub qua ordinata est secundum substantiam* [...].

40 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 208, p. 101, l. 1–2: *Omnis partialis anime susceptaculum immateriale est et indivisibile secundum substantiam et impassibile*.

essence of its vehicle, such that it is the essence of body as such before it is this body. Consequently, the union of the partial soul with its vehicle precedes whatever dimensions might be supposed to exist in it. From this it follows that not only the partial soul, but even its vehicle is indivisible in its substance. [...]

Since, therefore, the vehicle of the partial soul, which it first animates by its being, is immaterial [...] and since its union with its soul precedes dimensions – whether they are called ‘indeterminate’ or ‘determinate’ – it is necessarily indivisible in its substance after the manner of the celestial bodies. In these cases, the soul is first united by nature to its subject, insofar as they are principles or beings as such, and the heaven is by nature first constituted as a being as such and is, so to speak, a being according to species; then it is determined into an individual, so that it is this heaven.⁴¹

With this notion of the spiritual body and the partial soul forming a *quasi ens secundum speciem*, after the manner of the heavenly bodies, Berthold has found a way of accounting for the unicity of the incorruptible *susceptaculum*, and thus of reconciling the *Elementatio theologica* with the teaching of the Fathers as interpreted in the *Clavis physicae*. Given his rejection of the doctrine of cyclical re-embodiment (see 5.3, below), Berthold did not see the need to posit a plurality of spiritual bodies to ensure a soul's identity over time; as we will see, the creation of individual souls occurs according to the divine will within the order of voluntary providence. In Berthold's Eriugenian modification of Proclus, the spiritual body belongs to human nature as a species. Having interpreted the *Clavis* itself through the ontology of Dietrich of Freiberg, Berthold could agree with the Eriugenian doctrine that, in the case of human nature,

41 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 208E, p. 236, l. 161-172 and p. 237, l. 181-187: *Ipsus susceptaculum prius est essentia corporis simpliciter quam corporis huiusmodi, et eius forma (scilicet partialis anima) prius unitur essentiae sui susceptibili, ut est essentia corporis simpliciter quam huius corporis. Et per consequens unio animae partialis cum suo susceptaculo praecedit dimensiones, quaecumque sibi fingerentur inexistere, et ex hoc non solum anima partialis, sed etiam ipsius susceptaculum est indivisibile secundum substantiam. [...] Cum igitur susceptaculum animae partialis, quod primitus animat suo esse et sit immateriale [...] et unio eius cum sua anima praecedat dimensiones – sive dicantur interminatae vel terminatae –, ipsum necessario erit indivisibile secundum substantiam ad instar corporum caelestium, in quibus prius natura unitur anima suo subiecto, in quantum sunt principia seu entia ut simpliciter et constituitur caelum prius natura ut ens simpliciter et quasi ens secundum speciem et deinde determinatur in individuum, ut sit hoc caelum.*

“neither the substances or essences or the reasons of things descend into generation, but only their passions or accidents”.⁴²

The complete synthesis of these doctrines was achieved in Berthold's commentary on Proposition 211. Here, as was mentioned, Berthold fused the accounts of the creation of humanity in Genesis 1:26 (*Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*) and in the *Timaeus* 41a-42b (on the cooperation of the younger gods with the Demiurge in fashioning the human being). Berthold began by noting that the partial soul, because it subsists in nature, can be considered in three ways (*tripliciter considerari*):⁴³ (1) in the nobler mode according to which it pre-exists in its cause, (2) in itself according to existence or “essentially”, or (3) according to participation, in that the cause is considered in the effect.⁴⁴ The consideration of the human soul *secundum causam* looks to its subsistence in the hierarchy of primordial causes in light of the plurality of its intrinsic formal principles; in this perspective, the human soul is present especially *secundum causam* in the primordial causes of soul, intellect, and in the One. But before indicating how one ought to understand this mode of subsistence, Berthold introduces several passages from the *Clavis*, which alludes (*alludit*) to this Proclean mode: “the human is a certain intellectual notion eternally made in the divine mind”. Since all that is made by God is “primordial and causal” in him, but “proceeding and caused” in time, the human substance is one, but is seen under two aspects (*una dupliciter intellecta; duplex speculatio*): as established in the intellectual causes and in the effects of generation.⁴⁵ This dual conception was clearly at some variance with the tripartite model (cause, essence, participation), but Berthold reconciled them with the twofold descent of the soul: the first passes from the primordial causes into being, from (1) cause to (2) essence, and the second from (2) being

42 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211D, p. 262, l. 175-7: *Ex quibus aperte colligitur nec substantias seu essentias nec rationes rerum descendere in generationem, sed solum earum passiones seu accidentia. Quid autem veritatis in hoc sit circa animam partialem, plenius elucescet.*

43 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211A, p. 258, l. 13-18: *omne, quod qualitercumque subsistit aut secundum causam est principaliformiter aut secundum existentiam aut secundum participationem exemplariter per 65, necessarium est ipsam partialem animam tripliciter considerari: aut ut videtur in producente praeexistens ut in causa propterea, quod omnis essentialis causa nobiliori modo prae habet in se ipsa causatum suum existens prime, quod ipsum causatum est secundario [...].*

44 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211A, p. 258, l. 13-31.

45 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211A, p. 259, l. 32 – p. 260, l. 74. Cf. Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, c. 251-252, p. 200, l. 17-22 and 2-3; c. 254, p. 202, l. 6 – p. 203, l. 32. On the *duplex speculatio* on human nature, see W. Beierwaltes, *Eriugena. Grundzüge seines Denkens* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1994), p. 82–114.

into (3) becoming.⁴⁶ In this sense, the first descent corresponds to the eternal perspective on human nature in the *Clavis*, and the second to its manifestations in time.

This was the Platonic doctrine that, in Berthold's view, was common to Proclus and the *Clavis*. The first descent of the human soul is "into being by nature and condition", and the second is "into the particular mode of being related to generation".⁴⁷ We should repeat with Berthold that this dual model and the sequences of divine gifts within each descent do not imply the temporal pre-existence of the soul, but were only reflections of our mode of thinking (*secundum modum nostrum intelligendi*). In its first descent, the soul emanates from the Good through the primordial causes into its proper existence. The Good, through the primordial causes, "strengthens the irradiation of itself", so that the first primordial cause, power (*prime virtus*), bestows by its illumination "the possibility to be", and so on through being, life, intellect, and soul, until finally, "through primarily nature, [the human soul] joins to itself a spiritual and connatural body".⁴⁸ This is described as the human's "singular existence" and condition, before it has gone forth into individuals. Unified with its "concreated natural vehicle", the soul in this mode "stands perfectly in the totality and integrity of human nature, in which all humans exist – one human formed after the image and likeness of the primal Good". Thus the human soul is established not "in generation", but "in being", "beyond place and time, where even now it imitates the presiding gods",⁴⁹ and the spiritual body is located at the end of the partial soul's atemporal passage from its state *secundum causam* in the primordial causes to its existence *secundum propriam existentiam* or as an *ens secundum speciem*. Dietrich's influence can be detected clearly in

46 For a tripartite reading of the *Clavis*, see *Expositio*, 211D-E, p. 262, l. 175 – p. 263, l. 191.

47 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211C, p. 260, l. 91-93.

48 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211C, p. 260, l. 101 – p. 261, l. 106: *Deinde secundum modum nostrum intelligendi ipsum prime bonum per donationem primordialium causarum fortificat sui ipsius irradiationem [...], per prime naturam coaptat sibi corpus spirituale et connaturale*.

49 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211C, p. 260, l. 109 – p. 261, l. 115: *Sic ergo descendens anima per primordiales causas procedit per omnes per se perfectos ordines ipsarum primordialium causarum, ubi semper, plus et plus praemissis donationibus, contrahitur ad animalitatis existentiam singularem et ad unionem sui cum sibi concreate susceptaculo naturali, ubi perfecte stat in humanae naturae totalitate et integritate, in qua sunt omnes homines, unus homo formatus ad imaginem et similitudinem prime boni. Et sic in ente supra loca et tempora collocatur, ubi etiam deos praesides imitatur*. The final phrase, *deos praesides imitatur*, came from Proclus (*De malorum subsistentia*, c. 7, §23, p. 202, l. 18-25); see n. 62-63, below.

Berthold's description of the human nature constituted in the Word as a "singular existence" prior to individuation.

We find the same strategy (adjusting Proclus to the *Clavis* using Dietrich's ontology) at work when we turn from Berthold's understanding of the unicity of the spiritual body to his account of its incorruptibility. A key feature of Eriugena's doctrine, as Berthold inherited it from the *Clavis*, was that the substantial spiritual body is a present condition that is "hidden" until the Resurrection.⁵⁰ The Eriugenian *duplex speculatio* entails that the universal depth of every person corresponds to an eternal exemplar in the divine mind. Berthold evidently endorsed this theory.⁵¹ His reliance on Dietrich to explain it is clear in the following passage, where he described the nature of the spiritual body constituted spiritually in being (*in ente*), as distinct from its material state in becoming (*in generatione*):

Such spirituality is contracted by nature, that is, from the essential origin of this substance. Thus, the vehicle that the partial soul first uses and animates with its being, although it is essentially a body, is spiritual, and is so by the spirituality that abstracts from all bodily place and position, which is contracted by nature from its essential origin, according to which it depends on an immobile cause.⁵²

For Dietrich, "spirituality contracted by nature" (when taken in its essential rather than accidental signification) applies primarily to intrinsically spiritual living substances (angels, souls) and equivocally to non-living spiritual things

50 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 196F, p. 128, l. 190-194: *Cum incorruptibile perire non possit, ubi est nunc corpus incorruptibile, quod animae adhaereret, si non peccaret? Magister: In secretis naturae sinibus adhuc latet; in futuro autem saeculo apparebit, quando mortale hoc in illud mutabitur et corruptibile hoc induet incorruptionem.* See also *Expositio*, 210M, p. 255, l. 316-320: *Humana enim natura [...] non est secundum hoc consideranda, quod corporeis sensibus apparet irrationalibus animantibus similis, sed secundum hoc, quod ad imaginem Dei condita est, priusquam peccaret. In hac omne, quod Conditor primordialiter creavit, totum integrum manet. Adhuc tamen latet revelationem filiorum Dei expectans.* And, similarly, *Expositio*, 210C, p. 250, l. 110-114; 210D, p. 243, l. 116-120.

51 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211A, p. 259, l. 66 – p. 260, l. 74.

52 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 208A, p. 232, l. 21-25: *Spiritualitas enim talis aut est contracta per naturam, ex origine scilicet essentiali talis substantiae, et sic susceptaculum, quo primitus utitur anima partialis et quod ipso esse animat, licet sit corpus per essentiam, est spirituale, et hoc spiritualitate, secundum quam abstrahit ab omni loco et situ corporali, contracta per naturam ex origine sua essentiali, secundum quam dependet causaliter ab immobili causa.*

(spiritual places such as heaven and limbo).⁵³ In the passage used by Berthold, Dietrich did not refer to any innate spirituality belonging to the original human body in Paradise. For Dietrich, in the case of the resurrected body, that spiritual quality is only, as it were, accidental or imbued from without (*quasi ab extrinsecus indita*) and is not present by nature. In other words, the spirituality of souls and resurrected bodies differ “equivocally”.⁵⁴ Furthermore, while certain spiritual substances are in their proper “place” essentially (such as God, the intelligences posited by the philosophers and, perhaps, Dietrich adds, heavenly souls, since these are all essential causes), others (such as angels and human souls) are in their proper place only inchoatively (*inchoative*) by essence and consummately (*completive*) or destitutely (*destitutive*) in their places, depending on their merits.⁵⁵ Thus, in this passage at 208A, Berthold innovated from Dietrich, firstly, by extending the concept of innate spirituality to the soul’s incorruptible body in accordance with the *Elementatio* and the *Clavis*, and, secondly, by adding an allusion to Proposition 207 (*ab immobili causa*), so that the *susceptaculum* itself can now be said to possess spiritual properties by nature as an *ens secundum speciem*, by virtue of its origin from an immobile cause in the order of being.⁵⁶

Berthold had to go further to explain the relation between the spiritual and corporeal bodies when commenting on Propositions 209 and 210, where Proclus stated that the imperishable body acquires increasingly more materiality in its descent, even while it remains self-identical. According to

53 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*, 36.4, p. 339, l. 15–22.

54 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*, 36.8, p. 339, l. 34–40.

55 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*, 23.1–7, p. 320, l. 41 – p. 321, l. 94.

56 This did not, however, force Berthold to understand the Resurrection simply as the return to a primordial state before the Fall. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 209A, p. 240, l. 21–31: *Est et alius ordo, scilicet supernaturalis, quo gubernatur specialiter rationalis et intellectualis natura per providentiam Dei voluntariam secundum rationem meriti et praemii, et pertinet ad statum vitae felicitis, quo anima cum suo susceptaculo, quod primitus animat, est in ente, ad quem statum pertinet non solum gloria animae in fruendo per contemplationem et dilectionem fonte boni, ex cuius superplenitudine ipsa anima partialis utpote supercaelestis existens illuminatur, immo superimpletur divini luminis claritate, verum etiam gloria ipsius susceptaculi, ut non solum sit spirituale spiritualitate contracta per naturam, ex origine scilicet essentiali talis substantiae, sed etiam sit et dicatur spirituale ex perfectionibus talem spiritualitatem naturaliter consequentibus, quibus ipsum susceptaculum etiam dicitur gloriosum*. Although Berthold did not mention it directly, he may have endorsed the Eriugenian theory of a twofold return. See, for example, Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, lib. v, 908C–D, 1001A–B, and 1014B–C.

Berthold, following Dietrich, since spirituality and corporeality are not of the same genus, a spiritual substance can “assume” or “be clothed” with corporeality without leaving off its inherent spirituality.⁵⁷ In an earlier passage, Berthold had already incorporated arguments from Dietrich explaining how two spiritual bodies (for Dietrich, “glorified” bodies) can be in the same place, since they do not have an intrinsic relation to that place, and to account for the way that spiritual bodies can be in the same place as corporeal bodies.⁵⁸ Here in Proposition 209, however, Berthold has adapted texts in Dietrich that originally had been used relative to Christ’s appearance to Thomas and the other disciples after the Resurrection in order to explain Proclus.⁵⁹ The *Elementatio* and the *Clavis* led him to adapt these arguments to the present condition of the Proclean spiritual body.

So influenced was he by the Apostolic authority of the *Clavis* that Berthold did not regard this as a scandalous conclusion. In fact, in a most characteristic gesture, he freely drew a direct connection between Proclus’ abiding and incorruptible *susceptaculum* and the Eriugenian reading of Paul’s proclamation that we have, in the present (*habemus*), “an eternal house in heaven not made by hands”.⁶⁰ The eternal habitation is both a present fact and a promise. We can conjecture (*coniecturam capere possumus*) what the quality and state of that spiritual body must be, if we compare it with the corruptible body of our everyday experience: *this* body is visible and is temporal, *that* body is not seen and is eternal, and it exceeds in perfection every visible body that we can find. Berthold followed the *Clavis* in search of traces or intimations of the spiritual body at the level of the invisible elements, whose subtlety and omnipresence underlie and constitute the elements of sense-experience.⁶¹ Rather than criticising Proclus’ notion of an enduring and incorruptible spiritual body, he sought to bring out its agreement with the Apostle’s teaching, authorised by the *Clavis* and understood through Dietrich’s ontology.

Although Berthold would not summarise things this way, what we have witnessed so far is an undeniable subordination of Proclus’ theories of the

57 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 209C, p. 242, l. 91 – p. 243, l. 110.

58 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 208B, p. 233, l. 59 – p. 234, l. 101.

59 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 209A-B, p. 241, l. 37, 44, 60-69, and compare with Dietrich of Freiberg, *De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*, 31.3-4, 36.9, and 37.7.

60 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 210C, p. 249, l. 83-103. Cf. 2 Corinthians 5:1: *quod aedificationem ex Deo habemus, domum non manufactam, aeternam in caelis*.

61 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 210A, p. 247, l. 25 – p. 248, l. 47. Cf. *Expositio*, 129A, p. 173, l. 15 – p. 175, l. 91, and his marginalia to his manuscript of the *Clavis* listed in Introduction, section 2, above.

spiritual body and re-embodiment to the Christian standpoint of the *Clavis physicae*. For the anthropological implications of the *Expositio*, however, it is perhaps even more important that we note how the balance in Berthold's synthesis shifted in the opposite direction, from the *Clavis* to Proclus. As we saw in his comments on Proposition 211, Berthold described the enduring condition of human nature in Proclean terms: the singular human nature constituted in the first descent "imitates the presiding gods".⁶² This was a reference to one of the most important passages for Berthold's interpretation of Proclus:

For each soul, when it exists above, journeys through the heavens (that is, travels the high places) and governs the entire world, beholding beings, and ascending with the presiding gods to the blissful and most perfect banquet of being, and filling those which look upon it with nectar from that place.⁶³

Berthold alluded to this passage in his account of the astrologer as the exemplar of the *nexus Dei et mundi* in the *Prologus*, who "governs the world with the gods".⁶⁴ His echo of the same text in his description of the soul's first descent (in Proposition 211) alerts us to two things. The first is that it shows how Berthold, notwithstanding his criticism of Proclus on reincarnation (see below), sought to give the doctrine an acceptable interpretation in conformity with his view of the *Elementatio theologica* as the consummate restoration of Plato's theorematic philosophy. Secondly, and in line with the same passage in the *Prologus*, the phrase "imitates the presiding gods" suggests that this abiding condition of human nature is somehow related to the highest realisation of human contemplation in this life. That is, what individuals achieve through intellectual effort and divine assistance is what human nature as a singular *ens secundum speciem* always does. For Berthold, this doctrine of providential co-operation with the divine, which somehow belongs always to human nature with its spiritual body, and which souls partake of only in a transitory way, was a common teaching of the greatest Platonists (Proclus, Dionysius, Macrobius,

62 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211C, p. 261, l. 115–116.

63 Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*, c. 7, §23, p. 201, l. 7 – p. 202, l. 10: *sursum quidem enim ens anima omnis meteoropori (id est alta petit) et omnem mundum dispensat, entia speculans et cum diis presidibus ad felicem et perfectissimam entis epulationem ascendens, et que in ipsam respicientia replens eo quod ibi nectare.*

64 See 1.2, n. 66, above.

Boethius).⁶⁵ If human nature is an *ens secundum speciem*, then it must play an integral role within the essential order of natural providence. Its providential action, like that of the heavenly souls that always exercise the highest intellectual operation and the non-reflexive operative activity of the *unum animae*, cannot be intermittent.⁶⁶ The difference is simply whether the soul is in generation or in being (*in ente*), and the latter is equivalent to the essential order of natural providence, where essence is identical to operation. In Berthold's interpretation of this passage from Proclus' *De malorum subsistentia* in atemporal terms, what happens when the soul ascends "to the blissful and most perfect banquet of being" is that it temporarily regains the knowledge that is always underway in its ground, which connects it with the providential operation that belongs to human nature as such. The human individual, in being harmonised with its own nature as microcosm, is harmonised with the macrocosm and the providence that is inherent to it.

The first descent of the soul arrives at the cusp of the transition from natural providence to voluntary providence, from the human species *in ente* to the human individual *in generatione*. Berthold clearly evoked the terminology of voluntary providence when he wrote that the second descent of the soul occurs when it is well-pleasing to the primarily Good with the advice of its council (*ad beneplacitum prime boni de consilio sui senatus*):

Within human nature [the partial soul] is determined to this singular unity, which deiform unity is specified in intellectuality, and this intellectuality is singularised to the existence of this soul, which finally is particularised by the sensible and vegetative [powers].⁶⁷

65 See the way he echoes the phrase "imitates the presiding gods" when introducing citations from these authorities at *Expositio*, 206C-D, l. 81-82, 92, 117, and 141; 207A, p. 225, l. 18-21; 207B, p. 226, l. 63 – p. 227, l. 70.

66 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 197I, p. 139, l. 220-223: *In statu enim generationis potest enumeratas quinque cognitionum species exercere* [opinion, science, wisdom, intellect or intelligence, the unifical], *prout minus vel plus se ab his corporalibus separaverit; in statu autem entis, ubi nullus rationis discursus est, ultimae duae cognitionis species ab anima exercentur*. The five modes are enumerated in *Expositio*, 197G, p. 136, l. 108 – p. 138, l. 186.

67 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211C, p. 261, l. 117-124: *Existens vero in ente et totalitate naturae humanae, ut dictum est, ad beneplacitum prime boni de consilio sui senatus per descensum secundum (scilicet in generationem) in hunc mundum destinatur, in quo descensu determinatur intra ipsam humanam naturam ad hanc singularem unitatem, quae unitas deiformis specificatur in intellectualitatem et hoc intellectualitas singularizatur in hanc existentiam huius animae, quae etiam ultimo particulatur per sensuale et germinale. Et sic induit corpus materiale, quo etiam utitur secundum talis modi essendi exigentiam naturalem*. See also *Expositio*, 24B, p. 130, l. 189-198.

Unlike the first descent, where each primordial cause bestowed its own effect, the action here is undertaken exclusively by God, who produces the individual soul immediately. Then soul puts on (*induit*) a material body, which it uses according to the natural necessities of this mode of being. The last phrase is consistent with Berthold's view of Platonic doctrine, according to which the soul is the "mover" rather than the "act" or "form" of the body.⁶⁸

That God would be the immediate and exclusive agent in this process is consistent with Berthold's understanding of the relation between natural and voluntary providence. In the perspective of natural providence, the thearchy is unfolded into its necessary formal order; but from the standpoint of voluntary providence, the thearchy simply is God. The first stages of the soul's second descent as described here are somewhat mysterious, and we are left to make inferences based on passages discussed earlier in relation to the doctrine of determination in the *Expositio*.⁶⁹ This second descent must be understood as another logical and non-temporal narrative. The movement is evidently from the more universal to the more limited. First, he began with three kinds of determinacy (determination, specification, singularisation) that correspond precisely to the terminology that defined the condition of *entia secundum speciem*. Such beings come forth by determination or "information", they are constituted in specific being (*in esse specifico*) and are "singulars". We have encountered the notion of particularisation already passing relative to the ontological status of angels and separate souls.⁷⁰

Individuation, therefore, must be inchoate in the *unum animae* and fully realised only when the material body is finally "put on". What this seems to entail is that the soul's means of being made adequate to the condition of human nature in its abiding integrity are already latent within it, especially in its higher powers. These correspond to higher modes of life or cognition that are realised only to the extent that the soul has separated from the body.⁷¹ The goal of human life is to join itself to the higher world (*applicatio eius cum mundo altiore*) or to return to its higher world (*redit anima ad suum saeculum*

68 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 207C, p. 227, l. 78 – p. 228, l. 129. Against the Peripatetics, according to Berthold, the Platonists held that the soul descends by the will of God (*nutu Dei*) into "an arranged body", that it does not "beg" for its intelligible species, but knows by recollecting its vision during its "natural state".

69 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 201A, p. 173, l. 36-39: *colligitur omnem divinam animam habere tres partes formales intrinsecas et essentielles animae substantiam integrantes, scilicet unum, quod est divinum, et intellectum, quo specificatur, et animealitem, qua quasi individuatur*.

70 See 4.5, n. 234, above.

71 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 197I, p. 139, l. 221.

altius).⁷² In the following section, we will look closely into the second descent of the soul by following Berthold's adaptation of Dietrich's doctrine of the agent intellect as the essential principle of the soul, as well as his understanding of how this principle relates to the essential order of natural providence and the soul's beatitude.

2 Between Being and Becoming

Berthold's account of the dynamic relation between the soul and its ground, in both movements of procession and return, was heavily indebted to Part II of Dietrich of Freiberg's *De intellectu et intelligibili*. After setting out the cosmological principles of his argument in Part I of his treatise, Dietrich then turned to describe the relationship between the agent and possible intellects (=AI, PI). Each intellect is essentially a likeness of the totality of being for, as Aristotle stated (*De anima* III.5, 430a14-15), the AI makes all things, while the PI becomes all things.⁷³ Since there is an essential identity between both – the totality of being, either made or received – Dietrich described their interrelation using the all-important principle from Proposition 65 (but Dietrich cited Proposition 140 *commentum*) that, within an essential order, each thing shares the same essence while existing either according the mode of a cause, of the essence itself, or of participation. Thus, the PI is all things “by participation”, while the AI is all things “by cause”. On this point Dietrich acknowledged that he was venturing beyond the Scriptures and the articles of the faith, since the argument was compelling him to admit that a cause below God could be said to bring about the essence of a given effect. Nevertheless, he noted, having in mind Proposition 56 of the *Elementatio theologica* and Proposition 1 of the *Liber de causis*, even the philosophers agree that whatever a secondary cause produces, the first cause does so in a more eminent way. It was safe to proceed on this assumption since the primacy of God's creative causality was not being undermined. The remainder of Part II of the treatise was devoted to deducing (*deducitur*) from these premises that the AI is the causal principle (*principium causale*) of the essence of the soul itself (II.2-II.12). Once this is established, Dietrich addressed the problems of the unicity and individuation of the intellect (II.13-II.31) before discussing the object and mode of the AI's intellection (II.32-42).

72 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. I*, p. 50, l. 463-468.

73 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, II.1.1-5, p. 146, l. 5 – p. 150, l. 34.

According to Dietrich, the AI is a substance that belongs to the same class of beings that includes the separate intelligences of the Peripatetic philosophers or the “gods” of Proclus, and is identical to the hidden recess of the mind (*abditum mentis*) of Augustine’s *De Trinitate*.⁷⁴ These intellects are in need of no ontological supplement or accident to be what they are, that is, the ceaseless exercise of active memory, active understanding, and active will. The PI, by contrast, is nothing before it thinks, as Aristotle argued (*De anima* III.4, 429b30–430a2). When it is actualised, it is identical to the intelligible form or species it receives from the AI.⁷⁵ Dietrich understood this identity in the strongest sense: there is no PI “there” as a substance or subject before it thinks. Considered as a conceptional being (*ens conceptionale inquantum huiusmodi*) – a term Dietrich invented to describe the mode of being of intellectual substances when viewed in terms of their essential activities – there is something substantial about the PI’s operation, because it constitutes the quiddities of things by its universal act or conception (*universalis conceptio*). However, in the concrete order of conceptional beings (*ordo entium conceptionalium*), which regards intellectual entities from the perspective of their natural being (*ens naturae*), the PI’s actualisation by an intelligible form is accidental to it.⁷⁶ With this distinction, Dietrich intended to secure the individuation of the possible intellect alongside the universality of its content. Now, since the PI is nothing before it thinks, the AI must presuppose something else that is together with it (*simul*) by nature before it can produce the accidental disposition that is the intelligible species.⁷⁷ This something is the substance of the soul, which will receive the accidental disposition. The soul’s substance is therefore in an immediate, mutual contact with the AI. Dietrich clarified that this does not mean that the AI is simply the essence of the soul, as if it were a form and the soul were its matter. Rather, they must be found together (*simul*) in such a way that the AI is “the essential cause” of the soul.

Dietrich held that the argument about the AI as the essential cause of the soul becomes much clearer once we accept, following Augustine, that the soul is not affected by anything beneath itself.⁷⁸ In other words, the soul-body

74 See especially Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, I.1, p. 15, l. 10 – p. 36, l. 104; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, I.7.1–4, p. 140, l. 16 – p. 141, l. 43.

75 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, III.13.3, p. 187, l. 12–17; id., *De visione beatifica*, 3.2.3 (4), p. 73, l. 52–64.

76 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, II.3.2, p. 148, l. 80–87. On these kinds of *ens conceptionale*, see *De intellectu et intelligibili*, III.8.1–III.9.2, p. 151, l. 79 – p. 153, l. 14.

77 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, II.2.1–3, p. 147, l. 50 – p. 148, l. 76.

78 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, II.3.3–II.5.4, p. 148, l. 88 – p. 150, l. 34. On this doctrine in Augustine, see E. Bermon, *Le cogito dans la pensée de saint Augustin* (Paris: Vrin, 2001), p. 239–281.

composite is not the subject of exterior sense-perception and the interior senses like common sense and imagination; instead, the soul alone produces (*facit*) and performs (*exercet*) both external and internal functions, while the body is only the instrument of these operations. For Augustine, this meant that the soul has a certain interiority (*intraneitas*) that is not conjoined to the body. Dietrich explained this as follows:

Although the soul, according to its whole essence, is conjoined to the body (because it is simple), it is not however conjoined according to every qualitative mode of its substance. For it has many diverse qualitative, substantial modes in itself, any of which imply the whole essence of the soul which, nevertheless, is one and all of them simultaneously, whether it be conjoined according to some of its modes or not conjoined according to others. Neither do these diverse modes multiply the essence, but according to each there is one simple, undivided essence beneath each.⁷⁹

To explain this relation between a simple essence and its diverse qualitative substantial modes (=QSMs), Dietrich gave three examples. The first came from Augustine's argument in *De Trinitate* that the mind is totally present in each of its acts of memory, intellect, and will, which are distinguished only by relation. These are the QSMs of the mind. Among natural beings, we find the QSMs of genus, differentia, and species. This recalls Dietrich's theory of determination: each of these are formal intentions, which imply the entire essence of a thing while remaining distinct. As a better example, however, Dietrich purposed that we consider how the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers of a soul are its QSMs. As Aristotle explained, each implies the total rational soul, such that the vegetative exists in the sensitive, and the sensitive exists in the rational, like the triangle exists in the quadrilateral.⁸⁰ All these examples imply that QSMs are related according to a determinate order, either of coequals, in the case of *imago Trinitatis* (memory, intellect, will), or of prior and posterior

79 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, II.5.1, p. 149, l. 3-10: *Quamvis enim anima secundum totam essentiam suam coniungatur corpori, quia simplex est, non tamen est coniuncta secundum omnem modum qualitativum substantiae suae. Habet enim in se plures et diversos modos qualitativos substantiales, quorum quilibet importat totam essentiam animae, quae nihilominus una est, et tota simul est sive coniuncta secundum aliquem illorum modorum sive non coniuncta secundum alium. Nec illi diversi modi numerant essentiam, sed secundum quemlibet illorum est una simplex indivisa essentia sub quolibet illorum.*

80 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 194F, p. 112, l. 149 – p. 115, 242.

(the soul's powers). Each QSM implies the total essence of that of which it is a mode.

Having determined that there is such an inwardness in the soul, in which the soul is entirely and essentially present, Dietrich returned to the main argument. Just as an animate thing has within itself the principle of its motion, so too the rational soul has within itself a principle of its highest mode of life, that is, to live intellectually according to the possible intellect.⁸¹ The principle of intellectual life is the AI, which necessarily is inward (*intraneus*) to the rational soul. This inwardness (*ista intraneitas*), Dietrich argued, is a "substantial identity", and implies the mutual and essential relation (*respectus*) of two terms. There is, then, a dynamic relationship between the AI and the substance of the soul. This, however, does not make them totally identical. Burkhard Mojsisch has rightly argued that we must interpret the preceding discussion of QSM only relative to the soul's rational and vital operations, and not to say that the AI is a QSM of the soul.⁸² Rather, we might say that this inwardness corresponds to the soul's QSM that is the subject for the accidental disposition of the intelligible species.⁸³ The two related terms in "this inwardness" are in one another (*intra invicem*) essentially (*unum in alio essentialiter*), and only in this way are they the same in essence (*idem per essentiam*). That is, the AI and the soul are two essentially related substances. In such cases, for Dietrich, Proclus' threefold modes of existence apply. The soul and the AI cannot be essentially identical in a univocal way, such that they would be one essence (*una essentia*), nor does the AI participate its essence from the soul. The only option remaining is that the AI relates to the soul according to cause (*per causam*). From this it follows that the soul is in the AI "by a more eminent and noble mode than it is in itself".⁸⁴

81 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.7.2-4, p. 150, l. 46 – p. 151, l. 75.

82 B. Mojsisch, *Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Dietrich von Freiberg* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), p. 52–53.

83 Dietrich clarified (at *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.6.1-2) that it does not follow from this inwardness that the soul, conjoined to the body, exercises its vital operations intellectually (*intellectualiter*) for, even when separated from the body, it is not essentially intellectual or an intellect. This amounts to saying that the rational soul is not an intellectual substance, because otherwise it would be an essential cause. See also *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.17.1-4, p. 157, l. 38 – p. 158, l. 67. Dietrich did not mention whether the soul or, more specifically, this *intraneitas*, would occupy the mode *secundum essentiam* between the AI (*secundum causam*) and the PI (*secundum participationem*), but it would follow from his argument.

84 See also Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.8.1-11.9.4, p. 151, l. 79 – p. 153, l. 27; id., *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 23.1-6, p. 186, l. 93 – p. 187, l. 110, where Dietrich observed that the agent intellect satisfies the five criteria of an essential cause.

Although Dietrich spoke of the AI as the lowest of the order of essentially active intellects, in an important sense it is different in kind from the intelligences above it. Some essential causes (separate intelligences and heavenly souls), contain their effects in a simpler, nobler mode, but remain separate from their effects (sublunary substantial form) and share no univocal definition with them. Other essential causes “claim for themselves the conditions of their effects”. This applies to human and angelic AIs.⁸⁵ Such AIs have the individuating conditions of their essential effects “inchoatively”, which the effects have as a “disposition”. For example, a temperament exists in the soul inchoatively, in the body dispositively, and fully in the composite. According to Dietrich, the necessary and sufficient condition for individuation is the possession of parts that are after the whole (*posteriores toto*), which fall outside the consideration of the essence as such, but which the essence depends upon for its actuality. These parts can be quantitative, corporeal parts, such as a body’s limbs and members, or qualitative parts.⁸⁶ Since, at this point, Dietrich recalled his earlier discussion of QSMs, we can assume that these qualitative parts individuating the AI are something like “the sensible”, “the rational”, and so on. These would be inchoate in the AI by “real natural relations”, which have an ambiguous status: they are really from and in the nature of a thing (*realiter a natura et in natura rei*), like the inclination (*inclinatio*) of a stone to fall or of fire to rise; they exist in any AI according to its nature (*in quolibet intellectu agente secundum naturam suam*); and yet they are also “after the whole”.⁸⁷ Unlike corporeal “parts after the whole”, these relations are not added to the essence but perfectly hold the place of such parts (*perfecte gerunt vicem partium*), for they determine or incline the essence of the AI to a spiritual substance disposed to receive it according to its qualitative parts. Again, Dietrich insisted, the resulting individualised AI in the soul is not a form-matter composite, for this only occurs in the case of the *intellectus adeptus* once the possible intellect has been elevated by grace. An analogy can, however, be made with the heart’s efficient essential causality of the rest of the body or the way a form contains the entire substance of a thing in itself.⁸⁸ Therefore, although the AI is an essential cause,

85 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.19.2-3, p. 159, l. 83-105.

86 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.27.4, p. 166, l. 95-101, and 11.18.1-3, p. 158, l. 70 – p. 159, l. 78.

87 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.27.3, p. 166, l. 90-93: *Et sicut in alia manerie individuorum dictum est, quod sunt individua in habendo partes, quae sunt post totum, ita etiam suo modo se habet circa intellectum quantum ad dictos respectus, qui sunt posteriores toto, qui similiter est individuus in habendo eosdem.*

88 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.9.1-11.11.3, p. 152, l. 3 – p. 154, l. 74.

by virtue of these relations and its essential dependency on the soul's substance, it has only accidental natural being and does not belong as such to the *per se* order of the universe.⁸⁹ Presumably, then, the individual A1 belongs to the order of voluntary providence, but through its intellectual activity, the soul is related to the essential, natural order.

Berthold presupposed these arguments when he summarised the various grades of limitation comprising the second descent of the partial soul. These passages from Dietrich's treatise clarify that the partial soul's individuality must be inchoate in the *unum animae* and the *intellectus agens* in the form of QSMs.⁹⁰ This would have implications for the soul's return to God, as we see in Berthold's use of Dietrich's arguments in his commentaries on Propositions 188 ("Every soul is both life and living") and 193 ("Every soul subsists proximately from an intellect").⁹¹ We have already addressed an initial perplexity that could arise from a reading of 188E and 193E in isolation, where it would seem that the Aristotelian (*intellectus agens*), Augustinian (*abditum mentis* or *facies*), Proclean (*unum animae*; *vestigium unius*), and Dionysian (*unitas superexaltata mentis*) candidates for the soul's highest principle were placed on equal footing. Berthold's consistent position throughout the *Expositio* was that the *unum* is "the supreme portion of the rational soul" and, more precisely, the supreme "part of intellectual substance".⁹² His apparent equivocation in these passages can be explained simply by pointing out that the *unum animae* is, ultimately, the essential cause of the soul in a primary sense, "with mind or intellect mediating".⁹³

The reason why Berthold introduced them side-by-side in Proposition 188 was that he was concerned to explain the different kinds of "life" that heavenly and human souls may live. A principle of life can be numerically distinct from what it informs, as is the case of matter and form in a composite substance. Inspired, however, by Dietrich's *De intellectu et intelligibili*, Berthold proposed that other kinds of intrinsic principles of motion or life are essentially one with the substance in which they are found, and differ only intentionally or modally (*intentionaliter seu modaliter*).⁹⁴ Such is the case for separate substances that have in themselves the principles of rational, intellectual, and divine lives.

89 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, 11.21.2, p. 161, l. 43-49.

90 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 191E, p. 92, l. 110-122.

91 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 188, p. 91, l. 1: *Omnis anima et vita est et vivens*; prop. 193, p. 94, l. 1: *Omnis anima proxime ab intellectu subsistit*.

92 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 13D, p. 217, l. 270-284; 20H-1, p. 71, l. 235 – p. 72, l. 275.

93 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 164B, p. 31, l. 26 – p. 32, l. 34.

94 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 188D, p. 63, l. 156 – p. 65, l. 201.

Heavenly souls always live according to the intellectual and divine modes of life, although the way in which they exercise the latter is more hidden from us (*magis nos ibidem lateat*).⁹⁵

As for the human soul, Berthold's consistent position was stated succinctly in the final subsections of the *Expositio*: because of its "partial" conjunction with the body and its passage from intellection to non-intellection, these higher forms of life are available to it only by a rapture or a kind of crossing-over (*raptim et secundum quendam transitum fiat aliquibus*).⁹⁶ The partial soul descends whole (*tota*) into becoming because it cannot access this perfect intellectual life spontaneously, although it always presupposes its active operation. Therefore, the soul's formal union with the operation – the state of the *intellectus adeptus* – that would link it to the essential order belongs to the whole soul (*totius animae*) only accidentally.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, Berthold's interpretation of the anthropological exemplarism of the *Clavis* through Dietrich of Freiberg led him to add one important qualification to Proclus, which was signalled in his application of Proposition 65 to the case of the partial soul in 211A: because of its inwardness (*intranseitas*) that is not joined with the body, the partial soul does not descend totally (*totaliter*) into becoming.⁹⁸ According to Berthold, even though the human soul's alienation from its own ground cannot be fully overcome in this life, it can be mitigated through the process of recollection. Since true philosophy embraces logic, natural philosophy, and ethics,⁹⁹ the spiritual exercise of the soul's oblique motion through the study of the *Elementatio theologica*, with its logical rigour and attention to natures outside the soul, must coincide with ethical practice. As the soul gradually separates itself from bodily affections, it recollects (*recordetur*) the knowledge that

95 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 188E, p. 65, l. 230; 193E, p. 103, l. 126 – p. 104, l. 134.

96 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211F, p. 263, l. 216.

97 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211F, p. 264, l. 246–248: *Quamvis enim aliquid eius semper stet in lumine actualis intelligentiae intelligendo se ipsum et suum principium, a quo intellectualiter et cognitive emanat, tamen ista cognitio non est totius animae nisi per accidens.*

98 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211E, p. 263, l. 192–8: *Et sic omnis anima partialis per essentiam et se tota manet in suis primordialibus causis et tota procedit seu descendit non solum in suam propriam existentiam, sed etiam in generationem. Sed non totaliter, quia non secundum omnem modum, quo est in suis primordialibus causis quoad primum descensum, nec secundum omnem modum, quo est in ente, quamvis nihil pertinens ad ipsius talis animae substantiam, prout descendit in generationem, maneat in ente quoad secundum descensum sive in esse intellectuali.*

99 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 20, p. 32, l. 884 – p. 34, l. 973; *Expos. tit. L*, p. 50, l. 441–470.

belongs to that principle of intellectual life.¹⁰⁰ Insofar as it quiets even these interior movements, the soul lives the divine life.¹⁰¹ The theory of recollection provided the means of mediating the soul's alienation from the ongoing activity in its ground and the gradual approximation of it through the discipline of the oblique motion.

The place of the theory of recollection in Berthold's account of the soul's double descent is most clearly defined in Proposition 207. Here Berthold used the doctrine of recollection to interpret Proclus' statement that the first body of the partial soul is incorruptible because "it is established from an immobile cause". The soul's mode of knowing requires an appropriate kind of body. Since the soul's modes of knowing in being and in becoming are so unlike, so too are the kinds of body the soul uses: it requires a spiritual body when it is in being (*in ente*) and is conformed to the presiding gods (*conformis diis praesidibus*) or contemplating them (*contemplatrix deorum*), as "divine" and "intellectual" souls always are; but when it is in becoming (*in generatione*) and has fallen into "forgetfulness", it uses a material body.¹⁰² For the Platonists, if the soul had remained in its natural order (*in ordine naturali*), it would know things outside itself through the intelligible species with which the creator endowed it and would not have to beg for intelligibility (*mendicare species intelligibiles ab*

100 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211E, p. 264, l. 222-228: *Sed pro tunc solvitur secundum Platonicos unio superioris partis, quod supra dixi principium intellectualis, a residua portione substantiae ipsius animae, ne sit forma eius, licet ista solutio fiat plus et minus. Et per consequens ipsa anima in unione sui ad corpus materiale secundum proportionem talis solutionis obliviscitur eorum, quae prius existens in ente scivit, licet recordetur postea sedatis humoribus doctrina ventilante ad publicum semen veri, quod intus erat, sed in abdito latitabat.* Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 94.6, p. 258, l. 35-42: *Ut enim attrahamus ad huius rei restitutionem sententiam Platoniorum, videbimus eos concordare nobiscum in hac re. Dicunt enim, quod anima rationalis separata portat secum omnes artes, sed ex coniunctione sui ad corpus cadit in oblivionem earum. Sed istam sententiam Platoniorum quantum ad hoc, quod videtur sonare, quod anima fuerit informata omnibus artibus ante infusionem suam in corpus, et per consequens, quod dicit de causa oblivionis, non recipimus, cum teneamus et fateamur animam in sui infusione creari et in sua creatione infundi.* Berthold's phrase *ad publicum semen veri* echoes Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, metrum 11. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 194F, p. 114, l. 209-231; 207A, p. 225, l. 13 – p. 226, l. 58; 207D, p. 228, l. 111-124.

101 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202C, p. 186, l. 167-171. Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §31, p. 140, l. 11-12: *quo adiaciens le unum quietem amat, clausa cognitionibus, muta facta et silens intrinseco silentio.*

102 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 207A, p. 225, l. 18-21: *Secundum Platonicos vero anima partialis – secundum duplicem sui statum, quem alternare potest in infinitum, per praemissam – alio indiget susceptaculo, prout est in ente conformis diis praesidibus (quando videlicet est contemplatrix deorum), alio vero, quando est in generatione cadens in oblivionem.*

extra).¹⁰³ One might say that it would always know itself, according to the circular motion, and the world, according to the direct motion. To exercise these motions perfectly, as the higher souls always do, the partial soul would need a body like theirs, which Berthold described using the attributes Paul applied to the resurrected body (impassibility, clarity, subtlety, and agility).¹⁰⁴ Looking at the soul's present embodied condition, however, Aristotle was right to say that it must begin knowing by abstracting species from material things. In this sense, the material body is appropriate to initiate the process of recollection. Plato "did not deny this path", but held that such a view must always be balanced by the doctrine of recollection, which Berthold found authoritatively expressed by Boethius: "Now, the body bringing forgetful weight / does not expel all light from the mind; / within, there assuredly abides the seed of truth, / which is aroused by instruction fanning the ember".¹⁰⁵ For the Platonists, the soul's proper and vivid cognition has been obscured by the passions (*confunditur passionibus*). This is why Berthold can argue at the end of Proposition 211 that, even though a part of the soul always stands in the light of actual intelligence – always recollecting its content through the universality that belongs to the human species – the whole soul is far removed from that light.

As Berthold put it before the concluding prayer of the *Prologus*, the wayfarer is so remote from the font of paternal light because it is so distracted by cares, occluded by imaginings, and bound up in lust.¹⁰⁶ This light, whose "splendour is the Word", illuminates all people "coming into this world" (cf. John 1:9). It is very important to note that Berthold, playing on the phrase *in hunc mundum* ("into this world" or "into this pure [state]"), then reverses the more familiar interpretation of the verse. That is, the true light does not illumine all people equally who are born into the world of becoming – or, at least, it is not received equally by all. Rather, as Berthold made clear, it illumines only those who "come into intellectual purity" (*illuminat omnem hominem venientem in*

103 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 207C, p. 227, l. 94–100.

104 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 207A, p. 226, l. 40–58. Cf. 1 Corinthians 15:39–54.

105 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 207C, p. 227, l. 100 – p. 228, l. 110; 207A, p. 225, l. 31 – p. 226, l. 34. Cf. Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, metrum 11, p. 91, l. 9–12.

106 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 968–973: *Ex praemissis patere potest, cum quanta difficultate anima etiam deiformis effecta in hac vita ascendat ad conspectum fontis paternae lucis, cuius splendor gloriae est Verbum, 'lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum', scilicet puritatem intellectualem, a qua longe est mens hominis sollicitudinibus distracta, phantasmatis obnubilata, taceo autem de carnalibus voluptatibus implicata*. The final phrases (*sollicitudinibus distracta*, etc.) come from Bonaventure, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, in PP Collegii S. Bonaventurae (eds), *Opera omnia*, vol. 5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1896), c. 4, §1, p. 306a.

hunc mundum, scilicet puritatem intellectualem).¹⁰⁷ Again we are confronted with the paradox that the cognition that belongs to the soul by nature as an *ens secundum speciem* is by nature inaccessible to it as an individual *ens hoc*. The exemplarist turn Berthold gave to the doctrine of recollection meant that the fullness sought by recollection somehow must belong to human nature as it subsists in the mind of God – in effect a combination of the Eriugenian anthropology of the *duplex speculatio* with the Proclean notion of imitating the divine providence. Just as the ceaseless cognition of the ground of the soul remains hidden to us, so does the spiritual body abide still “in the hidden folds of nature”.¹⁰⁸ According to the doctrine of the double descent, as Berthold interpreted it through Dietrich of Freiberg’s *De intellectu et intelligibili*, individual souls created *de novo* are related to this plenitude through the *unum animae* and *intellectus agens*, which are simultaneously individuated and universalising powers. We can turn now to consider the content of what for Berthold was the highest approximation of that state a soul could reach in this life: the transitory enjoyment of the state he understood to be the goal of the study of the *Elementatio theologica*, namely, *puritas intellectualis*.

3 The Goodness of Silence: Deification and Providential Cognition

Berthold’s Eriugenian interpretation of the Proclean spiritual body (*susceptaculum*) coincided with the single most direct criticism of Proclus in the *Expositio*. Berthold insisted three times, each time using the *Clavis physicae*, that souls who fully enjoy blessedness after death can never fall. This criticism was made at the conclusion of Proposition 196, again in 206, and finally in 209, as Berthold cited the *Clavis* on the beatitude “promised to the saints” and the macrocosmic reversion of all temporal things into their primordial causes, when “God alone shall appear in them”.¹⁰⁹ This return of creatures to their

107 Cf. Meister Eckhart, *Sermo VI/2* (First Sunday after Trinity), eds E. Benz, B. Decker, J. Koch, *Die lateinischen Werke*, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1956), §57–58, p. 57, l. 3 – p. 58, l. 3: *Ubi nota primo, quod deus verissime mittit, gignit unigenitum suum in anima munda et ‘in ipso et per ipsum omnia’, se ipsum, Ioh. 14: ‘ad eum veniemus’ etc. [...] <Tertio> dic: in mundum. Non dicit: ‘in hunc mundum’ [1 John 4:9], sed in mundum simpliciter. Igitur in mundum intellectualem, secundum Platonem*. See also Albert the Great, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, lib. 11, tr. unicus, c. 10, p. 518a–b, cited at 1.2, n. 79, above, and the citation of Dionysius at *Expositio*, Prol. 17, p. 26, l. 685–689.

108 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 196F, p. 128, l. 190–2; 195D, p. 119, l. 99–118.

109 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 196F, p. 170, l. 64–5: *Non autem video quomodo homo beatitudinem perderet si eam re ipsa plene perfecteque gustaret*; 206F, p. 223, l. 261–266: *Istius autem descensus animarum vult auctor in infinitum vicissitudines permutari, quod non*

causes transpires only when creatures doff the finitude of time and place and revert to their infinite eternal principles while their nature remains intact; for the microcosm, the full enjoyment of that vision, understood in this sense of being “filled” with the plenitude of divinity by grace just as the humanity of the Son was filled with divinity by nature, precludes the possibility of any temporal pre-existence in such a state or a subsequent lapse from the beatific vision.

The central refutation of Proclus on re-embodiment is found in Proposition 206 (“Every partial soul can descend into generation and ascend from generation into being an infinite number of times”).¹¹⁰ Rather than rejecting the view outright by merely contrasting it with the authoritative doctrine of the faith, Berthold was more interested in giving it an acceptable metaphorical meaning. We should remember that, for Berthold, Proclus belonged alongside Plotinus as a philosopher who lifted the coverings (*integumenta*) with which the earliest Platonists had enshrouded Plato’s theorems (*theoremata*). Although he did not recall this history of Platonism at this stage of the *Expositio*, it seems likely that Berthold regarded the literal interpretation of reincarnation he found in Macrobius and Proclus as either a further act of concealment or, more plausibly, a failure to pierce all the way through those mythical coverings. His language of refutation in 209F (*refellitur*) would suggest the latter view. In either case, the search for an acceptable metaphorical meaning of reincarnation was required if Berthold was to demonstrate the thorough compatibility of the best of the pagan philosophers with the greatest theologian Paul (*summus divinalis sapientiae theologus Paulus*), his disciple Dionysius, and his commentators. To this end, he was assisted by Albert the Great’s *De natura et origine animae*, where the mythical soteriology of the Platonists is presented chiefly as an account of the soul’s origin, its immortality, and its natural yearning for knowledge.¹¹¹

videtur intelligibile; anima enim fruens fonte omnium bonorum utpote beata et felicitis vitae nec timore torqueri potuerit nec falsa securitate decipi nec commutabili bono allici ut, volens, a bono incommutabili se avertat nec ad aversionem ab aliquo violentari; 209F, p. 245, l. 201: per hoc iterum refellitur descensus animarum.

110 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 206, p. 101, l. 1-2: *Omnis anima partialis descendere in generationem in infinitum et ascendere potest a generatione in ens.*

111 Albert the Great, *De natura et origine animae*, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1955), tr. 2, c. 7, p. 30, l. 30 – p. 31, l. 67. See also Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. 33 (Paris: Vivès, 1895), pars II, tr. 12, q. 72, m. 4, a. 3, p. 51a-b: *Ad dicta Marcobii dicendum, quod fabulosa sunt, et integumenta eorum quae dixerunt Gentiles idolotrae [...]. Ad aliud dicendum, quod non intellexit Macrobius, nec etiam Plato, quod anima rationalis vires acciperet in stellis: quia potentiae animae a substantia et esse animae fluunt.*

Berthold began Proposition 206 by noting that the word “place” (*locus*) in the strict sense applies only to the corporeal realm of becoming. It also has a “metaphorical” meaning for spiritual realities, where the higher is “located” by the lower as what is “more exterior”, and the lower is “located” by the higher as what is “more interior”.¹¹² Here we may think of the hierarchy of cognition outlined in 123D, where the ascent to higher modes of knowing coincides with the apprehension of more fundamental aspects of the object. With this caveat about metaphor, Berthold was preparing for the argument that the notion of companion stars (*stellae compares*) in the *Timaeus* 42b, the “place” whence souls arise and whither they return, must be understood in the metaphorical sense.¹¹³ Platonists speak this way, he explained, because of their account of the origin of the partial soul, which holds that the constellations exercise a determinative operation through the influence of intellectual light, through which a celestial mover scatters intellectual seeds proportionate to itself within the soul.¹¹⁴ Berthold went so far as to claim that this accords with those (e.g., Augustine) who say that souls “are poured in by being created and are created by being poured in” (*creando infundi et infundendo creari*).¹¹⁵ With this simple manoeuvre, Berthold stripped Platonic doctrine of its association with the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, such that it becomes an account of the soul’s intellectual origins and its natural desire to return to the interiority where it can live the life most appropriate to it.¹¹⁶

112 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206A, p. 216, l. 14 – p. 217, l. 37. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*, 14.2-3 and 14.4-6, p. 313, l. 16-21 and 30-38.

113 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206B, p. 217, l. 39 – p. 218, l. 75.

114 Here Berthold also looked to Macrobius (*In Somnium Scipionis* 1.14), whom he cited on the “fiery” intellect which the souls receive from the higher stars of the Milky Way (207E), along with Boethius’ poetic images of recollection as glowing embers kindled by teaching (207A-C). This account of the human soul’s origin would be compatible with what he found in Albert the Great, *De natura et origine animae*, tr. 1, c. 5, p. 14, l. 14-27.

115 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206B, p. 217, l. 51-54: *Et in talem sententiam concordant etiam isti, qui dicunt animas creando infundi et infundendo creari ita, quod usque hodie in circulis nativitate ponitur ab eis una stella, quam Hyleg et Alkocoden vocant, quod Latine sonat vita et intellectus, eo, quod nato vitam et intellectum conferre dicitur*. See also *Expositio*, 207C, p. 227, l. 78-82.

116 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206B, p. 218, l. 62-69: *Videtur autem haec positio accipi ex quattuor motivis praecipuis: tum quia animarum partialium cum intellectualibus et divinis est eadem natura, cum sint eiusdem seyræ, ergo et idem locus; tum quia anima partialis non debetur corpori terrestri nisi propter similitudinem eius ad caelum, igitur caelum est magis proprius eius locus; tum quia anima partialis est quasi semen motorum caelestium secundum expositionem Calcidii super Timaeo: ergo eorum erit ad eundem locum comparitas; tum etiam quia sunt eiusdem operationis, scilicet intellectualis.*

More important still was Berthold's account of the soul's proper work in its native "place" at 206C (*quid autem animae partialis in comparibus stellis existentis opus sit*), where he forged a synthesis of Proclus and Dionysius on the question of beatitude and embodiment.¹¹⁷ This comparative approach has been followed unwittingly in more recent times by Jean Trouillard, who has contrasted Eriugena, whom he judged to follow Dionysius, and Proclus on precisely this question. Drawing on the *Tria opuscula* and Proclus' commentary on the *Republic* (unknown to Berthold), Trouillard saw differences between the two Platonists where Berthold found similarities.¹¹⁸ Trouillard was emphatic that, for Proclus, separated souls rejoice at the prospect of being reunited with a body. Virtuous and vicious souls alike find in their return to body the opportunity for action, although they descend for different reasons – some out of generosity and self-sacrifice, and others out of forgetfulness. Berthold was in fact aware of this view and cited the key passage from the *De malorum subsistentia*: souls descend either because of "the inability to imitate the presiding [gods], the desire for noble birth, purity, virtue, [or] divine intellect".¹¹⁹ Berthold's first citation of *De malorum subsistentia* in 206C, regarding the soul's work in heaven, is also one that Trouillard would regard as characteristically Proclean:

For the primary good is not contemplation, intellectual life, and knowledge, as someone has said somewhere. No, it is life in accordance with the divine intellect which consists, on the one hand, in comprehending the intelligibles through its own intellect, and, on the other, in encompassing the sensibles with the powers of [the circle of] difference and in giving even to these sensibles a portion of the goods from above. For that which is perfectly good possesses plenitude, not by the mere preservation of itself, but because it also desires, by its gift to others and through the ungrudging abundance of its activity, to benefit all things and make them similar to itself.¹²⁰

117 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206C, p. 218, l. 77 – p. 219, l. 110.

118 J. Trouillard, "Métempsomatose proclienne et eschatologie érigénienne", in J. Sojcher, G. Hotois (eds), *Philosophies non-chrétiennes et christianisme. Annales de l'Institut de Philosophie et de Sciences morales* (Bruxelles: Université libre de Bruxelles, 1984), p. 87–99.

119 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206D, p. 220, l. 140–2.

120 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206C, p. 218, l. 83–89, citing Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*, c. 7, §23, p. 202, l. 10–18: *Non enim erat prime bonum thea, id est speculatio, vel intellectualis vita et prudentia, ut alicubi ait aliquis, sed quod secundum divinum intellectum detinens quidem intellectualia sui ipsius intellectu. Ambiens autem sensibilia his quae alterius potentiis et eorum quae inde bonorum partem etiam ipsius his exhibens, quia, quod perfecte bonum non in salvare se ipsum solum habet le plenum, sed iam et ea, quae ad*

Rather than addressing the theme of the soul's desire for embodiment, however, Berthold focused on the term *plenum*, and connected this passage with one immediately preceding it, where Proclus stated that blessed souls in the realm of being "feast" with the gods: "with the presiding gods the soul ascends [...] to the fruition of divine things and especially of the primarily Good".¹²¹ According to Berthold, on this point Proclus in fact agreed with Dionysius, who wrote:

This, therefore, according to my knowledge, is the first rank of heavenly beings standing immediately in the circuit of God [*in circuitu*] and around God, simply and unceasingly encircling his eternal cognition in the highest arrangement beyond motion. This is what we find in the angels, who view many blessed contemplations purely, and who are illumined by simple and immediate splendours, and filled with divine nourishment [*divino nutrimento adimpletus*] – many, indeed, [are filled] by the first effusion that is bestowed, but one [rank] by the invariable and life-giving unity of the thearchic banquet [*invariabili et vivifica thearchicae epulationis unitate*].¹²²

According to Berthold, who did not mention that this passage referred to the seraphim at the summit of the angelic hierarchy, both texts describe the stable contemplation enjoyed by "divine souls" (the movers of the heavens) and "intellectual souls" (human souls in being). The language of feasting and plenitude, he argued, suggests that we are dealing with an activity that is connatural to the soul, and if it is given fully without impediment, then it does not have a contrary (*si est non impedita, non habet contrarium*). This simple point

alia datione et non invidiosae operationis omnia bonificare desiderat et sibi similia facere.
English translation: Proclus, *On the Existence of Evils*, trans. J. Opsomer, C. Steel (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 73–4.

121 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206C, p. 218, l. 91–93: *Ex quibus verbis aperte colligitur animam partialem, ut est in ente, esse beatam, sicut quae cum diis praesidibus ascendit ad felicem et perfectissimam entis epulationem, id est ad fruitionem divinorum et specialiter prime boni.*

122 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206C, p. 218, l. 95 – p. 219, l. 101, citing Dionysius, *De caelesti hierarchia*, 7.4, 212A: *Igitur hic quidem est secundum meam scientiam primus caelestium substantiarum ornatus in circuitu Dei et circa Deum sine medio stans et simpliciter et indesinenter ambiens aeternam ipsius cognitionem secundum supremam, ut in angelis, supermobilem collocationem; multis quidem et beatis videns pure contemplationibus, simplicibus autem et immediatis splendoribus illuminatus: et divino nutrimento adimpletus, multa quidem, primo data effusione, una autem, invariabili et vivifica thearchicae epulationis unitate.*

was meant to establish that Proclus was mistaken to assert that souls would ever descend from their homes among their “companion stars”, but the *Clavis* had it right: if ever souls delight in the immutable fount of all goods, nothing could draw them away.¹²³ Thus Berthold read Proclus through Eriugena (and Dionysius) for whom, as Trouillard observed, the perfection of the soul is precisely to be “saturated by contemplation”.

The soul naturally longs for the kind of incorruptible body that “whole” heavenly souls have already, and which will serve it in the greater realisation of contemplative felicity.¹²⁴ What a spiritual body enables, with the qualities of agility, subtlety, and so on, is the further transmission of the goods that the souls receive from intellects above them. For Berthold, souls do in a sense ascend and descend from being into becoming in rare moments of contemplative *raptus*, but to say that a soul would descend from the permanent possession of its own intellect (*intellectus adeptus*), is unthinkable. The Dionysian correction of Proclus, which for Berthold truly grasped the doctrine behind the *Timaeus*, which Proclus should have understood by the light of his own principles, was that the soul does not turn directly back to the world of generation and corruption, but exercises a divine care for what is below because of a kind of excess or overflow. As Proclus himself wrote, the soul raised to “govern the world with the gods” by “ascending to the blissful and most perfect banquet of being”, fills those who follow upon it with that same abundance.¹²⁵ This idea immediately preceded Proclus’ remark, cited above, that “the primary good is not contemplation” or “intellective life”. So too for Dionysius, hierarchy is intended to connect the higher and lower through such a dynamic exchange.¹²⁶ If contemplation does not result in some providential action, if it does not abound, then it is not yet divine.

123 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206F, p. 223, l. 263-6: *anima enim fruens fonte omnium bonorum utpote beata et felix vitae nec timore torqueri potuerit nec falsa securitate decipi nec commutabili bono allici ut, volens, a bono incommutabili se avertat nec ad aversionem ab aliquo violentari.*

124 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185H, p. 24, l. 334 – p. 25, l. 365; 202C, p. 185, l. 127-136: *quando incorruptibiles et immortales erimus et christiformem et beatissimum consequemur finem, visibili ipsius Dei apparitione in castissimis contemplationibus adimpleti, manifestissimis circa nos splendoribus refulgente, sicut circa discipulos in illa divinissima transformatione; intelligibili autem luminis datione ipsius, impassibili et immateriali mente participantes et super mentem unitione, in ignotis et beatis inmissionibus superclarorum radiorum, in diviniore imitatione supercaelestium mentium. Nam aequales erimus angelis, ut veritas dicit Eloquiorum, et filii Dei, resurrectionis filii existentes.*

125 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206C, p. 218, l. 80-83, cited above at 5.1, n. 63.

126 Dionysius, *De caelesti hierarchia*, 3.2, 165A-C.

In this respect, we see that Berthold attempted to be faithful to Proclus' own doctrine set out in Proposition 129 ("Every divine body is divine through a deified soul; but every soul is divine because of a divine intellect; but every intellect is divine through participation in a divine unity: and if the One is *anttheon*, that is, God from itself, intellect is most divine, soul is divine, and body is deiform").¹²⁷ Proclus' terminology prompted Berthold to discuss the meaning of deification (*deificatio*). If the body is to be deified, this must occur "through assimilation and union" with God, as Dionysius wrote. This can only happen through the intermediary terms, such that "the body would be, as it were, changed into soul, soul into intellect, and intellect into God".¹²⁸

Here, once again, Berthold's guide to interpreting Proclus on deification was the *Clavis physicae*.¹²⁹ Berthold first included the famous images of light-filled air and red-hot iron, which Eriugena elaborated from Maximus the Confessor, and which subsequently were included in the *Clavis*.¹³⁰ These metaphors originally were intended to illustrate how the divine and the human can be united without confusion or, in the more universal scope of Eriugena and Berthold, how a lower nature can be infused and transformed by the higher without losing its identity: the corporeal is changed into the soul, "not so that it would be lost", but "to preserve it in a better essence".

To get a clearer sense of how this will occur in the macrocosm, Berthold continued, let us take as an example the deified person (*ponamus hominem deificatum pro exemplo*), in whom the four cosmological genera are present. He then cited the two familiar texts from Dionysius and Proclus – Dionysius on "the unity exceeding the nature of mind", according to which it is necessary to think divine things, "not according to ourselves", and so on; and Proclus, who made this point more clearly (*istam intentionem clarius ponit Proclus*), when he disclosed the frenzy or cognition above mind, in which the soul "sees" the One by "not seeing", having brought all exterior and interior motions to stillness.

127 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 129, p. 65, l. 1-5: *Omne corpus divinum per animam est divinum exdeatam, omnis autem anima divina propter divinum intellectum, omnis autem intellectus divinus secundum participationem divine unitatis; et si quidem unum autotheon* [Berthold: *anttheon*] (*id est ex se*) *deus, intellectus autem divinissimum, anima autem divina, corpus autem deiforme*. On this commentary, see E. Massa, "La deificazione nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg a Proclo, *Elementatio theologica*, 129. Edizione del testo e prime analisi", in R. Lievens, E. van Mingroot, W. Verbeke (eds), *Pascua Mediaevalia. Studies voor Prof. Dr. J.M. de Smet* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), p. 545–604.

128 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129B, p. 177, l. 140-141: *quod corpus quasi mutetur in animam, anima in intellectum, intellectus in Deum*.

129 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129B, p. 177, l. 142 – p. 179, l. 196.

130 See Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena*, p. 193–203.

According to Berthold, this shows that, although the preparation or purification of the soul begins from below, deification begins from above, when God is participated separably (*separabiliter*) through the *unum animae*, which is the inseparable potency (*per inseparabilem potentiam*) or vestige God has left in the soul. Then the intellect is transformed and made most divine (*divinissimum*), and so on for the soul and for the body. In this way the participation in divinity passes through all intermediaries to the deification of the body (*sic participatio divinitatis transit per omnia media usque ad deificationem corporis*).

Among these more familiar sources, it is most striking to find Berthold citing Bernard of Clairvaux, as a confirmation of the consensus of the *Clavis* and Proclus about the deification of the microcosm (intended, we will recall, as an illustration of what will transpire in the macrocosm):

And so, as Bernard says, 'the whole person will proceed into God and, adhering to him, from thenceforth will be one spirit with him'. 'Just as a tiny drop of water infused in a large quantity of wine seems to leave itself, and now is imbued with the taste and colour of wine', 'so also, at that time, in the saints' (that is, 'when they are drunk, so to speak, with the abundance of the house of God, and in some way will have become oblivious of themselves'), 'all human affection will necessarily, in some ineffable way, liquify and be poured out deeply into the will of God. Otherwise, how will God be all in all, if in man something of man will remain? Indeed, the substance will remain, but in another form, another glory, and another power'.¹³¹

This citation brought together and reordered numerous phrases from Bernard's *De diligendo Deo*. This reordering, and the reference to Ephesians 3:19 that immediately follows it in the *Expositio*, indicate that Berthold's source was a popular *florilegium*, the so-called *Flores Bernardi*.¹³² This chapter of the

¹³¹ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129B, p. 179, l. 188-196: *Et sic, ut dicit Bernardus, 'totus homo perget in Deum et deinceps adhaerens ei unus cum eo spiritus erit'. 'Quomodo stilla aquae modica multo infusa vino deficere a se tota videtur, dum et saporem vini induit et colorem; 'sic omnem tunc in sanctis' (scilicet 'quando quasi ebrii ab ubertate domus Domini quodammodo obliti sui ipsorum fuerint') 'humanam affectionem quodam ineffabili modo necesse erit a semet ipsa liquescere atque in Dei penitus transfundi voluntatem. Alioquin, quomodo erit Deus omnia in omnibus, si in homine de homine quidquam supererit? Manebit quidem substantia, sed in alia forma, alia gloria, aliaque potentia'.*

¹³² Bernard of Clairvaux, *De diligendo Deo*, eds J. Leclercq, H. Rochais, *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, vol. 3 (Roma: Editiones Cistercienses, 1963): *totus ... erit* (c. 15, §39, p. 153, l. 9-10); *quomodo ... colorem* (c. 10, §28, p. 143, l. 15-17); *sic ... sanctis* (c. 10, §28 p. 143, l. 20); *quando ... fueriunt* (cf. c. 15, §39, p. 153, l. 7-8); *humanam ... potentia* (c. 10, §28, p. 143, l. 20-24).

Flores embellished Bernard's own summary of the argument in *De diligendo Deo* about of the four ascending modes of love, according to which a person (1) loves oneself for one's own sake, (2) loves God for one's own sake, (3) loves God for God's sake, and (4) loves oneself for God's sake.¹³³ In the lengthier discussion of the fourth mode in chapter 10 of *De diligendo Deo*, Bernard spoke of the rare possibility of attaining such love in this life, if only for an instant.¹³⁴ In the summary at chapter 15, however, which was retained by the *Flores*, the glass was half empty, and Bernard hesitated to affirm that the fourth mode could be attained "perfectly" in this life.¹³⁵ This would not have had a significant bearing on Berthold's analysis of Proposition 129, where the perspective was clearly that of the Resurrection and the total deification of the microcosm, but it will be worth keeping in mind when we return to consider Berthold's conception of the transitory cognition of the *unum animae*.

In one sense, Bernard only confirmed what Berthold already took from the *Clavis*, with the metaphors of mixture illustrating how the substance of

I have not been able to consult a manuscript of the *florilegium* written before the 15th century. Of the modern editions, the text used by Berthold was closer to *Flores sancti Bernardi* (Venezia: Junta, 1503), lib. IX, c. 42, p. 162vb, than what is found in *Flores operum D. Bernardi abbatis Clarevallensis* (Lyons: G. Rouillius, 1570), lib. IX, c. 36, p. 698, as the latter makes no reference to the *domus Domini*. In both editions, the next and final chapter of book IX is *De longitudine, latitudine, sublimitate et profundo* – a clear echo of Eph. 3:19, discussed below – which summarised Bernard of Clairvaux, *De consideratione*, lib. V, c. 13, §27. On the origins and medieval transmission of the *Flores Bernardi*, see M. Bernards, "Flores Sancti Bernardi", in J. Lortz (ed.), *Bernhard von Clairvaux. Mönch und Mystiker. Internationaler Bernhard-Kongress Mainz 1953* (Mainz: Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz, 1955), p. 176–191, and U. Köpf, "Die Rezeptions- und Wirkungsgeschichte Bernhards von Clairvaux. Forschungsstand und Forschungsaufgaben", in K. Elm (ed.), *Bernhard von Clairvaux. Rezeption und Wirkung im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1994), p. 5–65, at p. 12–17. The same passage from the *Flores* used by Berthold featured prominently in Henry Suso's account of releasement (*gelazsenheit*) in *The Little Book of Truth*. See Henry Suso, *Daz buechli der warheit*, c. 4, p. 336, l. 7–24. On Bernard's influence among Berthold's Dominican contemporaries, see G. Steer, "Bernhard von Clairvaux als theologische Autorität für Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler und Heinrich Seuse", in K. Elm (ed.), *Bernhard von Clairvaux*, p. 233–259.

¹³³ Bernard of Clairvaux, *De diligendo Deo*, c. 15, §39, p. 152, l. 18 – p. 153, l. 14.

¹³⁴ Bernard of Clairvaux, *De diligendo Deo*, c. 10, §27, p. 142, l. 13–15: *Beatum dixerim et sanctum, cui tale aliquid in hac mortali vita raro interdum, aut vel semel, et hoc ipsum raptim atque unius vix momenti spatio, experiri donatum est.*

¹³⁵ Bernard of Clairvaux, *De diligendo Deo*, c. 15, §39, p. 153, l. 3–6: *Sane in hoc gradu diu statur, et nescio si a quoquam hominum quartus in hac vita perfecte apprehenditur, ut se scilicet homo diligit tantum propter Deum. Asserant hoc si qui experti sunt; mihi, fateor, impossibile videtur.*

beatified human nature remains while it is imbued by grace with another glory and another power, so that God may be “all in all”.¹³⁶ Just as water takes on the properties of wine, or iron the properties of fire, so human nature is ennobled by the divine nature. But the imagery used by Bernard (the banquet in the house of God, drunkenness, and self-forgetfulness) went further than this, and struck a deeper resonance with more characteristic motifs of the doctrine of contemplation in the *Expositio*, which have more in common with Proclus and Dionysius than with the *Clavis*. The banquet, with the semantic register of abundance and plenitude, was central to Berthold’s understanding of how deification occurs as an overflow from the top, so to speak, of the macrocosm and microcosm. Such metaphors appeared at the culmination of his gloss on Psalm 42 at the conclusion of the *Prologus*, with the famished soul’s arrival to the house of God (the vision of the divine ideas) and the heavenly banquet (*usque ad domum Dei, in voce exultationis et confessionis sonus epulantis*). Similarly, the correction of Proclus’ literalist reading of Plato’s myths of embodiment with the Dionysian theology of the *Clavis* hinged on the idea that the soul’s proper activity in the realm of being is a feast (*epulatio*), whose overabundance redounds providentially to its body and all who follow after the soul.¹³⁷ Bernard’s association of the banquet – with “the house of the Lord” surely signifying for Berthold the primordial causes in the Word – with the drunkenness of the saints (*quasi ebrii*) and their self-forgetfulness (*obliti sui ipsorum*) would have aligned with Berthold’s own understanding of the *unum animae* as a non-reflexive ignorance of self that exceeds and grounds the self-reflexivity of the acquired intellect (123D). These themes are found in the immediate context of 129B with Dionysius (*totos nos ipsos extra totos nos ipsos statutos / melius est enim esse Dei et non nostri ipsorum*) and with Proclus’ metaphor of the divine frenzy of stillness (*divina mania / quietens se ipsum*).

The citation of Bernard also sheds new light on Berthold’s understanding of the *unum animae*. In a work as vast and methodical as the *Expositio*, which so

136 The same description of unitive cognition by “the flower of the intellect” used at 129B was cited at 114B, when Berthold maintained that Proclus was describing deification by grace (*per gratiam*). See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120C, p. 93, l. 97–107.

137 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206C, p. 218, l. 82–83: *et quae in ipsam respicientia replens eo, quod ibi nectare*; 209A, p. 240, l. 21–31: *Est et alius ordo, scilicet supernaturalis [...] et pertinet ad statum vitae felicitis, quo anima cum suo susceptaculo, quod primitus animat, est in ente, ad quem statum pertinet non solum gloria animae in fruendo per contemplationem et dilectionem fonte boni, ex cuius superplenitudine ipsa anima partialis utpote supercaelestis existens illuminatur, immo superimpletur divini luminis claritate, verum etiam gloria ipsius susceptaculi*; 209E, p. 244, l. 158–171: *ubi degustat et copiosam alimenterum divinatorum affluentiam et inebriatur divini nectaris ubertate*.

rarely departs from the parameters set by Proclus' philosophical vocabulary, the value of a passing reference or citation for understanding Berthold's unspoken assumptions can be inversely proportional to its quantitative presence. This has been the case with the *intellectus adeptus* in 123D, which was crucial for grasping Berthold's modifications of Dietrich's views about the roles of grace and reflexivity in the vision of God, and with the *Prologus'* astrologer who "governs the world with the gods", which enabled us to see how Berthold adapted Albert's notions of the acquired and assimilative intellects and prophecy to a Platonic register. If there is one thing that these phrases from Bernard introduce that was altogether absent from the recurring citations of Proclus and Dionysius on the *unum animae*, it was not the notion that the transformation of human nature occurs by grace, in which there is no confusion of humanity and divinity, but the idea that this occurs through a union of wills (*unus cum eo spiritus erit / humanam affectionem in Dei penitus transfundi voluntatem*).

The echo of Ephesians 3:19 that immediately followed the citation of Bernard in 129B ("thus a person will be filled unto all the fullness of God") further reinforces the sense that affect, love, or will, is somehow operative at this highest level of supra-intellectual cognition. For this verse speaks of "comprehending" Christ's love (*caritas*), which exceeds every determinate mode of being (*latitudo, et longitudo, et sublimitas, et profundum*) and every kind of knowledge, precisely by being filled with that love.¹³⁸ This imagery of plenitude evidently agrees with the overall theory of deification in 129B. But by concluding on this note, Berthold leaves the reader with the impression that the deification above mind is in some sense a transformation of the human will into the divine will or charity. The soul is so filled with God that it can love itself, a creature, for God's sake. It does not require much extrapolation to construe this as the soul's participation in the divine providence. If this is so, then it is through a kind of intellect in love that the soul exercises providence with the presiding gods.

In an entry on Berthold of Moosburg in the *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, Willehad Eckert clearly had this passage in mind when he concluded his brief summary of the *Expositio* in three sentences: "[Berthold's] interest in Proclus is above all motivated by the thematic of the soul's union with God which he, according

¹³⁸ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129B, p. 179, l. 197. Cf. Ephesians 3:17-19: *in caritate radicati, et fundati, ut possitis comprehendere cum omnibus sanctis, quae sit latitudo, et longitudo, et sublimitas, et profundum: scire etiam supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi, ut impleamini in omnem plenitudinem Dei* ("being rooted and grounded in charity, you might comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth, length, height, and depth: to know also the charity of Christ, which exceeds all knowledge, so that you may be filled unto all the fullness of God").

to the model of Bernard of Clairvaux, sees as given through love”.¹³⁹ This is a remarkable judgement from the first scholar in the 20th century to devote substantial attention to Berthold of Moosburg. Eckert rightly marked the anthropological inspiration for Berthold’s commentary, and hinted at centrality of grace to Berthold’s conception of divine union (*durch die Liebe gegeben sieht*).

While I would agree with Loris Sturlese that a label like “affective mysticism” for Berthold’s thought, which one might take Eckert’s summary to imply, would be a very inadequate description of the *Expositio* (since, as Sturlese has put it, for Berthold “the leap into mystical experience could not be a solution” to the restrictions of the metaphysics of being), I would not go so far as to say that Berthold therefore kept Bernard’s mysticism at a distance.¹⁴⁰ It is true that Berthold only cited Bernard in two, albeit important, passages, for the doctrines of deification (129B) and contemplation (202A), and, moreover, likely relied on a *florilegium*.¹⁴¹ It is also undeniable that for Berthold the Platonic alternative to the Aristotelian metaphysics of being has to be made available, in principle, to everyone who desires to follow the laborious path of reasoning according to the oblique motion of the soul, until they arrive at the unhypothetical and simple first principle that grounds all thought. So while it would be misleading to suggest, though Eckert has not, that Berthold’s principal motive was to be faithful to Bernard of Clairvaux – it was to elucidate the soteriological wisdom of the Platonists – we should remain sensitive to the nuance this citation of Bernard brought to the Platonic consensus of the *Expositio*. When Berthold added that the unitive cognition of Proclus and Dionysius can be conceived as a transformative union of wills, we should pay attention, for it is only in such details that Berthold’s understanding of the *unum animae* can be allowed to come into view.

It would be unsurprising if a commentator had understood providential, non-reflexive cognition through ignorance (Dionysius) or seeing the One

139 W. Eckert, “Berthold von Moosburg”, in *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. 1 (München / Zürich: Artemis, 1980), col. 2034: “Das Proklos-Interesse ist v. a. motiviert durch die Thematik der Gotteseinigung der Seele, die er nach dem Modell des Bernhard v. Clairvaux als durch die Liebe gegeben sieht”.

140 Sturlese, *Homo divinus*, p. 152: “Daß der Sprung ins mystische Erleben für Berthold keine Lösung sein konnte, zeigt die Distanz, mit der er die Mystik Bernhards in der *Expositio* betrachtet wird. Bernhard wird nur zweimal erwähnt.”

141 The two definitions of contemplation taken from Bernard’s *De consideratione* in 202A have the appearance of deriving on a *florilegium*, but in the printed editions of the *Flores Bernardi* they are quite far apart: *Flores sancti Bernardi*, lib. v, c. 64, p. 68vb and lib. viii, c. 90, p. 144rb; *Flores operum D. Bernardi abbatis Clarevallensis*, lib. v, c. 46, p. 318 and lib. viii, c. 82, p. 622.

through not seeing (Proclus), in terms of love. This reading of the *De mystica theologia* and *De divinis nominibus* 7.1 had been well established since the time of Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1141) and especially Thomas Gallus (d. 1226).¹⁴² Although Berthold's citation of Bernard gestured in this direction, it is equally important to note that he nowhere made an outright identification of the activity of the soul's supra-intellectual principle with *amor*. Some parallels between the two notions, however, do appear elsewhere in the *Expositio*, where Berthold more closely associated the banquet, divine plenitude, and love. We find this connection stated most clearly in Proposition 177 ("Every intellect is a plenitude [*plenitudo*] of species", etc.).¹⁴³ Explaining how an intellect is productive by being "subject to the superessential will" (*subicitur voluntati superessentiali*), Berthold linked its generative power to the presence of unity or goodness within it:

Intellect is not only receptive of species but is even profusive of itself in the specifying determination of all that is below. In this way, it makes the goodness of silence to shine forth clearly in itself – I mean the goodness which is diffusive of itself, not by reasoning or choice, which here can even be called the silence which is in the hidden places, that is, in the holies of holies.¹⁴⁴

The fecundity of an intellect is identical with the generative "goodness of silence". The vocabulary of this passage recalls what we read in Berthold's citations of Proclus and Dionysius on the angels as "revealers of the divine silence".¹⁴⁵ According to the exegetical possibilities made available to Berthold once he had integrated the methodology of natural and voluntary providence into Platonism, these passages about the angels can be applied proportionately

¹⁴² See D. Lawell, "Ecstasy and the Intellectual Dionysianism of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great", in J. McEvoy, M. Dunne, J. Hynes (eds), *Thomas Aquinas. Teacher and Scholar* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), p. 155–183; B.T. Coolman, *Knowledge, Love, and Ecstasy in the Theology of Thomas Gallus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 1–27.

¹⁴³ Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 177, p. 87, l. 1–5: *Omnis intellectus plenitudo ens specierum, hic quidem universaliorum, hic autem particulariorum est contentivus specierum; et superiores quidem intellectus universaliorum habent quanto particulariorem qui post ipsos, inferiores autem particulariorem quanto totaliorem qui ante ipsos.*

¹⁴⁴ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 177C, p. 176, l. 116–120: *Non solum autem intellectus est sic specierum receptivus, sed etiam est sui ipsius in omnium inferiorum specificationem profusivus, et sic est faciens munde resplendere in se ipso bonitatem silentii, bonitatem, inquam, sui ipsius diffusivam non ratiocinando nec praeeligendo, quod etiam potest hic vocari silentium, quod est in abditis, scilicet secretis secretorum.*

¹⁴⁵ See *Expositio*, Prol. 6, 26H, and 32E.

to the activity of the gods in the domain of natural providence.¹⁴⁶ In light of the distinction of hierarchy and *antarkia* in 10A, we can surmise that the difference in the proportion would be as follows: in a hierarchy ruled by will, “the goodness of silence” generates only providential operations and graces, but no substances, whereas in the order of natural providence, it is productive of *entia secundum speciem* by “specifying determination”. Here in 177C, Berthold connected that silence with the notions of overflow and plenitude. Although the *unum* is not mentioned explicitly, the language of “the hidden places” and “the holy of holies” was clearly meant to evoke the idea, found already in 162B, that a *unitas superexaltata* is at the root of each separate intellect as an *ens secundum speciem*. But what is most striking here was Berthold’s decision to explain the word “silence”, which characterised Proclus’ “clearer” account of deification through the *unum animae* cited at 129B, in terms of a spontaneous and generative activity prior to reasoning or choice.

Berthold’s commentary on Proposition 175 (“Every intellect is primarily participated by principles that are intellectual in both their substance and operation”) had already explored the role of the will or love in the essential activity of the intelligences.¹⁴⁷ Here, Berthold began with an argument about what belongs to the perfection of every intellectual nature in general.¹⁴⁸ The first text he offered was Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* 4.13, on “the superabundance of loving goodness” that draws God outside himself (*extra se ipsum*) in ecstasy (*secundum extasim*). Berthold maintained that this applies proportionately to every essential cause, stating that “love is an act of will, which according to its proper notion denotes what belongs to the perfection of every intellectual nature”. In these intellectual substances, he explained, love does not belong to the genus of an accident because it is not related to a potency that follows the essence of the intellect or to an appetite triggered by some object outside the intellect. This was an important clarification, for it might

146 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 156A, p. 169, l. 12–21: *sicut se habent superiores angeli in ordine providentiae voluntariae, ita se habent proportionaliter dii in ordine providentiae naturalis. ‘Si enim’, ut dicit Dionysius 4 cap. De divinis nominibus, ‘enunciat bonitatem divinam boniformis’ deiformis ‘angelus, illud existens secundum participationem’ secundo post Deum, quod quidem est secundum eam ‘primo enuntiatum, imago Dei est angelus, manifestatio occulti luminis, speculum purum, clarissimum, incontaminatum, incoinquinatum, immaculatum, suscipiens totam, si est conveniens dicere, pulchritudinem boniformis dei-formitatis et munde resplendere faciens in se ipso, quemadmodum possibile est, bonitatem silentii, quod est in abditis’, eodem modo proportionaliter est de diis.*

147 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 175, p. 85, l. 1–2: *Omnis intellectus a secundum substantiam simul et operationem intellectualibus participatur primitus.*

148 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 175A, p. 146, l. 13 – p. 147, l. 58.

account for Berthold's reluctance to identify the *unum animae* with *amor*, as this could imply that it is a power somehow separate from the intellect. Rather, love is "the inclination following the apprehended form". This "will" desires its own good and communion with what is apprehended. In the case of an intellect essentially in act, this desired good is God, who is more inward to the intellect than its innermost part. In its communion with the overflowing Good, the intellect does not act by the necessity of compulsion or the necessity of nature, but by the freedom of the will, which for Berthold is entirely consistent with the immutability of necessity.¹⁴⁹

Thus, every intellectual nature is elevated above its own nature, properly speaking, and attains to the likeness of the primarily Good. And because the will of an intellect essentially in act is not a power, but its very essence, it follows that the will does not belong to it such that the will would move once it has been moved by an external desirable object. Rather, it is said to be moved in goodness and love to cause all things that come after itself, just as Dionysius says about the primarily Good, as we saw above, that 'divine love' 'does not leave it without seed'; so too, intellectual love does not leave such an intellect barren. In this way, after the example of the primarily Good, the goodness of the will of the intellect itself cannot be without benevolence, nor can it be without the beneficence through which it communicates its goodness in every way that it can be communicated and participated by whatever things are capable of participating in whatever way. For otherwise there would be jealousy in it, since it would not diffuse or communicate the good that it can bestow without any detriment to itself – but it is known that such 'jealousy is far removed from' everything divine.¹⁵⁰

149 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 175A, p. 147, l. 33-37: *Et hoc enim duo consequuntur ipsam voluntatem, unum in se, scilicet quod bonum proprium et eius communionem desiderat et amat amore intellectuali, secundum, quod in talis boni redundantis communione non agit necessitate coactionis, sed nec proprie necessitate naturae, sed voluntatis libertate, quae bene stat cum immutabilitatis necessitate.*

150 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 175A, p. 147, l. 38-50: *Et sic omnis intellectualis natura elevatur supra naturam proprie dictam et accedit ad similitudinem prime boni, et quia voluntas intellectus in actu per essentiam non est potentia, sed sua essentia, patet, quod non competit ei, quod moveat mota ab appetibili extra, sed dicitur moveri in bonitate et amore ad causandum omnia, quae sunt post, sicut etiam de prime bono dicit Dionysius, ubi supra, quod 'divinus amor' 'non dimisit ipsum sine germine'; ita etiam amor intellectualis non sinit intellectum talem esse infecundum, et sic etiam ad instar prime boni bonitas voluntatis ipsius intellectus non potest esse sine benevolentia, quae etiam non potest esse sine beneficentia, per quam communicat bonitatem suam omni modo, quo communicari potest et participari a*

This is nothing if not a concise statement of Berthold's rationale for elevating "good" over "being" as the primary name of God in Propositions 1 and 7, and his understanding of "goodness" as the essential mode of any given thing, according to which an essence is intrinsically related to an order outside itself. The additional clarification here is that this communication of the good is not only an ecstasy in God and the separate substances, but that it amounts to an elevation "beyond nature" (*elevatur super naturam*) in all creatures below God. Through the will, an intellect that is always essentially in act goes above itself in love and beyond itself in fecundity. Similarities with the passage from 177C, considered above, are undeniable: through willing or love, the separate intellects "mirror" or "make present" the causality of the Good; this will is intrinsic to the essentially active intellect (*in abditis*) and yet transcends it (*in secretis secretorum*). Its activity is freedom itself, beyond reasoning or the necessity of nature, and is equivalent to "the goodness of silence" and the activity of the vestige of the One or Good in the intellect.

The echo of the *Timaeus* 29e in the final line of the text from 175A (*invidia longe ab omni divino noscitur relegata*) was followed up explicitly in 175B, where Berthold noted that Plato and Avicbron agreed when they stated that separate intellects "institute those things that exist by willing": Plato, when he said that "the will of God is the most certain origin of things", and Avicbron, in more precise terms, when he wrote that "Plato considered that the forms come to be in the intelligence from an intuition of the Will (*ex intuitu voluntatis*), and they come to be in the universal soul from an intuition of the universal intelligence".¹⁵¹ Berthold would have interpreted this passage from *Fons vitae* v.17 with reference to the highest three cosmological genera of the *Elementatio theologica*, but with the crucial difference that the domain of the Good has been identified with the Will. We find Berthold citing the same text whenever he wanted to explain how the separate intelligences receive the species of which they are the plenitude.¹⁵² The overall picture here suggests that the one beyond intellect, "the holy of holies" in the separate intellects wherein "the goodness of silence" reigns and is revealed in their fecundity that mirrors the Good, is

quibuscumque et qualitercumque participare valentibus. Aliter enim esset in eo invidia, cum non diffunderet et communicaret bonum, quod posset sine sui detrimento communicare, quae tamen 'invidia longe' 'ab' omni divino noscitur 'relegata'. Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 29e.

151 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 175B, p. 149, l. 109–114. On Berthold's use of Avicbron, see A. Beccarisi, "Avicbron (Solomon Ibn Gabirol) and Berthold of Moosburg on Essential Causality", forthcoming.

152 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 145F, p. 86, l. 142 – p. 87, l. 178; 170C, p. 97, l. 103–105; 174B, p. 139, l. 89–111; 177C, p. 173, l. 15 and p. 175, l. 73–75.

the “summit” of an intellectual substance that is immediately receptive to the divine will. Far from an isolated capitulation to authority, then, Berthold’s citation of Bernard was an acknowledgement of how profoundly the abbot’s notion of deification – a transformative plenitude arising from union with the divine will – agreed with what Berthold found in the *Timaeus* (the divine will, free from jealousy, as the origin of all things), the *Phaedrus* (on the feast in the heavenly circuit, reported by Proclus), Dionysius (the ecstatic love of the Good), and Proclus (the silent “frenzy” and union with the divine providence).

For Berthold, the simplicity of an intellectual substance was primary, and the notion of will or love could not compromise it.¹⁵³ The idea that the *vestigium unius* in all spiritual substances could be realised through a kind of love is, however, consistent with our earlier analysis of the *unum animae* and acquired intellect, where we concluded that the former should be seen as the higher phase of the latter, the kernel of non-reflexivity that grounds all intellectual activity. To the extent he has identified love with this higher phase, Berthold seems to have reached for the same doctrine expressed succinctly by Plotinus (d. 270):

So, Intellect has one power to think insofar as it regards what is in itself, and another insofar as it regards what transcends itself, with a kind of apprehension and receptivity. It is in accordance with the second power that it first sees, and then later while still seeing both comes to be intellect and a unity. And the former is the contemplation of a wise intellect, whereas the latter is intellect loving, when it becomes senseless, ‘drunk with nectar’; then it falls in love, simplified into happiness by having its fill. And it is better for it to be drunk with this drunkenness than to be sober.¹⁵⁴

For Plotinus as for Berthold, it would be inappropriate to speak of love as something separate from intellect. The drunkenness of intellect is rather one mode or “power” of its seeing that is always concomitant with the “sober” and reflexive knowing that it grounds: “intellect always has its thinking and always its non-thinking”, as Plotinus went on to explain. So too for Berthold, not only is the agent intellect of the soul always active, as Dietrich had argued, but the *unum animae* must be even more active than it. Even if their operations belong to the whole soul only accidentally, it is clear for Berthold that both are given to

153 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 175B, p. 150, l. 120–129.

154 Plotinus, *Enneades*, VI.7[38].35. English translation: Plotinus, *The Enneads*, ed. L. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 842 (modified).

the soul as a pair. But what Plotinus made explicit, and which Berthold, without knowing the *Enneads*, assumed in his endorsement of Avicbron's summary of Plato's explanation of how forms come to be in the intellect (*ex intuitu voluntatis; subicitur voluntati superessentiali*), was that the ecstatic activity of intellect in love, its "reaching out" (ἐπιβολή), is simultaneously a "receptivity" (παράδοχή).¹⁵⁵ Berthold would have encountered the transliteration of the first term in Moerbeke's translation of the *De providentia et fato* (*epibolis, id est adiectionibus, simplicibus*), but for him this passage in Proclus referred to the higher phase of the possible intellect as it intuitus and receives simple formal intentions from the agent intellect.¹⁵⁶ Be that as it may, we have now seen that the same dynamic of higher and lower modalities is found at the next and highest level, where the agent intellect, having been united to the possible intellect in its lower phase, intuitus, receives, and constitutes forms immediately from the divine will in its higher phase.

Far from undermining the philosophical coherence of the *Expositio*, the notion of the *unum animae* as a kind of affective intellect can bring some much-needed clarity to Berthold's occasionally faltering attempts to define the proper activity of the *unum* apart from the *intellectus agens*.¹⁵⁷ This struggle is nowhere more apparent than in the commentary on Proposition 124 ("Every god knows the divisible indivisibly, the temporal atemporally, the contingent necessarily, the changeable unchangeably, and in general all things more eminently than they are in their own order").¹⁵⁸ After explicitly referring back to the degrees of cognition outlined in 123D, Berthold declared that it would suffice to collapse the highest two modes (the fifth: *intellectus adeptus* and *unum animae*; the sixth: the cognition of the separate intelligences) into one, called "the intellective".¹⁵⁹ Following Dietrich of Freiberg, he maintained that the intellective embraces the lower forms of sensitive and rational cognition

155 On the influence of this doctrine on Dionysius, see M. Harrington, "The Drunken *Epibole* of Plotinus and its Reappearance in the Work of Dionysius the Areopagite", in *Dionysius* 23(2005), p. 117–138.

156 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123D, p. 129, l. 144–147.

157 Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 1, §5, p. 8, l. 4–6: *necesse et providentialem cognitionem super intellectualem esse, et sic utique omnia providentiam cognoscere uno quod sui ipsius, secundum quod et bonificat omnia [...]*.

158 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 124, p. 62, l. 1–4: *Omnis deus impartibiliter quidem partibilia cognoscit, intemporaliter autem temporalia, non necessaria autem necessarie et transmutabilia intransmutabiliter, et universaliter omnia eminentius quam secundum ipsorum ordinem*.

159 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 124A, p. 139, l. 15 – p. 140, 64. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *Quaestio utrum in Deo sit aliqua vis cognitiva inferior intellectu*, 1.15–10, p. 294, l. 34 – p. 295, l. 67.

within itself in a simple mode (*in ipso uniuntur modo simplici*). This is because the intellective knows an object in the simple essence (*simplex essentia*) that is intrinsic to the intellect itself: unlike the sensitive power, which is occupied with the particular, and reason, which abstracts the universal, the cognition of the simple essence is neither universal nor particular (*nec est universalis nec particularis / nec est individua nec universalis proprie loquendo*). That is, the agent intellect contains the essence it knows and produces within itself, and does so in a simpler and nobler way than the essence exists in its effect or in the possible intellect, which apprehends it only through its divided formal parts. Such a cognition beyond the universal and particular was precisely what Proclus intended to convey with his notion of divine providence as what is *prior* to intellect.¹⁶⁰ Berthold explicitly acknowledged this in 124B, but was confined to making *a fortiori* arguments about the *unum animae* as a cognitive principle based on Dietrich's descriptions of the *intellectus in actu per essentiam*.¹⁶¹ Compared with these rather awkward and ambiguous passages, the clarity of Berthold's proposal that the separate intellects are "elevated above nature" by their will that is identical with their essence (175A-B) is more informative. Not the cognition of the separate intellects but their fecundity is related to the vestige of the One within them, in which they are always located (*illocantur*) and, for that reason, always "imitate the gods".¹⁶²

Providence is found wherever there is an active vestige of the One.¹⁶³ This providence is operative in the human soul, even when a person is not aware of it, through the *unum animae*, which is the principle of order and harmony among the parts. As such, the *unum animae* (or, perhaps better here, the *bonum animae*) is nothing else than the origin of divine love in the soul.¹⁶⁴ In this

160 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 120, p. 60, l. 10-11: *Et enim ubi que pronoy (id est intellectus provisoris) operatio nisi in supersubstantialibus?* See also the parallel text to Proposition 124 in Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 1, §5, and especially at p. 8, l. 8-11: *Non enim est le unum ipsius velut le individuum unum: hoc enim ultimum entium et universali deterius, quo participans est quod est, illud autem et universali melius [...].*

161 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 124B, p. 141, l. 78-85; 124C, p. 141, l. 99-100; 124D, p. 143, l. 152-154 and 170-172. See also *Expositio*, 83B, p. 125, l. 88 – p. 126, l. 108 on the higher "certitude" of the superintellective.

162 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 134F, p. 217, l. 106-132.

163 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120H, p. 102, l. 382-383: *ubicumque invenitur unum secundum actum, ibi et providere invenietur.*

164 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141F, p. 50, l. 194 – p. 51, l. 197: *immo etiam supremum intra eandem essentiam sive substantiam respectu residuae portionis, sicut apparebit in anima, habet providentiam coordinatam propter alternam habitudinem eorum ad invicem, quam efficit divinus amor in eis.* At *Expositio*, 141D, p. 48, l. 122 – p. 49, l. 143, this is directly related to the *extasis divini amoris*.

sense, the *unum* as the highest term within its own “order” must be placed prior by nature to the agent intellect as the essential principle or auxiliary cause of the soul for exactly the same reason Berthold placed the Good prior to being: it provides the holistic field of possibility in which the intellect will operate. On this question Berthold had invoked Avicembron’s notion of the divine will in the *Fons vitae* as the power that creates and sustains the union of matter and form by ordering the parts in relation to one another and to their source.¹⁶⁵ By “intuiting” this will, an intellect becomes a plenitude. Like the *caritas* of Ephesians 3:19, this providential will is only “comprehended” when one is filled with it.¹⁶⁶ In this way it surpasses the determinate knowledge of the intellect. When the soul is “located” in its ground, even if only for a moment, it shares in the unitive knowledge of the higher principles – but there is also something more:

Their providence consists not in conjectural reasonings about the future, as in the case in political affairs among us; but by taking their station in the animative one, and through this being illumined all about with the unific light of the gods, they see things in time atemporally, and divided things indivisibly, and those things in place without any place, and they do not belong to themselves, but to those illuminating them.¹⁶⁷

Passages like this indicate why Berthold would interpolate Proclus into the description of the astronomer’s knowledge and activity in the *Prologue*, for this

165 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 13D, p. 215, l. 201–218, citing Avicembron, *Fons vitae*, lib. v, c. 31, p. 315, l. 5–21 and lib. v, c. 36, p. 323, l. 17–20: ‘*Fac me scire, quod est ligans materiam et formam, et quid est uniens et retinens earum unionem, et quid est, respondetur ex persona magistri: Haec est voluntas, quae est superior illis, quia unitio formae et materiae non est nisi ex impressione unitatis in illis. Et postquam inter unum et duo non est medium, scias per hoc, quod inter unitatem et materiam et formam non est medium. Discipulus: Quod est signum, quia unitas ordinatrix est materiae et formae? Magister: Signum ad hoc est omnimoda unitio materiae et formae firma et stabilis et perpetua in earum creatione, id est principio unionis [...]. Et hoc est, quod dicit ibidem 36 cap.: ‘Verbum, scilicet voluntas, postquam creavit materiam et formam, ligavit se cum illis, sicut est ligatio animae cum corpore, et effudit se in illis et non discessit ab eis et penetravit a summo usque ad infimum’.* Shortly before this, at 13C, p. 214, l. 169–197, Berthold had cited passages from Dionysius on the Good as the cause of friendship (*amicitia*) among the orders of beings.

166 See n. 138, above.

167 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 134F, p. 217, l. 127–132, citing Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §64, p. 106, l. 13–18: *et ipsorum providentia non in rationalibus coniecturativis futurorum, sicut politicorum, qui hic, sed in uno animeali stationem sumens; et per hoc circumlustrare uniali lumine deorum vident achronos, scilicet intemporaliter, quae in tempore, et indivisibiliter divisa, et quae in loco omnia sine loco, et sunt non sui ipsarum, sed illustrantium.*

is nothing else than a description of a prophetic knowledge whose certainty exceeds any prediction confined to the realm of becoming.¹⁶⁸ Everything in this description could apply to the cognition of an *intellectus in actu per essentiam* or, on the human level, the acquired intellect (i.e., the “intellective” of 124A) – except for the final clause stating that the soul no longer belongs to itself, as it would in reflexive, essential cognition, but to the higher causes. This we may connect with the love that elevates intellect beyond its nature to imitate the divine generative providence, by which it manifests “the goodness of silence”, which has for its spontaneous result the perfect communication of illumination to those that are below.¹⁶⁹

Berthold's synthesis of the *Clavis physicae*, Proclus, and Dietrich of Freiberg in his exemplarist anthropology, and his views about its perpetual providential activity to which the individual is related through the *unum animae*, bear striking similarities to Meister Eckhart's speculations about the relation of the individual to human nature and what this relation entails for the ethical life and the exercise of charity. Eckhart's understanding of the patristic adage that the purpose or “fruit” of the Incarnation was “that man may become by the grace of adoption what the Son is by nature” was closely related to his interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3:18: the adopted sons of God will be changed into the “same” image (*in eandem imaginem transformamur*) as the only-begotten Son.¹⁷⁰ Shortly after the passage discussed earlier, where Eckhart denied that beatitude would consist primarily in a reflexive act of the intellect, he stressed that the Word is received only by those who are “empty of every form impressed or begotten by creatures”.¹⁷¹ Eckhart applied this principle again when commenting on the wedding at Cana and “the marriage” of human and divine natures, and went further to unfold the ethical demand this natural philosophical principle places on the individual.¹⁷² Since the Word assumed human nature, not a human person – and since human nature is univocally common to all, including Christ, and is more interior to every person than they are to themselves – it follows that whoever “wishes to become son of God [...] must love

168 See 1.2, n. 66, above.

169 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 153F, p. 155, l. 231–242.

170 Meister Eckhart, *Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem*, §106 (John 1:12–13), p. 90, l. 11 – p. 91, l. 2. Cf. 2 Corinthians 3:18: *Nos vero omnes, revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes, in eandem imaginem transformamur a claritate in claritatem, tamquam a Domini Spiritu*.

171 Meister Eckhart, *Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem*, §110 (John 1:12–13), p. 94, l. 13–14.

172 Meister Eckhart, *Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem*, §289–291 (John 2:1), p. 241, l. 5 – p. 244, l.4.

their neighbour as himself" and must deny whatever is personal and one's own (*abnegare personale, abnegare proprium*). This, Eckhart stated, is charity: to love one God in all things and all things in him (*diligit siquidem unum deum in omnibus et omnia in ipso*).

He advanced this metaphysical and ethical teaching even more strongly in his sermons. Here are two especially clear examples:

The masters say that human nature has nothing to do with time, that it is entirely untouchable and much more intimate and closer to man than man to himself. And, therefore, God took on Himself human nature and united it with His persons. There, human nature became God, because He took the naked human nature itself on and not a man himself. Therefore, if you wish to be the same Christ and be God, so abandon everything that the eternal Word did not assume. The eternal Word did not take on Himself a human being, hence, abandon what is a human being in you and what you are, and take yourself according to naked human nature, then you are the same with the eternal Word which human nature is with Him. As there is no difference between your human nature and His own, it is one, because what it is in Christ, this it is in you.¹⁷³

The eternal Word did not take this person or that person to itself, but it took a free and undivided human nature to itself, which was naked without image; because the simple form of humanity is without image. And, therefore, as in this assumption human nature was assumed by the eternal Word as a simple one without image, the image of the Father, who is the eternal Son, became the image of human nature. Because as sure as God became man, so true it is that man has become God. And so human nature has been overformed by having become the image of God, who is the image of the Father. And so, if you shall be one Son, you need to detach yourself and leave everything that makes a distinction in you. Because man is an accident of nature; and, therefore, leave aside all that is an accident in you, and take yourself according to the free and undivided human nature. And since the same nature, according to which

¹⁷³ Meister Eckhart, *Predigt 24* (First Sunday in Advent), ed. J. Quint, *Die deutschen Werke*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1958-1986), p. 420, l. 2-11. English translation: Meister Eckhart, *The German Works. 64 Homilies for the Liturgical Year. 1. De tempore*, eds L. Sturlese, M. Vinzent (Leuven: Peeters, 2019), p. 89. See also the Latin sermon on the same pericope: Meister Eckhart, *Sermo LII* (First Sunday in Advent), §523, p. 437, l. 7 – p. 438, l. 5. Cf. Meister Eckhart, *Predigt 25* (Tuesday after Fourth Sunday in Lent), ed. J. Quint, *Die deutschen Werke*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971-1988), p. 13, l. 14 – p. 16, l. 3.

you will take yourself, has become the Son of the eternal Father by the assumption of the eternal Word, so you will become with Christ the Son of the eternal Father, because you take yourself according to the same nature that there has become God.¹⁷⁴

Eckhart would later defend these ideas in the proceedings of his trial in Cologne, appealing to the same arguments we find in his commentary on John about the purpose of the Incarnation, the distinction between the only-begotten Son by nature and the sons by adoption through grace, and its implications for the correct understanding of charity as leaving off “this” or “that”.¹⁷⁵ While these portions from the proceedings did not ultimately factor into the papal bull *In agro dominico* (1329), two articles deriving from passages closely related to them were censured, which taken on their own might imply a kind of naturalistic autotheism (article 11: whatever the only-begotten Son has in his human nature, “he gave all this to me”) or the loss of any distinction between the only-begotten Son and the sons of God by adoption (article 12: whatever the Scriptures say of Christ, all of this is true of every divine person).¹⁷⁶

While the Incarnation was of course methodologically excluded from Berthold’s consideration of the *Elementatio theologica*, it is nevertheless quite conceivable that his view of the relation of an individual within the order of voluntary providence (Eckhart: “leave aside all that is accidental in you”) to human nature as an *ens secundum speciem* (Eckhart: “human nature has nothing to do with time”) which exercises providence with the gods (Eckhart: “assumed by the eternal Word”) through the *unum animae* (Eckhart: “it is entirely untouchable and much more intimate and closer to man than man to himself”), would have direct consequences for any treatment of the subject. Berthold’s theory of the double descent of the soul, preserved a subtle but clear distinction between the individual and human nature. The theory of deification he outlined in Proposition 129 affirmed that the individual “lives by the divine life” through the *unum animae*, but also made it explicit that this transformation

174 Meister Eckhart, *Predigt 46* (Eve of the Ascension), ed. J. Quint, p. 379, l. 6 – p. 382, l. 3. English translation: Meister Eckhart, *The German Works. De tempore*, p. 591–593.

175 Meister Eckhart, *Magistri Echardi Responsio ad articulos sibi impositos II*, ed. L. Sturlese, *Acta Echardiana, Die lateinischen Werke*, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2006), §65–72, p. 333, l. 8 – p. 336, l. 14.

176 *In agro dominico*, ed. L. Sturlese, *Acta Echardiana*, p. 598, l. 47–51: *Undecimus articulus: Quicquid deus pater dedit filio suo unigenito in humana natura, hoc totum dedit michi. Hic nichil excipio, nec unionem nec sanctitatem. Sed totum dedit michi sicut sibi. Duodecimus articulus: Quicquid dicit sacra scriptura de Christo, hoc etiam totum verificatur de omni bono et divino homine.*

was not the annihilation of individuality (the *Clavis physicae*) or the individual will (Bernard of Clairvaux). It is rather the harmonisation of the individual to their own nature and, through that nature, to the divine. The union, as the citation of Bernard especially affirmed, is to be “one in spirit” with God through the union of wills. Nevertheless, Berthold’s attempt to offer a metaphysics of deification through a theory of human nature clearly moved along the trail that Eckhart had opened.

Berthold was not alone among his contemporaries in developing these Eckhartian themes. In his defence of Eckhart’s orthodoxy in the *Little Book of Truth* (c. 1330), Henry Suso took great care to nuance the master’s thought on these questions of the Incarnation, human nature, and individuality or personhood, with arguments from the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas.¹⁷⁷ In one of the few sermons preserved from Berthold’s confrere in Bavaria, Henry of Ekkewint, we find the Dominican preaching about the spark or tiny flame in the soul (*der funke oder der glanster der sêle*). This spark has a perpetual apprehension of the divine reasons and guides a person with ethical council. Its constant advice is that “you should let go of all man, so that you may be free of him, as if all of human nature was enclosed within you and your nature was the essence of all people, and as if you could see yourself in every man and every man in you”.¹⁷⁸ Berthold could be seen as combining the Eckhartian speculation about the ontological status of human nature with the approach we find in Henry of Ekkewint that focuses on a principle in the soul that mediates the relation of an individual to human nature, and guides a person in charity.

Of all Berthold’s contemporaries, however, John Tauler came the closest to what we find in the *Expositio*. In a sermon preached on the Nativity of John the Baptist, Tauler surveyed the various ways the faculties and powers in the soul “bear witness to the light” (John 1:7-8).¹⁷⁹ The lower faculties, the concupiscible and irascible, give one kind of testimony, by turning away from appetites and through perseverance. The higher powers of reason, will, and love, bear witness by apprehending the mysteries of God from afar, as John the Baptist had insofar as he was a prophet. But even this apprehension is separated from the light by a veil; the higher powers cannot attain to the ground (*grunt*). Here – which, Tauler stressed, is in fact no “here” at all, because it is prior to “this” or “that” – no image, determinacy, or created light can enter. Perhaps because the language of “ground” could imply a kind of stasis or sterility, Tauler switched

177 See F. Retucci, “On a Dangerous Trail. Henry Suso and the Condemnations of Meister Eckhart”, in J. Hackett (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart*, p. 587–605, at p. 595–599.

178 See Introduction, section 1, n. 29, above.

179 John Tauler, *Predigt 61* (Nativity of John the Baptist), p. 329, l. 33 – p. 332, l. 19.

to the semantic register of the abyss (*abgrünt*) and to imagery of the churning ebb and flow of the sea. Here we may recall for Berthold how the *unum animae* is both silence and frenzy and is a more active principle than anything encountered in the world of experience. When the soul is engulfed in this abyss, Tauler continued, it finds God's eternal dwelling-place, which God has never left. Here, eternity is experienced and tasted, where there is no past and no future. Tauler's preference for the term "abyss" also allowed him to establish a dynamic relation of difference and identity between the soul and God through the image of one abyss calling out to another (Psalm 41:8: *abyssus abyssum invocat*) – just as, for Berthold, the Good summons all of its vestiges back to itself.¹⁸⁰ Whoever becomes aware (*war neme*) of this calling finds that a light projects out from the ground and directs all the faculties of the soul toward their principle and origin: this is the voice, like John the Baptist, calling the soul out into the desert. When the soul enters this wilderness, which is beyond all thought, speculation, space, and time, it "is simple and without distinction". The "experience" of God here is, one might say, the experience of remaining, where a person finds human nature as it always was:

And to the one who truly enters here, it seems as though he has been here eternally and as if he were one with him, even though this endures for only a blink of an eye, and these blinks feel and appear as though they last an eternity. And this radiates a light to the outside, and testifies that the human was eternally in God in his uncreatedness. When he was in him, then the human was God in God.¹⁸¹

Just as with Berthold, the soul's entry into its ground coincides with an encounter with the exemplar of human nature in God, outside of the realm of becoming and change. And so, Tauler concluded, unless a person returns to that state of purity that was theirs when they passed from their uncreated to their created state, they will never return to God.¹⁸² This not only requires forsaking

¹⁸⁰ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7B, p. 146, l. 270–282.

¹⁸¹ John Tauler, *Predigt 61* (Nativity of John the Baptist), p. 331, l. 26–31: *Es ist einvaltig und sunder underscheit, und wer her in geratet recht, dem ist als er alhie eweklich gewesen si und als er ein mit dem selben si, noch denne das es nüt enist denne ougenblike, und die selben bliche die vindent sich und zoeigent sich ein ewigkeit; dis lüchtet es us und git ein gezüg das das der mensche was eweklichen in Gotte in siner ungeschaffenheit. Do er in im was, do was der mensche Got in Gotte.*

¹⁸² Cf. Meister Eckhart, *Predigt 52* (Martyr), ed. J. Quint, *Die deutschen Werke*, vol. 2, p. 491, l. 9–p. 494, l. 3. English translation: Meister Eckhart, *The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense*, p. 200.

attachment and possessiveness. The spirit must also be transformed with the light of grace and must make itself habitually acquainted with its own inwardness. Given this background, it is all the more remarkable that Tauler immediately introduced Proclus alongside Plato and other unnamed pagans who “were familiar with this ground”.¹⁸³ Proclus had also featured at the conclusion of Tauler’s sermon on Holy Cross Day after a similar exemplarist account of the soul’s ground.¹⁸⁴ As in his sermon for Trinity Sunday, Tauler was not interested in disabusing his audience of the impression that Proclus and Plato were therefore familiar with the state of simplicity he has just described.¹⁸⁵ He was more concerned with making the point that these pagans were more familiar with the hidden dignity of human nature, made known to them through a kind of grace of which they were fully aware, than the Christians of his own day. If we want to imagine the ethical implications and cultural context of Berthold’s investigation of the invisible things of God in the order of natural providence, and his conclusions about the activity of the *unum animae* as a kind of providential love that never deviates from its non-reflexive directedness toward its source, we need look no further.¹⁸⁶

183 On this passage, see Part 1, n. 6 and 3.2, n. 82, above.

184 John Tauler, *Predigt 65* (Holy Cross), ed. F. Vetter, p. 358, l. 10-16: *In der verborgenheit wirt der geschaffen geist wider getragen in sin ungeschaffenheit, do er eweklichen gewesen ist e er geschaffen würde, und bekent sich Got in Gotte und doch an im selber creatur und geschaffen. Aber in Gotte sint alle ding Got, do sich diser grunt inne vindet. ‘Als der mensche her in kumt’, spricht Proculus, ‘was denne uf den usseren menschen gevallen mag: armuete, liden oder gebreste, das si weler künne es si, des enachtet der mensche nüt.’* (“In this hiddenness, the created spirit is drawn back into its uncreatedness, where it is existing eternally before it was created, and it knows itself God in God, but acknowledges itself to be a creature and created. But in God all things are God, where this ground finds them within. ‘When a person enters here,’ says Proclus, ‘whatever then happens to the outer person – poverty, suffering, failure, whatever these kind these might be – the person does not notice it’”).

185 See 3.2, n. 81, above.

186 See also John Tauler on “essential prayer”, in *Predigt 24* (Sunday after the Ascension), ed. F. Vetter, p. 101, l. 22 – p. 102, l. 29, and on the mystical body, in *Predigt 39* (Fifth Sunday after Trinity), p. 158, l. 1 – p. 159, l. 22.

Conclusion

1 Legacy

The earliest traces of the influence of the *Expositio* appear in the sermons of John Tauler, whose astonishing endorsements of Proclus in his preaching have been our most important guide and witness to the cultural and anthropological implications of Berthold's valorisation of the pagan philosopher within his Christian milieu. Tauler not only cited some of the most important passages from the *Tria opuscula* used by Berthold to establish the concord of Proclus and Dionysius in their doctrines of the one of the soul: he compared them with contemporary notions of the *imago Dei* (Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, Meister Eckhart) and, sometimes only ambiguously separated them from the best of these positions (Dietrich of Freiberg). He also shared Berthold's judgement about the pagan knowledge of the Trinity, which was the basis for Berthold's synthesis of Dietrich's metaphysics with the theory of primordial causes from the *Clavis physicae*. Most importantly, Tauler's judgements about Proclus in *Predigt 60d* (Trinity Sunday) and *Predigt 6i* (Nativity of John the Baptist) explicitly drew the conclusion that these achievements of a pagan philosopher, who had such "familiarity" with the ground of the soul (Berthold would say, who had perfected "the habit of our divinising *supersapientia*") ought to be received as a reminder, and even as a cause of shame, for Christians. This is the strongest direct witness to the argument in this study that Berthold's *Expositio* should be understood as a project of reform that looked to antiquity for a divine science of God, the universe, and human nature that had been forgotten or even deliberately rejected by his contemporaries.¹ Tauler's use of Proclus in *Predigt 6i* and *Predigt 65* (Holy Cross) also coincided with his elaboration of an exemplarist anthropology. In this view, an individual is mediated to human nature in the divine mind through the ground, abyss, or the one of the soul. Such an anthropology was precisely what Berthold articulated in his commentary on Proposition 211. This is not to say that Tauler relied on Berthold for such a view of human nature – Meister Eckhart would be a more likely source – but that he would think of Proclus in such a context suggests

1 Cf. L. Sturlese, *Philosophie im Mittelalter. Von Boethius bis Cusanus* (München: Beck, 2013), p. 102: "Berthold projizierte das Reformprojekt Eckharts zurück in ein mythisches 'goldenes Zeitalter' der antiken Philosophie."

that even on this matter he was familiar with his confrere's interpretation of the *Tria opuscula*.²

After this case of a decisive but implicit influence, there are three instances of Berthold's explicit influence in the 14th and 15th centuries: there are explicit references to the *Expositio* from an anonymous author from 14th-century Regensburg, in the Mariological works of the Viennese Dominican theologian, Franz of Retz (c. 1343 – 1427), and in the *Apologia doctae ignorantiae* (*Defense of Learned Ignorance*) by Nicholas of Cusa (1401 – 1464).³

The earliest explicit mention of the *Expositio* is found in an anonymous commentary on the *Sentences* written by a Dominican author in Regensburg in the mid-late 14th century.⁴ The citation of Berthold appears in the commentary

2 These speculations were not confined to the German Dominicans. One may also mention a contemporary development in Jan van Ruusbroec, whose doctrine of the soul's three "unities" and exemplarist anthropology was first outlined in his *Spiritual Espousals* (*Die geestelike brulocht*), completed in Brussels around 1335–1343. See Jan van Ruusbroec, *Die geestelike Brulocht*, ed. J. Alaerts (Turnhout: Brepols, 1988), b41–b68, p. 286–289; b1625–1669, p. 470–475; and c125–141, p. 586–589. Incidentally, Tauler may have visited Ruusbroec around 1346, after Ruusbroec established the community of Groenendaal, and transmitted some of his works up the Rhine. A German translation of the *Espousals* was in circulation around 1350. See G. Warnar, *Ruusbroec. Literature and Mysticism in the Fourteenth Century*, trans. D. Webb (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 130–134.

3 There was possibly a tacit influence of Berthold on the incomplete commentary on the *Elementatio theologica* transmitted anonymously but now attributed to John Krosbein, who would have written the text before 1400. See F. Retucci, "Sententia Procli alti philosophi. Notes on an Anonymous Commentary on Proclus' *Elementatio theologica*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II. New Commentaries on Liber de causis and Elementatio theologica* (ca. 1350–1500) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 99–180, at p. 110–113. On John Krosbein, see D. Calma, "A Medieval Companion to Aristotle. John Krosbein's Paraphrase on *Liber de causis*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II*, p. 11–98, at p. 20. Commenting on Proposition 115, Krosbein identified the gods as primordial causes (Retucci, "Sententia Procli", p. 156, l. 26–30): *Quod vero velit in hoc loco dicere deos ordinum singulorum, me fateor ignorare, nisi forte velit hos esse primordiales causas et ydeas ordinum singulorum, que in sapientia Dei supersubstantialiter et supervitaliter et superintellectualiter sunt unite, per quas producuntur singula et formantur*. Given the presence of this syntagm (*primordialis causa*) in the Latin text of the *Elementatio* and its use among more mainstream authors influenced by Augustine and Peter Lombard (see 4.3, n. 134–136, above), its passing appearance in this commentary on its own cannot, however, be taken as decisive evidence of Berthold's influence.

4 MS München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26897. The citation of Berthold was noted first by F. Pelster, "Die Ehrentitel der scholastischen Lehrer des Mittelalters. Ein Beitrag und eine Ergänzung", in *Theologische Quartalschrift* 103(1922), p. 41–42. The two citations of the *De causa Dei* by Thomas Bradwardine (the *doctor profundus*), identified by Pelster at f. 33vb and f. 43ra, establish a *terminus post quem* of 1344. Boese, *Wilhelm von Moerbeke*, p. 75, has proposed that the commentator encountered Berthold's work in Cologne while he was a student there.

on distinction 1 of book 11 of the *Sentences*, in response to the following question: “whether the primarily first and unique principle, just as it can create all things from nothing and conserve them, can annihilate anything that has been created”.⁵ The commentator subdivides the question into several presuppositions that must first be addressed, which concern the unicity of the first principle and its status as the cause of all things. After setting out these problems, with various arguments for and against each thesis, the author then advances three principal arguments. Only the first is relevant here, which responds to the question, “Whether, of the whole cause of being, it is possible that there is a first effect prior to the first principle” (*Numquid totius causae entis et possibilis sit ante unum principium primum effectum*).⁶ Here, the anonymous elaborated an original interpretation of the distinction between *prime primum* and *prima primum*, which, as he indicated, was inspired by (*illud notabile similiter*) “the venerable father Berthold of Moosburg”. It is intriguing that this accurate reference, which was certainly to *Expositio* 8D, did not employ the alphanumerical system that we find in the extant manuscripts of the commentary, but referred instead to “the second principal article in theorem 8”. This could imply that the *Expositio*, or portions of it, circulated before the index and the system of alphabetical subdivisions were added.⁷

The passage in question from 8D outlined one of the characteristic terminological distinctions in the *Expositio*, where Berthold explained for the first time what he understood by the difference between two adverbs, *prime* and

5 MS München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26897, f. 42rb: *Utrum sicut principium prime primum et unicum potest omnia de nichilo creare, possit sic aliquod creatum anichilare.*

6 MS München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26897, f. 42va: *Notandum est quod differentia est inter prima primum et prime primum. Nam primum vel prima primum est aliquod primum in ordine aliorum, quod primum alia omnia eiusdem ordinis participant quodammodo, ut primus homo participatur quodammodo ab omnibus hominibus participatione naturae humanae. Prime autem primum significat absolutissimum cuiuslibet ordinis rerum, cuius dicitur primum, non quod participetur essentialiter ab aliis cuiuscumque ordinis. Ex quo [corpore add. sed exp.] sequitur secunda differentia, quod primum cuiuslibet ordinis invenitur in multis eiusdem ordinis, quoniam unumquodque respectu posterioris se dicit primum. Ex quo sequitur [sequitur in marg.] secundus quod primum competit multis, quia competit tot sicut possunt esse individua eiusdem ordinis, videlicet competit tot quot possunt esse ordines, non solum partiales sed etiam universales. Prime autem primum non competit alicui, nisi quod omnibus quorumcumque ordinum est superpositum et nulli citra se formaliter aut essentialiter aut quomodolibet absoluto immixtum aut commixtum, sed ab omnibus per universalem participationem penitus absolutum et separatum. Et sic utor illo termino prime primum in titulo quaestionis. Et illud notabile similiter est venerabilis patris Bertholdi de Mospurch ordinis nostri [ordinis nostri in marg.] in suo commento super propositiones seu elementationes Procli, theoremate 8, articulo secundo principali.*

7 See Introduction, section 3, n. 177–179, above.

primo, found in Moerbeke's translation.⁸ According to Berthold, *prime* modifies its term to indicate what is "the most absolute and most eminent of an intention" (e.g., *prime intellectus* or *intellectus secundum causam*), while *primo* indicates what is "perfect in this intention" and thus has that intention *per essentiam*. What exists *prime* stands outside its order, while all things in the order participate it analogically. What exists *primo* (for example, a separate intelligence), although it is highest within a given order, is nevertheless limited because participates the *prime intellectus* and, thus, has a determinate place within the order.

The anonymous commentator developed from this passage his own terminology of *prime primum* and *prima primum* and used it for a slightly different purpose. For both Dominicans, the *prime primum* denoted a term that is absolute and separate from the order it causes and is not "essentially" or "formally" dependent on anything beneath it. Berthold's own position was even stronger than this, in that he argued that the gods as formal causes are also not dependent on anything higher insofar as they are superabundant causes that originate their characteristic intentions.⁹ For the anonymous author, *prima primum* could apply to any member of an order, provided there are terms beneath it, whereas *primo* for Berthold denoted only the highest member within an order. Hence, the anonymous' *prima* had a wider scope than Berthold's *primo*.

This reference suggests that the anonymous commentator knew the *Expositio* quite well, for he has chosen a brief but important technical passage where Berthold defined the central logical principle of essential order that he found in Proposition 65 of the *Elementatio*, the *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam* 10.63, and Dionysius' *Epistula* IX.2, 1108D. Berthold had found this principle used extensively by Dietrich of Freiberg, who looked to Proposition 140 to reason about the order of separate substances according to the laws of symmetry and proportion. With Proposition 8, Berthold had brought further terminological clarity to that logical pattern. Without this principle, Berthold's harmonisation of Proclus with Dionysius through the *Clavis*, and his complex elaboration of Dietrich's ontology, in which the primordial causes are understood as goodnesses or unities according to essence (*bonitates per essentiam*), would have lacked a good deal of precision.

The next explicit reference to the *Expositio* comes from another Dominican, Franz of Retz, in his *Comestorium beatae Mariae virginis* (*Digest on the Blessed*

8 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 8D, p. 162, l. 178-209.

9 See especially his interpretation of the transliteration *amethectum* in 4.4, n. 198-200.

Virgin Mary).¹⁰ In his discussion of the Virgin's purity and her deification, Franz used the citation from Bernard of Clairvaux that Berthold reports (*allegat*) in Proposition 129B.¹¹ Although this is the only known explicit citation of the *Expositio* in Franz's writings that has been mentioned by scholars, it is clear that the Viennese master's familiarity with Berthold's commentary went well beyond this. His preface to the citation of Bernard (*homo tota mente vino deitatis adiunctus*) echoed a passage from the *Clavis physicae* (*sic humana natura Deo adiuncta*), which was cited earlier in the *Comestorium* with the attribution to Theodorus. In this earlier passage, Franz in fact combined two citations of the *Clavis* on deification that he would have found in Berthold, one from 129B (the lower is absorbed into the higher but retains its nature, giving the examples of air filled with sunlight and red-hot iron) and then another from 120C (just as air is filled with sunlight, human nature when joined to God appears filled with divinity, yet retains its own nature).¹² Earlier still in the *Comestorium*, while ruminating on the Virgin's proximity to the fount of wisdom (*fons sapientiae*) above all the angelic hierarchies, Franz explicitly cited another passage from the *Clavis* of "Theodorus", on the highest fount flowing through the primordial causes and thence into creatures, until its waters

10 On Franz of Retz, whose works remain unedited, see G. Häfele, *Franz von Retz. Ein Beitrag zur Gelehrten-geschichte des Dominikanerordens und der Wiener Universität am Ausgange des Mittelalters* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1918); Kaeppli, *Scriptores*, vol. 1, p. 397–398; I. Frank, "Retz (François de)", in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, vol. 13 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1988), p. 434–436. The centre of Franz's intellectual activity was the newly established Faculty of Theology in the University of Vienna. The citation of Berthold was identified in Häfele, *Franz von Retz*, p. 192, and was noted by M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese and L. Sturlese in the "Prolegomena" to the critical edition of Propositions 1–13 of the *Expositio*, p. xl, n. 5.

11 MS Klosterneuburg, Augustiner-Chorherrenstift, Cod. 43, f. 107ra-b: *Tertio principaliter est purissima et deificata, quia immutata vino abyssalis dulcoris. Nam sicut modicum aquae multo vino immisum totaliter convertitur in vinum, sic homo tota mente vino deitatis adiunctus deificatur et in Deum deiformiter transmutatur. Unde Bernardus, sicut allegat Bertholdus de Mosburg super Proclum [...]*. What follows is a verbatim citation of Bernard from Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129B, p. 179, l. 188–196. See 5.3, n. 131, above.

12 MS Klosterneuburg, Augustiner-Chorherrenstift, Cod. 43, f. 104vb. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129B, p. 177, l. 142 – p. 178, l. 149, and 120C, p. 93, l. 101–107. Bernard was one of the authorities, alongside the Scriptures, Albert the Great, and Richard of St. Victor, whom Franz cited most in the *Comestorium*, and it seems he knew the *De diligendo Deo* independently from Berthold (see the citations at f. 293rb-va and 294va). His echo of the *Clavis* when introducing the citation of Bernard suggests that he began with Theodorus and then recognised the connection Berthold had drawn between the two passages in terms of their argument and imagery; perhaps he chose to cite Berthold explicitly at this stage because he recognised that the citation combined disparate passages from the *De diligendo Deo*.

return through the most hidden recesses of nature. Franz then followed this an explicit citation of Proclus' *De providentia et fato*, on the first cause as the fount of all goods. Both citations clearly derive from 18B of the *Expositio*, where Berthold discussed the different kinds of "fontal principles".¹³ In total, then, we find seven explicit citations of the *Clavis physicae* in the *Comestorium beatae Mariae virginis* that were mediated by Berthold.¹⁴

Elsewhere in the same text, while discussing how the Virgin's knowledge of God increased from her contemplation of nature, Franz borrowed extensively from the beginning of Berthold's *Prologus*, but rearranged the authorities he found there into the philosophers (Al-Ghazali, Maimonides) and theologians (Paul, Ambrose [=Ambrosiaster], the Wisdom of Solomon 13:1-4, Hugh of St. Victor, Gundissalinus, John of Damascus).¹⁵ Later in the *Comestorium*, while discussing the necessary service imagination offers to reason in the contemplative ascent to God, Franz seems to have relied on these opening pages of the *Prologus* again for the citation of Ambrose (=Ambrosiaster) and also for the Wisdom of Solomon 13:1-4.¹⁶

Evidently Franz had direct access to a copy of the *Expositio* and was familiar with its contents, using it at least eleven times in the *Comestorium beatae Mariae virginis* alone (seven times for the *Clavis*, twice for the authorities from *Prologus* 1, once for Proclus, once for Bernard).¹⁷ Additionally, there is at

13 MS Klosterneuburg, Augustiner-Chorherrenstift, Cod. 43, f. 78rb-78va. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18B, p. 47, l. 109 – p. 48, l. 156.

14 In addition to the three mentioned in the previous notes, we find the same passage from 120C cited by Franz at f. 69rb (where it is followed by the 129B passage at f. 69vb) and later, in an abbreviated form, at f. 129rb. The passage from 129B was also cited in an abbreviated form at f. 164va-b.

15 MS Klosterneuburg, Augustiner-Chorherrenstift, Cod. 43, f. 110vb-111ra. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 1, p. 5, l. 5 – p. 6, l. 47. Perhaps this rearrangement was influenced by the presence of the two *tabulae auctorum* (*Philosophi famosi*, *Doctores ecclesiae*) in the *Expositio*. Interestingly, Franz omitted the Bertholdian phrase *divinalis sapientia* from his description of Paul as "the greatest theologian" as well as Berthold's citations of Dionysius. This was not out of any aversion to Dionysius' authority, whom Franz freely cited elsewhere, but a hesitation about Berthold's Dionysian argument that God is invisible even to "the eye of the mind" (*oculus mentalis*).

16 MS Klosterneuburg, Augustiner-Chorherrenstift, Cod. 43, f. 202vb-203ra.

17 The link between Cologne and Vienna was likely Jodocus of Gorizia, who identified himself as a son of the Viennese convent in his *explicit* to the copy of Dietrich of Freiberg's *De origine rerum praedicamentalium* that he made in Cologne in 1363. Jodocus brought it, along with four of the autographs of Albert the Great's works that bear Berthold's *ex libris* and a nearly complete copy of Proclus' *De decem dubitationibus* he made from Berthold's library, from Cologne either to Vienna or to Krems. These works were eventually bound together and given as a gift by Nicholas Staynecker of Krems to Franz of Retz in 1395,

least one other citation of the *Clavis* in Franz's later *Lectura supra antiphonam Salve Regina* that was taken from Berthold.¹⁸ A study of Franz's other works, which I have not undertaken, would undoubtedly reveal further borrowings.¹⁹ This would allow us to establish how much of the *Expositio* Franz knew and whether, as it seems from the *Comestorium beatae Mariae virginis*, he used it primarily as a reference work, or whether he was influenced positively or negatively by its philosophical content and aims.

Whereas the Regensburg commentator used Berthold as a philosophical authority for the distinction of *prime-primo*, with the elaborate theory of essential causality and proportionality this implied, Franz appears to have regarded the *Expositio* as a source for older authorities on the doctrine of deification and on the possibility of knowing God from creation. It is interesting to observe that Franz of Retz had a particular interest in the theory of deification he found in the *Clavis physicae* of Theodorus, perhaps because it accorded with what he read in Bernard of Clairvaux, but more likely as a rare and fascinating authority in its own right (see his use of *Expositio* 18B on the primordial causes). While the doctrine of primordial causes was unacknowledged but implicit in the technical terminology used by the Regensburg commentator, we see with Franz of Retz that the legacy of the *Expositio* had become more closely associated with the rare Eriugenian contents it transmitted with the authoritative attribution to Theodorus.

The *Expositio* was likely receiving increased attention in Cologne at the time the two extant manuscripts were copied there, in 1437 (by the Dominican Conrad Keller of Rottweil) and in 1444 (by the order of William Gray). Berthold's commentary was motivated and defined by the strict boundary he posited between abstraction and separation, logical and theological universality, doing theology "according to ourselves" or "not according to ourselves", and

who foliated the manuscript and added a table of contents. See Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen*, p. 125–126, summarising Frank, "Zum Albertus-Autograph".

18 See MS Klosterneuburg, Augustiner-Chorherrenstift, Cod. 52, f. 219rb, where Franz cited the *Clavis* for this same passage from 120C on the light-filled air as an image for the preservation of human nature even when it is infused by divinity.

19 Häfele, *Franz von Retz*, p. 197, has stated that Franz knew Proclus' treatises *De providentia* and *De malorum subsistentia* well. In the *Comestorium*, apart from the citation of the *De providentia et fato* from *Expositio* 18B (at f. 78rb–78va), Franz cited one passage of the *Tria opuscula* independently of Berthold. At f. 218va, we find an explicit citation of *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam* q. 8, §54 (that divine justice does not immediately exact punishment on wrongdoers but waits for the right moment), where Proclus gave the three examples of the virtue of Plato, Archytas, and Theano, whose zeal for justice curbed their anger. Coincidentally, the same passages from Proclus were cited by the Dominican Thomas Waleys in 1326–1327. See Introduction, section 1, n. 16, above.

the discordant forms of divine science they entail (the theology of being in the *Liber de causis* or the Platonic theology of the Good of the *Elementatio theologica*). One can imagine that such arguments could have resonated, at least in part, with the debates between the schools of thought (known to scholars as the *Wegestreit*) that were defined by their distinct approaches to Aristotle and that had become institutionally enshrined in the colleges (*bursae*) of the University of Cologne in the 15th century.²⁰ The debate concerning the status of universals was one among the many factors that led to the consolidation of these schools. Each school defined their reading of Aristotle through the approach taken by earlier masters, whether Albertists, Thomists, Aegidians, Scotists, or nominalists (*moderni*). At the turn of the 15th century, a resolutely “modern” reading of Aristotle prevailed in Cologne and, with it, a questioning of the “old” attempts at harmonising Aristotle with Christian doctrine made by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. By 1425, however, the realists and *antiqui* began to have the upper hand, largely thanks to the efforts of the Albertist, Heymericus de Campo, who was in Cologne from 1420/1422–1432 and supported his Thomist colleagues even though he was critical of their views.²¹ For the remainder of the 15th century, Cologne flourished as a stronghold of realism.

Berthold of course would agree entirely that a realist theory of universals was necessary to elucidate and defend the faith, but he would reject the claim made by Albertists like Heymericus that an Aristotelian metaphysics of being could adequately explain the doctrine of the flowing (*fluxus*) of universals from the divine mind. Berthold’s reading of Dietrich of Freiberg and Eustratius through the lens of the *De mystica theologia* of Dionysius and the *De providentia et fato* of Proclus meant that the Albertist notion of a continual *fluxus* of universals from God, into creatures, and back again through intellectual abstraction, had to be severed along the divide of logical and theological universality. An author like Heymericus, if he ever read the *Expositio*, might have been very sympathetic to Berthold’s valorisation of Proclus’ philosophical method, but he likely would have classified Berthold’s Platonism as an instance of “the divine and superhuman philosophy of the Stoics”, who strove

20 For what follows, see M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “*Via Antiqua* and *Via Moderna* in the Fifteenth Century. Doctrinal, Institutional, and Church Political Factors in the *Wegestreit*”, in R. Friedman, L. Nielsen (eds), *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), p. 9–36.

21 On Heymericus’ use of Albert the Great and his conception of metaphysics as a spiritual discipline, see D. Calma, “Metaphysics as a Way of Life. Heymericus de Campo on Universals and ‘The Inner Man’”, in *Vivarium* 58(2020), p. 305–334.

for a comprehension beyond their human station, and perhaps even as a deviation from the thought of Albert the Great.²² So while it is conceivable that some thinkers in Cologne at that time would have been aware of the *Expositio*, its positive influence on them seems less probable. Berthold's uncompromising Platonic metaphysics of separation or detachment would have made an uneasy bedfellow even for the most sympathetic Albertist, who would have been willing to entertain the possibility of the knowledge of the separate substances without recourse to phantasms.²³ His denigration of the *Liber de causis* and relegation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* to the status of a logical reflection on being and the transcendentals would have pleased neither the *antiqui* nor the *moderni* in these 15th-century debates.

The final explicit reference to consider, which is more of a reference to the *Expositio* than to Berthold himself, is found in Nicholas of Cusa's *Apologia doctae ignorantiae* (1449). The question of the extent to which Cusanus knew the text directly has frequently raised by scholars but never resolved. The strongest arguments that Nicholas knew the *Expositio* first-hand have been advanced by Ezequiel Ludueña.²⁴ Following the direction of Ludueña's study and taking into consideration the larger context of the mention of the *Expositio* and the pantheistic controversies alluded to by Nicholas, I will argue further that Cusanus either spoke on the basis of an earlier and direct acquaintance with the *Expositio* or had a reliable and accurate report about its contents.

Cusanus' mention of the *Expositio* comes near the conclusion of the *Apologia*:

-
- 22 See, for example, Heymericus' *Colliget principiorum*, which was likely written in 1434, long after Heymericus' polemic against the nominalists began with his *Tractatus problematicus* in 1424. On his Albertist classification of the history of philosophy, see D. Calma, R. Imbach, "Heymeric de Campo, auteur d'un traité de métaphysique. Étude et édition partielle du *Colliget principiorum*", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 80(2013), p. 277–423, at tr. 1, d. 1, c. 6, p. 297, l. 105. At *Colliget*, tr. 1, d. 1, c. 12, p. 301, l. 182–189, Heymericus indicated he was primarily interested in the *Elementatio theologica* insofar as it agreed with the unanimous doctrine of Aristotle and the *Liber de causis*. His preference for the theorematic method was signalled at *Colliget*, tr. 1, d. 1, c. 13, p. 303, l. 222–242.
- 23 On this aspect of 15th-century Albertism, see A. Saccon, "Die natürliche Gotteserkenntnis in den Schriften der Kölner Albertisten des 15. Jahrhunderts", in *Quaestio* 15(2015), p. 751–760.
- 24 This question has been considered recently in A. Fiamma, "Nicholas of Cusa and the So-Called Cologne School of the 13th and 14th Centuries", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 84(2017), p. 91–128, at p. 109–113, and in detail in E. Ludueña, "Nicolás de Cusa. Una contribución a la historia del erigenismo", in J.M. Machetta, C. D'Amico (eds), *Nicolás de Cusa, identidad y alteridad. Pensamiento y diálogo* (Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2010), p. 75–88.

It befalls [1] men of little intellect that they fall into errors when they seek higher things without learned ignorance. They are blinded in their mind's eye by the infinity of the supreme intelligible light. And, unaware of their blindness, they believe that they see, and, in their half-sight, they are made rigid in their assertions (just as, without the spirit, the Jews were made moribund by the letter). There are [2] others who suppose the [3] wise who see are ignorant and erroneous when [2] they read things to which they are unaccustomed in [3] their texts and, above all, when they then find these authors believing themselves to be wise when [2] they think that [3] they are ignorant. Wherefore all the saints rightly warn us that the intellectual light should be withdrawn from [1, 2] those with feeble mental eyes. The works of the holy Dionysius, Marius Victorinus' *Ad Candidum*, the *Clavis physicae* of Theodorus, the *Periphyseon* of John Scotigena, the *Quaternuli* of David of Dinant, and the *Commentaries* of brother John of Mossbach on the *Propositions* of Proclus, and other books like these, should never be shown to such people.²⁵

At this stage of the *Apologia*, Cusanus was responding explicitly to the charges of pantheism levelled against him seven years earlier by John Wenck in his *De ignota litteratura* (*On Unknown Learning*, 1442–1443).²⁶ Several of Wenck's accusations were directed against theses quoted from Nicholas' *De docta ignorantia* (*On Learned Ignorance*, 1440). The "third thesis", which prompted the passage in question, came from *De docta ignorantia* I.3-4, where Cusanus claimed that the quiddity of things, or the truth of beings,

25 Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, ed. R. Klibansky, *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, §43, p. 29, l. 1 – p. 30, l. 3: *Accidit autem hoc viris parvi intellectus, ut in errores incident, quando altiora sine docta ignorantia perquirunt; et fiunt ab infinitate lucis summe intelligibilis in oculo mentis caeci et suae caecitatis scientiam non habentes credunt se videre et quasi videntes indurantur in assertionibus, sicut Iudaei per litteram non habentes spiritum ducuntur in mortem. Sunt alii, qui illos videntes sapientes putant ignorantes et errantes, quando in eis legunt eis insolita, et maxime, quando reperiunt eos tunc se credere, quando cognoscunt se ignorantes. Unde recte admonent omnes sancti, quod illis debilibus mentis oculis lux intellectualis subtrahatur. Sunt autem illis nequaquam libri sancti Dionysii, Marii Victorini ad Candidum Arrianum, Clavis physicae Theodori, Iohannis Scotigenae Περὶ φύσεως, Tomi David de Dynanto, Commentaria fratris Iohannis de Mossbach in Propositiones Proculi et consimiles libri ostendendi. All references are to the Heidelberg Academy edition of Cusanus' works: Nicholas of Cusa, *Opera omnia*, iussu et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis (Leipzig / Hamburg: Meiner, 1932-).*

26 For an informative contextualisation of the dispute, see K.M. Ziebart, *Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and Intellect. A Case Study in 15th-Century Fides-Ratio Controversy* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), p. 53–136 and, on the *Apologia* in particular, p. 88–105.

is unattainable in its purity (*Quidditas rerum, quae est entium veritas in sua puritate est inattingibilis*), and therefore that the understanding of a quiddity can always be further improved or purified without end.²⁷ While Wenck agreed that truth of a thing in its purity cannot be attained in this life, he took issue with Cusanus' denial that a finite understanding can grasp the quiddity of things at all and his related proposal that the purity of quiddity can instead be grasped immediately by learned ignorance.²⁸ From this argument Wenck deduced two unacceptable corollaries: the first charged Nicholas with "the poison of error and falsehood", the destruction of all science, since the coincidence of opposites suspends the principle of non-contradiction. For Nicholas, indeed, it was a primary rule of learned ignorance that no proportion exists between the finite and the infinite, so that no matter where one would begin among entities that exhibit degrees of greater and lesser finitude, one cannot arrive to the absolute Maximum. The absolute Maximum, for its part, can only be apprehended when it is intuitively or "incomprehensibly" understood to coincide with the absolute Minimum, because neither can be greater or lesser than itself.²⁹ Cusanus replied to Wenck's charge about the destruction of scientific knowledge by maintaining that the principle of non-contradiction holds necessarily in the domain of discursive reason, but that it must be recognised that this domain is subordinate to the standpoint of intellect, which grasps the coincidence of opposites non-discursively. Wenck's second corollary, derived from the third thesis about the quiddity of things, shifted from epistemology to ontology: "the absolute Maximum is a given thing in such a way that it is all things; and it is also no thing" (cf. *De docta ignorantia* 1.4). Wenck immediately associated this idea with the beguards, who were condemned for maintaining that they were "by nature indistinct from God".³⁰

Nicholas' response, which immediately preceded the classification of the three kinds of ignorance cited above, began by specifying Wenck's generic reference to the beguards by associating their thought with the heretical

27 John Wenck, *De ignota litteratura*, ed. E. Vansteenbergh, *Le De ignota litteratura de Jean Wenck de Herrenberg contre Nicolas de Cues* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1910), p. 28–29.

28 John Wenck, *De ignota litteratura*, p. 23–24.

29 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, eds E. Hoffmann, R. Klibansky, *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, lib. 1, c. 3, §9, p. 8, l. 20–21.

30 John Wenck, *De ignota litteratura*, p. 28–29. He attributed six heretical views to the beguards: (1) that they are God and not distinct from him by nature; (2) that all divine perfections are in them; (3) that they are eternal and in eternity; (4) that they created all things; (5) that they are more than God; (6) that they needed no one, no God or deity.

doctrines attributed to Amalric of Bene.³¹ Now on the familiar ground of canon law, Nicholas began to turn the tables on his opponent:

And if there were beguards who said, as Wenck writes, that they are God by nature, they were rightly condemned, just as Innocent III condemned Amalric in a general council (on this, see the chapter *Damnamus de summa Trinitate*), who did not have a sound understanding of how God is all things by enfolding [*Deus est omnia complicate*]. John Andrea in his *Novella* reports Amalric's errors.³²

This reference to Amalric, as Ludueña has argued, is decisive for understanding the rationale for behind Nicholas' list of dangerous books that includes the *Expositio*.³³ At the source of Amalric's errors, which persisted all the way up to the anonymous beguards (and now, by implication, to Wenck himself), was for Nicholas the misunderstanding of the notion of enfolding (*complicatio*) and unfolding (*explicatio*).³⁴ Without this distinction, Amalric would have had no way of avoiding the false interpretation of the statement that God is "the form of everything" (*forma omnium*), which would identify God with all things as they are unfolded in their particularity. Cusanus was implying that if Wenck, having read the *De docta ignorantia*, has now made such an accusation against its author, then he must unfortunately have suffered from the same blindness as Amalric – and in some sense was even worse off because he condemned it in another without recognising it in himself. Looking to the Nicholas' classification of the kinds of ignorance, we see that Amalric and the beguards would belong in group (1), who were simply mistaken, with Wenck in group (2) who,

31 On Amalric and his followers, see the studies collected in Lucentini, *Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia nel medioevo*, p. 363–469.

32 Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, §43, p. 28, l. 24 – p. 29, l. 5: *Et si fuerunt Begardi, qui sic dicebant, ut scribit, scilicet se esse Deum per naturam, merito fuerunt condemnati, prout etiam Almericus fuit per Innocentium Tertium condemnatus in concilio generali, de quo in capitulo 'Damnamus de summa Trinitate'; qui non habuit sanum intellectum, quomodo Deus est omnia complicate; de cuius erroribus Iohannes Andreas aliqua recitat in Novella.*

33 Ludueña, "Nicolás de Cusa".

34 On Nicholas' early formulation of this doctrine and his reception of 12th-century Chartrian sources, see D. Albertson, *Mathematical Theologies. Nicholas of Cusa and the Legacy of Thierry of Chartres* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 184–186 and 230–232. A comparison between Nicholas and Eriugena on his point has been undertaken in C. Riccati, *Processio et explicatio. La doctrine de la création chez Jean Scot et Nicolas de Cues* (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1983), p. 110–122, and W. Beierwaltes, "Cusanus and Eriugena", in *Dionysius* 13(1989), p. 115–152.

given his unjust criticisms of Nicholas (and, elsewhere in *De ignota litteratura*, Meister Eckhart), succumbed to a kind of double ignorance. The (3) wise who see are, therefore, wise through learned ignorance, and they would presumably include Nicholas himself.³⁵

As for the list of authors and texts Nicholas went on to mention, it is important to note that Cusanus was not claiming that the writers themselves belonged to group (3) – he referred to books, not authors. Rather, the wise in group (3) are those whose clear mental eyesight gives them the authority to interpret such works. Earlier in the *Apologia*, Cusanus made it clear that, if a person wishes to join the ranks of the wise, they should read the *De mystica theologia* with the commentaries of Maximus, Hugh of St. Victor, Robert Grosseteste, John the Scot, Thomas Gallus, “and other more recent commentators”.³⁶ Now, of these writings, only the glosses attributed to Maximus, the commentary of Grosseteste, and the *Explanatio* and *Extractio* of Thomas Gallus were actually devoted to the *De mystica theologia*, while Hugh and Eriugena wrote commentaries only on the *De caelesti hierarchia*. What Cusanus must mean is that these are all reliable guides to follow as one grapples with the Dionysian corpus, and eventually learns to approach the *De mystica theologia* with the proper intellectual disposition. Once learned ignorance, or the intuitive understanding of the nature of enfolding and unfolding and the coincidence of opposites, has been gained, one can then begin the ascent into mystical theology,³⁷ and, presumably, correctly interpret the more dangerous and esoteric texts listed in his response to Wenck.

Nicholas’ reference to the *Novella super Decretalibus* of John Andrea (d. 1348) gives us some clues about the criteria he had in mind when compiling this list. In the *Novella*, we read that three errors of Amalric were condemned at the general council: (1) all things are God (*omnia sunt Deus*); (2) there are primordial causes that create and are created (*primordiales causae, quae creant et creantur*); (3) there will be a unification of the sexes at the end of time, or there will be no sexual differentiation at all (*adunatio sexuum post*

35 Wenck’s criticisms of Eckhart were addressed by Cusanus almost immediately before the passage in question. See Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, §32–38, p. 22, l. 10 – p. 26, l. 25.

36 Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, §30, p. 20, l. 16 – p. 21, l. 4. For an argument that Cusanus intended to disseminate the *Apologia* widely, see Ziebart, *Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and Intellect*, p. 91.

37 Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, §7, p. 6, l. 7–9: *Unde, cum nunc Aristotelica secta praevaleat, quae haeresim putat esse oppositorum coincidentiam, in cuius admissione est initium ascensus in mysticam theologicam [...]*.

consummationem, seu non erit distinctio sexus).³⁸ In his report, John Andrea cited the *Chronicon* of Martin of Opava who, like his contemporary Henry of Segusia in 1271, had glossed Innocent III's decretals and established direct links between each error and passages from Eriugena's *Periphyseon*. Martin in fact classified the *Periphyseon* as a *liber Amalerici*, while Henry identified Amalric as a follower of John Scotus (*secutus est iste Amalricus*).³⁹

Although it cannot be excluded that Cusanus had all three theses in mind, as well as their association with Eriugena, when compiling his list of dangerous books, an examination of Nicholas' views of each text, case by case, in his other works tells a simpler story. In the *Apologia*, indeed, the only thesis mentioned from Andrea's *Novella* was (1) that God is all things, which, Cusanus has argued, must be qualified to mean that God as all things "by enfolding". Indeed, Nicholas himself had used expressions very similar to the notion of God as the *forma omnium* in *De docta ignorantia* 1.23 and 11.2 (*forma formarum, forma essendi*).⁴⁰ This is the thesis the wise could interpret fruitfully in the esoteric works, thanks to learned ignorance, and it is a sufficient criterion to explain the presence of each dangerous text listed here in the *Apologia*. Again, however, we cannot rule out that Nicholas had the other theses in mind as well. We will see that Nicholas never affirmed any version of errors (2) and (3), on the primordial causes as created and creative principles or on the loss of sexual differentiation, but his reasons for avoiding them can only be inferred from other aspects of his thought.

Turning now to the list of dangerous books, we of course find an abundance of material in Nicholas' works relating to Dionysius, whose authority he held in the highest esteem.⁴¹ Restricting ourselves to the *Apologia*, we have already noted that for Nicholas learned ignorance must be presupposed as a

38 John Andrea, *Novella super Decretalibus cum apostillis noviter editis* (Venezia: De Tortis, 1505), f. 8rb.

39 For the texts, see Lucentini, *Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia nel medioevo*, p. 362–365. Martin's list included two additional errors: (a) that ideas in the divine mind create and are created (=2), and that all things will return to God and find rest in these ideas, and will remain one individual (*unum individuum*); (b) just as Abraham and Isaac are one nature, so all are one and all are God (*omnia esse unum et omnia esse Deum*) (=1); (c) no sin can be imputed to those acting out of charity; (d) God is seen only in creatures, never in himself; (e) had man not sinned, there would be no division of the sexes, but only angelic multiplication, and that after the Resurrection the sexes will be united (=3).

40 On the influence of Thierry of Chartres on these notions in particular, see J.-M. Counet, *Mathématique et dialectique chez Nicolas de Cues* (Paris: Vrin, 2000), p. 140–150.

41 L. Baur (ed.), *Cusanus-Texte III, Marginalien, I. Nicolaus Cusanus und Ps.-Dionysius im Lichte der Zitate und Randbemerkungen des Cusanus* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1940–1941).

hermeneutical key for reading Dionysius correctly. He framed this point dramatically when he recalled that he received the vision of learned ignorance as a gift from God before he had examined Dionysius or any of the other “true theologians”.⁴² Whether or not this accurately described the historical sequence of events is irrelevant. What Nicholas was implying is that the perspective of *intellectus* cannot be reached by the arduous effort of reason but is always there, grounding reason in its discursive operation; *intellectus* can only be received, it cannot be won. In other words, for Nicholas, one cannot even begin to seek God except by learned ignorance, that is to say, without the recognition that God withdraws precisely to the extent that discursive reason draws nearer to him.⁴³ In this sense, the *De mystica theologia*, properly understood, would be the antidote to Amalric’s error: for Dionysius, God is beyond the coincidence of opposites and the interplay of affirmative and negative theology or, in other words, God is “the opposite of opposites”. Since God utterly transcends the finite realm of distinction, division, and opposition, he can indeed be said to be all things by enfolding, for he is “the being of all things in such a way that he is not any of these things”.⁴⁴

As for Marius Victorinus (d. c. 363), mentioned next in the *Apologia*, we unfortunately do not have any further clues about how Nicholas interpreted his letter to Candidus (*Ad Candidum*), with its arguments that the Word is the “being” that proceeds from transcendent “non-being”, and is the manifestation of the existence that is “hidden” in the Father.⁴⁵ It is conceivable, nevertheless, that Cusanus would have tried to extract the doctrine of folding and unfolding from these utterances, perhaps while clarifying that Victorinus’ words do not necessarily entail the subordination of the Son to the Father that they might seem to imply.

In the case of David of Dinant, whose works were censured at the same council that condemned Amalric in 1210, we find Nicholas advancing a positive

42 Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, §16-17, p. 12, l. 4-22.

43 Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, §18, p. 13, l. 21-26: *Reperies enim ibi, quod licet ubique sit et non absit a nobis – ut ait Paulus Atheniensibus, quando Dionysium convertit –, tamen tunc proprius ad ipsum acceditur, quando plus fugisse reperitur; quanto enim ipsius inaccessibleis maior elongatio melius capitur, tanto propinquius inaccessibleitas attingitur.*

44 Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, §21, p. 15, l. 14-16, and §24-25, p. 17, l. 16-20.

45 Marius Victorinus, *Ad Candidum*, eds P. Henry, P. Hadot, *Traité théologique sur la Trinité*, vol. 1 (Paris: Cerf, 1960), §2-14, p. 132, l. 10 – p. 151, l. 27. On the influence of Victorinus on Eriugena’s notion of theophany, see G. Piemonte, *Vita in omnia pervenit. El vitalismo eriugeniano y la influencia de Mario Victorino* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Patristica et Mediaevalia, 1988); Beierwaltes, “Cusanus and Eriugena”, p. 134, n. 64.

interpretation of his thought in his later work *De li non-aliud* (1462).⁴⁶ David was introduced there relative to a problem raised by Ferdinand, representing the Aristotelians, who wondered how Dionysius' statement that "the One is in a sense the element of all" could be reconciled with the *De mystica theologia*, where he denied the God is "one".⁴⁷ Ferdinand was instructed by Nicholas that "element" here means that God is the cause of unity, since he is the immanent and sustaining root of each thing. If this "element" were to be removed, all things would cease to exist. If this is so, observed Ferdinand, this means that David of Dinant and his followers erred minimally (*minime errarunt*) when they called matter (*hyle*), intellect (*nous*), and nature (*physis*), "God" and declared that the world is "the visible God".⁴⁸ Nicholas seemed to concur, and explained that David identified *hyle* as the principle of bodies, *nous* as the principle of minds, and *physis* as the principle of motions, but "he did not see that they differ among themselves insofar as they are principles, which is why he spoke as he did".⁴⁹ That is (if I understand correctly), David called *hyle*, *nous*, and *physis* "God" because he regarded them all under their aspect as "elemental" roots or principles of bodies, minds, and motions, but he did not recognise that, since each of these principles is an other, each is necessarily posterior to the Not-other. But you, Ferdinand, Nicholas continued, having received a correct interpretation of Dionysius, see more clearly that God as the Not-other defines all things and is in all things, even though he is not mixed with any of them. What the text implies here is that David of Dinant and his followers nearly reached

46 Due to a confusion of a later chronicler from Laon, it was believed in the 13th century that David was directly influenced by Amalric. See E. Maccagnolo, "David of Dinant and the Beginnings of Aristotelianism in Paris", in P. Dronke (ed.), *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 429–442.

47 Nicholas of Cusa, *De li non-aliud*, eds L. Baur, P. Wilpert, *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, c. 17, §81, p. 42, l. 25 – p. 43, l. 15; citing Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 13.3, 980B.

48 This refers to the well-known fragment edited in David of Dinant, *Quaternulorum fragmenta*, ed. M. Kurdzialek, in *Studia Mediewistyczne* 3(1963), p. 69–71. For the last statement, Nicholas likely had in mind the passage where David expressed his agreement with Plato: the world is the sensible God (*mundum esse Deum sensibilem*).

49 Nicholas of Cusa, *De li non-aliud*, c. 17, §81, p. 43, l. 3: *et illa non vidit differre inter se ut in principio, quocirca sic dixit*. The sense of the Latin is unclear and has led translators either to change the word order to *et illa vidit non differre* (Dupré: "und lenkt seinen Blick darauf, daß sich jene, sofern sie im Ursprung sind, nicht voneinander unterscheiden") or to render *ut in principio* more freely (Hopkins: "but he did not see that they differ among themselves as beginnings"). It does not seem possible to translate the latter phrase literally as, presumably, Nicholas would hold that all these principles are indeed one insofar as they exist *complicite* in the principle itself. Therefore, I follow Hopkins because I understand the statement as a judgement of a shortcoming in David of Dinant's philosophy, which is then contrasted with the correct position of learned ignorance (*Tu autem*, etc.).

the truth of the doctrine of enfolding and unfolding (*minime errarunt*) but emphasised one side of the relation (God's immanence) at the expense of the other (God's transcendence). Indeed, David's own Platonic formulations about the world as the "visible" or "sensible" God come close to Cusanus' own declaration in the *De li non-aliud* that "the creature is the appearance [*ostensio*] of the creator defining himself, or the light, which God is, manifesting itself".⁵⁰

As for the *Clavis physicae*, named next in the *Apologia*, we have no direct evidence of Cusanus' reading of the text. This has not always been the view of scholars. On the basis of Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny's judgement in her influential study of 1953 ("Le cosmos symbolique"), Paolo Lucentini ascribed the 15th-century marginalia in MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 6734 (the same manuscript used by Berthold), to Cusanus, whose attribution of the *Clavis* to Theodorus, coupled with the verdict of d'Alverny, seemed to put the matter beyond dispute.⁵¹ In her review of Lucentini's *Platonismo medievale* in 1982, however, d'Alverny revised her earlier hypothesis, having consulted two experts of Cusanus and after further comparison with the cardinal's authentic glosses.⁵² To my knowledge, d'Alverny's doubts have remained unaddressed, even though they are indeed substantial enough to revise the attribution to Nicholas.⁵³ This raises the question of how Cusanus came to attribute the text to Theodorus. The copy of the *Clavis physicae* preserved in his personal library (MS Bernkastel-Kues, Bibliothek des St. Nikolaus-Hospitals, Cod. Cus. 202) is anonymous and contains no annotations. In the absence of any evidence for the circulation of another manuscript of the *Clavis* ascribed to Theodorus, it

50 Nicholas of Cusa, *De li non-aliud*, prop. 12, §118, p. 63, l. 4-6: *Creatura igitur est ipsius creatoris sese definientis seu lucis, quae deus est, se ipsam manifestantis ostensio*.

51 On the *Clavis* marginalia, see Lucentini, *Platonismo medievale*, p. 77–109, reprinted in Lucentini, *Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia*, p. 19–48, citing d'Alverny from 1953 at p. 23, n. 11: "Le cardinal Nicolas de Cues, grand amateur, on le sait, de textes platoniciens et néo-platoniciens, a sans doute eu quelque temps notre manuscrit entre les mains, car les annotations marginales du XV^e siècle que porte celui-ci ressemblent fort à son écriture."

52 D'Alverny, "*Platonismo medievale*", p. 349.

53 After consultation with Dragos Calma, who with Ruedi Imbach has published a study of Cusanus' marginalia on Heymericus de Campo (MS Bernkastel-Kues, Bibliothek des St. Nikolaus-Hospitals, Cod. Cus. 106) – see Calma, D., Imbach, R., "Les notes marginales de Nicolas de Cues au traité *Colliget principiorum* d'Heymeric de Campo", in K. Reinhardt *et al.* (eds), *Heymericus de Campo. Philosophie und Theologie im 15. Jahrhundert* (Regensburg: Roderer-Verlag, 2009), p. 15–51 – I note that there are indeed significant discrepancies between the two hands: the hand annotating the *Clavis* is more cursive, and there are clear differences between, for instance, the letters "x", "y", the final superscript "m", and the abbreviation "con-/com-". D'Alverny already signalled a difference in their formation of the letter "s".

seems most likely that, like Franz of Retz, Nicholas relied on the *Expositio* for the attribution.

Nicholas' views about the *Periphyseon* can be gleaned from his marginalia to Book I of the dialogue, which fortunately are preserved.⁵⁴ We see in these marginalia that he found in Eriugena phrases that would match the first of Amalric's erroneous theses.⁵⁵ But Nicholas also saw that Eriugena understood this statement correctly through the notions of the coincidence of opposites,⁵⁶ of God as the opposite of opposites,⁵⁷ and the corresponding notion of creation as theophany.⁵⁸ Accordingly, Nicholas was able to paraphrase Eriugena's text using the terminology of *complicatio*.⁵⁹ Along with Nicholas' recollection of his first encounter with Dionysius in the *Apologia* and his interpretation of David of Dinant in the *De li non-aliud*, this is a clear example of his use of the hermeneutic of learned ignorance to draw out a correct and even fruitful interpretation of a difficult work.

As for the primordial causes and the division of the sexes – the other two theses for which Amalric was condemned – the cardinal's judgement was less positive. He certainly never used the syntagm *causa primordialis* in his works. His discussion of the Platonic theory of divine ideas in *De docta ignorantia* II.9 gives some indication that the notion of an intermediary level of any sort of created and creative principles would not fit easily into his own thought.⁶⁰ In this passage, he noted the view of "certain Christians" who adopted the Platonic theory of the world soul as the principle that contains the plurality of exemplars as they exist between the simplicity of the divine mind and their likenesses in the material world. A better proposal, he argued, can be reached by recourse to learned ignorance. In this standpoint, one acknowledges that, since God is the absolute and uncontracted Maximum, in him "the maximum

54 These are preserved in MS London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, and have been published in J. Koch, "Kritisches Verzeichnis der Londoner Handschriften aus dem Besitz des Nikolaus von Kues", in *Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft* 3(1963), p. 16–100, at p. 86–100. A selection of these is also found in Lucentini, *Platonismo medievale*, p. 113–124.

55 MS London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, f. 64v: *Forma omnium deus* (*Periphyseon*, lib. I, 501D).

56 MS London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, f. 18v: *Nota contraria de deo dici* (*Periphyseon*, lib. I, 452C).

57 MS London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, f. 80r: *Nota istud singularissime* (*Periphyseon*, lib. I, 517B–C: *infinitas infinitorum, oppositorum oppositio, contrarietas contrariorum*, etc.).

58 MS London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, f. 14v, 15r, 16r, 16v.

59 MS London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, f. 82r: *Deus est complicatio omnium amorum* (*Periphyseon*, lib. I, 519C).

60 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, lib. II, c. 9, §141–150, p. 89, l. 26 – p. 96, l. 11.

truth of a circle is not other than that of quadrangle”; that is, all ideas are one and “indistinct” in the Word. There is no need to posit an intermediary principle containing distinct exemplars – or, in Nicholas’ terms, “there is no medium between the absolute and the contracted” – for if there were many exemplars then there would be a plurality of “maximal and most true” things. The plurality of primordial causes, whose number remained inscrutable for Eriugena but was decidedly fixed by Berthold, thus was not recognised by Cusanus’ learned ignorance.⁶¹

As for the overcoming of the division of the sexes, once again we can only make inferences based on Cusanus’ other works. We find no endorsement in his writings of the Eriugenian notion that sexual difference is doffed at the Resurrection or that human nature as an *imago Dei* in Paradise with its spiritual body is free from it. However, we can see that Cusanus’ obscure reflections on the subject of the Resurrection were, once again, explicitly marked by learned ignorance.⁶² His discussion of eschatology in the final chapters of *De docta ignorantia* III.7–12 approached such questions Christologically, focusing primarily on Christ’s death, Resurrection, and the last judgement, and only hinted at what the implications of these events might be for those who are members of his body. His argument hinged on the notion that Christ’s humanity is the medium between the purely absolute and the purely contracted: as united to his *divine* person it is absolute, as united to his divine *person* it is contracted.⁶³ The divine and human natures are united in such a way that there is a mutual exchange of predicates (*communicatio idiomatum*) between them. This means that, at the time of Christ’s death, his human body and soul were never separated from his divine person, because his “maximum humanity” was supposed in his divine person. Therefore, all the attributes of human nature, including the union of body and soul, remained there.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, since it belongs to “the shadowy truth” of human nature to undergo death and the separation of soul and body, it is fitting that Christ’s temporal birth should be fulfilled in a temporal death, so that the full truth of humanity as it was in him could be revealed. As temporally contracted, Christ’s humanity was thus a sign

61 On this aspect of Eriugena’s doctrine, see S. Gersh, “L’*Ordo Naturalis* des causes primordiales. La transformation érigénienne de la doctrine dionysienne des noms divins”, in *Les Études philosophiques* 104(2013), p. 57–78.

62 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, lib. III, c. 7, §222, p. 140, l. 3–4. See also H.-G. Senger, *Ludus sapientiae. Studien zum Werk und zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Nikolaus von Kues* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 162–180.

63 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, lib. III, c. 7, §225, p. 141, l. 19–20.

64 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, lib. III, c. 7, §223–224, p. 140, l. 5 – p. 141, l. 5.

and image (*signum et imago*) of the supratemporal truth of humanity. At the Resurrection, these shadows had their ending, for when the temporal truth of contracted human nature was fulfilled in its corruptibility, only the incorruptible truth remained. And although there is only one indivisible humanity common to all human beings, such that it is possible to say that the humanity of all has, in Christ, put on immortality, this is not a present reality except in him (cf. 1 Corinthians 15:20: “the first fruits of them that slept”).⁶⁵ All of humanity will rise from the grave because of the transformation Christ has accomplished. Nicholas thus understood the Resurrection entirely through Christ’s temporal birth and death, as the doctrine of learned ignorance required, and therefore would have rejected the views he would find in Eriugena (if he had read Book v of the *Periphyseon* or the entirety of the *Clavis*), and in Berthold, who located the general Resurrection in the domain of “natural providence,”⁶⁶ with their concomitant views about the association of the fall from the pristine *imago Dei* with the beginning of sexual differentiation.⁶⁷

When we consider the list of dangerous works mentioned by Cusanus, we must always remember that he concerned above all with defending the rationale and hermeneutical validity of learned ignorance. The context of this passage in the *Apologia* and a survey of his judgements about the esoteric works, as far as this is possible, indicate that it was the first of Amalric’s errors that he was most concerned to correct by learned ignorance: God is all things “by enfolding”. Imagining his encounter with “friar John of Mossbach”, we note that such an idea could be found, for instance, in Berthold’s notion that all things are immediately related to the Good, which is all things “according to cause”, even though all things are other than the Good through their intrinsic limitations or contractions.⁶⁸ Berthold also stated that God’s transcendence

65 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, lib. III, c. 8, §227–228, p. 142, l. 17 – p. 143, l. 29.

66 Eriugena admitted his difficulties in determining whether the general Resurrection will be the result of nature or grace (*Periphyseon*, lib. v, 898D–906C). He concluded that the Resurrection is natural, but deification is gracious (979B–C). Berthold’s references to the Resurrection, the glorified bodies of the saints, and the spiritual topography of the afterlife, were placed under the banner of voluntary providence (*Expositio*, 129A, p. 176, l. 94 – p. 177, l. 130) because, in Eriugenian terms, they would pertain to the “special” Resurrection that follows the “general”.

67 The 15th-century annotator of the *Clavis* was also hostile to the doctrines of sexual differentiation and the spiritual body. Using the numbering in Lucentini, “Le annotazioni di Nicola Cusano alla *Clavis physicae*”, in *Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia nel medioevo*, p. 24–48: L36: *Nota quod male* (*Clavis* c. 70); L39: *Male. nota quod male* (*Clavis* c. 76); L115: *Error* (*Clavis* c. 271); L118: *Error* (*Clavis* c. 349); L119: *Error* (*Clavis* c. 381).

68 For example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2E, p. 88, l. 237 – p. 89, l. 265; 7D, p. 151, l. 453–470.

of every causal order coincides with his “becoming” (*fieri*) within all orders of providence, which he described through Dionysius and the *Clavis*.⁶⁹ As for Berthold’s Eriugenian doctrine of primordial causes and the spiritual body, we can only assume that Nicholas would have regarded these matters as detrimental for a true interpretation of Dionysius. And so, in light of these patterns in the *Apologia* and Nicholas’ otherwise inexplicable attribution of the *Clavis* to Theodorus, it is reasonable to conclude that he either had read the *Expositio* directly or had a very accurate report of its contents. For Nicholas, an axiomatic interpretation of Dionysius like Berthold’s, with its limited and linear hierarchies of separate principles from the primordial causes to the *ens secundum speciem* of human nature, would have at best been preparatory for elucidating the dialectical mystical theology of the Areopagite.⁷⁰ Berthold, as it were, saw the promised land of the coincidence of opposites and the standpoint of learned ignorance in his conception of the *intellectus adeptus* and the *unum animae*, but he remained in the realm of the oblique motion, which he had regarded as the best preparation of the soul for the reception of that higher perspective.⁷¹

69 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 3A, p. 92, l. 14 – p. 93, l. 32. See also, for example, *Expositio*, 7A, p. 144, l. 196–199: *Secundum diversum igitur gradum huius determinationis constituuntur etiam diversa bona minus vel plus contracta quasi secundum bonitatis quondam intentionem et multiplicationem et quasi, ut sic loquar, unius boni ex alio expressionem*. Perhaps the most Eriugenian passage of all is found at *Expositio*, 119B, p. 83, l. 22 – p. 84, l. 34 (*non apparentis apparitio, occulti manifestatio, negati affirmatio, incomprehensibilis comprehensio, etc.*).

70 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 5–6, p. 13, l. 252 – p. 14, l. 286. It has to be noted that, in terms of his reception of Proclus, Cusanus’ annotations to the *Elementatio theologica* are incomplete and much sparser than those accompanying the *Platonic Theology* or the *Commentary on the Parmenides*. See S. Gersh, “Nicholas of Cusa”, in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 318–349, at p. 327–336, who concludes: “It seems implausible to suggest that the philosophical ideas in the [*Elementatio theologica*] were simply of less interest to Nicholas than those in the [*In Parmenidem*]. It is perhaps more reasonable to think that the axiomatic methodology of Proclus’ treatise seemed inappropriate for articulating a paradoxical ‘Dionysian’ theology”.

71 On this matter, Meister Eckhart was for Nicholas a superior, but still imperfect, interlocutor. Nicholas judged that Eckhart’s works should not be made widely available because of their subtlety and difficulty. See Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, §36, p. 25, l. 9–12. Nicholas had acquired Eckhart’s Latin works in 1444 (MS Bernkastel-Kues, Bibliothek des St. Nikolaus-Hospitals, Cod. Cus. 21) and used them in his defence of Eckhart against Wenck. On this manuscript, see S. Frost, *Nikolaus von Kues und Meister Eckhart. Rezeption im Spiegel der Marginalien zum Opus tripartitum Meister Eckharts* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 2006). Nicholas’ marginalia to this manuscript are included in the Stuttgart critical edition of Eckhart’s Latin works.

From the Regensburg commentator, for whom the linear model of *prime/ primo* derived from “the venerable father Berthold” was an inspiration, to Franz of Retz, who used the *Expositio* as a resource for his doctrine of deification that preserves the distinct orders of nature even when they are elevated by grace, to Nicholas of Cusa, who would prefer to interpret Dionysius through other works of Proclus besides the *Elementatio*, we have seen that the explicit reception of the *Expositio* was more or less intertwined with its Eriugenian sources, and was ultimately defined by the harmony of Dionysius with the *Elementatio theologica* that Berthold had used these materials to establish.⁷²

If not in his method but in his ambitions, Berthold profoundly anticipated Cusanus as a thinker who sought to articulate the accord of Dionysius and Proclus simply insofar as both authorities were understood to be heirs of Plato.⁷³ For Berthold, this was a Platonism defined by Dionysius and the

72 This fortune has persisted to the present day. The first critical editions of Berthold (Propositions 184–211, by Loris Sturlese) and the *Clavis physicae* of Honorius (chapters 1–314, by Paolo Lucentini) were published in the same series in 1974. This coincidence was underscored by the series editor, E. Massa, “Presentazione”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 184–211. De animabus*, ed. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), p. v–xi. The first major study of the *Expositio*, published in 2013 (Ezequiel Ludueña’s *La recepción de Eriúgena*), used Berthold’s Eriugenian doctrine of the primordial causes to measure Berthold’s reception of and innovations upon the intellectual heritage of the Dominican school of Cologne.

73 Nicholas of Cusa, *De venatione sapientiae*, eds R. Klibansky, H.-G. Senger, *Opera omnia*, vol. 12, §59, p. 57, l. 15–19; §64, p. 61, l. 3 – p. 62, l. 20. On Thomas Aquinas as the originator of this reading of Proclus and Dionysius, see W. Hankey, “Misrepresenting Neoplatonism in Contemporary Christian Dionysian Polemic. Eriugena and Nicholas of Cusa versus Vladimir Lossky and Jean-Luc Marion”, in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 82/4(2008), p. 683–703, at p. 690; id., “The Concord”, p. 153–154. On the importance of this approach to the Platonic tradition, see Hankey, “Misrepresenting Neoplatonism”, p. 693–694: “Although the history of Cusanus is skewed because he accepted Dionysius’ self-representation, in principle he is ready for another account. Because he has detected that Dionysius reproduces Platonic texts, and because on a mixture of scriptural and philosophic principles, he regards Plato as also divinely inspired, he could have given up the derivation of the Dionysian doctrine from the mystical experience attributed to St. Paul, without thereby depriving the doctrine of the *corpus* of spiritual authority and truth. Equally, because Proclus is seen to borrow from both Dionysius and Plato, all three belong to a common hunting of God, a common theological tradition and enterprise. For Cusa, there is one sole source of being, truth, and good, beyond conceptual grasp, but giving, disclosing, indeed creating itself diversely. In fact, Cusanus has the evidence which moved modern scholars to place Proclus before Dionysius and which would allow Dionysius to have received his Platonism via Plotinus and Proclus, rather than from Plato directly. Because the fact that the Christian divine Dionysius was taught by the pagan divine Plato overturns none of his deepest convictions, reordering the history to place

Latin corpus of Proclus as he knew it (*Elementatio theologica* and the *Tria opuscula*), that could be elucidated using rare doxographies (Thomas of York), marginal philosophies (Dietrich of Freiberg), or combinations of the two (Eriugenism). For thinkers after Berthold who would entertain this deeper agreement between Proclus and Dionysius, the face of the Areopagite would have to change as his companion stepped further into the light. Berthold's understanding of Platonism evidently had already been formed when he read, however extensively, Proclus' commentary on the *Parmenides*. His two brief citations this rich text indicate that he could find in it only the confirmation of the strict distinction between abstract and separate universals.⁷⁴ This was the central axis around which the entire *Expositio* would revolve, just as it passed through microcosm, in whom the frontiers of these two realms were conjoined. This vision of a theorematic Platonism, with the existential choice it presented through the *De mystica theologia* – whether to do theology according to ourselves and remained “sealed off” in beings, or not according to ourselves, and prepare the mind for the gift of a higher insight – had sufficient urgency that whatever other dimensions of Proclus that Berthold found in the *Parmenides* commentary were regarded either as secondary or impossible to assimilate. What was primary was to make the mind receptive to the domain of what is beyond being and the “divine frenzy” of stillness which, for Berthold, it seems so inclined to ignore and retreat into the familiar territory of abstraction, solipsism, and appropriation. As Dionysius and Proclus had taught, “as long as we are occupied with what is below, we are incredulous about all these things.”⁷⁵

Proclus before Dionysius would be of no deep importance. In contrast, the interpenetration of philosophy and Scriptural revelation is of such heaven-shaking consequence for the twentieth-century Christians to whom we now move that they are unwilling to recognise the obvious philological facts which Nicholas and those around him saw. What blinds them is a sectarian religious narrowness which belongs to their determination either to free their religion from Hellenic philosophy, or to have it generate its own metaphysics, or, stranger yet, to do both! At the very point when our historical researches make us endlessly aware of the inescapable interpenetration of religion and philosophy, our philosophy and theology fail us.”

74 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 11, p. 17, l. 401-402; 41K, p. 53, l. 232-243. Berthold did not situate the *Parmenides* commentary relative to the three motions of the soul in *Expositio*, *Expos. tit.* B-D, p. 38, l. 49 – p. 41, 147.

75 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 17, p. 27, l. 724-728: *Donec autem circa ea, quae deorsum, volumur, increduliter habemus circa haec omnia divino cognoscente impartibiliter et supraeternaliter. Haec ille. Ad idem consentit Dionysius 1 et 2 cap. Mysticae theologiae.* Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §32, p. 140, l. 6-7.

2 Lady Philosophy's Vesture

As the only commentary on the entire *Elementatio theologica* from the Latin tradition, which also served later readers as an encyclopaedia of a vast tradition of sapiential theology (*divinalis sapientia*), the achievement of Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio* was a substantial one. In comparison with similar works from contemporary Dominican authors, such as the earlier commentaries on the *Liber de causis* or Nicholas of Strassburg's *Summa*, the *Expositio* stands out not only for its scope and complex use of sources, but above all for its Dionysian critique of the *Liber de causis* and the metaphysics of being. If we can conclude that the philosophical and hermeneutical principle "not according to ourselves" was the guiding light of Berthold's work, which was presupposed in his professed exegetical method of *compilatio*, then we must also acknowledge that the result was anything but unoriginal or derivative.

Although we may never know what was being taught in the Dominican *studia* of the period, it is conceivable, given its subject matter, that the *Expositio* would have been written with the schools of natural philosophy (*studia naturalium*) in mind. It is clear in the commentary that Berthold regarded the *Metaphysics* and the *Liber de causis* as fundamentally flawed in their assumptions about first principles. To be sure, certain doctrines from *Metaphysics* XII could be incorporated into the Platonic synthesis, especially when elucidating the background assumed by Proclus' propositions on intellect, but by this stage of the *Expositio* the framework has been entirely reconfigured along the strict separation of theological and logical universality. It seems Berthold regarded the other books of the *Metaphysics* as valuable for the study of the logical intention of *ens* as it is derived or abstracted from the material world. But as a theory of the separate substances, the metaphysics of being was for him only a hindrance. The science of being as being would be conceded to Aristotle in its logical domain, while the pursuit of wisdom and the salvation of the soul through philosophy required leaving behind that familiar world and entering byways "beyond the common path of reasonings".⁷⁶ Of the *Liber de causis* there was little to retain. Perhaps Berthold also envisioned the progression from the study of invisible realities in natural providence to the consideration of voluntary providence in subsequent theological study. His emphasis on the accord of Proclus and "Dionysius Platonicus" would have made this transition a seamless one. Such hypotheses, however, must remain tentative given the almost total lack of evidence concerning the place of the *Liber de causis*, not to

⁷⁶ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Expos. tit.* K, p. 48, l. 394-400.

mention the *Elementatio theologica*, in the curricula of the Dominican schools of this period.

Of all the philosophical projects we find among the German Dominicans in the 14th century, Berthold's *Expositio* most resembled the earlier *Summa* of Nicholas of Strassburg, although there is no proof of a direct influence of Nicholas on Berthold. Both thinkers identified their works as compilations, either explicitly or conceivably suited to respond to a lack of books besetting the provincial schools. More strikingly, both Dominicans looked to Boethius to account for the rationale for their compilations. Nicholas made the point clearly: Lady Philosophy's garment has been divided and dismantled not only by sectarianism, but also in the fragmentation and proliferation of compendia and *florilegia*, which lacked the coherence required to direct the student toward wisdom in its fullness.

There have been many occasions in this study to emphasise the centrality of Thomas of York or Eriugena for the establishment of the peace that reigns among the ancient philosophers of Berthold's golden age, or the importance of Dietrich of Freiberg as the source for the mechanisms of Berthold's metaphysics and anthropology, or the role of Eriugenian sources in the reception of the *Expositio*. With the greater part of the commentary now in view, however, we may say that the author whom Berthold most closely approximated in his understanding of the science of metaphysics and theology, and his views about the kind of knowing demanded by it and the path by which the human is to achieve it, was Boethius. Him we find described, with one of the few epithets in the entire *Expositio*, as that "most brilliant man" (*vir clarissimus*).⁷⁷ The prayer "with Plato and Boethius" to the paternal Light that concluded the *Prologus* was taken directly from the *Consolatio philosophiae*, where the prisoner and Lady Philosophy attempt to move from the discursive apprehension of finite goods to their simultaneity (*cuncta simul*) in the Good itself – that is, to ascend from *ratio* to *intellectus*. The aim of the *Expositio* was to re-enact the same movement that Proclus had undertaken in the *Elementatio theologica*: passing from the oblique motion of ratiocination to the *intellectus adeptus* and the providential *unum animae* of the direct motion, or (which amounts to the same thing) to the *intelligentia* of the circular motion. To join in the prayer for divine grace common to a pagan and a Christian author was for Berthold anything but a rhetorical trope.⁷⁸ If we recall how thoroughly Berthold's

⁷⁷ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Expos. tit. E*, p. 41, l. 153.

⁷⁸ Cf. Albert the Great, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, lib. II, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 516b: *et haec est irradiatio de qua multum locuti sunt Philosophi, et ordinaverunt propter illam supplicationes et orationes*.

understanding of the formal and final causes of the *Elementatio theologica* – its theorematic method and its beatifying end – was informed by Boethius, and if we consider now how he synthesised doctrines he found in *De Trinitate*, the *Consolatio*, and the *De hebdomadibus*, we will see that, for Berthold, the method of the commentary was intrinsically connected to that end. In other words, by considering Berthold's use of Boethius, we can best understand the continuity and distinction between the oblique motion and the two motions that are above it.

Berthold's discussion of the final cause of the *Elementatio* in the *Expositio tituli* was framed by two themes from Boethius: first, the strong doctrine of deification in the *Consolatio* (*omnis beatus deus*) and, secondly, the description of Lady Philosophy's first appearance to the prisoner.⁷⁹ Regarding the first, Berthold connected two passages from Book III of the *Consolatio*, where it is argued that beatitude is to be found "in pursuing the perfect condition brought about by the collection of all goods", and that "everyone in bliss is god" by participation.⁸⁰ As Berthold framed it, this beatifying collection of all goods is to be found in the passage from contemplating the gods dividedly (which are *divina per essentiam* but nevertheless "participate" or "limit" God's superabundance),⁸¹ to contemplating God himself (*et per hoc ad divinum principali-forme*), which anticipated the second prayer in the *Expositio*, where he looked to Christ, "the mediator of God and man", to lead the soul from the gods to the One.⁸² In this regard, Berthold shared the view of Lady Philosophy, who agreed with her servant Plato, that the passage from dividedness to unity always presupposes a gift from the higher and unified principle.⁸³

As for the second Boethian theme in the *Expositio tituli*, the appearance of Lady Philosophy, Berthold began by recalling her face and stature.⁸⁴ She appeared to the prisoner as at once ancient yet animated by the vigour of youth, with eyes aflame that can see beyond human capacity, whose height at times seems to pierce the very heavens, while at other times she adopts a more human measure. We have here already, as Robert Crouse observed, the

79 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.* L, p. 49, l. 408-430.

80 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, prosa 9, §22-23, p. 68, l. 63-69; lib. III, prosa 10, §25, p. 84, l. 85-86.

81 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 4, p. 12, l. 243 – p. 13, l. 250.

82 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.* L, p. 51, l. 486-491.

83 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, prosa 9, §32, p. 79, l. 94-97: *Sed cum, uti in Timaeo Platoni, inquit, nostro placet, in minimis quoque rebus divinum praesidium debeat implorari, quid nunc faciendum censes, ut illius summi boni sedem reperire mereamur?*

84 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, p. 49, l. 420-430. Cf. Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. I, prosa 1, §1-6, p. 4, l. 1 – p. 5, l. 24.

essentials of the Boethian conception of wisdom, in a figure who transcends the same boundaries that Berthold sought to overcome:

In his final work, [Boethius] is most directly concerned with the problems – not pagan or Christian, but universal – of understanding the rational order of the world, the vagaries of fortune, and the nature of man's freedom. Lady Philosophy is not natural *or* revealed, not philosophy *or* theology; she is simply *Sapientia*, who can lift her head to pierce the very heavens.⁸⁵

Berthold's conception of the supersapiential habit of the *unum animae* in the *Praeambulum*, which received the properties Dionysius had used to describe the faith that locates the mind in the first Truth, finds its precursor here. For Berthold, the notions of divinising grace and revelation were intrinsic to the natural philosophy of Platonism, and in this way it could challenge the stark boundaries of nature and grace, pagan and Christian. It was the same conception of nature that led Berthold to affirm that true light that "illuminates every person who comes into the world" or "the natural light of intellect", only fully illuminates those who "come into intellectual purity".⁸⁶

For the Dominican, this wisdom was most adequately realised, not in a dialogue like the *Consolatio*, which was intended to use poetic metre and rational argument as the medicines of the soul, but in the theorematic form of the *Elementatio theologica*. In his account of the theology of the *unum animae* in the *Praeambulum*, Berthold had drawn on the tripartite division of speculative philosophy he found in Boethius' *De Trinitate*, into the physical, quadripartite, and theological (*theologica*).⁸⁷ For Boethius, the "theological" proceeds "intellectually" and not by imaginings. It is the intuitive vision of the Form

85 R. Crouse, "The Doctrine of Creation in Boethius. The *De hebdomadibus* and the *Consolatio*", in *Studia Patristica* 17(1982), p. 417–421, at p. 418.

86 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 968–973; *Expos. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 30 – p. 38, l. 34.

87 Boethius, *De Trinitate*, c. 2, p. 169, l. 78–83; *in naturalibus igitur rationabiliter, in mathematicis disciplinaliter, in divinis intellectualiter versari oportebit neque diduci ad imaginations, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam, quae vere forma neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est*. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 63, l. 375–376: *quo theologus in divinis apprehendendis versatur*; p. 64, l. 417: *quo circa divina versari oportet*; p. 65, l. 423: *circa divina versatur*. See also A. Speer, "The Hidden Heritage. Boethian Metaphysics and Its Medieval Tradition", in *Quaestio* 5(2005), p. 163–181, at p. 167–174; id., "The Division of Metaphysical Discourses. Boethius, Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart", in K. Emery, Jr., R. Friedman, A. Speer (eds), *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages. A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 91–115, at p. 94–106.

(*ipsam inspicere formam*) that forms all things. Following Boethius, Berthold stated that the objects of knowing are determined by and correlative with modes of knowing. Through this principle he made the insightful connection between the description of *theologica* in *De Trinitate* with the highest of the four modes of knowing identified in the *Consolatio* (lib. v, prose 4), *intelligentia*, which comes after sense-perception, imagination, and reason. Intelligence is the mode of knowing exercised by the divine providence, which grasps the simple Form (*illam simplicem formam*) beyond the entire universe.⁸⁸ In the *Consolatio*, *intelligentia* is described as primarily the possession of God, while human beings tend toward it, as Olivier Boulnois has remarked, “in a ceaseless effort of ascesis of all sensible images”.⁸⁹ It is, in other words, the perspective sought through prayer at the centre of the *Consolatio* and at the conclusions of the *Prologus* and the *Expositio tituli*, which seeks the passage from the dividedness of fate to union with the divine providence.

That passage to beatitude, as Berthold described it in the phrase *scalaris ascensus*, was figured on the vesture of Lady Philosophy as a ladder ascending from the letters Π to Θ, which he interpreted in the standard way as a representation of practical and theoretical philosophy (*opus et scientia*).⁹⁰ The rungs on this ladder are the propositions, elements, or “elevatements” of the *Elementatio theologica*.⁹¹ For Berthold, we will recall, the highest achievement of the ancient wisdom of Hermes (in the *Liber xxiv philosophorum*) and Plato (in his originally theorematic philosophy concealed by the later Academy in the kind of imaginings Boethius deemed inappropriate for theology) was restored in the *Elementatio theologica*. This, and Proclus’ exhaustive exploration of the three possible motions of the soul, were the two sources of his “excellence”.⁹²

88 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 67, l. 516-520: *cum cognitivum nostrae supersapientialis et divinalis sapientiae sit non solum omnem scientiam, quae est entium, sed etiam ipsum intellectum supracurrens, ut supra ostensum est, habitus etiam ipsius non erit compositus proprie loquendo ex intellectu et scientia, sed simplex inspectio formae simpliciter omnia formantis iuxta illud Boethii De Trinitate, quod ‘circa divina intellectualiter versari oportet neque deduci ad imaginationes sed ipsam inspicere formam’. Et quia, ut idem dicit De consolatione v libro prosa 5, ‘intelligentiae vero celsior oculus existit, supergressa namque universitatis ambitum illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur’. Cf. Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. v, prosa 4, §30, p. 149, l. 86-88.*

89 O. Boulnois, *Métaphysiques rebelles. Genèse et structures d’une science au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2013), p. 53.

90 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.* L, p. 49, l. 420-430.

91 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.* K, p. 47, l. 343-348.

92 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.* A, p. 37, l. 25-31.

When we consider Berthold's discussion of the difficulty and divinity of theological theorems, we see why he held this method in such high regard.⁹³ As Hermes explained in his *Asclepius*, the difficulty of theology consists in the fact that one cannot keep pace with "the torrent" of the river of divinity as it rushes on ahead of those who would listen to it and speak about it. Therefore, as Thomas of York (Berthold's tacit source) concluded, theology demands an attentiveness and concentration, a mode of knowing, that is almost superhuman: both the teacher and the student of theology must be attentive and divine (*oportet non tam tractantem, quam audientem esse divinum hominem et attentum*) – all the more so, Berthold added, are these qualities demanded of one who would follow "the coordination of theological elements". At this point, he had recourse to Boethius' *De hebdomadibus* and the commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers. Whereas for Boethius in the *De hebdomadibus*, the theorems are what prevent the wisdom concealed in them from being divulged and misunderstood, in Berthold's tacit modification of Gilbert, and in accordance with his history of Platonism, both the content and the theorems themselves were the secret: the wisdom contained in this book should be revealed only to the worthy, who are desirous of the unveiled (*revelata*) image of truth, and who "are attentive (*attenti*) and perspicacious (*perspicaces*) in the apex of the mind". "Perspicacious" is the pivotal term here. It was presupposed in Berthold's unusual interpretation of John 1:9 (*venientem in hunc mundum, scilicet puritatem intellectualem*). As he put it in the *Prologus*, what must be exercised in the one who comes to know the invisible things of God is "the perspicacity of the mind" (*subiectum [...] exercendum est animi perspicacitas*).⁹⁴ Combining all of these Boethian threads together, we can understand that, for Berthold, theorems are necessary in theology because they serve to sharpen the *acies mentis* or awaken *intelligentia* – which, as we saw, is intellect in its providential state or intellect in love. They do this because the attention required to grasp the meaning of a proposition must see how a multiplicity, doxographically and philosophically, is gathered up and contained unconfusedly in simplicity and, from there, how this simplicity is taken up into a greater totality through the concatenation or "elementation" of theorems.⁹⁵ Such a method at the level of

93 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. K*, p. 47, l. 368 – p. 48, 400. Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 5 (MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.v1.437, f. 5va).

94 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol. 7*, p. 14, l. 291–292.

95 It can be argued that this theorematic method was implicit in the approximation of *intelligentia* that the prisoner and Lady Philosophy pursued after the prayer inspired by the *Timaeus*. See Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, pr. 12, §30, p. 94, l. 77 – p. 95, l. 81, and §36–38, p. 95, l. 94 – p. 96, l. 106: *Ludisne, inquam, me inextricabilem labyrinthum*

discursive reason would best approximate the onrush or torrent of divine providence that comprehends all things in a simple intuition. Berthold, therefore, meant that the attention the teacher and student must cultivate is “divine” in the fullest sense: it participates in providential knowledge.⁹⁶ If, for Boethius, the human rises to *intelligentia* through an ascesis of images, for Berthold this happens through the theorematic method and the discipline of the passions.⁹⁷ The *Elementatio theologica*, a pagan text, was thus a work whose study formed the central part of a spiritual discipline that disposed the soul to receive divine grace.

Observing his synthesis of these Boethian materials, we must acknowledge how indebted Berthold remained to the very tradition he sought to overcome. The notion of first philosophy as simultaneously the knowledge of God and a participation in the divine self-knowledge was, of course, a defining feature of wisdom as described by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* I.1-2.⁹⁸ So too, the theorematic method of the *Liber de causis* allured scholastic philosophers from before the time of Berthold and well into the 15th century.⁹⁹ Berthold’s conclusion that the *Elementatio* incalculably surpassed its Peripatetic contenders because of its realisation of the theorematic method shows the common ground he shared with his opponent and the limitations of his critique, especially if we compare it with the later efforts of Nicholas of Cusa and Marsilio Ficino.¹⁰⁰ The goal

rationibus texens, quae nunc quidem qua egrediatis introeas, nunc vero quo introieris egrediare, an mirabilem quandam divinae simplicitatis orbem complicas? [...] Tum illa: Minime, inquit, ludimus remque omnium maximam dei munere, quem dudum deprecabamur, exegimus. Ea est enim divinae forma substantiae, ut neque in externa dilabitur nec in se externum aliquid ipsa suscipiat, sed, sicut de ea Parmenides ait, πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὅρκω rerum orbem mobilem rotat dum se immobilem ipsa conservat. Quodsi rationes quoque non extra petitas sed intra rei quam tractabamus ambitum collocates agitavimus, nihil est quod admirare, cum Platone sanciente didiceris cognatos, de quibus loquuntur, rebus oportere esse sermones.

96 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 65, l. 419-420: *divina tractantes efficiuntur di et cognoscunt divina*. There may also be an echo of the watchtower (*specula*) of providence at *Expositio*, 202F, p. 188, l. 228-231, translated at 2.2, n. 55, above. Cf. Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. IV, prosa 6, §30, p. 125, l. 117-119.

97 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 197I, p. 139, l. 220-221: *In statu enim generationis potest enumeratas quinque cognitionum species exercere, prout minus vel plus ab his corporalibus separaverit.*

98 Boulnois, *Métaphysiques rebelles*, p. 126-131, as well as p. 12, 25, and 35.

99 For literature on the theorematic method in the 12th century and a study of its importance in the 15th century, see M. Meliàdò, “Axiomatic Wisdom. Boethius’ *De hebdomadibus* and the *Liber de causis* in Late-Medieval Albertism”, in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 55(2013), p. 71-131, at p. 94-116.

100 S. Gersh, “Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino as Historians of Philosophy” (forthcoming), shows how, in Nicholas, learned ignorance and the method

presupposed by the *Expositio* and the means used to achieve it were inherited from this tradition it sought to overcome. From Berthold's perspective, one could say, the outward appearance of a propositional metaphysics of being in the *Liber de causis* promised the sought-after ladder to the divine, but its content fell short of the ascesis or self-criticism demanded by its method. Only a theorematic metaphysics of the Good, as Boethius himself had attempted in a more incipient way in the *De hebdomadibus*, could secure the passage to *intelligentia*.

The *Expositio*, then, belonged solidly within the medieval tradition of metaphysics as a spiritual exercise.¹⁰¹ A major assumption that Berthold shared with the Church Fathers and the Neoplatonic commentators of late antiquity (and, incidentally, not with Boethius), was his view that the highest fruition and goal of human life is to be sought in the *exegesis* of an inspired text. This meant that the end sought in the science could not be entirely separated from the method used to reach it.¹⁰² In Berthold's Procleanised reading of Dietrich of Freiberg, the *unum animae* and the agent intellect are perpetually active in the soul. For him, this accorded with Boethius' metaphorical account of recollection and the ember or "seed of truth" that is aroused by teaching. Both the ground of the soul and the ancient wisdom familiar with it had been concealed by forgetfulness, but this did not affect their actuality. Otherwise, Tauler could not have preached what he did about Proclus and his familiarity with the soul's ground.

If the ascent up the ladder of theorems is a spiritual exercise in that it forms a divinising *habitus*, then it is in Berthold's exegetical methods that we would learn how the rungs are navigated. As we have seen, there are two methods in the *Expositio*: the historical (*suppositum*, *propositum*) and the syllogistic (*commentum*). In both cases, each proposition of the *Elementatio* is found to contain unconfusedly within itself an entire tradition of philosophical speculation and a sequence of syllogistic arguments. By discursively unfolding the content that is latent in each proposition and comment, the *compiler* and *theoricus* set out the necessary conditions for the movement back from plurality to unity. The difficulty of this spiritual exercise consists in moving from the divided to

of conjecture replaced axiomatics, while for Ficino axiomatics in fact concealed the true Platonic doctrine.

101 On this tradition, see Boulnois, *Métaphysiques rebelles*, p. 21–62. Imbach, "Au-delà de la métaphysique", p. 389, associates Berthold with the same tradition.

102 For a similar conclusion about unity of the content and method in the *Expositio* that focuses on the meaning of *principium* in the three prefaces, see Gersh, "Berthold of Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy".

the unified in such a way that the unified does not dissolve differences, as an abstraction would, but gathers them up like a separate universal. To whatever extent this is achieved, it coincides with the awakening of the *unum animae*, the exercise of the perspicacity of the mind, and the beginning of the habit of *supersapientia*. For the commentator, the Dionysian motto that theology must proceed “not according to ourselves” must be understood in a double sense, exegetical and philosophical, and in both senses it was recollection.¹⁰³ To mend the torn vesture of Lady Philosophy was to ascend the ladder emblazoned upon it.

In the analysis of Berthold's understanding of the macrocosm and microcosm in Part 2, we have found that his project involved an ongoing dialogue with Dietrich of Freiberg's works.¹⁰⁴ It is in the thought of Berthold's “modern sage” (*sapiens modernus*) that the interplay of philosophical insight and forgetfulness is also most apparent. Certain notions from Dietrich were identified by Berthold as authentically Platonic and were therefore embellished (*absoluta essentia secundum se non habet rationem boni; transfusio interior; causa essentialis; maneries; ens secundum speciem*; the agent intellect as the essential cause of the soul), some were openly criticised as Aristotelian (the *transcendentia* with the priority of *ens*, and the concomitant doctrine that *intellectus efficit universalitatem in rebus*), while others were handled ambivalently (the gods as *intellectus in actu per essentiam*). Berthold's multiplication of cosmological principles (infinities, beings, lives) followed from his application of a few basic patterns of causal ordering from Proclus that he interpreted through Dietrich.¹⁰⁵ He was led down these paths, far indeed “beyond the common path of reasonings”, because he could not share Dietrich's hypothetical attitude to the divine science of the philosophers. If the metaphysics of the Good was perfectly realised in antiquity, it was no longer necessary to hypothesise about the separate substances within the constraints of the metaphysics of being. With this he jettisoned Dietrich's elegant Pauline distinction between the transience of the philosophers' worldly *scientia* and the enduring *caritas* of practical life that looks beyond the boundaries of this world. For Berthold, the aim was to harmonise the microcosm as far as possible with the macrocosm, where the heavenly souls must already exercise the kind of providential

103 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 64, l. 410–417.

104 Sturlese, *Homo divinus*, p. 143: “Als Berthold die Entscheidung traf, die Philosophie Dietrichs in Form eines Prokloskommentars zu durchdenken [...]”.

105 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 4, p. 11, l. 201 – p. 12, l. 242; *Prol.* 19, p. 28, l. 745 – p. 30, l. 828; 1D, p. 77, l. 228 – p. 78, l. 246; 8B, p. 158, l. 34 – p. 161, l. 141; 65F, p. 203, l. 102 – p. 204, l. 114; 113A, p. 33, l. 10 – p. 34, l. 62; 133E, p. 37, l. 133 – p. 38, l. 161.

cognition to which individuals aspire *in patria*¹⁰⁶ – in other words, to live in accordance with the human nature that abides in Paradise, as the *Clavis* taught from the Fathers, or in Platonic terms, that abides in being (*in ente*) and the order of natural providence.¹⁰⁷ Whereas Dietrich only acknowledged the possibility of a transitory *raptus*, for Berthold the contemplative ascent can and should pass over into the non-reflexive cognition of providence that mirrors the ecstasy of divine love and “the goodness of silence”. Berthold was emphatic that deification did not entail a dissolution of human individuality or human nature in God. Rather, it amounted to a harmonisation of the individual with human nature and the divine will through the *unum animae*.¹⁰⁸ In this regard, the individual is restored to the natural providence that guides the macrocosm. As Berthold’s older contemporary put it, the highest bliss in this life is to be moved by the same love that moves the sun and the other stars.

It is here that parallels with some of Berthold’s closer contemporaries, especially Meister Eckhart, Henry of Ekkewint, or John Tauler, began to emerge.¹⁰⁹ Deification, as Berthold understood it through Proclus, Dionysius, the *Clavis physicae*, and Bernard of Clairvaux, is when the lower is elevated beyond itself to union with the higher, becomes transfused with the abundance it receives from above, and communicates that bounty to what is below. Nature is not destroyed; rather, the divided is taken up into an active unity or the unified coordination of its parts. What changes is that the Good itself now operates through the creature. As the *Clavis* put it, nothing is “seen” in the creature except God, for, in other words, the creature has become a cooperator with the divine. We may appreciate how careful Berthold was when he gave proof that

106 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185G-M, p. 23, l. 310 – p. 28, l. 471.

107 Berthold would have likely agreed with Eckhart’s declaration that “the blessedness Christ brought us was ours”. See Meister Eckhart, *Predigt 5b* (First Sunday after Trinity), ed. J. Quint, p. 87, l. 5-6: *Diu saelicheit, der er uns zuo truoc, diu was unser*.

108 To take one example from the conclusion of Eckhart’s most widely disseminated work in the Middle Ages, *Die rede der underscheidunge*, ed. J. Quint, *Die deutschen Werke*, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963-1987), c. 23, p. 309, l. 3-5: *Der allen sînen willen hât und sînen wunsch, der hât vröude; daz enhât nieman, dan des wille und gotes wille alzemâle einez ist. Die einunge gebe uns got. Âmen*. (“Whoever has all his will and his desire has joy; no one has this unless his will and God’s will are entirely one. May God give us union. Amen.”).

109 Cf. L. Sturlese, “Die Kölner Eckhartisten. Das Studium generale der deutschen Dominikaner und die Verurteilung der Thesen Meister Eckharts”, in A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989), p. 192–211, reprinted in Sturlese, *Homo divinus*, p. 119–135, at p. 134: “die Strategie Bertholds bestand darin, durch den Rückgriff auf die Philosophie Dietrichs von Freiberg und durch ihre Einbettung in den denkgeschichtlichen Kontext der platonischen Tradition die spekulativen Instanzen Eckharts weiterzuführen. Dies ist die historische Bedeutung seines grossen Prokloskommentars.”

Proclus traversed all three motions of the soul by citing passages that are effectively reports of an experience of the circular motion (the soul encountering its “sisters” in the heavens and moves beyond them to Boethian *intelligentia*) and the direct motion (beginning from creatures and culminating in the *intellectus adeptus* and *unum animae*). In both cases, it seems the description of the exercise of this higher mode of knowing was a report of the experience of the doctrine of deification described objectively at 129B. The divided parts of creation are seen to be held together by a unity actively transfusing them, which the *Asclepius* had likened to “the torrent of divinity”, or which St. Benedict saw as a single ray of light enfolding the entire universe. Once the perspicacity of the mind has been exercised and *puritas intellectualis* has been received, the experience of the *intellectus adeptus* and *unum animae* is of creatures suddenly becoming transparent to their exemplar, just as the air is filled with light.¹¹⁰

In the exercise of the oblique motion that prepares for that vision, the *unum animae* is presupposed and gradually awakened; in each theorem or rung of the ladder, when the divided is gathered into a unity, the inherently dispossessive cognition of this principle (Dionysius: *nullius neque sui ipsius neque alterius / melius est enim esse Dei et non nostri ipsorum*; Proclus: *sunt non sui ipsarum, sed illustrantium*) is communicated more and more to the rest of the soul as the *habitus* is cultivated. As long as reason follows this motion, creatures will only seem to be “vestiges” of their ideas, contradictions and oppositions that beckon

110 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. C*, p. 39, l. 73–78. Cf. Meister Eckhart, *Predigt 103* (First Sunday after Epiphany), ed. G. Steer, *Die deutschen Werke*, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003) p. 487, l. 121 – p. 489, l. 140. English translation: Meister Eckhart, *The German Works. De tempore*, p. 267–269: “Now you may say: Ah, Lord, you mean, this birth should happen, so that the Son be born in me. Ah, can I have a sign by which I know that it has happened? Of course! Three true signs! Of them I will now mention one. I am often asked whether man can achieve that he is not hindered by time, crowd or matter. Yes, in truth, when this birth has taken place in truth, none of the creatures will hinder you; rather, they all point you to God and to this birth. Take lightning as an example. Whatever the lightning hits, it strikes; whatever it hits, be it a tree, an animal or a man, it turns it immediately to itself. And if a man had turned his back to it, in this moment it would turn him round to face it. If a tree had a thousand leaves, they would all turn right side up towards the strike. See, so it happens with all who are touched and struck by this birth, they will suddenly turn to this birth with everything that is present. Yes, as far as something can be coarse, yes, what before was an impediment for you, now will fully help you. Your face, therefore, will be turned towards this birth. Indeed, everything that you see or hear, whatever it is, you can only grasp in all things nothing but this birth. Indeed, all things become the naked God, as in all things you cannot recognize or love but the naked God. Just as if man had looked for a long time into the sun in heaven, what he sees after that is that the sun is placed in him. If you fail to search for God, to grasp and love Him in all things and in each thing, there you miss this birth.”

for resolution. This persists all the way up to the rational apprehension of the primordial causes, where the distinct cosmic genera have their source. But to move from that most unified state of the possible intellect to the “altogether at once” (*cuncta simul*) of beatifying *intelligentia*, either in its fleetingness or permanence, was not an automatic process for Berthold. It was the result of a divine work in the soul, as the best of the Platonists, pagan and Christian, acknowledged. This was the philosophical revelation of *divinalis supersapientia* Berthold of Moosburg discerned in the distant past. In it he recognised an opportunity for the reform of theology by the recovery of the Platonic understanding of how nature and the soul are rooted in God, which the mind seems so predisposed to ignore. If we must conclude that Berthold has blurred the old boundary between nature and grace,¹¹¹ and that the kinds of revelation involved are plural, this is because the hardened divisions we would employ to bring the conversation to a reassuring close are ill-suited to capture the lowly contemplator’s transient vision of a greater consensus.

111 Cf. Meister Eckhart, *Die rede der underscheidung*, c. 23, p. 306, l. 10 – p. 308, l. 3. English translation: Meister Eckhart, *The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense*, p. 284–285: “There was a man who would dearly have liked to make a stream flow through his garden, and he said: ‘If the water could be mine, I should not care what sort of channel brought it to me, iron or timber, bone or rusty metal, if only I could have the water.’ And so anyone is quite wrong who worries about the means through which God is working his works in you, whether it be nature or grace. Just let him work, and just be at peace.”

Translation

Note on the Translation

The three prefaces of Berthold's commentary (*Prologue, Exposition of the Title, Preamble*) have been translated from the critical edition in the *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi*: Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1-13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 5-69. The translation incorporates the notes from this edition with slight modifications and additions, the most substantial being the new references to Thomas of York's *Sapientiale*, which was frequently Berthold's direct source.

Prologue

THE INVISIBLE THINGS OF GOD, FROM THE CREATION OF THE
WORLD, ARE BEHELD, BEING UNDERSTOOD THROUGH THE
THINGS THAT ARE MADE.

Romans 1:20.

[1] The greatest theologian of divinising wisdom, Paul, was aware of the hidden things of God because he was rapt into the third heaven.¹ Speaking of those who are wise in worldly philosophy – after stating,² “What is known of God is manifest to them, for God revealed it to them” – he adds, “The invisible things of God”, etc.

Now, Ambrose, in the *Hexaemeron*,³ which is found in the *Gloss* on these verses,⁴ says this: “God, whose nature is invisible, fashioned a work, so that he might be known from what is visible. By its visibility, the work points to its maker, so that the uncertain might be known through the certain, and so that the maker of this work (which could not possibly be made by human hands), would be believed to be the God of all.”

»“For the ways to the creator”, as Gundissalinus writes in his book *On Creation*,⁵ “are his works. When we diligently turn our attention to these, we are able to reach the understanding of any hidden thing of God whatsoever”; indeed, “the crafting of the world is the setting-forth of the invisible things of God”, as Dionysius says to Titus.⁶»⁷ »Al-Ghazali alludes to this in treatise 3 of his *Metaphysics*, chapter

1 2 Corinthians 12:2-4.

2 Romans 1:19. “*Revelavit*”: cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. I. Brady (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971–1981³), lib. I, d. 3, c. 1, §1, p. 69, l. 8.

3 Ambrosiaster, *Commentarius in epistulas Paulinas. Pars prima. In epistulam ad Romanos*, ed. H.J. Vogels (Wien: Hoelder / Pichler / Tempsky, 1966), In Rom. 1:19, p. 39, l. 28 – p. 41, l. 3; apud Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, lib. I, d. 3, c. 1, §2, p. 69, l. 11-14.

4 Cf. Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in Epistulas d. Pauli*, In Rom. 1:18-19 (PL 191, 1326C-D).

5 Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi*, ed. G. Bülow, *Des D. Gundisalvi Schrift von dem Hervorgange der Welt* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1925), p. 2, l. 1-3.

6 Dionysius, *Epistulae*, IX.2 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 642; PG 3, 1108B).

7 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 7 (F f. 7va). All references to the *Sapientiale* are to MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.VI.437 (henceforth F).

11:⁸ the first principle is known only as the hidden is known through what is manifest, that is, as the exemplar is known through the exemplated, which are his works and attributes,⁹ »for, according to Rabbi Moses in *The Guide of the Perplexed*, chapter 33,¹⁰ “there is no way to the creator we seek except through his creatures, for these prove his existence and what one must believe about God”.¹¹

Dionysius, however, shows that God is a nature invisible not only to the bodily and the spiritual eye, but even the eye of the mind, as he says in chapter 1 of *On the Divine Names*:¹² “Certainly the knowledge and contemplation of what he is (that is, God) is inaccessible to all beings, for the Good is supersubstantially separated from all. You will find that many theologians have praised him not only as invisible and incomprehensible, but also as inscrutable and unsearchable, just as those who have passed over into his hidden infinity have left no trace behind. And yet the Good is not entirely incommunicable to any being; indeed, he establishes singularly the supersubstantial ray within himself, and benevolently sheds forth illuminations proportioned to every being, and elevates holy minds to the contemplation of him and to communion and assimilation with him, as far as possible.” Thus Dionysius. Damascene alludes to this in Book I, at the beginning,¹³ when he says: “He does not forsake us in complete ignorance, for he naturally implants in us the knowledge of his existence.”

And so, as is said in the *Sentences*,¹⁴ man has been assisted to know God in two ways: “from rational nature, and from the works made by God,” which manifest the maker. I say, “from nature” because “what is known of God is manifest to them”.¹⁵ The *Gloss* explains:¹⁶ this refers to what can be known about God by the guidance of reason. And I say, “from works”, “for creation itself”, according

8 Cf. Al-Ghazali, *Metaphysica*, ed. J.T. Muckle, *Algazel's Metaphysics. A Medieval Translation* (Toronto: St. Michael's College, 1933), pars I, tr. 3, c. 11, p. 87, l. 3-6.

9 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 4 (F f. 5rb).

10 Moses Maimonides, *Dux seu director dubitantium aut perplexorum* (Paris: Ascensius, 1520), lib. I, c. 33, f. 12v.

11 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 3 (F f. 3va).

12 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 1.2 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 13-15; PG 3, 588C-D).

13 John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, ed. E.M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1955), lib. I, c. 1, p. 12, l. 21-23 (PG 94, 789B); apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 5 (F f. 5vb).

14 Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, lib. I, d. 3, c. 1, §1, p. 69, l. 6-7; apud Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. Libri I, pars I. Quaestiones 1-50A*, ed. D. Siedler (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), pars I, tr. 3, q. 13, a. 4, p. 46, l. 12-15.

15 Romans 1:19.

16 Cf. Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in Epistulas d. Pauli*, In Rom. 1.18-19 (PL 191, 1326B).

to Damascene in the passage just mentioned,¹⁷ “its permanence, and its governance declare the greatness of the divine nature”. For this reason, those scrutinising the works of the creator are reproved in Wisdom, chapter 13,¹⁸ because they did not know the creator from those works, for “from the greatness and beauty of the creature their creator could be seen by knowledge”.¹⁹ And so, according to Hugh, commenting on the *Hierarchy* of Dionysius,²⁰ “nature, having been established in servitude, pointed to its creator”.

Indeed, according to Augustine in Book IV of *The Literal Commentary on Genesis*,²¹ “there is no knowledge that is not preceded by objects to be known; these, moreover, are first in the Word, though which all things are made, before they are in all things that have been made. Thus, the human mind first experiences through bodily sense those things that have been made and derives knowledge of them only in a small measure because of human weakness. It then seeks after their causes, if in some way it can attain them, which primarily and immutably abide in the Word of God. Thus, it beholds the invisible things of the Word through the things which are made, once these things are understood. But who is unaware of how sluggish and dull the mind is at doing this, with what difficulty the mind undertakes it, and how long the mind tarries because of the corruptible body that weighs down the soul, even when it is caught up with a most fervent zeal to undertake this search earnestly and diligently?”

[2] From all the foregoing, therefore, it follows that “the invisible things of God”, etc.

In these words introduced from Paul, we may consider three things: what is beheld, since it says “the invisible things of God”; from what and in what they are beheld, because it has “from the creation of the world”; and that through which they are beheld, because it has “through those things, which are made”, etc.

The first denotes the object to be understood; in the second, following a twofold interpretation, we have the subject to be pondered and the subject to be exercised and elevated; finally, the middle term that has been brought into view is discerned and analysed.

17 John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, I.1, p. 12, l. 23-24 (PG 94, 789B).

18 Wisdom of Solomon 13:1-4.

19 Wisdom of Solomon 13:5; cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, eds WJ. Mountain, F. Glorie (Turnhout: Brepols, 1968), XV.2.3, p. 462, l. 36-45.

20 Hugh of St. Victor, *Commentaria in Hierarchiam caelestem*, I.1 (PL 175, 926A).

21 Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, ed. J. Zycha (Wien: Tempsky, 1894), IV.32.49, p. 129, l. 25 – p. 130, l. 10.

The object ultimately to be contemplated is, as it were, inscrutable, illimitable, and ineffable. For who shall thoroughly seek out the invisible things of God? Who shall lay hold of, I dare not say comprehend, the illimitable? Who shall describe the ineffable? For “the seeker shall be overcome by glory”;²² the intruder into immensity shall be charged with wrongdoing; the one who declares the unsayable through their senselessness shall be laughed to scorn.

The subject especially to be pondered is fourfold: the bodily, the spiritual, the intellectual, and the unificational. Similarly, the subject especially to be exercised and elevated is threefold according to Augustine,²³ but fourfold according to Dionysius:²⁴ the bodily, the spiritual, the mental, and the unificational visual power.

The middle term that is really beheld, discerned, and analysed is also fourfold: the bodily, the animated, the intellectual, and the unificational.

[3] Regarding the first, know that THE INVISIBLE THINGS OF GOD can be taken in two ways: either intransitively or transitively.

In the first way, it means the following: the invisible things of God are God, as we read in the First Letter to Timothy, chapter 1:²⁵ “Unto the King of ages, the immortal” (the *Gloss*:²⁶ “immutable”), “invisible” (the *Gloss*: “incomprehensible”), “the King of ages” (the *Gloss*: “the Trinity”).

Augustine, in his book *On Seeing God*, chapter 2,²⁷ discussing the words of Ambrose, says this: “God is an invisible nature.” And later:²⁸ “Undoubtedly the error of the Arians is increased if it is believed that the Father’s nature is invisible while the Son’s is visible. Therefore, Ambrose affirmed that the nature of both is one and is equally invisible, and to this he added the Holy Spirit.” And below:²⁹ “Therefore, God is an invisible nature, not just the Father, but the Trinity itself is one God.” Thus Augustine. And so not only is the Father invisible, as some³⁰ interpret the words of the Apostle to the Colossians, chapter 1,³¹ where he speaks of the Son, “who is the image of the invisible God”; rather, the

22 Proverbs 25:27.

23 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Prologus* 20, n. 247.

24 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 15, n. 160.

25 1 Timothy 1:17.

26 Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in Epistulas d. Pauli*, In 1 Tim. 1:6-17 (PL 192, 333C).

27 Augustine, *Epistulae*, ed. A. Goldbacher (Wien: Tempsky, 1895-1923), 147.7, §19, p. 292, l. 10-11; cf. Ambrose, *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*, ed. M. Adriaen (Turnhout: Brepols, 1957), p. 18, l. 369 – p. 20, l. 432.

28 Augustine, *Epistulae*, 147.7, §19, p. 293, l. 1-4.

29 Augustine, *Epistulae*, 147.8, §20, p. 293, l. 13-14.

30 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In omnes s. Pauli Apostoli epistolas commentaria*, 2 vols (Torino: Marietti, 1929), vol. 2, Ad Col. 1, lect. 4, p. 119a.

31 Colossians 1:15.

Son is consubstantial, that is, coessential with the Father, and thus is invisible like the Father.

Concerning the invisibility of the Trinity, Dionysius says this in chapter 2 of *On the Divine Names*:³² “In the divine union, that is, in supersubstantiality, these are all one and common with the primary Trinity: the supersubstantial Essence, the superdivine Deity, the Goodness beyond good [*superbona bonitas*], which is the Identity beyond all of the complete Characteristic existing beyond all, the Unity beyond the principiated, the Ineffable, the Pluriluminous, Ignorance, absolute Unintelligibility.” Thus Dionysius. If God is unknowable, he is invisible. And below:³³ “For all divine things and whatever is revealed to us are known only through participations. Those things themselves, whatever they are in their own principle and foundation, are beyond the mind, beyond all substance and all knowing.” Thus Dionysius. These are the proper invisible things of God in the strict sense.

There are also the appropriated or attributed invisible things of God, according to the words of Hugh of St. Victor:³⁴ “The invisible things of God are three: power, wisdom, and benevolence.”

The invisible things of God are equally the eternal and immutable reasons existing in the Word of God the Father, according to what is said by Augustine in Book VI of *On the Trinity*, chapter 10:³⁵ “The Word ... is the art of the omnipotent and wise God, and is filled with all living, immutable reasons.” Dionysius calls these reasons “exemplars” in chapter 5 of *On the Divine Names*,³⁶ where he says: “We say that the exemplars in God are the substantiating reasons of beings and that they singularly preexist. Theology calls them the predefinitions of beings and the determinative and effective divine wills, according to which the supersubstantial Substance has predefined and produced all things.”

We read this in the Letter to the Hebrews, chapter 11:³⁷ “By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that visible things would arise from invisible things.” Augustine glosses this as follows:³⁸ “What is meant by ‘from invisible things’ is the invisible world, which was in the wisdom

32 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 2.4 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 76–77; PG 3, 641A).

33 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 2.7 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 94; PG 3, 645A).

34 Hugh of St. Victor, *De tribus diebus*, ed. D. Poirel (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), p. 3, l. 6 – p. 4, l. 7 (PL 176, 811C).

35 Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VI.10.11, p. 241, l. 20–23.

36 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 5.8 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 360–361; PG 3, 824C).

37 Hebrews 11:3.

38 Cf. Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in Epistulas d. Pauli*, In Hebr. 11:2–4 (PL 192, 489D–490A); Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. 31 (Paris: Vivès, 1894), pars 1, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 560a.

of God, after whose likeness this visible world was made ... This is the arrangement according to which he has arranged all things, so that they would arise after the manner of the intelligible exemplar that was in God's mind." Thus Augustine.

Augustine himself discusses these eternal reasons in question 73 of 83 *Questions* in the following terms:³⁹ "Now there are certain primary ideas, forms, or reasons of things. These are stable and immutable, unlike the things themselves that have been formed. And so the eternal reasons, which are held together in the divine intelligence, always exist in the same mode. And while these never come to be or pass away, everything that can come to be and pass away, and everything that does come to be and pass away, is said to be formed according to them." He says this, and much else besides, in the same text. Accordingly, he declares⁴⁰ that "such power is placed in them, that no one can be wise without knowing them". Augustine also discusses these reasons at length in Book v of *The Literal Commentary on Genesis*,⁴¹ and how God knows all things in them and produces all things through them.

Let these words suffice for now concerning the invisible things of God in the first sense, that is, when taken intransitively.

[4] But if the invisible things of God are taken transitively, then in this sense, according to Thomas Gallus, commenting on chapter 11 of *On the Divine Names*,⁴² "the divine Good is said to be the Substantiator", namely, "of his invisible things, which are the rays, so to speak, of superunified Goodness, such as *per se* being, *per se* life, and so on". Al-Farabi discusses these invisible things in his treatise *On the Cause of Causes*,⁴³ which begins, "The Principle of principles", and states the following: "Therefore, there are exemplars, the primary causes of things." And below:⁴⁴ "The first causes, because of their infinite diffusion over all things and the incomprehensible height of the ineffable purity of their excellence, are not perceived by intellect, because they are not outside the First, who formed them in the principle." And below:⁴⁵ "The invisible things are hidden away in the shadows of his excellence, but in their effects – brought forth, as it were, into a certain light of cognition – they ceaselessly appear."

39 Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, ed. A. Mutzenbecher (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975), q. 46, p. 71, l. 26-32.

40 Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 46, p. 70, l. 10-11.

41 Cf. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, v.13.29-v.18.36, p. 156, l. 9 – p. 161, l. 16.

42 Thomas Gallus, *Extractio de Divinis nominibus (Dionysiaca)*, vol. 1, p. 705b).

43 *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, ed. R. de Vaux, *Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin aux confins des XII^e-XIII^e siècles* (Paris: Vrin, 1934), c. 2, p. 91, l. 15-16.

44 *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, c. 2, p. 92, l. 12-16.

45 *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, c. 2, p. 93, l. 4-6.

Thus Al-Farabi. Concerning these primordial causes, which Dionysius calls “*per se* power”,⁴⁶ “*per se* being”⁴⁷ or “being-itself”, and so on, and “the principles of beings”, Dionysius himself says the following in chapter 5 of *On the Divine Names*:⁴⁸ “Being-itself is both more ancient than *per se* life, and more ancient than *per se* wisdom.” And later:⁴⁹ “I say that he made being-itself to preexist, and through being-itself he made to subsist everything that exists in any way. And because the principles of beings participate the Being of all, they exist and are principles; first they exist, and then they are principles. And if the power of what lives, insofar as it is the principle of what lives, is called *per se* life ...”.

Concerning this passage in Dionysius, Maximus in his *Comment* writes:⁵⁰ “There are primordial causes, which the Greeks call ‘ideas’, meaning ‘species’ or ‘eternal and immutable forms’, according to which and in which the visible world is formed and governed. This is why, among the Greek sages, they earned the name *potyn*, which means the primary exemplars that the Father made in the Word, and which he divided and multiplied in his effects through the Holy Spirit. They are also called *porismata*, meaning ‘predestinations’, for in them all things whatsoever come to be and are made by the divine providence, and they are predestined all together and at once; for nothing among visible and invisible creatures arises by nature before it is predefined and preordained in these causes, prior to all time and extension.” And shortly thereafter:⁵¹ “The ideas are frequently called ‘divine wills’ by the philosophers, and especially by the Platonists, since whatever God willed to make, he primarily and causally made in them.” And below:⁵² “Dionysius and other saints called these forms or ideas ‘goodness-through-itself’, ‘essence-through-itself’, ‘life-through-itself’, ‘power-through-itself’, ‘wisdom-through-itself’ ... For whatsoever is good, is good through participation in *per se* goodness, and whatsoever exists, exists by participation in *per se* essence, and whatsoever lives, lives by participation in *per se* life (and so on for the other participations and participants) ... Accordingly, no power, either general or particular, is found in the nature of

46 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 8.2 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 418; PG 3, 889D).

47 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 5.5 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 337 [transl. Eriugena]; PG 3, 820A).

48 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 5.5 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 337; PG 3, 820A).

49 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 5.5 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 339; PG 3, 820B).

50 *Commentator*, In *De divinis nominibus*, 5 (MS Paris, BnF lat. 17341, f. 247ra-b); apud Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, pars 1, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 559b-560a.

51 *Commentator*, In *De divinis nominibus*, 5 (MS Paris, BnF lat. 17341, f. 247rb); apud Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, pars 1, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 560a.

52 *Commentator*, In *De divinis nominibus*, 5 (MS Paris, BnF lat. 17341, f. 247rb-va); apud Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, pars 1, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 560a.

things, which does not proceed from the primordial causes by an ineffable participation.” Thus Maximus.

In chapter 11 of *On the Divine Names*,⁵³ where Dionysius explains in what sense God was sometimes called *per se* Being and *per se* Life, and at other times the Substantiator of *per se* being and *per se* life, he also says this: “We say ‘*per se* being’, ‘*per se* life’, and ‘*per se* deity’ in a divine sense and in a causal sense: causally, with respect to the one superprincipal and supersubstantial Principle and Cause of all, but divinely and participably (we say that) providential powers are given from out of the imparticipable God, who is the *per se* Substantiator, the *per se* Vivifier, the *per se* Deifier. Beings, according to their characteristic, exist by virtue of these and are called participants, givers of life, existents, divine things, and so on. For this reason (God) is first said to be the Substantiator of them, then of their wholes, then of their particulars, and finally of what participates in them particularly. And what should be said about these? Since some of our divine and holy teachers indeed call the Substantiator of *per se* goodness and deity ‘the Beyond-good’ and ‘the Beyond-divine’, calling ‘*per se* goodness and deity’ the beneficent and deifying gift coming forth from God, and ‘*per se* beauty’ at once the *per se* beautifying effusion, the whole beauty and the particular beauty, the completely beautiful and the partially beautiful, and whatever other things have been or may be said in a similar fashion, they are pointing to the providences and goodness participated by beings. These providences proceed from God by an abundant effusion and are superabundant, so that the Cause of all is strictly above all and, supersubstantially and supernaturally, altogether exceeds what exists according to any substance or nature.” This is what Dionysius says about the First Cause as such and the primordial causes, which he calls the thearchy, the agatharchy [*principatum boni*], the primary principles of beings, deities, goodnesses, unities, and the beneficent and deifying gifts of the Beyond-deity and the Beyond-good, who is the imparticipable and superprincipal God beyond every principle.

Dionysius’ *Second Letter* to the monk Gaius should be understood in this way. It reads as follows:⁵⁴ “How is it that he is beyond all and beyond the thearchy and beyond the agatharchy? In this way: if you took ‘deity’ and ‘goodness’ to mean the exercise of the beneficent gift and the inimitable imitation of the Beyond-deity and the Beyond-good, by which we are deified and made good. For indeed, if this is the principle of deification and of deifying the blessed, he is the Superprincipal beyond every principle and beyond this deity and

53 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 11.6 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 521–526; PG 3, 953D–956B).

54 Dionysius, *Epistulae*, 11 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 608–610; PG 3, 1068A–1069A).

goodness, just as he is beyond the thearchy and agatharchy. Insofar as he is inimitable and incomprehensible, he exceeds the imitations and relations of what imitates and what participates him.” Thus Dionysius in the *Letter*.

See how Dionysius declares so plainly that the First Cause as such is beyond-god, beyond-good and is principal beyond every principle, beyond deity and goodness, and beyond the thearchy and the agatharchy! Accordingly, the beyond-blessed Trinity of primary persons, in which “the Father is fontal deity, but the Son and the Holy Spirit are god-born of deity, if one must speak in this way, and burgeonings of the divine nature, and are like flowers and super-substantial lights”⁵⁵ – this Trinity, I say, is “supersubstantial, beyond-god, and beyond-good”, according to Dionysius at the beginning of the *Mystical Theology*.⁵⁶

Concerning these gods – above which is God, the great Lord and great King, “the primary God and the one God supersubstantially beyond-god”,⁵⁷ who is “exalted in the highest”⁵⁸ for he is “God the Lord of gods”⁵⁹ – Dionysius writes the following,⁶⁰ using the words of the Apostle:⁶¹ “For if there are gods either in heaven or on earth, just as there are indeed many gods and lords, yet to us truly there is one God: the Father, from whom are all things and we in him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and we through him.”

These gods, as is said in the book *On the Existence of Evils*,⁶² “are beyond beings and are the measures of being, because every being is in them as in unitary numbers, and yet beings proceed from them”.

These gods are called unities and goodnesses, which God, who is the primarily One and Good, produced, as is said in question 10 of *On Providence*:⁶³ “Indeed, every god, as I have said already, exists as a god according to the One (which we emphatically declare to exist prior to intellect), being identical with the Good and proceeding from the Good. Now, there are two kinds of unities or

55 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 2.7 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 96–97; PG 3, 645B).

56 Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, 1.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 565; PG 3, 997A).

57 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 2.11 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 116–117; PG 3, 649C).

58 Psalm 96:9.

59 Psalm 49:1.

60 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 2.11 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 118; PG 3, 649D–652A).

61 Cf. 1 Corinthians 8:5–6: *Nam etsi sunt qui dicantur dii sive in caelo [...]*.

62 Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*, ed. H. Boese, *Tria opuscula (De providentia, libertate, malo)*. *Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960), c. 2, §11, p. 190, l. 15 – p. 191, l. 17.

63 Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, ed. H. Boese, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 1 – p. 104, l. 16.

goodnesses that the Good produced, being the cause of both and yet remaining one in another way; some of these are self-complete, meaning *per se* perfect, but others are scattered into what participates the causes. For the 'one' and the 'good' are threefold: either according to cause, namely, the First, for he is the Good and Cause of beings and of all goods and unities; or according to existence, namely, any god existing as one and good; or according to participation, namely, the one and good in substances, by which every substance is unified and is boniform. Every god, then, if it is a unity, is a self-complete unity, that is, *per se* perfect, for it is not the being of another, but of itself. But every intellect and soul that participates a certain one is unifical, for it is a certain one that soul and intellect participate."

From what has been said it is abundantly clear that God, the Lord of gods, is called "God" in one sense, because he is God according to cause primarily, that the gods that are produced are called "god" in another sense, because each is a god according to essence, and, finally, in another sense, that those who participate deity called "god", as Boethius says in Book III of *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, prose 10:⁶⁴ "Everyone in bliss is god; certainly, God is one by nature, but nothing prevents there being as many gods as you please by participation." Now if you object, "So gods according to essence do not exist!", I say that the two are not mutually exclusive, since every god according to essence participates deity inasmuch as it does not have deity in its superabundance like the primarily God, who is blessed throughout the ages.

So much for the first kind of transitive invisible things mentioned above.

[5] The invisible things also include the effects of the primordial causes, and these are either *per se* perfect or have their subsistence in others.

The *per se* perfect are, for example, infinities, true beings, lives, intellectual hypostases, total and partial souls, and what participates in these. Concerning these primordial causes and their effects, Dionysius says the following in chapter 11,⁶⁵ as was recounted above: "And the good God is first said to be Substantiator of them (that is, of *per se* being, *per se* power, and so on), and then of their wholes (that is, of the orders that the primordial causes institute; these orders are called wholes because they are *per se* perfect), and then of their particulars (that is, of the singulars of these orders), and then of what participates in them particularly (in which the perfections of the higher exist

64 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, ed. C. Moreschini, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica* (München / Leipzig: Saur, 2005²), lib. III, prosa 10, p. 84, l. 85-86.

65 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 11.6 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 523, PG 3, 956A).

neither first nor *per se*, such as the intellectuality that is participated particularly in us and by us human beings)."

These are the invisible things of God taken transitively, which are discussed most subtly in this *Theological Elementation* within the domain of natural providence.

[6] For there are also the invisible things of God in the order of voluntary providence, such as the angels, which, as Proclus says in *On the Existence of Evils*, chapter 3,⁶⁶ are "the class that is the interpreter of the gods, existing in continuity with the gods. This class knows the mind of the gods and brings the divine will to light. Surely it is a divine light proceeding from the light abiding within the sanctuary that appears without, and is nothing other than the Good proceeding and coming to light first of all from those that remain inside the One. For it is necessary to make the procession of wholes continuous; but one thing is by nature consequent upon another because it is similar. Many goods, therefore, are consequent upon the founts of goods, that is, the number of unities that remain concealed within the ineffable Fount. Continuous with these founts is the first number of things proceeding and descending from here, stationed as it were at the portals, that is, before the gates of the gods, uttering forth their silence." Thus Proclus.

The invisible things of God are also human souls and especially the blessed with their glorified bodies. For bodies that are not glorified are visible, though there are exceptions to this, for the universal elements, the celestial element, and certain familiar elements, such as fire as it exists in its own sphere, are not visible; only compressed bodies, which arrest the visual ray by their density, are visible. But as to how other spirits are invisible, such as demons, or our souls with rational and intellectual powers, or how prime matter and substantial forms are invisible, all of this I pass over for now.

So much then for the first part regarding the invisible things of God.

[7] Now there follows the second part: FROM THE CREATION OF THE WORLD.

In this part, we observe both the "from which" and the "in which" (for "from the creation of the world" can be taken either objectively or subjectively); here, in other words, the object to be pondered and the subject to be exercised and elevated are considered. As to the first, if "the creation of the world" is taken intransitively, the totality of all things is to be pondered; but if it is taken transitively, it refers to the being of certain things. The second, what is to be exercised, refers to the perspicacity of the mind.

66 Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*, c. 3, §14, p. 194, l. 8-18.

Now “world” comes from “adornment”: for “cosmos” in Greek, which is the same as “adornment”, is translated into Latin as “world”.⁶⁷ In this way, “world” can be interpreted either with reference to the macrocosm or to the microcosm.

[8] The macrocosm, meaning the greater world, is described by Trismegistus to his companion Asclepius as follows:⁶⁸ “The world is the immutable work of God, a glorious construction, a good work composed of a multiform variety of images, a mechanism of God’s will, who sustains his work without jealousy.”

[9] Regarding this description one should observe that the world is called a work and not a creature. Perhaps this is because of the primordial causes. For these, as was said above with Maximus,⁶⁹ God “the Father made in the Son, and divided and multiplied in his effects through the Holy Spirit”, and according to them the visible world is formed and governed. For this reason, Dionysius says⁷⁰ that, through being-itself, God made to preexist “all that he made to subsist in any way”, for being or being-itself is one of the primordial causes.

For this reason, Theodorus in the *Key*⁷¹ does not dare call them “creatures”, for they are “the heaven of heavens” and “the waters that are above the heavens”.⁷² As it is written in the Psalm:⁷³ “For he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created.” Now, the primordial causes are called “heavens” [*caeli*] by derivation, either from “concealing” [*a celando*] or because they are the houses of the sun [*casae elios*], that is, the abode of the highest God,⁷⁴ who dwells in darkness and light inaccessible⁷⁵ “and has made the shadows his hiding place”.⁷⁶ All of these notions signify the primordial causes

67 Cf. Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX*, ed. W.M. Lindsay, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), vol. 1, lib. XIII, c. 1, §2; Papias, *Elementarium doctrinae rudimentum* (Venezia: Pincius, 1496), s.v. “Mundus”, f. 106v.

68 *Asclepius*, ed. C. Moreschini, *Apulei opera quae supersunt. Vol. III. De philosophia libri* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1991), c. 25, p. 66, l. 21 – p. 67, l. 2; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).

69 *Commentator*, In *De divinis nominibus*, 5 (MS Paris, BnF lat. 17341, f. 247ra-b); apud Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, pars 1, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 559b-560a.

70 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 5.5 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 339; PG 3, 820B).

71 Cf. Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, ed. P. Arfé, *La Clavis physicae (316-529) di Honorius Augustodunensis* (Napoli: Liguori Editore, 2012), c. 333, p. 71, l. 327 – p. 72, l. 346.

72 Psalm 148:4.

73 Psalms 32:9 and 148:5.

74 Huguccio of Pisa, *Derivationes*, eds E. Cecchini *et al.*, 2 vols (Firenze: SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2004), vol. 2, s.v. “Celo” (C123, p. 210, §7).

75 Cf. 1 Timothy 6:16.

76 Psalm 17:12.

themselves. They are also the “waters” that are above the heavens, according to the interpretation of Theodorus in the *Key*,⁷⁷ where he explains what is said in Genesis 1,⁷⁸ “the Spirit of God was borne above the waters”, to mean that “he is supereminent above established causes in the excellence of knowledge”. For the God of gods himself, that is, God the Father, “spoke”, meaning he begot the Son, in whom these most divine things “were made”; he “commanded” these most divine things, the primordial causes, and all things “were created” in them, that is, through them, through the Holy Spirit, who divided and multiplied them in his effects.

Therefore, Hermes said the world is a “work” and, moreover, a work of the highest artificer, who accomplished his work, the universe of things, within which the primordial causes are supereminent. It is, I say, a work that is most perfect, most beautiful, and most orderly.

It is a “work”, which is a word derived from “labour”, because, according to Cicero in Book II of *On the Nature of the Gods*,⁷⁹ the world is “the sower, the planter, and the begetter of all things governed by nature and is, so to speak, the rearer and nourisher that gives nutriment to all things, which are like its limbs and parts, and contains them”.

It is “most perfect” because, according to Plato in the *Timaeus*,⁸⁰ “God the artificer made” the world resemble the most perfect thing, namely, “the intelligible substance, the nature that is eminent, primary, and perfect in every way”. Therefore, the world is perfect in every way, and contains all things by imitation, which the intelligible world contains through its essence.

It is “most beautiful”, since it is formed after the fairest exemplar, just as Boethius sings in Book III of *On the Consolation*, metre 9:⁸¹

From the supernal exemplar
You lead all things out, you who are most beautiful; the beautiful world
You carry in your mind, and you form it after your image and likeness.

77 Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, ed. P. Lucentini (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), c. 87, p. 62, l. 4-5.

78 Genesis 1:2.

79 Cicero, *De natura deorum*, eds O. Plasberg, W. Ax (Leipzig: Teubner, 1933), II.34.86, p. 83, l. 15-18; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).

80 Plato, *Timaeus*, ed. J.H. Waszink, *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus* (London / Leiden: The Warburg Institute / Brill, 1962), 30d-31a, p. 23, l. 16-18; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 2 (F f. 57rb-va).

81 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, metrum 9, p. 80, l. 6-8.

And likewise, according to Trismegistus, from the same text mentioned earlier,⁸² “the world is prepared by God as the dwelling place of all species”, and thus is most beautiful [*speciosissimus*].

The world is “most orderly”, for it is made in wisdom by the Beyond-wise, who reaches from the supernal to the lowest bound, and arranges all things sweetly in weight, number, and measure,⁸³ or in order, form, and mode.⁸⁴ For nothing is without order, as Trismegistus says in the same text,⁸⁵ since everything that is made is ordered and “nothing is without the composition of order”. Order, according to Augustine,⁸⁶ is “the arrangement that allots to things equal and unequal their proper place”. For “in all things”, according to Trismegistus,⁸⁷ “the world is sustained by order”. For this reason, in Book II of *On the Nature of the Gods*,⁸⁸ Cicero says that the world is that than which “nothing is better, nothing superior, nothing more beautiful”.

And so, the world is rightly called “the work of God”, who is the King of kings, the Lord of lords, the God of gods.⁸⁹ As Dionysius says in chapter 12 of *On the Divine Names*,⁹⁰ “Scripture calls by the name of kings, lords, and gods the more primary adornments in each [dominion].”

Since, therefore, the primordial causes are the most primary things above the whole universe, they are kings, lords, and gods. Above them and their kingdoms and dominions is God, the great Lord and King above all gods, above which he is exalted in the highest.⁹¹ There is nothing like his work in all the kingdoms of the gods. For although they reign and preside in their kingdoms, as Proclus says in *On the Existence of Evils*,⁹² since their kingdoms are partial universes, that is, parts of the whole universe, they fall short of its perfection. This universe is the work of the highest God, which enfolds all things and is the kingdom of all the ages, whose glory even the gods themselves will proclaim,

82 *Asclepius*, c. 3, p. 42, l. 4-5; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).

83 Wisdom of Solomon 8:1.

84 Cf. Augustine, *De natura boni*, 1.3 (PL 42, 553).

85 *Asclepius*, c. 39, p. 84, l. 8; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 37 (F f. 42vb), lib. II, c. 1 (F f. 51ra).

86 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, eds B. Dombart, A. Kalb (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), XIX.13, p. 679, l. 11-12.

87 *Asclepius*, c. 39, p. 84, l. 8-9; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 37 (F f. 42vb), lib. II, c. 1 (F f. 51ra).

88 Cicero, *De natura deorum*, II.7.18, p. 56, l. 18-20; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).

89 Cf. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 12.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 527; PG 3, 969A).

90 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 12.4 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 535; PG 3, 972B).

91 Cf. Psalm 96:9.

92 Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*, c. 2, §11, p. 190, l. 5-10.

declaring themselves to be the work of the highest God, who “established it forever and into the age of ages”.⁹³

[10] And then there follows in Trismegistus: “immutable”.

And this seems obvious with respect to the intelligible world, whether the supersubstantial or the substantial intellectual world, which is complete being, and is stable, fixed and immobile, immutable and eternal. For this reason, it is described by Pliny⁹⁴ as follows: “The world” is “without beginning and without end, ... sacred, immense, eternal, all in all, and truly is itself whole; infinite, and yet like what is finite; the most determinate of all, and yet like what is indeterminate; enfolding at once in itself all things within and without; at once the work of the nature of things and the nature of things itself.”

The sensible world, however, is becoming and is not stable or fixed, but is moving and mutable. Plato in the *Timaeus*⁹⁵ also describes it in this way: the world “is begotten and not eternal, ... the object of opinion through fragile sense, since it is indeterminate, arises and perishes, and never retains a fixed and stable position”. Thus Plato.

The world soul⁹⁶ is the nexus of these two worlds, the sensible and the intelligible. According to Plato,⁹⁷ it is a self-moving essence, and thus agrees with the higher through its essence and with the lower through its animating motion. And although the sensible world regarded in itself is becoming and mutable, yet in its totality the world, insofar as it simply enfolds the works of the beyond-blessed God altogether, is an immutable work. For every work proceeding from an immobile cause as such has an immutable essence.⁹⁸ For this reason, Pliny says that the world is eternal, and the philosopher Secundus says that it is “an eternal steadfastness”,⁹⁹ and thus is an eternal arrangement or work that remains upright, is ruled over, and is ordered, and thus is immutable.

Behold: “his work is full of the glory of the Lord”!¹⁰⁰

93 Psalm 148:6.

94 Pliny, *Naturalis historia*, ed. K. Mayhoff, 5 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1892-1909), vol. 1, II.1.1-2, p. 128, l. 12-20; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).

95 Plato, *Timaeus*, 27d-28a, p. 20, l. 16-20; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).

96 Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, 34b, p. 26, l. 17-19.

97 Cf. Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970), 1.14.19, p. 58, l. 30-31.

98 Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica, translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca*, ed. H. Boese (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), prop. 76, p. 40, l. 1-2.

99 *Vita Secundi philosophi*, ed. B.E. Perry, *Secundus the Silent Philosopher. The Greek Life of Secundus* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), 8.1, p. 78, l. 13-14 and p. 94; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212ra).

100 Ecclesiasticus 42:16.

[11] And so, fittingly, there follows in Trismegistus: “a glorious construction”, which means an edifice filled with glory.

Now, glory is defined in four ways. According to Cicero,¹⁰¹ it is the praise proclaimed from the mouth of many, or it is a proclamation widely disseminated; or, according to Augustine,¹⁰² it is “recognition with illustrious praise”; or, finally, it is “what no reasonable person would hesitate to bestow”, as Aristotle says.¹⁰³ According to Aristotle, glory makes itself manifest to everyone’s awareness by its nobility and honour. Glory belongs to God in these ways, for only he can be proclaimed by the mouth of many, because all things declare the glory of his magnificence and tell of his wonderful deeds¹⁰⁴ in the glorious construction of the world that “he made magnificently”,¹⁰⁵ which is also set forth with illustrious praise before the recognition of all, so that, in his work, its builder may be “praiseworthy and glorious unto the ages”.¹⁰⁶ He appears here, through his glorious construction, with his nobility and honour before the face of all who are aware of him, for in it he has made all things noble and honourable.

Now if, as Proclus says in his commentary on the *Parmenides*, “the world is the plenitude of every kind of species”,¹⁰⁷ and, »as Trismegistus says in the text mentioned above,¹⁰⁸ it is “the receptacle and container of everything God governs”, and according to Cicero in Book 11 of *On the Nature of the Gods*, chapter 15,¹⁰⁹ it is “the common abode and city of both gods and human beings” and, according to the philosopher Secundus,¹¹⁰ it is “the admirable furnishment” (which means the lofty and beautiful instrument and adornment) – from

101 Cicero, *De inventione*, ed. E. Stroebe (Leipzig: Teubner, 1915), 11.55.166, p. 150b, l. 18-19; Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, ed. M. Pohlenz (Leipzig: Teubner, 1919), 111.2.3, p. 317, l. 24 – p. 318, l. 1; vel potius *Glossa interlinearis*, in *Biblia Sacra cum Glossis interlineari et ordinaria* [...] (Lyons: Trechsel, 1545), Ps. 70:8, f. 184v, ex Cassiodorus, *Expositio in Psalterium*, 70:8 (PL 70, 498C).

102 Augustine, *Contra Maximinum haereticum Arianorum episcopum*, 11.13 (PL 42, 770).

103 Aristotle, *Topica, translatio Boethii*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Bruxelles / Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1969), 111.3, 118b21-22, p. 57, l. 24-25.

104 Cf. Psalm 18:2.

105 Isaiah 12:5.

106 Daniel 3:56.

107 Proclus, *Expositio in Parmenidem Platonis*, ed. C. Steel, *Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Tome I. Livres I à IV* (Leuven: Presses universitaires de Louvain, 1982), lib. 111, p. 136, l. 99 – p. 137, l. 00.

108 Cf. *Asclepius*, c. 17, p. 55, l. 13-15; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).

109 Cicero, *De natura deorum*, 11.62.154, p. 112, l. 30-31; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).

110 *Vita Secundi philosophi*, 8.1, p. 78, l. 12; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).

all of this it follows that the world must be a glorious construction, made not of timber and stones, but of all sensible and intelligible things. For this reason, it is called the common abode of gods (whether according to essence or according to participation) and of human beings, and especially of those who are wise in the wisdom that is the virtue and final possibility of every science, and which is the possession of divine individuals who know all things in the highest degree. And this is fitting, for this wisdom is attained through the causes of all things, which are known through two kinds of toil, namely, through the labours demanded even of the person who is divine, and through the labours inherent to the things themselves by virtue of their perfection beyond perfection, according to which they exceed every principle of knowing. Just so are the primordial causes, which are in the ineffable Fount of all goods, the God of gods whose majesty is ineffable and indescribable.

Now, this world is also called “an abode”. This is the orb-shaped¹¹¹ abode that the beyond-wise Wisdom, who is “an infinite sphere, whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere”,¹¹² “built for itself”,¹¹³ provoking a certain sage¹¹⁴ to cry aloud: “O Israel, how great is the abode of God, and how vast is the place of his possession; it is great and has no end; it is high and immeasurable!” O Israel, you are a man most upright and a man who sees, by virtue of your lively effort in the study of divine wisdom, how great is the abode of God.¹¹⁵

“The abode of God” is said to be the circuit of all those things in which God shows himself, either through power, through the effects of nature, grace, and glory, through his image, or through his vestige. For in all these things the elegance and glory of divine contemplation are shown. Wherefore, a certain Israelite declared:¹¹⁶ “Lord, I have loved the elegance of your abode, and the place of the habitation of your glory.”

The “elegance” of the abode is the beauty of form [*formae*], because in it there are wonderous works, works that are lofty, glorious, and concealed. For “the place of the habitation of his glory”, which is light inaccessible, is beyond

111 Cf. Hermes Latinus, *Liber de sex rerum principiis*, eds P. Lucentini, M. Delp (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), p. 153, l. 11-16; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212ra).

112 Hermes Latinus, *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum*, ed. F. Hudry (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), maxim 2, p. 7, l. 1-2.

113 Proverbs 9:1.

114 Baruch 3:24-25.

115 Jerome, *Hebraicae quaestiones in libro Geneseos*, ed. P. de Lagarde (Turnhout: Brepols, 1959), In Gen. 32:28, p. 41, l. 8-14; cf. Albert the Great, *Super Dionysii Mysticam theologiam et Epistulas*, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), c. 1, p. 453, l. 35-37.

116 Psalm 25:8.

all form [*speciem*] and elegance, for “the place of his possession” is “vast” and beyond-beautiful in a way that can scarcely be imagined. Upon it the Beyond-blessed sits as upon the throne of his kingdom, who is beyond-praiseworthy and glorious, truly great throughout the ages, of whose greatness there is no end. And so, he is endless, lofty beyond every height, and immeasurable, for the infinite sphere “built for himself an abode”¹¹⁷ shaped as an orb, both regarding things intelligible and things sensible, as is clear to us, and “has hewn seven pillars”.¹¹⁸

“He has hewn”: from the most hidden living and immutable reasons of the first and most eminent Art and of the other arts, which God the Father made in his Word (which indeed is his Art and is the first as such) – “he has hewn”, I say, he has polished and rounded out pillars that are most steady, upright, and fit for his work. “Seven pillars”: the number seven, according to Macrobius in Book I of *On the Dream of Scipio*,¹¹⁹ is by its manifold majesty understood to be fruitful in its parts as well as in the whole of its parts, for its primary fastening is constructed from one and six. Now, one, which is the monad, is not a number, but the fount and principle of numbers; the beginning and end of all refers to the highest God and to the intellect or mind born from the highest God, which, since it cannot be numbered (for it is one), nevertheless creates from itself and contains within itself the innumerable species of the classes of things.

Therefore, the highest God, though his paternal intellect, has hewn the first pillar, which he called goodness, erecting it upon its own stability,¹²⁰ at the top of which were six small capitals. These are the primordial causes, which he constituted in the first perfect number insofar as they are perfect unities; he has placed himself perfectly upon them, and thus “he made them perfect, unmixed, and complete goods”.¹²¹ And thus »the number six that, when joined with one, makes seven, is a number with various and manifold religious honours and powers«,¹²² which is related back to the primordial causes, through which and in which the beyond-wise Wisdom has hewn six other pillars for the fabrication of its outer habitation: for Wisdom dwells within the inner abode, just as it says: “I dwell in the high and lofty places and my throne is in the pillars of cloud”,¹²³ of the cloud that is most superluminous and most fecund. Of

117 Proverbs 9:1.

118 Proverbs 9:1.

119 Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, 1.6.6-8, p. 19, l. 19 – p. 20, l. 3.

120 Cf. Psalm 103:5.

121 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.20 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 246; PG 3, 717C).

122 Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, 1.6.12, p. 20, l. 21-24.

123 Ecclesiasticus 24:7.

the other six pillars it is said¹²⁴ that “the pillars of heaven tremble (not with the fear of punishment but with admiration) and are astonished at the command of him” who made them. The first of these is called infinity, which has 12 crossbeams and two bases upon which it is established, with the first pillar having only one base. The second is called being, having 18 crossbeams and three bases. The third is life, with 24 crossbeams and four bases. Fourth is intellectuality, having 30 crossbeams and five bases. The fifth is animateness, with 36 crossbeams and six bases. Sixth is naturalness, greatest in quantity but least in power; to it the crossbeams of the fifth column are connected, and it has seven bases. Behold, the dignity of the number seven! And so not without reason is seven called the attendant of the entire edifice by Macrobius.¹²⁵ This is the orb-shaped abode.

And so, it is called “the city”, that is, the city of the great King, because “God shall be known in her abodes”.¹²⁶ Oh, such “glorious things are spoken of you, city of God!”,¹²⁷ for your entire edifice rises up into a holy and wonderful temple, into which you too, O primordial causes, have been built together for a habitation of God through the Holy Spirit!¹²⁸

[12] With the structure of the abode now in place, there follow its paintings and engravings, for it is said by Trismegistus to be “a good work composed of a multiform variety of images”.

It is “good”, which is the essence of any given thing, for it proceeds from the primarily Good. The world is a whole good because it contains all; it is a formal good through the dynamic influence of superiors into the middle terms, and of the middle terms into the inferior; it is a good bounded in species and in parts because it is established in the mutual relation of superordinate and subordinate, which necessarily is bounded at the limits. Therefore, you should understand the meaning of the term “good” not adjectivally but substantively.

Concerning “the multiform variety of images”, note that Hermes specifically says “of images”, because “exemplar” properly speaking pertains to the super-substantial, “image” to the substantial, and “imitation” [*exemplum*] to both. For “likeness” is said relative to all things produced internally or externally, as well as to things belonging to the same order, as Dionysius says in chapter 9 of *On the Divine Names*.¹²⁹ Now, according to Dionysius, there are three kinds of

124 Job 24:11; *Glossa interlinearis* ad loc., in *Biblia Sacra cum Glossis interlineari et ordinaria*, f. 51r.

125 Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, 1.6.81, p. 33, l. 29-30.

126 Psalm 47:4.

127 Psalm 86:3.

128 Cf. Ephesians 2:21-22.

129 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 9.6 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 468-472; PG 3, 913C-916A).

likenesses: there is a most perfect likeness, by which something is said to be like itself or like that with which it is identical in absolute being, even though it is distinct in relative being, just as among divine things the Son is like the Father; there is a perfect likeness, by which an image is like its prototype or first exemplar; and there is an imperfect likeness, by which something is said to be like its cause because it displays some vestige of it. And so, because this primarily active Cause brings forth all things as such, all things resemble it as such, even though they are of a different and multiform likeness. For this reason, the philosopher Secundus¹³⁰ calls the world “a multiform formation”; and, accordingly, this world is said by Trismegistus to be “good, composed of a multiform variety of images”. »For “image” means, as it were, “imitage” [*imitago*].«¹³¹

To see how this is the case, one should consider corporeal things, spiritual things, and the things between them.

In corporeal things, this is the case either visibly (for example in reflected and radiant phenomena), or subsistently (as in artificial or natural things), whether you consider minerals, seeds, aquatic life, reptiles, mobile animals, birds – and this is only to mention things generable and corruptible. Indeed, among incorruptible things, “look to the heavens, whose aspect [*species*] is the glory of the stars”,¹³² and consider the celestial spheres and the multiform variety of things moving in these spheres and stars, the eccentric circles and epicycles, and especially the images in the eighth sphere (the Chaldaeans say there are 48 of these images, but according to the Indians there must be many more,¹³³ for they say that in any face among the signs of the Zodiac there are a variety of images).

Now, leaving behind such things because they are corporeal, open your spiritual eye and consider the hierarchies of angels, their orders, the things set beneath them, and their hierarchical acts. Each of these, according to Dionysius in chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names* is “an image of God, a manifestation of hidden light”.¹³⁴ This applies to either extreme, either corporeal things or spiritual things: »in bodies an image is a certain external configuration of bodily features«,¹³⁵ while in spiritual things »an image is a species belonging

130 *Vita Secundi philosophi*, 8.1, p. 78, l. 13; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1 (F f. 212ra).

131 Huguccio of Pisa, *Derivationes*, s.v. “Imitator” (I49, p. 606, §1).

132 Genesis 15:5; Ecclesiasticus 43:10.

133 Cf. Albert the Great, *De animalibus*, ed. H. Stadler, 2 vols (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1916–1920), vol. 2, lib. XX, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 1310, l. 13–14.

134 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.22 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 269; PG 3, 724B).

135 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, ed. B. Mojsisch, *Opera omnia*, vol. 1. *Schriften zur Intellekttheorie* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), 1.1.1.1 (1), p. 17, l. 61–63.

indifferently to the thing and that with which it is made coequal», according to Hilary in his book *On the Councils*.¹³⁶

Finally, as to the middle terms, that is, human beings, who are made by God »according to his image and likeness«,¹³⁷ consider the variety of bodily figures and natures of souls, in whose hidden depths according to Augustine¹³⁸ are all true reasons, and according to Boethius:¹³⁹

Within ... there clings the seed of truth,
Which is aroused by instruction fanning the ember.

Even for the Peripatetics the first principles of the sciences and other things are in the hidden depths of the soul. There is a discussion of this below.¹⁴⁰

Now, leaving behind all natural things, consider their limit and the beginning of things beyond nature: the movers of the celestial spheres, which are both united to the spheres and separate from them, according to diverse relations, insofar as they are divine and intellectual souls.¹⁴¹ Each of these possesses all the species that intellect has primarily¹⁴² and, indeed, each is all things: sensible things in the mode of an exemplar, but intelligible things in the mode of an image.¹⁴³ Above these souls are intellectual hypostases, or separate intellects, that are *per se* subsistent. Each of these is what is prior to it and what comes after it in an intellectual mode¹⁴⁴ and is the plenitude of species.¹⁴⁵ Each species is constitutive of things perpetual.¹⁴⁶ Above the intellects are lives, and above these are true beings. Infinites are above these. Above infinities there are the primordial causes of all things; these are the self-sufficient, the unparticipated, the gods. Infinitely beyond them is the Beyond-god, the Beyond-unknown of ineffable majesty.

Behold, what various multiformity and multiform variety of images you find in the world by a glorious construction, by which the whole good is constructed and adorned!

136 Hilary of Poitiers, *Liber de synodis*, §13 (PL 10, 490B).

137 Genesis 1:27.

138 Cf. Augustine, *De immortalitate animae*, IV.6 (PL 32, 1024).

139 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, metrum 11, p. 91, l. 11-12.

140 Berthold of Moosburg, *Praeambulum* A-B.

141 Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 184, p. 90, l. 1-3.

142 Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 194, p. 95, l. 1.

143 Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 195, p. 95, l. 1-2.

144 Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 173, p. 84, l. 1-2.

145 Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 177, p. 87, l. 1.

146 Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 178, p. 87, l. 1.

[13] There follows in Hermes: “a mechanism of God’s will”.

“A mechanism” in that, according to Trismegistus in the same text,¹⁴⁷ the world is “a sort of instrument or mechanism subjected to the will of the highest God”. It is called “an instrument” because, just as in a musical instrument there is a diverse multiplicity of chords and a manifold diversity of things like and unlike, which produce a sweet harmony when struck in an orderly way due to their proportion with one another, so also, according to Theodorus in the *Key*,¹⁴⁸ “the beauty of the whole universe – established from things like and unlike – is constituted like a certain wonderful harmony, which is joined together out of diverse genera and various forms, and is ordered out of the diverse orders of substances and accidents in a certain ineffable unity. For just as an instrumental melody is made up of diverse qualities and quantities of sounds through proportions of things truly differing from one another, but which through the skills of the musical art yield a natural sweetness, so too from one nature’s subdivisions, which seem dissonant among themselves when regarded on their own, the concord of the universe is brought together into unity according to the will of the creator.” Thus Theodorus. And so, according to Hermes in the *Hellera*,¹⁴⁹ “Knowing music is nothing other than understanding the order of all things together.” And below, he writes:¹⁵⁰ “By divine song, the order of singular things, brought together into a whole by skilful reason, produces a concord that is most sweet and true.” Thus Hermes. See why the world is called an instrument!

The world is fittingly called “a mechanism”, which means a well-crafted, artificial, or ingenious construction. “Well-crafted”, because it is his work, and is crafted not only out of the dawn and the sun, but out of all things.¹⁵¹ “Artificial”, because it is the artifice of the highest Art, who is the artificer of all,¹⁵² who looks out upon all,¹⁵³ and because it is most artfully brought to completion. And what is more “ingenious” than the works of the Lord, which are great and highly sought after in all his divine and good wills that constitute beings? Behold, “how great are your works, O Lord! Your thoughts are made exceedingly deep. The unwise does not know it, and the fool does not understand

147 *Asclepius*, c. 16, p. 55, l. 5-6.

148 Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, c. 131, p. 99, l. 15-25.

149 *Asclepius*, c. 13, p. 52, l. 17-18; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 6 (F f. 62rb).

150 *Asclepius*, c. 13, p. 52, l. 19 – p. 53, l. 1; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 6 (F f. 62rb).

151 Cf. Psalm 73:16.

152 Cf. Wisdom of Solomon 7:21.

153 Wisdom of Solomon 7:23.

it.”¹⁵⁴ And above:¹⁵⁵ “I will exult in the works of your hands”, because you are God, from whom all “jealousy is far removed”;¹⁵⁶ you sustain your work without jealousy.¹⁵⁷

Let this suffice, then, for the macrocosm.

[14] Now, concerning the microcosm, which is the human being, one must know what is written by Trismegistus in the text mentioned above:¹⁵⁸ »The human is the nexus of God and the world, existing beyond the world through two kinds of scientific inquiry, namely, the physical and the quadrivial [*doctrinalem*]. Both are perfected through human reason. In this way the human is properly called the governor of the world. He is, however, subjoined to God, receiving his beauties that are not immersed in the world, in extension and time, through a divine likeness, which is the light of the simple intellect, which he participates from the God of gods.«

[15] In this description, one must first understand how the human is “the nexus” of God and the world, which means “a joining”: this necessarily occurs through likeness. By virtue of this likeness, the human being may be said to be like God and the world, such that he binds or connects them together.

Here, one should note that the human being, in his composition, embraces the four primary parts of the universe, by virtue of which he is rightly called “the small world” or “the creation of the world” and “the nexus of God and the world”. These parts are body, soul, intellect and the one or unity. Concerning the last of these, since the first three are obvious, Proclus says this in question 10 of the book *On Providence*:¹⁵⁹ “For there lies in us (that is, in us human beings), a hidden vestige of the One, something that is more divine than intellect.” Dionysius agrees with him in chapter 7 of *On the Divine Names*,¹⁶⁰ calling this kind of one “the union [*unionem*] exceeding the nature of the mind (or, according to the other translation:¹⁶¹ the unity [*unitatem*] superexalted beyond the nature of the mind), through which the mind is conjoined to those things that are above it (that is, above the nature of the mind)”.

The human is “the nexus of God and the world” through these four parts. For he is assimilated to God and to things divine by the one and the intellect,

¹⁵⁴ Psalm 91:6-7.

¹⁵⁵ Psalm 91:5.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, 29e, p. 22, l. 18-19.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 8, n. 68.

¹⁵⁸ Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1960-1964), vol. 1, lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 2, l. 5-15; cf. *Asclepius*, c. 6-10, p. 44, l. 3 – p. 49, l. 17.

¹⁵⁹ Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §64, p. 106, l. 9-11.

¹⁶⁰ Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 385; PG 3, 865C).

¹⁶¹ Translatio Eriugena (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 385).

and to the world and things mundane by the soul and the body. And thus he is beautifully and perceptively called “the nexus”, “the bond” or “the continuation of God” through the one, which is like God and things divine – like God, who according to Dionysius in chapter 13 of *On the Divine Names*,¹⁶² is “One, for he is all things unitively according to the one exceeding unity” and like things divine according to essence, each of which is one or a unity, for the human is such through his highest part – and is like the intelligible world through the intellect, which is like things intelligible, whether they be such according to cause or according to essence.

Furthermore, he is the nexus of God, of things divine, and of things intelligible on the one side, through the one and the intellect, and of animate and of bodily things on the other side, through the soul and the body.

[16] And then it follows in Trismegistus: “existing beyond the world through two kinds of scientific inquiry, namely, the physical and the quadrivial”.

Here, one should note that »physical scientific inquiry perfects the human intellect chiefly insofar as it is related to time, while quadrivial scientific inquiry perfects it insofar as the intellect is inclined toward extension; for the speculative intellect must be perfected according to every kind of speculative form, according to which the true is examined«. ¹⁶³

»Now, things studied in physics are conceived with matter, which is subjected either to motion, to alteration, or both; therefore, the inquirer conceives them with time, according to which they exist in the temporal thing. As a result, whatever is known about them is mixed with a great deal of opinion and lacks the stability and necessity of a scientific habit.«¹⁶⁴ »For an unstable habit necessarily corresponds to an unstable object, as Plato says in the *Phaedo*.¹⁶⁵ Now, forms existing in matter are always unstable – for they exist, as it were, in a narrow strait [*in euripo*], that is, they are seething [*in ebullitione*] (for a narrow strait is the seething of the sea as it churns to and fro), and so nothing certain, nothing stable can be conceived relative to them. For this reason, there can only be opinion about them and nothing can be known about them, as Heraclitus said.«¹⁶⁶

162 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 13.2 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 540; PG 3, 977C).

163 Cf. Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 1, l. 13-18.

164 Cf. Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 1, l. 18-26.

165 Cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, translatio Henrici Aristippi, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (London: The Warburg Institute, 1950), 90c, p. 50, l. 16-17.

166 Cf. Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. 32 (Paris: Vivès, 1895), pars 11, tr. 1, q. 4, m. 1, a. 2, p. 74a.

»However, quadrivial sciences, through rational inquiry, receive the medium of their demonstration according to the defining aspect of the form. Although the form exists only in physical things and not outside physical things, nevertheless, its defining aspect is not conceived with physical matter; it does not depend in its essential principles on physical matter but receives the principles of its essence apart from physical matter. And so, in all the variety of physical things, those that are investigated relative to the form remain certain and stable. Examples of these are the even, the odd, and every proportion of number in arithmetic, the circle and the square in geometry, the fifth and the fourth in harmonics, conjunction in a point and every interrelation of the stars in astronomy, and other things of this sort. And just as these are stable and free from motion and alteration, so they produce stable habits that possess necessary knowledge and not opinion. Therefore, they are called quadrivial or instructional sciences, which do not depend on experience but rather on the understanding of terms. It is otherwise in physics, where experience counts for more than learning by demonstration.«¹⁶⁷

From the foregoing it is sufficiently clear how physics and the quadrivial sciences are perfected by the power of human reason.

It is also clear now that, through these, and especially through astronomy and astrology, the human being is properly called “the governor” of the sensible world.¹⁶⁸ Among all who philosophise, to the astrologers alone it is granted by divine obligation to be inquirers of the celestial decrees from the consideration of causes that are primary, natural, *per se*, essential, and sempiternal, and to be aware of things to come. For these thinkers never depart from the principles of nature and natural science, just as Haly in his *Commentary on the Quadripartitus*¹⁶⁹ commends us to follow the procedure of Ptolemy and, moreover, because, according to Al-Farabi in *On the Origin of the Sciences*,¹⁷⁰ the wise man is the measure of all things, dwelling among the elements and parts of the world, gaining the highest delights. And thus, according to Proclus in question 10 of *On Providence*,¹⁷¹ he rules the world with the gods.

167 Cf. Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 1, l. 28–56.

168 Cf. Albert the Great, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. 9 (Paris: Vivès, 1890), lib. 11, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 517a–b.

169 Cf. Haly, *Commentum in Quadripartitum Ptolemaei*, in Ptolemy, *Quadripartitum, Centiloquium* [...] *cum Commento Haly Heben Rodan* (Venezia: Locatellus, 1493), f. 2vb.

170 Cf. Al-Farabi, *De ortu scientiarum*, ed. C. Baeumker, *Über den Ursprung der Wissenschaften (De ortu scientiarum). Eine mittelalterlichen Einleitungsschrift in die philosophischen Wissenschaften* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1916), c. 1, §2, p. 18, l. 20–26; c. 2, p. 22, l. 27–30.

171 Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*, c. 7, §23, p. 201, l. 7 – p. 202, l. 9.

»These two kinds of scientific inquiry form the steps and conveyances to divinising wisdom, which belongs to the human, not as human, but as divine.«¹⁷²

For, according to Proclus in the text mentioned above,¹⁷³ the human is divine through the one that is more divine than intellect: “the soul, attaining this and settling itself within it, is divine and lives by divine life, to the extent permitted to it”. Thus Proclus.

Dionysius agrees with him, in the text mentioned above. After Dionysius spoke¹⁷⁴ about the union or unity superexalted above the nature of the mind (or the intellect), “through which the mind is conjoined to those things that are above it”, he immediately adds:¹⁷⁵ “Therefore, it is necessary to think divine things according to this (that is, the union or unity), not according to ourselves, but our whole selves placed outside our whole selves and deified whole”. Thus Dionysius.

Note that he says, “not according to us”, and so on (that is, insofar as we are human). For “it is impossible for the thearchic ray to illumine us from above unless it envelops itself, in order to elevate us, with various sacred veils that are according to us, and that are arranged naturally and in a familiar way by the paternal providence”, as Dionysius says in chapter 1 of the *Angelic Hierarchy*.¹⁷⁶

»John the Scot and John the Saracen, discussing this passage in their *Comments*, state that the created intellect cannot approach God through knowledge except in reflections and theophanies. Reflections are the lights scattered in creatures, calling out like a vestige, an image, or a sign; theophanies are intellectual lights descending through God’s influence into angels and men, revealing the unbounded light that is God, as much as possible.«¹⁷⁷ For, according to Dionysius in chapter 1 of the *Mystical Theology*,¹⁷⁸ “God only appears unveiled and in truth” to those who transcend all things and enter the darkness. This “divine darkness”, as Dionysius says in the *Letter to Dorotheus*,¹⁷⁹ “is the inaccessible light, wherein God is said to dwell”.

[17] “The human is subjoined to God”, which follows in the description from Hermes. This means “he is conjoined”, “he is bound”.

172 Cf. Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 1, l. 57–58 and p. 2, l. 2–4.

173 Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §64, p. 106, l. 11–12.

174 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 385; PG 3, 865C); Berthold of Moosburg, *Prolog.* 15, n. 160.

175 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 385–386; PG 3, 865D–868A).

176 Dionysius, *De caelesti hierarchia*, 1.2 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 2, p. 733; PG 3, 121B–C).

177 Cf. Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, pars 1, tr. 3, q. 13, c. 1, p. 40, l. 3–11.

178 Cf. Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, 1.3 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 573; PG 3, 1000C).

179 Dionysius, *Epistulae*, v (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 620; PG 3, 1073A).

According to Dionysius at the beginning of the *Mystical Theology*,¹⁸⁰ this occurs by a strong contrition, through the abandonment of the senses and intelligible operations, of all sensible and intelligible things, and of all beings and non-beings, so that a person, insofar as he is divine, might rise unknowingly, insofar as it is possible, “to union with him, who is beyond all substance and knowing”. And Dionysius adds¹⁸¹ that it is necessary to go beyond oneself and all things. Now, this abandonment and excess of all things and union with God is accomplished by the peace of God that passes all intellect¹⁸² – the intellect, I say, which, according to Plato,¹⁸³ “belongs to God and to a few chosen ones”. On account of this peace, as Dionysius says in chapter 11 of *On the Divine Names*,¹⁸⁴ “souls unite their profuse reasonings, and directing themselves toward the one purity that gathers the intellectual power together, they arrive, according to their character and by their own path and order, through the immaterial and simple intellect, to that union which surpasses intellect”. Thus Dionysius.

Behold, what Dionysius called “the mind” earlier in chapter 7,¹⁸⁵ here he calls “the intellect”, above which is the union, one, or unity, »by which, as by his summit that God planted in human nature,«¹⁸⁶ the human is conjoined or subjoined to God, and through which he enters the divine darkness! “Into this”, as Dionysius says to Dorotheus,¹⁸⁷ “enters everyone, who is held worthy to know and see God by not seeing and not knowing him, because he is beyond everything sensible and intelligible.” Take note of the entire *Letter*.

Proclus agrees with the foregoing in his book *On Fate and Providence*,¹⁸⁸ where, having enumerated three modes of cognition (the opinionative, the quadrivial, and the scientific), speaking about the fourth kind of cognition, the intellective, he describes its difference from the third mode in this way:¹⁸⁹ “For scientific knowledge indeed seems to belong to the soul, insofar as the soul is cognition; whereas intellect belongs to it insofar as the soul is an image of what is truly intellect.” And below:¹⁹⁰ “Imitating this intellect as much as it can,

180 Cf. Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, 1.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 567–568; PG 3, 997B).

181 Cf. Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, 1.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 568; PG 3, 997B–1000A).

182 Cf. Philippians 4:7.

183 Plato, *Timaeus*, 51e, p. 50, l. 9–10.

184 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 11.2 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 503–504; PG 3, 949D).

185 Cf. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 385; PG 3, 865C); Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 15, n. 160 and 16, n. 174.

186 Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, prooem. (4), p. 14, l. 34–35.

187 Dionysius, *Epistulae*, v (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 620–621; PG 3, 1073A).

188 Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, ed. H. Boese, c. 8, §27–29, p. 136, l. 1 – p. 138, l. 15.

189 Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §30, p. 139, l. 11–14.

190 Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §30, p. 139, l. 18–20.

the soul itself also becomes intellect, running beyond scientific knowledge.” And below:¹⁹¹ “After all these cognitions, I want you to receive the fifth mode of knowing, even though you believed Aristotle, who only leads up as far as intellectual activity and insinuates nothing beyond it. But now I want you to follow Plato and the theologians before Plato, who are wont to praise for us a cognition beyond intellect, and who divulge it as a truly divine frenzy, for they say this arouses the one of the soul, no longer an intellectual faculty, and connects it to the One. For all things are known by like: the sensible by sense, scientific objects by science, the intelligibles by intellect, and the One by the unificial. Indeed, when thinking, the soul knows itself and whatever it thinks through contact, as we have said; likewise, when thinking, the soul is ignorant of itself and other things, and because of that, casting forth its one, it loves to be at peace, enclosing itself from cognitions, having been made silent. For how else could it cast itself toward the most ineffable of all without putting to sleep the chatter within? Therefore, let it become one so that it may see the One; or rather, so that it may not see it. For by seeing it will see something intellectual and not what is beyond intellect; it will think a certain one, but not the One itself. My friend, when someone realises this most truly divine operation of the soul, entrusting oneself to it alone, to the flower of the intellect, and quieting oneself not only from external motions, but also from internal motions, having become god, as far as this is possible for the soul, one will only know in the way the gods know all things, in an ineffable manner, each according to the one that is properly theirs. But as long as we are occupied with what is below, we are incredulous about all these things, which are grasped by the divine knower indivisibly and in a manner beyond eternity.” Thus Proclus.

Dionysius is of the same mind in chapters 1 and 2 of *The Mystical Theology*,¹⁹² which will become clear to an extent in what follows.

[18] In this way, therefore, the human is truly subjoined to God, to the ineffable One, through his one, that is, through the divine likeness – for, by his one, which is the image of God, by which man is capable of God himself [*capax ipsius Dei*] and connected to God, man has the likeness of God, or rather is the likeness of God and a god by participation – “receiving”, according to Trismegistus,¹⁹³ “beauties that are not immersed in the world, in extension and time”.

Here, one should know that »God made the human according to his image and likeness«. ¹⁹⁴ And notably it says “his”, for, according to Dionysius in

191 Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §31–32, p. 139, l. 24 – p. 140, l. 8.

192 Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 19, n. 224 and 20, n. 236.

193 Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 14, n. 158.

194 Cf. Genesis 1:27.

chapter 9 of *On the Divine Names*,¹⁹⁵ “the theologians say that nothing is like God in himself, who exists above all; yet God gives the divine likeness to those who convert to him – who exists beyond all definition and reason – according to the power for imitation. And it is the power of divine likeness that converts all things to the cause.” Thus Dionysius. »Now, every conversion occurs through the likeness of those that convert to that, toward which they are converted.«¹⁹⁶ Therefore, the human is converted to God in this way, to whom he is subjoined, and receives beauties not immersed in the world, that is, in extension and time.

Consider what we have from Dionysius in chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names*:¹⁹⁷ “the Beautiful is identical to the Good, because all things altogether desire the Beautiful and the Good, according to every cause, and there is no being that does not participate the Good and the Beautiful”. And slightly earlier, speaking about the primarily Good, he says this:¹⁹⁸ “This Good is praised by the holy theologians as the Beautiful, as Beauty, as Love and the Beloved, and whatever other gifts of beauty befit that beautifying graciousness. Now, the Beautiful and Beauty should not be divided in the cause that comprehends the whole in one. For indeed, it is by dividing this [unity] into participations and participants, as it is found in beings, that we call that which participates beauty ‘beautiful’, while by ‘beauty’ we mean the participation of the Beautifying cause of all that is beautiful. For the supersubstantial Beautiful is called Beauty because of the beauty communicated from it to all beings, according to the degree of beauty of each; and also because it is the cause of the lucidity and consonance of universes. For, in the manner of light, it sends out with a flash the communications of its fontal ray that beautify the universes; and also because it calls everything to itself, for it gathers all in all into the same. For this reason, it is named ‘Beautiful’. It is called ‘Beautiful’ as being both most beautiful and beyond-beautiful, and is always beautiful according to the same aspect and the same manner.” And below:¹⁹⁹ “And thus it precontains exceedingly in itself the fontal beauty of every beauty. For, indeed, by the substantial and simple nature (in other words:²⁰⁰ ‘in the simple and supersubstantial [nature]’) of all beautiful things, every beauty and every beautiful thing preexists uniformly according to cause. And from this Beautiful there comes to all beings their

195 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 9.6 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 467–468; PG 3, 913C).

196 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 32, p. 21, l. 1–2.

197 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.7 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 185; PG 3, 704B).

198 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.7 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 178–181; PG 3, 701C–D).

199 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.7 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 182–184; PG 3, 704A).

200 Cf. Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1972), c. 4. §84, p. 190, l. 44–45.

beauty according to their proper measure; on account of the Beautiful there arise the concords, friendships, and communions of all things; and all things are united by the Beautiful.” And below, in chapter 11,²⁰¹ after Dionysius shows that “*per se* being”, “*per se* life”, and “*per se* deity” are taken in two ways, both divinely and causally, and, after explaining this distinction, he adds: “And what needs to be said about these?”, and so on, as was noted above concerning the invisible things of God.²⁰²

[19] From the foregoing it can be gathered that, just as (according to the author in question 10 of *On Providence*²⁰³) “‘one’ and ‘good’ exist in three ways”, so also “beautiful” is said in three ways.

»“Beautiful” is said either according to cause, meaning the First, for he is Beautiful²⁰⁴ because of the beauty communicated from him according to the degree of each. For he is the cause of the agreement and lucidity of universes, calling everything to himself, and gathering all in all into the same. And this is the fontal Beauty that precontains exceedingly in itself every beauty, as was said.²⁰⁵ It is also the primarily Beautiful, the beyond-blessed Trinity, such that what is said here may be understood with reference to it:²⁰⁶ “The eye will marvel at the beauty of the radiance thereof, and the heart trembles at its pouring-down.” Behold, the radiance of everlasting light²⁰⁷ and the splendour of the paternal glory, and the figure of his substance,²⁰⁸ that is, the substantial mark and image of his goodness! “At the beauty”, I say, that is beyond the most beautiful; and “of the radiance” of the Son; and “the eye of the beholder will marvel” at the paternal light; and “the heart trembles” at the pouring-down of the Holy Spirit upon the glorious souls devoted to the study of the power of beauty. In just this way the noble Apuleius the African introduces Plato in the book *On the God of Socrates*:²⁰⁹ “Plato, who was endowed with celestial eloquence, said that on account of the incredible and ineffable transcendence of his majesty, he (namely, the God of gods) cannot be comprehended even in the slightest degree, and stated that the understanding of this God can scarcely be had even

201 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 11.6 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 524–526; PG 3, 953D–956A).

202 Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 4, n. 53.

203 Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 7.

204 Cf. Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 7–8.

205 Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 18, n. 199.

206 Ecclesiasticus 43:20.

207 Cf. Wisdom 7:26.

208 Cf. Hebrews 1:3.

209 Apuleius, *De deo Socratis*, ed. C. Moreschini, *Apulei opera quae supersunt. Vol. III. De philosophia libri* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1991), 3.124, p. 11, l. 4–10; apud Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, pars 1, tr. 3, q. 13, c. 1, p. 41, l. 14–20.

by the wise, when they have separated themselves from the body as much as possible.” Thus Apuleius.

»“Beautiful” is also said according to existence, meaning any single god that exists as one, good, and beautiful.²¹⁰ and as *per se* beauty, as the *per se* beautifying effusion, and as total beauty. The beyond-beautiful and fontal Beauty is perfectly innate within them, so that he might make them perfect, unmixed, and complete beauties,²¹¹ and thus participants in beauty in the highest degree. For this reason, they are *per se* beautiful, *per se* beauties and are called the primordial causes of every beauty found among beings, such that it can be said of them:²¹² “Praise and beauty are before him; sanctity, holiness, and magnificence are in his sanctuary.” And again:²¹³ “O Lord my God, you are exceedingly magnificent; you have put on praise and elegance and are clothed with light as with a garment.” In the translation of Jerome:²¹⁴ “Glory and elegance in bestowing honour are before his face; strength and exultation are in his sanctuary.” And again:²¹⁵ “O Lord my God, you are magnificent in the highest; you have put on glory and elegance, you are clothed with the light that you have made.” Behold, how the beauty of the primordial causes is most glorious and fairest, and how exceedingly great is their elegance, their glory, and form, so also that God himself, clothed with them, is magnified in the highest!

»“Beautiful” is also said according to participation, for instance, relative to the beautiful that is found in substances according to every variety of their beauty, either total beauty or particular beauty, and, among the latter, whether they be totally beautiful or beautiful in part.²¹⁶ The following verse can be interpreted relative to the participants in beauty:²¹⁷ “The Lord bless you, the beauty of justice.” “Of justice”, I say, that is divine and “distributes to all, according to worthiness, commensuration, beauty, good ordering, and adornment, and administers all distributions and orders to each according to what is truly the most just limit, and is the cause of the cooperation proper to all things. For divine justice orders and limits all things, and preserves all things without admixture or confusion, and bestows to all things what agrees with each, according to their worthiness.” Dionysius says this in chapter 8 of *On the Divine*

210 Cf. Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 9-10.

211 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Prolog.* 11, n. 121.

212 Psalm 95:6.

213 Psalm 103:1-2.

214 Psalm 96:6, translatio Hieronymi (PL 28, 1203C).

215 Psalm 104:1-2, translatio Hieronymi (PL 28, 1208B).

216 Cf. Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 10 – p. 104, l. 11.

217 Jeremiah 31:23.

Names.²¹⁸ And again it is written:²¹⁹ “The beauty of the field (that is, of the world) is with me” through the immutable reasons, the archetypal exemplars of things, the beauties not immersed in the world, but separated and elevated beyond union with bodily forms. And, notably, Trismegistus says “beauties” because, according to Plato,²²⁰ the artificer cannot make things diverse in form to have one countenance; indeed, Plato says, “it cannot happen that there would exist one face that would contain all the forms and countenances of all things and would display the various appearances of bodies found everywhere”.

For these beauties are “not immersed” but are separate according to the various degrees of separation of the beauties themselves. After the primarily Beautiful – which is most absolute, most unlimited, and is simply exalted above all things – the *per se* beauties hold the highest degree of separation, since they are most immediate and most akin to the primarily Beautiful. Next, the other beauties of the orders of *per se* beauties assume the degrees of separation proportionate to themselves, until we reach total and partial souls, which are intermediate between the beauties not immersed in the world and those that are immersed “in the world, in extension and time”.

The human, who is subjoined to God, “receives” these beauties “through the divine likeness” or image, that is, through the mind or the simple and immaterial intellect, which is the image of the primarily Intellect (with regard to the intelligible beauties that it resembles), and through the one or unity lifted high above the nature of the mind or simple intellect.²²¹ This one or unity, because of its supereminence in the entire domain of the soul, is called “light” or “the simple light of the intellect”, by which the soul resembles the primarily One and the primordial unities (with regard to their beauties and, above all, the beauty of the primarily One). For, by his one, the human enters into the supersubstantial world, the beyond-luminous divine darkness that, as was said already,²²² is inaccessible, “in which God is said to dwell, and indeed is called ‘invisible’ because of its excessive lucidity, and ‘inaccessible’ because of the excess of the effusion of supersubstantial light”.²²³

This beyond-blessed world is the beyond-unknown, the beyond-resplendent, and the highest summit, “where the simple, absolute, and unchanging theological mysteries”, as Dionysius says in the prayer on the *Mystical Theology*,²²⁴ “lie

218 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 8.7 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 434–435; PG 3, 893D–896A).

219 Psalm 49:11.

220 Plato, *Timaeus*, 50d, p. 48, l. 17–19.

221 Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 17, n. 185.

222 Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 16, n. 179.

223 Dionysius, *Epistulae*, v (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 620; PG 3, 1073A).

224 Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, 1.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 566–567; PG 3, 997A–B).

hidden away in the super-resplendent darkness of the silence teaching hiddenly, the darkness that causes to shine forth what is beyond-lucid in what is most obscure, and that fills to excess, with beyond-beautiful lucidities, minds that are dispossessed of eyes, in what is altogether impalpable and invisible." Thus Dionysius.

The mental eye is the simple intellect, and the one that is lifted high above the nature of the mind is more divine and more luciform than it. "For God is light."²²⁵ Alan alludes to this in Proposition 6 of *On Intelligences*,²²⁶ saying: "The first of substances is light" and, consequently, "to the extent that anything possesses light, it holds fast to divine being; any substance that is more luminous than another is said to be nobler than it", according to Proposition 7 in the same text.²²⁷

Therefore, since the one, which we are discussing here, is more luciform than the simple intellect (which itself is light, as Aristotle says),²²⁸ the one is nobler than it. It is thus the noblest thing that the human participates from the God of gods – not through an echo or a passing image, like a mirror participates the image of the face over against it, but rather through an impression, as a seal is imprinted in wax. And so, it is written in the Psalm:²²⁹ "the light of your countenance, O Lord, is sealed upon us". The *Gloss*:²³⁰ "meaning, your face is luminous and illumines us, namely, the image, by which you are known", now in a glass darkly but, in the time to come, as you are, face to face.²³¹ For this one of ours is the face or countenance, the hidden depth of the mind,²³² the higher reason, which inheres only in those divine things that are the object of contemplation.²³³ By this we are like God, and in it this light or this seal is impressed. "Therefore, the countenance of God is taken to be our reason, for just as someone is known by their countenance, so God is known through the mirror of reason; and just as one person's countenance is likened to another by conformity, so through reason we are like

²²⁵ 1 John 1:5.

²²⁶ Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, *Liber de intelligentiis*, ed. C. Baeumker, *Witelo. Ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrhunderts* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1908), prop. 6, p. 8, l. 6.

²²⁷ Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, *Liber de intelligentiis*, prop. 7, p. 9, l. 19–22.

²²⁸ Aristotle, *De anima*, III.5, 430a14–15.

²²⁹ Psalm 47.

²³⁰ *Glossa ordinaria* (Ps. 47) *marg.*, [facsim., v. 2, p. 460b], eds M. Morard, *et al.*, *Glossae Sacrae Scripturae electronicae* (Paris: CNRS-IRHT, 2017), accessed 29 June 2020 [<http://gloss-e.irht.cnrs.fr>].

²³¹ Cf. 1 Corinthians 13:12.

²³² Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XIV.7.9, p. 433, l. 19.

²³³ Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XII.7.12, p. 367, l. 104–106.

God, according to what is said:²³⁴ »God made the human to his image and likeness«.»²³⁵

So much, then, concerning the microcosm. Let this suffice for the second part.

[20] As for the third part, that is, how the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, ARE BEHELD, BEING UNDERSTOOD THROUGH THE THINGS THAT ARE MADE, one should know that on this matter different sages among the theologians and the philosophers advanced along different paths.

For Dionysius in chapter 1 of the *Mystical Theology*²³⁶ teaches Timothy the path that was mentioned above,²³⁷ and is as follows: the passage through the activity of the senses and things intellectual, the abandonment of all things sensible, intelligible, of beings and non-beings, and, as far as possible, the ascent in ignorance to union with him, who is beyond every substance and cognition. There is also [the path] through the exceeding of oneself, through separation from all things, and an upward action.²³⁸ Here Dionysius gives the example of Moses.²³⁹ Then, when the soul becomes deiform and has arrived at the apex of contemplation, it contemplates the place where God is, “and then it takes leave of these sights and seers, and enters the darkness of ignorance.”²⁴⁰ Enough has been said already about this darkness.²⁴¹

Now Plato, as Augustine recounts in Book VIII of *On the City of God*,²⁴² “is praised for having perfected philosophy by joining both philosophies (that is, the Socratic and the Pythagorean) into one, which he then arranged into three parts: the moral, which above all concerns action; the natural, which is considered by contemplation; and the rational, by which the true is separated from the false”. Plato and his followers arrived at the knowledge of the invisible things of God through these parts, as through three paths, so that they could understand where the cause of all natural things is to be found, the light of all reasons, and the end of all actions. And thus, they discerned “that in God must be found the cause of subsisting, the reason of thinking, the order of living”. The first of these pertains to the natural part, the second to the rational part, and the third to the moral part. Following these paths, they reached “that which

234 Cf. Genesis 1:27.

235 Peter Lombard, *Commentaria in Psalmos* 4:7 (PL 191, 88A).

236 Cf. Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, 1.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 567–568; PG 3, 997B).

237 Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 17, n. 180.

238 Cf. Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, 1.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 568–569; PG 3, 997B–1000A).

239 Cf. Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, 1.3 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 574–575; PG 3, 1000C–1001A).

240 Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, 1.3 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 577; PG 3, 1001A).

241 Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 16, n. 179, and 19, n. 222.

242 Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.5, p. 220, l. 24 – p. 221, l. 62.

surpasses everything, namely the one, true, and best God, without whom no nature subsists, no doctrine instructs, no exercise liberates. And so, may he be sought, in whom for us all things are serene; may he be discerned, in whom for us all things are certain; may he be loved, in whom for us all things are right.” And then Augustine shows²⁴³ that Plato advanced along the first path to the Principle of all things, which is not made and from whom everything exists. In this way, what is known of God, God showed to them, for the invisible things of God, and so on.²⁴⁴ Augustine says²⁴⁵ that the Platonists had also understood God through the second path: “For they distinguished those things that are beheld by the mind from those that are reached by the senses, not depriving the senses of anything of which they are capable, nor attributing to them anything that is beyond their capacity. But they said that the light of minds, which can come to know all things, is the same as God himself, by whom all things are made.” Finally, Augustine says that the Platonists understood God through the moral part of philosophy:²⁴⁶ “in this part the question of the highest Good is discussed, to which all our actions are directed; by seeking it, not for the sake of something else but for the sake of itself, and by reaching it, we would be blessed, and there would be nothing further we would require. Therefore, God is the end, because we will everything else on account of him, but himself only for his own sake.” This is from Augustine’s teaching in *On the City of God*.

In question 73 of the book 83 *Questions*,²⁴⁷ the title of which is “On the Ideas”, Augustine also says this: “But every soul except for the rational soul is denied the power to contemplate these (that is, the ideas). The rational soul does this by that part in it which surpasses the rest, namely, by the mind or reason, as if by a kind of face or by its inward and intelligible eye. And, indeed, not the whole soul and not just any soul is said to be prepared for this vision, but rather the soul that is holy and pure, which has that very eye, by which the ideas are beheld, in a state that is healthy, limpid, serene, and like those things that it intends to see.” And below, in the same chapter:²⁴⁸ “Plato called these primary reasons of things the ideas, which are not only ideas, but are themselves true, because they are eternal and remain immutable and self-identical. Whatsoever exists, in whatever way it exists, comes into being by participation in these. But the rational soul, among those things which are established by

243 Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.6, p. 223, l. 45 – p. 224, l. 53.

244 Cf. Romans 1:19–20.

245 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.7, p. 224, l. 16–20.

246 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.8, p. 224, l. 2–6.

247 Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 46, p. 71, l. 33 – p. 72, l. 40.

248 Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 46, p. 73, l. 60–73.

God, transcends all things and is near to God when it is pure. And to the extent that it adheres to God in charity, to that degree the soul is in some way flooded with that intelligible light from him. Having thus been illumined, the soul discerns these reasons, not through bodily eyes, but through that primary part of itself that excels the rest, namely through its intelligence. By the vision of these reasons the soul becomes most blessed. These reasons, as was said, may be called ideas, forms, species, reasons; and while it is granted to many to call them what they wish, it is granted to few to see them in truth.” Thus Augustine.

Belonging to that smaller company was the one who said:²⁴⁹ “Like as the hart desires the water-brooks, so longs my soul after you, O God. My soul is athirst for God, the living fount; when shall I arrive and when shall I appear before the face of God? My tears have been to me etc., ... while they daily say to me, ‘Where is now your God?’ These things I ponder upon” (in other words:²⁵⁰ “I meditate upon”), as we read in the *Gloss*,²⁵¹ “through all visible things. ‘Where is my God?’, means that I have, so to speak, surveyed the visible things of the world through the windows of the senses, so that through them I might know the invisible creator – and know him not only through these visible things, but even through my soul itself. For having abandoned these exterior instruments belonging to the bodily senses, my mind returns to itself and begins to contemplate itself, so that it might see him in itself” (thus the *Gloss*) in imagination according to imagination, and in imagination according to reason,²⁵² (resuming with the *Gloss*:) “so that it might recognise him within itself (in reason according to imagination and in reason according to reason), so that it can understand whether any of this could belong to God himself. And this is what is meant by ‘I pour out’: that is, ‘I have dilated my soul within me’. But because my mind finds God neither in exterior things nor within the soul, I shall pass over, that is, ‘I shall go beyond myself’, to things intellectual, as it were, in this sense: ‘I have dilated my soul to know those things that are above it’ (so that it might seek God in intelligence according to reason). For if the soul remains in itself, and does not go beyond itself, it will not see God, who is beyond. But why have I done this? Because in this way (that is, through intelligence, that eye, which according to Boethius,²⁵³ is higher than imagination and reason – ‘for surpassing the boundary of the universe it views that simple Form by the

249 Psalm 41:2-5.

250 Peter Lombard, *Commentaria in Psalmos* 41:4 (PL 191, 417B).

251 Peter Lombard, *Commentaria in Psalmos* 41:4-5 (PL 191, 417B-418A).

252 Cf. Richard of St. Victor, *De contemplatione (Beniamin maior)*, ed. J. Grosfillier (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), lib. 1, c. 6, p. 102, l. 5 – p. 104, l. 10 (PL 196, 70B-C).

253 Cf. Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. v, prosa 4, p. 149, l. 86-88.

pure apex of the mind' – in this way, I think,) I shall pass over or I shall enter (by the one of the soul) into the place of the wonderful tabernacle (that is, into light inaccessible, which is the primordial causes), even into the abode of God: 'with the voice of praise and of thanksgiving is the sound of one who feasts'. I know not what hymns or songs, sweet to one's heart, are resounding in that eternal festival. Here, one is taken up like a hart to the water-brooks and is soothed with the voice of exultation and eternal praise; here, there resounds to the mind the wondrous sweetness of the shouts of those who feast, of the banqueters calling out."

[21] Perhaps from all of this it is now clear with what great difficulty even the soul that has been made deiform ascends in this life to glimpse the Fount of paternal light, whose splendour of glory is the Word,²⁵⁴ "the true light, which illumines everyone coming into this world"²⁵⁵ (that is, into intellectual purity itself), and how far from this is »the mind of one who is distracted by cares, clouded by images, not to mention entangled by bodily lusts«. ²⁵⁶

Therefore, with Plato and Boethius, I deem it good that the lowly contemplator should resolutely implore the most divine light with supplicant prayers, saying: O most blessed, most excellent, most revered, most honourable, most complete, most omnipotent, most free, most sovereign, most virtuous, most simple Light; remove from those who seek you the innate restriction of nature, the crooked habitual ways, the indolent discipline, the ignorance of the measure of intellectual capacity, the aversion to the light of intelligible lucidity, the dread of such subtlety, the degree of remoteness, the presumption of familiar intelligibility, the search for too much provability and demonstrability!

And grant, Father, that our minds may climb to your august throne,
Grant the sight of the Fount of good, and grant light
To fix upon you the mind's unblinded eye!
Disperse the clouds and weight of this earthly concretion;
Shine in the splendour that is yours! For you are serenity,
You are untroubled rest for worshippers, to see you is the end,
You, the principle, conveyance, guide, path, and boundary – the same.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ Cf. Hebrews 1:3.

²⁵⁵ John 1:9.

²⁵⁶ Cf. Bonaventure, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, eds PP Collegii S. Bonaventurae, *Opera omnia*, vol. 5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1896) c. 4, §1, p. 306a.

²⁵⁷ Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, metrum 9, p. 80, l. 22-28.

Exposition of the Title

An exposition of the title prefixed to the *Theological Elementation*:
HERE BEGINS THE *THEOLOGICAL ELEMENTATION* OF PROCLUS,
SON OF DIADOCHUS, SON OF LICIUS, THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHER

This is the title prefixed to the present book. In it the four causes of the work, which are customarily sought out at the beginnings of books, are stated plainly. First there is the primary efficient cause, since it says: OF PROCLUS; the subjective material cause is touched upon in the phrase *THEOLOGICAL ELEMENTATION*, which also expresses the directive formal cause and the perfective final cause.

[A] Now, the philosopher Proclus was the author of this book. He was one of the greatest disciples of Plato, and so by prophetic insight he was named “Proclus”, which means, as it were, “being esteemed from far and near” [*procul cluens vel prope*] or “being esteemed before” [*ante cluens*]; and “being esteemed” means “exceeding” or “surpassing”. For, according to Papias,¹ “I am esteemed” is the same as “I exceed” or “I surpass”.

For Proclus exceeded by far [*procul excellabat*] all the followers of Plato and thus surpassed them all in ability [*praepollebat*], such that there emanated forth from him most of all, as it once had from Plotinus, “the very voice of Plato”, which, as Augustine attests in Book III of *Against the Academicians*,² “is the purest and most lucid in all of philosophy after the clouds of error have been cleared away” and all the coverings [*integumentis*], with which the first Platonists, and especially the Academicians, had concealed Plato’s wisdom. For it was customary among them, as Cicero says and Augustine recounts in the same work,³ “to conceal his doctrine and not reveal it to anyone, except to those who had lived with them up to old age”. And thus Proclus, like Plotinus, as is recounted in the same text,⁴ “was deemed to be so similar” to Plato “that

1 Cf. Papias, *Elementarium*, s.v. “Cluere”, f. 34v.

2 Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, ed. W. Green (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970), III.18.41, p. 59, l. 41 – p. 60, l. 43.

3 Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, III.20.43, p. 60, l. 5-7.

4 Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, III.18.41, p. 60, l. 43-46.

one would have supposed that they lived at the same time; but since so many centuries had elapsed, one had to suppose that Plato was reborn in him".

Now, the excellence and surpassing ability of Proclus in comparison to the other Platonists is abundantly clear from the fact that, in the present book, he gave order to the theorems of Plato himself and explained what he had thus ordered in a most subtle way. Concerning these theorems, Eustratius says this in his commentary on Book I of the *Ethics*, chapter 4:⁵ "Plato passed on theorems concerning the first Good that are above contempt; indeed, they are magnificent conveyers of the soul into what is absolutely highest."

The excellence of Proclus also appears in the fact that, by ascending through the three motions that the divine Dionysius ascribes to angels and souls in chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names*, section K⁶ (which concerns the circular, direct, and oblique motions), he arrived at the knowledge of the highest Good, insofar as this is attainable to mortal humans under the guidance of the natural light of the intellect. As Dionysius treats them in that text, the definitions of these motions as they belong to the soul are as follows:⁷ "Indeed, the motion of the soul is circular when it enters into itself from things external. It is a uniform convolution of its intellectual powers, granting inerrancy to the soul, as it were, in the form of a certain circle, first by gathering it, diffused in many externals, to itself, and then, with the soul having been given form, uniting it unitively with the united powers, and thus guiding it to the Beautiful and the Good, which is beyond all beings, and is one and the same, without beginning and without end. But the soul is moved obliquely insofar as it is illumined with divine cognitions according to its capacity, not intellectually and singularly, but rationally and diffusely, as it were, with mixed and transitory activities; and from exterior things as from certain variegated and manifold signs, it rises up to simple and united contemplations. But it moves by the direct motion when, neither entering into itself nor being moved by singular intellectuality (for this, as I have said, belongs to the circular motion), it proceeds to those things that are around it."

[B] That Proclus ascended by the circular motion, as I have claimed, is clear from his book *On Fate and Providence*, chapter 6,⁸ where he shows that reason, moved insofar as it is reason, looks to intrinsic reasons, and as such "evidently

5 Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, translatio Roberti Grosseteste*, ed. H.P.F. Mercken (Leiden: Brill, 1973), lib. I, c. 4, p. 68, l. 60-62.

6 Cf. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.8-9 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 189-194; PG 3, 704D-705B); cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 6 (F f. 6rb).

7 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.9 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 190-193; PG 3, 705A-B).

8 Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 6, §17, p. 124, l. 20-24.

distances itself from the senses, which it disdains, and is sequestered from pleasures and pains". And immediately thereafter he speaks about the uniform convolution of the soul's intellectual powers, saying:⁹ After the motion of the rational soul, I see another motion, better than the last, "with the lower powers now quieted and exhibiting none of the tumult that is usually found among the masses; by this motion, the soul is converted toward itself and sees its own substance and the powers existing in it, and the harmonic reasons from which it is made, and the many lives of which it is the plenitude, and it recollects that it is a rational world – indeed, an image of those things that are prior to it, from which it has come forth, but an exemplar of those which come after it, over which it presides."

And a little later in the same chapter, he writes:¹⁰ "After these two activities of this rational soul, as was said, we climb back up now to its highest intelligence, through which it actually sees its sister souls in the world" – and then, further on¹¹ – "and again, above all these souls, it sees the intellectual substances and orders" – and then¹² – "and yet again prior to these it sees the monads of the gods themselves that are beyond intellect."

Boethius states the same thing concisely in Book v of *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, prose 4,¹³ while explaining the difference between intelligence and reason: "But there exists a higher eye of intelligence: for surpassing the boundary of the universe it views that simple Form by the pure apex of the mind."

So much for the first motion.

[C] That Proclus also ascended to the knowledge of God by the direct motion – »not by returning into himself, nor by proceeding with discursive reason from things that are outside, but departing from creatures as from certain tokens, images, or signs that are variegated and manifold in themselves, toward unitive reflections, not intelligibly but intellectually, not discursively but unively, that is, not by the mind's oblique motion, but by its direct vision«¹⁴ – is clear in chapter 8 of the book mentioned above.¹⁵ By this point Proclus has enumerated three of the soul's modes of cognition, that is, the opinionative, the scientific, and that which ascends up to the one and unhypothetical "through all the forms, so to speak – dividing some, analysing others, making

9 Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 6, §18, p. 124, l. 2 – p. 126, l. 8.

10 Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 6, §19, p. 126, l. 1-3.

11 Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 6, §19, p. 126, l. 5-6.

12 Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 6, §19, p. 126, l. 8-9.

13 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. v, prosa 4, p. 149, l. 86-88.

14 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 6 (F f. 6vb).

15 Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §27-29, p. 136, l. 1 – p. 138, l. 15.

the many from the one and the one from the many". Through this process the soul ascends to the principle of beings as such and "as far as the ascent of the instruction of the sciences reaches". Then he immediately adds:¹⁶ "There is yet a fourth mode that you must understand, and this is our simpler cognition that no longer uses methods such as analyses, syntheses, divisions, or demonstrations, but gazes upon beings by simple *epiboles*, meaning 'projections', and, so to speak, by *antoptices*, meaning 'per se visions'. Those who can achieve this mode of knowing praise it, referring to it now reverently as intellect and not as science. Or have you not heard that Aristotle in his books on demonstration in fact says something like this, that intellect in us is greater than all science, and that he defines it as that by which we know the terms? And that Plato in the *Timaeus* declares that intellect and science are modes of cognition in the soul that relate to beings? For science indeed seems to belong to the soul, insofar as the soul is cognition; whereas the intellect belongs to it insofar as the soul is an image of what is truly intellect. For the latter sees things intellectual, or rather being itself, through one *epibole*, as he says (meaning 'injection' or 'intuition'), and through contact with the things known; thinking itself, it beholds those beings within it, and because of that, it thinks both that it itself exists and that it is thinking, and that it at once thinks being and what it is itself. Therefore, imitating this as much as it can, the soul itself becomes intellect, running beyond science, abandoning the manifold methods with which it was formerly adorned, and raises its eyes to beings alone."

Shortly thereafter,¹⁷ Proclus discusses the cognition above intellect, which the theologians before Plato also divulged by calling it a truly divine frenzy: "For they claim that the one of the soul no longer arouses an intellectual power", but connects the one itself to the highest One, to which, "casting forth its one, the soul loves to be at peace, enclosing itself from cognitions, having been made silent, and keeping quiet with inward silence". Dionysius agrees with these points in chapter 7 of *On the Divine Names* section B and chapter 4, section N.¹⁸

So much for the direct motion.

[D] Proclus certainly also ascended by the oblique motion to the knowledge of the highest Good. This motion was proper to the philosophers and occurred »by a laborious investigation of the first Principle of all beings, by dividing, defining, using common principles, proceeding from the known to the unknown by discursive reason, ascending from the sensible to the intelligible,

16 Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §30, p. 139, l. 1–21.

17 Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §31, p. 139, l. 1 – p. 140, l. 12.

18 Cf. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.1 (*Dionysiaca* vol. 1, p. 385–386; PG 3, 865C–868A) and 4.11 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 205–207; PG 3, 708D–709A).

and tending from one thing to another among the intelligible, until it arrives to the ultimate¹⁹ as such. It is clear from the present book that Proclus accomplished this. For here he ascends to the highest by attending to the condition of the works, the governance of what is made, and the reconciliation of contraries. For these are the three ways by which the philosophers arrived at the knowledge of God by discursive reason.

»A person ascends by attending to the condition of the works, because, as Gundissalinus says in *On the Creation of Heaven and Earth*,²⁰ “The ways to the creator are his works. When we diligently turn our attention to these, we are able to reach the understanding of any hidden thing of God whatsoever”; indeed, “the crafting of the world is the projection of the invisible things of God”, as Dionysius says in the *Letter to Titus*.²¹«²² The author ascended along this path, both by the investigation of the many and the one, and by the investigation of productive principles and what is produced, as is clear from the first 12 elements.²³

»A person also ascends to God from the governance of what is made, just as Cicero shows in Book 11 of *On the Nature of the Gods*, chapter 5.²⁴ His words are summarised as follows: the world exists and is ruled by reason; but the reason ruling the world is beyond the world and not from the world; therefore, there is some reason that rules the world, which we call God or his providence.«²⁵ The author also proceeded along this path in this book, as is clear from proposition 120 and many that follow,²⁶ and especially in the book *On Providence*,²⁷ where ten questions concerning providence are resolved.

A person also ascends to the knowledge of God from the reconciliation of the contraries that are in the world, Plato made clear in the *Timaeus*.²⁸ In this work, Plato himself pursued the cognition of God and the highest Artificer by all three paths. Boethius is also in agreement with him in Book III of *On the Consolation*, prose 12:²⁹ “The world could hardly have come together from such

19 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 6 (F f. 6vb).

20 Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi*, p. 2, l. 1-3.

21 Dionysius, *Epistulae*, IX.2 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 642; PG 3, 1108B).

22 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 7 (F f. 7va).

23 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, props 1-12, p. 3, l. 1 – p. 9, l. 19.

24 Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum*, 11.6.16-11.7.19, p. 55, l. 11 – p. 57, l. 4.

25 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 7 (F f. 8ra).

26 Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 120, p. 60, l. 1-13.

27 Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*.

28 Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, 27d-29d, p. 20, l. 15 – p. 22, l. 14 *et seqq.*

29 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. 111, prosa 12, p. 92, l. 14-25; cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 7 (F f. 8rb).

diverse parts into one form, were there not one God, who joins such diversity together. But this diversity of natures, once brought together, is discordant with itself, and would dissociate and tear apart, were there not One who sustains what he has brought together. Such a defined order of nature, moreover, would not have proceeded forth, nor would the things thus arranged unfold in local motions, times, effective causes, spaces, and qualities, were there not One who, remaining himself, arranged these varieties of change. This, whatever this is, by which the things that are made abide and are set in motion, I call 'God', using the word that everybody uses." That Proclus proceeded along this path is clear from proposition 20³⁰ and those that follow, and in many other places in the present book, and in his book *On the Existence of Evils*.³¹

From the foregoing, the excellence and surpassing ability of this author, Proclus, are abundantly clear.

[E] Now, in the title there follows: OF DIADOCHUS, OF LYCIUS. These might be Proclus' first name and surname, such that he would have had three names; or, as seems more likely to me, these were the first names of his ancestors, which he prefixed to the title of his book following the ancient custom. For the ancients not only set down their own names in their titles and the names of their parents, but also their ancestors' first names, last names, and epithets, as is clear from the books of that most brilliant man, Boethius.³² For this reason Proclus also adds both his school and his profession: "the Platonic philosopher".

Therefore, he states: OF DIADOCHUS, meaning "son of". Now Diadochus means "what is taught" or "what teaches generously", for *dia* means "generous",³³ or it derives from *dia* and *doxa*, which means "glory"³⁴ – meaning, as it were, "generous glory" or "generously glorifying" or "glorious and generous". For there is nothing (to say nothing of his descendant) more generous than wisdom itself, in whose possession Diadochus glorified.

Wisdom's generosity appears from its source, the height of its nobility, and the multitude of its generous effects that it produces in those who have it.

»The source of wisdom is most high because "the fount of wisdom is the Word of God in the highest",³⁵ not only the divine wisdom of the orthodox or the faithful, but even of the Gentile philosophers, as is clear from Plato's

30 Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 20, p. 13, l. 1 – p. 14, l. 31.

31 Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*.

32 Cf. Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, titulus, p. 3; id., *De Trinitate*, ed. C. Moreschini, prologus, p. 165; id., *Utrum Pater et Filius*, ed. C. Moreschini, p. 182.

33 Cf. Papias, *Elementarium*, s.v. "*Dia*", f. 46r.

34 Cf. Huguccio of Pisa, *Derivationes*, s.v. "*Doxa*" (D88, p. 348, §1).

35 Ecclesiasticus 1:5.

propositions, which Augustine recounts.«³⁶ For in Book VIII of *On the City of God*, chapter 3,³⁷ he says that God is “the light of all”, and in chapter 4,³⁸ that God is “the enlightener of truth” and “the reason of thinking”, without which “no teaching instructs”. In Book IX, chapter 25,³⁹ he says that God is “the giver of intelligence”. And in Book I of the *Soliloquies*, near the beginning, he writes:⁴⁰ “God, the Father of truth, the Father of wisdom, ... the Father of intelligible light”; and below:⁴¹ “God of truth, in whom and from whom and through whom are true all things that are true; God of wisdom, in whom and from whom and through whom are wise all who are wise”; and below:⁴² “God, intelligible light, in whom and from whom and through whom shine intelligibly all things that shine intelligibly.”

The height of the nobility of wisdom is clear »because it is desirable in itself, as Aristotle shows in Book VI of the *Ethics*, chapter 15,⁴³ where he says that wisdom and prudence are desirable in themselves: “now, what is desirable in itself is free and perfect through itself, serving nothing else, governing the order through itself and holding dominion within itself”, as the Commentator explains on the same text.⁴⁴

If we now turn the mind's gaze toward the effects of wisdom, it becomes clear that wisdom is also generous. In those who possess it, wisdom, with regard to evil things, is fugitive of vice, sanative of sickness or allative of health, conducive to a place far from disturbances and passions, and contemptive of this life and this world; but with respect to the good, wisdom is formative of life, inculcative of the virtues, perfective of the soul, consummative of creation, elongative from our animal nature, impletive with longings, introductive of delight, and operative of beatitude.«⁴⁵ »And so Cicero, in Book v of the

36 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 1 (F f. 1rb).

37 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.4, p. 220, l. 35-36; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 16 (F f. 20ra).

38 Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.4, p. 220, l. 50-60; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 16 (F f. 20rb).

39 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, IX.25, p. 334, l. 12; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 16 (F f. 20rb).

40 Augustine, *Soliloquia*, I.1.2 (PL 32, 870).

41 Augustine, *Soliloquia*, I.1.3 (PL 32, 870).

42 Augustine, *Soliloquia*, I.1.3 (PL 32, 870); apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 16 (F f. 20va).

43 Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI.13, 1144a1-2.

44 Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, lib. VI, c. 15 (MS Vaticano [Città del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 129ra).

45 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 1 (F f. 1rb).

Tusculan Disputations, chapter 5,⁴⁶ exclaims: “O Philosophy, the guide of life, O discoverer and cultivator of virtue, and expeller of vices, what would we, and indeed the whole life of humankind, be without you?” And below:⁴⁷ “You have been the discoverer of laws, the mistress of morals and discipline. We take refuge in you; from you we implore succour. We, who formerly devoted our greater part to you, now give ourselves over entirely. For a day spent well in your precepts is preferable to perpetuity and immortality without them. Whose succour do we need more than yours, you who have granted to us tranquillity of life and taken from us the fear of death?”⁴⁸

Therefore, from the explanation of his name, one can gather the nature and greatness of the philosopher Diadochus, whose name is inscribed in the title.

[F] Then there follows in this title: OF LICIVS, meaning “son of”. Liciv was the grandfather of Proclus. Now, Apollo was also called Liciv,⁴⁹ and Apollo stands for the “sun”,⁵⁰ which according to the Gentiles of old was the god of wisdom;⁵¹ or, according to Papias,⁵² “Liciv” comes from *lichios*, meaning the luminescent purple stone in lanterns that shines forth in splendour, and for this reason a lantern is called a *lichios*.

And so, one can surmise from his name that Liciv was, in a manner of speaking, a god or the sun, and the fontal, overflowing abundance of wisdom, with the ray of his wisdom passing over everything. For among the sages of his time it is likely that he shone like a radiant lantern. Otherwise, it would have been inappropriate for Proclus to inscribe this at the beginning of his book, »unless those to come could obtain immense benefits from the splendour of his wisdom. For it is quite possible that, from the illumination of wisdom, many devoted themselves to the exercise of their own intellect and, consequently, to gather kindred spirits, to educate them in the preambles to wisdom, to dissolve doubts, to consider the height of wisdom, and to apprehend the deeper truth.«⁵³

[G] Next in the title we have the sect to which Proclus belonged: OF THE PLATONIST.

46 Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, v.2.5, p. 406, l. 3-5.

47 Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, v.2.5-6, p. 406, l. 9-16.

48 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 1 (F f. 1vb-2ra).

49 Cf. Papias, *Elementarium*, s.v. “Liciv”, f. 91r.

50 Cf. Papias, *Elementarium*, s.v. “Apollo”, f. 13r; Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum*, vol. 1, lib. VIII, c. 11, §53.

51 Cf. Augustine, *De ordine*, ed. W. Green (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970), I.4.10, p. 94, l. 22-26.

52 Cf. Papias, *Elementarium*, s.v. “Luchinus”, f. 91r.

53 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 3 (F f. 3ra-b).

Now, just as Augustine says in Book VIII of *On the City of God*, chapter 1,⁵⁴ “there is no one, who has even a meagre acquaintance with such things, who does not know about those philosophers called Platonists, who derive their name from the learned Plato. Therefore, concerning this Plato, I will touch briefly upon those things I deem necessary to the present question, first by recalling his predecessors in this kind of literature.”

And he says in chapter 2 of the same book:⁵⁵ “As far as Greek literature is concerned (which among the nations is the more celebrated), two schools of philosophers are known to us: the one is called Italic, coming from that part of Italy once known as Magna Graeca; the other is Ionian, coming from those lands now called Greece. To the Italic school belonged the authority of Pythagoras of Samos, from whom the very name of philosophy takes its origin; ... the founder of the Ionic school was Thales the Milesian; ... Anaximander was his pupil and succeeded him; ... Anaximander left Anaximenes as his disciple and successor; ... and Anaxagoras was his pupil” along with Diogenes. Succeeding Anaxagoras was Archelaus, whose disciple Socrates is said to have been, and Socrates was the master of Plato – which is why I have briefly summarised these passages from Augustine’s *City of God*.

“Therefore, having acquired such illustrious renown by his life and death, Socrates left behind many followers of his philosophy”, as Augustine says in chapter 3.⁵⁶ “But among the disciples of Socrates”, as we read in chapter 4,⁵⁷ “Plato shone with a most surpassing glory and, not unjustly, he eclipsed the others in every way.”

Plato, as is said in Book III of *Against the Academicians*,⁵⁸ “was the wisest and most learned man of his times, and he spoke in such a way that whatever he said became important, and he spoke of such things that, in whatever way he said them, they never became unimportant”. And later:⁵⁹ “In this way, he added to the Socratic charm and subtly (which Socrates possessed in ethical doctrine), an expertise in things natural and divine ... and is said to have devised the perfect practice of philosophy”, “which is arranged in three parts”, as we saw already from *On the City of God*,⁶⁰ “one part is moral, which above all

54 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.1, p. 217, l. 34-39.

55 Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.2, p. 217, l. 1 – p. 218, l. 48.

56 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.3, p. 219, l. 31-32.

57 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.4, p. 219, l. 1-3.

58 Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, III.17-37, p. 57, l. 6-9.

59 Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, III.17-37, p. 57, l. 15-21.

60 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.4, p. 220, l. 25-28; cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 20, n. 242-246.

concerns action, the other part natural, which is considered by contemplation, and the third part is rational, by which the true is separated from the false". And later:⁶¹ "But as to Plato's views about these parts taken altogether or about each singly, that is, what he understood to be the end of all actions, the cause of all natures, and the light of all reasons – I believe it would take a long time to explain these, and I do not wish to make rash assertions." Thus Augustine.

Therefore, from this same Plato, whom Labeo calls a demigod,⁶² the philosophers mentioned already, namely, Proclus and his ancestors Diadochus and Licius, are called Platonists in order to distinguish themselves from the Peripatetics and Cynics. For, according to Augustine in Book III of *Against the Academicians*,⁶³ "Nowadays we scarcely see any philosophers who are not Cynics, Peripatetics, or Platonists. The Cynics are especially popular because a certain liberty of life or licentiousness brings them delight. Since, however, philosophy touches on learning, teaching, and morals, by which the soul is cared for," we have in the title: OF THE PHILOSOPHER.

[H] The word "philosophy", as was said,⁶⁴ comes from Pythagoras. For "when asked what he professed, he responded truly, saying that he was 'a philosopher', meaning a lover of wisdom, since it seemed supremely arrogant to claim that one was wise. And so, from that point on, it pleased those who came thereafter that, no matter how much a person seemed to excel in wisdom, either to himself or to others, he would not be called anything except 'a philosopher'", as Isidore writes in Book VIII of the *Etymologies*.⁶⁵

Now Cicero writes, in Book V of the *Tusculan Disputations*,⁶⁶ that seven philosophers in antiquity "were and were called *sophi* by the Greeks and, by us, 'the wise' ". Below he adds:⁶⁷ "their name was preserved down to the age of Pythagoras who, as Heraclides Ponticus (a most learned man and a student of Plato) reports, is said to have gone to Phlius and to have learnedly and regularly discoursed on certain subjects with Leon, the prince of the Phliusians. When Leon, admiring his genius and eloquence, asked him what art he professed above all else, he answered that he in fact knew no art but was rather a philosopher. Leon, admiring the novelty of the name, asked him who the philosophers were and what distinguished them from others. Pythagoras then replied ... ,"

61 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.4, p. 220, l. 33-38.

62 Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.13, p. 230, l. 31-32.

63 Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, III.19.42, p. 60, l. 1-5.

64 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio tituli G*, n. 55.

65 Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum*, vol. 1, lib. VIII, c. 6, §2-3.

66 Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, V.3.7, p. 407, l. 7-9.

67 Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, V.3.8-9, p. 407, l. 19 – p. 408, l. 3.

and below:⁶⁸ “those who hold all other pursuits as nothing, and studiously look into the nature of things – these people call themselves zealous for wisdom, that is, philosophers; and just as there [that is, in sport,] one is freest when one is a spectator, appropriating nothing for oneself, so too in life, the contemplation and knowledge of things surpass all other pursuits by far.” Pythagoras also gives the example of the marketplace.⁶⁹ “Pythagoras not only coined the name ‘philosophy’, but also magnified the thing itself.”⁷⁰ Thus Cicero.

And so, from the foregoing, the identity of the author of this book, the sect to which he belonged, and his profession, have all been made clear.

[I] There follows *THEOLOGICAL ELEMENTATION*, which expresses the material, the formal, and the final cause of the book.

It expresses the subjective material cause in that the book, through the ordering of elements, treats the divine Good according to the order of natural providence. For this reason, it is called an “elementation” [*elementatio*], and not of just any kind, but “theological”, to distinguish it from the *Physical Elementation*,⁷¹ which this author is also said to have produced. In these two words the matter and subject are touched on most succinctly.

It touches on its matter, because the elements are, so to speak, the hylements⁷² or the propositions, out of which this book is constructed and made whole. If they are taken in themselves and according to their own notion, they possess only the mode of matter with respect to this wisdom itself, and they contribute to its wholeness; “the mode of matter”, I say, which carries the notion of a principle or an element, insofar as from them, together with the form, as from an intrinsic principle, as it were, the substance of the composite thing is constituted. For just as grammar has letters or elements for its material, from which it is brought together into a whole, and just as the *Arithmetic* of Jordan,⁷³ the *Geometry* of Euclid,⁷⁴ the *Optics* of Peckham,⁷⁵ and certain other sciences, have hylementary propositions, so too this book has 211 elements, which are the principles of demonstration in this philosophy.

68 Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, v.3.9, p. 408, l. 14-20.

69 Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, v.3.9, p. 408, l. 3-14.

70 Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, v.3.10, p. 408, l. 21-22.

71 Proclus, *Elementatio physica*, ed. H. Boese, *Die mittelalterliche Übersetzung der Stoiceiosis physike des Proclus* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958).

72 Cf. Huguccio of Pisa, *Derivationes*, s.v. “Yle” (145, p. 605, §3).

73 Jordan of Nemi, *Arithmetica*.

74 Euclid, *Elementa*.

75 John Peckham, *Perspectiva communis*.

Aristotle alludes to this meaning of “element” in Book v of the *Metaphysics*,⁷⁶ where he discusses the several senses of the term: “the elements of geometrical diagrams” and the elements of demonstrations all “are called ‘elements’ in a similar sense”. What the Commentator explains about this passage can be summarised as follows: »They are called “elements” in a similar sense and in accordance with the same notion. But the first composite parts of geometrical diagrams, meaning those figures depicted in extension, are called “elements” in that they are composite parts relating only to position and are “parts from the whole” or “universal parts”. But if what is meant is rather “an intrinsic element” by virtue of some power, then this denotes the “elements” of demonstrations, according to the notion of element introduced above. Now, the first demonstrations of all, to which none are prior, and which exist in many demonstrations that follow them due to their power, are called “the elements of demonstrations”. Now, although these first demonstrations exist in the consequent demonstrations through their power, they also exist in them in some mode according to their substance: for, when dealing with a subject and a predicate, the first demonstration is implicated in the second, and so on, where the prior is always in the consequent according to the order of theorems. Postulates, hypotheses, and definitions are the elements of the first demonstrations in this way, and certain propositions are the truest “elements” of the conclusions«⁷⁷ and, consequently, are the matter.

These theological elements are also the subject insofar as they include that which exists as something in act, in that it has the property of a subject. The act of consideration is concerned with the properties and attributes of this subject, which has a common notion by virtue of an analogical attribution to one first term, and to this first term the notion of a subject primarily belongs.

»This entire book treats the universe of divine things according to its procession from the highest Good and its return into the Good, according to the order and the proper intrinsic modes of the divine things themselves. These modes are placed in them by what is primarily divine or divine according to cause. This book treats this universe according to the order of natural providence, and not presently according to the order of voluntary providence (following the distinction made by Augustine in Book VIII of *The Literal Commentary on Genesis*).⁷⁸ It is necessary that everything treated here should agree in a single

⁷⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, v.3, 1014a35-37.

⁷⁷ Cf. Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, lib. v, tr. 1, c. 4, p. 217, l. 8-26; cf. Averroes, *Metaphysica*, ed. R. Ponzalli, *Averrois in librum V (Δ) Metaphysicorum Aristotelis commentarius* (Bern: Francke, 1971), lib. v, comm. 4, p. 86, l. 78 – p. 87, l. 88.

⁷⁸ Cf. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, VIII.9, p. 243, l. 25 – p. 244, l. 20.

notion of a subject, by virtue of which this philosophy itself is a single science. That subject is called, and indeed is, the divine good, which belongs to the first principle of all simply, absolutely, and causally or primarily, but to the other goods, namely the divine according to essence and the divine according to participation, attributively in relation to the first. This attribution occurs according to the modes distinguished by Averroes while commenting on the beginning of Book IV of the *Metaphysics*:⁷⁹ namely, in relation to the primary efficient cause, in relation to the ultimate end, and also in the relation of accidents to their subject.⁸⁰ For God, who is the highest Good, is not only “the principle without principle, the process without variation, the end without end”, as is said in rule 7 from Trismegistus,⁸¹ but indeed “God” is also that, “in comparison with whom substance is an accident, and an accident is nothing at all”, as we read in rule 6 of the same text.⁸² Now, Hermes means that any substance is an accident by virtue of its dependency on the First, to whom alone the notion of a subject belongs – not as it belongs to beings existing in passive potency, but as the active potency by which he, who made the universes, sustains all things. Avicenna uses the term “accident” in this sense in Book III of the *Fount of Life*, chapters 36 and 54.⁸³

From this it is clear that the subject of this book is the divine good within the order of natural providence, and this is expressed by the title *THEOLOGICAL ELEMENTATION*.

[K] In the same phrase, but taken under another notion, one finds expressed the book’s directive formal aspect or the formal cause. For the form of proceeding in this book is through the coordination and separation of theorems or elements, which are, so to speak, elevations or elaborations⁸⁴ because they elevate and cultivate the mind. These are the rules of this most divine philosophy; and it is also by virtue of these that it is called an “elementation”, just as Varro calls grammar “letteration”, according to Isidore.⁸⁵

79 Cf. Averroes, *Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* (Venezia: Junta, 1562), lib. IV, comm. 2, f. 65rF-vI.

80 Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, ed. L. Sturlese, *Opera omnia*, vol. 3. *Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 3-5-6, p. 281, l. 69-84.

81 Hermes Latinus, *Liber XXIV philosophorum*, maxim 7, p. 13, l. 1-2.

82 Hermes Latinus, *Liber XXIV philosophorum*, maxim 6, p. 12, l. 1-2.

83 Cf. Avicenna, *Fons vitae, ex Arabico in Latinum translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino*, ed. C. Baeumker, 2 vols (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1892-1895), vol. I, lib. III, c. 36, p. 161, l. 14 – p. 162, l. 10; lib. III, c. 54, p. 199, l. 8-17.

84 Cf. Papias, *Elementarium*, s.v. “Elementum”, f. 52r; Huguccio of Pisa, *Derivationes*, s.v. “Yle” (145, p. 605, §4-5).

85 Cf. Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum*, vol. I, lib. I, c. 3, §1.

For every science uses the rules by which it is upheld like its own foundations, as Alan writes in the prologue of *On the Rules of Theology*,⁸⁶ so that dialectic has maxims, “rhetoric has commonplaces, ethics has general teachings, physics has aphorisms, arithmetic has *aporismata*, meaning ‘subtle rules’”, music has axioms, meaning “measures”, geometry has theorems, meaning “speculations”, and astronomy has excellences. In the same way, this philosophy, the most excellent, most divine, and most difficult of all sciences, has rules that are “exceedingly more obscure and subtler than the other” rules of other sciences, as is said in the same text.⁸⁷ “Although complete necessity holds sway over the other rules, since the regular course of nature is governed by regularity alone, the necessity of theological rules is nevertheless absolute and unshakable, because they produce conviction about what cannot be changed by action or by nature. And so, because of their immutable necessity and their glorious subtlety, they are almost fittingly called ‘glorious paradoxes’ by certain philosophers”, or “enigmas” because of their obscurity, or “marquetries” because of their intrinsic splendour, or “hebdomads” because of their dignity.⁸⁸

But the author calls them “theological elements”, meaning “propositions”, in which there is a discourse on the divine or on God, who is both the most divine and the most difficult to attain.

»“Most divine”, as Trismegistus says to Asclepius in *On Hellera*,⁸⁹ which means “On the God of gods” (where he establishes that, of all discourses inspired by divine obligation, a discourse on the God of gods is more divine in religious devotion), stating, “if you will be found to understand it, your whole mind will be filled with all goods”. It is also “most difficult”, and for this reason Trismegistus in the same text compares the discourse to a torrent:⁹⁰ “An account of divinity ... is most similar to a torrent of a river running from on high, sweeping and churning, such that it rushes on ahead of our attention, not only as we listen but also as we speak about it”.

Thus it follows that not only the teacher but even the auditor must be a divine and attentive person.

“A divine person” because, in light of what Trismegistus says in the same text,⁹¹ “an account of divinity is to be known through the divine concentration

86 Cf. Alan of Lille, *Regulae caelestis iuris*, ed. N. Häring, in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 48(1981), prologue, §1, p. 121.

87 Cf. Alan of Lille, *Regulae caelestis iuris*, prologue, §1-5, p. 121-122.

88 Cf. Alan of Lille, *Regulae caelestis iuris*, prologue, §5-6, p. 122.

89 *Asclepius*, c. 1, p. 39, l. 4-5.

90 *Asclepius*, c. 3, p. 41, l. 19-23.

91 *Asclepius*, c. 3, p. 41, l. 19-20.

of awareness". For this is true philosophy: the assiduous inquiry into the knowledge of divinity. As Trismegistus says there,⁹² philosophy consists "only in repeated contemplation and the holy reverence with which one must know divinity".⁹³ "An attentive person", because of the elementation, extension, or coordination of the theological elements themselves; for to the extent that they contain a loftier meaning, so they require a more attentive and skilful auditor. Therefore, they are not to be expounded to fleshly or even to spiritual people, as is clear from the parable that Rabbi Moses sets down on this matter in chapter 182,⁹⁴ but only to intellectual people, »who, by a more rigorous inquiry, are attentive and perspicacious in the apex of the mind, and are less carried away by the fickleness of praise than attracted by the most longed-for, unveiled image of truth itself. Only to these worthy people should the worthiness of wisdom contained in this *Theological Elementation* be uncovered. And so are they led into these theorems as into a certain byway that is beyond the common path of reasonings.«⁹⁵

Now, I say "beyond the common path of reasonings" because, as Boethius states near the beginning of *On the Trinity*:⁹⁶ "In physics one must apply oneself rationally, in mathematics scientifically, and in theology intellectually, not being led astray by imaginings, but rather by looking into the Form itself, which is a true form and not an image." For the intentions of the *Theological Elementation* diverge from those of all other sciences such that »one cannot find discourses akin to them with which they could be easily explained«. ⁹⁷

From the foregoing one can grasp succinctly both the form or mode of proceeding in this book and the reason for its name, *Theological Elementation*, which is imputed from the form. Moreover, one can understand why it is not called "First Philosophy" or "Metaphysics", "On the Pure Good", "On the Light of Lights", "On the Cause of Causes", or "On the Flowers of Divine Things", as others⁹⁸ – who all treated similar material, but completely unlike the present author – bothered to call their works.

92 *Asclepius*, c. 12, p. 52, l. 2-4.

93 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 5 (F f. 5va).

94 Cf. Moses Maimonides, *Dux seu director dubitantium aut perplexorum*, lib. III, c. 52, f. 109v-112r; cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 3 (F f. 4ra).

95 Cf. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecii librum de bonorum ebdomade*, ed. N. Häring, *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1966), prologue, §7, p. 184, l. 32-38.

96 Boethius, *De Trinitate*, c. 2, p. 169, l. 78-82.

97 Cf. Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecii librum de bonorum ebdomade*, prologue, §8, p. 184, l. 39-45.

98 Cf. Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, ed. W. Fauser (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), lib. II, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 59, l. 7 – p. 61, l. 68.

[L] Finally, the name *THEOLOGICAL ELEMENTATION* expresses the perfective final aspect or final cause. In this sense, “theological elementation”, meaning “of divine reason”, connotes a ladder ascending from the divine according to participation to the divine according to essence, and through this to the primarily divine, the divine according to cause, who is to be contemplated. The contemplation of this divinity makes the contemplator not only blessed, by pursuing “the perfect condition that is brought about by the collection of all goods”,⁹⁹ but even god.

For, as Boethius says in Book III of *On the Consolation*, prose 10,¹⁰⁰ “since it is obvious that they become blessed by acquiring beatitude, and by acquiring justice they become just, and by acquiring wisdom they become wise, so by a similar argument it follows necessarily that by acquiring divinity they become gods. Therefore, everyone who is in bliss is god; certainly, God is one by nature, but nothing prevents there being as many gods as you please by participation.”

Now, this ladder ascending through deified reason to the divine reason according to cause seems to be implied by the allegory [*integumentum*], with which Lady Philosophy’s embroidered garment is described using two letters, the Greek *pi* and *theta*, as we have it from Boethius in Book I of *On the Consolation*, prose 1.¹⁰¹ Having described Philosophy’s countenance, expression, complexion, strength, age, and height, he describes her garment:¹⁰² “Her robes were fashioned perfectly with the finest threads, the most delicate artistry, and imperishable materials, which, as I would later learn from her, she wove herself.” And below:¹⁰³ “On the hem at the bottom one could discern a woven Greek *pi*, and at the top a *theta*, and between the two letters there seemed to be steps emblazoned as a ladder, forming an ascent from the lower to the higher letter.”

Now what are meant by these robes if not the sciences? And, among the sciences, this one is the worthiest. Seneca points out its difference from every other human science in Book I of *On Natural Questions*, chapter 1:¹⁰⁴ “the difference between philosophy ... and the other arts is as great as that ... between the part of philosophy concerned with humans and the part concerned with gods: the latter is higher and more spirited ... In short, the difference between

99 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, prosa 2, p. 60, l. 10–11.

100 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, prosa 10, p. 83, l. 80 – p. 84, l. 86.

101 Cf. Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. I, prosa 1, p. 4, l. 1 – p. 5, l. 12.

102 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. I, prosa 1, p. 5, l. 12–15.

103 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. I, prosa 1, p. 5, l. 17–21.

104 Seneca, *Naturalium quaestionum libros*, ed. H. Hine (Leipzig: Teubner, 1996), lib. I, §1, p. 1, l. 5 – p. 2, l. 17; apud Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 5 (F f. 5va).

the two is as great as that between God and human beings: the one teaches us what is to be done on earth; the other, what is to be done in heaven; the one dispels our wrongdoings and casts the light in, with which the uncertainties of life can be discerned; the other goes beyond the darkness in which we wallow and guides us, standing upright, out of the shadows, and leads us to the light's source."

And so, this science is denoted by the *theta* sewn on the upper hem of Philosophy's robes. For it consists in contemplating not just any object, but the highest Good, which is the end of all desires because, as Plato says, as Augustine recounts in Book VIII of *On the City of God*, chapter 4,¹⁰⁵ it is the end of all actions, the cause of all natures, and the light of all reasons.

"For if the human being is constituted in such a way that, through what surpasses everything in him, he may attain unto that, which surpasses all things as such (that is, the one, true, and best God, without whom no nature subsists, no doctrine instructs, no exercise liberates), then may he be sought, in whom for us all things are serene; may he be discerned, in whom for us all things are certain; may he be loved, in whom for us all things are right."

"If, therefore", as Augustine says in chapter 5, "Plato declared that the wise person is the one who imitates, knows, and loves this God, and becomes blessed by participating in him", what remains to be said, except that the end of theological wisdom is God? And what could be signified by those two letters on Philosophy's garment, except activity and knowledge?

And so Avicbron, in Book I of the *Fount of Life*, chapter 2,¹⁰⁶ responds to the question, "What is it that the human ought to seek in this life?", and says: "Since the part of the human that knows is better than all other parts, then the higher activity is to seek knowledge. As for knowledge, however, it is more necessary that he know himself, so that through this he might know things that are outside him; for his essence comprehends and penetrates all things, and all things are subjected to his power. Along with this, he should also seek knowledge of the final cause, on account of which he was made, so that he might seek it out more zealously, because happiness will follow on account of this." And later, in the character of the Disciple:¹⁰⁷ "What, therefore, is the final cause for which the human was made? Master: To join himself to the higher world, so that each thing might return to what is similar to it." And later:¹⁰⁸ "Knowledge

105 Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, VIII.4-5, p. 220, l. 33-38 and p. 220, l. 56 – p. 221, l. 2; cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 16 (F f. 20ra).

106 Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. I, c. 2, p. 4, l. 1-9.

107 Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. I, c. 2, p. 4, l. 23-25; cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 1 (F f. 1va).

108 Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. I, c. 2, p. 5, l. 2-4.

and activity liberate the soul altogether from the captivity of nature and purge it of its darkness and obscurity; in this way, the soul returns to its higher world.” And later, in chapter 4:¹⁰⁹ “The knowledge, for which the human being was created, is the knowledge of all things insofar as they exist and is, above all, the knowledge of the first Essence, which sustains and moves them”, in order that the soul may be joined to the higher world.

Boethius sings of this world in Book III of *On the Consolation*, metre 9:¹¹⁰

From the supernal exemplar
You lead all things out, you who are most beautiful; the beautiful world
You carry in your mind.

From all the foregoing it is abundantly clear that, not only through activity and knowledge, as through the two letters, the practical and theoretical, but even more so through the highest philosophy of the *Theological Elementation*, a person returns by an ascent to his final perfection, for the sake of which he was created: namely, happiness or, to speak more plainly, beatitude. “For there is no reason for a person to philosophise except that he may be blessed”, according to Augustine in Book XIX of *On the City of God*, chapter 2,¹¹¹ “but what makes him blessed is the End of all good; therefore, there is no reason to philosophise, except the End of all good”: “for the End of all good, as soon as anyone arrives to it, immediately makes him blessed”.¹¹²

Now, what is the end of all good but the highest Good, the Good that is “the Good of every good”?¹¹³

To the knowledge of this Good this entire book is arranged, since it makes us ascend through the good participants in the divine Good, to knowledge of the divine goods according to essence. And that we may ascend through this to contemplate the highest Good, the primarily Good, may we be carried across with his support, who is the mediator of God and humanity, Jesus Christ,¹¹⁴ who with the Father and the Holy Spirit lives and reigns, one God, unto the ages of ages. Amen.

109 Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. I, c. 4, p. 6, l. 13-15.

110 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, metrum 9, p. 80, l. 6-8.

111 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XIX.1, p. 659, l. 121-123.

112 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XIX.2, p. 660, l. 8-9.

113 Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VIII.3.4, p. 272, l. 17.

114 Cf. 1 Timothy 2:5.

Preamble of the Book

Here begins the text, to the exposition whereof I add this clarification, showing that this philosophy most truly and properly possesses the notion of a science that is veridical, most certain, and, following from this, that it is the highest science.

EVERY MULTITUDE etc.

The author, who is portrayed most skilfully in the title as a most learned man, when setting out his theology in detail, first demonstrates the One as such and the Good as such, and then proceeds to treat the properties of this One and Good in element 8.¹ Now, “one” has the notion of a principle and “good” that of a cause. But since a principle is found in more things than a cause, it is prior according to definition. Therefore, this philosopher first establishes that the One exists and then, in element 7, that the Good exists.²

To establish the One’s thatness or its existence, he uses a certain complex principle, namely, “there is multitude”. Similarly, when establishing the thatness of the Good, he uses another principle, “there is the productive”. He assumes these two principles, upon which the edifice of this entire philosophy depends as upon its own foundations, as if they are grasped [*nota*] through the reception of the senses and in no way are intellected, known [*scita*], or apprehended [*apprehensa*] by any other scientific habit, but only are believed, just as the theology that concerns the divine Good according to the order of voluntary providence is founded upon principles that are believed, which are the articles of the Christian faith.

For this reason, many have tended to doubt whether either theology, the sapiential and the divinising, is a science in the true sense of the word.

To address this doubt, I will do three things. First, I present certain preliminaries regarding the principles from which the sciences proceed in general, and upon which they are founded in their considerations and in the demonstrations of their conclusions. Secondly, I discuss the three kinds of principles

¹ Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 8, p. 7, l. 1-2.

² Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 7, p. 6, l. 1-2.

found in the sciences in particular, as well as their properties and notions. Thirdly, I demonstrate from the foregoing that in this divinising wisdom or sapiential theology there is truly and properly a scientific mode and procedure that begins from its proper principles, as they are enumerated in the second part.

[A] As to the first point, one should know that every science uses its rules and principles as its own foundations, and from these one acquires the knowledge [*scientia*] of conclusions. »For every science considers causes and principles proportionate to its subject, as we know from Book VI of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, chapter 1.³ For all knowledge begins from things that are already known [*praecognitis*], as Aristotle states in Book VI of the *Ethics*, chapter 4,⁴ and Book I of the *Posterior Analytics*, chapter 1,⁵ saying that "every instruction and intellective discipline begins from pre-existing cognition". Now, the knowledge of conclusions is had through a demonstrative syllogism. But those things, from which syllogisms proceed, are either principles as such or are principles relative to the conclusion. Therefore, since all knowledge proceeds through syllogisms, every science [*scientia*] must possess certain things that are already understood, and these are the principles. For unless there are some propositions that are most certain and received from common teachings, from which the syllogisms would proceed, it would be impossible to demonstrate anything at all.

Although the name "principle" is common to every proposition that is already understood in any science, nevertheless, one assigns different names to them in different cases depending on the characteristic of the designations, as we saw already in the *Exposition of the Title* from the prologue to the treatise *On Ecclesiastical Rules*.⁶ Now, by a common name the principles are called "terms", according to what Aristotle says in Book VI of the *Ethics*, chapter 9:⁷ "intellect" is "of terms, about which there is no reasoning". On this the Commentator writes:⁸ "All principles are terms, because we, who seek to know more specifically how many principles there are, ascend towards them

3 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, VI.1, 1025b3-10.

4 Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI.3, 1139b26.

5 Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora*, eds L. Minio-Paluello, B.G. Dod (Brugge / Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1968), I.1, 71a1-2, p. 5, l. 3-4.

6 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expos. tit.* K, n. 86.

7 Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, ed. R.A. Gauthier (Leiden / Bruxelles: Brill / Desclée De Brouwer, 1972), VI.9, 1142a25-26, p. 262, l. 26-27.

8 Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, lib. VI, c. 9 (MS Vaticano [Città del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 119vb).

by analysis and come to rest; about these terms there is no reasoning, ... essential definition, designation of the cause, or syllogism”, as Aristotle says in the same place.

Now, there are three kinds of principles, according to the Commentator in chapter 8 of the same text:⁹ “axioms [*dignitates*], hypotheses [*suppositiones*], and postulates [*petitiones*]”. Now, “axioms are whatever things are understood by the student that are both believed intrinsically and, perhaps, only need to be presented, which happens when they are spoken” – for example, “things equal to the same thing are equal to one another”. “However, when the auditor does not have an inherently credible understanding of what is said, but still posits and concedes it to the one who assumes it, this is a hypothesis; for example, we do not presuppose the proposition ‘this figure is a circle’ on the basis of a common understanding or concept without instruction, but we listen and concede it without a demonstration. When, on the contrary, what is said is not understood and is not conceded, but is assumed for the sake of the argument, then we call it a postulate.”

In Book I of the *Posterior Analytics*,¹⁰ Aristotle says that the principle of a demonstration is the immediate proposition, which is subdivided into axioms and theses. Theses are subdivided into hypotheses and definitions. An axiom is the greatest proposition, »which anyone accepts as soon as they hear it«. ¹¹ A thesis, as Aristotle says in Book I of the *Topics*,¹² is an unfamiliar opinion coming from someone who is renowned for their philosophy. A hypothesis, according to Aristotle in Book I of the *Posterior Analytics*, chapter 2,¹³ is what can assume either part of a contradiction, by which I say that something is or is not. But a definition assumes neither existence nor non-existence, for a definition as such is neither affirmative nor negative; thus, it does not predicate the definition of something else, that is, it does not predicate the notion of the definition to the thing defined.

In chapter 9 of the same text,¹⁴ Aristotle states that an axiom is not a hypothesis or a postulate, because an axiom is a principle that is intrinsically and immediately apparent, and does not stand in need of any reasoning or a

9 Cf. Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, lib. VI, c. 7 (MS Vaticano [Città del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 112va).

10 Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora*, I.2, 72a7 and 72a14–24.

11 Cf. Boethius, *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint*, ed. C. Moreschini, p. 187, l. 17–18.

12 Cf. Aristotle, *Topica*, I.11, 104b19–20.

13 Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora*, I.2, 72a18–20.

14 Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora*, I.10, 76b23–39.

sylllogism to demonstrate or explain it. It requires only the reason that exists in the soul (just as a visible luminous body requires nothing for it to be seen except sight falling upon it from without), for it is understood [*cognoscitur*] when it is seen. The truth of an axiomatic proposition is understood in this way, when the identity of the predicate and subject in the substance is seen. The necessity of a syllogism is understood when the identity of both extremes with the middle term is seen. Because an axiom requires no exterior reasoning, it does not inherently depend on reasoning, for it is accepted by all. However, when something is demonstrable in a higher science, and if it is accepted by the student and seems probable to them, then to them it is a hypothesis; I say, “to them”, because a hypothesis as such is what is not demonstrable nor is it accepted by everyone. Now, if something is demonstrable in a higher subalternating science, and it does not seem probable to the student, then it follows that the teacher begs it of the student, and this is a postulate. Nevertheless, one commonly calls a “postulate” everything that is accepted without demonstration when it is in fact demonstrable, whether it seems probable to the student or not. Definitions, which are put forward at the beginnings of demonstrations, are not hypotheses, because every hypothesis predicates something of something else or from something else, and is a proposition that brings two notions into an ordered relation (the subject and the predicate), either in one subject or from one subject. A definition does not do this, but merely exemplifies a simple thing; intellect, when it apprehends the definition *qua* definition, is nothing else than a kind of simple understanding [*intellectus*] falling upon one thing that has been unfolded.

Furthermore, one should know that all indemonstrable principles of any discipline are comprehended under a general name: “a common concept of the mind”. According to Boethius in *On the Hebdomads*,¹⁵ there are two kinds of common concepts: those accepted by everyone and those accepted only by the learned.¹⁶

So much for the first part.

[B] Now, regarding the properties, proper modes, and notions of the principles of the sciences, [one should know that] there are three different kinds of principles: some are most-common, others are less common, and are intrinsically proper to particular sciences.

The first are and are called most-common because, by their universal power, they descend into all sciences. For example, “it is impossible that the same

¹⁵ Cf. Boethius, *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint*, p. 187, l. 18-25.

¹⁶ Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. III, c. 23 (F f. 166vb-167rb).

thing at the same time is and is not”, or “it is impossible that the affirmation and the negation of something is true”, or “names have determinate meanings”. Aristotle discusses these Book IV of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁷ stating that they are grasped by reason or by the experience gained from the mere judgement of things in everyday life, as is clear from that text. The modes or conditions of any most-common principle, as we read in the same place,¹⁸ are that it is “most certain of all”, that “one cannot lie about it”, that it is “best known”, one cannot be deceived about it or err, that it is not “conditional” or hypothetical, (»such that it would be true only here or now or henceforth, but it is true to everyone, always, and everywhere«),¹⁹ and, finally, that it necessarily “comes to the one who has it” by nature, not by instruction. Now, these principles are most-common in this way because they concern being as being, which is the most universal of all formal intentions according to Aristotle – but for Plato it is otherwise, as will be clear later.²⁰

There are also principles that are less common than these. They are, nevertheless, common by virtue of their power and the extent of their universality. For even if they do not descend into every science, they still descend into some, insofar as their commonality is taken up proportionately by different sciences. This is clear in the case of those principles that are called “common concepts of the mind” and posited at the beginning of Euclid; for example, “if you take equals from equals”, and so on,²¹ and “every whole is greater than its part”.²² These are said to be less common than the principles of the first kind insofar as they are found only in discrete or continuous quantities.

There are also principles of a third kind, which are intrinsically proper to particular sciences. They are not taken up by different sciences according to proportional or analogical commonality; rather, each principle stands according to its own notion. If it descends from a higher science into a determinate science, or even if it is used in some other science, nevertheless, this kind of principle will always stand according to its proper and determinate notion and nature, and is not taken from here to another determinate intention by way of any analogical commonality. For example, in geometry, there is the definition

17 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, IV.3-4, 1005b19-1009a5 (esp. c. 3, 1005b19-20; c. 4, 1007b17-18 and 1006b7-9).

18 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, IV.3, 1005b11-17.

19 Cf. Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, lib. IV, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 174, l. 62-64.

20 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 71, l. 22 – p. 74, l. 127.

21 Euclid, *Elementa*, eds J.L. Heiberg, E.S. Stamatis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1969-1977), vol. 1, lib. 1, common concept 2, p. 5, l. 10; id., *Opera a Campano interprete fidissimo tralata* (Venezia: Paciolini, 1509), f. 4v.

22 Euclid, *Elementa*, vol. 1, lib. 1, common concept 8, p. 6, l. 4; id., *Opera a Campano*, f. 4v.

of the circle²³ or the principle “all right angles are equal”;²⁴ in optics, the principle “colour moves sight”, and so on; in physics, “there is motion in nature”.

Having now outlined the different kinds of scientific principles, let us now consider their mode of certitude and the way their truth is apprehended.

»It is evident that, in most-common principles and in those we have called “common”, the truth is apprehended from the notion of the terms. Since, as Aristotle says in Book VI of the *Ethics*, chapter 4,²⁵ the cognitive habits “by which the soul says” or apprehends “what is true” are five, namely, art, demonstrative knowledge [*scientia*], prudence, wisdom, and intellect – for it belongs to suspicion and opinion to say what is false, as he writes there²⁶ – it follows, as Aristotle concludes in chapter 7,²⁷ that there will be no demonstrative knowledge, art, prudence, or wisdom concerning the principle of the knowable [*scibilis*] or of the sciences [*scientiarum*]. It remains, therefore, that intellect relates to the principle or the kind of principles mentioned above. According to the Commentator,²⁸ intellect is “that, according to which we take cognition of the principles” and through which we come to cognise them. For intellect alone has the principles of the sciences as its subject. For this reason, as the Commentator says at the beginning of chapter 8,²⁹ “concerning the common conceptions, which we call axioms, our intellect, through its intellectual activity, shows the simple and actual proximity between the objects of knowledge, which is immediate and cannot be reached through a syllogism, in that it does not require a mediating definition in order to comprehend the things intellect-ed”. Aristotle says the same in the final chapter of Book I of the *Posterior Analytics*.³⁰«³¹

From the foregoing it is clear that most-common and common principles are apprehended from the notion of the terms or through the habit called “intellect” which, as is said in chapter 8 of *On Fate and Providence*,³² is greater than all scientific knowledge in us and is that by which we understand the terms

23 Cf. Euclid, *Elementa*, vol. 1, lib. 1, definition 15, p. 2, l. 9-13; id., *Opera a Campano*, f. 4r.

24 Euclid, *Elementa*, vol. 1, lib. 1, postulate 4, p. 5, l. 3; id., *Opera a Campano*, f. 4v.

25 Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI.3, 1139b15-17, p. 255, l. 13-15.

26 Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI.3, 1139b17-18, p. 255, l. 15-16.

27 Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI.6, 1140b33-1141a8.

28 Cf. Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, lib. VI, c. 6 (MS Vaticano [Città del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 111rb).

29 Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, lib. VI, c. 7 (MS Vaticano [Città del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 111vb).

30 Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora*, I.34, 89b10-15.

31 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 111, c. 23 (F f. 167vb).

32 Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §30, p. 139, l. 7-10.

or principles. This apprehension does not occur in any way through another habit or through the experiential apprehension [*experimentalem notitiam*] of the senses, as becomes obvious if one examines these principles case by case.

However, if we speak about the certitude of apprehended truth with regard to proper principles, then a distinction must be made: some proper principles belong to purely mathematical sciences, others do not, and if not, they belong to physical sciences or those related to the physical sciences.

For purely mathematical sciences, let us take as examples the principles of arithmetic and geometry. The principles of these sciences have the same mode of certitude as common and most-common principles; that is, such proper principles are grasped through the habit of intellect or according to the reason of the terms, and not through the experiential apprehension [*notitiam*] of the senses. Admittedly, sometimes we already possess some cognition of the substance of the things signified by the terms through the apprehension [*apprehensionem*] of the senses (for example, the number four, the number six, the circle, the triangle, and so on). In the case of non-mathematical sciences, however, the principles themselves are received through the senses or the experiential apprehension of the senses, and not through intellect or any cognitive habit besides intellect.

The reason for this is as follows. We apprehend the proper principles of the mathematical sciences, which concern things abstracted by our consideration of them, at the outset of our entry into these sciences, and we apprehend them by intellect. For, in such sciences, those things that are prior as such in reality and in nature are also grasped earlier by us. Therefore, at the first stage of our approach toward these objects of knowledge, the principles appear to our intellect, whether they are definitions (for example, of the circle or the triangle, or of the number four or the number six and so on), or whether they are the propositions that they call “postulates” (for example, “to extend a line indefinitely” or “all right angles are equal” and so on, which are enumerated at the beginning of Euclid).³³ Therefore, it is the same for common and most-common principles as it is for principles that are proper to purely mathematical sciences: their mode and notion of certitude and apprehended truth is as we have just described it.

However, it is otherwise for sciences concerning things joined to matter, to bodily nature, or to any changeable substance in general, or even to unchangeable substance – whether such things are the essences themselves,

33 Euclid, *Elementa*, vol. 1, lib. 1, postulates 2 and 4, p. 4, l. 16-17 and p. 5, l. 3; id., *Opera a Campano*, f. 4v.

the substances, the natural attributes, properties, or operations of essences or substances, or in general any alteration or change, by which the things are affected, either by nature or by the determination of intellect (as happens, for example, in ethics). In the sciences concerned with such things, I say that their proper principles have another mode of apprehended truth and certitude. For in all these sciences that are investigated and comprehended through the scrutiny of natural reason – whether they concern things abstracted both according to existence and our mode of consideration, or things joined to matter or bodily nature, as was said, or things abstracted according to our mode of consideration that are related to the physical world – in all these cases, the things that are grasped earlier by us and according to our mode of thinking are later in reality (and thus by nature are grasped later, even though they are grasped earlier by us). Such things are the objects of the senses. In the pursuit of these sciences, these things occur earlier, relative to us, in the inquiry undertaken by way of the senses.

Aristotle's teaching that is transmitted in the prologue of the *Metaphysics*³⁴ applies to the pursuit of these sciences: from sense there arises memory, and from these two an experience is acquired, and from many experiences comes the universal, which is the principle of art and science. He makes the same point at the beginning of Book I of the *Posterior Analytics*:³⁵ "Every art and intellectual discipline comes from the pre-existing cognition" of the senses. Thus in physics, "there is motion" is received through the cognition of the senses; in medicine, "scammony purges the bile"; in music, "the proportion of pitches is relative to the size of the hammers being struck"; in optics, "light and colour move sight",³⁶ while the principle "the angles of incidence and reflection in a mirror are equal" is captured by experience using an instrument called a pinhole camera, as is evident in Book IV of Alhazen's *Optics*;³⁷ similarly, in astronomy, the experiential knowledge of certain things is gained through the instrument of the armillary sphere.

Therefore, proceeding along this path of sense and experience in the pursuit of these sciences, one universal is taken as their principle, and this principle in each science is only believed, and not at all known or intellected. For is not grasped from the proper reason of the terms, which would require the

34 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, I.1, 980b28–981a12.

35 Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora*, I.1, 71a1–2, p. 5, l. 3–4.

36 Cf. John Peckham, *Perspectiva communis*, in D. Lindberg (ed.), *John Peckham and the Science of Optics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), lib. 1, prop. 1, p. 62, l. 2–5.

37 Cf. Alhazen, *Opticae thesaurus*, ed. F. Risner (Basel: Episcopius, 1572), lib. IV, c. 7 and 10, p. 104–106 and 108.

use of intellect, nor is it a conclusion reached from any other principles or causes; rather, as was said, the principle is only believed. Accordingly, it is apprehended under the certitude of the true, which cannot possibly be otherwise. Now, I say “it is apprehended”, meaning the principle is that with which reason is objectively occupied in cognition, for example, “that, which is moved, exists”; I understand “the true” to mean the equality or consonance of the thing apprehended and the intellect (this, in its notion and mode, involves a complexion or composition of speech); finally, “certitude” about the truth of the apprehended thing itself is the firm and unshakeable assent of reason in the apprehended thing.

Now, although the believed [*creditum*] is apprehended by reason under the certitude of the true and, in this respect, agrees under a common notion with the known [*scito*], nevertheless, they differ from one another.

First, they differ in the mode and reason of certitude. For demonstrative knowledge [*scientia*], relative to the known, brings about a kind of certitude arising from the evidence of the thing itself. This evidence occurs in the intellect from the intention and the notion of the terms, which form a complex with one another; this happens either through the immediate relation of the terms with one another, if the proposition is immediate in both cause and subject (first principles, for example, are like this), or through a mediate relation, if the conclusion was deduced from prior principles. But the certitude of faith or credulity with respect to the believed does not arise from the evidence of the thing, as it does in demonstrative knowledge, but rather has its cause and reason from the outside, as it were – that is, from the clear authority of some expert, from whose truth the intellect cannot reasonably dissent.

From this distinction in the mode of certitude there arises the second difference between the believed and the known. This consists in the order of apprehension according to which someone apprehends the thing itself (which is in fact the primary object of cognition) as well as the truth about that thing. This truth is one mode of the thing apprehended. For, in demonstrative knowledge, the evidence of the thing comes from the intention and notion of the terms, which are, as it were, the intrinsic principle of cognition discovered in the thing itself, insofar as it is a being and a thing of first intention. From this it follows that the thing itself by nature is apprehended first under its own real notion, which is the object of cognition, and only then does one apprehend truth or falsity about it, since, as Aristotle says, truth and falsity are certain modes of complexion.³⁸ But it is otherwise for faith in relation

38 Cf. Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, I, 16a12-13; *De anima*, III.6, 430a27-430b28.

to principles that are believed. For it does not have the cause and notion of its certitude from the thing itself, but from the authority of some expert, in whose truth reason declares our trust must absolutely be placed and to whose truth the will inclines. From this it follows that the believed as such is apprehended as true primarily and through itself and, as believed, it is known only under the notion of the true and not in its own notion, according to which it is a natural being. Thus, the believed does not have the same evidence as the known, because things known have evidence firstly and through themselves, insofar as they are beings of this or that kind according to the proper notion of their entity; things believed, however, are apprehended firstly and through themselves and have evidence only insofar as they are true, and not insofar as they are beings of this or that kind according to the real and proper notion of their entity.

From the foregoing, by way of summary, we can gather eight noteworthy conclusions about principles.

The first is that the cognition of principles is one thing, and the cognition of conclusions is another: for there is no demonstration of principles, but only of conclusions, because principles are not understood through anything prior – for they are themselves the principles of knowing other things – but conclusions are known from the principles.

The second is that the cognition of most-common principles, common principles, and those proper to purely mathematical sciences are one thing, because they are intellected, but the principles of metaphysics or things divine, of physics, and of things related to physics, are another, because they are received through the senses.

The third conclusion is that all principles do not possess the same certitude and evidence.

The fourth is that there is neither demonstrative knowledge, nor art, nor prudence of the principle of the knowable; there is either the reception of the senses (with respect to the believed), or intellect or wisdom (with respect to the other principles).

The fifth is that it belongs to wisdom to manifest the principles the sciences, not to demonstrate them.

The sixth is that the habits of principles of the first kind of certitude are innate in us. Later it will become clear whether they are in us by nature only in potency and proceed into act from pre-existing sense-cognition, as Aristotle says,³⁹ or, as Plato says, whether they are by nature in us already in act, although

39 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Praeamb.* B, n. 34-35.

they are aroused by instruction fanning the ember, according to Boethius in Book III of *On the Consolation*, metre 11:⁴⁰

Within ... there clings the seed of truth,
Which is aroused by instruction fanning the ember:
For why, being asked a question, do you freely and correctly respond,
Unless buried deep in the heart there burned a living coal?
If Plato's Muse makes the truth resound,
What each forgetful person learns, they recollect.

The seventh conclusion is that nothing is more known than the first principles.

The eight is that it does not belong to any science to demonstrate its principles, even though they are disclosed by first philosophy or wisdom.

From these eight conclusions the properties of every complex principle, insofar as it is a principle, appear in summary form: namely, such a principle is conceived by intellect or common reason, or by the reception of the senses; it comes last in analysis and thus is terminative; it is more permanent and more manifest; it is first apprehended and far removed from deception, and is intellect through itself; it is understood from what comes after it, but in a different mode of cognition than that which comes after it; it is understood most of all; and it is not considered by any particular science.

So much for the second principal part of the *Preamble*.

[C] It remains to consider the third and final part, which concerns the proper mode of theological consideration.

One should know that this divinising wisdom proceeds in exactly the same way, according to the proper mode of a science, proportionately speaking, as the sciences mentioned above, apart from the purely mathematical sciences. This applies to its apprehension [*notitiam*] and use of most-common and common principles, as well as to the way in which its proper principles are received.

Now, this divinising wisdom uses most-common principles, such as "it is impossible that the affirmation and the negation of something are true", or "it is impossible that something both is and is not", and "names have determinate meanings", and any others that there may be.⁴¹

This divinising wisdom also presupposes common principles like the other sciences, especially the quadrivial sciences, but by an analogy, in accordance with the notion of its own matter and subject; examples of these principles

40 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. III, metrum 11, p. 91, l. 11-16.

41 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Praeamb.* B, n. 17.

are “the whole is greater than its part”,⁴² “whatever things are equal to one and the same thing are equal to one another”,⁴³ “if you take equals from equals, the remainders will be equal”,⁴⁴ and so on. The extension of principles is proportionate to the degree of their power.

This sapiential science also has its proper principles, from which it perfectly proceeds according to the scientific mode. It follows this procedure in terms of the apprehension [*notitiam*] of its principles, in terms of their source, and in terms of the process by which it demonstrates conclusions, either positively or by a *reductio*. Now, the proper principles of this science are “there is multitude” and “there is the productive and the produced”.

These principles are grasped in this most divine science in the same way, proportionately speaking, as the proper principles are in other sciences that concern things joined to motion or change and to matter, and in those sciences that are related to the physical world, such as music, optics, so on. For it is obvious that in such sciences there is no necessary relation between the apprehension [*apprehensionem*] of the senses and the apprehension of the intellect which arises from them. Consequently, there is no necessary relation between sensible, experiential apprehension [*notitiam*] and the universal proposition, which the science takes for its principle, as if something could be inferred necessarily from the sensible, as it were, according to the proper notion of the terms, or concluded from its *per se* causes – unless it might seem to someone that that weak mode of argumentation, which occurs through induction or by example,⁴⁵ could hold, but even from these nothing is inferred or concluded, nor does anything come to be apprehended according to its proper notion or cause.

Therefore, in taking this universal principle from sensible experiences there is nothing but a certain conjectural inference under the notion of the true and not under the notion of determinate being, as has been said. Thus, the universal principle is only received as believed, not as intellected or known. And, as has been said, it is taken according to a certain conjecture, but nevertheless with the firm and unshakeable assent of reason. This firmness and unshakeable assent arise from a certain natural instinct founded in the distinctive and simultaneously collective and collative power that we call “the cogitative”.⁴⁶

42 Euclid, *Elementa*, lib. 1, common concept 8, p. 6, l. 4; id., *Opera a Campano*, f. 4v.

43 Euclid, *Elementa*, lib. 1, common concept 1, p. 5, l. 9; id., *Opera a Campano*, f. 4v.

44 Euclid, *Elementa*, lib. 1, common concept 3, p. 5, l. 11-12; id., *Opera a Campano*, f. 4v.

45 Cf. Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales*, ed. L.M. De Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), tr. 5, §3, p. 56, l. 12 and p. 58, l. 4-5.

46 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Praeamb. C*, n. 56.

In or through this power the simple and pure intentions of things are apprehended, distinguished, collected, and drawn together, once they have been separated from their idols, to borrow an expression from Averroes.⁴⁷ This is the doctrine of Aristotle in Book I of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 2,⁴⁸ and in the final chapter of Book II of the *Posterior Analytics*,⁴⁹ where he shows how, from many sensations, memory arises in rational creatures once reason is stimulated, and from many memories there comes experience, and from many experiences the universal, which comes after the particulars and is, as it were, not separate from them but is nearly identical with them. Such is the principle of art and science, as has already been explained.⁵⁰

»It is similarly the case in this science with regard to the reception of its proper principles, namely, “there is multitude” and so on, which the author receives and assumes, not by a *propter quid* demonstration, which is “from what is prior or from the causes”, but by a *quia* demonstration, which is “from those things, which seem to the many or to the wise to be the case, or which are agreed upon from prior things”, as Aristotle, in Book I of the *Ethics*, chapter 10,⁵¹ and his commentator, Eustratius,⁵² have it. As if in response to the question, “what are the modes by which the principles are cognised?”, Aristotle says in that passage that there are three modes:⁵³ “Now, some principles are viewed by induction, others by sense, and others by habituation, and others in other ways.” Now, they are cognised “by induction”, for example, “if you take equals from equals, what remains are equal”, and others like this. The Commentator explains this as follows:⁵⁴ if someone doubts these, you assume numbers, sizes, and other things that can be measured in the demonstration of this principle. But the principles are cognised “by sense” when, for example, we know the particular qualities of the elements that are prior to them, such as the heat of fire, the humidity of air, and so on. The principles are cognised “by habituation” when, for example, we understand that the virtues are good and morally upright by performing them and in becoming familiar with their acts.«⁵⁵

47 Cf. Averroes, *De anima*, ed. F.S. Crawford (Cambridge, Mass.: Medieval Academy of America, 1953), lib. III, comm. 6, p. 415, l. 62-64.

48 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, I.1, 980b28-981a12.

49 Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora*, II.19, 100a3-9.

50 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Praeamb.* B, n. 34.

51 Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, I.7, 1098a33-b2.

52 Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, lib. I, c. 7, p. 124, l. 46-48.

53 Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, I.7, 1098b3-4, p. 152, l. 5-6.

54 Cf. Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, lib. I, c. 7, p. 126, l. 98 – p. 127, l. 12.

55 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 24 (F f. 169ra-b).

The principles of this science, “there is multitude”, and so on, are received in exactly the same way. In fact, over and above the mode common to it and the other sciences, it has something greater in the notion and cause of its certitude and its unshakeable assent in these principles themselves.

This becomes evident first from a consideration of the cognitive principle, with which the theologian applies himself to divine objects, and which is more eminent and thus more acute than every other cognitive principle that we use relative to any knowable objects whatsoever.

For it exceeds the particular reason, which some⁵⁶ call “the cogitative” and which, though it is one in subject, is three in operation. Regarding its lower part, where it touches the imagination, the particular reason is opinionative and is occupied with the intentions of physical things; regarding its higher part, where it is joined to the universal reason, it knows demonstratively [*scientifica*] and is occupied with purely mathematical things, such as arithmetic and geometry (these two kinds of speculation belong to reason, as the author explains in chapter 8 of *On Fate and Providence*,⁵⁷ near the beginning); as for its middle part, the particular reason is occupied with mathematical things that are applied to the physical world, for example, with number related to sound in the case of harmonics, the visual and radial line in the case of optics, or moving quantity in the case of astronomy. From here the levels in reason can be considered from the diversity of knowable objects with which reason is occupied.

Now, the cognitive principle of this science also exceeds the universal reason, which we call “the possible intellect”, which apprehends the thing in its reason. This universal reason, regarding its lower part, is occupied with logical intentions; regarding its middle part, with metaphysical intentions, as can be gathered from the book and chapter mentioned above;⁵⁸ but regarding its higher part, it reflects beings as such and is intellect, as is written in the same passage.⁵⁹

Indeed, these cognitive principles relate only to beings, though according to different notions. However, there are many divine things above being, as is clear

56 Cf. Averroes, *De anima*, lib. III, comm. 6, p. 415, l. 59 – p. 416, l. 9; Albert the Great, *De anima*, ed. C. Stroick (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1968), lib. III, tr. 2, c. 19, p. 206, l. 27-28; Thomas Aquinas, *De anima*, ed. A.M. Pirotta (Torino: Marietti, 1959⁴), lib. II, lect. 13, §396-398, p. 101; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, ed. B. Mojsisch, *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, III.27.2, p. 200, l. 26.

57 Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §28, p. 136, l. 1 – p. 138, l. 5. Reading *metaphysicas* with MS Oxford, Balliol College Library, Cod. 224B, where the critical edition follows MS Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2192 (*mathematicas*).

58 Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §29, p. 138, l. 1-15.

59 Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §30, p. 139, l. 1-7.

in the case of things divine according to essence and what is divine according to cause, which is “above all beings”, as Dionysius attests in chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names* B.⁶⁰ For this reason, in chapter 1 of the *Mystical Theology*,⁶¹ he calls “unlearned” those “who are sealed off in beings and believe that there is nothing supersubstantially beyond beings, but they presume to know, with that cognition that is according to themselves, him, who makes the shadows his hiding place”. Consequently, it is impossible that we should receive those things that are above us according to our ownness and thus compare things divine with a reason that has been reared on the senses, through which we are deceived by appearances, as he says there in chapter 7 of *On the Divine Names*.⁶² Dionysius adds an explanation for this,⁶³ when he describes the cognitive principle in us of things divine, which we are seeking here: “one must see that our mind has a certain power for knowing, through which it examines things intelligible, but a union exceeding the nature of the mind (the other translation says: ‘a unity superexalted beyond the nature of the mind’), through which the mind is conjoined to those things that are above it. Therefore, it is necessary to think divine things according to this, not according to ourselves, but our whole selves placed outside our whole selves and deified wholly. For it is better to be God’s and not our own; thus, divine things will be given to those made to be with God”. Thus Dionysius.

Behold, how beautifully he describes this cognitive principle, this union or unity, with which »one must apply oneself to divine things«,⁶⁴ and its supereminence relative to every other principle in us! Proclus speaks of this principle, which he also calls “the one of the soul”, and about its eminence relative to every other cognitive power in us, in the text discussed above,⁶⁵ and about how those treating divine things are made gods and knowers of things divine. For this reason, in question 10 of *On Providence*,⁶⁶ he says that this one itself is more divine than the intellect.

Thus, it is evident that this science, because of its cognitive principle through which it considers divine things, not only incomparably exceeds all particular sciences in the certitude of its principles, but even the metaphysics of the Peripatetics that is occupied with being as being.

60 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.3 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 175; PG 3, 697A).

61 Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, 1.2 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 569–570; PG 3, 1000A).

62 Cf. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 384–385; PG 3, 865C).

63 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 385–386; PG 3, 865C–868A).

64 Cf. Boethius, *De Trinitate*, c. 2, p. 169, l. 79–80.

65 Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §31–32, p. 139, l. 1 – p. 140, l. 5.

66 Cf. Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 10, §64, p. 106, l. 9–11.

This is evident in a second way from a consideration of the divinising or supersapiential habit through which this theology receives its principles, and from a reflection on the eminence of this habit itself relative to all other habits, whether these be scientific or even sapiential.

To make this point clearer, one should know that, just as Plato and Aristotle diverge on the question of the cognitive powers and modes of cognition in the human soul, so likewise they do not agree on the question of scientific and sapiential habits.

Aristotle, as the author attests in his book *On Fate and Providence*, chapter 8,⁶⁷ leads us through the cognitive powers and modes of cognition in our soul as far as intellect and intellectual activity, and insinuates nothing beyond this. But Plato and the theologians before Plato praised a cognition beyond intellect, which they divulge as a divine frenzy, and they say that this cognition is the one of the soul. For in this one – which Dionysius, as we saw,⁶⁸ calls “the union (or, according to the other translation, ‘the unity’) superexalted above the nature of the mind (or intellect)” – the cognitive power and the cognition are the same. Therefore, it necessarily follows that, just as the cognitive powers and modes of cognition are ranked in terms of nobility and eminence, so too must the sapiential habits of these cognitive powers be ranked in terms of nobility and excellence. For one cognitive power relates to another just as one habit relates to another. Now, the cognitive power of this, our divinising theology, exceeds not only the cognitive powers of all sciences but even the intellect itself, as was said – and the intellect, according to the author in the text mentioned above,⁶⁹ is greater than every science and belongs to the soul itself “insofar as it is an image of what is truly intellect”. For “imitating this as much as it can, the soul itself becomes intellect, running beyond science, abandoning the manifold methods with which was formerly adorned, and raises its eyes to beings alone”. Thus Proclus.

The eminence of this cognitive power, the one or unity of the soul, is so great that the soul – once it is completely stationed within it – is almost made into God, according to Dionysius and the author in the passage mentioned above.⁷⁰ Therefore, the habit of this, our divinising beyond-wisdom, exceeds every other habit – not only of the sciences, but even the habit of intellect that is wisdom, through which Aristotle received his first principles in his first philosophy which, because it concerns being as being, is merely of beings.

67 Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §31, p. 139, l. 2 – p. 140, l. 6.

68 Berthold of Moosburg, *Prol.* 15, n. 160; 16, n. 174; 17, n. 185.

69 Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §30, p. 139, l. 8–21.

70 Berthold of Moosburg, *Praeamb.* C, n. 63–66.

Now, according to Aristotle himself, this habit of wisdom, although it seems to differ in general from intellect, nevertheless is said by him to consist in science and intellect.

»This can be shown more clearly by the three propositions that Aristotle himself gives in Book VI of the *Ethics*, chapter 8.⁷¹ The first is that wisdom is the most certain kind of knowledge; the second, that wisdom is “intellect and demonstrative knowledge [*scientia*]”; the third, that wisdom “is the most honourable knowledge because it holds the highest rank”. He proves the first proposition when he says⁷² that “wisdom must not only know what follows from the principles but also must be able to say what is true about the principles”. The second part of this quotation shows the difference between wisdom and intellect; for, according to what Eustratius the commentator says there,⁷³ wisdom “is not only the cognition of things demonstrated from the principles but is the veridical science of the principles themselves and those things relating to them”. For wisdom is able to think these things, not only by a primary reception, but, if needed, it can use arguments to persuade someone who requires them. For this reason, first philosophy is entirely wisdom and the first philosopher is entirely wise, “because it crafts the crafts, knows the sciences scientifically, demonstrates the principles, and, where it is fitting, manifests them”, and conveys them to the other sciences. The Commentator gives the fine example of geometry:⁷⁴ geometry assumes extensions, height, width, and depth, but the philosopher himself demonstrates these, and likewise for the other sciences.

And so from the foregoing it is clear that intellect is the simple reception of principles, but wisdom is the reception of the principles with certainty about them.⁷⁵

If, therefore, wisdom is the most certain knowledge, as the first proposition states, because it receives the principles of the sciences with certainty about them, what shall we say about our beyond-wisdom? It receives, with certainty, not only the principles of beings (which according to Aristotle are themselves beings),⁷⁶ but even the principles that are beyond beings, and especially the primarily Good, which is the principle and cause, not only of all beings, but

71 Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI.7, 1141a16-20, p. 259, l. 17-22.

72 Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI.7, 1141a17-18, p. 259, l. 19-20.

73 Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, lib. VI, c. 7 (MS Vaticano [Città del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 2171, f. 112rb and 112va).

74 Cf. Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, lib. VI, c. 7 (MS Vaticano [Città del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 112vb-113ra).

75 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. III, c. 23 (F f. 168ra-b).

76 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, V.1, 1012b34-1013a23.

even of the divinising principles that are the primordial principles of all beings, which are beneath the first Principle as such. What shall we say, except that this is the most certain and highest cognition of the deified human?

For this reason, the author, speaking about that cognition of the soul, by which it ascends to the One and hypothetical, says this in *On Fate and Providence*, chapter 8:⁷⁷ “From this, the geometer and each of the other scientists will derive knowledge of their principles, because it reconnects the many and divided principles with the one principle of all. For what it (meaning: the Principle) is in all things, in geometry is the point, in arithmetic the monad, and in each science that which is most simple, from which the sciences bring forth and demonstrate what belongs to them. But, to be sure, each of these is called a particular principle, but the Principle of all beings is the principle as such, and it is this that the ascent of the teaching of the sciences reaches”. Thus Proclus.

From what has been said it is abundantly clear that, if wisdom is said to have such certainty while it only concerns beings, how great will the certitude of that wisdom be, which treats not only beings, but beyond-beings, which, as it were, infinitely surpass beings themselves? For among these are things that are divine according to essence and indeed God himself, who is glorious unto the ages.

»Similarly, from the second proposition we have the other difference between wisdom and intellect, namely, that wisdom consists of intellect and demonstrative knowledge. For, as the Commentator states,⁷⁸ wisdom is the habit composed of intellect and knowledge. For intellect has cognition of the principles and demonstrative knowledge concerns conclusions derived from the principles, but wisdom has the necessary knowledge of both. Accordingly, Aristotle says⁷⁹ that “the wise must not only know what follows from the principles (that is, the conclusions), but must be able to say what is true about the principles”. “Therefore, when the soul conceives both kinds of truth – both the truth about the principles and the truth about what follows from the principles – then it becomes intellectual, and a theologian (that is, a wise soul).”⁸⁰ Thus the Commentator.⁸¹

77 Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, c. 8, §29, p. 138, l. 7-15.

78 Cf. Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, lib. VI, c. 7 (MS Vaticano [Città del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 113ra).

79 Berthold of Moosburg, *Praeamb.* C, n. 72.

80 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. III, c. 23 (F f. 168rb).

81 Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, lib. VI, c. 7 (MS Vaticano [Città del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 113rb).

Indeed, since the cognitive power of our supersapiential and divinising wisdom not only runs beyond every kind of knowledge that concerns beings, but even ascends beyond intellect itself, as was shown above,⁸² the habit of this wisdom will not strictly speaking be composed of intellect and knowledge, but will be the simple inspection of the Form forming all things as such, according to what is said by Boethius in *On the Trinity*:⁸³ “in theology one must apply oneself intellectually, not being led astray by imaginings, but rather by looking into the Form itself”.

And since, as he says in Book v of *On the Consolation*, prose 5,⁸⁴ “there exists the higher eye of the intelligence, for, surpassing the boundary of the universe, it views that simple Form by the pure apex of the mind”, so therefore, according to Dionysius in chapter 7 of *On the Divine Names*,⁸⁵ “because of the divine wisdom, souls have the rational power, indeed, to go about in a circle around the truth of beings, and because of their abundant variety they fall short of the unitive minds, but also, by virtue of enfolding the many into the one, they are held worthy of intellections equal to the angels, insofar as this is fitting and possible for souls”.

Now, Dionysius had said already⁸⁶ that in these angels “intellectual power and activity shines forth pure and immaculate and is able to behold the divine intellects. And by virtue of its simplicity and immateriality, the intellectual power is shaped, as much as possible, by its simplicity, immateriality, and by its divinely, conformly, and uniformly unitive character, after the divine and beyond-wise mind and reason”. And below, in the same chapter, section I,⁸⁷ after he spoke about the cognition of God in a general way, he adds: “And there is, furthermore, the most divine cognition of God, which is known through ignorance according to the union above mind, when the mind, having departed from everything else, and then also sending itself away, is united with the super-resplendent rays, and is illuminated hither and yon by the inscrutable depth of wisdom.” Dionysius makes the same point in chapter 1, section A.⁸⁸

From these passages, we clearly see the eminence of the habit of the supersapiential science of the Platonists in comparison to the habit of sapiential metaphysics.

82 Berthold of Moosburg, *Praeamb.* C, n. 69.

83 Boethius, *De Trinitate*, c. 2, p. 169, l. 79–81.

84 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. v, prosa 4, p. 149, l. 86–88.

85 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.2 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 390–391; PG 3, 868B–C).

86 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.2 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 389–390; PG 3, 868B).

87 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.3 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 406; PG 3, 872A–B).

88 Cf. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 1.1 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 5–8; PG 3, 585B–588A).

»The third proposition, from which the third difference comes, is that wisdom is the most honourable knowledge.⁸⁹ This is explained in two ways. The first is relative to its matter and subject, since we say that things divine are most honourable.«⁹⁰ According to Aristotle,⁹¹ these things are being as such and its parts, modes, and properties. »The second is relative to its form, since we think using the most honourable principles, and wisdom is a veridical and most certain knowledge about these principles. Therefore, Aristotle says in the same place⁹² that “wisdom is the demonstrative knowledge and intellect of things that are most honourable by nature”.«⁹³

From this third proposition, once again, we clearly see the eminence of the habit of this divinising science above the habit of metaphysics. In terms of matter and subject, this wisdom concerns the most honourable things, namely, the divine good according to cause primarily and according to essence or existence – that is, the first Good and One and the goodnesses and unities – and also what participates goodness after the manner of an exemplar.

Similarly, in terms of its form, these are the most honourable principles, through which this divinising science ascends to the thatness of the primarily One and primarily Good (I do not say “the whatness”), in accordance with what Dionysius writes in chapter 7 of *On the Divine Names*, section H:⁹⁴ “Moreover, one must ask how we are to know God, who is neither intelligible, nor sensible, nor is absolutely any of those things that exist. So is it never true to say that we know God? Not from his nature, for this is unknown and exceeds all reason and mind; but from the ordering of all things, just as it has been projected from him”, and so on. Thus Dionysius.

For this reason, the author ascends methodically and gradually, according to his capacity, to what is beyond all things, through the principles proper to the science, as will be clear immediately in what follows.

From all the foregoing it is abundantly clear that this, our divinising philosophy, is most truly and properly a science – a science, moreover, that is veridical, most certain, and thus the highest of all, both by virtue of its mode of proceeding from principles that are most-common, common, and proper, which is truly scientific, and by virtue of the habit, by which it receives its principles, as has been shown here extensively.

89 Berthold of Moosburg, *Praeamb.* C, n. 71.

90 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. III, c. 23 (F f. 168rb).

91 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, VI.1, 1026a19–32.

92 Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI.7, 1141b2–3, p. 260, l. 14–15.

93 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. III, c. 23 (F f. 168rb).

94 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.3 (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 402–403; PG 3, 869C–D).

Bibliography

Manuscripts

- Anonymous Ratisbonensis, *Quaestiones in IV libros Sententiarum*, MS München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26897, ff. 11a-138vb.
- Eustratius of Nicaea, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius*, MS Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, ff. 11a-211vb.
- Franz of Retz, *Comestorium beatae Mariae virginis*, MS Klosterneuburg, Augustiner-Chorherrenstift, Cod. 43, ff. 11a-296rb.
- Franz of Retz, *Lectura super antiphonam Salve regina*, MS Klosterneuburg, Augustiner-Chorherrenstift, Cod. 52, ff. 11a-260va.
- Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.VI.437, ff. 11a-230vb.
- William of Conches, *Glossae super Macrobiū (versio longior)*, MS Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. lat. 1140, ff. 21-153v.

Primary Sources

- Adelheid Langmann, *Die Offenbarungen der Adelheid Langmann, Klosterfrau zu Engelthal*, ed. P. Strauch, Strassburg, Trübner, 1878.
- Alan of Lille, *Summa 'Quoniam homines'*, ed. P. Glorieux, in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 20(1953), p. 113-364.
- Alan of Lille, *Regulae caelestis iuris*, ed. N. Häring, in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 48(1981), p. 121-226.
- Albert the Great, *Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, 38 vols, Paris, Vivès, 1890-1899.
- Albert the Great, *De animalibus*, ed. H. Stadler, 2 vols, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1916-1920.
- Albert the Great, *Physica*, ed. P. Hossfeld, Editio Coloniensis IV/1-2, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1987-1993.
- Albert the Great, *De caelo et mundo*, ed. P. Hossfeld, Editio Coloniensis V/1, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1971.
- Albert the Great, *De natura loci. De causis proprietatum elementorum. De generatione et corruptione*, ed. P. Hossfeld, Editio Coloniensis V/2, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1980.
- Albert the Great, *De anima*, ed. C. Stroick, Editio Coloniensis VII/1, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1968.
- Albert the Great, *De natura et origine animae*, ed. B. Geyer, Editio Coloniensis XII, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1955, p. 1-46.

- Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, ed. B. Geyer, Editio Coloniensis XVI/1-2, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1960–1964.
- Albert the Great, *De fato*, ed. P. Simon, Editio Coloniensis XVII/1, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1975, p. 65–78.
- Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, ed. W. Fauser, Editio Coloniensis XVII/2, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1993.
- Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. Libri I, pars I. Quaestiones 1-50A*, ed. D. Siedler, Editio Coloniensis XXXIV/1, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1978.
- Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De caelesti hierarchia*, eds P. Simon, W. Kübel, Editio Coloniensis XXXVI/1, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1993.
- Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, ed. P. Simon, Editio Coloniensis XXXVII/1, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1972.
- Albert the Great, *Super Dionysii Mysticam theologiam et Epistulas*, ed. P. Simon, Editio Coloniensis XXXVII/2, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1978.
- Alexander of Hales, *Summa fratris Alexandri*, ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 4 vols, Quaracchi, Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–1948.
- Alfarabi, *De ortu scientiarum*, ed. C. Baeumker, *Über den Ursprung der Wissenschaften (De ortu scientiarum). Eine mittelalterlichen Einleitungsschrift in die philosophischen Wissenschaften*, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1916.
- Alghazali, *Metaphysica*, ed. J.T. Muckle, *Algazel's Metaphysics. A Medieval Translation*, Toronto, St. Michael's College, 1933.
- Alhazen, *Opticae thesaurus*, ed. F. Risner, Basel, Episcopius, 1572.
- Ambrose, *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*, ed. M. Adriaen, Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina 14, Turnhout, Brepols, 1957.
- Ambrosiaster, *Commentarius in epistulas Paulinas. Pars prima. In epistulam ad Romanos*, ed. H.J. Vogels, Wien, Hoelder / Pichler / Tempsky, 1966.
- Apuleius, *Apulei opera quae supersunt. Vol. III. De philosophia libri*, ed. C. Moreschini, Leipzig, Teubner, 1991.
- Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora, translationes Iacobi, Anonymi sive 'Ioannis', Gerardi et Recensio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, eds L. Minio-Paluello, B.G. Dod, Aristoteles Latinus IV/1-4, Brugge / Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1968.
- Aristotle, *Topica, translatio Boethii*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus V/1-3, Bruxelles / Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1969.
- Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea, translatio Roberti Grosseteste*, ed. R.A. Gauthier, Aristoteles Latinus XXVI/1-3, Leiden / Bruxelles, Brill / Desclée de Brouwer, 1972.
- Augustine, *De immortalitate animae*, Patrologia Latina 32, Paris, Migne, 1841, cols 1021–1034.
- Augustine, *Soliloquia*, Patrologia Latina 32, Paris, Migne, 1841, cols 869–904.
- Augustine, *Contra Maximinum haereticum Arianorum episcopum*, Patrologia Latina 42, Paris, Migne, 1985, cols 743–814.
- Augustine, *De natura boni*, Patrologia Latina 42, Paris, Migne, 1865, cols 551–572.

- Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, ed. J. Zycha, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 28/1, Wien, Tempsky, 1894.
- Augustine, *Epistulae*, ed. A. Goldbacher, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 34/1-2, 44, 57, 58, Wien, Tempsky, 1895–1923.
- Augustine, *Contra academicos. De beata vita. De ordine. De magistro. De libero arbitrio*, eds W. Green, K. Daur, Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina 29, Turnhout, Brepols, 1970.
- Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, ed. A. Mutzenbecher, Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina 44A, Turnhout, Brepols, 1975, p. 3–249.
- Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, eds B. Dombart, A. Kalb, Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina 47–48, Turnhout, Brepols, 1955.
- Augustine, *De Trinitate*, eds W.J. Mountain, F. Glorie, Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina 50–50A, Turnhout, Brepols, 1968.
- Averroes, *Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, in *Aristotelis opera cum Averroes commentariis*, vol. 8, Venezia, Junta, 1562.
- Averroes, *De substantia orbis*, in *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, vol. 9, Venezia, Junta, 1562–1574, f. 3r–14v.
- Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, ed. F.S. Crawford, Cambridge, Mass., Medieval Academy of America, 1953.
- Averroes, *Averrois in librum V (Δ) Metaphysicorum Aristotelis commentarius*, Bern, Francke, 1971.
- Averroes, *La béatitude de l'âme*, eds M. Geoffroy, C. Steel, Paris, Vrin, 2001.
- Avicenna, *Fons vitae, ex Arabico in Latinum translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino*, ed. C. Baeumker, 2 vols, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1892–1895.
- Bernard of Clairvaux, *De diligendo Deo*, eds J. Leclercq, H.M. Rochais, *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, vol. 3, Roma, Editiones Cistercienses, 1963, p. 119–154.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 184–211. De animabus*, ed. L. Sturlese, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi VI/1, Hamburg, Meiner, 1984.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi VI/2, Hamburg, Meiner, 1986.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 35–65*, ed. A. Sannino, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi VI/3, Hamburg, Meiner, 2001.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi VI/4, Hamburg, Meiner, 2003.

- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108-135*, ed. F. Retucci, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi VI/5, Hamburg, Meiner, 2011.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136-159*, ed. F. Retucci, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi VI/6, Hamburg, Meiner, 2007.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160-183*, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi VI/7, Hamburg, Meiner, 2003.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184-211*, ed. L. Sturlese, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi VI/8, Hamburg, Meiner, 2014.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Tabula contentorum in Expositione super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, ed. A. Beccarisi, Pisa, Scuola Normale Superiore, 2000.
- Berthold of Moosburg, "Commentaire des Éléments de théologie de Proclus. Préambule du livre", in R. Imbach, M.-H. Méléard (eds), *Philosophes médiévaux. Anthologie de textes philosophiques (XIIIe-XIVe siècles)*, Paris, Union Générale d'Éditions, 1986, p. 335-372.
- Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica*, ed. C. Moreschini, München / Leipzig, Saur, 2005².
- Bonaventure, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, eds PP Collegii S. Bonaventurae, *Opera omnia*, vol. 5, Quaracchi, Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1896, p. 293-316.
- Cassiodorus, *Expositio in Psalterium*, Patrologia Latina 75, Paris, Migne, 1865, cols 9-1056.
- Christina Ebner, *Der Nonne von Engelthal Büchlein von der Gnaden Überlast*, ed. K. Schröder, Tübingen, Laupp, 1871.
- Cicero, *De inventione*, ed. E. Stroebel, Leipzig, Teubner, 1915.
- Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, ed. M. Pohlenz, Leipzig, Teubner, 1919.
- Cicero, *De natura deorum*, eds O. Plasberg, W. Ax, Leipzig, Teubner, 1933.
- David of Dinant, *Quaternulorum fragmenta*, ed. M. Kurdziałek, in *Studia Mediewistyczne* 3(1963).
- Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie*, ed. B. Mojsisch, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi II/1, Hamburg, Meiner, 1977.
- Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 2. Schriften zur Metaphysik und Theologie*, eds R. Imbach et al., Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi II/2, Hamburg, Meiner, 1980.
- Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, eds J.-D. Caviglioli et al., Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi II/3, Hamburg, Meiner, 1983.

- Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia*, vol. 4. *Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft, Briefe*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese et al., *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi* 11/4, Hamburg, Meiner, 1985.
- Dionysius the ps.-Areopagite, *Opera omnia quae exstant*, *Patrologia Graeca* 3-4, Paris, Migne, 1857-1889.
- Dionysius the ps.-Areopagite, *Dionysiaca*, ed. P. Chevallier, 2 vols, Brugge, Desclée de Brouwer, 1937-1950.
- Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi*, ed. G. Bülow, *Des D. Gundisalvi Schrift von dem Hervorgange der Welt*, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1925.
- Euclid, *Opera a Campano interprete fidissimo tralata*, Venezia, Pacioli, 1509.
- Euclid, *Elementa*, eds J.-L. Heiberg, E.S. Stamatis, 5 vols in 6, Leipzig, Teubner, 1969-1977.
- Eustratius, *In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, translatio Roberti Grosseteste*, ed. H.P.F. Mercken, *Corpus Latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum* VI/1, Leiden, Brill, 1973.
- Flores operum D. Bernardi abbatis Clarevallensis*, Lyons, Rouillius, 1570.
- Flores sancti Bernardi*, Venezia, Junta, 1503.
- Geminus, *Elementa astronomiae*, ed. K. Manitius, Leipzig, Teubner, 1898.
- Gilbert of Poitiers, *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers*, ed. N. Häring, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1966.
- Glossa interlinearis*, in *Biblia Sacra cum Glossis interlineari et ordinaria* [...], Lyons, Trechsel, 1545.
- Glossa ordinaria*, eds M. Morard et al., *Glossae Sacrae Scripturae electronicae*, Paris, CNRS-IRHT, 2017, accessed 29 June 2020 [<http://gloss-e.irht.cnrs.fr>].
- Godfrey of Fontaines, *Les quatres premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines*, eds M. de Wulf, A. Pelzer, *Les philosophes belges* 11, Louvain, Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'Université, 1904.
- Godfrey of Fontaines, *Le huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. J. Hoffmans, *Les philosophes belges* IV/1, Louvain, Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'Université, 1924.
- Godfrey of Fontaines, *Le neuvième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. J. Hoffmans, *Les philosophes belges* IV/2, Louvain, Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'Université, 1928.
- Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, eds G. Wilson, G. Etzkorn, *Opera omnia* VIII, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2011.
- Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, ed. J. Decorte, *Opera omnia* XVI, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1987.
- Henry Suso, *Deutsche Schriften*, ed. K. Bihlmeyer, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1907.
- Henry Suso, *The Exemplar, with Two German Sermons*, trans. F. Tobin, Mahwah, Paulist Press, 1989.

- Hermes Latinus, *Liber de sex rerum principiis*, eds P. Lucentini, M. Delp, Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis 142, Turnhout, Brepols, 2006.
- Hermes Latinus, *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum*, ed. F. Hudry, Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis 143A, Turnhout, Brepols, 1997.
- Hilary of Poitiers, *Liber de synodis*, Patrologia Latina 10, Paris, Migne, 1845, cols 479–546.
- Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, ed. P. Lucentini, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974.
- Honorius Augustodunensis, *La Clavis physicae (316–529) di Honorius Augustodunensis*, ed. P. Arfé, Napoli, Liguori Editore, 2012.
- Hugh of St. Victor, *Commentaria in Hierarchiam caelestem*, Patrologia Latina 175, Paris, Migne, 1854, cols 923–1154.
- Hugh of St. Victor, *De tribus diebus*, ed. D. Poirel, Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis 177, Turnhout, Brepols, 2002.
- Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis Christiane fidei*, ed. R. Berndt, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 2008.
- Huguccio of Pisa, *Derivationes*, eds E. Cecchini *et al.*, 2 vols, Firenze, SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2004.
- Humbert of Romans, *Opera de vita regulari*, ed. J.J. Berthier, 2 vols, Roma, Befani, 1888.
- Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX*, ed. W.M. Lindsay, 2 vols, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911.
- Jan van Ruusbroec, *Die geestelike Brulocht*, ed. J. Alaerts, Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis 103, Turnhout, Brepols, 1988.
- Jerome, *Liber Psalmorum*, Patrologia Latina 28, Paris, Migne, 1845, cols 1127–1240.
- Jerome, *Hebraicae quaestiones in libro Geneseos*, ed. P. de Lagarde, Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina 72, Turnhout, Brepols, 1959.
- John Andrea, *Novella super Decretalibus cum apostillis noviter editis*, Venezia, De Tortis, 1505.
- John of Damascus, *Opera omnia quae exstant*, Patrologia Graeca 94, Paris, Migne, 1864.
- John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa. Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. E.M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, Franciscan Institute, 1955.
- John Scotus Eriugena, *L'Homélie sur le prologue de Jean*, ed. É. Jeaneau, Sources chrétiennes 151, Paris, Cerf, 1969.
- John Scotus Eriugena, *Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem*, ed. J. Barbet, Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis 31, Turnhout, Brepols, 1975.
- John Scotus Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, ed. É. Jeaneau, Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis 161–165, Turnhout, Brepols, 1996–2002.
- John Tauler, *Die Predigten Taulers. Aus der Engelberger und der Freiburger Handschrift sowie aus Schmidts Abschriften der ehemaligen Strassburger Handschriften*, ed. F. Vetter, Berlin, Weidmann, 1910.
- Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. J. Willis, Leipzig, Teubner, 1970.

- Marius Victorinus, *Ad Candidum*, eds P. Henry, P. Hadot, *Traité théologique sur la Trinité*, vol. 1, Paris, Cerf, 1960, p. 126–173.
- Meister Eckhart, *Die lateinischen Werke*, eds E. Benz *et al.*, 5 vols, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1936–2007.
- Meister Eckhart, *Die deutschen Werke*, eds J. Quint, G. Steer, 5 vols, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1936–.
- Meister Eckhart, *The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense*, trans. E. Colledge, B. McGinn, Mahwah, Paulist Press, 1981.
- Meister Eckhart, *Das Buch der göttlichen Tröstung*, trans. K. Flasch, München, Beck, 2007.
- Meister Eckhart, *The German Works. 64 Homilies for the Liturgical Year. 1. De tempore*, eds L. Sturlese, M. Vinzent, Leuven, Peeters, 2019.
- Moses Maimonides, *Dux seu director dubitantium aut perplexorum*, Paris, Ascensius, 1520.
- Nicholas of Cusa, *Opera omnia*, iussu et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis, Leipzig / Hamburg, Meiner, 1932–.
- Nicholas of Strassburg, *Summa. Liber 2, tract. 1-2*, ed. G. Pellegrino, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi v/2(1), Hamburg, Meiner, 2009.
- Nicholas of Strassburg, *Summa. Liber 2, tract. 3-7*, ed. G. Pellegrino, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi v/2(2), Hamburg, Meiner, 2009.
- Nicholas of Strassburg, *Summa. Liber 2, tract. 8-14*, ed. T. Suarez-Nani, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi v/2(3), Hamburg, Meiner, 1990.
- Papias, *Elementarium doctrinae rudimentum*, Venezia, Pincius, 1496.
- Peter Lombard, *Commentaria in Psalmos*, Patrologia Latina 191, Paris, Migne, 1854, cols 61–1296.
- Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in Epistulas d. Pauli*, Patrologia Latina 191–192, Paris, Migne, 1854–1855.
- Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. I. Brady, Grottaferrata, Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971–1981³.
- Peter of Spain, *Tractatus, Called Afterwards Summulae logicales. First Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1972.
- Plato, *Phaedo, translatio Henrici Aristippi*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Plato Latinus 11, London, The Warburg Institute, 1950.
- Plato, *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus*, ed. J.H. Waszink, London / Leiden, The Warburg Institute / Brill, 1962, p. 5–52.
- Pliny, *Naturalis historia*, ed. K. Mayhoff, 5 vols, Leipzig, Teubner, 1892–1909.
- Plotinus, *The Enneads*, ed. L. Gerson, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, ed. E. Diehl, 3 vols, Leipzig, Teubner, 1903–1906.
- Proclus, *Elementatio physica*, ed. H. Boese, *Die mittelalterliche Übersetzung der Stoiheiosis physike des Proclus*, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1958.

- Proclus, *Tria opuscula (De providentia, libertate, malo)*. Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta, ed. H. Boese, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1960.
- Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E.R. Dodds, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963².
- Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, eds H.D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink, vol. 3, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1978.
- Proclus, *Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Tome I. Livres I à IV*, ed. C. Steel, Leuven, Presses universitaires de Louvain, 1982.
- Proclus, *Elementatio theologica, translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca*, ed. H. Boese, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1987.
- Proclus, *On the Existence of Evils*, trans. J. Opsomer, C. Steel, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2003.
- Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria*, ed. C. Steel, 3 vols, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007–2009.
- Ptolemy, *Quadripartitum, Centiloquium [...] cum Commento Haly Heben Rodan*, Venezia, Locatellus, 1493.
- Richard of St. Victor, *Opera omnia*, Patrologia Latina 196, Paris, Migne, 1855.
- Richard of St. Victor, *De contemplatione (Beniamin maior)*, ed. J. Grosfillier, Turnhout, Brepols, 2013.
- Robert Grosseteste, *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste*, ed. L. Baur, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1912.
- Robert Grosseteste, *Compotus*, eds A. Lohr, P.E. Nothaft, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Seneca, *Naturalium quaestionum libros*, ed. H. Hine, Leipzig, Teubner, 1996.
- Thomas Aquinas, *In omnes s. Pauli Apostoli epistolas commentaria*, 2 vols, Torino, Marietti, 1929.
- Thomas Aquinas, *In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, ed. C. Pera, Torino, Marietti, 1950.
- Thomas Aquinas, *In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium*, ed. A.M. Pirotta, Torino, Marietti, 1959⁴.
- Thomas Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis*, ed. Leonina, vol. 40D, Roma, Santa Sabina, 1968.
- Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate. Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus*, ed. Leonina, vol. 50, Roma / Paris, Commissio Leonina / Cerf, 1992.
- Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, ed. H.D. Saffrey, Paris, Vrin, 2002.
- Thomas Gallus, *Paraphrasis super De divinis nominibus*, ed. P. Chevallier, *Dionysiaca*, Brugge, Desclée de Brouwer, 1937, p. 673–708.
- Thomas Gallus, *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, ed. D. Lawell, Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis 223, Turnhout, Brepols, 2011.

- Thomas of York, *Sapientiale. Liber III, cap. 1-20*, ed. A. Punzi, Firenze, SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2020.
- Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 1*, ed. B. Mojsisch, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi 1/1, Hamburg, Meiner, 1989.
- Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 1-4*, ed. A. de Libera, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi 1/2(1), Hamburg, Meiner, 1987.
- Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5-6*, ed. A. Beccarisi, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi 1/2(2), Hamburg, Meiner, 2007.
- Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 1-3*, ed. S. Tuzzo, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi 1/3(1), Hamburg, Meiner, 2004.
- Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 1-2,7*, ed. S. Pieperhoff, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi 1/4(1), Hamburg, Meiner, 1987.
- Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 3*, ed. A. Palazzo, Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi 1/4(4), Hamburg, Meiner, 2005.
- Vita Secundi philosophi*, ed. B.E. Perry, *Secundus the Silent Philosopher. The Greek Life of Secundus*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1964, p. 68–100.
- William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, ed. F. Hotot; *Supplementum*, ed. B. Le Ferron, 2 vols, Paris, Thierry, 1674.
- William of Conches, *Glosae super Platonem*, ed. É. Jeauneau, Paris, Vrin, 1965.

Secondary Sources

- Aertsen, J., “Ontology and Henology in Medieval Philosophy (Thomas Aquinas, Master Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg)”, in E.P. Bos, P.A. Meijer (eds), *Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy*, Leiden, Brill, 1992, p. 120–140.
- Aertsen, J., *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez*, Leiden, Brill, 2012.
- Albertson, D., *Mathematical Theologies. Nicholas of Cusa and the Legacy of Thierry of Chartres*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Allen, J.B., *The Friar as Critic. Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages*, Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1971.
- Anzulewicz, H., “Entwicklung und Stellung der Intellekttheorie im System des Albertus Magnus”, in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 70(2003), p. 165–218.
- Anzulewicz, H., “Anthropology. The Concept of Man in Albert the Great”, in I.M. Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences*, Leiden, Brill, 2013, p. 325–346.
- Baeumker, C., *Witelo. Ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrhunderts*, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1908.

- Baur, L. (ed.), *Cusanus-Texte III, Marginalien, I. Nicolaus Cusanus und Ps.-Dionysius im Lichte der Zitate und Randbemerkungen des Cusanus*, Heidelberg, Winter, 1940–1941.
- Beccarisi, A., “La scientia divina dei filosofi nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in *Rivista di storia della filosofia* 61(2006), p. 137–163.
- Beccarisi, A., “Dietrich in the Netherlands. A New Document in the Lower Rhenish Vernacular”, in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2009, p. 221–237.
- Beccarisi, A., “Le Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi (CPTMA)”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57(2010), p. 425–430.
- Beccarisi, A., “*Ex Germano in rebus divinis*. ‘Spekulative’ und ‘deutsche’ Mystik im Kontext”, in *Quaestio* 15(2015), p. 169–182.
- Beccarisi, A., “Avicebron (Solomon Ibn Gabirol) and Berthold of Moosburg on Essential Causality”, forthcoming.
- Beierwaltes, W., “Der Begriff des *unum in nobis* bei Proklos”, in P. Wilpert (ed.), *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 2, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1963, p. 255–266.
- Beierwaltes, W., “Cusanus and Eriugena”, in *Dionysius* 13(1989), p. 115–152.
- Beierwaltes, W., *Eriugena. Grundzüge seines Denkens*, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1994.
- Bermon, E., *Le cogito dans la pensée de saint Augustin*, Paris, Vrin, 2001.
- Bernards, M., “Flores Sancti Bernardi”, in J. Lortz (ed.), *Bernhard von Clairvaux. Mönch und Mystiker. Internationaler Bernhard-Kongress Mainz 1953*, Mainz, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz, 1955, p. 176–191.
- Boese, H., *Die mittelalterliche Übersetzung der Stoiceiosis physike des Proclus*, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1958.
- Boese, H., *Wilhelm von Moerbeke als Übersetzer der Stoiceiosis theologike des Proclus. Untersuchungen und Texte zur Überlieferung der Elementatio theologica*, Birkenau, Bitsch, 1985.
- Böhringer, L., “Kölner Beginen im Spätmittelalter – Leben zwischen Kloster und Welt”, in *Geschichte in Köln* 53(2006), p. 7–34.
- Boland, V., *Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Sources and Synthesis*, Leiden, Brill, 1996.
- Boulnois, O., *Métaphysiques rebelles. Genèse et structures d'une science au Moyen Âge*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2013.
- Brown, S., “*Duo Candelabra Parisiensia*. Prosper of Reggio in Emilia's Portrait of the Enduring Presence of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines regarding the Nature of Theological Study”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 28, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2001, p. 320–356.

- Brown, S., "Late Thirteenth Century Theology. *Scientia* Pushed to its Limits", in R. Berndt, M. Lutz-Bachmann, R.M.W. Stammberger (eds), *Scientia und Disciplina. Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert*, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2002, p. 79–90.
- Bürkle, S., *Literatur im Kloster. Historische Funktion und rhetorische Legitimation frauenmystischer Texte des 14. Jahrhunderts*, Tübingen, Francke, 1999.
- Bürkle, S., "Ebner, Christine", in W. Kühlmann (ed.), *Killy Literaturlexikon*, vol. 3, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2008, p. 163b–165b.
- Caiazzo, I., *Lectures médiévales de Macrobie. Les Glosae Colonienses super Macrobius*, Paris, Vrin, 2002.
- Caiazzo, I., "Mains célèbres dans les marges des *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* de Macrobie", in D. Jacquart, C. Burnett (eds), *Scientia in margine. Études sur les marginalia dans les manuscrits scientifiques du Moyen Âge à la Renaissance*, Genève, Librairie Droz, 2005, p. 171–189.
- Calma, D., "La connaissance réflexive de l'intellect agent. Le 'premier averroïsme' et Dietrich de Freiberg", in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2009, p. 63–105.
- Calma, D., *Le Poids de la citation. Étude sur les sources arabes et grecques dans l'oeuvre de Dietrich de Freiberg*, Fribourg, Academic Press, 2010.
- Calma, D., "Maneries", in I. Atucha et al. (eds), *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach*, Porto, Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2011, p. 433–444.
- Calma, D., "Du néoplatonisme au réalisme et retour. Parcours latins du *Liber de causis* aux XIII^e – XVI^e siècles", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 54(2012), p. 217–276.
- Calma, D., "The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism. Considerations of a Recently Discovered *Corpus* of Texts", in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, I. New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250–1350)*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2016, p. 11–52.
- Calma, D., "A Medieval Companion to Aristotle. John Krosbein's Paraphrase on *Liber de causis*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II. New Commentaries on Liber de Causis and Elementatio Theologica (ca. 1350–1500)*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2016, p. 11–97.
- Calma, D., "Metaphysics as a Way of Life. Heymericus de Campo on Universals and 'The Inner Man'", in *Vivarium* 58(2020), p. 305–334.
- Calma, D., Imbach, R., "Les notes marginales de Nicolas de Cues au traité *Colliget principiorum* d'Heymeric de Campo", in K. Reinhardt et al. (eds), *Heymericus de Campo. Philosophie und Theologie im 15. Jahrhundert*, Regensburg, Roderer-Verlag, 2009, p. 15–51.
- Calma, D., Imbach, R., "Heymeric de Campo, auteur d'un traité de métaphysique. Étude et édition partielle du *Colliget principiorum*", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 80(2013), p. 277–423.

- Carron, D., "A Theological Reading of the *Liber de causis* at the Turn of the Fourteenth Century. The Example of William of Leus", in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, I. New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250–1350)*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2016, p. 467–550.
- Catto, J., "Theology and Theologians 1220–1320", in J. Catto (ed.), *The Early Oxford Schools*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 471–517.
- Châtillon, J., "Les trois modes de la contemplation selon Richard de Saint-Victor", in *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique* 41(1940), p. 3–26.
- Chenu, M.-D., *La théologie comme science au XIII^e siècle*, Paris, Vrin, 1957³.
- Chulp, R., *Proclus. An Introduction*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Clark, J.G., "Trevet, Nicholas (b. 1257x65, d. in or after 1334)", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 349–351.
- Colli, A., *Tracce agostiniane nell'opera di Teodorico di Freiberg*, Genoa, Marietti, 2010.
- Coolman, B.T., *Knowledge, Love, and Ecstasy in the Theology of Thomas Gallus*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Coolman, B.T., Coulter, D. (eds), *Trinity and Creation. A Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard, and Adam of St Victor*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2010.
- Counet, J.-M., *Mathématique et dialectique chez Nicolas de Cues*, Paris, Vrin, 2000.
- Creytens, R., "Les écrivains dominicains dans la chronique d'Albert de Castello (1516)", in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 30(1960), p. 227–313.
- Crouse, R., "The Doctrine of Creation in Boethius. The *De hebdomadibus* and the *Consolatio*", in *Studia Patristica* 17(1982), p. 417–21.
- Crouse, R., "Primordiales Causae in Eriugena's Interpretation of Genesis. Sources and Significance", in G. Van Riel, C. Steel, J. McEvoy (eds), *Iohannes Scottus Eriugena. The Bible and Hermeneutics. Proceedings of the Ninth International Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies Held at Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve June 7–10, 1995*, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1996, p. 209–220.
- Crouse, R., "Predestination, Human Freedom and the Augustinian Theology of History in Eriugena's *De divina praedestinatione*", in J. McEvoy, M. Dunne (eds), *History and Eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and His Time. Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies, Maynooth and Dublin, August 16–20, 2000*, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2002, p. 303–311.
- Dahan, G., "Les prologues des commentaires bibliques (XII^e–XIV^e siècle)", in J. Hamesse (ed.), *Les prologues médiévaux. Actes du Colloque international organisé par l'Academia Belgica et l'École française de Rome avec le concours de la F.I.D.E.M. (Rome, 26–28 mars 1998)*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2000, p. 427–470.
- D'Alverny, M.-Th., "Le cosmos symbolique du XII^e siècle", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 20(1953), p. 31–81.

- D'Alverny, M.-Th., "Une rencontre symbolique de Jean Scot Érigène et d'Avicenne. Notes sur le *De causis primis et secundis et fluxu qui consequitur eas*", in J.J. O'Meara, L. Bieler (eds), *The Mind of Eriugena*, Dublin, Irish University Press for the Royal Irish Academy, 1973, p. 170–181.
- D'Alverny, M.-Th., "Paolo Lucentini, *Platonismo medievale. Contribua per la storia dell'Eriugenismo*", in *Scriptorium* 36/2(1982), p. 348–351.
- D'Ancona, C., "Saint Thomas lecteur du *Liber de causis*", in *Revue thomiste* 92(1992), p. 785–817.
- Dean, R.J., "Cultural Relations in the Middle Ages. Nicholas Trevet and Nicholas of Prato", in *Studies in Philology* 45(1948), p. 541–564.
- Dean, R.J., "The Dedication of Nicholas Trevet's Commentary on Boethius", in *Studies in Philology* 63(1966), p. 593–603.
- Decaix, V., "Les transcendants et l'un. Dietrich de Freiberg à l'école de Thomas d'Aquin", in *Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 16(2013), p. 146–162.
- Decaix, V., "Théologie rationnelle ou métaphysique? Les deux sens de la métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg", in *Quaestio* 13(2013), p. 303–321.
- Denzinger, H., *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, ed. P. Hünermann, Freiberg / Basel / Wien, Herder, 2009⁴⁶.
- Dondaine, H.-F., *Le Corpus dionysien de l'université de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, Roma, Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1953.
- Draelants, I., "Le 'siècle de l'encyclopédisme'. Conditions et critères de définition d'un genre", in A. Zucker (ed.), *Encyclopédie. Formes de l'ambition encyclopédique dans l'Antiquité et au Moyen Âge*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2013, p. 81–106.
- Dronke, P., *Hermes and the Sibyls. Continuations and Creations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Dronke, P., *Intellectuals and Poets in Medieval Europe*, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1992.
- Eckert, W., "Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik im Spätmittelalter", in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 65(1957), p. 120–133.
- Eckert, W., "Berthold von Moosburg", in K. Ruh et al. (eds), *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, vol. 1, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1978, p. 816–817.
- Eckert, W., "Berthold von Moosburg", in *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. 1, München / Zürich, Artemis, 1980, col. 2034.
- Ehrle, F., "Nikolaus Trevet. Sein Leben, seine Quodlibet und Quaestiones Ordinariae", in *Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festgabe Clemens Baeumker*, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1923, p. 1–63.
- Emden, A.B., *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1957–59.

- Emery, Jr., K., “*Sapientissimus Aristoteles and Theologicissimus Dionysius*. The Reading of Aristotle and the Understanding of Nature in Denys the Carthusian”, in A. Speer, A. Zimmermann (eds), *Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter*, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 21, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1992, p. 572–606.
- Emery, Jr., K., “A Complete Reception of the Latin *Corpus Dionysiacum*. The Commentaries of Denys the Carthusian”, T. Boiadjev, G. Kapriev, A. Speer (eds), *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2000, p. 197–247.
- Erismann, C., *L'Homme commun. La genèse du réalisme ontologique durant le haut Moyen Âge*, Paris, Vrin, 2011.
- Evans, J., Berggren, J.L., *Geminus' Introduction to the Phenomena. A Translation and Study of a Hellenistic Survey of Astronomy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Faës de Mottoni, B., “Il commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all' *Elementatio theologica* di Proclo. Edizione delle proposizioni riguardanti il tempo e l'eternità”, in *Studi medievali* 12(1971), p. 417–461.
- Faës de Mottoni, B., “Il problema della luce nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all' *Elementatio theologica* di Proclo”, in *Studi medievali* 16(1975), p. 325–352.
- Ferro, T., “Berthold of Moosburg, Reader of Ulrich of Strassburg. On Natural Providence”, forthcoming.
- Fiamma, A., “Nicholas of Cusa and the So-Called Cologne School of the 13th and 14th Centuries”, in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 84(2017), p. 91–128.
- Finamore, J., *Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul*, Chico, Scholars Press, 1985.
- Flasch, K., “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1-13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese, Hamburg, Meiner, 1984, p. xi–xxxviii.
- Flasch, K., “Von Dietrich zu Albert”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), p. 7–28.
- Flasch, K., “*Procedere ut imago*. Das Hervorgehen des Intellekts aus seinem göttlichen Grund bei Meister Dietrich, Meister Eckhart und Berthold von Moosburg”, in K. Ruh (ed.), *Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposium Kloster Engelberg 1984*, Stuttgart, Metzler, 1986, p. 125–134.
- Flasch, K., “*Converti ut imago* – Rückkehr als Bild. Eine Studie zur Theorie des Intellekts bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 45(1998), p. 130–150.
- Flasch, K., *Dietrich von Freiberg. Philosophie, Theologie, Naturforschung um 1300*, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 2007.
- Flasch, K., *D'Averroès à Maître Eckhart. Les sources arabes de la 'mystique' allemande*, Paris, Vrin, 2008.

- Flasch, K., "Dietrich von Freiberg und Siger von Brabant. Eine Studie zur 'Schule' Alberts des Großen", in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet*, CPTMA Beiheft 4, Hamburg, Meiner, 2008, p. 127–141.
- Flasch, K., *Meister Eckhart. Philosoph des Christentums*, München, Beck, 2011.
- Flasch, K., *Meister Eckhart. Philosopher of Christianity*, trans. A. Schindel, A. Vanides, New Haven / London, Yale University Press, 2015.
- Frank, I., "Zum Albertus-Autograph in der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek und zum 'Albertinismus' der Wiener Dominikaner im Spätmittelalter", in G. Meyer, A. Zimmermann (eds), *Albertus Magnus – Doctor Universalis 1280–1980*, Mainz, Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag, 1980, p. 89–117.
- Frank, I., "Retz (François de)", in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, vol. 13, Paris, Beauchesne, 1988, p. 434–436.
- Friedman, R., *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University. The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans 1250–1350*, 2 vols, Leiden, Brill, 2013.
- Frost, S., *Nikolaus von Kues und Meister Eckhart. Rezeption im Spiegel der Marginalien zum Opus tripartitum Meister Eckharts*, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 2006.
- Führer, M., "The Agent Intellect in the Writings of Meister Dietrich of Freiberg and its Influence on the Cologne School", in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, B. Stammkötter (eds), *Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven seiner Philosophie, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft*, Amsterdam, Grüner, 1999, p. 69–88.
- Führer, M., Gersh, S., "Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg", in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 299–317.
- Gelber, H.G., *It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350*, Leiden, Brill, 2004.
- Gersh, S., *From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition*, Leiden, Brill, 1978.
- Gersh, S., "Ideas and Energies in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite", in *Studia Patristica* 15(1984), p. 297–300.
- Gersh, S., *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition*, 2 vols, Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1986.
- Gersh, S., "Honorius Augustodunensis and Eriugena. Remarks on the Method and Content of the *Clavis Physicae*", in W. Beierwaltes (ed.), *Eriugena redivivus. Zur Wirkungsgeschichte seines Denkens im Mittelalter und im Übergang zur Neuzeit. Vorträge des V. Internationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums, Werner-Reimers-Stiftung, Bad Homburg, 26.–30. August 1985*, Heidelberg, Winter, 1987, p. 162–173.
- Gersh, S., "The Structure of the Return in Eriugena's *Periphyseon*", in W. Beierwaltes (ed.), *Begriff und Metapher. Sprachform des Denkens bei Eriugena. Vorträge des VII.*

- Internationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums Werner-Reimers-Stiftung Bad Homburg*, 26.-29. Juli 1989, Heidelberg, Winter, 1990, p. 108–125.
- Gersh, S., “Berthold of Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy”, J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 28, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2001, p. 493–503.
- Gersh, S., “The First Principles of Latin Neoplatonism. Augustine, Macrobius, Boethius”, in *Vivarium* 50(2012), p. 113–138.
- Gersh, S., *L’Ordo Naturalis* des causes primordiales. La transformation érigénienne de la doctrine dionysienne des noms divins”, in *Les Études philosophiques* 104(2013), p. 57–78.
- Gersh, S., “Nicholas of Cusa”, in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 318–349.
- Gersh, S., “Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino as Historians of Philosophy”, forthcoming.
- Goris, W., “Das Gute als Ersterkanntes bei Berthold von Moosburg”, in W. Goris (ed.), *Die Metaphysik und das Gute. Aufsätze zu ihrem Verhältnis in Antike und Mittelalter*, Jan A. Aertsen zu Ehren, Leuven, Peeters, 1999, p. 139–172.
- Goris, W., “Metaphysik und Einheitswissenschaft bei Berthold von Moosburg”, in *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 85(2018), p. 239–258.
- Goris, W., “Metaphysical Freedom. From Albert the Great to Berthold of Moosburg”, forthcoming.
- Gottschall, D., “Eckhart and the Vernacular Tradition. Pseudo-Eckhart and Eckhart Legends”, in J. Hackett (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart*, Leiden, Brill, 2013, p. 509–551.
- Grabmann, M., *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, 3 vols, München, Hueber, 1926–1956.
- Gregory, T., “Leschatologie de Jean Scot”, in R. Roques (ed.), *Jean Scot Érigène et l’histoire de la philosophie. Laon 7–12 juillet 1975*, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 1977, p. 377–392.
- Greig, J., “Proclus on the Two Causal Models for the One’s Production of Being. Reconciling the Relation of the Henads and the Limit/Unlimited”, in *The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* 14(2020), p. 23–48.
- Grupe, D., *The Latin Reception of Arabic Astronomy and Cosmology in Mid-Twelfth-Century Antioch. The Liber Mamonis and the Dresden Almagest*, PhD diss., The Warburg Institute, 2013.
- Guldentops, G., “Henry Bate’s Encyclopaedism”, in P. Binkley (ed.), *Pre-Modern Encyclopaedic Texts. Proceedings of the Second COMERS Congress, Groningen, 1-4 July 1996*, Leiden, Brill, 1997, p. 227–237.
- Häfele, G., *Franz von Retz. Ein Beitrag zur Gelehrten Geschichte des Dominikanerordens und der Wiener Universität am Ausgange des Mittelalters*, Innsbruck, Tyrolia, 1918.

- Haines, R.M., "Grey, William (c.1414–1478)", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edition, May 2011 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11567>], accessed 6 May 2013.
- Hamesse, J., "Les florilèges philosophiques. Instruments de travail des intellectuels à la fin du moyen âge et à la Renaissance", in L. Bianchi (ed.), *Filosofia e teologia nel trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi*, Louvain-la-Neuve, Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 1994, p. 479–508.
- Hamesse, J., "Approche terminologique de certaines méthodes d'enseignement et de recherche à la fin du moyen âge. *Declarare, Recitare, Conclusio*", in O. Weijers (ed.), *Vocabulary of Teaching and Research between Middle Ages and Renaissance. Proceedings of the Colloquium, London, Warburg Institute, 11–12 March 1994*, Turnhout, Brepols, 1995, p. 8–28.
- Hankey, W., *God in Himself. Aquinas' Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Hankey, W., "Misrepresenting Neoplatonism in Contemporary Christian Dionysian Polemic. Eriugena and Nicholas of Cusa versus Vladimir Lossky and Jean-Luc Marion", in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 82/4(2008), p. 683–703.
- Hankey, W., "The Concord of Aristotle, Proclus, the *Liber de Causis* & Blessed Dionysius in Thomas Aquinas, Student of Albertus Magnus", in *Dionysius* 34(2016), p. 137–209.
- Häring, N., "Commentary and Hermeneutics", in R. Benson, G. Constable (eds), *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982, p. 173–200.
- Harrington, M., "The Drunken *Epibole* of Plotinus and its Reappearance in the Work of Dionysius the Areopagite", in *Dionysius* 23(2005), p. 117–138.
- Hasse, D.N., *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West. The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300*, London / Torino, The Warburg Institute / Nino Aragno Editore, 2000.
- Hellmeier, P., "Der Intellekt ist nicht genug. Das proklische *unum in nobis* bei Berthold von Moosburg", in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 126/2(2019), p. 202–226.
- Hellmeier, P., "The Meaning of the Biblical Citations in the *Expositio* of Berthold of Moosburg", forthcoming.
- Hindsley, L.P., *The Mystics of Engelthal. Writings from a Medieval Monastery*, London, Macmillan, 1998.
- Hoffmann, P., "*Erôs, Aletheia, Pistis ... et Elpis*. Tétrade chaldaïque, triade néoplatonicienne", in M. Delgado, C. Méla, F. Möri (eds), *Orient-Occident. Racines spirituelles de l'Europe*, Paris, Cerf, 2014, p. 63–136.
- Hoenen, M.J.F.M., "*Via Antiqua* and *Via Moderna* in the Fifteenth Century. Doctrinal, Institutional, and Church Political Factors in the *Wegestreit*", in R. Friedman, L. Nielsen (eds), *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2003, p. 9–36.

- Hunt, R., "The Introductions to the *Artes* in the Twelfth Century", in *Studia mediaevalia in honorem R.J. Martin*, Brugge, De Tempel, 1948, p. 84–112.
- Imbach, R., "Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik. Zur Diskussion zwischen Nikolaus von Strassburg und Dietrich von Freiberg über die Atrennbarkeit der Akzidentien", in *Theologie und Philosophie* 61(1986), p. 359–395.
- Imbach, R., "Die deutsche Dominikanerschule. Drei Modelle einer Theologia mystica", in M. Schmidt, D.R. Bauer (eds), *Grundfragen christlicher Mystik. Wissenschaftliche Studientagung Theologia mystica in Weingarten vom 7.-10. November 1985*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1987, p. 157–172.
- Imbach, R., "Au-delà de la métaphysique. Notule sur l'importance du *Commentaire* de Berthold de Moosburg OP sur les *Éléments de théologie*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Vol. 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates*, Leiden, Brill, 2019, p. 376–393.
- Imbach, R., Lindblad, U., "*Compilatio rudis ac puerilis*. Hinweise und Materialien zu Nikolaus von Strassburg OP und seiner *Summa*", in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), p. 155–233.
- Iremadze, T., *Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter. Dietrich von Freiberg – Berthold von Moosburg – Joane Petrizi*, Amsterdam, Grüner, 2004.
- Jeaneau, É., "L'usage de la notion d'*integumentum* à travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 24(1957), p. 35–100.
- Jeaneau, É., "Gloses de Guillaume de Conches sur Macrobe. Note sur les manuscrits", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 27(1960), p. 17–28.
- Jeaneau, É., *Études érigéniennes*, Paris, Études augustinienes, 1987.
- Jeck, U.R., *Aristoteles contra Augustinum. Zur Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Zeit und Seele bei den antiken Aristoteleskommentatoren im arabischen Aristotelismus und im 13. Jahrhundert*, Amsterdam, Grüner, 1994.
- Jeck, U.R., "Die hermetische Theorie des Mikrokosmos in der Metaphysik Alberts des Grossen und im Prokloskommentar des Berthold von Moosburg", in *Patristica et Mediaevalia* 20(1999), p. 3–18.
- Jeck, U.R., "Weisheit im Schatten Apollons. Der Proklos Kommentar des Berthold von Moosburg als Einführung in die Philosophie und Geschichte des Platonismus", in *Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur* 17(2011), p. 112–170.
- Jeschke, Th., *Deus ut tentus vel visus. Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320)*, Leiden, Brill, 2011.
- Jundt, A., *Histoire du panthéisme populaire au Moyen Âge et au seizième siècle*, Strasbourg, Fischbach, 1875.
- Kaeppli, Th., *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, 4 vols, Roma, Santa Sabina, 1970–1993.

- Kaeppli, Th., "Ein Fragment der Akten des in Friesach 1315 gefeierten Kapitels der Provinz Teutonia", in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 48(1978), p. 71–75.
- Kaluza, Z., "Comme une branche d'amandier en fleurs. Dieu dans le *Liber viginti quatuor philosophorum*", in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), *Hermetism from Late Antiquity to Humanism. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Napoli, 20–24 Novembre 2001*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2003, p. 93–123.
- Kandler, K.-H., "Theologie und Philosophie nach Dietrich von Freibergs Traktat *De subiecto theologiae*", in J. Aertsens, A. Speer (eds), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1998, p. 642–647.
- Kandler, K.-H., "Theologische Implikationen der Philosophie Dietrichs von Freiberg", in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, B. Stammkötter (eds), *Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven seiner Philosophie, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft*, Amsterdam, Grüner, 1999, p. 121–134.
- Kandler, K.-H., "*Anima beata vel homo glorificatus possit progredi in aliquam naturalem cognitionem*. Bemerkungen zu eschatologischen Gedanken des Dietrich von Freiberg, vor allem zu seinem Traktat *De dotibus corporum gloriosorum*", in J. Aertsens, M. Pickavé (eds), *Ende und Vollendung. Eschatologische Perspektiven im Mittelalter*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 29, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2002, p. 434–447.
- Keussen, H., *Die Matrikel der Universität Köln. Erster Band: 1389–1475*, Bonn, Hanstein, 1928.
- King, E., "Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the One of the Soul", in *Dionysius* 36(2018), p. 184–199.
- King, E., "Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Vol. 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates*, Leiden, Brill, 2019, p. 394–437.
- King, E., "*Sapiens modernus*. The Reception of Dietrich of Freiberg in Berthold of Moosburg", forthcoming.
- Koch, J., "Kritisches Verzeichnis der Londoner Handschriften aus dem Besitz des Nikolaus von Kues", in *Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft* 3(1963), p. 16–100.
- König-Pralong, C., "Dietrich de Freiberg, métaphysicien allemand antithomiste", *Revue thomiste* 108(2008), p. 57–79.
- König-Pralong, C., *Le bon usage des savoirs. Scolastique, philosophie et politique culturelle*, Paris, Vrin, 2011.
- König-Pralong, C., "Expérience et sciences de la nature chez Dietrich de Freiberg et Berthold de Moosburg", in L. Bianchi, C. Crisciani (eds), *Forme e oggetti della conoscenza nel XIV secolo. Studi in ricordo di Maria Elena Reina*, Firenze, SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2014, p. 107–133.
- Köpf, U., "Die Rezeptions- und Wirkungsgeschichte Bernhards von Clairvaux. Forschungsstand und Forschungsaufgaben", in K. Elm (ed.), *Bernhard von Clairvaux*.

- Rezeption und Wirkung im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit*, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1994, p. 5–65.
- Krebs, E., *Meister Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft*, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1906.
- Kupfer, M., “The Cosmic Vision of Saint Benedict, *e specula and in speculo*”, in N. Bouloux, A. Dan, G. Talias (eds), *Orbis disciplinae. Hommages en l’honneur de Patrick Gautier Dalché*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2017, p. 139–165.
- Largier, N., “Die ‘deutsche Dominikanerschule’. Zur Problematik eines historiographischen Konzepts”, in J. Aertsen, A. Speer (eds), *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 27, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2000, p. 202–213.
- Largier, N., “Time and Temporality in the ‘German Dominican School’. Outlines of a Philosophical Debate Between Nicolaus of Strasbourg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Eckhart of Hoheim, and Ioannes Tauler”, in P. Porro (ed.), *The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic Debate and Its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy*, Leiden, Brill, 2001, p. 221–253.
- Largier, N., “Das Glück des Menschen. Diskussionen über *beatitudo* und Vernunft in volkssprachlichen Texten des 14. Jahrhunderts”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 28, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2001, p. 827–855.
- Lawell, D., “Ecstasy and the Intellectual Dionysianism of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great”, in J. McEvoy, M. Dunne, J. Hynes (eds), *Thomas Aquinas. Teacher and Scholar*, Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2012, p. 155–183.
- Leclercq, J., “La théologie comme science dans la littérature quodlibétique”, in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 11(1939), p. 351–374.
- Lerner, R., *The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972.
- Libera, A. de, “Philosophie et théologie chez Albert le Grand et dans l’école dominicaine Allemande”, in A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 20, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1989, p. 49–67.
- Libera, A. de, “Albert le Grand et Thomas d’Aquin interprètes du *Liber de Causis*”, in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 74(1990), p. 347–378.
- Libera, A. de, *La mystique rhénane. D’Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart*, Paris, Seuil, 1994.
- Libera, A. de, “Albert le Grand et la mystique allemande”, in M.J.F.M. Hoenen, J.H.J. Schneider, G. Wieland (eds), *Philosophy and Learning. Universities in the Middle Ages*, Leiden, Brill, 1995, p. 29–42.
- Libera, A. de, *Raison et foi. Archéologie d’une crise d’Albert le Grand à Jean-Paul II*, Paris, Seuil, 2003.
- Libera, A. de, *Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand*, Paris, Vrin, 2005.

- Libera, A. de, "D'Averroès en Augustin. Intellect et cogitative selon Dietrich de Freiberg", in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2009, p. 15–62.
- Lindberg, D., *John Pecham and the Science of Optics*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1970.
- Löhr, G.M., *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Kölner Dominikanerklosters im Mittelalter*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland 15–17, Leipzig, Harrassowitz, 1920–1922.
- Löhr, G.M., *Die Kölner Dominikanerschule vom 14. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert*, Köln, Kölner Universitätsverlag Balduin Pick, 1948.
- Longpré, E., "Fr. Thomas d'York, O.F.M. La première somme métaphysique du XIII^e siècle", in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 19(1926), p. 875–930.
- Lord, M.L., "Virgil's *Eclogues*, Nicholas Trevet, and the Harmony of the Spheres", in *Mediaeval Studies* 54(1992), p. 186–273.
- Lucentini, P., *Platonismo medievale. Contributi per la storia dell'eriugenismo*, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1980.
- Lucentini, P., "Hermes Trismegistus II. Middle Ages" in W. Hanegraaff (ed.), *Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism*, vol. 1, Leiden, Brill, 2005, p. 479–483.
- Lucentini, P., *Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia nel medioevo*, Louvain-la-Neuve, Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2007.
- Lucentini, P., Perrone Compagni V., "Hermetic Literature II. Latin Middle Ages", in W. Hanegraaff (ed.), *Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism*, vol. 1, Leiden, Brill, 2005, p. 499–529.
- Ludueña, E., "Nicolás de Cusa. Una contribución a la historia del eriugenismo", in J.M. Machetta, C. D'Amico (eds), *Nicolás de Cusa, identidad y alteridad. Pensamiento y diálogo*, Buenos Aires, Biblos, 2010, p. 75–88.
- Ludueña, E., "Platon vs. Aristoteles en la *Expositio* de Bertoldo de Moosburg", in S. Filippi (ed.), *Controversias filosóficas, científicas y teológicas en el pensamiento tardo-antiguo y medieval*, Rosario, Paideia Publicaciones, 2011, p. 383–398.
- Ludueña, E., *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia*, Saarbrücken, Publicia, 2013.
- Ludueña, E., "Eriúgena en el siglo XIV. Su presencia en la *Expositio* de Bertoldo de Moosburg", in *Scintilla* 10/2(2013), p. 99–154.
- Ludueña, E., "El politeísmo de Proclo en la *Expositio* de Bertoldo de Moosburg", in S. Filippi, M. Coria (eds), *La identidad propia del pensamiento patrístico y medieval. ¿Unidad o pluralidad?*, Rosario, Paideia Publicaciones, 2014, p. 393–403.
- Ludueña, E., "Creatio y determinatio en la Escuela Renana. De Alberto Magno a Bertoldo de Moosburg", in *Principios. Revista de Filosofía* 22/37(2015), p. 77–97.
- Ludueña, E., "The Gods and Causality. On Aquinas' Presence in Berthold's *Expositio*", forthcoming.

- Maccagnolo, E., "David of Dinant and the Beginnings of Aristotelianism in Paris", in P. Dronke (ed.), *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 429–442.
- MacIsaac, D.G., "The Origin of Determination in the Neoplatonism of Proclus", in M. Treschow, W. Otten, W. Hannam (eds), *Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought. Essays Presented to the Rev'd Dr Robert D. Crouse*, Leiden, Brill, 2007, p. 141–172.
- Marenbon, J., *From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre. Logic, Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Marenbon, J., "Eriugena, Aristotelian Logic and the Creation", in W. Otten, M. Allen (eds), *Eriugena and Creation. Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Eriugenian Studies, held in honor of Edouard Jeuneau, Chicago, 9–12 November 2011*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2014, p. 349–368.
- Marenbon, J., *Pagans and Philosophers. The Problem of Paganism from Augustine to Leibniz*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015.
- Martijn, M., *Proclus on Nature. Philosophy of Nature and its Methods in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Leiden, Brill, 2010.
- Massa, E., "Presentazione", in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 184–211. De animabus*, ed. L. Sturlese, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974, p. v–xi.
- Massa, E., "La deificazione nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg a Proclo, *Elementatio theologica*, 129. Edizione del testo e prime analisi", in R. Lievens, E. van Mingroot, W. Verbeke (eds), *Pascua Mediaevalia. Studies voor Prof. Dr. J.M. de Smet*, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1983, p. 545–604.
- McGinn, B., "*Sapientia Judaeorum*. The Role of Jewish Philosophers in Some Scholastic Thinkers", in R.J. Bast, A.C. Gow (eds), *Continuity and Change. The Harvest of Late Medieval and Reformation History*, Leiden, Brill, 2000, p. 206–228.
- Meliadò, M., "Axiomatic Wisdom. Boethius' *De hebdomadibus* and the *Liber de causis* in Late-Medieval Albertism", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 55(2013), p. 71–131.
- Meuthen, E., *Kölner Universitätsgeschichte, Band I. Die alte Universität*, Köln, Böhlau Verlag, 1988.
- Meyer, G., Burckhardt, M., *Die mittelalterlichen Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Basel. Beschreibendes Verzeichnis. Abteilung B: Theologische Pergamenthandschriften. Bd. 2: Signaturen B VIII 11 – B XI 26*, Basel, Verlag der Universitätsbibliothek, 1966.
- Minnis, A.J., *Medieval Theory of Authorship. Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages*, Aldershot, Wildwood, 1988².
- Minnis, A.J., Nauta, L., "More Platonico loquitur. What Nicholas Trevet really did to William of Conches", in A.J. Minnis (ed.), *Chaucer's Boece and the Medieval Tradition of Boethius*, Woodbridge, Brewer, 1993, p. 1–33.

- Mojsisch, B., *Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Dietrich von Freiberg*, CPTMA Beiheft 1, Hamburg, Meiner, 1977.
- Mojsisch, B., "Sein als Bewußt-Sein. Die Bedeutung des *ens conceptionale* bei Dietrich von Freiberg", in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart*, CPTMA Beiheft 2, Hamburg, Meiner, 1984, p. 95–105.
- Mojsisch, B., "Aristoteles' Kritik an Platons Theorie der Ideen und die Dietrich von Freiberg berücksichtigende Kritik dieser Kritik seitens Berthold von Moosburg", in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, B. Stammkötter (eds), *Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven seiner Philosophie, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft*, Amsterdam, Grüner, 1999, p. 267–281.
- Mojsisch, B., "Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Berthold von Moosburg. Zur Proklosrezeption im Mittelalter", in Th. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, O. Summerell (eds), *Selbst – Singularität – Subjektivität. Vom Neuplatonismus zum Deutschen Idealismus*, Amsterdam, Grüner, 2002, p. 175–184.
- Mojsisch, B., "Aristoteles mit oder ohne Platon", in L. Honnefelder *et al.* (eds), *Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter*, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 2005, p. 821–833.
- Mulchahey, M.M., "*First the Bow is Bent in Study ...*". *Dominican Education Before 1350*, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998.
- Mulchahey, M.M., "The Studium at Cologne and its Role within Early Dominican Education", in *Listening. Journal of Religion and Culture* 43(2008), p. 118–147.
- Müller, J., "Der Einfluß der arabischen Intellektspekulation auf die Ethik des Albertus Magnus", in A. Speer, L. Wegener (eds), *Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter*, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 33, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2006, p. 545–568.
- Nauta, L., "The Scholastic Context of the Boethius Commentary by Nicholas Trevet", in M.J.F.M. Hoenen, L. Nauta (eds), *Boethius in the Middle Ages. Latin and Vernacular Traditions of the Consolatio philosophiae*, Leiden, Brill, 1997, p. 41–67.
- Oliva, A., "La contemplation des philosophes selon Thomas d'Aquin", in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 96(2012), p. 585–662.
- O'Meara, D., "La science métaphysique (ou théologie) de Proclus comme exercice spirituel", in A.-P. Segonds, C. Steel (eds), *Proclus et la théologie platonicienne. Actes du Colloque International de Louvain (13–16 mai 1998) en l'honneur de H.D. Saffrey et L.G. Westerink*, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2000, p. 279–290.
- Opsomer, J., "Was sind irrationale Seelen?", in M. Perkams, R.M. Piccione (eds), *Proklos. Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik*, Leiden, Brill, 2006, p. 136–166.
- Paschetto, E., "*L'Elementatio theologica* di Proclo e il commento di Bertoldo di Mosburgo", in *Filosofia* 27(1976), p. 353–378.
- Pagnoni-Sturlese, M.R., "A propos du néoplatonisme d'Albert le Grand. Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d'Albert dans le Commentaire sur Proclus de Berthold de Moosburg", in *Archives de Philosophie* 43(1980), p. 635–654.

- Pagnoni-Sturlese, M.R., "Filosofia della natura e filosofia dell'intelletto in Teodorico di Freiberg e Bertoldo di Moosburg", in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart*, Hamburg, Meiner, 1984, 115–127.
- Palazzo, A., "Le fonti ermetiche nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), *Hermetism from Late Antiquity to Humanism. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Napoli, 20–24 Novembre 2001*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2003, p. 189–202.
- Palazzo, A., "Ulrich of Strasbourg and Denys the Carthusian. Textual Analysis and Doctrinal Comments", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 46(2004), p. 61–113.
- Palazzo, A., "La *sapientia* nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Quaestio* 5(2005), p. 495–512.
- Palazzo, A., "La ricezione di un passo ermetico (*Asclepius* 8) nel tardo medioevo. Ulrico di Strasburgo, Pietro di Tarantasia, Riccardo di Mediavilla, Bertoldo di Moosburg e Dionigi il Certosino", in T. Iremadze, T. Tskhadadze, G. Kheoschvili (eds), *Philosophy, Theology, Culture. Problems and Perspectives. Jubilee Volume Dedicated to the 75th Anniversary of Guram Tevzadze*, Tbilisi, Neker / Arche, 2007, p. 104–25.
- Palazzo, A., "The Scientific Significance of Fate and Celestial Influences in Some Mature Works by Albert the Great. *De fato, De somno et vigilia, De intellectu et intelligibili, Mineralia*", in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet*, CPTMA Beiheft 4, Hamburg, Meiner, 2008, p. 55–78.
- Palazzo, A., "Albert the Great's Doctrine of Fascination in the Context of his Philosophical System", in L. Honnefelder, H. Möhle, S. Bullido del Barrio (eds), *Via Alberti. Texte – Quellen – Interpretationen*, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 2009, p. 135–215.
- Palazzo, A., "Albert the Great's Doctrine of Fate", in L. Sturlese (ed.), *Mantik, Schicksal und Freiheit im Mittelalter*, Köln, Böhlau, 2011, p. 65–95.
- Palazzo, A., "Philosophy and Theology in the German Dominican *Scholae* in the Late Middle Ages. The Cases of Ulrich of Strasbourg and Berthold of Wimpfen", in K. Emery, Jr., W. Courtenay, S. Metzger (eds), *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts. Acts of the XVth International Colloquium of the Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale, University of Notre Dame, 8–10 October 2008*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2012, p. 75–105.
- Palazzo, A., "Ulrich of Strasbourg's Philosophical Theology. Textual and Doctrinal Remarks on *De summo bono*", in A. Speer, Th. Jeschke (eds), *Schüler und Meister, Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 39, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2016, p. 205–242.
- Palazzo, A., "*Regna duo duorum*. Berthold of Moosburg's Theory of Providence and Fate", forthcoming.
- Pellegrino, G., "La *Summa* di Nicola di Strasburgo (1315–1320). *Compilatio rudis ac puerilis o novus libellus?*", in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem*

- philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet*, CPTMA Beiheft 4, Hamburg, Meiner, 2008, p. 204–215.
- Pellegrino, G., “*Novus ex veteribus libellus*. Guglielmo di Conches nella *Summa* di Nicola di Strasburgo”, in C. Martello, C. Militello, A. Vella (eds), *Cosmogonie e cosmologie nel medioevo. Atti del Convegno della Società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale (S.I.S.P.M.)*, Catania, 22–24 settembre 2006, Louvain-la-Neuve, Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2008, p. 339–349.
- Pelster, F., “Die Ehrentitel der scholastischen Lehrer des Mittelalters. Ein Beitrag und eine Ergänzung”, in *Theologische Quartalschrift* 103(1922), p. 37–56.
- Peters, U., *Religiöse Erfahrung als literarisches Faktum. Zur Vorgeschichte und Genese frauenmystischer Texte des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts*, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1988.
- Pfeiffer, F., “Predigten und Sprüche deutscher Mystiker”, in *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum* 8(1851), p. 209–258.
- Piemonte, G., *Vita in omnia pervenit. El vitalismo eriugeniano y la influencia de Mario Victorino*, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Patristica et Mediaevalia, 1988.
- Porreca, D., “Hermes Trismegistus. William of Auvergne’s Mythical Authority”, in *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 67(2000), p. 143–158.
- Porreca, D., “Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York. A 13th-Century Witness to the Prominence of an Ancient Sage”, in *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 72(2005), p. 147–275.
- Porro, P., “*Ponere statum*. Idee divine, perfezioni creaturali e ordine del mondo in Enrico di Gand”, in *Mediaevalia* 3(1993), p. 109–159.
- Porro, P., “Essere e essenza in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg. Note sulla prima ricezione del tomismo a Colonia”, in M. Pickavé (ed.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan. A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag*, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 30, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2003, p. 226–245.
- Porro, P., “*Res praedicamenti* e *ratio praedicamenti*. Una nota su Teodorico di Freiberg e Enrico di Gand”, in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2009, p. 131–143.
- Porro, P., “The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century. Proclus and the *Liber de causis*”, in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 264–298.
- Porro, P., “Tra l’oscurità della fede e il chiarore della visione. Il dibattito sullo statuto scientifico della teologia agli inizi del XIV secolo”, in L. Bianchi, C. Crisciani (eds), *Forme e oggetti della conoscenza nel XIV secolo. Studi in ricordo di Maria Elena Reina*, Firenze, SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2014, p. 195–256.
- Potestà, G.L., “*Per laboriosam investigationem ascendendo*. L’edizione di Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 76(1984), p. 637–643.
- Retucci, F., “*Magister Thomas Anglicus minor*. Eine neue Quelle der *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam* Procli Bertholds von Moosburg – das ungedruckte

- Sapientiale* des Franziskaners Thomas von York”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci, CPTMA VI/6, Hamburg, Meiner, 2007, p. xxii–xxxix.
- Retucci, F., “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet*, CPTMA Beiheft 4, Hamburg, Meiner, 2008, p. 79–111.
- Retucci, F., “Berthold de Moosburg”, in M.-A. Vannier et al. (eds), *Encyclopédie des mystiques rhénans. D’Eckhart à Nicolas de Cues et leur réception*, Paris, Cerf, 2011, p. 195–196.
- Retucci, F., “Nuovi percorsi del platonismo medievale. I commentari bizantini all’*Etica Nicomachea* nel *Sapientiale* di Tommaso di York”, in *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 24(2013), p. 85–120.
- Retucci, F., “On a Dangerous Trail. Henry Suso and the Condemnations of Meister Eckhart”, in J. Hackett (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart*, Leiden, Brill, 2013, p. 587–605.
- Retucci, F., “*Sententia Procli alti philosophi*. Notes on an Anonymous Commentary on Proclus’ *Elementatio theologica*”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II. New Commentaries on Liber de causis and Elementatio theologica (ca. 1350–1500)*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2016, p. 99–180.
- Retucci, F., “*Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor*. Tommaso di York fonte dell’*Expositio* di Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in F. Amerini, S. Fellina, A. Strazzoni (eds), *Tra antichità e modernità. Studi di storia della filosofia medievale e rinascimentale*, E-THECA, On Line Open Access Edizioni, 2019, p. 1–41.
- Retucci, F., “Between Cologne and Oxford. Berthold of Moosburg and Thomas of York’s *Sapientiale*”, forthcoming.
- Retucci, F., Goering, J., “The *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York, OFM. The Fortunes and Misfortunes of a Critical Edition”, in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 52(2010), p. 133–155.
- Riccati, C., *Processio et explicatio. La doctrine de la création chez Jean Scot et Nicolas de Cues*, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1983.
- Ringler, S., *Viten- und Offenbarungsliteratur in Frauenklöstern des Mittelalters*, München / Zürich, Artemis-Verlag, 1980.
- Rodnite, H., *The Doctrine of the Trinity in William of Conches’ Glosses on Macrobius. Texts and Studies*, PhD diss., Columbia University, 1972.
- Roudaut, S., “Founding a Metaphysics of Light in Proclus’ Universe. Berthold of Moosburg’s Theory of Forms”, forthcoming.
- Ruello, F., *Les “Noms divins” et leurs “raisons” selon saint Albert the Grand commentateur du De divinis nominibus*, Paris, Vrin, 1963.
- Ruh, K., “Heinrich von Ekkewint (Eckbuint, Egwint, Egwin)”, in K. Ruh et al. (eds), *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, vol. 3, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1980, p. 718–720.

- Ruh, K., *Geschichte der abendländischen Mystik, Band III. Die Mystik des deutschen Predigerordens und ihre Grundlegung durch die Hochscholastik*, München, Beck, 1996.
- Saccon, A., *Intelletto e beatitudine. La cultura filosofica tedesca del XIV secolo*, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2012.
- Saccon, A., "Die natürliche Gotteserkenntnis in den Schriften der Kölner Albertisten des 15. Jahrhunderts", in *Quaestio* 15(2015), p. 751–760.
- Sannino, A., "Berthold of Moosburg's Hermetic Sources", in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 63(2000), p. 243–258.
- Sannino, A., "Il concetto ermetico di natura in Bertoldo di Moosburg", in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), *Hermeticism from Late Antiquity to Humanism. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Napoli, 20–24 Novembre 2001*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2003, p. 203–221.
- Sannino, A., "Il *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum* nella metafisica di Bertoldo di Moosburg", in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet*, CPTMA Beiheft 4, Hamburg, Meiner, 2008, p. 252–272.
- Senger, H.-G., *Ludus sapientiae. Studien zum Werk und zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Nikolaus von Kues*, Leiden, Brill, 2002.
- Senner, W., *Johannes von Sterngassen OP und sein Sentenzen-Kommentar*, 2 vols, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1995.
- Senner, W., "Dominican Education", in J. Hackett (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart*, Leiden, Brill, 2013, p. 711–723.
- Sharp, D.E., *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century*, London, Oxford University Press, 1930.
- Sheffler, D., *Schools and Schooling in Late Medieval Germany. Regensburg, 1250–1500*, Leiden, Brill, 2008.
- Smalley, B., "Thomas Waleys O.P.", in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 24(1954), p. 50–107.
- Smalley, B., *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1960.
- Smalley, B., "Peter Comestor on the Gospels and his Sources", in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 46(1979), p. 84–129.
- Smith, A.M., *Alhacen's Theory of Visual Perception. A Critical Edition, with English Translation and Commentary, of the First Three Books of Alhacen's De aspectibus, the Medieval Latin Version of Ibn al-Haytham's Kitāb al-Manāẓir*, 2 vols, Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 2001.
- Solère, J.-L., "Maître Eckhart, Proclus et Boèce. Du statut des prologues dans l'axiomatique néoplatonicienne", in J. Hamesse (ed.), *Les prologues médiévaux. Actes du Colloque international organisé par l'Academia Belgica et l'École française de Rome*

- avec le concours de la F.I.D.E.M. (Rome, 26–28 mars 1998)*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2000, p. 535–571.
- Solère, J.-L., “L’ordre axiomatique comme modèle d’écriture philosophique dans l’Antiquité et au Moyen Âge”, in *Revue d’histoire des sciences* 56/2(2003), p. 323–345.
- Speer, A., “*Sapientia nostra*. Zum Verhältnis von philosophischer und theologischer Weisheit in den Pariser Debatten am Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts”, in J. Aertsens, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 28, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2001, p. 248–275.
- Speer, A., “The Hidden Heritage. Boethian Metaphysics and Its Medieval Tradition”, in *Quaestio* 5(2005), p. 163–181.
- Speer, A., “The Division of Metaphysical Discourses. Boethius, Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart”, in K. Emery, Jr., R. Friedman, A. Speer (eds), *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages. A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, Leiden, Brill, 2011, p. 91–115.
- Steel, C., “Medieval Philosophy: an Impossible Project? Thomas Aquinas and the ‘Averroistic’ Ideal of Happiness”, in J. Aertsens, A. Speer (eds), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1998, p. 152–174.
- Steel, C., *Die Adler und die Nachteule. Thomas und Albert über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik*, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 2001.
- Steel, C., “The Neoplatonic Doctrine of Time and Eternity and its Influence on Medieval Philosophy”, in P. Porro (ed.), *The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy*, Leiden, Brill, 2001, p. 3–32.
- Steel, C., “The Return of the Body into Soul. Philosophical Musings on the Resurrection”, in J. McEvoy, M. Dunne (eds), *History and Eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and his Time. Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies, Maynooth and Dublin, August 16–20, 2000*, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2002, p. 581–609.
- Steel, C., “Why Should We Prefer Plato’s *Timaeus* to Aristotle’s *Physics*? Proclus’ Critique of Aristotle’s Causal Explanation of the Physical World”, in *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement* 78(2003), p. 175–187.
- Steel, C., “Proklos über Selbstreflexion und Selbstbegründung”, in M. Perkams, R.M. Piccione (eds), *Proklos. Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik*, Leiden, Brill, 2006, p. 230–255.
- Steel, C., “William of Moerbeke, translator of Proclus”, in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 247–263.
- Steer, G., “Bernhard von Clairvaux als theologische Autorität für Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler und Heinrich Seuse”, in K. Elm (ed.), *Bernhard von Clairvaux*.

- Rezeption und Wirkung im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit*, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1994, p. 233–259.
- Sturlese, L., “Introduzione” in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 184–211. De animabus*, ed. L. Sturlese, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974, p. xv–lxxxiii.
- Sturlese, L., “Alle origini della mistica speculativa tedesca. Antichi testi su Teodorico di Freiberg”, in *Medioevo* 3(1977), p. 21–87.
- Sturlese, L., “Gottebenbildlichkeit und Beseelung des Himmels in den Quodlibeta Heinrichs von Lübeck OP”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 24(1977), p. 191–233.
- Sturlese, L., “Il *De animatione caeli* di Teodorico di Freiberg”, in R. Creytens, P. Künzle (eds), *Xenia Medii Aevi historiam illustrantia, oblata Thomae Kaeppli O.P.*, 2 vols, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1978, vol. 1, p. 175–247.
- Sturlese, L., “Saints et magiciens. Albert le Grand en face d’Hermès Trismégiste”, in *Archives de Philosophie* 43(1980), p. 615–634.
- Sturlese, L., “*Super Dionysii Mysticam theologiam et Epistulas*, ed. P. Simon (Alberti Magni Opera omnia, t. XXXVII, pars 2) and *Summa theologiae sive de mirabilia scientia Dei, Libri I pars 1, Quaestiones 1–50A*, ed. D. Siedler (Alberti Magni Opera omnia, t. XXXIV, 1)”, in *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia*, Series III, 10/4(1980), p. 1691–1698.
- Sturlese, L., “Albert der Große und die deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 28(1981), p. 133–147.
- Sturlese, L., “Eckhart, Teodorico e Picardi nella *Summa philosophiae* di Nicola di Strasburgo. Documenti per una storia della filosofia medievale tedesca”, in *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 61(1982), p. 183–206.
- Sturlese, L., “Proclo ed Ermete in Germania da Alberto Magno a Bertoldo di Moosburg. Per una prospettiva di ricerca sulla cultura filosofica tedesca nel secolo delle sue origini (1250–1350)”, in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart*, CPTMA Beiheft 2, Hamburg, Meiner, 1984, p. 22–33.
- Sturlese, L., *Dokumente und Forschungen zu Leben und Werke Dietrichs von Freiberg*, CPTMA Beiheft 3, Hamburg, Meiner, 1984.
- Sturlese, L., “Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P., scienziato e filosofo”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), p. 249–259.
- Sturlese, L., “*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds von Moosburg und die Probleme der nacheckhartschen Zeit”, in K. Ruh (ed.), *Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposium Kloster Engelberg 1984*, Stuttgart, Metzler, 1986, p. 145–161.
- Sturlese, L., “Il dibattito sul Proclo latino nel medioevo fra l’università di Parigi e lo studium di Colonia”, in G. Boss, G. Seel (eds), *Proclos et son influence. Actes du colloque de Neuchâtel, juin 1985*, Zürich, Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987, p. 261–285.

- Sturlese, L., "Tauler im Kontext. Die philosophischen Voraussetzungen des 'Seelengrundes' in der Lehre des deutschen Neuplatonikers Berthold von Moosburg", in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* 109 (1987), p. 390–426.
- Sturlese, L., "Die Kölner Eckhartisten. Das Studium generale der deutschen Dominikaner und die Verurteilung der Thesen Meister Eckharts", in A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 20, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1989, p. 192–211.
- Sturlese, L., "Traktat von der Seligkeit", in K. Ruh et al. (eds), *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, vol. 9, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1995, p. 998–1002.
- Sturlese, L., *Storia della filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo. Il secolo XIII*, Firenze, Olschki, 1996.
- Sturlese, L., "Philosophische Florilegien im mittelalterlichen Deutschland", in K. Elm (ed.), *Literarische Formen des Mittelalters. Florilegien, Kompilationen, Kollektionen*, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 2000, p. 39–72.
- Sturlese, L., "Intelletto acquisito e divino. La dottrina filosofica di Alberto il Grande sulla perfezione della ragione umana", in *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 82/2 (2003), p. 161–189.
- Sturlese, L., *Vernunft und Glück. Die Lehre vom intellectus adeptus und die mentale Glückseligkeit bei Albert dem Grossen*, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 2005.
- Sturlese, L., *Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse*, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 2007.
- Sturlese, L., "Universality of Reason and Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages. Geography of Readers and Isograph of Text Diffusion before the Invention of Printing", in A. Musco et al. (eds), *Universality of Reason, Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages. XII Congresso internazionale di filosofia medievale. Palermo, 17–22 September 2007*, Palermo, Officina di Studi Medievali, 2012, p. 1–22.
- Sturlese, L., *Die Philosophie im Mittelalter. Von Boethius bis Cusanus*, München, Beck, 2013.
- Sturlese, L., "Berthold of Moosburg, the *unum animae*, and Deification", forthcoming.
- Suarez-Nani, T., *Tempo ed essere nell'autunno del medioevo. Il De tempore di Nicola di Strasburgo e il dibattito sulla natura ed il senso del tempo agli inizi del XIV secolo*, Amsterdam, Grüner, 1989.
- Suarez-Nani, T., "Substances séparées, intelligences et anges chez Thierry de Freiberg", in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, B. Stammkötter (eds), *Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven seiner Philosophie, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft*, Amsterdam, Grüner, 1999, p. 49–67.
- Suarez-Nani, T., *Les anges et la philosophie. Subjectivité et fonction cosmologique des substances séparées à la fin du XIII^e siècle*, Paris, Vrin, 2002.
- Suarez-Nani, T., "Les êtres et leurs lieux. Le fondement de la localisation selon Dietrich de Freiberg", in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2009, p. 145–163.

- Tautz, I.J., *Erst-Eines, Intellekte, Intellektualität. Eine Studie zu Berthold von Moosburg*, Hamburg, Kovač, 2002.
- Teeuwen, M., *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2003.
- Thali, J., *Beten – Schreiben – Lesen. Literarisches Leben und Marienspiritualität im Kloster Engelthal*, Tübingen, Francke, 2003.
- Theben, J., *Die mystische Lyrik des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts. Untersuchungen – Texte – Repertorium*, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2010.
- Théry, G., “Originalité du plan de la *Summa de bono* d’Ulrich de Strasbourg”, in *Revue thomiste* 27(1922), p. 376–397.
- Torrell, J.-P., “Le savoir théologique chez les premiers thomistes”, in *Revue thomiste* 97(1997), p. 9–30.
- Torrell, J.-P., *Recherches thomasiennes. Études revues et augmentées*, Paris, Vrin, 2000.
- Trizio, M., “Neoplatonic Source-Material in Eustratios of Nicaea’s Commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics”, in C. Barber, D. Jenkins (eds), *Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics*, Leiden, Brill, 2009, p. 71–110.
- Trottmann, C., *La vision béatifique. Des disputes scholastiques à sa définition par Benoît XII*, Paris, École française de Rome, 1995.
- Trottmann, C., “La théologie comme pieuse science visant la béatitude selon Albert le Grand”, in *Revue thomiste* 98(1998), p. 387–410.
- Trottmann, C., “La théologie des théologiens et celle des philosophes”, in *Revue thomiste* 98(1998), p. 531–561.
- Trouillard, J., “Métempsychose proclienne et eschatologie érigénienne”, in J. Sojcher, G. Hottois (eds), *Philosophies non chrétiennes et christianisme. Annales de l’Institut de Philosophie et de Sciences morales*, Bruxelles, Université libre de Bruxelles, 1984, p. 87–99.
- Trouillard, J., “Érigène et la théophanie créatrice”, in J.J. O’Meara, L. Bieler (eds), *The Mind of Eriugena*, Dublin, Irish University Press for the Royal Irish Academy, 1973, p. 98–113.
- Tugwell, S., “Waleys [Wallensis], Thomas”, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 800–801.
- Vansteenbergh, E., *Le De ignota litteratura de Jean Wenck de Herrenberg contre Nicolas de Cues*, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1910.
- Vaux, R. de, *Notes et textes sur l’avicennisme latin aux confins des XII^e-XIII^e siècles*, Paris, Vrin, 1934.
- Ventura, I., “On Philosophical Encyclopaedism in the Fourteenth Century. The *Catena aurea entium* of Henry of Herford”, in G. de Callatay, B. Van den Abeele (eds), *Une lumière venue d’ailleurs. Héritages et ouvertures dans les encyclopédies d’Orient et d’Occident au Moyen Âge. Actes du colloque de Louvain-la-Neuve, 19–21 mai 2005*, Louvain-la-Neuve, Centre de recherche en histoire des sciences, 2008, p. 199–245.

- Ventura, I., "Encyclopédie et culture philosophique au Moyen Âge. Quelques considérations", in A. Zucker (ed.), *Encyclopédire. Formes de l'ambition encyclopédique dans l'Antiquité et au Moyen Âge*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2013, p. 107–123.
- Wallace, W., *The Scientific Methodology of Theodoric of Freiberg. A Case Study in the Relationship between Science and Philosophy*, Fribourg, University Press, 1959.
- Warnar, G., *Ruusbroec. Literature and Mysticism in the Fourteenth Century*, trans. D. Webb, Leiden, Brill, 2007.
- Winkler, N., *Von der wirkenden und möglichen Vernunft. Philosophie in der volkssprachigen Predigt nach Meister Eckhart*, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2013.
- Wippel, J., *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy*, Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America Press, 1981.
- Zavattero, I., "La figura e il pensiero di Proclo in Bertoldo di Moosburg", in *ARKETE. Rivista di studi filosofici* 1(2005), p. 51–67.
- Zavattero, I., "Berthold of Moosburg", in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2011, p. 163–165.
- Zavattero, I., "Bonum beatitudinis. Felicità e beatitudine nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Memorie Domenicane* 42(2011), p. 283–313.
- Zepeda, H., *The First Latin Treatise on Ptolemy's Astronomy. The Almagesti minor (c. 1200)*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018.
- Ziebart, K.M., *Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and Intellect. A Case Study in 15th-Century Fides-Ratio Controversy*, Leiden, Brill, 2014.

Index of Manuscripts

Basel

Universitätsbibliothek

- B.XI.10. 6
- F.I.21. 29
- F.IV.30. 5, 36, 262
- F.IV.31. 14, 28, 36, 38, 40, 90, 105, 110, 136, 204, 262

Bernkastel-Kues

Bibliothek des St. Nikolaus-Hospitals

- Cod. Cus. 21. 343
- Cod. Cus. 106. 339
- Cod. Cus. 202. 339

Dresden

Sächsische Landesbibliothek

- Db. 87. 27, 38

Erfurt

Universitätsbibliothek

- Dep. Erf, CA. F 72. 37

Firenze

Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale

- Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437. 71, 73, 74, 112, 351, 362–363, 373–378, 381, 383, 400–401, 403, 405–406, 413–415, 420, 422, 429, 433–434, 436

Klosterneuburg

Augustiner-Chorherrenstift

- Cod. 43. 327–328
- Cod. 52. 32

Köln

Historisches Archiv

- W 258a. 29, 38

London

British Library

- Cod. Addit. 11035. 340

München

Bayerische Staatsbibliothek

- Clm 14448. 28, 38
- Clm 26897. 324–325

Oxford

Balliol College Library

- Cod. 224B. 22, 38, 53, 110, 179, 430

Paris

Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal

- lat. 473. 26

Bibliothèque nationale de France

- lat. 6734. 30, 34, 229, 339
- lat. 17341. 31, 368, 373

Vaticano (Città del)

Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana

- Urb. lat. 1140. 19, 21
- Vat. lat. 2171. 405, 418–419, 422, 433–434
- Vat. lat. 2192. 22, 35, 37, 53, 57, 110, 179, 430
- Vat. lat. 3091. 51

Wien

Österreichische Nationalbibliothek

- Cod. Vindob. 273. 26, 37–38

Index of Authors (Ancient)

- 'Abd al-Masiḥ of Winchester 27
Adam Pulchrae Mulieris 108, 262, 264, 394
Adelheid Langmann 11–13
Alanus ab Insulis 69, 77, 108, 166, 223, 394, 412
Albertus de Castello 9, 35–36
Albertus Magnus 3, 10, 15, 26–31, 35–38, 42–50, 52–53, 71–72, 74, 81–84, 86–93, 99, 101, 103–104, 113, 116, 126–127, 130, 134, 140, 142, 144, 150, 154, 179–180, 182, 184–185, 202–205, 208–209, 212, 215, 220, 222, 227, 232–233, 248, 254–256, 297–299, 307, 323, 327–328, 330–331, 347, 363, 366, 368, 373, 378, 381, 384–387, 390–391, 410, 413, 421, 430
Alexander Aphrodisiensis 119, 124
Alexander Halensis 226
Alexander Neckam 77
Alfarabi (Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Fārābī) 31, 82, 85, 88, 119, 124, 227–230, 367–368, 386
Al-Farghani (Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Kathīr al-Farghānī) 15
Algazel (Abū Ḥamid Moḥammed ibn Moḥammed al-Ghazālī) 156, 328, 362–363
Alhazen (Ḥasan ibn al-Haytham) 262, 264, 424
Amalricus de Bena 334–338, 340, 342
Ambrosiaster 328, 362
Ambrosius Mediolanensis 328, 362, 365
Anaxagoras 407
Anaximander 407
Anaximenes 407
Anselmus Cantauriensis 254
Apuleius 15, 20–21, 76, 150, 391–392
Aristotle x, 5, 15, 24, 35, 40, 45–48, 50–51, 54, 81, 88, 90, 111–112, 114, 116–118, 128, 137, 143, 144, 159, 162–163, 167–168, 171, 173, 180, 182–184, 194–201, 202, 208, 211–213, 220, 232, 237, 250, 261–262, 264, 288–290, 296, 330–331, 346, 352, 377, 389, 394, 402, 405, 410, 418–419, 421–422, 424–426, 429, 432–434, 436
Asclepius 19, 69, 70–75, 77, 80–84, 351, 356, 373, 375, 377, 383–384, 412–413
Augustinus Hipponensis 6, 19, 32, 55, 65–66, 75, 77, 94–95, 98–99, 104–107, 116–117, 129, 133–135, 139, 141, 143, 145–146, 148–149, 217, 220, 222–223, 225–228, 242, 289–290, 299, 324, 364–367, 375, 377, 382, 394–397, 399, 405–408, 410, 415–416
Averroes (Abū 'l-Walid Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Rushd) 5, 15, 82, 119–120, 124, 137–138, 147, 172, 175, 198, 207, 243, 272, 277, 410–411, 429–430
Avicbron (Abū Ayyūb Sulaymān ibn Yaḥyā ibn Gabirol) 6–7, 133, 147, 204, 245, 247, 262, 312, 314, 316, 411, 415–416
Avicenna (Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Abd Allāh Ibn Sinā) 15, 17–18, 20, 39, 82, 86–89, 156, 198, 207, 210–211, 264
Beda Venerabilis 226
Benedictus Casinensis 120, 126, 132, 183, 356
Bernardus Claraevallensis 56, 125, 271, 304–308, 313, 320, 327, 329, 355
Bernardus de Alvernia 164
Boethius (Anicius Manlius Severinus) 4, 14–15, 52, 54–56, 58–59, 66, 68, 79, 96–99, 101, 104, 106–108, 110–111, 131, 133, 135, 147, 161, 171, 178, 183, 211, 225, 234–235, 245, 253, 286, 295–296, 299, 347–353, 371, 374, 382, 397–398, 401, 403–404, 413–414, 416, 419–420, 427, 431, 435
Bonaventura de Balneoregio 96, 216, 227, 296, 398
Calcidius 299
Campanus Novariensis 27
Cassiodorus 139, 377
Christina Ebner 11–12, 14
Cicero (Marcus Tullius) 15, 22, 77–79, 86, 105, 112, 374–375, 377, 399, 403, 405–406, 408–409
Conradus Keller de Rotovilla 37, 329
David de Dinanto 332, 337–340
Dionysius Cartusianus 202

- Dionysius ps.-Areopagita ix, 6, 31–33, 35,
39, 44–50, 66, 73, 76–79, 83–84, 86,
89–94, 99–101, 106, 108–109, 112, 115–118,
124–125, 127, 130, 147–152, 155–158, 161,
178–186, 199–202, 204–205, 207–212,
215–216, 220, 222–223, 225–229,
231–237, 241–242, 244–245, 247, 254,
257–258, 264, 266–267, 285, 297–298,
300–303, 306–311, 313–314, 316, 323, 326,
328, 330, 332, 336–338, 340, 343–346,
349, 355–356, 362–366, 368–371, 373,
375, 379–381, 384–385, 387–395, 400,
402–403, 431–432, 435–436
- Dominicus Gundissalinus 147, 245, 328,
362, 403
- Eckhardus de Hochheim (Meister
Eckhart) 7, 38, 42, 65, 66, 81, 83, 93,
116, 123, 127–130, 272, 297, 317–321, 323,
335, 343, 355–357
- Euclides 28, 167–168, 409, 421–423, 428
- Eustratius Nicaenus 106–107, 156, 166, 171,
182, 198–199, 253, 400, 405, 418–419,
422, 429, 433–434
- Franciscus de Retz 324, 326–329, 340, 344
- Galterius ab Insulis 28
- Geber (Jābir ibn Aflāḥ) 15, 28
- Geminus Rhodius 27
- Gerhardus Cremonensis 27–28
- Gerhardus de Sternngassen 42
- Gilbertus Porretanus 55, 103, 107, 155, 351, 413
- Godefridus de Fontibus 163, 163–165, 169–
171, 173, 176, 198
- Gregorius i papa (Magnus) 6, 120, 183
- Gregorius Ariminensis 166
- Gregorius Nyssenens 15, 32, 275–276
- Guillelmus Alvernus 71, 73–76, 210
- Guillelmus Autissiodorensis 160
- Guillelmus de Conchis 4, 15, 19, 21, 52, 105
- Guillelmus de Leus 51
- Guillelmus de Moerbeka 23, 26, 48, 118–119,
218, 226, 243, 255, 314, 326
- Haly ('Alī ibn Riḍwān) 85, 386
- Henricus de Ekkewint 6–7, 13–14, 272,
320, 355
- Henricus de Gandavo 141, 163, 218, 253
- Henricus de Lübeck 42
- Henricus de Segusio 336
- Henricus Suso 42–43, 81, 83, 93–94, 305, 320
- Heraclitus 385
- Hermes Trismegistus 19, 49, 69–79, 81–82,
87–88, 100, 108, 147, 150, 222–223, 245,
350–351, 373–378, 380–381, 383–385,
387, 389, 393, 411–413
- Hervaeus Natalis 52, 164
- Hesiod 232
- Heymericus de Campo 330–331, 339
- Hieronymus Stridonius 6, 378, 392
- Hilarius Pictaviensis 382
- Homer 15
- Honorius Augustodunensis 30
Clavis physicae 7, 9, 29–35, 38, 55–56, 78,
185, 205–206, 216, 225, 229, 231–232, 236,
240–242, 247–248, 254, 270–277, 279–
285, 294, 297, 302–306, 317, 320, 323, 326–
329, 332, 339, 342–344, 355, 373–374, 383
- Hugo de Sancto Victore 139, 226, 309, 328,
335, 364, 366
- Hugo Ripelin de Argentina 216
- Hugutio Pisanus 373, 381, 404, 409, 411
- Humbertus de Romanis 10
- Iacobus Metensis 164
- Iamblichus 217
- Iodocus de Gorizia 37, 328
- Iohannes Andreae 334–336
- Iohannes Buridanus 166
- Iohannes Cronisbenus 324
- Iohannes Damascenus 220, 328, 363–364
- Iohannes Duns Scotus 164
- Iohannes de Sternngassen 42
- Iohannes Pecham 262, 409, 424
- Iohannes Picardi de Lichtenberg 42, 52
- Iohannes Quidort 128
- Iohannes Rusbrochius 324
- Iohannes Sarracenus 35, 202, 233, 387
- Iohannes Scotus Eriugena 9, 31–33, 35, 202–
203, 206, 225–227, 229, 232, 274–276,
283, 300, 302–303, 332, 334–337, 340–
342, 347, 384, 387
- Iohannes Tauler 42, 63–65, 67, 77, 81, 83,
100–101, 124, 186–187, 272, 320–324,
353, 355

- Iohannes Wenck de Herrenberg 332–335, 343
 Iordanus Nemorarius 409
 Isidorus Hispalensis 15, 373, 406, 408, 411
- Lactantius (Lucius Caecilius Firmianus) 75
Ler von der selikeyt 122–124, 128
Liber de causis 6, 15, 17–18, 20, 39–40, 42, 44–51, 54, 73, 108, 150, 191, 200–221, 229, 237, 239, 288, 330–331, 346, 352–353
Liber de causis primis et secundis 31, 33, 225, 227–229, 231–232, 234–235, 367
Liber de vi rerum principii 71–72, 378
Liber xxiv philosophorum 2, 19, 71–74, 76–77, 106, 108, 147, 223, 350, 378, 411
 Ludolphus de Luco 28
- Macrobius (Ambrosius Theodosius) 5, 14–16, 18–24, 26, 28, 33, 36, 38–39, 77, 105, 262, 270, 275, 285, 298–299, 376, 379–380
 Marius Victorinus 332, 337
 Marsilius Ficinus 352–353
 Martinus Oppaviensis 336
 Maximus Confessor 31–32, 79, 225, 227, 232, 235, 276, 303, 335, 368–369, 373
 Moses Maimonides 15, 107, 328, 363, 413
- Nemesius Emesenus 15
 Nicolaus Ambianensis 108
 Nicolaus Cusanus 38, 324, 331–344, 352
 Nicolaus de Argentina 42, 51–54, 58, 346–347
 Nicolaus Staynecker 328
 Nicolaus Trevet 4, 68, 103–104
- Origenes Alexandrinus 6, 31, 204
 Ovidius 15, 20
- Papias 373, 399, 404, 406, 411
 Parmenides 352
 Paulus (Apostolus) 66, 69–70, 79, 99–100, 112, 132, 234, 272, 284, 296, 298, 328, 337, 344, 362, 364–365, 370
 Petrus Abaelardus 77, 226
 Petrus Hispanus 428
 Petrus Lombardus 6, 9, 47, 57, 96, 98–99, 153, 179, 226, 268, 324, 362–363, 365–366, 395, 397
- Philo Alexandrinus 105
 Plato x, 15, 16, 20, 22, 24, 35–36, 40, 45, 47–48, 52, 54, 58–59, 65–67, 75–79, 84–85, 87, 90, 95, 101, 104–106, 108–109, 112, 117, 133, 150–152, 167, 171, 184, 194, 197, 200–201, 204, 209, 211, 214, 216, 225, 232, 240–242, 262, 285, 296–298, 306, 312, 314, 322, 329, 338, 344, 347–348, 350, 352, 374, 376, 384–385, 388–389, 391, 393, 395–396, 398–400, 402–404, 407–408, 415, 421, 426–427, 432
 Plinius 78, 376
 Plotinus 15, 22, 104–106, 298, 313–314, 344, 399
 Porphyrius 15, 77
 Ptolemaeus 15, 27–28, 84–86, 88, 386
 Pythagoras 15, 24, 407–408
- Quodvultdeus 19, 75, 77
- Richardus de Sancto Victore 96–99, 125, 152–155, 216, 327, 397
 Robertus Grosseteste 15, 27–28, 335
 Rogerius Bacon 165, 262
- Secundus Philosophus 376–377, 381
 Seneca (Lucius Annaeus) 77, 414
Summa fratris Alexandri 69
- Thābit ibn Qurra 15
 Thales 407
 Theodoricus Carnotensis 336
 Theodoricus de Vriberg (Dietrich of Freiberg) 2–3, 5, 9, 15, 23, 29–30, 32, 36–37, 42–44, 52–53, 55, 64, 70, 77, 81, 83, 91, 100, 104, 109, 113–116, 118–124, 126–128, 130, 132–134, 136–148, 149, 160–165, 167, 169, 170, 172–179, 183–184, 191, 193, 195–198, 200, 206, 208–209, 213, 217–222, 224–225, 235, 237, 239–240, 242, 247–251, 253–262, 264–265, 270–273, 277–279, 281–284, 288–295, 297, 299, 307, 313–315, 317, 323, 326, 328, 330, 345, 347, 353–355, 381, 388, 411, 430
 Thomas Bradwardinus 324
 Thomas de Aquino 14–15, 28, 43–48, 50, 52, 54, 64, 92, 100, 123, 139, 152, 162–163, 178, 181–182, 185, 191, 196, 202, 210, 216, 221,

- 227, 233, 248, 254, 320, 323, 330, 344,
365, 430
- Thomas Eboracensis 2–4, 17, 21, 30–31, 44,
71–75, 77–79, 81, 104, 106, 108–113, 124–
125, 131–132, 148, 161–162, 166, 168, 171,
182, 185, 217, 222, 225, 245, 345, 347, 351,
361–363, 373–378, 381, 383, 400–401,
403, 405–406, 413–415, 420, 422, 429,
433–434, 436
- Thomas Gallus 35, 226–228, 235, 309,
335, 367
- Thomas Waleys 4, 5, 329
- Ulricus Engelberti de Argentina 3, 31,
42, 44, 47–48, 71, 75–76, 81, 83, 91–
93, 104, 134–136, 148, 150, 203–205,
208, 210, 216, 220, 222, 227, 242, 248,
254–256
- Valerius Maximus 15
- Varro Reatinus 411
- Vergilius 15, 68
- William Gray 38, 329
- Witelo (Erasmus Ciołek) 262

Index of Authors (Modern)

- Adriaen, M. 365
 Aertsen, J. 43, 87, 123, 140, 144, 162, 183, 199
 Alaerts, J. 324
 Albertson, D. 334
 Allen, J.B. 4
 Allen, M. 275
 Amerini, F. 3
 Anzulewicz, H. 87
 Arfé, P. 31–33, 373
 Atucha, I. 193
 Ax, W. 374

 Baeumker, C. 7, 108, 386, 394, 411
 Barber, C. 171
 Bauer, D.R. 43
 Baur, L. 28, 336, 338
 Beccarisi, A. x, 3, 42–43, 48, 52, 56, 70, 92,
 123, 134–135, 140, 312
 Becker-Lindenthal, H. x
 Beierwaltes, W. 232, 280, 334, 337
 Benson, R. 103
 Benz, E. 297
 Berggren, J.L. 27
 Bermon, E. 289
 Bernards, M. 305
 Berndt, R. 165, 226
 Berthier, J.J. 10
 Bianchi, L. 58, 165
 Biard, J. 123, 143, 163, 174
 Bieler, L. 31, 225
 Bihlmeyer, K. 93
 Binkley, P. 57
 Boese, H. 1, 14, 23, 26, 36–37, 55, 68, 324, 370,
 376, 388, 409
 Böhringer, L. 8
 Boiadjev, T. 202
 Boland, V. 233
 Borgnet, A. 81–82, 144, 209, 298, 366, 385–386
 Boss, G. 42
 Boulnois, O. 350, 352–353
 Bouloux, N. 120
 Brady, I. 179, 362
 Brown, S. 162, 164
 Bullido del Barrio, S. 83
 Bülow, G. 362
 Burckhardt, M. 6

 Bürkle, S. 10, 14
 Burnett, C. 15
 Butler, E. 240
 Buytaert, E.M. 363
 Bydén, B. 171

 Caiazzo, I. 15, 19
 Calma, D. x, 31, 44, 50–51, 123, 143, 160, 163,
 174, 193, 324, 330–331, 339
 Campillo Bo, Á. x
 Carron, D. 51
 Catto, J. 4
 Cavigioli, J.-D. 23, 146
 Cecchini, E. 373
 Chatelain, É. 143
 Châtillon, J. 153, 155
 Chenu, M.-D. 160
 Chevallier, P. 226
 Chulp, R. 273
 Clark, J.G. 4
 Colledge, E. 127
 Colli, A. 217
 Constable, G. 103
 Coolman, B.T. 226, 309
 Coulter, D. 226
 Counet, J.-M. 336
 Courtenay, W. 47
 Crawford, F.S. 429
 Creytens, R. 36, 139
 Crisciani, C. 165
 Crouse, R. 226, 273, 348, 349

 D'Alverny, M.-Th. 30, 31, 339
 D'Amico, C. 331
 D'Ancona, C. 44, 240
 Dahan, G. 68, 103, 104
 Dan, A. 120
 De Callatay, G. 58
 De Lagarde, P. 378
 De Libera, A. 42, 44, 47, 48, 87, 92, 140, 174,
 208, 255, 262, 265
 De Rijk, L.M. 428
 De Vaux, R. 31, 229, 367
 De Wulf, M. 164
 Dean, R.J. 4
 Decaix, V. 196

- Decker, B. 297
 Decorte, J. 163
 Delgado, M. 180
 Delp, M. 378
 Denifle, H. 143
 Denzinger, H. 123
 DeWeese, L. x
 Diehl, E. 240
 Dod, B.G. 418
 Dodds, E.R. 238, 273
 Dombart, B. 375
 Dondaine, H.-F. 31
 Draelants, I. 57
 Dronke, P. 72, 338
 Dunne, M. 273, 275, 309
 Dupré, W. 338

 Eckert, W. 1, 11, 307–308
 Ehrle, F. 4
 Elm, K. 58, 305
 Emden, A.B. 3–4
 Emery, K. 47, 123, 162, 183, 202, 349
 Erismann, C. 275
 Etzkorn, G. 141
 Evans, J. 27

 Faës de Mottoni, B. 262
 Fauser, W. 45, 413
 Fellina, S. 3
 Ferro, T. 48, 76, 134
 Fiamma, A. 331
 Finamore, J. 273
 Flasch, K. 2, 42–43, 65, 128, 130, 136, 139–145,
 162–163, 217, 221, 249–250
 Frank, I. 37, 327, 329
 Friedman, R. 216, 330, 349
 Frost, S. 343
 Führer, M. 126, 140

 Gauthier, R.A. 418
 Gelber, H.G. 3–4
 Geoffroy, M. 5
 Gersh, S. x, 18, 26, 82, 106, 135, 140, 183, 217–
 218, 225, 232, 236, 303, 341, 343, 352–353
 Gerson, L. 313
 Geyer, B. 48, 298, 384
 Gils, P.-M.J. 182
 Glorie, F. 364
 Glorieux, P. 69

 Goering, J. 3–4
 Goldbacher, A. 365
 Goris, W. 182, 198, 203
 Gottschall, D. 6
 Grabmann, M. 42
 Green, W. 399, 406
 Gregory, T. 276
 Greig, J. x, 238, 240
 Grosfillier, J. 96, 153, 397
 Grupe, D. 27
 Guldentops, G. 57

 Hackett, J. 1, 7, 320
 Hadot, P. 337
 Häfele, G. 327, 329
 Haines, R.M. 38
 Hamesse, J. 58, 68
 Hampton, A. x
 Hanegraaff, W. 71
 Hankey, W. x, 46–47, 92, 233, 344
 Hannam, W. 217
 Häring, N. 103, 412–413
 Harrington, M. 314
 Hasse, D.N. 86
 Hedley, D. x
 Heiberg, J.L. 421
 Hellmeier, P. x, 79, 115–116, 122
 Henry, P. 337
 Hindsley, L.P. 10
 Hine, H. 414
 Hoenen, M.J.F.M. 4, 42, 330
 Hoffmann, E. 333
 Hoffmann, P. 180
 Hoffmans, J. 164
 Honnefelder, L. 83
 Hopkins, J. 338
 Hossfeld, P. 50, 71, 140
 Hotot, F. 75
 Hottois, G. 300
 Hudry, F. 2, 70–73, 77, 378
 Hünemann, P. 123
 Hunt, R. 103
 Hynes, J. 309

 Ierodiakonou, K. 171
 Imbach, R. 3, 43, 51–53, 70, 123, 134, 137, 140,
 142–143, 146, 160–161, 163, 169, 174, 178,
 198, 331, 339, 353
 Iremadze, T. 70

- Jacquart, D. 15
 Jeaneau, É. 19, 21, 31, 33, 105, 225
 Jeck, U.R. 10, 53, 70
 Jenkins, D. 171
 Jeschke, Th. 47, 128
 Jundt, A. 6
 Juste, D. 28

 Kaeppli, Th. 1, 8, 36, 327
 Kalb, A. 375
 Kaluza, Z. 2, 72
 Kandler, K.-H. 126, 140, 143
 Kapriev, G. 202
 Keussen, H. 38
 Kheoschvili, G. 70
 King, E. 31, 53, 115
 Klibansky, R. 332–333, 344
 Kobusch, Th. 70
 Koch, J. 297, 340
 König-Pralong, C. 139–142, 163, 165, 166
 Köpf, U. 305
 Kübel, W. 142
 Kühlmann, W. 11
 Künzle, P. 139
 Kupfer, M. 120
 Kurdzialek, M. 338

 Lagerlund, H. 8
 Largier, N. 43, 53, 123
 Lawell, D. 226, 309
 Leclercq, J. 164, 304
 Lerner, R. 123
 Lievens, R. 303
 Lindberg, D. 424
 Lindblad, U. 51–53
 Lindsay, W.M. 373
 Lohr, A. 28
 Löhr, G. 9
 Longpré, E. 2
 Lord, M.L. 68, 104
 Lortz, J. 305
 Lucentini, P. 2, 30–33, 70–72, 75, 82, 334,
 336, 339–340, 342, 344, 374, 378
 Ludueña, E. x, 31, 44, 218, 221, 229, 233, 237,
 331, 334, 344
 Lutz-Bachmann, M. 165

 Maccagnolo, E. 338
 Machetta, J.M. 331

 MacIsaac, D.G. 217, 219
 Manitius, K. 27
 Marenbon, J. x, 33, 77, 275
 Martello, C. 52
 Martijn, M. 247
 Massa, E. 303, 344
 Mayhoff, K. 376
 McEvoy, J. 226, 273, 275, 309
 McGinn, B. 127
 Méla, C. 180
 Méléard, M.-H. 161
 Meliador, M. 352
 Mercken, H.P.F. 400
 Metzger, S. 47
 Meuthen, E. 8
 Meyer, G. 6, 37
 Militello, C. 52
 Minio-Paluello, L. 377, 385, 418
 Minnis, A.J. 4, 103
 Möhle, H. 83
 Mojsisch, B. 10, 70, 91, 114, 126, 140, 221, 248,
 291, 381, 430
 Morard, M. 394
 Moreschini, C. 21, 76, 82, 101, 107, 371, 373,
 391, 404, 419
 Möri, F. 180
 Mountain, W.J. 364
 Muckle, J.T. 363
 Mulchahey, M.M. 5–6, 9, 10, 47, 50–51
 Müller, J. 87
 Musco, A. 43
 Mutzenbecher, A. 367

 Nauta, L. 4
 Nielsen, L. 330
 Nothaft, P.E. 28

 O'Meara, D. 108
 O'Meara, J.J. 31, 225
 Oliva, A. 152
 Opsomer, J. 273, 301
 Otten, W. 217, 275

 Pagnoni-Sturlese, M.R. 9–10, 141–142, 167,
 215, 327, 361
 Palazzo, A. 47, 50, 70, 82–83, 92, 134–135, 210
 Parri, I. 2, 70, 82
 Pellegrino, G. 51–53
 Pelster, F. 324

- Pelzer, A. 164
 Pera, C. 46
 Perkams, M. 217, 273
 Perrone Compagni, V. 2, 70–72, 82
 Perry, B.E. 376
 Peters, U. 11
 Pfeiffer, F. 6
 Piccione, R.M. 217, 273
 Pickavé, M. 43, 140
 Piemonte, G. 337
 Pieperhoff, S. 205
 Pirotta, A.M. 430
 Plasberg, O. 374
 Pohlenz, M. 377
 Poirel, D. 366
 Ponzalli, R. 410
 Porreca, D. 71–73, 75
 Porro, P. 3, 43, 52–54, 70, 134, 163, 165,
 218, 253
 Punzi, A. 71

 Quint, J. 127, 318–319, 321, 355

 Rehn, R. 142, 250
 Reinhardt, K. 339
 Resnick, I.M. 87
 Retucci, F. x, 2–4, 9–10, 71, 72, 77, 166, 171,
 182, 320, 324
 Riccati, C. 334
 Ringler, S. 10, 12–13
 Risner, F. 424
 Robinson, J. x
 Rochais, H. 304
 Rodnite, H. 15
 Roques, R. 276
 Roudaut, S. 254, 262
 Ruello, F. 184
 Ruh, K. 6, 11, 67, 123, 217

 Saccon, A. 8, 123, 331
 Saffrey, H.D. 44, 47, 241
 Sannino, A. 10, 70–72, 75
 Schindel, A. 65
 Schmidt, M. 43
 Schneider, J.H.J. 42
 Schröder, K. 11
 Seel, G. 42
 Segonds, A.-P. 108
 Senger, H.-G. 341, 344

 Senner, W. 1, 8–9
 Sharp, D.E. 245
 Sheffler, D. 6
 Siedler, D. 35, 363
 Simon, P. 99, 134, 142, 184, 378, 390
 Smalley, B. 4–5, 68
 Smith, A.M. 264
 Sojcher, J. 300
 Solère, J.-L. 107
 Speer, A. 43, 47, 87, 123, 140, 162, 183,
 202, 349
 Stadler, H. 81, 381
 Stamatis, E.S. 421
 Stammberger, R.M.W. 165
 Stammkötter, B. 126, 140
 Steel, C. 5, 26, 54, 87, 108, 194, 217, 226, 240,
 275, 301, 377
 Steer, G. 305, 356
 Steffan, H. 137, 142, 175
 Strauch, P. 11
 Strazzoni, A. 3
 Stroebe, E. 377
 Stroick, C. 87, 430
 Sturlese, L. x, 1–2, 5–6, 8–10, 14–15, 23, 26–
 30, 33, 36, 37, 42–43, 47, 52–53, 55, 58,
 64–65, 67, 72, 81–82, 87–88, 109, 123–
 124, 128, 134, 136, 139–142, 151, 161–163,
 167, 173, 193, 250, 263, 308, 318–319, 323,
 327, 329, 344, 354–355, 361, 411
 Suarez-Nani, T. 51, 53, 140, 142, 149, 250, 254
 Summerell, O. 70
 Székely, I. x

 Tarlazzi, C. x
 Tautz, I.J. 10, 70
 Teeuwen, M. 58
 Thali, J. 11, 13–14
 Theben, J. 12
 Théry, G. 47
 Tobin, F. 94
 Tolias, G. 120
 Torrell, J.-P. 163–164
 Treschow, M. 217
 Trizio, M. 171
 Trottmann, C. 124, 140, 144
 Trouillard, J. 225, 300, 302
 Tskhadadze, T. 70
 Tugwell, S. 4
 Tuzzo, S. 220

- Van den Abeele, B. 58
 Van Mingroot, E. 303
 Van Riel, G. 226, 240
 Vanderkwaak, M. x
 Vanides, A. 65
 Vansteenbergh, E. 333
 Vella, A. 52
 Ventura, I. 58
 Verbeke, W. 303
 Vetter, F. 63, 65, 77, 187, 322
 Vinzent, M. 318
 Vogels, H.J. 362

 Wallace, W. 173, 242
 Warnar, G. 324
 Waszink, J.H. 374
 Watson, D. x

 Webb, D. 324
 Wegener, L. 87
 Weijers, O. 58
 Westerink, L.G. 241
 Wieland, G. 42
 Willis, J. 22, 376
 Wilpert, P. 338
 Wilson, G. 141
 Winkler, N. 122–123
 Wippel, J. 163, 198

 Zavattero, I. 8, 10, 92, 109
 Zepeda, H. 28
 Ziebart, K.M. 332, 335
 Zimmermann, A. 37, 128, 140, 202, 355
 Zucker, A. 57–58
 Zycha, J. 364