Hadith and Ethics through the Lens of Interdisciplinarity
الحديث والأخلاق: مقاربة متعددة التخصصات
Studies in Islamic Ethics

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Ḥadīth and Ethics through the Lens of Interdisciplinarity

Edited by

Mutaz al-Khatib
To my shaykhs
Nūr al-Dīn ʿItr and ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghudda

Also, to the future generation of ḥadīth scholars hoping that this work will inspire them to bridge the gap between ḥadīth and ethics
Contents

Notes on Style, Transliteration and Dates  ix
Notes on Contributors  x

Introduction: Ḥadīth and Ethics  1
Mutaz al-Khatib

1 Ḥadīth-Based Ethics
Hadīth as a Scholarly Sub-discipline of Islamic Ethics  8
Mutaz al-Khatib

2 Ḥadīth and the Concept of Adab as Moral Education  30
Nuha Alshaar

3 الأحاديث الكلية: من الأحكام التفصيلية إلى القواعد والمبادئ الأخلاقية
Mutaz al-Khatib

4 الحافظ ابن أبي الدنيا وتأسيس أخلاق المكارم
Mutaz al-Khatib

5 Narrations on Virtuous Acts in Epitomes of al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’
From Ibn al-Jawzī’s Minhāj al-Qāṣidīn to Its Reception in Modernity  120
Pieter Coppens

6 Ḥadīth and Sufism in Ethical Discourse
Exploring ‘ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī’s Conception of Taḥbīb  147
Salahudheen Kozhithodi and Khairil Husaini Bin Jamil

7 Seclusion
An Ethical Imperative Driven by the Ḥadīth?  170
M. Imran Khan

8 The Ethical in the Transmission of Sunna
Rethinking the ‘Ulamā’-Quṣṣāṣ Conflict  198
Safwan Amir
| 9 | Abū Shuqqa’s Approach to the Hadīth  
Towards an Egalitarian Islamic Gender Ethics  | 221 |
|   | Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir |
| 10 | Islamic Ethics and the Hadīth of Intention  | 248 |
|    | Ali Altaf Mian |
| 11 | Consult Your Heart  
The Self as a Source of Moral Judgment  | 268 |
|    | Mutaz al-Khatib |
| 12 | مصنفات المحدثين في الأخلاق: كشاف أوّلً  
معتز الخطيب |
|    | 306 |
|    | فهرس  337 |
|    | Index  344 |
Notes on Style, Transliteration and Dates

For referencing, this volume follows the *Chicago Manual of Style* author-date in-text citation system.

Arabic words and names are transliterated according to the system used in Brill’s *Encyclopaedia of Islam Three*, which is also adopted in the *Journal of Islamic Ethics (JIE)*:

- **Consonants**: ʾ, b, t, th, j, ḥ, kh, d, dh, r, z, s, sh, ñ, ŏ, ẓ, ʿ, gh, f, q, k, l, m, n, h, w, y.
- **Short vowels**: a, i, u.
- **Long vowels**: ā, ī, ū.
- **Diphthongs**: aw, ay.
- *Tāʾ marbūṭa*: -a, -at (construct state).

While classical proper names are fully transliterated (e.g., al-Ghazālī), for modern names, i.e., since 1900, also the official or common spellings are adopted (e.g., Taha Abdurrahman). The “l” of the definite article “al-” is always retained, regardless of whether it is assimilated in pronunciation to the initial consonant of the word to which it is attached (*idghām*).

If not otherwise specified, the dates given are common era (CE) dates. If two dates are provided (e.g., 505/1111), the first one is the year according to the Islamic *hijrī* calendar (*AH*) and the second the CE date. For dates after 1900 only the CE date is provided.
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Introduction: Ḥadīth and Ethics

Mutaz al-Khatib

This edited volume addresses the link between ḥadīth (Prophetic reports) and ethics, or what can be termed as “ḥadīth-based ethics.” Despite ḥadīth (or Sunna) historically being the second normative source in Islam after the Qurʾān, this topic has not received sufficient attention in the contemporary scholarship on Islamic ethics. Indeed, ḥadīth played a key role in the development of Islamic thought and in forming ʿulūm al-sharīʿa (Islamic sciences), as has been noted by some contemporary scholars. This volume introduces ḥadīth-based ethics as a sub-discipline of Islamic ethics and fills the gap within the scholarship on Islamic ethics and ḥadīth studies since one of its key characteristics is applying an interdisciplinary approach to both ḥadīth and ethics.

Approaching ḥadīth as a reference for ethics reflects the intensity of the ethical content contained in the Prophetic traditions and practices. To do so, one can distinguish between two levels of analysis. At the first level, the Prophetic Sunna is approached as a revealed reference or an exemplary application of the revelation. At the second level, the Sunna is approached as a historical reference for the ethics that prevailed in the formative period of Islamic history.

The mainstream position in Islamic history has held that declaring things and actions as good (taḥsīn) or bad (taqbiḥ) should be premised on revelation, not on human intellect as claimed by the Muʿtazila (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1996, 6/1:7–8, 6/2:323; al-Taftāzānī 1998, 4:282–283; Hourani 1985, 57–66; Shihadeh 2016, 384–407). If this is the case, then it should have been the standard that the Qurʾān and ḥadīth are the sources of both legislation and ethics. Historical reality, however, shows such theorising in Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) and jurisprudence (fiqh) but not so much in the field of Islamic ethics, where the role of ḥadīth or Sunna, like the Qurʾān, has been marginalised in classical Islamic moral philosophy. Furthermore, Majid Fakhry (d. 2021), in his book Ethical Theories in Islam, and Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābīrī (d. 2010), in his book al-ʿAql al-Akhlāqi l-ʿArabī (“The Arabic Moral Reason”), introduced what were

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1 For example, in Athar al-Ḥadīth fī Khtilāf al-Fuqahāʾ (“The Role of Ḥadīth in the Disagreement between Muslim Jurists”), Muhammad ʿAwwāma quotes texts that reflect early arguments between fuqahāʾ and muḥaddithūn (traditionists) on the relationship between fiqh (jurisprudence) and ḥadīth. Likewise, John Burton discusses the impact of ḥadīth on the formation of Islamic knowledge historically. While he specifically underscores the political and theological dimensions, he neglects the ethical dimension (see ʿAwwāma 2007; Burton 1994).
claimed to be comprehensive overviews of Islamic literature on ethics in the Islamic tradition (Fakhry 1991; al-Jābirī 2001), but hadīth was, as clearly reflected in their works, absent in their overview of ethics in the Islamic tradition.

In contrast to the case of theoretical ethics, the practical and behavioural elements of the Prophetic hadīth have received extensive attention by hadith scholars who have produced a vast genre, including the ethical aspects of Sunna. An extensive amount of hadīth literature has also been dedicated to ādāb (sing. adab, etiquettes and good manners) which have sometimes addressed professional ethics, such as the ādāb of the narrator of hadīth and the one who listens to him (ādāb al-rāwī wa-l-sāmī), and the ādāb of the senior and junior jurists (ādāb al-faqīh wa-l-mutafaqqīh). Additionally, some books have focused on outlining good and bad character (maḥāsin al-akhlāq wa-masāwīrühā), religious etiquettes (al-ādāb al-shar‘yya), the etiquette of dealing with parents (birr al-wālidayn) and so forth. Other books are dedicated to the virtues and vices (al-faḍā’il wa-l-radhā’il); books enlisting incentives to do good (targhib) and deterrents from doing evil (tarhib); books concerned with the branches of faith (shu’āb al-imān); books on virtues which vary according to persons, ages and times; and the Sufi literature on asceticism (zuḥd), remembrance of God, supplication (ādāb al-du‘āʾ), spiritual diseases of the heart (iʿtilāl al-qulūb) and so on (al-Kattānī 1993, 50–60).

The six canonical collections of hadīth also had specific chapters dedicated to the aḥādīth on manners and ethics, whose total number reached more than 500 in the Sunan compiled by Abū Dāwūd (d. 275/888) and exceeded 600 in the Ṣaḥīḥ of Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 354/965) (al-Arnāʾūṭ and al-Qayyām 1999, 1:8). Moreover, the ethics of the Prophet (akhlāq al-nabī) were the subject of dedicated books, such as Abū l-Shaykh’s work (1998), or occupied segments in books on the biography of the Prophet, meant to provide the exemplary model of ethics to be followed.

**This Book**

Against this background, the majority of this volume’s chapters originated from a seminar I convened on “Hadīth and Ethics: Concepts, Approaches and Theoretical Foundations,” at the Research Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE) between 30 April and 2 May 2019. This seminar complemented a previous initiative on “Qurʾān and Ethics” within CILE’s broader vision, which seeks to canonise the field of Islamic ethics through two different methods:
teaching and producing reference works that help to fill the gaps and theorise the field.2

This volume consists of 12 chapters that address the interplay of hadīth and ethics and contribute to examining hadīth-based ethics, which will hopefully inspire future studies to cover further aspects of this emerging field.

Broadly speaking, the chapters included in this volume cover five main aspects related to hadīth and ethics:

1. a theoretical foundation for hadīth-based ethics as a scholarly sub-discipline of Islamic ethics (chapter 1);
2. virtue ethics: noble virtues (makārim al-akhlāq) and virtuous acts (faḍāʾil al-aʿmāl), covered by chapters 4 and 5;
3. moral concepts (adab, taḥbib, ʿuzla), covered by chapters 2, 6 and 7;
4. hadīth-related sub-disciplines (hadīth transmission, gender ethics), covered by chapters 8 and 9; and
5. foundational hadīths on ethics (the hadīth of intention, consult your heart, and other key hadīths), which are covered by chapters 3, 10 and 11.

These five sections offer various approaches to studying ethics in hadīth works. Chapters 1 through 5 focus on the overarching framework to scriptural ethics. As is argued in chapter 2, hadīth-based ethics “initiated an epistemological shift in the understanding of adab; namely, that it had been informed solely by customary law and human knowledge but came to be seen as dictated by divine command and associated with religious sensitivity.” In chapter 3, examining specific key traditions is employed as one approach to study ethics in hadīth. Chapter 4 on Ibn Abī l-Dunyā (d. 281/894) represents an attempt to establish a new field by Islamising common morality through hadīth. In chapter 5, which takes the case of al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and his commentators, the author examines what “hadīth-based ethics” means: is it only its attribution to the Prophet as long as it is about common knowledge of morality, or should it strictly follow the technicalities of authenticity as outlined in the hadīth sciences?

Chapters 6–7 and 10–11 focus on discipline-based approaches where ethics is studied through (a) personal accounts: al-Jilānī’s (d. 561/1166) conception and practice of taḥbib, and al-Nābulusī’s (d. 1143/1731) conception and practice of seclusion, and (b) interdisciplinary approaches where individual hadīths are

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2 In January 2015, I dedicated one of the CILE international seminars to the theme of “Qurʾān and Ethics” and its proceedings were published as a thematic issue in the Journal of Islamic Ethics (al-Khatib 2017).
analysed through the lens of different disciplines, such as the *hadiths*: “deeds are judged by intention” and “consult your heart.” Chapters 8 and 9 especially focus on the role of interpretation in restoring the fundamental idea of *hadith* as deeply intertwined with ethics. Chapter 8, in particular, utilises a Derridean trace to present the *qussas*’ (storytellers/preachers) impact on the Sunna’s transmission to the wider Muslim community. Meanwhile chapter 9 addresses “conflicting *hadiths*” (*mukhtalif al-hadith*) in searching for egalitarian gender ethics.

Chapter 12 can be considered as an appendix in which a classification of the key primary sources in the Islamic tradition that are relevant to the field of *hadith* and ethics are presented in the form of an annotated bibliography.

After outlining the key ideas and approaches examined in this volume and the rationale of combining them together in one work, below, I provide a more elaborate overview of each chapter:

In chapter 1, “*Hadith*-based Ethics: *Hadith* as a Scholarly Sub-Discipline of Islamic Ethics,” Mutaz al-Khatib lays out the foundations for *hadith*-based ethics as a sub-discipline in Islamic ethics. This chapter provides the theoretical ground for the following chapters that tackle some of the issues in this emerging field. It reveals the value of *hadith* as a corpus on ethics, conceptualises “*hadith*-based ethics,” classifies relevant works, and defines the key themes and issues in this emerging discipline.

In chapter 2, “*Hadith* and the Concept of *Adab* as Moral Education,” Nuha Alshaar treats the interaction between *hadith* and the concept of “*adab,*” historically a term with wide semantic meanings. *Adab* here is dealt with primarily as knowledge, an ethical call to action, and, especially, as a required form of training for those aspiring to maintain good manners, proper etiquette, and cleanse the soul.

In chapter 3, “al-Aḥādīth al-Kulliyya: Min al-Aḥkām al-Tafsīliyya ilā al-Qawāʿid wa-l-Mabādiʿ al-Akhlāqiyya” (“Beyond *Aḥādīth al-Aḥkām*: From Detailed Rulings to Ethical Fundamentals and Principles”), Mutaz al-Khatib argues that the *hadith* corpus comprises of key traditions that can serve as proper foundations for approaching *hadith* literature as a repository of ethics, and where the focus will move: (a) from studying individual traditions to examining the overall governing system of *hadith*; and (b) from the monodisciplinary approach where *fiqh* is dominant, to an interdisciplinary approach where *fiqh* is one part of a much larger whole. The main part of this chapter analyses the key *hadiths* categorised by *hadith* scholars, including Abū Dāwūd (d. 275/888), Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245), al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) and others, such as *jawāmiʿ al-kalim* or those upon which the edifice of the Islamic tradition is constructed (*al-aḥādīth allatī ʿalayhā madār al-islām*).
In chapter 4, “al-Ḥāfīz Ibn Abī l-Dunyā wa-l-Ta’sīs li-Akhlāqīyyāt al-Makārim” (“Ibn Abī l-Dunyā and the Formation of the Ethics of Noble Deeds”), Chafik Grauguer argues that Ibn Abī l-Dunyā’s work can be seen as an attempt to establish a ḥadīth-based ethics where makārim al-akhlāq refers to: human dignity, murū’a (which contains a set of values in Arab pre-Islamic morality) and rationality. Ibn Abī l-Dunyā’s work also addresses faḍā’il, hence the ethics in Ibn Abī l-Dunyā’s work are scriptural, in terms of form, and rational, in terms of content and sources.

In chapter 5, “Narrations on Virtuous Acts in Epitomes of al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyāʾ: From Ibn al-Jawzī’s Minhāj al-Qāṣidīn to Its Reception in Modernity,” Pieter Coppens focuses on the reception of the Iḥyāʾ in the Ḥanbalī circles of Baghdad and Damascus, with the epitomes of Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201) and Ibn Qudāma (d. 689/1290) at its centre. He argues that their criticism of al-Ghazālī’s use of unreliable ḥadīth in matters related to virtuous acts (faḍā’il al-aʾmāl) was among their main motivations for composing their texts.

In chapter 6, “Ḥadīth and Sufism in Ethical Discourse: Exploring ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī’s Conception of Taḥbīb,” Salahudheen Kozhithodi and Khairil Husaini Bin Jamil delve into the ḥadīth al-taḥbīb which reads: “I was made to love (ḥubbiba ilay) from your world; women and perfume, and I found the coolness of my eyes in the prayer.” They argue for the intertwinement of ḥadīth and Sufism as a mechanism for ethical discourse where Sufi ethics claim a scriptural foundation, as evident in the scholarship of ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī (d. 561/1166).

In chapter 7, “Seclusion: An Ethical Imperative Driven by the Ḥadīth,” Mohammed Imran Khan explores ‘Abd al-Ghanī l-Nābulusī’s (d. 1143/1730) seclusion (ʿuzla) in light of some of the moral and social dilemmas of associating with others. He argues that al-Nābulusī’s concern for seclusion is justified by the ḥadīth traditions, and it is moral outrage which compels al-Nābulusī to write the tract as an ethical defence of his actions.

In chapter 8, “The Ethical in the Transmission of Sunna: Rethinking the Ḥaṣāṣ-Quṣṣāṣ Conflict,” Safwan Amir argues that the oft-neglected quṣṣāṣ (storyteller-preacher) played a vital role in directly conveying the Sunna to the larger public. He suggests that the quṣṣāṣ not only provide us with alternative histories to how knowledge was transmitted, taught, and realised in the Islamic tradition, but they also restore the fundamental idea of the ḥadīth as deeply intertwined with the ethical.

In chapter 9, “Abū Shuqqa’s Approach to Ḥadīth: Towards an Egalitarian Islamic Gender Ethics,” Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir tackles the question of how ḥadīths have been reinterpreted to explain Islamic egalitarian gender ethics, through an analysis of ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad Abū Shuqqa’s (d. 1995)
In chapter 1, “Islamic Ethics and the Ḥadīth of Intention,” Ali Altaf Mian contextualises “the Ḥadīth of intention” in order to demonstrate, in part, the salience of Ḥadīth texts as important sources for the study of Islamic ethics. He relates this Ḥadīth to three broader themes in Islamic ethics. In doing so, he problematises the binary of the inner (bāṭin) and outer (ẓāhir) and highlights the social dimensions of intention through the illustration of migration, which signals the public – and not merely private – nature of intentions. The chapter also considers the multiple valences of intention in everyday Muslim religiosity.

In chapter 11, “Consult Your Heart: The Self as a Source of Moral Judgment,” Mutaz al-Khatib explores the authority of the heart (qalb) as a potential locus of individual moral knowledge and normativity in Islamic ethics. To do so, he discusses two Ḥadīths that ostensibly suggest that one’s “self” is a potential source of the moral judgment. He argues that although the Islamic legal tradition, as a discipline, has focused on qualified external actions of individuals and the ijṭihād (independent legal reasoning) of mujtahids (jurists), it did not ignore the authority of the bāṭin over moral evaluation and the ijṭihād of common individuals (ijṭihād al-mukallafrīn).

In chapter 12, “Muṣannafat al-Muḥaddithin fī l-Akhlāq: Kashshāf Awwalī” (“The Compendia of the Scholars of Ḥadīth on Ethics: A Preliminary Survey”), Mutaz al-Khatib presents a chronological bibliography of the key primary sources in the Islamic tradition with relevance to understanding the interplay of Ḥadīth and ethics. The bibliography is preceded by an analytical introduction. This addition to the volume is meant to serve as a tool for future researchers to benefit from and build upon.

Although this volume is meant to provide theoretical foundations and insights about the study of Ḥadīth as a crucial and rich source of Islamic ethics, there is a further thematic focus shared by various chapters, i.e., ethical subjectivity and relevant concepts such as intention, seclusion, noble virtues, tahbīb, and consulting the heart.

The last editorial note I want to make here is that I have decided to pursue a systematic referencing to Ḥadīth (takhrīj) and that is by referring to the book (kitāb) and the chapter (bāb). The purpose of that is not just for technical benefit and following the traditionists’ method but also to highlight the thematic relevance and the moral argument behind each title if any.

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Bibliography


CHAPTER 1

Ḥadīth-Based Ethics

Ḥadīth as a Scholarly Sub-discipline of Islamic Ethics

Mutaz al-Khatib

The ethical content of ḥadīth has not received its due attention in contemporary scholarship on Islamic ethics: while some scholars completely disregarded it, others only briefly addressed it. So, this chapter will start with the section below to demonstrate this point.

1 Ḥadīth and Ethics in Contemporary Scholarship

Of the prominent scholars who disregarded the role of ḥadīth in Islamic ethics (akhlāq) is Bernard Carra de Vaux (d. 1953), who, in 1913, wrote the entry on “Akhlāq” in the first edition of The Encyclopaedia of Islam. In this entry, de Vaux adopted a limited understanding of Islamic ethics that was confined to the Greek philosophical tradition and argued that “the doctrine of the akhlāq is nothing but the ethics of the peripatetic philosophy” where “the science of moral philosophy ... has an existence of its own; it is not an extract from different literary works, it is a science which is in fact connected with the tradition of Greek philosophy” (de Vaux 1987, 231). He thus concluded that “the Muslim authors who have written in a methodical manner about moral philosophy are comparatively few” (de Vaux 1987, 233).

Nine decades later, Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī (d. 2010) also adopted a narrow conception of ethics in his al-ʿAql al-Akhlāqī l-ʿArabī (“The Arabic Moral Reason”), a large work in which he attempted to present a history of ethics in Islamic civilisation. However, al-Jābirī’s work neglected specific contributions, most importantly Qur’ānic ethics, although he did reference the work of Muhammad ʿAbd Allāh Drāz (d. 1958), The Moral World of the Qurʾān, but he undermined its value and contribution. Likewise, despite acknowledging that “the ḥadīth on ethics were countless,” al-Jābirī downplayed the contribution of the ḥadīth corpus to ethics on grounds of differentiating between advocating and living (ʿamal) by the values of the Qurʾān and ḥadīth, on the one hand, and engaging in scholarly writing (taʾlīf ʿilmī) on Islamic values on the other. In other words, al-Jābirī restricted his historicisation to the theoretical works.
Hadīth-Based Ethics (kalām) on ethics and excluded the lived experience (mumārasa) of Muslim communities throughout history. In addition, he only included systematic works (kitāba munāẓzama) which formulated a theoretical argument that follows scholarly methods (i.e., works that make use of typologies, analyses, and construction) (al-Jābīrī 2001, 535, 537). Al-Jābīrī also undermined the contribution of the fiqhāʾ to ethics, where he classified their work under adab al-sharʿyya, by which he denotes “the best manner (ṭarīqa fiṣla) to perform what is obligatory or recommended” and is thus “a formality (shakliyya) that is lacking in ethical content.” To al-Jābīrī, the work of the fiqhāʾ was enriched by the work of Sufis on adab al-sulūk, which address the etiquette of spiritual wayfaring, even though the Sufi contribution to adab al-sharʿyya continued to be complementary to fiqh. These adab sharʿyya entrenched “in the minds (nufūs) of the fiqhāʾ, muḥaddithūn (traditionists, sing. muḥaddith), and mutakallimūn the certainty that the sciences of religion (ʿulūm al-dīn) and akhlāq are one and the same” (al-Jābīrī 2001, 536).

Accordingly, al-Jābīrī was biased towards the philosophical ethics, despite his criticism of other scholars who confined themselves to the Greek tradition. In fact, al-Jābīrī’s conception of akhlāq is reductive: he presents a reductive conception of adab according to the fiqhāʾ under which he then classifies the works of the muḥaddithūn, while, in fact, the ethical content is present in both the rulings (āhkām) and the ādāb (good manners and etiquette). For example, to the fiqhāʾ adab is used to denote (1) good character traits (khiṣāl ḥamīda), (2) the recommended (to the exclusion of the obligatory),1 (3) all that is commanded, be it obligatory or recommended, or (4) inflicting discretionary punishment (al-zajr wa-l-taʿzīr).

As for the muḥaddithūn, they were among the first to write on topics such as zuhd (asceticism), starting in the middle of the second hijrī century. If zuhd is to be included within al-Jābīrī’s conception of adab, then it cannot be considered a formality since zuhd served as the impetus for the development of Sufism as a discipline rich in ethics. Additionally, the muḥaddithūn’s works span different genres of adab, as in al-Adab al-Mufrad of Abū ʿAbd Allah al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870),2 al-Mujālasa wa-Jawāhir al-ʿIlm of Abū Bakr al-Dinawarī

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1 'Fiqhāʾ used several definitions such as: nafl (supererogatory), mustahab (recommended/desirable), and tatāwaw (volunteerism), as well as the better action to be carried out (mā fiʿluhu khayrun min tarkihī), what the person who is accountable is praised for doing but would not be criticised for disregarding (mā yumdaḥu bihi al-mukallaf wa-lā yudhammu), and what is required to be done but would not cause criticism if not done (al-maṭlīb fiʿluhu shaʿrān min ghayri dhammin ʿalā tarkihī) (see Wizārat al-Awqāf 1983, 2:345–346).

2 Al-Bukhārī entitled this work al-Adab al-Mufrad to distinguish it from the chapter (kitāb) on adab under the Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī. The book al-Adab al-Mufrad contains hadīths that
Adab al-Nufūs by Abū Bakr al-Ājurri (d. 360/971), Adab al-Ṣuḥba by Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulami (d. 412/1021), al-Jāmī’ li-Akhlāq al-Rāwī wa-Ādāb al-Sāmi’ by Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1071), and Adab al-Imlāʾ wa-l-Istimlāʾ by Abū Sa’d al-Samʿānī (d. 562/1167). These works reflect a conception of adab that is broader than what al-Jābirī labels as al-mawrūṭh al-ʿarabī (Arab heritage) which is limited to individual manners (adab al-nafs) and etiquettes of speech (adab al-lisān). In fact, from an ethical perspective the works of the muḥaddithūn are so rich and they demonstrate the Islamic ethical heritage, a heritage that al-Jābirī searched for. The muḥaddithūn’s works further demonstrate some of the scholarly criteria that al-Jābirī set as conditions for inclusion, namely the use of typology, analysis, and construction, through which the muḥaddithūn classified their collections thematically under chapters (kutub, sing. kitāb) and sections (abwāb, sing. bāb). This idea will be further elaborated under the third section of this introductory chapter.

As in the works of de Vaux and al-Jābirī, a bibliography on Islamic ethics commissioned by Oxford University Press and written by Andrew March also disregarded the contribution of ḥadīth, despite adopting a broad conception for ethics that included various Islamic disciplines. The bibliography moves from Qur’ānic ethics to theological ethics, and other disciplines, without examining the discipline of ḥadīth (March 2009).

Conversely, there were studies that addressed the ethical aspects in ḥadīth, but while some simply mentioned ḥadīth as a source on ethics, others dedicated a chapter or a few pages to the topic. The following paragraphs chronologically present a critical review of these studies and their key ideas.

Dwight M. Donaldson (d. 1976) was probably the only scholar who dedicated a whole chapter in his book Studies in Muslim Ethics to ḥadīth, titled “The Ethics of the Traditions.” In this chapter, Donaldson noted the significance of the practical dimension of īmān (faith) in Islam; that is, emulating the Prophet’s guidance as depicted in his words, actions, and approvals. In other words, the Prophet serves as a role model and exemplar to be followed, thus offering the ḥadīth their “utmost importance”. In his discussion, Donaldson differentiated between three concepts: Sunna, sīra, and adab. Sunna serves as a source for determining “ceremonial duties, legal practices, necessary beliefs, etc.” Sīra recounts the Prophet’s biography, his life events, and the circumstances in which he lived and taught others. Adab addresses “the requisites for good manners, education, and general culture” (Donaldson 1953, 60–61). Accordingly, Donaldson built his
chapter around these three concepts to stress the historical and ethical value of *ḥadīth*, as “it represents the Prophet’s ethical as well as religious consciousness”. Indeed, as Donaldson explained “though it is said that there were thousands of instances in which traditions were falsely attributed to the Prophet, still these very traditions may have evidential value for the religious and moral syncretism that took place in the development of the Muslim community after the all-absorbing period of rapid expansion” (Donaldson 1953, 61).

In the first volume of *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*’s second edition, published in 1960, Richard Walzer (d. 1975) and Hamilton Gibb (d. 1971) highlighted the role of the *muḥaddithūn* in supplementing “the religious ethics of the Ḵurān” (Walzer and Gibb 1960, 326). They argued that “the importance of the *ḥadīth* in forming and maintaining the common ethical ideas of the Muslim Community in all ages and all regions has been incalculable; but in addition it was largely responsible for the ethical framework of the developing Islamic Law, and for laying the foundations which made possible the process of integration” of different and sometimes conflicting kinds of morality. As they correctly explain, “... the whole corpus of *ḥadīth* constitutes a handbook of Islamic ethics” (Walzer and Gibb 1960, 326).

Later in 1975, George Hourani (d. 1984) listed *ḥadīth*, alongside the Qurʾān, as sources for “rules of law and morality for man”, or what he termed “normative religious ethics” (Hourani 1975, 128–135; Hourani 1985, 15). Hourani concluded that the texts of the *ḥadīth*, just like those of the Qurʾān, “contain [...] suggestions for answers to some more general questions of ethics” and serve as content of analytical ethics, but “all these kinds of normative religious books provided materials for analytical ethics, without themselves analysing ethical terms,” since they are neither philosophical nor theological (*kalām*) texts (Hourani 1985, 15–16).

In 1991, Majid Fakhry (d. 2021) briefly addressed the ethical dimensions in the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* under what he referred to as “scriptural morality” (Fakhry 1991, 10). Yet, given his focus on theoretical ethics, he set three parameters to his search for ethics in the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth*: (a) the nature of right and wrong, (b) divine justice and power, and (c) moral freedom and responsibility. Through his reading of a few *ḥadīth* which are of definite ethical relevance, Fakhry concluded that the *ḥadīth* is not as explicit as the Qurʾān, that it provides “an even dimmer view of the intricate correlations between the three ethical concepts,” and that it only casually touches upon ethics. While Fakhry seems aware that this cursory review of his may appear “sketchy” (Fakhry 1991, 28), he proceeded to conclude that the *ḥadīth* does not articulate a substantive and systematic theory of justice and moral responsibility. This is clear through three observations (Fakhry 1991, 28):
1. With the exception of the problem of free will and predestination (qadar), not much systematic material can be produced from hadīth. Even this little material is of questionable historical value, since it appears to reflect the theological partisanship of the major theological and legal controversies that followed the Prophet’s death. In fact, the theological trends that prevailed at those times “are of far greater significance” than hadīth to understanding “the standpoint of ethical development” of moral theology in Islam.

2. It cannot be assumed “that a substantive and systematic theory of justice and moral responsibility is articulately laid out in the canonical [hadīth] collections.”

3. Given the circumstantial nature of utterances and legal pronouncements, and the personal or communal opinions embedded in the reports, it would be a mistake to premise profound and far-reaching moral constructions on these hadīth.

Fakhry’s analysis seems methodologically flawed since he admits to a cursory reading but still draws general conclusions about the value of the hadīth corpus to ethics. Moreover, his methodology is biased since he focuses on philosophical and theological meta-ethics, while excluding other branches of ethics. Finally, in his search for the three parameters that he set for his analysis, he restricts himself to a few hadīth that appear in the kutub on īmān (faith) and qadar (predestination) in the Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī and the Ṣaḥīḥ of Muslim (d. 261/875), to the exclusion of the other kutub in these collections and to the exclusion of other canonical collections. This confirms the cursory nature of his reading, since he concludes that these two collections do not include content on divine justice, or justice in general, while in fact the texts of the Qurʾān and hadīth served as rich content for the discipline of kalām. Fakhry also seems to have missed that hadīth on justice do not necessarily need to appear under a chapter on justice, since the classification of hadīth under chapters and sections is a function of authorial discretion, rather than a function of the value of the hadīth as a proof. In fact, other hadīth collections across time did feature sections on justice.3

3 For example, Abū Muḥammad al-Dārīmī (d. 255/869) has a chapter on “justice among the people” in his Musnad (2015, 3:70), Nūr al-Dīn al-Haythami (d. 807/1404) dedicated a section to “justice and transgression/wrongdoing/injustice” (1994, 5196), and Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Būṣīrī (d. 840/1436) dedicated a section to “justice in ruling between the people on the day of judgement” (1999, 8169). Shihāb al-Dīn Ibn Ḥajar al-Ḥaytamī (d. 973/1566) also compiled 40 hadīths on justice in a treatise (2012). Issues concerning justice have been addressed in several hadīths under other kutub in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī including those on īmān, maẓālim
Contrastingly, Scott C. Lucas acknowledged, in his 2008 work, the important influence of hadīth on Muslims and that such an influence persisted for over a millennium. Yet, Lucas pointed out that the content of hadīth remained largely inaccessible to non-Arabs, partly due to the “Western scholars’ preoccupation with its authenticity rather than the function of hadīth in Islamic thought” (Lucas 2008, 226). In his journal article, Lucas provided an overview of the content of the key Sunnī canonical hadīth collections, presenting a sample of the hadīth with ethical content from the Sunan of Abū Dāwūd (d. 275/888). He also presented a comparison between the Ṣaḥīḥ of Muslim and the Sunan of Abū Dāwūd, where he listed 26 chapter titles common to both compilations. In doing so, he stressed that although “most of these topics relate to Islamic law and address the three broad legal categories of acts of worship (‘ibādāt), transactions (mu‘āmalāt), and punishments (‘uqūbāt),” ethical topics were still observable in a kitāb in Abū Dāwūd’s Sunan, which includes 502 hadīth, while in Muslim’s Ṣaḥīḥ ethical topics are more observable and an almost equivalent number of the hadīth are scattered across several kutub. He then listed 22 “ethical hadīth” from the Sunan of Abū Dāwūd, and indicated that al-Arbā‘īn al-Nawawiyya (“al-Nawawī’s Collection of 40 Ḥadīths”) is primarily about ethical teachings. Lucas also argued that the hierarchy – Islam (submission), īmān (faith), and ihṣān (beautiful conduct) – favoured by Sufis is of an ethical nature, and that a comparative thematic analysis of the major hadīth collections “ha[s] the potential to shed light on the role of hadīth in Islamic law, ethics, and theology” (Lucas 2008, 226–239).

In her 2010 book, Mariam al-Attar dedicated a few pages to what she termed “ethical presuppositions of hadīth” (al-Attar 2010, 21–25). She first listed a few hadīths that discourage documenting hadīth, confirm the Prophet’s humanity, underscore the distinctness of ḥalāl (permissible) from ḥarām (im permissible), and highlight the centrality of the qalb (heart). She then deduced that “such reports are rare, and one cannot conclude that the hadīth reports support objective ethics, especially when considering [that there are] many reports that tend to emphasise predestination, and others in which goodness is given a political dimension advocating conformity to the will of the community and its leader, while evil is said to consist simply in following any heretical group” (al-Attar 2010, 21–22). Al-Attar also echoed Fakhry’s philosophical ethical concepts, but rearranged them under four headings, while similarly limiting her examination to the Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī and the Ṣaḥīḥ of Muslim. She thus concluded that “from Bukhārī and Muslim one cannot produce much

(complaints against authority, oppression), qadar, aḥkām (rulings) and tawhīd (asserting Allāh’s Oneness).
systematic material pertaining to the problem of the nature and knowledge of ethical values and divine justice,” and that “the terms qaḍāʾ and qadar are used to refer to God’s predetermination of everything, including ethical values, human moral choices, and the destiny of every individual,” thus, those ḥadīths that align with orthodoxy, especially that of the Ashʿarī theology, are dubious and, in fact, fabricated (al-Attar 2010, 24). As was the case with Fakhry, al-Attar’s research is selective and restricted to a few ḥadīths of al-Bukhārī and Muslim without presenting a justification for this selectivity or outlining the methodology used for her analysis. Further, she seems to overlook ḥadīth commentaries, which tips the balance towards a Muʿtazili view at the expense of highlighting the historical and ethical value of ḥadīth.

Finally, it is also worth highlighting a critical bibliography produced by some Iranian researchers in 2012, which brought together what they term as “the ethical schools in the Islamic thought” (al-madāris al-akhläqiyya fī l-fikr al-islāmī) (Islāmī et al. 2012). The bibliography lists some works, both from the Sunnī and the Shiʿi literature, and provide a description for each. In it, the scholars dedicated a section to what they called madrasat al-akhlāq al-athariyya (the narration-based ethical school) (Islāmī et al. 2012, 75–80). To them, this school encompasses the works that included and classified the reports on ethics which depict a narrative style, which makes these works more of examples of compilations than ones on ethics (kutub riwāya) (Islāmī et al. 2012, 77–78). Specifically, these works include repetitions and contradictions with no attempt at reconciling these ḥadīths, nor do they depict an acceptable methodical classification, rather they depict some conflation of Islamic ethics and ādāb (Islāmī et al. 2012, 77, 79–80). The researchers thus build their bibliography on the presumption that al-akhlāq al-athariyya is premised in revelation as the only, or most important, source of ethics – which, in their view, seems to align with the Ashʿarī position on shar‘ being the source of normativity (al-tahṣīn wa-l-taqbih) – although the authors admit to having no proof for this presumption and acknowledge that some muḥaddithūn produced their works based on specialization, where the main concern is to narrate and compile reports (Islāmī et al. 2012, 30–31, 75–76).

Despite the diversity depicted in the Iranian bibliography, which includes works from the four different schools of philosophical (falsafīyya), Sufi (ʿirfāniyya), narration-based (athariyya), and reconciliatory (tawfīqiyya) ethics, it fails to offer a clear conception for akhlāq. In the introduction to the bibliography, akhlāq seems limited to afʿāl al-bāṭin (inner actions) and tahdhib al-nafs (disciplining the self). Yet, under the section on al-akhlāq al-athariyya, the authors talk about the akhlāq of the individual, the family, the community, and of serving God (Islāmī et al. 2012, 17, 30, 80). However, while in the
introduction the authors conclude that the Islamic tradition’s content in terms of theoretical works on Islamic ethics does not match those on fiqh, tafsīr (exegesis), kalām, or even philosophy, they still conclude, under the section on al-akhlāq al-athariyya, that the literature of this school on akhlāq is richer than the literature of other schools of ethics (İslâmi et al. 2012, 19, 79).

While we could have deduced from the Iranian bibliography that the researchers differentiated theoretical ethics from applied ethics, since al-akhlāq al-athariyya is classified as applied ethics, the authors still criticise the works on al-akhlāq al-athariyya for conflating akhlāq and ādāb, without providing a definition for these two concepts. The authors also do not clearly differentiate theoretical ethics from applied ethics, nor do they clarify whether they consider all works on al-akhlāq al-athariyya as devoid of theory. Further, the authors do not provide proof for how they classified the sources on al-akhlāq al-athariyya as aligned with the Ashʿarī position, nor do they provide an opinion on whether applied ethics can stand without an explicit or implicit theoretical base. On top of that, the authors do not provide any discussion on how the works on al-akhlāq al-athariyya, which they consider as purely narrative works (kutub riwāya), can be classified as a school on their own, and whether an underlying classification is sufficient to establish this group of works as a school or approach in ethics. In short, it seems that the authors of this bibliography were more preoccupied with describing these sources at the expense of critically analysing their contents, so they adopted a limited conception of akhlāq. In fact, had the authors adopted an interdisciplinary approach to akhlāq, they may have succeeded in touching on the intersections between akhlāq and the other Islamic disciplines including fiqh, kalām, and philosophy, which may have enabled them to broaden their conception of riwāyat akhlāqiyya (ethical narrative) beyond aḥwāl al-bāṭin (states of the heart) and ādāb.

2 Ḥadīth as a Corpus on Ethics

Ḥadīth, specifically that which is characterised as marfūʿ – meaning that the chain of transmission is traced to the Prophet – includes all that is attributed to the Prophet, in: words, actions, tacit approval (taqrīr), physical traits (ṣīfa khalqiyya), or character traits (ṣīfa khuluqiyya). In the terminology of muḥaddithūn, the scope of Ḥadīth extends beyond that of Sunna, where the latter is restricted to the actions and behaviours of the Prophet (see al-Shumunni 2004, 92; al-Kattānī 1993, 3, 32). To some muḥaddithūn, the word “Ḥadīth” also extends to encompass the mawqūf, for which the chain of transmission ends
at a Companion (ṣaḥābī), and the maqṭūʿ, for which the chain of transmission ends at a Successor (tābiʿī); although, they still acknowledge the inferiority of these two ḥadīth forms to the marfūʿ, in serving as a source of law (al-Zarkashi 1998, 1:420–421).

There are thus two levels to studying ḥadīth. The first is specifically concerned with its sources and depicts various approaches to compilation, such as arranging content according to the Companion transmitting the ḥadīth (musnad, pl. masānīd), the scholar through which the compiler received the ḥadīth (muʿjam, pl. maʿājīm), or according to an existing arrangement by another muḥaddith, but using the compiler’s relevant chain of transmission instead (mustakhraj, pl. mustakhrajāt). The second level, which has been largely disregarded in Western academia, is concerned with the texts (mutūn, sing. matn) reporting the Prophet’s words, actions, or approvals, which, in totality, form the corpus of ḥadīth. This second approach gained traction in different forms during the classical period, including ḥadīth commentaries and collecting as much of these texts, in a single book, as possible. Examples of this form of ḥadīth collection include, Jamʿ al-Jawāmiʿ by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) and Kanz al-ʿUmmālī Sunan al-Aqwāl wa-l-Afʿāl by ‘Alāʾ al-Dīn al-Muttaqī l-Hindi (d. 975/1567) in the Mamluk era (al-Suyūṭī 2005; al-Muttaqī l-Hindi 1981).

In studying these texts, Muslim scholars were largely concerned with their value to generating fiqhī (juristic) rulings, or to serving as proofs, and were, accordingly, preoccupied with collecting and commenting on ahādīth al-aḥkām (traditions on fiqhī rulings). Yet, in fact, the ḥadīth corpus extends beyond rulings to encompass sunan (exemplary behaviour), stories, ādāb (manners) and mawāʿiẓ (moral exhortations), historical narratives with moral content (ʿiṣa), and creed. Accordingly, the examination of the ḥadīth corpus should extend beyond a discipline-based approach to, instead, adopt an interdisciplinary one.

With this expanded conception, ḥadīth serves as a corpus on ethics, in the broad conception of ethics, as is demonstrated through both the historical context and the actual content in ḥadīth sources. With respect to the historical context, the ḥadīth corpus documents, in detail, issues, concerns, and questions of the early Muslim community, who were in need of normative judgement relevant to all aspects of life at the communal, family, and individual levels. It was this level of detail that allowed ḥadīth to serve as a normative authority

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4 Textual reporting has recently started to gain traction in Western scholarship in different forms, including ḥadīth commentary (Blecher 2018), the narrative elements in the ḥadīth literature (Calamawy 1983; Günther 1998; Sperl 2007), the Prophet’s example as a husband (Ali 2004; Chaudhry 2011), Prophetic authority (Brown 1999, 60–80; Musa 2008), the use of ḥadīth in theology (Holtzman 2010), and studies on single ḥadīths or muḥaddiths (Leirvik 2010; Bellamy 1963).
among the fuqahāʾ (Muslim jurists) who examined hadīth both theoretically, under Islamic legal theory (usūl al-fiqh), and practically, under fiqh. Compared to the Qurʾān, which lays out general principles and which, in the eyes of the fuqahāʾ, includes a limited number of verses on rulings (āyāt al-ahkām), it was hadīth that played the more significant role in fiqh (jurisprudence). In fact, even when some hadīths are not necessarily sound (ṣaḥīḥ), they still carry a normative value where, at the minimum, they reflect the norms of their times. In addition, the hadīth corpus carries significance for narrative ethics as it provides insight into the complexity of specific incidents, the drivers of normativity, and the character traits of subjects, albeit many texts were transmitted devoid of such details (al-Shāfiʿī 1938, 213, 216).

As for the hadīth corpus’ content, it may be classified into three categories: words, actions, and character traits, where these categories correspond to the contemporary dichotomy of ethics of action versus virtue ethics. While the sources on hadīth are generally concerned with words and actions, character traits, at times referred to as akhlāq, were the concern of other genres, such as those on sīra (Prophetic biography), on shamaʿil (Prophetic perfections), and of other distinct works entitled sīfāt al-nabīʾ and akhlāq al-nabī such as the works of Muḥammad b. Hārūn (d. 353/964), Abū I-Shaykh al-Aṣbahānī (d. 369/979), Abū Ḥāyyān al-Aṣfahānī (d. 429/1038), Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn al-Maqdisī (d. 643/1245), and others.

It is through these three categories that Sunna established its normative authority as the second source of Islamic law, after the Qurʾān. Additionally, these three categories positioned the Prophet as the role model and exemplar whose words, actions, and character traits are to be emulated, consequently establishing his rights over Muslims, starting with the duty to love him,5 extending to other duties which are compiled in books such as that of al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ (d. 544/1149) entitled al-Shifāʾ bi-Taʿrīf Ḥuqūq al-Muṣṭafā (2013). The Prophet’s position as an exemplary role model is central to the hadīth corpus and is premised in the Qurʾānic exhortation “The Messenger of God is an excellent model for those of you who put your hope in God and the Last Day and remember Him often” (Q 33:21, tr. Abdel Haleem). This exemplary role is also cemented through the use of the term “Sunna,” which indicates that which is set to be followed, making Sunna the second source of Islamic law. Finally, this exemplary role is also cemented through exclusion, specifically, the emergence of a genre on “Prophetic characteristics” (khaṣāʾīṣ nabawīyya) that seeks to delineate what is specific to the Prophet and is not to be emulated, as in the

5 See, for example, al-Bukhārī (2001, 2:125): Kitāb al-Īmān (“Book of Faith”), Bāb Ḥubb al-Rasūl min al-Īmān (“Chapter on Loving the Prophet is Part of Faith”).
works of Abū l-Khaṭṭāb Ibn Diḥya al-Kalbī (d. 633/1236), Ḥaḍīth al-Dīn Ibn ‘Abd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), Sirāj al-Dīn Ibn al-Mulaqqin (d. 804/1401), and others.

By excluding that in which the Prophet is unique, these works indirectly confirm that, apart from these exclusions, perfection and happiness are attainable by following the Prophet as a role model. In other words, Sunna defines what a Muslim should be to achieve the ultimate ends of perfection and happiness in both lives: the here and the hereafter.

In addition, Ḥadīth as a corpus on ethics is not limited to the outer actions (afʿāl al-jawārīḥ or al-zāhir) but extends to include the inner actions (afʿāl al-baʿṭin) to which specific works were dedicated such as those by Ibn Abī l-Dunyā (d. 281/894), Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Ismāʿīl al-Ḍarrāb (d. 392/1002), and others. Others dedicated kutub (chapters) in their canonical books on Ḥadīth to the inner actions, such as the kitāb al-riqāq (softening the heart) in the Sahīḥ of al-Bukhārī and in the Sahīḥ of Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 354/965) (as ordered by Ibn Balabān [d. 739/1338]), and the kitāb al-bIRR wa-l-ṣila wa-l-ādāb (virtue, caring for kin, and manners) in the Sahīḥ of Muslim. Finally, Ḥadīth as a corpus on ethics encompasses both texts that address casuistries, as well as texts that establish general principles such as those of al-Arbaʿīn al-Nawawīyya (“The Forty Ḥadīths of al-Nawawī [d. 676/1277]”) (al-Nawawī 2009).

Considering ethics in its broad conception, the content on ethics in the Ḥadīth collections can be found dispersed in several kutub, as in those on rulings (akhkām), grievances and usurpation (maẓālim wa-ghaṣb), coercion (ikrāḥ), tricks (hiyāl), destiny (qadar), and others in the Sahīḥ of al-Bukhārī, for example. However, if we consider ethics in its most restricted conception, the texts that serve as a corpus on ethics can be found under two types of sources. The first are those works dedicated to a specific topic such as dhamm al-riyāʿ (blameworthiness of insincerity) or to a group of virtues. These works will be further classified later in this introductory chapter. The second type of sources are the key collections where the texts on akhlāq (ethics) are listed under specific kutub, as in the kitāb al-adab in Sunan Abī Dāwūd which includes more than 500 reports (Abū Dāwūd 2009, 7:153–545), and the kitāb al-bIRR wa-l-iḥsān (virtue and good deeds) and kitāb al-raqāʿiq (softening the heart) in the Sahīḥ of Ibn Ḥibbān (as ordered by Ibn Balabān) with more than 767 reports (Ibn Ḥibbān 1988, 1:506, 3:310). A survey of the six canonical collections highlights specific kutub as pertinent to ethics in its most restricted conception, namely kitāb al-manāqib (merits) which highlights certain virtues, and kitāb al-adab, kitāb al-riqāq, kitāb al-bIRR wa-l-ṣila, and kitāb al-zuḥd (asceticism). Specific to the Sahīḥ of Muslim, the texts with ethical content are spread across kitāb al-salām (greeting), kitāb al-faḍāʾil (virtues), kitāb al-tawba
Hadīth-based Ethics

Based Ethics

Based Ethics is rich in ethical content as evident in the conception of hadīth and Sunna, in the content of the hadīth corpus, itself, and through the hadīth sciences. We can now speak of hadīth-based ethics. Yet, it is imperative to also delve into examining the nature of such ethics since the works of the
muḥaddithūn on akhlāq are usually perceived as hadīth collections, devoid of any theoretical framework or introduction, where the muḥaddith is simply reporting texts and chains of transmission rather than contributing their own ideas.

It is true that the collections of the muḥaddithūn on akhlāq do not follow the theoretical approach common to works on ethics, since their methodology holds knowledge to be in the narrative form rather than in the scholar’s opinion or analysis. Yet, despite their faithfulness to this methodology, a theoretical component is evident in the sciences of hadīth, as well as in the collections themselves. Since the latter may need some clarification, al-Bukhārī’s collection, for example, demonstrates the fiqh of the muḥaddithūn, whereby he embeds a theoretical framework in the narrative that he offers. Accordingly, those engaging in commentary on his work highlighted that while al-Bukhārī does not provide a theoretical introduction to his work, his contribution to fiqh is in his classification and categorisation of texts, and in the titles that he uses for chapters and sections (fiqh al-Bukhārī fī tarājimīh). Indeed, Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī (d. 852/1448) concluded through induction (istiqrā’) that al-Bukhārī relies on implicit rather than explicit means to present his argument (Ibn Ḥajar n.d. a, 1: 8). As for al-Nawawī, he stressed that al-Bukhārī sought to make an argument and used the texts as proofs for that argument, rather than simply offering a collection or compilation of hadīths, which explains his tendency to drop the chains of transmission at times (Ibn Ḥajar n.d. (b), 8). In other words, the theoretical dimension in the work of al-Bukhārī is implicit and is to be extracted, a task for which many commentators dedicated their works, including Ibn al-Munayyir (d. 683/1284), Wali Allāh al-Dihlawī (d. 1176/1762), Muḥammad Zakariyyā al-Kāndihlawī (d. 1402/1632) and others (Ibn al-Munayyir 1987; al-Dihlawī 2018; al-Kāndihlawī 2012).

One can further appreciate the theoretical dimension found in the collections of hadīth by recognising that classifying and compiling reports under chapters or titles is a form of presenting an argument: an undertaking that extends beyond masānīd, maʿājim, or according to reasons for rejection of the hadīth (ʿilal al-hadīth). Nonetheless, some muḥaddithūn attempted to combine both methodologies, such as al-Nasāʾī (d. 303/915) who offered a thematic classification, comparable to commenting on reasons for rejection where relevant. In fact, it was in the second hijrī century that the muḥaddithūn started to offer a thematic classification (al-taṣnīf ʿalā l-abwāb) of hadīth, as in the work of ‘Abd Allah Ibn al-Mubārak (d. 181/797) – an approach that was initially criticised given its departure from the established methods (Abū Nuʿaym 1974, 8:165). Yet, thematic classification continued to gain traction until it was recognised as an approved methodology under hadīth sciences (al-Ḥākim 2001, 43; Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ 1986, 253; Ibn Ḥajar 2000, 147), and later it was considered as

In fact, the theoretical dimension that underlies thematic classification was recognised by al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī (d. 405/1014) and Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ who believed that a *muhaddith* who classifies *hadīth* by themes or titles is, in actuality, generating a ruling and considering the texts listed under a specific title fit to serve as proofs for it (al-Ḥākim 2001, 43; Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ 1986, 38). Likewise, Ibn Ḥajar came to recognise that, in general, whoever classifies *hadīth* thematically is arguing for the ruling presented as the theme or title under which texts are listed, a method that is very different from classifying according to the transmitting Companion (al-*taṣnīf al-l-*masānīd) where no conclusion about the fitness of the texts to serve as proofs can be made. At any rate, Ibn Ḥajar was aware of irregularities, since some *muḥaddithūn* who adopted a thematic classification still included texts that were unfit to serve as proofs (Ibn Ḥajar 1984, 1:446–447, 449). Accordingly, some *ḥadīth* scholars were keen to emphasise that whoever adopts a thematic classification should avoid including week or unsound *ḥadīth* (*ḥadīth al-duʿāfā‘*) unless they serve specific purposes, such as identifying reasons for rejection (*iʿtībār*) or confirming the essence of a text in question (*shāhid*) (al-Isʿārī 1989, 36; al-Zarkashī 1998, 1:270; al-Suyūṭī 1994, 1:141).

In conclusion, an implicit theoretical framework does underlie thematic *ḥadīth* classification, including the chapters or sections on ethics. Yet, this framework is different from those employed by both the philosophers and the *fuqahā‘*. This framework also overrides the dichotomy of normative (or narrative) ethics versus analytical ethics adopted by George Hourani and Mohammed Arkoun (Hourani 1985, 15; Arkoun 1990, 89), since *ḥadīth*-based ethics combines the narrative and the analytical, as will be demonstrated in this book’s chapter on Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, and as evident in the works of al-Ḥākim al-Tirmidhī (d. c.320/932), Abū Bakr al-Kalābādī (d. 380/990), al-ʿIzz Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, and others. Thus, there is a need to invest in unearthing and examining the framework that underlies thematic classification of *ḥadīth*.

In examining the Islamic literature to identify works on ethics, Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh Drāz (d. 1958) (1998, 4), and others, were limited by their search for works that demonstrated the methods of the philosophers. In doing so, they overlooked the books compiled by the *muḥaddithūn* on ethical themes, which makes coming up with a classification of works on *ḥadīth*-based ethics a challenging undertaking. Yet, our attempt will exclude the *kutub* (chapters) listed earlier under the canonical works, as well as the chapters on *ḥadīth* on rulings that extend to encompass some texts with a restricted conception of ethics. Therefore, when focusing on books that were specifically dedicated to *ḥadīth*-based ethics, I propose the following classification:
– Adab genre: which discusses manners and etiquette as relevant to the different disciplines, including those applicable to: the narrator and the listener, the faqīḥ and the student of fiqh, to the one who dictates and the one who transcribes, and others. This genre also includes works on individual manners (adab al-nuṣūṣ), treating the parents, and other works that follow the muḥaddithūn's method in narrating reports with their chain of transmitters (al-aḥādith al-muṣnada).

– Works on noble virtues (makārim al-akhlāq), or on good and bad character traits (mahāsīn wa-maṣāwiʾ al-akhlāq), which came to be treated as a standalone genre.

– Works on al-targhīb wa-l-tarḥīb (persuasion and intimidation) that address praiseworthy and blameworthy actions, and that cover both religious and ethical aspects.

– Works on shuʿab al-īmān (branches of faith) that seek to survey what falls under these branches, building on the well-known hadīth that offer a foundation for these branches. These works bring together kalâm, fiqh, and ethics, as well as both belief and action.

– Works on manāqib (merits) and excellences (faḍāʾil), depicting a diversity of literature according to specific individuals and times.

– Works on asceticism, which emerged starting in the second hijrī century and which pioneered thematic classification.

– Works that present Prophetic guidance (hady al-nabī), his character traits (akhlāq), and his perfections (shamāʾil) as a role model and exemplar. These came to stand as a distinct genre after being included as part of the Sīra works.

– Works dedicated to a specific topic, such as the blameworthiness of the attachment to this life (dhamm al-dunyā), the blameworthiness of insincerity (dhamm al-riyāʾ), diseases of the heart (iʿtilāl al-qulūb), and others.

Some of the most notable authors with works classified under these genres are Ibn al-Mubārak, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), al-Bukhārī, al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892), Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, al-Kharāʾīṭī (d. 327/939), al-Ṭabarānī (d. 360/971), Abū l-Shaykh b. Ḥayyān (d. 369/979), al-Ḥalimi (d. 403/1012), al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066), and others.

4 Concluding Remarks: Suggested Research Topics

The above listed writings on ethics show the richness of the hadīth literature and its great potential for the field of Islamic ethics. It can be also of added value to the field of hadīth. Although practical and behavioural ethics can be
clearly observed in this literature, it should not be perceived only as narrative-based ethics or merely as a collection of reports on advice and good manners (adab). It is true that ḥadīth collections are devoid of any philosophical framework since philosophical theorisation does not fit within the traditionists’ (muḥaddithūn) mindset, which perceives knowledge through the lens of transmitted knowledge (naql) rather than intellectual reasoning (‘aql). But this doesn't mean that they are free of any indirect theoretical foundations or implicit frameworks (including concepts, analysis, classification, structure, and implicit argument). This is why this literature ended up producing what I called “ḥadīth-based ethics” which, being diverse and variable, needs to be studied and analysed from an interdisciplinary approach. My hope is that this edited volume comes as the first step in this direction.

With this in mind, theorising ethics in the works on ḥadīth can be conceptualised through the following six broad themes:

1. Terminology and Ethical Concepts in Ḥadīth Collections
   - A ḥadīth-based dictionary of ethics: noble virtues (makārim al-akhlāq), immoral qualities (masāwī′ al-akhlāq), etiquette and good manners (adab), virtuous acts (faḍāʾil al-aʾmāl), branches of faith (shuʿab al-īmān), the ethics of the Prophet, and shamāʿil.
   - Tackling the problem of distinguishing between juristic rulings (aḥkām), on the one hand, and faḍāʾil al-aʾmāl, on the other.
   - Examining the concept of Sharīʿa as outlined in the works on rulings and those which study good manners (ādāb), compared to the writings on the “branches of faith” which incorporate ethics. This may result in the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach that combines the disciplines of Islamic theology, jurisprudence, and ethics.
   - Analysing the diverse and rich typologies of morals from the various disciplines that invoke ethics, and observing their impact on both ethical form and content. This also involves studying the implications of specialist works on ethics and how they relate to the other collections of ḥadīth.

2. Ḥadīth-based Ethics: History, Development, and Approaches
   - Examining the history and evolution of writings dedicated to ḥadīth-based ethics by introducing a historical-epistemological reading that analyses the evolution of this genre in light of the developments of the three other genres, namely: (1) philosophical ethics, such as the writings of Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (d. 256/870), Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 311/923), Abū ‘Alī Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) and others; (2) adab-based ethics, such as the writings of Ibn al-Muqaffa’ (d. 142/759) and others; and (3) juristic rulings, such as the early works on fiqh written by Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan (d. 189/805), al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/819) and others.
– Studying the *ḥadīth* in al-Ghazālī’s *Iḥyāʾ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn* (“Revival of the Religious Sciences”) – without imposing the standards of *ḥadīth* scholars to verify the authenticity of these traditions – in search of the ethical model that was possibly served by the *ḥadīth* that was widely circulating in the Sufi discourse. To what extent did these traditions serve as foundation for a certain vision, or were they simply quoted to support an already existing vision?

– Examining the question of ethics in the collections of *ḥadīth* commentaries – its scope, dimensions, and theoretical issues.

– Recognising the theoretical potential that can be captured from the prolific ethical compilations provided by scholars like al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857), Ibn Abī l-Dunyā and others.

– Studying the ethical visions provided by some early *ḥadīth* collections, such as the *Muṣannaf* of ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Ṣan‘ānī (d. 211/826), to understand the ethical vision of the formative period of Islamic history as reflected in the miscellaneous *ḥadīth* narrated by ‘Abd al-Razzāq, irrespective of the authenticity of these *ḥadīth*.

– Conducting an ethical analysis of the biography of the Prophet and the *shamā’il* genre, to identify the practical side of the “exemplar model” (*uswa*) and the traits that should be followed by believers.

3. The Nature of Ḥadīth-based Ethics

– Can *ḥadīth*-based ethics be classified as religious ethics, or does it fit under one of the key Western moral theories (deontology and utilitarianism), or is it not restricted to the current theories, thus producing a third category?

– Examining the concept of *targhib*/*tarhib*, its applicability and the problems it raises in moral philosophy. For example, this concept may support the idea of religious-based ethics, with praise and blame being in the hereafter, whereas Draz (2008, 285–290) and others argue that Islamic ethics are not exclusively religious in nature.

– Exploring the possible reasons that prompted jurists (fuqahā’) and traditionists to be lenient with regards to the traditions that talk about virtuous acts (*faḍā‘il al-a‘māl*), while strictly scrutinising those traditions that imply rulings (*aḥādīth al-ahkām*). How does this differentiation relate to disagreements regarding the epistemological sources that justify judging actions as “good” or “bad”? In the same vein, to what extent would the low probability of attributing the weak *ḥadīth* on *faḍā‘il al-a‘māl* to the Prophet, provide a sufficient basis to make it a religious virtue although it will not be enough in the case of a ruling produced by the human intellect, which the Mu’tazilis considered one of God’s messengers.
Further exploring the relationship between ethics and religion, and the nature of the ethics provided by ḥadīth collections in terms of authority, relationships, and sources. Do they produce religious-based ethics?

4. Sunna as a Source: Towards the Fundamentals of Ethics

- Studying the theoretical aspects of ethics as elaborated by Muslim legal theorists (uṣūliyyūn) in the chapter dedicated to Sunna (mabāḥith al-sunna) in the books of Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh). How far can these theoretical elements be integrated into the study of meta-ethics or normative ethics?
- Studying ethical concepts in the Prophetic ḥadīth, but based on a theoretical foundation. In studying these concepts, it is also possible to search for key values in ḥadīth corpus (bīr, taqwā, ḥayā', amāna, etc.).
- Reviewing major ethical propositions in Sunna using a thematic approach; that is conducting theme-based studies (ḥadīth mawduʿî) premised in a theoretical foundation before proceeding to the applied examples.
- Extracting the key and governing ethical principles in ḥadīth corpus and developing potential methodologies for such identification and extraction.
- Developing a theoretical basis for the Prophetic traditions on ethics (aḥādīth al-akhlāq), similar to what was done with the genre of traditions on rulings (aḥādīth al-aḥkām) which has received considerable attention from both traditionists and jurists.

5. Ḥadīth-based Ethics: Comparative Studies

- Comparing ḥadīth-based ethics to other ethical traditions, such as pre-Islamic Arab values, Christianity and Judaism. Enabling comparative critical studies demonstrating what was adopted, added or subjected to amendment or correction.
- Comparing the all-comprehensive words (jawāmiʿ al-kalim) in the ḥadīth corpus to similar genres of other cultures that were known to Muslims in early Islamic history.

6. Applied Studies on Ethical Values in Ḥadīth Corpus

- Advancing applied studies on select ethical values that are mentioned in ḥadīth collections and discussed in Islamic theology, such as the creation of deeds (khalq al-afāl), compulsion and freedom, or determining the good (taḥṣīn) and the bad (taqbiḥ).
- Initiating applied studies that address some of the ḥadīth-based values in fields such as politics (obeying the ruler, commanding right and forbidding wrong, the rights of common people, freedom, justice, etc.), and economics (social justice, distribution of wealth, equal opportunities, etc.), as well as in other fields.
Bibliography


Chapter 2

Ḥadīth and the Concept of Adab as Moral Education

Nuha Alshaar

Introduction

This chapter discusses the interaction between ḥadīth and the concept of adab as sources for moral education and training. The term “adab” has wide semantic implications and nuances that have evolved over time due to religious, cultural and social development in Muslim societies (Sperl 2007, 459; Alshaar 2017, 1–48). However, for the purpose of this chapter, the term adab will be treated from the point of view of its ethical dimension and will be considered here, as rightly suggested by Stefan Sperl, as “practical ethics” (Sperl 2007, 459). In other words, knowledge that is a call to action and a required form of training for those aspiring to good manners, proper etiquette and cleansing of their souls.

Ḥadīths originated in an oral society, which was, with the introduction of writing and the documentation of the Qurʾān, slowly changing into a new community by adopting the religious authority of the divine scripture and the Prophetic paradigm (Neuwirth 2014, 72). The Prophet was endowed with the authority to teach and interpret the divine scripture and he had the opportunity to put his teaching into practice. This Prophetic model of dictating the Muslim community’s moral norms underlined the intersections of the private and public domains, as well as the role of interpretive narrative in forming patterns of moral behaviour and standards for different situations.

Building on existing literature, including Sperl’s seminal work on the ethics and aesthetics of ḥadīth literature and classical Arabic adab compilations of the third/ninth century (Sperl 2007), this chapter will explore the interaction between Prophetic traditions and the term adab in two ways: at an epistemological level, and at an authoritative level. The epistemological level underlines how the circulation of certain ḥadīth materials shaped the conceptualisation of adab and its moral paradigm, which was a shift from viewing adab as solely informed by customary law and human knowledge to viewing it as dictated by divine commands and aligned to religious sensitivity. The authoritative level demonstrates the role of the Prophet as an uswa (qudwa, role-model) who has...
provided Muslims with a living example of how to behave in different situations. It also explains the role of hadith narratives as explanatory and interpretive vehicles that erect ethical discourses and invoke moral and religious authority, as well as a linguistic authority. This linguistic authority emerges from the famous maxim that the Prophet had been endowed with “jawāmi’ al-kalim,” a phrase that came to be interpreted as the ability to express oneself with brevity, wit and fluency.

2 Hadīth as a Moral Source and its Influence on the Conceptualisation of Adab

Recorded in oral memory and through means of writing, hadīth rapidly became an authoritative repository of the community’s early religious and historical experiences (Khalidi 1994, 17). After the Prophet’s death, the early Muslim community collected the speeches and reports about him and disseminated them for exemplary use and guidance under the term “ḥadīth.” This term is found together with others such as khabar (report), nabaʾ (news) and ʿilm (knowledge), and is used in the Qurʾān to refer to reports and the representations of the past. The basic meaning of the word is also a story or narration, parable, or report, which, as suggested by Tarif Khalidi, could indicate a shift in the function of hadīth from a private to a more public role of guidance (Khalidi 1994, 17–18).

The connection of the term hadīth with those for report, news and parable reflect a moral content, while the connection with the word ʿilm implies knowledge and wisdom derived from sacred scripture. In the sense of unveiling the past, the term hadīth covered various content, including narrative emanating from the Prophet Muḥammad and his Companions. This material varied in importance and religious seriousness, ranging from legal injunctions, rituals, the virtues of individuals or tribes, eschatology, ethical conduct, biographical fragments, the Prophet’s expeditions, correct manners, admonitions and homilies.

3 The Prophet as Uswa (Qudwa, Ethical Role-Model)

Ḥadīth materials included interpretive narratives, which not only complemented the teaching of the Qurʾān but also provided an authoritative body of knowledge on “how to act” and “what is right and what is wrong” in different themes and aspects of life. This allowed hadīth to compete with other forms
of knowledge. It also established the authority of the Prophet as an ethical role-model whose behaviour in different situations guided his Companions and followers. They imitated his example and in turn contributed examples for other situations, for later Muslims. The Prophet acted as the main educator (muʿaddib) of his community and provided materials for other educators (muʿaddibūn) or the practitioners of adab, thus shifting the notion of moral and educational endeavour. Before analysing the circulation of specific hadith that influenced the conceptualisation of adab and established the authority of the Prophet as an educator and ethical role-model, it is useful to look at some of the pre-Islamic uses of adab.

The term adab had several pre-Islamic uses, according to early and medieval lexicologists. For example, al-Khalīl b. Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī (d. 175/791) links the “adib” and “adab” to the concept of taʿdīb, a form of offering education or training for those aspiring to acquire good manners and to learn proper etiquette. Al-Farāhīdī says that the adib “is the educator who educates others” (muʿaddib yuʿaddibu ghayrah), or “is educated by others” (yataʿaddabu bi-ghayrih). Al-Farāhīdī also associates the term adab with “correction” and “punishment” (al-Farāhīdī 1980–1985, 8:85); this definition was used among the nomads to indicate the domestication of animals (Bonebakker 1984, 405–410).

This pre-Islamic understanding of adab as educating someone about correct manners and appropriate behaviour was a recurrent theme discussed in poetry, proverbs and anecdotes. In these cultural and literary records, adab was described in relation to the concept of muruwwa or murūʿ; a pre-Islamic moral term that combines the notion of manliness with virtuous conduct that was informed by tribal law and customs (Montgomery 1986, 7). Muruwwa also represented a moral code by which to judge the moral and social standing of individuals and their relations and obligations towards their communities. Thus, the discussion on muruwwa and adab not only bridged the gap between the community and the person, but also encompassed the substantive moral issues of the time, including people’s aspirations, their struggle for survival and their attempt to create coherent communities.

Pre-Islamic Arabs also linked adab to forms of sociability and social interactions, such as offering food and sharing a meal, which were indicators of social status and part of portraying friendship (Alshaar 2020). In this culture, banquets were recurrent themes in the literature, celebrating moral and social values, such as generosity, through which individuals reached moral refinement and commonly accepted etiquettes. Al-Farāhīdī links adab and the root ʾ-d-b to the meaning “invitation to a banquet” and the adib to a “ṣāḥib al-maṭduba,” where maṭduba or maṭdaba is a banquet, and the adib is the host who invites and entertains the guests (al-Farāhīdī 1980–1985, 8:85).
Although *adab*, as a form of practical moral guide, was informed by inherited customary norms, it also developed over time, incorporating religious elements (see Alshaar 2017, 7; 2020, 182–183). With the coming of Islam, and the circulation of *ḥadīths* that communicated ethics inspired by the revelation, *adab* gained a new point of reference, leading to a shift in its nature and sources. While the *ḥadīth* functioned as an interpretive and subordinate source to the Qurʾān, it was a central reference point for different religious endeavours and for moral values. The ethical underpinning of *ḥadīth* narratives produced not only moral knowledge that determines norms or accepted standards, but also guidance for practical reasoning and problem-solving, focusing on situations or circumstances where the Prophet himself, as an exemplary model, approved or disapproved. In one *ḥadīth*, the Prophet Muḥammad is reported as saying,

> My Lord has educated me, and so He excelled in educating me and I was brought up among the tribe of Saʿd (*addabanī rabbī fa-aḥsana taʿdībī wa rubbitu fi bani Saʿd*).1

Another *ḥadīth*, related by al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī (d. 405/1014) and attributed to Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 124/742) says,

> Verily this knowledge [referring to *ʿilm al-ḥadīth*] is “God’s *adab*,” through which He has educated his Prophet, and through which the Prophet has educated his community.

*Al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī* 2003, 247–248

In both cases, *adab* constitutes the sum of divine knowledge that protects one from errors in speech, acts and character, and dictates the best form of behaviour.

In many Prophetic reports, the Prophet is depicted with a disposition naturally in line with the moral teaching of the Qurʾān. He also encouraged his followers to cultivate the best moral character. For example, in a report narrated by al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1065), the Prophet declares that the essence of his message is to guide people to perfect their moral character: “Indeed I was sent [by God] to perfect good moral character.”2 He also equates the notion of *birr*

1 This *ḥadīth* is related by al-Samʿānī (d. 562/1166) (al-Samʿānī 1981, 1) and considered by some late *ḥadīth* scholars as a weak tradition that bears a true meaning (see Ibn al-Athīr 1963–1965, 1:4; al-Sakhāwī 1985, 73–74).

(righteous virtue), which is a central theme in the Qurʾān, with “having the best moral character” (al-bīr ʾr ḥusn al-khuľq).

Acting morally is equal to sincerity in performing the five prescribed pillars, and a person whose actions are guided by the best moral character is equal in rank to the believer who performs much supererogatory fasting and praying, “indeed, a believer with good character attains the same degree of the one who fasts and prays throughout the night.”

As the moral guide for Muslims, the Prophet asked his followers to acquire unwavering moral character and said this is the way to receive his love: “Those of you who have the best moral character will be the closest to me on the Day of Judgement.”

In another hadīth, the Prophet says “nothing is weightier on the scale [on the Day of Judgement] than good (ḥusn) character.”

In this hadīth, the need to cultivate good character is seen as an aesthetic quality (ḥusn), the origin of which is divine knowledge. In another famous report, ‘Āʾisha (d. 58/678) described her husband, the Prophet, as having a disposition and a character that mirrors the Qurʾān and as embodying the essence of its values and moral virtues.

In this statement, the Qurʾān constitutes the ideal source that informs the disciplining of the soul, which results in proper behaviour.

Thus, the imitation of Prophet Muḥammad and fulfilling the reciprocal rights and duties that he established becomes an important part of Muslim moral and ethical teaching and practices, a position that the Qurʾān asserts: “Indeed you have been endowed with a noble character” (khuľq ʿaẓīm) (Q 68:4). This exact point provides grounds for the Muslim community’s acceptance of the Prophet’s words as authoritative and of a different register of speech than other forms of human language. This is because they not only erect moral discourses that embody the essence of God’s divine wisdom, but also manifest the ability to express their intended meanings with brevity and fluency, as expressed in the famous maxim about the Prophet that he was endowed with “jawāmiʿ al-kalim.” The Prophet is considered as proof of God’s divine generosity, a medium of metaphysical force and the eloquent


4 Abū Dāwūd 2009: Kitāb al-Adab (“Book of Manners”).


6 Al-Bukhārī 1955, 78: Bāb Ḥusn al-Khuľq (“Chapter on Good Moral Character”).

Hadīth and the Concept of Adab

communicator of divine knowledge to people, which educates them and helps them refine their characters (Q 2:129).

On this basis, a strong link between hadīths and divine ʿilm provides hadīth with legitimacy as an edifying source of knowledge. This source transcends the personal realm, that is, the life and actions of the Prophet to communal practice through emulation. Thus, hadīth can be described as intermediary communication, conveying divine teaching and values to humans through verbal interpretation, and as a linguistic moral source based on the Prophet's mastery of pure Arabic. The Prophet asserted, as mentioned in the hadīth cited above, that he spoke the Arabic of the Bedouins (Banū ʿSaʿd) and he received the revealed scripture, which contains the best meanings expressed in the most eloquent words. Such hadīths draw attention to the rhetorical and aesthetical features of hadīth and could explain why a muʿaddib who is interested in the moral education of others finds hadīth an important and necessary source.

Hence, the correct use of language, including certain words and expressions, is seen as a religious and moral act, which is a topic covered in hadīth literature. For example, in the chapter on adab in al-Bukhārī’s collection of hadīths, the edifying power of speech is a metanarrative manifested in the intrinsic relationship between word and deed, and speech and action. As outlined by Sperl, worthy action as induced by eloquent and laudable speech seems to form common ground between several hadīth compilations and pre-modern literary compilations (Sperl 2007, 466–467). This link between word and action leads to an important shift, embodied in hadīth literature, in which the Qurʾān as the divine and eloquent words of God induced good actions in people.

4 Hadīth and the Shift in the Pre-Islamic Notion of Adab

A number of hadīths introduced a new twist to the pre-Islamic notion of an adīb as someone who invites others to a “banquet” in order to promote Islamic moral and literary sensibilities. For example, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Maṣʿūd (d. 32/652–653) narrates a hadīth comparing the Qurʾān to a divine banquet sent by God:

Indeed, the Qurʾān is the banquet of God [on earth], so you should learn from its banquet whatever you can (inna hadhā l-Qurʾān maḍubat Allāh fa-ta`allamū min maḍubatih mā staṭa’tum).

This hadīth is reported on the authority of Ibn Maṣʿūd in different wordings; in some sources it is reported as Ibn Maṣʿūd’s own statement (mawqīf), while in
others it is elevated to the Prophet (marfūʿ). In this hadith, the banquet is the divine knowledge that educates people and helps them to refine their behaviour (Alshaar 2017, 11).

From the third/ninth century onwards, scholars continued to use this first/seventh-century allegory of the Qurʾān as a divine banquet providing the “nourishment” of knowledge, goodness and guidance and might have influenced the conceptualisation of adab and the role of the adīb. In the chapter on daʿawāt (invitations) in his Kitāb al-Alfāz (“The Book of Words”), the grammarian Ibn al-Sikkit (d. 244/858) defines maʿduba and maʿdaba as a banquet that is prepared by someone who invites his brothers. Next, he explains the verb form adaba and the subject noun adīb. He then quotes the hadith on the authority of Ibn Masʿūd, discussing how God compares the Qurʾān to a banquet, as something He makes for people’s welfare and benefit. Following this analogy, he states that the practitioner of adab (the adīb) is the one who invites people to religion (Ibn al-Sikkit 1998, 456). In Maqāyīs al-Lughā (“Analogical Templates of Language”), Aḥmad b. Fāris al-Qazwīnī (d. 395/1004) mentions the root ‘-d-b, listing two main derived meanings: adb, which is the act of gathering people to a banquet, and adab which is something that there is collective agreement for its praise (muṣmāʿin ʿala istiḥsāniḥ). He also quotes the hadith on the authority of Ibn Masʿūd, adding that from the same metaphor of the Qurʾān as God’s banquet, one could make the analogy that the adīb is one who gathers people to guide them to achieve inner excellence (istiḥsān) (Ibn Fāris al-Qazwīnī 1946–1952, 1:74–75). Thus, there are two shifts: One is related to the scope and the nature of knowledge that leads to adab, and another is linked to the social function of adab, which became more religiously oriented in search of inner goodness, based on satisfying a divine standard.

This conceptual shift continued into later literature. In his al-Jāmīʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān (“Compilation of the Rulings of the Qurʾān”), Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Qurtubī (d. 671/1272) quotes two hadiths describing the Qurʾān as a divine banquet. He begins by citing:

The Qurʾān is the banquet of God on earth, and the one who seeks refuge in it is safe, so you should learn from its banquet (al-Qurʾān maʿdubat Allāh fi l-ard fā-man dakhala fīh fā-huwa āmin).

Al-Qurṭūbī 2006, 1:12

Al-Qurṭūbī explains this ḥadīth by citing Abū ʿUbayda Maʿmar b. al-Muthannā (d. 210/825), who says in his Gharīb al-Ḥadīth (“Strange Traditions”) that this is a proverb in which the Prophet compares the Qurʾān to something that God has made for people, in which lies their welfare and benefit. Al-Qurṭūbī adds, still drawing on Abū ʿUbayda:

It [the word maʿduba] can be pronounced maʿduba and maʿdaba. The one who reads it as maʿduba refers to the making that is made by God (al-ṣanīʿ ṣanaʿahu Allāh), while the one who reads it as maʿdaba refers to adab, so he takes it as the derivative form mafʿala from the word adab.

Abū ʿUbayda supports this opinion by quoting another similar ḥadīth: “Indeed this Qurʾān is the banquet of God on earth, so you should learn from His banquet (maʿdaba).” Abū ʿUbayda then associates the allegory of the Qurʾān as maʿdaba with adab, underlining its benefit as a proof of God’s divine generosity (al-Qurṭūbī 2006, 1:12–13).

The shift in the meaning of adab and its religious, moral and social function is further elaborated in later philological works. The association of adab with duʿāʾ (supplication in prayer) is a prominent example in the literature, for example in Lisān al-ʿArab (“The Tongue of the Arabs”) by Abū al-Faḍl Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Manẓūr (d. 711/1311). Furthermore, in order to emphasise the moral and religious orientation of adab, Ibn Manẓūr identified the adīb as someone who educates people, calls for praiseworthy actions and forbids blameable ones (summiya adaban li-annahu yurḍībū al-nās ilā l-maḥāmid wa-yanhāhum ‘an al-maqābīḥ). Ibn Manẓūr cites Abū Ishāq al-Zajjāj (d. 310/922), who said that the best form of adab is that which God used to educate His Prophet (Ibn Manẓūr 1955–1956, 1:200).

Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), in al-Tawshīḥ ʿalā al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaḥīḥ (“The Strophic Work on the Authentic Collection”) in the chapter on adab, explains adab as “the use of that which is praiseworthy in speech and deed” (istiʿmāl mā yuḥmadu qawlan wa-fiʿlan); he also says it means “applying one’s moral character.” Al-Suyūṭī adds that adab is derived from maʿṭuba (banquet), and that this banquet is the call for morality (al-Suyūṭī 2000, 537). He further cites several ḥadīths concerning the ethics of action and companionship in which the Prophet states that the best deeds that lead to reward and satisfaction of
God are performing prayers on time and being kind and caring towards parents (al-Suyūṭī 2000, 5:37–38). This point illustrates how adab was influenced by religion as conveyed in the teachings of hadīth, echoing the Qur’ānic spirit. 

Thus, the religiously informed moral dimension of adab as every type of praiseworthy training, which leads a person to reach one of the many virtues and excellence, and a tool for acquiring the discipline of the soul and the best of character is maintained in various Prophetic hadīths. This underlines the educational function of this form of adab as imparting exemplary instruction and rules in the social domain as taught by the Prophet and the early Muslim community.

5 Adab Chapters in Ḥadīth Collections, Their Edifying Function and Reception

Ḥadīths were initially collected as recorded, heard or remembered. However, as they began to be compiled in authoritative collections, hadīths were classified by subject-matter and there was an awareness of their educational and moral value. Sperl explains that this specific function manifested in the development of canonical hadīth compendia in the late third/ninth century, which he compares with literary compilations of the same period, showing a common interest in chapters under the heading of adab (Sperl 2007, 459–486). He identifies the spread of derivatives, such as ta’addub and ta’dīb (“to acquire education” and “to educate” respectively), and a common interest for good conduct in these compilations. Sperl notes the brevity of a hadīth from Thābit (d. 123/741 or 127/745) on the authority of Anas (d. 93/712) that the Prophet said:

When God created Adam in Paradise, He left him as He wished to leave him, and Satan began to walk around him to see what he was. When he realised that he was hollow he knew that he had been created unable to control himself (Muslim 1991, 4:2016: Kitāb al-Bīr w-a-l-Ṣīla w-a-l-Ādāb (“Book on Virtue, Maintaining the Ties of Kinship and Manners”), Bāb Khalq al-Insān Khalqan lā Yatamālak (“Chapter on the Creation of Humankind in a Way that He Would Not Control Himself”).

According to Sperl, this hadīth evokes a metanarrative underlying the phenomenon of hadīth in general, concerning the inability of the human being to control himself or herself, hence susceptible to the danger of Satan and

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9 In Sperl’s article it is “Thābit b. Anas,” but in the Šaḥīḥ of Muslim it is “Thābit ‘an Anas.”
temptation, and in need for help and divine guidance. This divine guidance is provided “by a succession of divine messengers despatched to earth as a sign of God’s mercy,” a message that resonates with Qur’anic teachings (Sperl 2007, 461–462).

Thus, as explained in the above discussion about the Prophet as an ethical role-model, hadīths from Muḥammad, the last Prophet responsible for teaching and interpreting divine guidance, offer a metanarrative that surpasses other forms of human language in their emotional, spiritual and didactic impact on religiously oriented audiences. On this basis, hadīth presents authorised codes of practice and ethical conduct in order to promote a coherent community. Thus, the importance of hadīth is manifested by how many Muslims see the Prophet not only as someone who preached an alternative and continually relevant way of living, but who also implemented his religious and moral teachings in all facets of life, whether personal in relation to God, his family, or at social and political levels. Therefore, his practice “was not mere private conduct, but a detailed interpretation and application of his teachings” (Hamidullah 1992, 23). Tarif Khalidi has also showed that for centuries the Islamic community has continued to centre its attention on the Prophet Muhammad even more than the Qurʾān itself. He showed how the persona, sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muḥammad have been conceived in various ways by Muslims in different places, to reflect their aspirations and the demands of living (Khalidi 2009).

The traditions of the Prophet proved important for adab (as practical ethics) and for devoted Muslims in their search for a moral agent who could influence their practices and perspective on life. Hadīth narratives offered an authoritative guide for most aspects of Muslim daily life and thus form the basis of what could be termed as “ordinary ethics,” a form of ethics which has been described by Michael Lambek as intrinsic to action (Lambek 2010, 39–63). Here, this can be seen in two ways: narratives specific to acts in terms of performance (what the Prophet said or did) and narratives specific to actions in terms of passing judgements or establishing a practice (what the Prophet approved or did not approve). Hence, adab’s basic function in hadīth, as pointed out by Sperl, is to define the basic behavioural standards of the Muslim community and to outline the moral ground for the interpersonal relationship of different groups (Sperl 2007, 472).

The five canonical collections of hadīth, namely, those of al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 261/875), Abū Dāwūd (d. 275/889), al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892) and Ibn Māja (d. 273/887), all contain chapters devoted to adab. Each compiler maintained his own method and approach of including or excluding certain hadīths. However, the hadīths they included in these chapters
share a common interest in creating a set of moral behavioural codes, an awareness of the self in relation to others and self-control. For example, in the Şaḥīḥ of Muslim in Kitāb wa-l-Ṣila wa-l-Ādāb (“Book on Virtue, Maintaining the Ties of Kinship and Manners”) and in the Şaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī in Kitāb al-Adab (“Book of Manners”), hadīths are arranged to provide practical advice on forms of relationships and how a person could lead a pious life. Hadīths have covered many aspects starting with one’s responsibilities towards others, including care and love for parents, observing bonds of kinship and extending righteousness, mercy and forgiveness towards neighbours and fellow humans. These are followed by additional hadīths that act as parables for how a person may gain control over his or her emotions, including anger, avoidance of conflict, commanding right and forbidding wrong, as well as hadīths that show the importance of cultivating virtues such as honesty and telling the truth, cheerfulness and joviality, humility and compassion.

Abū Dāwūd starts his chapter on adab with reports on the moral qualities of the Prophet. He seems to give more importance to certain aspects, including the need for self-control (ḥilm), anger management, decency and detesting praising a person in their presence. There are also hadīths relating to the rules of behaviours in specific situations.

Another example is Ibn Abī l-Dunyā (d. 281/894), an ascetic at the ʿAbbāsid court, whose main pre-occupation as an educator and tutor of several ʿAbbāsid caliphs and princes (Dietrich 1968) influence greatly his selection criteria of hadīths. Being interested in providing an authoritative basis for proper conduct and moderate morality, Ibn Abī l-Dunyā included hadīths and āthār (reports generally concerning the Companions of the Prophet) that served a moral purpose, including piety, tazkiyat al-nafs (purification of the soul), zuhd (asceticism) and adab (moral rectitude) and self-control. For example, in his work Makārim al-Akhlāq (“The Noblest Moral Character”) (see Ibn Abī l-Dunyā 1989). Ibn Abī l-Dunyā introduced hadīth (especially qudsī [divine]) that dealt with noble qualities of character and personal piety, which were addressed to religiously oriented audiences. These hadīths are not consulted in the work of jurists, but they function as metanarratives offering overarching accounts, or interpretations of particular events, or a set of circumstances concerning the Prophet and his early companions to provide patterns for correct behaviour and a set of values and beliefs that give meaning to people’s experiences.

The link between hadīth and adab is also clear in al-Nawawī’s (d. 676/1277) hadīth collection, Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn (“Gardens of the Righteous”). In his authorial remarks of Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn, al-Nawawī stated that human beings were created to worship God and to refrain from anything that distracts from this. He added that the best way to achieve this moral rectitude and refinement of character
is through the authentic reports about the Prophet (al-ta‘addub bi-mā saḥḥa ‘an Nabīyyinā) (al-Nawawī 2001, 18). Likewise, for al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) anyone who is ignorant of ḥadīth is deprived of great goodness, but the one who knows it obtains great goodness. Therefore, the one who has this form of knowledge should rectify his intention and purify his heart from worldly desires. Indeed, al-Suyūṭī underlines the moral value of Imām al-Nawawī’s compilation. He mentions that the ḥadīths which are combined and explained by Imām al-Nawawī are the link to the Prophet and provide a source for the person interested in rectifying his speech and actions (al-Suyūṭī n.d., 6). Thus, the relationship of ḥadīth to ethics is manifested in pre-modern collections by the sheer number of ḥadīths that cover various topics on morality and by the ways in which these moral ideas are presented as intrinsically related to actions and practices in most aspects of Muslim daily life.

However, in the third/ninth and the fourth/tenth centuries, which were a period of cultural, polemical and intellectual tension, the reception and status of ḥadīth as a source of moral knowledge was often debated in various circles. In the field of adab (literary traditions) and with the introduction of elements coming from other cultures, several practitioners of adab, especially those driven by anti-Arab sentiment (shu‘ūbīyya) and professional pride rejected the use of ḥadīth and devalued the reports about the Prophet and his Companions (Ibn Qutayba 1982, 7). Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889) and Abū ‘Uthmān ‘Amr b. Bahr al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868), however, emphasised the moral dimension of the art of writing, arguing for the unique place of the Qurʾān, Prophetic traditions and science of the Arabic language to achieve moral rectitude and a model of piety (see Ibn Qutayba 1982, 7; Van Gelder 1998, 1361; Sperl 2007, 462; Alshaar 2017, 15; Khalidi 1996, 104–108; Montgomery 2013). Studying and memorising the Qurʾān and ḥadīth in learning sessions (majālis al-taʿlīm) continued to be part of the education and training that many udābā’ received, and some engaged in the transmission and teaching of ḥadīth, such as Ibn Qutayba and Abū ‘Alī al-Tanūkhī (d. 384/994). Thus, acquiring knowledge of the Qurʾān and Prophetic traditions was seen as the basis for three-dimensional moral education, which focuses on inner personal development, that is, spiritual progress that comes about through the internalisation of collective Islamic values and its implementation at the social level. This use of Prophetic traditions manifests a strong connection between rhetoric and the manifestation of moral values in action and practices.

Ibn Qutayba, in his Adab al-Kātib (“Manners of the Scribe”), acknowledges the inherent elements in ḥadīth as a source for wisdom and mentions that a chancery writer, or an adīb, should particularly memorise ḥadīth that concern fiqh (jurisprudence) and its rulings (Ibn Qutayba 1982, 9). This point was also
suggested by al-Qalqashandi (d. 821/1418), who drew attention to memorising hadith on various subjects and added that a writer needs also to memorise more general hadith (as khabar) concerning wisdom, siyar (biographies) or historical events, which people often cite in their speech or texts (al-Qalqashandi 1987, 202–203).

Hadith narratives as examples of wisdom derive their legitimacy from the Prophet’s statement, “I have been given the ability to combine many meanings in a few words and to arrive at new ones,” (uṭitu jawāmiʿ al-kalim). Therefore, his utterances are considered above ordinary human wisdom and above other forms of Arabic style and rhetoric. For this reason, hadith and Qur’anic citations (iqṭībās) are commonly accepted as authoritative (Sanni 1998). Many authors used hadith alongside Qur’anic citations to support their views and to advance their goals by providing a persuasive voice in the religious and political disputes of the time. Therefore, authors were advised to comprehend al-Muwatta’ (“The Well-Trodden Path”) of Mālik b. Anas (d. 796/1023), the Sahīhs of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, the Sunan of al-Tirmidhī, Abū Dāwūd, al-Nasāʾī and other hadith collections. This inclusive approach to hadith is adopted in al-Kāmil fī l-Lughā wa-l-Adab (“The Comprehensive Work on Language and Manners”) by al-Mubarrid (d. 898), whose motive to compose a work that combines forms of adab, or materials that provide training in virtue as well as eloquence, led him to cite many sayings of the Prophet alongside eloquent prose from the early Companions, well-composed poetry, popular proverbs, wisdom and oratory (al-Mubarrid 1937, 3–4.).

Often, hadith was positioned after Qur’ānic verses, creating a hierarchy of knowledge that reinforces the understanding of hadith as explanatory and subordinate to the Qur’ān. This position of hadith is maintained by many pre-modern authors. For example, the Prophet’s customs (Sunna) are second within the hierarchy of sources for Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023), whose moral vision was influenced by his spiritual commitment to the example of the Prophet and his early Companions. In his epistle Risāla fī l-ʿUlūm (“Epistle on the Classification of Knowledge”), the Prophetic Sunna is subordinate to the Qur’ān and elucidates its principles and terms. He argues that part of the Prophetic Sunna gives rise to knowledge, while another part necessitates action and demands rules of behaviour, which is the highest degree of moral knowledge (al-Tawḥīdī 1968, 107; Alshaar 2015, 70). This knowledge seems the highest degree and it includes elements that qualify it as wisdom (ḥikma) with religious reference ascribed to the Prophet’s sayings and practices. This position is similar to that of al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820), who also links ḥikma to the Sunna of the Prophet within the framework of divine revelation. The Prophet’s Sunna and the divine revelation are the best sources to determine right and wrong (al-Tawḥīdī 1984, 1:515).
As subordinate and explanatory to God’s Qur’ānic commands, the Prophetic Sunna provides the foundation for moral education in Islam, disseminating knowledge of what people should do (ḥalāl, permitted) and should not do (ḥarām, forbidden), and motivating them to act in accordance with the examples provided in the ḥadīth narratives and with God’s commands. This knowledge can be divided into three main types: a) relating to akhlāq, moral traits concerning religious duties and responsibilities as set out by Qur’ānic commands; b) relating to people’s dealings with each other and manners associated with good behaviour (adab) and judgments about them; c) the qualities of personal character emulating the ideal example of the Prophet.

Thus, ḥadīth contains elements considered worthy of preserving by the Muslim community and provides a strong basis for the interface between religion, morality and rhetoric, by delivering outstanding moral claims on the basis of being secondary to the Qur’ān. ḥadīth narratives provide a form of timeless morality based on timeless religious principles. Thus, Sunna became part of the law that enforces this form of religious collective morality rather than an autonomous one.

Modern scholarship has recently come to appreciate the value of ḥadīth as “khabar” or narrative that presents a situation or an understanding of a situation (Günther 1998, 433–471; El Calamawy 1983, 308–316). Sahair El Calamawy particularly addresses the narrative elements of ḥadīth, especially their “aspects of storytelling” due to their oral popular transmission, and how the details of certain narratives woven around the persona of the Prophet functioned to arouse emotion (El Calamawy 1983, 308–316). Daniel Beaumont also discusses the act of narrating in ḥadīth and argues that while the isnād provides a sense of needed legitimacy, the matn provides elements for comparison and drawing similarities (Beaumont 2010, 41–28), which help to form moral judgements. These elements help readers to compare their situations with knowledge about the life of the Prophet, who is seen by devoted Muslims as the exemplar of the ideal man. This aspect of storytelling in the domain of ḥadīth highlights the links between stories, reports and storytelling and that of ethics and morality. Thus, moral values form an integral part of ḥadīth reports, since the narratives deal explicitly with questions, as mentioned above, related to behaviour or action and to judgements about different situations.

6 Conclusion

In conclusion, the reception of ḥadīth narratives was closely linked to questions of adab and morality in Islamic culture along with their use in legal discussions. Ḥadīth has continued for centuries to provide models of piety
and morality, based on the ideals of the Prophet and his companions, for the Muslim community seeking to define its place and identity, while interacting with Qur’anic scripture.

Islamic scholarship in numerous fields manifested a great interest in using reports on the Prophet and his early companions as normative sources for moral knowledge. This practice not only shows the role of stories, narrative and their interpretations in shaping ethical discourses in Islamic culture, but also a conscious attempt to limit sources and thus possibilities for moral knowledge, putting forward a religio-Arab moral source of knowledge in a culture of competing ethical claims.

The fact that many contemporary Muslim communities still look to the Prophet as an ideal model emphasises the continued role of hadīth in forming ideas about morality. Religious language based on hadīth plays an important role in raising the emotions of members of the community and adding a human psychological example to their understanding of ethics and morality. Therefore, Prophetic traditions have become an integral part of Muslim social imaginary and cultural memory, in which the morality of the Prophet, through his deeds and sayings, have been received and appropriated in various contexts.

Bibliography

Sources


**Studies**


الفصل 3
الأحاديث الكلية: من الأحكام التفصيلية إلى القواعد والمبادئ الأخلاقية
معتز الخطيب

مقدمة
يرجع تعريف "الأحاديث الكلية" إلى الإمام أبي عمرو بن الصلاح (ت. 643/1245) الذي كان أول من أمال في مجلس حديثي - مجموعة من الأحاديث سماها "الأحاديث الكلية". وقد شكلت أحاديثه فائحةً للاستغلال بنوع يجمع أحاديث مخصوصة شرطها أن تؤسس لقاعدة من قواعد الدين أو مبدأ من مبادئه. لم يكن ابن الصلاح بالرقم أربعين، وكان قد بنى عمله على أقوال سابقة لعدد من الحديثين المتقدمين. وكان قد بنى عمله على أقوال سابقة لعدد من الحديثين المتقدمين. ولكن الإمام محيي الدين النووي (ت. 676/1277) الذي عني بالأحاديث الكلية، أدخلها في نوع الأربعينات اسمها في أحاديثه بين خصوصيات الكلية والأربعين، متجاوزًا تقليد سابق كان يجمع أربعين حديثًا في باب أو مفهوم جزئي.


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الأحاديث الكلية

أعلم بالرجال: فلان عن فلان كذا وكذا، وكان شقيق (الثوري، ت. 866/161).

ولكن أن تقع الأحاديث الكلية من هالتين الطريقتين؟ توفر المصなんだ عل الأبواب

فبعضها أقصى على باب واحد أفرده عن الكتب الطوال، وبعضها جمع أحاديث مختلفة سميت جوامع وسنن وغيرها.

وكان الخليل البغدادي (ت. 1071/286) قد أفرد بابا بعنوان: "الأحاديث التي تدور أباب الفقه عليها"، ساق فيه روايتين عن أبي داود (ت. 788/275) في أن "الفقه يدور على أربعة أحاديث" أو "على خمسة أحاديث" وهي من الأحاديث الكلية التي ستأتي لاحقًا، وخصص أيضا بابا آخر لمعرفة الشيخين الذين روى عنهم الأحاديث الحمجة والمسائل الفقهية (الخطيب، 1983/285-290).

فنى تقسيم السنن على الأحكام - لدى المتاخرين - إلى ما يسمى "أحاديث الأحكام" التي يجمع فيها كل مصنف أدلة الفقه على مذهب معين، ومحدودة الأسائد، وهي نظام آيات الأحكام.

ولكن الفقه - وإن غلب – لم يستوعب طريق التصنيف على الأبواب، التي شملت أيضًا أحاديث أخرى مثل القول، كالحفظ والرقائق والأخلاقيات والأدب، وشعب الإيمان وجوامع الكلم والحكم والمواعظ والترغيب والفضلاء وغيرها.

فالأحاديث الكلية تبدو خارج طريق التصنيف السابقين ومتجاوزة لفكرة الأبواب، في انتقال من الجزئي إلى الكلي، ومن التفاصيل إلى الأصول، ومع ذلك يمكن أن تدرج الأحاديث الكلية ضمن الأحوالية الحديثية أو المصنفات الحديثية المتصلة بحقائق الأخلاق، من جهة مضامينها، كـ "يختلف لاحقاً - ومن جهة كونها تعبر عن قواعد ومبادئ كلية متزودة بالنزعة التفصيلية لأحاديث الأحكام التي يجمع بين الجانب الأخلاقي والقانونية، والتعبدية، وإذا كان بعض متقدم الديناء قد اعتبر التصنيف على الأبواب يدخلي في طلب الآخرة (الخطيب، 1983/285-286) ؛ فإن الانشغال بالأحاديث الكلية يدخل في أمن الأول: طلب طريق الآخرة؛ فقد قال النووي في مقدمة أربعينه: "ويجري لكل راغب في الآخرة أن يعرف هذه الأحاديث، لما شملت عليه المهمات، واحترى عليه من التنبؤ على جميع الطاعات" (النووي، 2009، 45)، والثاني: تصحيح الأخلاق، لما اشتملت هذه الأحاديث من المبادئ والمفاهيم الكلية التامة.

اسلك الفرد في علاقته بشجرة تعلية والآخرين.

يشرح هذا الفصل الأحاديث الكلية من خلال ثلاثة مناور بالإضافة إلى مقدمة وخلاصة. في المحور الأول يشرح فهم الأحاديث الكلية وعلوته بفهم جوامع الكلم، وفي المحور الثاني يؤخ لفكرة الأحاديث الكلية تطوراتها، وفي المحور الثالث يحل المضامين الأخلاقية للأحاديث الكلية.
مفهوم الأحاديث الكلية وصلتها بجوامع الكلام

اختلقت عبارات علماء الحديث وشراحه في وصف الأحاديث المصممة في هذا الباب، ولكن تغطي تعبيرات متعددة وهي: جوامع الكلام، والأحاديث التي عليها مدار الإسلام، وقواعد الدين أو أصول الإسلام، والأحاديث الكلية. ولم يأعد للعلماء كلامًا صريحاً حول ما إذا كانت هذه التعبيرات مترادفة أو متباينة المدلول، وذلك سأتناول استعمالات العلماء لهذه التعبيرات أولًا، ثم أحرر القول في مفهوم «جوامع الكلام» ثانياً، لأن ذلك سيعين على تحرير المفاهيم ومن ثم تنزيل عبارات العلماء عليها.

جوامع الكلام والأحاديث الكلية في نصوص العلماء

1. تتجنب ابن الصلاح ومحيي الدين النووي تعبير جوامع الكلام في وصفهما للأحاديث التي جمعوها، وتميز بين المفاهيم، فقد استعمل ابن الصلاح تعبير الأحاديث الكلية، في حين اقتصر النووي - في مقدمته للأربعين - على وصف النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم بأنه "المخصوس بجوامع الكلام"، ولكن حين وصف الأحاديث التي جمعها لم يستعمل تعبير جوامع الكلام، وأكدنى بإيضاح شرطه فيها فقال: "من العلماء من جمع الأربعين في أصول الدين، وبعضهم في الفروع، وبعضهم في الجهاد، وبعضهم في الزهد، وبعضهم في الأدب، وبعضهم في الفقه، وكلها مقاصد صلالة رضي الله تعالى عن قاصديها، وقد رأى جمع أربعين أهدٌ من هذا كله، وهي أربعون حديثًا مشتملة على جميع ذلك، وكل حديث منها قاعدة عظيمة من قواعد الدين؛ قد وصفه العلماء بأن مدار الإسلام عليه، أو هو نصف الإسلام أو ثلثه أو نحو ذلك ... (ال النووي 909، 43-44)، ثم قال في خاتمة الأربعين: "هذا آخر ما قصدته من بيان الأحاديث التي جمعت قواعد الإسلام، وتضمنت ما لا يغص من أنواع العلوم في الأصول والفرع والآداب ووجه الأحكام" (ال النووي 909، 161).

وظهر من تبع كلام النووي في أعماله المختلفة أنه تجب - عمداً - استخدام تعبير جوامع الكلام في هذا السياق، ففي خاتمة كتاب الأذكار قال: "وقد رأيت أن أضع إظهار أن محاكمة الكتاب بها إن شاء الله تعالى، وفي الأحاديث التي عليها مدار الإسلام، وقد اختالف العلماء فيها اختلافًا متكرراً، وقد اجتمع من تداخل أقوالهم - مع ما ضمت إليه - ثلاثون حديثًا" (ال النووي 1994، 405)، وفي شرحه على صحيح مسلم قال في حديث «إن الله طيب لا يقبل إلا طيبة»!  

1. تتجنب - في هذا الفصل - تخرج الأحاديث الارمدة في الأربعين النووية لعدة أسباب: أوها: أن النووي اشترط فيها الصحة وفق حكمه على الأحاديث، فقال: "الأزم في هذه الأربعين أن تكون صحية، ومعظمها في صحيح البخاري ومسلم" (ال النووي 909، 44)، ثانياً: أنها طبعت بتحقيقات
وهذا الحديث أحد الأحاديث التي هي قواعد الإسلام ومبادئ الأحكام، وقد جمعت منها أربعين حديثًا في جزء (النووي 2921،7/100)، ومن ثم جعل عنوان أربعينه هكذا: "الأربعين" في مباني الإسلام وقواعد الأحكام، أي أنه تنبه أيضا - استخدام جوامع الكلم - في العنوان على خلاف ابن رجب الحنبلي (ت.790/1390)، ملائى على الفار (ت.1014/1607) مثالاً، وفي كتابه "بستان العارفين" قال: "وأما ينبغي الاعتناء به الأحاديث التي قبل: إنها أصول الإسلام، وأصول الدين، أو منها مدار الإسلام، أو مدار الفقه والعلم، ... ولأنها مهمة فينجب أن تقدم. وقد اختلف العلماء في عددها اختلافًا كبيرا، وقد اختلف في جمعها وتبينها الشيخ الإمام الحافظ أبو عرو عثمان بن عبد الرحمن المروف بابن الصلاح - رحمه الله تعالى - ولا يزيد على تحقيق وتبينها، لأنه أنه جزء من جواب الإسلام - رحمه الله - مختصرًا، وأضمه إليه ما تيسر مما لم يذكرقه (النووي 206، 47، وفي "تهذيب الأسماء واللغات" قال: "قد قبل: مدار الإسلام على حديث: الدين النصيحة، وقيل: غير ذلك، وقد جمعت كل ذلك في كتاب الأربعين" (النووي د.ت.أ، 226/2).

ويؤخذ فكرة التمييز بين جوامع الكلم والأحاديث الكلية، ما ذهب إليه نجم الدين الطوفي (ت.1316/1754) في مقدمة شرحه على الأربعين النووية، إذ قال: "ثم أضاف الناس إلى هذه الأحاديث ما هو من جنسها من الأحاديث الكلية مما ذكر المصنف. وبسبب وجه كون كل حديث منها قاعدة كلية من قواعد الإسلام إن شاء الله تعالى"، ثم قال: "وخاصية هذه الأحاديث كونها مشتملة على قواعد الدين وكلماته" (الطوفي 1998، 23). ولكن قد ينطبق على فكرة التمييز بين جوامع الكلم والأحاديث الكلية (أو مدار الإسلام أو قواعد الدين) أن ثمة ثلاثة اضطخت في بالتبني والمقارنة، وهي:

الأمر الأول: أن هذه الأحاديث وصفها شراح الحديث بأنها من جوامع الكلم، وهي في الأربعين التي يذكَر النوري على "الأحاديث الكلية" لابن الصلاح، من ذلك أن النووي نفسه حين جاء إلى 

عده مع الطريقة تخرجها، كما أنه طُبعت شروح عديدة لها، من أشهرها شرح ابن رجب الحنبلي الذي اعتبر تخرج هذه الأحاديث، وثانية: تجاهلاً للتطوير في هذا الفصل من دون داع، فإن السهل العودة إلى الأربعين النوري نفسها لمعرفة تجهيز حدث منها.


الأمر الثاني: أن تعبيري جوامع الكلم وقواعد الدين قد يجتمعان في عبارة واحدة لوصف أحاديث في الأربعين النووية، مما قد يؤدي بالترادف أيضاً، كقول النووي نفسه في حديث: «إذا أمرتكم بشيء فأتوا منه ما استطعتم» (النووي 1929، 9/102)، وكقول ابن دقيق العيد في حديث: «من أحدث في أمرنا هذا ما ليس منه فهو رد»: "هذا الحديث قاعدة عظيمة من قواعد الدين، وهو من جوامع الكلم" (ابن دقيق 2003، 41، وانظر 57)، وقول ابن رجب الحنبلي (ت. 1449/852) في حديث: "كل بدعة ضلالة" (ابن رجب د.ت.، 57)، ونقول ابن حجر العسقلاني (ت. 1446/10) في حديث: "فليكرم ضيفه، ومن كان يؤمن بالله واليوم الآخر فلا يؤذ جاره، ولا يصمت" (ابن حجر د.ت.، 111-110). بل إن ابن رجب رأى أن "الأحاديث الكلية" التي جمعها ابن الصلاح "جميعها من الأحاديث الجوامع التي يقول: إن مدار الدين عليها، وما كان في معناها من الكلمات الجامعة الوجيزة"، ثم سمي ابن رجب كتابه هكذا: "جامع العلم والحكم في شرح نصيحة حديث عن الإسلام" (ابن رجب 2001، 56)، ورأى في مقدمته أن يضم إلى أحاديث النووي "أحاديث أخرى من جوامع الكلم الجامعة لأحاديث العلم والحكم" (ابن رجب 2001، 128). فهذه قرائن قد تدل على التراث بين الأحاديث الكلية وجوامع الكلم.

الأمر الثالث: أن النهاية أحاديث وصفت بأنها من جوامع الكلم ولم تدرج ضمن الأحاديث الكلية أو التي عليها مدار الإسلام. من ذلك الأمثلة التي ضربها أبو سليمان الخطابي (ت. 998).
الأحاديث الكلية

53

لجمع الكلم وجعلها دالة على ما وراءها من نظائرها وأخواتها، وهي: حديث "المؤمنون تكافأ" دماؤهم ويسعى بدمتهم أفئادهم، وهم يد على من سواهم"، وحديث "المنة مرودفة، والعارية"، وحديث "سوا الله اليقين والعافية" (الخطابي 1982، 66-65/1)، وكذلك بعض الأمثلة التي ساقها ابن حجر العسقلاني لجوامع الكلم مما هو خارج الأربعين، بل ليس في زيادات ابن رجب أيضًا. حديث "المُنْحة مردودة، والعاريّة". وحديث "دماؤهم ويسعى بذمتهم أدناهم، وهم يدٌ على مَن سواهم". 

ولا يقل ابن حجر: "إلى غير ذلك مما يكثر". ثم قال ابن حجر: "ما ملأ ابن آدم وعاء شرٌّ من بطنه، وسوا ال". وحديث "مؤداة، والدَّين مَقضي، والزعيم غارم"، وحديث "لم يرتظه ابن ساحفة وسعود من شرور التزامن، وهم يدٌ على مانعم". ووصفت بدر الدين العيني حديث "كل شرط ليس في كتاب الأربعين، بل ليس في زيادات ابن رجب أيضًا، كحديثي: وحديث "مكَّنَّا من جوامع..."

رواها أبو داود (909/76/6)؛ كتاب الديات، باب: أيُقاد المسلم بالكافر؟، وابن ماجه (باب: ما جاء في أن العارية مؤداة، والدَّين مَقضي، والزعيم غارم)؛ وابن أبي شيبة (باب: التوكل والتواضع، كتاب أبواب البيوع، 417/5، 2009)؛ أبو يعلى (90/1، 1988)؛ والبزار (باب الدعاء بالعافية، كتاب أبواب البيوع، 196/3، 2009)؛ وأحمد (المُكاتَب، باب: كتاب أبواب البيوع، 563/3، 2009)؛ ورواه ابن المبارك (د.ت.، 2001)؛ وأبو يعلى (90/1، 1988)؛ والترمذي (باب: في تضمين العارية، كتاب أبواب البيوع، 477/3، 2009)؛ وأحمد (المُكاتَب، باب: كتاب أبواب البيوع، 448/4، 2009)؛ أبواب البيوع، باب: لا يبيع على بيع أخيه، ولا يبيع على بيع أخيه، ولا يسوع على سوء أخيه، حتى يتأذى له أو يترك، وحديث "المنة مرودفة، والعاريّة"، وحديث "دماؤهم ويسعى بذمتهم أدناهم، وهم يدٌ على من سواهم". وحديث "المئة مرودفة، والعاريّة"، وحديث "سوا الله اليقين والعافية" (الخطابي 1982، 66-65/1)، وكذلك بعض الأمثلة التي ساقها ابن حجر العسقلاني لجوامع الكلم مما هو خارج الأربعين، بل ليس في زيادات ابن رجب أيضًا، كحديثي: وحديث "مؤداة، والدَّين مَقضي، والزعيم غارم"، وحديث "لم يرتظه ابن ساحفة وسعود من شرور التزامن، وهم يدٌ على مانعم". ووصفت بدر الدين العيني حديث "كل شرط ليس في كتاب الأربعين، بل ليس في زيادات ابن رجب أيضًا، كحديثي: وحديث "مكَّنَّا من جوامع...".
الخطب: لاشتغال على خيري الدنيا والآخرة (العيني د.ت.، 2/54)، وقال كذلك في حديث «فمن وُلِيَ شيئًا من أمة محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم فاستطاع أن يُضِرَّ فيه أحدًا أو يَنْفَعَ فيه أحدًا، فليقل من محسِسن ويجاور عن مسيئهم»: 10 من جوامع الكلم، لأن الحال منحصر في الضّر أو النفع، والشخص في الحسن والمنسيء (العيني د.ت.، 6/228)، ووصف غير واحد حديث كل شركأ سكر فهو حرام (العيني د.ت.، 21/171; البirmaوي 2012). 11

كل شرّاب أسكر فهو حرام لأنه سيساعد على القول في ما سبق، لا بد أن نناقش مفهوم «جوامع الكلم» نفسه، لأنه سيساعد على تحديد مفهوم الأحاديث الكلية وصلته بها من جهة، وعلى فهم عبارات العلماء السابقين من جهة أخرى.


رواه البخاري (132 [1894؟]، 2، 35/4، 204/4، 3/35)، كتاب الجمع، باب: من قال في الخطفة بعد التناء، أما بعد، وكتب المقابل، باب: علامات النبوة في الإسلام، وباب قول النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: "اقبلوا من محسِسن ويجاوروا عن مسيئهم".

رواه البخاري (1314، 58، 7، 105/1)، كتاب الوضوء، باب: لا يجوز الوضوء بالنبيذ، ولا المسكر، وكتاب الأشربة، باب: المسكر وهو البِتْع والبَتْح، ومسلم 1991، 3/358). 13

بين أن كل مسكر حرام، وآن كل حرام.


استقصى ابن رجب الحنابل الروايات في هذا (ابن رجب 2001، 53-54).
لكثيرة في الألفاظ اليسيرة (النووي 1929، 13/170، ابن الأثير د.ت.، 80، ابن الملقين 2012، 959، العيني د.ت.، 14/235)، وقد جعل الجاحظ (ت. 255/688) "جوامع الكلم" أحد فنون الكلام النبي - صلى الله عليه وسلم - "وهو الكلام الذي قل عدد حروفه وكثر عدد معانيه، وجعل عن الصناعة، وترّه عن التكلف" (الجاحظ 1988، 2/17)، ثم جاء أبو سليمان الخطابي فقررها بأنها "إيجاز الكلام في إشباع المعاني، يقول الكمية القليلة الحروف فتنظم الكثير من المعنى، وتتضمن أجزاؤاً من الأحكام" (الخطابي 1988، 2/1422)، وتتفق هذه التحديدات على معنى عام هو صفة الكلام، وشأن من أساليب البيان.

ولكن هذا المفهوم العام لجوامع الكلم يشمل القرآن أيضًا، ولا سيما أنه قد خصّ به النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم، بل ربما كان هو الأقرب إلى الفهم. وكان بأبي الطفيل في الألفاظ اليسيرة منه معاني "جوارح" (الخطابي 1988، 2/1428، 170/13)، وابن الأثير الجزري (ت. 1095/488) وابن الأثير الجريزي (ت. 695/1331) بتوثيقان، وهو ما قال عليه فيما يبدو - الحافظ أبو عبد الله الجيحي (ت. 1285/888)، والجاحظ (ت. 685/1285) أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم، وابن رجب (1214/651) وابن تيمية (1227/622) وابن فيض (1235/640) وابن حasan (1239/641) في كتابه "التقديس"، وابن النعيم (1233/650) وابن الفارسي (1233/660) وابن القروي (1233/660) وغيرهم من المؤرخين، يعمّرون جوامع الكلم على نوعين: الأول ما هو في القرآن كقوله عز وجل:

 "إنَّ الله يَأْمُرُ بِٱلْعَدْلِ وَٱلْإِحْسَٰنِ وَإِيتَآئِ ذِى ٱلْقُرْبََهْنَى وَيَنْهَى عَنِ ٱلْفَحْشَآءِ وَٱلْمُنكَرِ وَٱلْبَغْيٍ" (النحل 285/19). ولهذا حين جاء إلى حدث "أعطي جوامع الكلم بخواتمه" (رواه مسلم 3/1586)، باب: بيان أن كل مسكر خمر وأن كل خمر حرام (كتاب الأشربة 1991/1586/3، 1991/1586/3)، بل إن النووي بعد أن ذكر جوامع القرآن الهدى وستين عام لجوامع الكلم بل إن أظهر عبارة النووي في كلامه "كلامه من جوامع الكلم" وأن عامة كلامه كذلك، وقيل "كلامه من جوامع الكلم" بل إن النبوي النحوي (النووي 1929، 5/5) في كتاب "العلم لجوامع الكلم"، ولهذا حين جاء إلى حدث "أعطي جوامع الكلم بخواتمه" (رواه مسلم 3/1586). بل إن النبوي النحوي (النووي 1929، 5/5) في كتاب "العلم لجوامع الكلم"، ولهذا حين جاء إلى حدث "أعطي جوامع الكلم بخواتمه" (رواه مسلم 3/1586). أظهر عبارة النووي "كلامه - صلى الله عليه وسلم - كان بالجوامع" أن نوعاً من الأحكام "جوامع الكلم" (الخطابي 1988، 2/1422)؛ وأن "جوامع الكلم - صلى الله عليه وسلم - جوامع الكلم" بباب: بيان أن كل مسكر خمر وأن كل خمر حرام.
هذا المجرى، "أي في إيجاز اللفظ وسعة المعنى (ابن الأثير د.ت.، 1/80)، وقال ابن حجر: إن جوامع الكلام في كلامه - صلى الله عليه وسلم - "ما يكثر بالتبين" (ابن حجر العسقلاني د.ت، 250/13)، وهذا لأن خصية الإيجاز في اللفظ مع سعة المعنى سمة دينية على الحديث النبوي، بالرغم من وجود بعض المطولات في كلامه، ولكننا نبقى استنتاجا لأغراض تختص بها، وهذا فلا حاجة إلى تكلف التمييز بين قولين هنا: قول يريد أن كل كلام النبي جوامع، وقال آخر يريد أن بعض كلامه فقط جوامع، كما فعل بعض المعاصرين (اللوغاني 2018، 10-12)؛ لأن مدونة الحديث تتطلع على أحاديث طويلة، وأحاديث تفصيلية تتناول مسائل ووقائع جزئية أو خاصة، ولكن الجوامع صفة لأسلوب البيان، وهو الإيجاز والإقلال من الكلام، وقد كان هذا السمة العامة للحديث النبوي، وهي أيضًا سمة صحة، ومن ثم جعل الخطابي جوامع الكلام "من أوان فصاحة النبي وحسن بيانه" التي تُعدت أشكالها، كُنوا بلغات اختصاصها لم تُسم من العرب قبله (الخطابي 1982، 64-67)، وقد أدرج ملائ القاري هذه الألفاظ المقتضبة تحت جوامع الكلام (القاري 2013). وقد مثل الخطابي نوعين من جوامع الكلام: القضايا والأحكام، والوصايا (الخطابي 1982، 64-65)، ويمكن أن نضيف إليهما أيضًا الأمثال والحكم والأدعية النبوية وغيرها.

جوامع الكلام - إذن - أوسع من الأحاديث الكلية، فكل حديث كلي هو من جوامع الكلام من دون تفسير، وقد تنبه إلى هذا الفرق - فيما أفهم - بعض العلماء، فعبد الله النيراوي (1275/1959) - مثلاً - وصف "الأربعين النبوية" بأنها "من جوامع كلامه - صلى الله عليه وسلم - مشتملة على أثلِ المعاني وأحكام المباني" (النيراوي د.ت.، 2)، وأدرج نور الدين عتر (2020) تحت ألوان جوامع الله: "الأحاديث التي قيل: إنها تجمع أمور الإسلام، وعلى قام أساس اتباع الأربعين حديثا التي استemma الإمام النووي" (عتر 2013، 389-394)، وجمع صالح الشامي الأحاديث التي عليها مدار الدين أو أصول الإسلام أو الأحكام فيلمت - عندن - عشرة أحاديث، ثم قال: "هذه الأحاديث هي من جوامع الكلام التي خص بها النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم" (الشامي 2014، 7)، ونويع عبد الرحمن بن ناصر السعدي (ت 1376/1957) الجوامع إلى "جوامع في جنس أو نوع أو باب من أرباب العلم" (السعدي 2011، 7)، فالأحاديث في رأيي - معنى عام لسبيسي الإيجاز في اللفظ والصحة في المعنى، وهذا سمة عامة في كلامه صلى الله عليه وسلم، ويشمل أقساماً، ما يعني أن المطول من حديثه يختل فيه شرط الإيجاز في اللفظ، والخاصة من حديثه يختل فيه شرط سعة المعنى، وفي حديثه الرواية بالمعلق أيضاً فيختل شرط اللفظ النبوي، ولها قال ابن حجر: "وأما يُسُلم ذلك فيما لم يتصرف الرواة في أفلاطهم، وإلا فإن خارج الحديث إذا كثرت قل"
أن تتفق ألفاظه؛ لتوارد أكثر الرواة على الاقتصار على الرواية بالمعنى بحسب ما يظهر لأحدهم.

وأسطر (ابن حجر العسقلاني د.ت.، 13/250).

الحوار 2.3

فالأحاديث الكلية من جوامع الكلم ليست هي جوامع الكلم، وهو المعنى الذي قصده ابن الصلاح ثم توسع فيه النووي، إذ شرط الكليّ أنه يتداول قاعدة من قواعد الإسلام ومباني الأحكام أو عليه مدار الإسلام، وهو ما عبر عنه النووي حين قال في مقدمة أربعينه: "كل حديث منها قاعدة عظيمة من قواعد الدين، قد وصفه العلماء بأنه مدار الإسلام عليه، وهو نصف الإسلام أو ثلثه أو نحو ذلك" (ال النووي 99، 44)، واعتبره الطوفي "خاصة هذه الأحاديث" (الطوفي 1998، 23). وقد تبعت أوصاف العلماء المتقدمين ل"الأحاديث الكلية"، ومنها وصفهم للحديث بأنه ثلث العلم أو ربعه، ووصفهم للأحاديث بأن عليها مدار الدين، وأنها "أصول الإسلام" أو "أصول الأحاديث" (وهي يختلف عن "الأحاديث الأصول")، و"أصول السنن". وقد استخدم شراح الحديث تعبير قواعد الإسلام، وأصول الشريعة، واستخدم ابن الصلاح تعبير "ملاك أمر الدين والدنيا"، ووجد الكلي في الحديث مهم جهه وفاء نصوص الشريعة بالواقع المستمر، ولها قال ابن تيمية (ت. 282/728) في الجواب على من قال: إن النصوص لا تأتي بعشر معاشر الشريعة: "إذا الله ي.pem - صلى الله عليه وسلم - يجامع الكلم فيتكلم بالكلمة الجامعة العامة التي هي قضية كلية وقاعدة عامة تتناول أنواعا كثيرة، وتلك الأنواع تتناول أعيانا لا تُحصى; في هذا الوجه تكون النصوص محيطة بأحكام أفعال العباد" (ابن تيمية 2004، 91/19).

وبناء على هذا التحديد المفهومي للكلي، يمكن لنا أن نقوم بالزيادات على "الأربعين النووية"، كزيادات ابن رجب التي منها: "ألحقوا الفرائض بأهلها"، و"يرجم من الرضاع ما يحرم من

رواه البخاري (1312 [894]، 8/150-153)، كتاب الفرائض، باب: ميراث الولد من أبيه وأمه، وباب: ميراث ابن الابن إذا لم يكن ابن، وباب: ميراث أحد مع الأب والأخوة، وباب: ابني عم: أخذهم أحلاً للأم والآخر زوج، ومسلم (1233/3) في كتاب الفرائض، باب: ألحقوا الفرائض بأهلها، فما يحرم من الرضاع ما يحرم من
الخطيب، و"إن الله إذا حرم شيئا حرم شمله"،17 و"كل مسكر حرام"،18 و"ما مالآدم وعاء شرًا من بطنه" (ابن رجب 1981، 1/57)؛ هذه أحاديث لا تتوفر على شرط الكلم الذي يبحث عنوان كتابه - مفهوم "جوامع الكلم" أكثراً ما لحظ مفهوم "الكلم".

وقد جرى بعض المعاصرين على تقسيم الأحاديث الكلية إلى قسمين: كلي في أكثر من باب، وكلي في باب واحد (السعدي 2011، 7; اللوجاني 2018، 12، المقبل 2017، 73)، ولكن ما يميز كلياً في باب ليس كلياً بالمعنى الذي أراده ابن الصلاح والنووي والذي شرطه أن يكون من قواعد الدين أو كلياته، ويبدو أن التأثير بين جوامع الكلم والأحاديث الكلية يغطي عن تكليف هذا التأثير بين أنواع من الكلم، سواءً ببناء على تناوله لباب أو أباب أو مفردات مثل "أصل الكلي"، فإن الكلي في الفقه والكلام في العقدة، وهكذا، فما يميز كلي الباب يعبر عنه بالأصل، فنجده في كلام النووي - مثلاً - وصف أحاديث عدة بأنه "أصل عظم"، ولكن عند التدقيق نجدها تنقسم إلى نوعين: نوع أجرد الالحوي في الأربعين، وهو أصل كلي، ونوع آخر جزئي، weil ذلك لم يُدرج ضمن الأربعين بالرغم من كونه أصلياً، فالحديد الأصلي قد يكون كلياً وقد يكون جزئياً في باب معين من أبواب العلم. حدث في "الإسلام على الخمس" - مثلاً - قال فيه النووي: هو "أصل عظم في معرفة الدين، وعلى اعتقاده، وله جزئية، وفيه أدرك الالحوي في الأربعين، وهو أصل كلي، ونوع آخر جزئي، وله جزئية، وفيه أدرك الالحوي في الأربعون، في حين أن هناك أحاديث أصولاً مقيدة بباب فقط، كباب الطهارة أو باب الوضع أو باب الحج أو باب البيع أو باب الولاية وهكذا، وقد أشار النووي في أعماله إلى حدث أصل في كل باب من هذه الأبواب.


ففي حديث عثمان أنه "دعا بوضوء فتوأ فغسل كفية ثلاث مرات..."، قال النووي:
"هذا الحديث أصل عظيم في صفة الوضوء" (النوروي 2919، 3/106)، وفي أبابا الطهارة ذكر النووي عدة أحاديث، كحديث "إن ماء الرجل غليظ أبيض، ومام الرأة رقيق صفر". ثم قال فيه: "هذا أصل عظيم في بيان صفة المني" (النوروي 2919، 3/222)، وحديث "إن المؤمن لا يجس" الذي قال فيه: "هذا الحديث أصل عظيم في طهارة المسلم حيًا ومتوفاة" (النوروي 1929، 66/4)، وحديث "هو الطهور ماؤه الجلي مميتة" قال: "أصل عظيم من أصول الطهارة، ذكر الماوردي (ت. 450/1058) صاحب الحاوي عن الجيدي (ت. 209/834) شيخ البخاري وصاحب الشافعي قال: قال الشافعي (ت. 204/820): "هذا الحديث أصل عظيم في طهارة مناكم" (النوروي د.ت.ب. 84/1، الماوردي 1994، 1/37); فكونه نصف علم الطهارة لا ينقص العلم أحرجه عن أن يكون أصلًا مناكم، وكما قال: "أصل عظيم في طهارة-IN- مناكم" (النوروي 2919، 9/45)، وحديث النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم في الصلوة: صلى الله عليه وسلم إذا أكل من أصول كتاب البيوع، وللذا قدمه مسلم، ويدخل فيه مسائل كثيرة غير منحصرة (النوروي 1929، 10/156)، وحديث "لا تأمرني على اثنين ولا تولِيني مالين"، قال فيه: "هذا الحديث أصل عظيم في اجتناب الولايات ولاسماً من كان فيه ضعف عن القيام بؤاظف تلك الولاية، ولأصل عظيم في مناسك الحج،...

رواية البخاري (1312/1934، 44/1)، كتاب الوضوء، باب: المضمضة في الوضوء، ومسلم (1991، 204/1)، كتاب الطهارة، باب: صفة الوضوء وكاله.

رواية مسلم (1312/1934، 44/1)، كتاب الحيض، باب: وجوب الوضوء على المرأة بخروج المنى منها.

رواية البخاري (1312/1934، 73/1، 65/2، 29/1)، كتاب الغسل، باب: النبي يحج ويتمشى في السوق وحال عطاء: "يحجج النبي ويقل أطافه، ويخلق رأسه وإن لم بوضوا"، وحديث الجائزة: باب غسل اليت ووضعه بالماء والسواد، ومسلم (1991، 282/1)، كتاب الحيض، باب: الدليل على أن المس لم يجس.

رواية أبو داود (2009، 62/1)، كتاب الطهارة، باب: الوضوء يمامة البحر، وإن ماجه (2009، 250/1)، أبو الطهارة وسننها، باب: الوضوء يمامة البحر، ومالك (2004، 29/2)، وقوت الصلاة:

الطاور في الوضوء، وغيرهم.

رواية مسلم (1991، 943/2، 25/1)، كتاب الماء، باب: استحبات في جمرة العقبة يوم النحر راكان وبيان

قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: "تأخذوا مناكم".

رواية البخاري (1312/1894، 128/1)، كتاب الأذان، باب: الأذان للمسافر إذا كانوا جامعاً والإقامة، وكذلك تعرف وجع، وقول المؤذن: الصلاة في الرحال في الليلة الباردة أو المطرة.

رواية مسلم (1991، 1153/3)، كتاب البيوع، باب: يطالم بعض الخصاوة، والبعض الذي فيه غرور.

رواية مسلم (1991، 1457/3)، كتاب الإمارة، باب: كرابة الإمارة بغير ضرورة.
(النوعي 1929، 12/210)، فالأخير في باب لا يسمى كليًا على هذا الاصطلاح، وإن دخل في جوامع الكلم، من جهة اشتماله على شرطي الإيجاز في اللفظ وكثرة المعنى.

من الجزئي إلى الكلي: محاولة لتاريخ «الأحاديث الكلية»

في تعلقه على قول النووي: إن كل حديث من الأربعين يتضمن "قاعدة عظيمة من قواعد الدين"، قال الطوليف: "قلت: أول من علمنا قال نحو هذا أبو داود" (الوطني 1998، 22-23)، ولكن يظهر - بالتبني - أن فكرة الأحاديث الكلية ظهرت في القرن الثاني الهجري ثم شاعت في القرنين الثالث والرابع الهجريين حتى إن الحافظ حمزة بن محمد الكناني (ت. 357/968) قال: "سمعت أهل العلم يقولون: هذه الثلاثة أحاديث هي الإسلام،" 27 ما يفيد أن الفكرة صارت شائعة بين أهل العلم، ويظهر من جمع أقوالهم وجود اختلاف في تحديد الأحاديث الكلية وعددها، الأمر الذي سيدفع بعض متاخرى المحدثين - كابن الصلاح - إلى الاعتقاد أن الأقوال التي وردت في أقوال الأئمة المتأخرين فإنها فلأت على الابة 26 حديثًا، ثم جاء النووي فاستتمها وزاد عليها بالتدريج حتى بلغت أربعين حديثًا، ثم زاد على الأربعيين حديثين على سبيل المعلوم إذا كان رجب الحنبلي وغيره، في حين نجا آخرون إلى جمع وإحصاء الأقوال، كما فعل ابن الملقن (ت. 804/1401) فبلغ بها عشرة أقوال، ثم راد عليها واحدًا فيلفت أحد عشر قولًا، وكان قد نقل بعض هذه الأقوال عن كتاب "الأقسام والخصائص" لأبي بكر الخفاف (أحمد قديمًا فقهاء الشافعية ومن علماء القرن الرابع الهجري/العاشر الميلادي) ثم قال: "ولم أعلوي تعرضاً لذلك فاستفده" ابن الملقن (1401/663)، وسأجعل تاريخ الفكرة، على قسمين: ظهور الفكرة لدى المتقدمين، ثم تطوراتها اللاحقة لدى المتاخرين.

الأحاديث الكلية عند الأئمة المتقدمين

برزت فكرة الأحاديث الكلية في القرن الثاني الهجري، وساهم في صياغتها عدد من الأئمة من جمع بين الفقه والحديث في الغالب، وهم: عبد الرحمن بن مهدي، ومحمد بن إدريس الشافعي (ت. 204/820)، وأبو عبيد القاسم بن سلام (ت. 224/838)، وعلي بن المتهي، وإسحاق بن راهويه (ت. 238/851)، وأحمد بن حنبيل (ت. 241/852)، وأبو داود السجستاني، وعثمان بن سعيد الدارمي (ت. 280/893)، وحمرة بن محمد الكناني، وأبو الحسن الدارمي (ت. 385/995)، وأبو زيد الغفاري (ت. 386/996)، ويشكل أبو داود محطة بارزة في صياغة الفكرة، فقد

27 سيأتي لاحقًا ذكر هذه الأحاديث.
نُقل عنه خمس روايات مختلفة في تحديد الأحاديث الكلية وكثر ناقلوها، ولهذا نظر نجم الدين الطوفي أنه أول من قال بذلك. سأقدم فيما يأتي تأريخًا للفكرة من خلال حصر الأقوال وتوثيقها أولًا، ثم تحليلها عبر التدقيق في العبارات المستعملة ودلالاتها ثانيا، وتحري الاختلاف في عدد الأحاديث الكلية وفي تعيينها ثالثًا، ثم النظر في المتفق والمفترق بين الأقوال رابعًا، وهذا التأريخ يتجاوز مجرد سرد الأقوال المختلفة في الأحاديث الكلية، كما فعل ابن الملقن مثلا.

1. عبد الرحمن بن مهدي:
نُقل أبو بكر الخفاف عنه قوله: مدار الإسلام على أربعة أحاديث هي: «الأعمال بالنيات»، و«لا يَحل دم مرء مسلم إلا بإحدى ثلاث»، و«بني الإسلام على خمس»، و«البيئة على الدعوي والمدينين على من أكثر» (ابن الملقن 155/1، ابن الملقن 662/1).

2. أبو عبيد القاسم بن سلام:
قال: "مدار الإسلام على أربعمئة حديث"، قال ابن الملقن: "كذا رأيته أربعمئة، ثم رأيت في أصول الفقه لابن سُراقة العامري (ت. نحو 410/1019م) من أصحاباً يذكر أربعة أحاديث، وكأنه أصوب" (ابن الملقن 662/1).

3. علي بن المديني:
نُقل عنه قولان: أولهما من رواية ابنه محمد بن علي بن المديني قال: سمعت أبي يقول: "إذا يدور حديث رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم عن أربعة أحاديث: حديث عمر بن الخطاب (ت. 64/4)، عن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم في «الأعمال بالنيات»، وحديث زيد بن وهب (ت. 78/602) عن ابن مسعود (ت. 32/650)، وحديث رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم - وهو الصادق المصدق - "إن خلق أحدٍ لم يُمحِّب في بطن أمه أربعين يومًا"، وحديث عثمان بن عفان (ت. 56/35) أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: "لا يَحل دم مَنَّهَا لأحدٍ.

4. حكّت مصادر عدة عن أبي عبيد ولم تسمه، وأغلب الظن أنه أبو عبيد القاسم بن سلام الذي وُلد قبل المئتين بقليل وتوفي سنة 224/838 (الذهبي 490/170).

عند الهروي وابن رجب: عثمان بن سعيد قال سمعت أبي عبيد. وعبد الباقي والطيبي: عن يحيى بن سعيد قال: سمعت أبي عبيد.
مسلم إلا بإحدى ثلاث»، وحديث النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: "أمرت أن أقاتل الناس حتى يقولوا لا إله إلا الله" (ال宪طلي 989، 2/53).

أما القول الثاني عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم، وهو مثل قول عبد الرحمن بن مهدي السباق - فقال عنه أبو بكر الخفاف وهو أن مدار الإسلام على أربعة أحاديث هي: "الأعمال بالنيات"، و"لا يحل دم إمرئ مسلم إلا بإحدى ثلاث"، و"بني الإسلام على خمس"، وب"البينة على المدعى واليمن على من أُكرِم" (ابن المقص 1997، 155/3، ابن المقص 2004، 1/661/2).

إحثاك بن راهب: تقل عنه قولان، الأول: أن "أربعة أحاديث هي من أصول الدين" وهي: حديث عمر "إِنْ خَلَقَ الْحَيَاةَ عَلَى أَمْرِهِ"، وحديث "الأعمال بالنيات"، وحديث "الحلال بين والحرام بين"، وحديث "من صنع في أمرنا شيئا ما ليس منه فهو رد" (ابن رجب 2004، 1/2).

أما القول الثاني فنقله عنه أبو بكر الخفاف، وهو أن: "إِنْ خَلَقَ الْحَيَاةَ عَلَى أَمْرِهِ"، وحديث "الأعمال بالنيات"، وحديث "الخلال بين"، وحديث "الالتباس على من أكرِم" (ابن المقص 1997، 155/3)، وقد تقل مثل هذا القول الآخر عن الإمام أحمد كما سيأتي.

أحمد بن حنبل: رُوي عنه روايثاً: الأول: أنه قال: "أصول الإسلام على ثلاثة أحاديث" وهي: حديث عمر: "إِنْ خَلَقَ الْحَيَاةَ عَلَى أَمْرِهِ"، وحديث "الأعمال بالنيات"، وحديث "الالتباس على من أكرِم" (ابن رجب 2004، 1/2).


أبو داود: ذكرت أقوال أبو داود في هذا الباب: فقد أحييت خمس روايات مختلفة عنه، وهي كالآتي: الرأئي: حديث أحمد بن محمد بن الأعرابي (ت. 685/70) وجاء فيها: "حدثنا أبو داود سليمان بن الأشعث قال: "أемые بطرسوس عشرين سنة كنت المستند، فكنت أربعة
الحادي عشر الكلي:


ثم نظرت فإذا مدار أربعة آلاف على أربعة أحاديث لمن وفقه الألف، وثانيها حديث: "الحلال بين والحرام بين": جل ثناؤه؛ فأولها حديث النعمان بن بشير له طيب لا إن الله طيب لا، وثالثها حديث أبي هريرة (ت): "الأعمال بالنيات"، ورابعها حديث أبي هريرة أيضًا: "يقبل إلّا الطيب".

وقد جمع نصر بن إبراهيم المقدسي (ت) في حديث: "لا ضرر ولا ضرار«، وثالثها حديث أبي هريرة (ت): "الحلال بين والحرام بين". (ابن مسلمة)


الخطيب

الخطيب

؛ ابن أبي يعلى د.ت.، 365/4، 1935
؛ الخطابي، 355، 2004
؛ ابن بلبان 79–78، 1992
؛ ابن الصلاح 43/1، 2009
؛ ابن دقيق العيد 86/1 أ، 1997
؛ العراقي د.ت.، 633–621، 2001
؛ ابن رجب 203/1، 1981
لكرماني
؛ 98، 1981
التجيبي، 1981

(الخطيب

6
98).


من الواضح أن الروايات الخمس اتفقت على حديثين هما: حديث النية وحديث "الحلال بين"، واختلفت في الباق٢. وقد قال ابن حجر: "والموعود عن أبي داود عند الباق٢ ما نهتم عنه فاجتبوه ... الحديث، بدل "يازهد فيما في أيدي الناس" (ابن حجر العسقلاني، 129/1).

8
عثمان بن سعيد الدارمي:
نقل عليه ابن الملقن أنه قال: "أمثال الحديث أربعة، وحديث النية أحدثها"، ولكن ابن الملقن لم يذكر البقية (ابن الملقن 2004، 662/1؛ ابن الملقن 1997، 1/154).

6
ذكِر حديث النية، وحديث "من حسن إسلام المرء تركه ما لا يعنيه"، وحديث "الحلال بين والحرام بين"، ثم قال: "سمعته أهل العلم يقولون: هذه الثلاثة أحاديث هي الإسلام، وكل حديث منها ثلث الإسلام" (ابن الملقن 2004، 1/622؛ ابن الملقن 1997، 1/154)

10
ابن أبي زيد القيرواني:


الإنسان لديه» – معيّرة بدقة عن محتوى تلك الأحاديث، ولا سيما أن أبا داود نفسه قد قال:
"وإذا لم أصنف في كتاب السنن إلا الأحكام، ولم أصنف كتب الزهد وفضائل الأعمال وغيرها،
فهذه الأربعة آلة والثامنة كلها في الأحكام. فأنا أحدهما كثيرة في الزهد وفضائل الأخرى من غير هذا فلم أخرج.» (أبو داود 1984، 33-34؛ التبجيء 1981، 98)، وقد شرح الخطابي هذا
فقال: "وقد جمع أبو داود في كتابه هذا من الحديث في أصول العلم وأمالي السنن وأحكام الفقه
ما لا نعلم متقدم بما سبقه إليه ولا متاخرًا لحده فيه» (الخطابي 1932، 1/8). أما تعبير "جمع آداب
الخبر"؛ فإن الأحاديث التي تحته تناول أخلاق النفس المتمثلة في أربعة هي: حفظ السُن
عن اللغو، وعدم التدخل فيما لا يعني، وعدم الغضب، وأن يحب المرء لأخيه ما يحب لنفسه.
تؤكد هذه التعبيرات المختلفة مفهوم الكلّ الذي سبقت مناقشته، وأنه معنى دقٍّ من مطلق
جوامع الكلام، وهو السمة الأساسية التي تميز هذه التعبيرات رغم اختلافها، فجميعها يؤكد الخروج
من فكرة الباب أو المجال إلى الأبواب أو عموم الإسلام أو الدين أو عموم مدونة الحديث التي هي
مصادر رئيس للإسلام، وهو معنى سأزيده بيانًا فيما بعد.
أما من جهة تقدير العدد، فالآراء الارادة تدور على أليفين وثلاثة وأربعة وخمسة، ولكن ابن
المقلّن حكي قولًا مبهمًا يرى أنها تعود إلى واحد فقط هو حديث "الحلال بين
هم"، ولكنه لم يبين
قاّلائه (ابن الملقّن 2008، 2؛ 196؛ ابن الملقّن 1997، 1/154)32.
وأما من جهة تعيين الأحاديث الكلية والاختلاف الواضح فيه، فإن الواضح أن تُنّه اتفاقًا على
مركزية حديث النية باستثناء ما ورد عن ابن أبي زيد، فإن أحاديثه أخص من أحاديث الباقيين،
ولذلك عبر عنها ب"آداب الخبر". وهذا الاتفاق يؤكّد ما قاله الحافظ ابن حجر: "وقد تواتر النقل
عن الأئمة في تعميم قدر هذا الحديث. قال أبو عبيد:33 ليس في أخبار النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم
شيء أعم وأبلغ وأكثر فائدته من هذا الحديث (ابن الجرير السنن، 1/11).34
وإذا أردنا أن نتّخّب دقة ما نتّمّ مشهركة التكاثر إلى "أهل العلم" من اتفاقهم على الأحاديث
الثلاثة: حديث النية و"من حسن إسلام المرء" وحديث "الحلال بين"، سنجد أن الاتفاق وقع
على حديث النية فقط، أما حديث "من حسن إسلام المرء"؛ فإنه ورد في ثلاث روایات عن

32 من اللافت أن ابن الملقّن ذكر هذا الفعل – ضمن أربعة أقوال أقتصر عليها – في شرحه على صحيح
البخاري، وعنّ هذا الحديث الفرد، ولكنّه حين ذكر هذا الفعل في "الإسلام برواية عمة الأحكام"
لم يذكر الحديث؛ بالرغم من أنّه كان في شرح البخاري إلى الإسلام، فإن الواضح أنه كتبه بعد
"الإسلام".

33 اضطررت المصادر في تعيين هذا الاسم، ففي بعضها أبو عبد الله، وفي بعضها أبو عبيدة، والواضح أنه
أبو عبيدة صاحب أحد الأقوال المذكورة سابقاً.
أبي داود، كما ورد عن الدارقطني، وإن أبي زيد فقط. أما حديث «الخلال بين» فإنه جاء عن أبي داود، كما ورد عن الروايين، وعن أحمد في رواية، وعن أبي داود الذي اتفقت الروايات الخمس عليه.

وقد اجتمع من مجموع هذه الأقوال أحد عشر برواياتها المختلفة 17 حديثًا: «الأعمال بالمانيات»، ولا يُقَدِّم دم إرمين مسلم إلا بإحدى ثلاث، و«بني الإسلام على حسن»، و«البيئة على الدعوي وابن من أبيكر»، و«من أحدث في أمرنا ما ليس منه فهو رد»، و«إِنْ خَلقَ» أحدٌ مُّجِّعَ في بطن أمه أربعين يومًا، وأمَرت أن أقاتل الناس حتى يقولوا لا إله إلا الله، و«الحلال بين والحرام بين»، و«إن الله طيب لا يقبل إلا الطيب»، و«من حسنإسلام المرء». ترقب ما لا يعنينه، وأماً نجحناه وما أحكم به فأجتهدونه، ولا ضرر ولا ضرار، ولا يكون المؤمن مؤمنًا حتى يرضي لأخيه ما يرضى لنفسه، و«الدين النصيحة»، و«أزهده في الدنيا يحبك الله»، و«من كان يؤمن بالله واليوم الآخر فليقل خيرا أو ليصمت»، و«لا تغضب».


جمع صالح الشامي (الشامي 34، 7، 11) «الكلمات التي صدرت عن الرعيل الأول» تحت عنوان "الأحاديث النبوية الكليّة" فيبلغه - بحسبه - 10 أحاديث، في حين أن الحاصل من مجموع أقوالهم هو 17 حديثًا لا عشرة. وقد قال الشامي: إنما جمعها من أقوال المتقدمين؛ لأنها أكثر دقة في الدلالة على ما ذهبوا إليه من اختيار الأحاديث التي هي أصول الأحكام بل وأصول الإسلام، وما أضيف إليها بعد ذلك فهو في معظمه شروح وتطبيقات تلك الأصول المختارة، ولذلك وقع في إشكالين:

الأول: أنه حذف منها حديثين؛ يزعم أنها لم بلغ مبلغ الصحّة، وهو ما حسن إسلام المرء، والثاني: لا ضرر ولا ضرار؛ لأنه لا يعقل - وفق قوله - أن يكون الحديث من الأصول ولم يرتب إلى الصحة، ثم أضاف دينين أخرين فيبلغ الأحاديث عشرة. فيما أن أقوال المتقدمين أكثر دقة، كان عليه أن يعتبر ذلك صحيحاً لها؛ فعداً من الأصول فصُرיכותها لا الأعس، ثم بما أن أقوال المتقدمين - بحسبه - أكثر دقة كان عليه أنها لا يزيد عليها، ولا لزمه قبول الزيادات التي وقعت من المتأخرين!
الفقهية في القرن الرابع الهجري، والتي آلت - فيما بعد - إلى القواعد الخمس الكبرى التي ترد إليها الأحكام، وهي مقدمة بين القواعد الفقهية والأحاديث الكلية، فقد فهم من قول أحمد: حدث
النيل ثلاث العين، أنه يرد جميع الأحكام إلى قواعد ثلاث (ابن حجر العسقلاني د.ت.، 11/1).


أولى من جلب المصالح» (السيوطي 1983، 87؛ ابن نجيم 1998، 78).

ويبدو أن فكرة الكليات كانت مطروحة أيضًا قبل ذلك، فقد أورد عمران الزناتي (ت. 1314/714) حكاية لها دلالة هنا، وهي أن أحدهم كتب إلى ابن عمر رضي الله عنهما (ت. 963/73) أن اكتب لي بالعلم كله. فكتب إليه: العلم كثير، ولكن إن استطعت أن تلقى الله تعالى خمس البطن من أموال الناس، خفيف الظهر من دنياهم، كافّ اللسان عن أعراضهم، ملازمًا لمجاعاتهم؛ فافعل. قال: "فكانوا يقولون: جمع العلم في أربع كلمات (ابن الملقن 1997، 157/1).

الأحاديث الكلية عند المتأخرين

3.2

وقد أوضح ابن الصلاح - في بعض أعماله - مجمله فقال: "وكتبت قد قلت: إن ملاك أمر الدين والدنيا في أربعة أحاديث، ومثل ذلك هو رسالته في "الأحاديث الكلية" التي جمع فيها الأقوال المختلفة، ويدعو أنه مال إلى قول مفرد فيها، والأربعة التي يعبدها هنا هي حديث معاذ بن جبل (ت. 8/169) "قلت يا رسول الله أوصني. قال: اتق الله، فإنما كنت حسباً. قال: أجمع السبعة الحميدة تمحها، قلت: زدني. قال: خالق الناس بخلق حسن"، وحديث معاذ أيضًا "أتبع السيئة الحسنة تمحها. قلت: زدني. قال: خالق الناس بخلق حسن«.

وقد أوضح ابن الصلاح في بعض أعماله "الأحاديث الكلية" التي جمع فيها. وقضاء ابن الصلاح، وحديثه في أحمد وحفظ السمان، وحديثه في الرياض بن سارية (ت. 687) "قلت يا رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: "أوصيكم بتحلي الله والسمع والطاعة وإن تأخر عليكم عبد من كل شيء، وحدث ابن عباس (ت. 687/186) أن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: "احفظ الله في السماء وما في الأرض".

وقد اطلع على الأقوال العشر التي جمعها ابن الصلاح، وحدثه في أحمد وحفظ السمان، ومما في معناها. فقد رواه مسلم، وأخذه حديثة: "استقت قلبك"، وتمتع بحديث آخر هو "بر حسن الخلق"، و"إن الله كتب الإحسان على كل شيء"، و"إن الله فرض فرائض فلا تضيعوها"، وحديث جبريل في الإيمان والإسلام والإحسان والساعة.

وقد جاء النووي في نسخة الفقه جمع كل الأحاديث التي تحقق فيها الشرط الموضح سابقًا، وزاد عليها ما وجدته من زيادات بشكل متتالي حتى بلغت 40 حديثًا كما سابقًا. وقد وقع له ذلك على ثلاث مراحل: في المرحلة الأولى زاد على أحاديث ابن الصلاح ثلاثة أحاديث افتتحها بقوله: "وما في معناه" (النويي 90/189-189)، وفي المرحلة الثانية زاد على أحاديث أخرى حديثًا واحدًا وقال: "وقد اجتمع من تداخل أقوالهم - مع ما ضمت إليه - ثلاثون حديثًا" (النويي 205/405)، وفي المرحلة الثالثة أوصى إلى أربعين، ثم زاد أربعين، "كأنه رأى الختم بهما على الأربعين.

وتبّع النووي على ذلك لاحقًا فأعطى الحديثين رقميًا واحدًا، ولكنه قدّم حديث النواس: "بر حسن الخلق"، فقد رواه مسلم، وأخر حديث وابحث: استقت قلبك، فإنه ليس في الكتب الستة ولكن النووي حسنًا.

وقد جاء في زياته الأولى الأحاديث الأئته: «قل آمنت بالله ثم استقم»، وألفيس قد جعل الله لهما تصدوق؟»، و«المسلم آخر المسلم لا يظلمه ولا يتخذه ولي منك»، ومن نسخة عن مؤمن كُربة من كرب الدنيا...»، و«إني حرمت الظلم على نفسي وجعلته الأذكار الأولى ابتعدت عن أمتي الخطأ والنسيان وما استُكرهوا عليه،».

أما إذا ما دعوا رجوت غفت لك على ما كان منك ولا أبيا!...».

ثم صنف ابن المظفر (ت 634/1234) كتاب الأربعين المسمى بـ"دار السلام في مدار الإسلام" (نكاحلة دت، 3/8)، وقال القاسم بن يوسف التجيبي (ت 730/1329) - بعد ذكره كلام أبي داود في الأحاديث الكلية - "وقد ذكرت في كتاب مستفاد الرحلة والاغراب، في ترجمة أبي العباس البترني المجري (ت 793/1390) الأحاديث التي قبل فيها: إنها أصول الإسلام أو أصول الدين أو عليها مدار الإسلام أو مدار الفقه أو العلم، وبلغ جميع ما ذكرته هناك من ستة عشر حديثا" (التجيبي 1981، 98)، وهو العدد نفسه الذي انتهى إليه ابن الصلاح، ثم جاء ابن رجب الحنبلي فزاد عليها ثمانية أحاديث وألبغها تحسين حديثاً، وكان قد عزا إلى بعض شراح الأربعين النووية أنهم تعقبوها بزيادات تخصص في الأحاديث الآتية: "النقاش الفرائض بأهلها، فلا أفقفت الفرائض، فأولى رجل ذكر، بمجرد أنه "جامع لقواعد الفرائض التي هي نصف العلم، فكان ينبغي ذكره في هذه الأحاديث".

هذا الحديث لما استدرك الطوفي على النووي حيث قال: "فاته الشيخ أن يكون بالأربعين حديث.

وقال: "النقاش الفرائض بأهلها، فلا أفقفت الفرائض، فأولى رجل ذكر، فإنه من الجوامع في علم الفرائض، وهو نصف العلم (الطوفي 1998، 338)، وكونه جامعا في باب دون آخر يخرجه من الكلي على ما سبق.

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الأحاديث الكلية

على المدعي، والثاني على من أنكر: 37

جمع أحكام القضاء، "ثم سرد زياداته التي تمتلت في
الأحاديث الآتية: "أن ألقوا القروض بألبها"، و
وإن الله إذا حرم شيء حرمه تمهينه، "وكل مسكر حرام، و"

من كن فيه كان متفقة": 38

ألحقوا الفرائض بأهلها:

أربع: "و"

ما ملأ آدمي وعاء شرا من بطن، "و"

كل مسكر حرام، "و"

له إذا حرم شيئا حرم ثمنه,

ه، لرزقكم كما يرزق الطير

لون على ال

وأبي عبد ال

عزة ابن رجب الحنبلي

أبي نعيم كلٌّ من: السمعاني

عبد الرحمان بن مهدي وعلي بن المديني

ابن الصلاح، وما يدخل في جنسه من النووي الذي وسعه على ثلاث مراحل.

والثاني: الاستقلال من "الأحاديث الكلية" إلى "الأحاديث الجوامع" من خلال الزيادة

على ابن الصلاح والنووي، والغاية بالاحادة الجوامع توجه كان قد بدأ مع أبي بكر التفال

الشافعي الكبير (ت. 365/976) في كتابه "جوامع الكلم وبدائع الحكم" (مخطوطة)، وأبي نعم

الأصبهاني (ت. 430/1038) في كتابه "الإيجاز وجامع الكلم"، وأبي عبد الله القضاي (ت. 365/976)

الله تعالى، وهو أنكم تَوَتَّق

وعزه إلى

أبي نعيم، باب: علامة المنافق، وكبب المزاح


ابن الخالق، باب: باب الخص المفاق


رواية الرملي (1999/4/10)، أقواب الهد، باب: التوكل، واليقين، وغيرهما.

رواية الرملي (1999/4/10)، أقواب الهد، باب: ما جاء في فضل الذكر، ابن ماجه

رواية الرملي (1999/4/10)، أقواب الهد، باب: فضل الذكر، وغيرهما.

غزاء ابن رجب الحنبلي (2000/42/1066)، لأبي بكر بن السني (ت. 365/974) ولكن عزاه إلى

أبي نعم كل من: السمعاني 1996/1/582، السمعاني 1975/1/582، الفكري 1984/193، الذهبي

2003/254، 2003/253، وخرج منه العراقي بعض الأحاديث، وعزه لأبي نعم أيضاً (العراقي 2005/2)

708/4، 2009/4/38، أقواب الهد، باب: علامة المنافق، وكبب المزاح

زوهج أن المقبول (2017/127/227)، عزه لأبي علي الحداد (ت. 365/974/365)

ную

لا يزال لسانك رطبً

أبو بكر القفلك (ت. 56/3/256، 2009/4/38، أقواب الهد، باب: فضل الذكر، وغيرهما.

غزاء ابن رجب الحنبلي (2000/42/1066)، لأبي بكر بن السني (ت. 365/974) ولكن عزاه إلى

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الخطيب

وقد مثل ابن رجب محطة مهمة هنا، إذ إنه فهم من عمل ابن الصلاح أنه "جمع فيه الأحاديث الجوامع التي يقول: إن مدار الدين عليها، وما كان في معناها من الكلمات الجامعة الوجيزة". (ابن رجب 2001، 565)، أي أنه رادف بين مفهوم "الأحاديث الكلية" وجامع الكلم الذي هي عبرية عن "الكلمات الجامعة الوجيزة". وقد علامة قل حلي وتم توقيعه بيد ابن الصلاح ولا النووي، ومن ثم وضع الاستيعاب بين المجامع، ومن زاد عليهما لم يحقق شرطهما، ومن ثم وضع الخروج عن مسار الأئمة المتقدمين الذين اشغلا بالأحاديث الكلية قلبة الدين، وتحول ذلك نجده عند شمس الدين الصليبي (ت. 748/1348)، فإنه حين جاء إلى قول أبي داود: إنه "يُكفين الإنسان لديه أربعة أحاديث"، علق قائلًا: هذا "منعم، بل يحتاج المسلم إلى عدد كبير من السين الصحيحة مع القرآن" (الصليبي 1393، 721). لا يبدو أن الذهبي حرر مفهوم الأحاديث الكلية ومقصود أبي داود وغيره هنا. وقد استمر هذا الخلط مع بعض المعاصرين كعبد الله بن الصديق الغماري (ت. 1993). فإنه قال في تعليقه على رسالة ابن الصلاح وصل البلاغات الأربعة في المولى: "وفاتهما [أي ابن الصلاح والنووي] كثير من الأحاديث الوجيزة الجامعة للعاني الكثيرة، ثم راح يسوق بعض المؤلفات في "الكلم الجوامع من أحاديث النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم" (ابن الصلاح 2017، 210). فمن لم يميز بين الأحاديث الكلية والأحاديث الجوامع خلط بين مصنفات كل منهما؛ ليجعل الجميع شيئا واحداً، ولا بد من التمييز هنا.

الأحاديث الكلية وسؤال الأخلاق

ثم أبين وجه صلتها بعلم الأخلاق في فروعه الثلاثة: أخلاقيات الفعل وأخلاقيات الفاعل وما بعد الأخلاق، ثم أخطب بين وجه كونها أحاديث كلية على التفصيل.

الموضوعات المفتاحية للأحاديث الكلية

تدور الأحاديث السبعة عشر المشار إليها سابقًا على قضايا هي: النية، وعصمة دم المسلم (وفيها حديثان)، وأركان الإسلام (وفيها حديثان)، واتباع السنة وعدم الابتداع في الدين، وماراح خلق الإنسان والقدر وعمله، والخلال والحرم وترك الشبات وللذب الفضل، وأن قبول الأعمال مشروط بالطيب، وترك المسلمين ما لا يعجبه، واجتناب الممنهات كلية وإثبات بالوثاب في الدنيا، والاقتصاد على قول الخير وإكرم الجار والضيف، وترك الغضب، والبيئة والتين.

وتدور زيادات ابن الصلاح والنووي على قضايا هي: ترك ما يربك، والإيمان والإحسان والصلاة (الجزء)، وأن الإحسان كتب على كل شيء، والنقلى وحسن الخلق، والإخلاص والصبره، ونحو ذلك.
الأخلاق الكلية

الله والإيمان بالقدّر، والحياء، والاستقامة، وأن فعل الأمورات واجتناب الممنهات كاف لدخول الجنة، وجواز الخير التي تشمل الذكر والصلاة والصدقة والصبر، وتحريم المظلمة وسعة إعلام الله وأن الجزاء مرتبط بالعمل وسعة مفهوم الصدقة، وتنوع أفعال الخير التي تشمل الذكر والأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر والمعاشرة الزوجية وإعانة الناس والكلمة الطيبة وإماتة الأذى عن الطريق وحفظ اللسان وغيرها (وهذا حديثان)، والبر والإثم واستفتاء القلب، وتقوى الله السمع والطاعة والالتزام بالسنة، والأوامر والنهي وإخضاع الله، والذكر، وتغير المنكر ومراتبه، والأخوة وحقوق المسلم، وقضاء حوائج المسلمين، والحسنات والسيئات، والسلوك إلى الله عز وجل والوصول إلى معرفته وربنه، والعفو عن الخطأ والنسيان والإكراه، وتهذيب النفس ليكون الهوى تبعًا لشريعة النبي.

ويمكن أن نلاحظ من خلال هذه الموضوعات أحداً: أنها ذات مضمون أخلاقي واضح، والأخلاق هنا مفهوم موسّع يتناول تقويم الأفعال وصفات الفاعل وفضائله، وهي حقّ متعدد التخصصات، وعبارة النووي قد حمل هذا المعنى، فقد كتب في رأيه بقوله: "هذا أكثر ما قصدته من بيان الأخلاق الذي جمعت قواعد الإسلام، وتضمنت ما لا يُحصى من أنواع العلوم في الأصول والفروع، وسائر وجوه الأحكام" (النووي 2009، 167). فالأخلاق بهذا المعنى تشمل الأفعال والشروط والأخلاق وغيرها، وقد أدخل النووي كل هذا في جنس الأحكام (التنقيمات)، التي تبدو - لديه - جنسًا يشمل أنواعًا.

والثاني: أن بعض الزيادات التي في الأربعين جاءت مودّعة معالج وردت في الأحاديث الكلية السبعة عشر، مثل الزهد (كما في حديث "كن في الدنيا كأنك غريب")، والإخلاص لله (كما في حديث النية وحديث "إن الله طيب لا يقبل إلا طيبًا")، والوعاء (كما في حديث "دع ما يربك")، وتحليل الخلافات (كما في حديث "أرأيت إذا صممت الكبابطا")، وحديث "إن الله غفور غفور")، وسبيبة الأعمال للجزاء (كما في حديث "إني حرمت الإسلام على نفسي" وكذبة "إن أحدكم يعلم خلفه")، ولكن تمت إضافة كليات أخرى تتصل بالتقوى، والإحسان، والحياة والاستقامة، وسعة أبواب الخير (في ثلاثة أحاديث)، وسعة مفهوم الصدقة التي تشمل الأفعال أيضًا وليس الأمور فقط، والبر والإثم واستفتاء القلب، والسمع والطاعة، والأخوة وحقوق المسلم، وعفو عن الخطأ والنسيان والإكراه، والحسنات وسعة فضل الله في الجزاء عليها، تستنتج من هذا عدم دقة ما فهمه صالح الشامي حين اعتبر أن ما زاده المتأخرون "مفعوله شروح وتطبيقات لتلك الأصول المختارة" من قبل الرعيل الأول (الشامي 2014، 11).
الأخلاق الكلية وحقل الأخلاق

تتصل مضامين الأحاديث الكلية بالمحاور الثلاثة لعلم الأخلاق وهي: أخلاق الفعل، وأخلاق الفاعل، وما بعد الأخلاق.

وفىما يخص أخلاق الفعل، يقسم الفعل الإنساني إلى نوعين: اختياري وغير اختياري، والأخلاق إما تتناول الأفعال الاختيارية، وهنا يأتي حديث «إن الله يتجاوز لأمتي...» الذي يُخرج الخطأ والنسبة والإكراه من دائرة العقوب لفقدان حرية الاختيار. ثم إن الأفعال الاختيارية يمكن أن تقسم أحكامها إلى تقسيمات عدة، فهي:

- إما خلال وحرام ومشتبة، وهنا يأتي حديث «الخليل بين...»، وحديث «استفت قلبي»، وحديث «ألحسان الحاج»، ثم إن الريبة وصف شامل لأفعال متنوعة، فقد تقع في أفعال العبادات والمعاملات والمشاكل وسائر الأبواب.
- أو أنها تقسم إلى ما يُستحب منه وما لا يُستحب منه، وهذه قيمة يفدها حديث إذا لم تستح فاصنع ما شئت.
- أو أنها تقسم إلى معروف يجب الأمر به، ومكرر يجب النبي عنه، وهذه قيمة يفدها حديث من رأي منكم منكم.
- والخليل والحرام، وما يُستحب منه وما لا يُستحب منه، والمعروف والمنكر: تقسيمات يمكن أن ترجع إلى الأحكام الخمسة التي تُسبع أفعال المكلفين التي لا تخضر، ومن ثم فهي تقسيمات أخلاقية. ومدار التكليف على منظومة حقوق ثلاثة تتناول حقوق الله وحقوق المكلف وحقوق العباد، وهذا مستفاد من حديث «قل أمانت بالله ثم استقم»، فالتقوى تعب عن حقوق الله، وعمل الحسنات لتغليب السيات يعبر عن حقوق المكلف، ومخالفة الناس تخلق حسن تعب عن حقوق العباد. وعلى هذا فإن التكليف يتناول جميع أفعال العباد الظاهرة والباطنة (أعمال القلب وأعمال البدن) المتعلقة بأنواع الحقوق الثلاثة.

وقد جاءت تفصيلات هذه الحقوق في أحاديث أخرى، حديث «يا غلام إني أعلمك...» الذي تتناول رعاية حقوق الله، وحديث «من عادى لي وليًّا...» هو أحد في السلوك إلى الله، وبيان طريقة أداء المفروضات، أي في رعاية حقوق الله. أما حديث «من حسن إسلام المرء تركه ما يشبهه» فتناول حقوق العباد، فالتكليف والحيل إنما يتناول الأفعال الظاهرة، وهي هنا عدم التدخل في شؤون الآخرين، وحديث «لا يؤمن أحدكم حتى يحب لأخيه» يتناول الأعمال الباطنة التي تأتي بعد تهديب النفس لتصل إلى ترك حب الأمة ومساواة الغير بالنفس. وما يفصل أيضًا ت นอกจาก العباد: أحاديث عصمة دم المسلم، والأحاديث التي وضح توزع أبواب الخير والنشرها - ومنها حديث «من نس ع مؤمنة كرية»، فأباب الخير تناول التبشير على المعمر، وستر عورة المسلم، وعون الأخ على أموره، وإكرام الجار، وإكرام الضيف، والنبي عن
الأندلس الكلية

التحامض والتباغض والتناغش والتدابير وبيع بعض على بعض. ثم إن الأحاديث التي توضح سعة مفهوم الصدق (صدقة الأموال وصدقة الأعمال التي تلتخص في عمادة الله، ونفع العبد) تتصل ببيان منظومة الحقوق - على اختلاف أنواعها وتفاوت درجاتها - ومنها حديث "أوليس قد جعل الله لكم ما تصدقون"، وحديث "كل سلامي من الناس على صدقه". أما حقوق المكلف فقد قدر في أحاديث أخرى؛ كحديث "لا تغضب" الذي يتصل بحق النفس وتهذيبها، لأن الغضب والشوة مصدراً للشر، بالإضافة إلى ما سبق من أن المكلف إذا فعل سلية عليه أبت ببعدها حسنة نحواً وتدفع عنه وزرها. بل إن منظومة الحقوق تسع لتتشمل حتى الحيوان؛ فالإحسان يوصف به مفهومًا شاملاً لكل شيء، تشمل جزئيات التخفيف عن الحيوان في الذبح والقتل كما في حديث "إني جعلت الملك عيناً على كل شيء"، وبعده على هذا جاء التأكيد في الأحاديث - حديث "أرايت إذا صلبت المكتوبات - على أن تحلل الخلال وتحريم الحرام كلام جامع لأصول الدين وفرعوه، وأن الأعمال سبيل الجراء إن خيرًا فهو وإن شرًا فشوك، كما في حديث "إنه أحكم يجمع خلقه". وحديث "با عبادي كن حريت الظالم".

ومما يدخل في أخلاق الفضيلة جملة من الفضائل التي انطوت عليها الأحاديث الكلية، منها: التقوى، حديث "أتب الله حينما كنت" أصل فيه، والورع، حديث "الحلال بين" وحديث "دع ما يزيك" أصلان فيه، والإخلاص، حديث النية التي هي من أعمال القلوب، وحديث "إن الله طيب حليم" أصل فيه، والعدل (وقضية الفظم)؛ حديث "إني حريت الظالم على نفسي" أصل فيه، والأخوة، حديث "لا تحاسدوا ولا تناجشوا" أصل فيما، وترك الأثر ونبهة الخضر الغير، حديث "لا يؤمن أحدكم حتى يحب لأخيه" أصل فيما، وفضائل إكرام الجار وإكرام النفس، حديث "من كان يؤمن بالله واليوم الآخر" أصل فيه، وهذه الفضائل تقود - جميعاً - إلى فضيلة أعلى وهي الأخوة والإخال بالله والخدا وبين الناس. ومن الفضائل التي انطوت عليها الأحاديث الكلية أيضًا، فضائل الإنسان المتعلقة بالاقتصاد على قول الخبر والصرم عن غيره، والعلم والتكاليف، وتهذيب أهواء النفس لتكون تبعًا للشريعة، كما في حديث "لا يؤمن أحدكم حتى يكون يدًا تبعًا"، وإحساس الذي كتب على كل شيء. والحياة كما في حديث "إذا لم تست", والهدوء كما في حديث "أزهد في الدنيا" وحديث "كن في الدنيا كأنك غريب"، والصلاح المستدام من رعاية المصالح ونفي الفاسد جملة، والاستقامة كما في حديث "قل أميت بالله ثم استقم". وقد عد حديث جبريل في الإيمان والإسلام والإحساس أصلًا في مقامات السالفين من التوكل والهدوء والإخلاص والمرام والوقت والبيئة ونحوها.

وقد استلمت الأحاديث الكلية كذلك على مباحث تتعلق بما بعد الأخلاق (meta-ethics) التي تبحث في اللغة الأخلاقية ومصدر التقويم الأخلاقي؛ فقد تضمنت قاموسًا أخلاقياً غريباً...
يشمل الحسنات والسيئات، والحلال والحرام والمشتبه، والبر والإثم، والخطأ والإكراه، والمعروف والمكرر. ويمكن البحث في الفروق المحتملة بين الحلال والمعروف وما لا يُستحى منه من جهة، والحرم والمكرر وما يُستحى منه من جهة أخرى؛ والاستشباهة والريبة وما يُنصح بهما من مفاهيم فقهية كخلاف الأولي والأحوت مثلًا من جهة ثانية. فالمعروف والحرام منفصلان أخلاقيان، يفيدان معنى زائدًا على مجرد الحلال والحرمة، كما أنها قد يُهبلان إلى مصادر أخرى غير الوحي، كالعرف الاجتماعي مثلًا، بينما الحلال والحرمة محددان بالوحي، إذ ليس للإنسان سلطة التحليل والتحريم، وحديث من أحدث في أمرنا هذا صريحًا في هذا المعنى، ولهذا يدخل في مصادر التقويم الأخلاقي حديث «استفت قلبك» الذي هو أصل في إثبات الضمير الأخلاقي بوصفه مصدرًا لتقويم الأفعال، فإن التكليف الشرعي والإلزام الخطي ثابت على عهد الله (كل مسلم بالغ عاقل مختار)، ولكن الحكم الشرعي قد يكون متكيّئًا به (صراحة أو استنباطًا) أو مسكونًا عنه، ولهذا مستزايد من حديث «إن الله فرض فرائض»، وقال التكليف الخاص أن الذي عنه يُربك بالكلية، وأن المأموم به مفيد بالاستطاعة وهذا كله مستنادًا من حديث «ما نهيك عنه فاجتنبوه، وما أمرتكم به فأتوا منه ما استطعتم...»، وقد يُيجي على هذا ثلاث قواعد أخلاقية: أولاً: نظرة الحد الأدنى والحد الأعلى الذي ترمي النظري الأخلاقي، وهو ما سماه محمد عبد الله دراز «الجهد المبدع» (1998، 613)، وثانيها: أن الميسور لا يسقط بالمعسور، وثالثها: أن درء المفسدة مقدم على جلب المصاح.
الأفعال التي تصدر عن الشخص على قسمين: ما يتعلق بمعايشه وما يتعلق بمعاده، ف"المتعلق بمعايشه" هو علم القلب، أو الإسلام وهو عمل البدن كما مر في حديث جبريل)، ثم حصل على خير، وسلم من كل شر، ووقت جميع عهد الشرع (الطوفي 1998، 148).

وقال في حديث "أرأت إذا صلت المكتوبات": "تحلل الخالق وتحري الخمر كلام جامع لأصول الدين وفروعه؛ لأن أحكام الشرع إما قلية أو بديئة" (الطوفي 1998، 173).

الثاني: أنه وصف أحاديث أخرى بأنها نصف العلم أو نصف الشريعة أو نصف أدلة الشرع; يحكي "من أحدث في أمرنا"، فقد قال فيه: "وهذا الحديث يدل أن يسمى نصف أدلة الشرع" (الطوفي 1998، 93–94)، وقال في حديث "من رأى منكم منكراً وغيره" "يجب الأمر به، أو مركب يدي النبي ع" (الطوفي 1998، 292)، وقال في حديث "إن الله تجاوز لي عن أمتي": "إن العرف عظم الوقت، وهو ينصح ras_nasm نصف الشريعة؛ لأن أعمال الشريعة: إما معروف يجب الأمر به، أو مركب يدي النبي ع" (الطوفي 1998، 292)، وقال في حديث "إن الله تجاوز لي عن أمتي": "إن العرف عظم الوقت، وهو ينصحras نصف الشريعة؛ لأن فعل الإنسان: إما أن يصدر عن قصد واختيار وهو العمد مع الذكر اختياراً، أو عن قصد واختيار وهو الخطأ والنسيان والإكراه، وهذا القسم ras_nasm معفوٌ عنه والأول مؤاخذٌ به" (الطوفي 1998، 322).


103
ويمكن توضيح وجه كون هذه الأحاديث كليةً من خلال أمرين:

الأول: كونها متجاوزة للأبواب، وهو المعنى الذي عبر عنه بتعبارات مختلفة كالقول بأن علوم الشريعة راجعة إليه، أو هو ثلث أو ربع الإسلام، أو نصف العلم، أو يمكن أن تُرد جميع الأحكام إليه، أو يجمع أحكام الدين كلها، أو استوفى أفضل الفضل وأوتو حقوق الدين، أو لا يخرج عنه عمل أصلاً، أو تناول جميع الطاعات، أو غير ذلك مما يفيد معيّن الكلّيّ مما ورد في كتب شراح الحديث، وخاصة شراح الأربعين النووية، فقد قيل في حديث جبريل: إنّه يتصل على شرح الدين كله، وقال القاضي عياض (ت 544/1149/4) "علوم الشريعة كلها راجعة إليه وتمشية منه" (القرطبي 152/1، العيني د.ت.، 289/1)، وقال ابن رجب: "جميع العلوم والمعارف ترجع إليه وتدخل تحته" (ابن رجب 134/1، 201/1)، وقال ابن العربي في حديث "الحلال بين": "يمكن أن يُنتزع منه – وحده – جميع الأحكام" (ابن حجر العسقلاني د.ت.، 129/1).

وبذل مثل هذا هو حديث النية؛ فقد قال فيه عبد الرحمن بن مهدي: " ينبغي أن يُجعل رأس كل باب" (ابن حجر العسقلاني د.ت.، 11/1)، فهو أصل في الإخلاص الذي يدخل في عموم الأفعال، أي أنه متاجر للأبواب، وهذا قال ابن مهدي أيضًا: إنه يدخل في ثلاثين بابًا من الفقه«، وقال الشافعي: إنه يدخل في سبعين بابًا من الفقه، وراح الشراح يعدون هذه الأبواب جميعًا، وذكروا أن مراد الشافعي الأبواب الكلية كالطهارة بأنواعها، والصلاة بأقسامها، والزكاة، والصيام، والاعتكاف، وهكذا (ابن الملقن 161-2، 197/1، 200/8، ابن الملقن 1997، 1/160-62)، وقال ابن الجهمي (ت 1566/974، ابن الملقن 290/2)، وقال ابن جرير البويطي (ت 474/666): إن الشافعي لم يرد المبالغة; فلكل باب (ابن حجر العسقلاني د.ت.، 11/1، 156/7، ابن الملقن 197/2)، وقال ابن جرير الهيتمي (ت 747/1566): إن الشافعي لم يرد المبالغة; فلكل باب (ابن حجر العسقلاني د.ت.، 11/1، 156/7، ابن الملقن 197/2)، وقال ابن جرير البويطي (ت 474/666): إن الشافعي لم يرد المبالغة; فلكل باب (ابن حجر العسقلاني د.ت.، 11/1، 156/7، ابن الملقن 197/2).

وقال ابن جرير العسقلاني: "اتفق عبد الرحمن بن مهدي والشافعي – فيما نقله البويطي عنه – وأحمد بن حبل وعلي بن المديني وأبو داود وتدخيلي (ت. 279/829) والأميري وحمزة الكاباني على أنه ثلث الإسلام، ومنهم من قال: ربعه، وتحلفوا في تعين الباقى" (ابن جرير البويطي).
الأحاديث الكلية

العُسقلانِي، د.ت.، 11/1). ووجّه أبو بكر البِهْقِيّ الشَّافعِيّ (ت. 548/1156هـ) كونه ثمّث العلم بأنّ “كُسب العبد إِنما يكون بِقلبه وِلسانه وِبتانه، والنيّة واحدة مِن ثلاثة أقسامِ اكتسابه. ثمّ لقسم النية ترجيحٌ على القسمين الآخرين؛ فإنّ النية تكون سِبةاً بِانفرادها، والقول العاري عن النية، والعمل الخالٍ عن العقيدة: لا يكون سِبةاً بِنفسيهما”؛ فَنسبة لا يدخلها البَرياء على خلاف العمل (البيهقي 1981، 8).

الأمر الثاني: أن بعض الأحاديث الكلية يتناول الفضائل والمفاهيم الكلية التي لا تحصر تعنيها، كالتقوع والحياة والبر والإثم، والحسنت والسيئات، والصدقة، والإحسان، وغير ذلك مما سبق ذكره. وإنّ اعتبارنا “النية” مفهومًا مجردًا غير ناجز بخصوص فشل في وجه كون الهجر الولد فيها كليًّا واضحًا، وإنّ قصرنا الينية على باب القضاء فقط جرى الحديث عن كونه كليًّا، ولكنّ الينية تَشترط في كل دعاوى سواء كانت قضائٍ أم غير قضائٍ، سواء في الخصومات المحتقنة أو في الجدل والجرح.

ويمكن أن نُجمّل موارد الكلٍّ - في هذه الأحاديث - في اشتمال الحديث على القولي والفعل، أو تناوله لأفعال الظاهر والباطن أو أعمال القلب وأعمال البدن، أو تناوله لكسب العبد بِانونه الثلاثة المذكور إليها سابقاً، أو تناوله لأحكام الخمسة، أو إستيعابه على النفيّة من الرذائل والتحلي بالفضائل، أو استيعابه لأحكام الله للقُوافِل والخيار والحدود والمسكوت عنه، أو استيعابه للأصول والفروع، أو تناوله لرعاية المصالح ودرء المفاسد، أو إستيعابه على مفهوم من المفاهيم الكلية كما سبق، وغير ذلك.

خاتمة

تبدو "الأحاديث الكلية" - إذن - انتقالًا من الجريئ إلى الكل، ومن الفروع إلى الأصول، فهي تتجاوز طرقية التصنيف في الحديث النبوي سادتا في الأزمنة الأولى. فالأحاديث الكلية تُشترط في كل دعوى سواء كانت قضائٍ أم غير قضائٍ، سواء في الخصومات المحتقنة أم في الجدل والجرح، وكلاً ما يمكن أن يُجمل موارد الكل، أو تناوله لأفعال الظاهر والباطن أو أعمال القلب وأعمال البدن، أو تناوله لكسب العبد بِانونه الثلاثة المذكور إليها سابقاً، أو تناوله لأحكام الخمسة، أو إستيعابه على النفيّة من الرذائل والتحلي بالفضائل، أو استيعابه لأحكام الله للقُوافِل والخيار والحدود والمسكوت عنه، أو استيعابه للأصول والفروع، أو تناوله لرعاية المصالح ودرء المفاسد، أو إستيعابه على مفهوم من المفاهيم الكلية كما سبق، وغير ذلك.

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الأخلاق تصل بالحلال والحرام والمشتبه من جهة، والحياء والمعروف والمتكر من جهة أخرى، ثم هي تفصل في منظومة الحقوق الثلاثية: حقوق المكلف وحقوق العباد وحقوق الله تعالى، بل وتناول بعض حقوق الحيوان أيضًا، وفيما يخص أخلاقيات الفاعل تنطوي الأحاديث على العديد من الفضائل مثل القوى، والوعود، والإخلاص، والعدل (وتقضيه الظلم)، والأخوة، وتركيب الأثر، ونجية الخير للغير، وفضائل إكرام الجار و إكرام الضيف، وفضائل النساء، والعلم، وتركيب الغضب، وتهذيب أهواء النفس، والإحسان، والجود، والاستقامة، وغيرها، ثم إنها تضمنت كذلك مفاهيم أخلاقية كثيرة عديدة مثل الحسنات والسيئات، والحلال والحرم، والمشتبه، والبر والإثم، والأخلاق والإكرام، والمعرفة، والمتكر، كما تطرقت إلى مصادر التقويم الأخلاقي التي تتمثل في الوجي، والعرف، والقلب أو الضمير.

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الفصل 4
الحافظ ابن أبي الدنيا والتأسيس لأخلاق المكارم
شفيق الكنّير

يسعى هذا الفصل إلى استنباط المعاني الخلقية الكامنة في عمل ابن أبي الدنيا (ت، 894/281). واستكشاف النظرية الأخلاقية الثائبة خلفها، من خلال قراءة تحليلية لرسالته: "المكارم وفضله" و"المكارم الأخلاقية". ويستنتج من خلال هذه القراءة أن "المكارم الأخلاقية" - عند ابن أبي الدنيا - تستعمل الحديث لتبرهن على قضيتين متوازيتين: أولويات العقل ووصفيه مصدرًا رئيسيًا للذكاء الأخلاقي، ومُركبة مفهوم "المكارم الأخلاقية"، أما المثل الأعلى الذي يشدده الجهود الأخلاقية للإنسان - عند - فهو التحقق بالمرودة، أي ما يكون الإنسان إنسانًا على التحقق.

عند الحديث عن "المكارم الأخلاقية"، ينصر الذهن مباشرة إلى الراغب الأصفهاني (ت. 60-59 هـ) الذي رفع "المكارم الأخلاقية" مكانًا عليًا من خلال "الذريعة إلى مكارم الشرعية"، المصنف الذي قرن فيه مكارم الأخلاق بخلافة الإنسان لله تعالى، جاعلاً خلافة الله تعالى مصدراً بحياته، حيث عينه مكارم الأخلاق بخلافة الإنسان الذي وُجد لأجلها الإنسان ثلاث الرسائل، وابن أبي الدنيا كان أسرق إلى الراغب الأصفهاني، وتبني عليه اعتباراً جمع الفضائل والملل الأخلاقية التي ينبغي للمجتمع الاجتماعي تحقيقها، وقد أمكن للرهب أن يطلع على الترجمات الإنجيلية في عصره وأن يقترب منها بعض الأفكار والتصورات، فكيّفها مع التصور الإسلامي، وبدأت نباني نظرية رصد لبناه وطبيعة. أما ابن أبي الدنيا فقد سلك مسارًا في اقتصر فيه على الرواية المسندة جمعًا وترتيبًا، من غير تدخل مباشر منه بالشرح أو التعليق، ولا

تحل أخلاقيات ابن أبي الدنيا الدرس والتحليل بسبب هذه الأسبقية التاريخية فحسب، فقد انطوى – أيضاً – على معانٍ أخلاقية لطيفة تجعلها معاصرة لمسماً اليوم، ولعلها في تدار الأزق الأخلاقي المعاصر، وهو ما يُعراض المسلمين الذين يتقدمون في أنفسهم أنهم خير أمة، وأنهم جزء من الإنسانية المعاصرة التي عليهم أن يثعلوا بها إلى كلمة سواء.

أما ابن أبي الدنيا فهو عبد الله بن محمد، ولد في بغداد وكان قليل الرحلة، ولكنه أخذ العلم عن خلق كثير حتى الحافظ جمال الدين المزي (ت: 742/1342) جمع أسماء شيوخه على حروف المعجم. وقد استشهد ابن أبي الدنيا بالفصاحبة والبلاغة، وكان واعظاً ومؤدباً؛ فقد أُدب غير واحد من أولاد الخلفاء. قال عنه الحافظ موسى بن محيي الدين الذهبي (ت: 748/1345): "تصاحبه كثيرة جداً، في تحقّيات وثوابات "(الذهبي 1985، 139/3)، وقال المؤرخ ابن تغري بردي د.ت. (1474/3674): "الناس بعد بعض عبائله في الفنون التي تجعلها" (ابن تغري بردي د.ت. 1985)، 86/3. وقد ساق له الذهبي أكثر من 160 رسالة ونشرها على حروف المعجم، ولكن الناظر فيها يلاحظ بوضوح مركزية الأخلاق فيها، رغم أنه صنف في فنون أخرى تتميز بالأدب والعلم.

وقد جمع بعض المعاصرين رسائله في الأخلاق والرقائق وهي كثيرة. وهذا التصنيف المنتمي والغيره بجانب الأخلاق يدل على الشغف به. ولقد انتهى هذه الغزارة على أنه من أوائل الذين فطعوا للأفكار الأخلاقية المعاصرة الحديثة، بل لعله لم ير فيها إلا هذا الجانب الذي ينطوي على رسالتين: العقل وفضله ومكارم الأخلاق؛ فقطنها للأفكار الأخلاقية المعاصرة الحديثة، بل لعله لم ير فيها إلا هذا الجانب الذي ينطوي على رسالتين: العقل وفضله ومكارم الأخلاق.

وتأتي في جملة رسالته، نجد أنها تتضمن إلى قسمين: (1) قسم أداره على فضائل دينية مثل التوكل والشكر والزهد والدعاء والولاية والبكاء، ويدخل في ذلك أيضاً الرسائل التي جمعها عبد الله سعداوي تحت الكتب الآتية: "كتاب التوحيد والتوكل" و"كتاب أخبار الصالحين" و"كتاب المذمومات". (2) وقسم في فقه على فضائل أخلاقية صفة، ويشمل الرسائل المجموعة تحت عنوان "كتاب العقل ومكارم الأخلاق" الذي ينطوي على رسالتين: العقل وفضله ومكارم الأخلاق، بالإضافة إلى بقية الرسائل التي يتقاتلون مضمونها مع رسلة "مكارم الأخلاق"، وتنتناول: الحُلم، والقناعة والتخفيف، وقضاء الحوائج، والأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر، وقرى الصريف، واصطحاب المعروف. وقد أحس سعداوي عندما افتتح الكتاب برسالة "العقل وفضله" ثم أعقبها برسالة "مكارم الأخلاق"؛ لأن العقل عند ابن أبي الدنيا هو المقدمة والذريعة.

تشبه ذلك تميز التقليد المسيحي بين فضائل حُزينة هي الإيمان والمحبة والرجاء، وأخرى فضلية هي

الأخلاق والاعتدال وشجاعة والعدل (أنظر مثلاً الهبشي 2010، 11).
نعني بالأخلاق الأثرية هنا "مجموعة التصانيف التي تُعنى بالتأكيد على الروايات الأخلاقية جمعاً وتوبيداً" (تقيق إسلامي وآخرون 2012، 75). ولن وقع الخلاف في مفهوم «الأثر»، فإنه - على المعنى الشائع - يشمل الأحاديث المرفوعة والموقوفة والمقطوعة (أقوال النبي والصحابة والتابعين)، وعلى هذا المعني تجري مصنفات الأخلاقيات الأثرية، بل إن بعض مصنفات الأخلاقيات الأثرية قد يضيف إلى تلك الآثار أقوال الفقهاء ولذا وقع بعض الدارسين (تقيق إسلامي وآخرون 2012) عندم سماها بهذا الاسم، وعندما هي مدرسة قائمة بذاتها إثر ثلاثة مدارس أخلاقية أخرى هي: الأخلاق العرفانية، والأخلاق الفلسفية، والأخلاق التوفيقية.

عُني دارسو الفكر الأخلاقي الإسلامي بتحليل المنظورات الأخلاقية التي استوت على عودها ولم ينشغلوا باستنباط ما كان مضمراً منها، فلم تستوفهم مصنفات الأخلاقيات الأثرية بما فيها مصنفات ابن أبي الدنيا. ويعتقد هؤلاء الدارسين أن هذه المصنفات تقوم أصلًا على سرد الروايات وتبويها تحت تراجم معينة، وهي تكون حديثًا في حدود هذه المهمة "الروائية"، مقالة أو خطاب نظري خاص به، وفي أحسن الأحوال تستفي في محرر الحديث خلف غابة الفقهاء، كما هو الحال عند محمد عابد الجابري الذي رأى أن المحدثين عملاً في صلة وثيقة بالفقهاء، الأمر الذي ترك أثرًا على رؤية المحدثين للآداب، فالفقه يعتبر "مكارم الأخلاق هي نفسها الآداب"، وينعدد في كتاباته والستين مبماتهما (الجابري 2001، 536). وظل هذا المنظور الفقهي - في نظر الجابري - شائعاً قفيراً في مصنفات الأخلاق، ولم يغتن إلا عند انتشار "آداب السلوك" عند التصوفية. بيد أن هذا التعبيس استنثا، كما كتب، مع ابن أبي الدنيا الذي متفق نسبًا من الخطاطة الفقهية وألف في مكارم الأخلاق، وعلى خلاف الجابري، يورد ماجد فخري في صُنافته (1994، xi) "النصية (scriptural ethics)", التي مردها إلى النص القرآني وتحديداً في متن الأخلاق، وعند استكشافه لمتون الحديث، راح فخري لتمس هذه الأخلاق النصية في الصحيحين فقط، ثم لم يفأل بذلك محدثين أقل شرارة، لكنهم جمعوا أحاديث تحت عناوين أخلاقية صريحة، وعلى رأسهم ابن أبي الدنيا، صحيح أن فخري أدرج اسم ابن أبي الدنيا مع الحسن البصري (ت. 728/110) ضمن مكارم الأخلاق، كما سأبين، ولذا أفردته رسالة "العقل وفضله" و"مكارم الأخلاق".

الحافظ ابن أبي الدنيا والتأسيس لأخلاقيات المكارم
Ethical traditionalism (Fakhry 1994, 157-151), unless it is specific.

Hasan al-Basri (Librande 2005, 151-157) is a traditionalist who defined the first ethical movement. However, he also devoted most of his efforts to the axiological and the axiological (Librande 2005, 42). The qualities of Ibn Abu Al-Dunya were emphasized in a paper by Librande (2005, 42). He concluded that certainty is the first virtue of life, which he analyzed in his book "Certainty," which he placed under the axiological, which Ibn Abu Al-Dunya realized is an Islamic proposal for fear and doubt. Nevertheless, the titles of Librande (2005, 8) are of little significance, and his summary is accurate to a great extent. I do not believe this; there are other axiological titles, such as "Manners of Ethics" and "Benefit of Intelligence," which could be placed under the ethical part of the book. It is not clear that the omission of these axiological titles is due to the general idea they have about ethics in Islamic schools, such as the authors of the book "Moral Education." They admitted that the detractors of Ibn Abu Al-Dunya did not publish any books in ethics because they were writing books in Hadith to record repeated stories (in their view) and did not publish any books in ethics, while they confused the Islamic and Islamic literature, and they became a school of thought that makes good and bad identical to what is written. It is true that the titles of some papers by Bellamy (1963, 106-108) were cited in this study; Bellamy 1963, 106-108 (and his works) could not be cited without translation, and his paper on the importance of these axiological titles. It is significant that in this field, Bellamy (1963, 111-117) mentioned some axiological titles translated into Arabic, adapted to their topic, which is the subject of this paper (Bellamy 1963, 111-117), and they have been cited in the addendum to the paper, including these axiological titles. (Bellamy 1963, 106-108)
أخلاقيات المكارم عند ابن أبي الدنيا

في هذا القسم سأقوم بتحليل مضامين رسالتين رسلتي ابن أبي الدنيا، وسأخصص قسمًا لكل رسالة على حدة، بدأنا برسالة "العقل وفضله" ثم أثني برسالة "مكارم الأخلاق" وكيف أسسها ابن أبي الدنيا على مركزية العقل.

العقل وفضله على الأخلاق

رسالة "العقل وفضله" هي رسالة في إثبات شرعية العقل حيث يلتمس ابن أبي الدنيا لهذه المكارم أداة من داخل الفرعون والحديث والأثر. ولكن ابن أبي الدنيا وإن كان يخترق وراء الروايات المسندة والأدبيات التي ينقلها، فإن قارئه يمكن أن يستبطن من هذه الروايات خصائص وثائقية للعقل وموقعه المركزي بوصفه أول الموجودات وقوام الدين لدى ابن أبي الدنيا.
تبدأ رسالة "العقل وفضله" بحديث ابن عباس (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 255، ح1)، قال:

"قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: أنا الشاهد على الله أنه عاقل إلا رفعه الله، ثم لا يعثر إلا رفعه، حتى يدخل الجنة. وفِي موضع آخر (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 256، ح4) يَوُّرِى مَا يفِيد أن العقل والمراد شيء واحد: "كرم المرء دينه، ومرأة عقله، وحسبه خلقه". ويرد المعنى نفسه عن عم بن الخطاب (ت. 23/644 من قوله، ولفظه: "حسب المرء دينه، وأصله عقله، ومرأة عقله، وحسبه خلقه" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 256، ح5)، ويبدو أن ابن حبان البستي (ت. 354/965) قد تابعه على هذا المعنى؛ إذ أسند في باب "ذكر الحث على إقامة المروءات" حديث "مرأة عقله"، وأوضح المعنى بقوله: "صرح النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم في هذا الحديث بأن المراءة هي العقل" (ابن العباس 1977، 229)، وهي جميعها أخبار تلح على ثلاثة أمور هي: الدين، والعقل، والمروءة. والمروءة تارة عقل، وأخرى خلق.

وقد يُؤكِّد فضل العقل عند ابن أبي الدنيا - تلك الإحالات القرآنية له، وهي قد تأتي صريحة وقد تأتي مؤنثة. وفي حالة الطلب تستعين ابن أبي الدنيا بأقوال بعض المفسرين لإثبات أن المراد بها مؤنث. ففي الألفاظ الصريحة ما جاء في تفسير "هل في ذلك قسم للغريب" (البقرة: 5)، إذ يروي ابن أبي الدنيا عن ابن عباس أن "الغريب" هو النبي والعقل (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 260، ح27)، ومن الألفاظ المؤنثة التي تحمي إلى العقل ما رواه عن التابعي معاذا بن جرب (ت. 104/672 في تفسير "أولى الأئمة والأنصار") (ص: 45) من أن "الغريب" هي القوة، والأوراق هي العقل" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 256، ح1)، وما تقدم في تفسير "أطيعوا الله" من الآن قد صادقنا سأذكر رقم الصفحة مبوعا برم الحديث الذي أُرِمَ لِهَ بِفُجرِ الْحَيَاةِ، نظرًا لأنني سأحيل إلى أحاديث بعينها على مدار الفصل لصلة ذلك بالمضمون الذي سأقوم بتحليله.

4 5 6
وأطياع الوسيط والواثق في الصحيح من أن "أولي الأمر" هم أولو العقل والفقه في دين الله (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 270، ح 78)، وما تلقى عن سعيد بن المسهب (ت. حوالي 712/93) في تفسير "وآتَاهُمَا دُوَى عَدُلٍ منْ ثَلَاثٍ" (الطلاق: 2) من أن "العدل" يعني العقل، وما تلقى عن الضحاك بن مزاحم (ت. 200-720/5 هـ) في تفسير "فُنِّدَّ مِنْ كَانَ حِيًا"

(يس: 7) في أن "الحي" هو العاقل (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 262، ح 33).

فإذا كان "الحي" أو النُّهى أو العقل بمعنى واحد أو متقارب، فإن في تأويل أولي الأنصار والأمر والعدل والحياة بأصحاب العقل حرضا وافضا على إزال العقل منزلة الأساس لكل شيء، وبهذا تعتبر العقل مبدأً ميتافيزيقياً للموجودات العقلية منها والمحسوسية. ثم يُسند ابن أبي الدنيا إلى الحسن البصري قوله في "فأقتوا الله يا أولي الألباب" (الطلاق: 10): "إذا عاشتم لأنه يحبهم" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 69، ح 68)، فكأنه يريد بذلك الإيحاء بأن العقل الذي هو مناط التسديد الإلهي هو أيضًا مناط العقلية الإلهية والعاطبة.

وإذا كانت مسألة العقل، فإن ابن أبي الدنيا يختلف عن الحارث المحسن (ت. 780/93)، الذي استشهد كتاب "ماياء العقل ومعناه" بتعريفات صريحه له (المحسني 1971، 101)، في حين أننا لا نقف عند ابن أبي الدنيا على تعرف أحد العقل، وإن كان نستند على جملة الروايات التي يُسندها، وهي عناصر لها صلة بالفلسفة تستحق أن نفهم بحث مستقل.

من ذلك هذا التعريف الجنيني الذي ساقه على لسان أحد الحكماء للعدالة: "العقل أمراً أخذاً: صحة الفكر في الذكاء والفطنة، والآخر: حسن التمييز وكثرة الإصابة" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 110). ويعزو ابن أبي الدنيا إلى معاوية بن أبي سفيان (ت. 201، 1971) تعريف "الماء العقل" بتعريفات صريحة له (المحاسبي 2000، 173، ح 60)، ويشير ابن أبي الدنيا إلى العقل الفطري والعقل المكتسب في قوله: "العقل عقلان: عقل نظر، وعقل نظر" (ديكارت 1644-1711)، وهو تعريف يذكرنا بقول ديكارت: "العقل يتساوى بين كل الناس بالفطرة، وهي التي تسمى في الحقيقة بالعقل أو النطاء - نسبياً إلى كل الناس بالفطرة" (ديكارت 1644-1711، 110).

ويذكر ابن أبي الدنيا في مقالة له عن عبيد الله بن محمد بن عبيد الله الخزيمة (ت. 680) التمييز بين العقل الفطري والعقل المكتسب في قوله: "العقل عقلان: عقل نظر، وعقل نظر" (ديكارت 1644-1711).

قال سمعت أبي يحدث عن أبيه قال: سئل بعض العرب عن العقل، ولهذا أتسع في لسان أحد الحكماء الذي قال: "العقل أمراً أخذاً: صحة الفكر في الذكاء والعاطفة، والأمر والعقل والعفة، والآخر: حسن التمييز وكثرة الإصابة" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 69، ح 68).

ويعزو ابن أبي الدنيا إلى معاوية بن أبي سفيان (ت. 201، 1971) تعريف "الماء العقل" بتعريفات صريحة له (المحاسبي 2000، 173، ح 60)، ويشير ابن أبي الدنيا إلى العقل الفطري والعقل المكتسب في قوله: "العقل عقلان: عقل نظر، وعقل نظر" (ديكارت 1644-1711).

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بلاغة يُعرف أن لا يُعرف (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 271، ح83).

يمكن لنا أيضاً أن نستنبط من مرويات ابن أبي الدنيا تصويرًا معيّنًا لعلاقة العقل بباقي ملكات الإنسان من قلب وجسد وكلام، فالعقل يبدو كما لو كان المبدأ الفعال المنتج المحدد لما يحوّيه القلب، وذلك من خلال ما يرويه عن علي بن عبّادة: "القلوب أوعية والعقول معادن، فما في القلب يُفد إذا لم تُمده المعادن" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 269، ح72)، ويعبّد ما نقله من قول علي بن أبي طالب (ت. 40/656): "إن هذه القلوب تشبه كما تملّ الأبدان، فالتسمّى لها الحكمة طرفًا" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 273، ح98)، وأن "طول النظر في الحكمة تلقيح للعقل" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 265، ح46) ثم نقل عن عبد الله بن حبيب الأنصاري (ت. 3/628) - وكان أحد الزهاد في الكوفة - أنه كان يقول: "العقل سراج ما بطن، وملء ما عل، وسائر الجسد، وزينة كل أحد، فلا تصلح الحياة إلا به، ولا تدور الأمور إلا عليه" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 269، ح73) ويؤكد هذا يشبه المفهوم الفلسفي النظري للنفس العقلة السامسة. أما ميزان العلاقة بين البعضين، أي العقل والكلام، فيوضحه الخليفة الأموي سليمان بن عبد الملك (ت. 99/717)؛ إذ أعجب بكلام رجل، فلما اختبره نطقه، فقال: "زيادة منطق على عقل خدعة، وزيادة عقل على منطق مجنون، ولكن أفضل ذلك ما زين بعضه بعضًا" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 268، ح62).

والعقل عند ابن أبي الدنيا مضمون أخلاقي واضح، أي أنه عقل عليّ أو موجه نحو العمل.

وهذا تجد لدى تلك العقلة التي يهمت على الفكر الأخلاقي في الإسلام تأثير من الفلسفية اليونانية، وهي ثنائية العقل والهوى؛ فقد نقل عن أحد الحكمة: "ليس من أحد إلا ومعه قاضبان بألبان: أحدهما ناصح والآخر غاش. فأما الناصح فالعقل، وأما الغاش فالهوى، وهما ضدان فأيّهما ميلت معه وغيّ الآخرين" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 272، ح93). ويتضح المضمون الأخلاقي في...

7 قال ياقوت الحموي: "علي بن عبّادة الرجائي، أحد البلغاء الفصحاء، من الناس من يفضله على الجاحظ في البلاغة وحسن التصنيف... وكان له اختصاص بالألقاب (ت. 283/888) ويدرك في تأليفاته وصفاته طريقة الحكمة وكان يمزج بالALCHEMY (الحموي 1993، 4/1814)"، ولم أجد ذكرًا للذين وقته في كتب التراجم.

8 استشهد الماوردي بهذا الأمر ليسوغ اشتقاق كلاه على أمثال الحكماء، وأداب البلاغة، وأقوال الشعراء إلى جانب آي القرآن، وأحاديث السنة (الماوردي 985، 6-5).

9 لا يُستبعد أن يكون صاحب هذا القول فيلسوفًا لم يشاً ابن أبي الدنيا أن يدعو بهذه الصفة؛ وذلك لأن ثنائية العقل الناصح والهوى الناصح العقل من الموضوعات المفضلة عند الفلسفة المسلمين.
ما ينقل عن عبد الملك بن جريج (ت. 50/670) في أقسام العقل الثلاثة وهي: "حسن المعرفة بالله، وحسن الطاعة، وحسن الصبر على أمره" (87: 272)، وثمة أيضًا رد العقل إلى القيمة العربية العريقة وهي الجهل، وذلك عندما ينقل كلامًا لورد بن محمد نصيروه (ت؟) يفيد بأن العقل هو غلبة الجهل على الجهل والمدين (ابن أبي الدنيا 263، ح 39)، ويضيفه لاحقًا "كلام منسوب إلى أكثم بن صيفي (ت. 9/316)، زمر الحكمة العربية، وهو قوله: "دعاة العقل" (ابن أبي الدنيا 266، ح 141).

وتقل ابن أبي الدنيا عن وهب بن منبه (ت. 114/732) كلامًا ينقل معه المؤمن إلى حكيم روقي طرح عن نفسه الأهواء والانفعالات فاستعاد السكنية والحرية الداخلية، أو إلى فلسوف أفلاطوني يتأمل الحقائق الخالية وال الموجودات الأزلية. يقول وهب: "المؤمن مفكر، فن ذكر تفك عقله السكينة وقع في نبضه، ورفض الشهوات فصار حراً، وألغي الندم فظهرت له النخبة، ورزق في كل فنان فاستقل العقل، ورغب في كل شيء باب فعلى العقل" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 273–274، ح 101)، ولا يبدو أن هذا يختلف في شيء عما نجده عند الفيلسوف أيوب يوسف الكندوي (ت. 256/870) والفيلسوف الطبيب ابن زكريا الرازي (ت. 295/1732) عن استعمال العقل لطرد الحلم والزعزعة وجلب السكينة، والزهد فيما يصيبه، والانصارف إلى تعقل ما هو خالد من الموجودات والحقائق.

ويكاد العاقل عند ابن أبي الدنيا يصير ذلك المؤمن العابر لحدود الملل والعصور، فهو ينقل عن وهب بن منبه أنه قرأ في حكمة آل داواد أن للعقل أربع ساعات: مناجاة ربه، ومحاسبة نفسه، وخلوة إلى صديق يبصئه بعيوب نفسه، وساعة لنفسه في لذة الحلال (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 261–262، ح 31)، وهذا يكون العقل هذا هو الباعث على كل مناشط الإنسان، سواء تعلقت بربه أو نفسه أو صديقه أو جسمه، بل ينقل عن قادة بن دعاة السدوبي (ت. 736/118) كلامًا، أن العلماء الحكيم تناصًا إذا وما ينكر أن "العقل غاية السؤد والشرف في الدنيا والآخرة" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 262، ح 35)، ومن ثم يقول ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 262، ح 32)، ويتبعه هذه القسمة. ينقول السؤد مرادفاً للمؤمن الكامل، متحليًا بالعقل الذي ينقص الأحمق، والفحول التي تُعارف الفاجر. فالمحال هذه إن كان من علامات فساد الزمان.

(انظر الرازي 939، 88، والرازي الأسفياني 2007، 93)، ويبدو أن الراغب هنا يتقبل عن الرازي دون أن يسهم "الصديق المبصئ بالعيوب" من الموضوعات الفلسفية المشهورة التي بدأها أرسطو، وصادفت هوى في تفوس الفلاسفة المسلمين (انظر مثلاً الرازي 939، 32–35).
(أو أشراط الساعة إن جاز القول) رفع العقل وفشو التحامث (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 66، ح 52–56).


إن العقل عند ابن أبي الدنيا ليس مجرد ملكة أو فعل قائم في ذات إنسانية، بل هو مخلوق من خلقين الله وخطاب بالأمر الإلهي، وفي هذا المعنى، يروي حديثًا مرفوعًا نصه: "ما خلق الله تعالى العقل، قال له: قم، فقال: أمبر، فأقبل، فأقبل، ثم قال له: أدقع، فدقع، فقال: ما خلقت خلقًا خيرا منك ولا أكرم منك ولا أفضل منك ولا أحسن من قول عبد الملك بن جرّاح.

11 ح 111/1.

12 ح 14/14.

13 ح 163/1.

14 ح 63/1.

15 ح 355/6.

16 ح 803/2.

17 ح 656/3.

18 ح 52593/6.

19 ح 52593/1.

20 ح 52593/4.

21 ح 52593/5.
من المهم أن نلاحظ هنا ذلك التطابق التام بين العقل والإرادة الإلهية (قم قام)...، بما يجعل العاقل مطيعاً لله بحكم طبيعة العقل وخلقه، وأن العقل اشتمل على مستويات الخبر والكم والفضل والحسن بين الخلافات، وأنه أخيراً أساس الثواب والعقاب، وهي الفكرة التي شغلت المتكلمين بصدد مصدر التحسين والتقبيح ومبدأ استحقاق الثواب أو العقاب. وتتضح هذه الفكرة في حديثين آخرين (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 61، ح 28-29) يحضر فيها العقل متزامناً هذه المرة مع خلق الإنسان لا مع خلق الأكوان، ويشير منها أن آدم قد خُلِّف في مبادئ حياته الأرضية بين العقل والدين وحسن الخلق (أو العلم كما في الحديث الثاني) فاختار العقل، ولكنه في النهاية يحصل على الجميع؛ لأن الدين وحسن الخلق لا ينفك عن العقل، ويكون معه حيث يكون. ومن الضروري أن يكون آدم متمتعاً بحرية الاختيار وقادرًا على التميز قبل الحصول على أداة الاختيار وآلة التمييز وهي العقل.

هكذا تضحّى ألوانية العقل - عند ابن أبي الدنيا - من الناحية المعرفية والأخلاقية، ووجوده، بدل إديث - وهو البديل لا يتردد في أن بروي عن الحسن البصري ما يجعل الدراية فوق الرواية: "من لم يكون للعقل سوسيه لم يفتح بكتيرة روایات الرجال" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 270 ح 76). ومن المرجح أن عنده ابن أبي الدنيا في مساحة العقل، ومبدأ الاحترام لفضله بالروايات، كان على قدر إعجاز بعض معاصره في معاداة العقل، أو على الأقل ازدرائه والزرابية بمداخله.

هذا على الأقل ما يُستحبّ من هذه الرواية الطريفة عن منصور بن المعمّر (ت 750/1970) الذي كان يتحمسه بالدعاء بالتمويه والجنة، وهذا مما يدعو به مسلم، ولكنه كان يضيف: "وخلقنا تعبيه بين الناس، وحكقنا تنفعتا به" فإذا قال هذا، كان محمد بن أبي إسحاق (ت 759/1452) فإذا ذكر العقل أخذ منه الضحك، فسأل منصور: "لا شيء، فضحك؟" إن الرجل يكون عنده ويكون عنده، ولا يكون عنده عقل فلا يكون له شيء" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 271 ح 84).


في المطبوع من رسالة "العقل": "حسين الجعفي عن زائدة عن أبي إسحاق مؤذن البرامج"، ولكن في "شعب الإيمان" لبيتيبي (2003، 170/4): "حسين الجعفي عن محمد بن أبي إسحاق".
فالمكارم كاـلة معًا عند ابن أبي الدنيا الفضيلة المطلقة الجامعة لكل خير، فإن الكرم ليست أفعاـً معزولة، بل هيئـة راـصدة في النفس. فإذا كانت هذه المعاني تعدألت بالموروث العربي، فإن الكرم يستمد أيضًا صفة الفضيلة العالية من كونه صفة إلهية وعمود الدين أيضًا. و وذلك تفسير مكارم الأخلاق - عند ابن أبي الدنيا - لعمـلية تأويل معقدة يمتزج فيها الأخلاقي بالديني.

تبدأ ابن أبي الدنيا رسالة "المكارم" بنفس ما بدأ به رسالة "العقل"، وحسب خلقه (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 277).

وتأتي رسالة "مكارم الأخلاق" بعد رسالة "العقل وفضله"، وهي كذلك فعالة في النظام العام لفكر ابن أبي الدنيا الأخلاقي. وتتكون الرسالة من 486 مادة بين حديث وأثر وحكم وشعر، وهي تأليف فريد، لا لجـهة مضمونها الذي ستعرضه بعد قليـل، بل للجهة الترتيب المنطقي لهذا المضمون، ويمكن تقسيم الرسالة إلى مقدمة ومحورين يقطعان اتصالهما استطرادًا ذو علاقة بالمقدمة. وتنظم المواد وفق الترتيب الآتي:

- مقدمة في المكارم، وتشمل المرويات (1-36)، في التقوى والمكارم والحكم وبقاء الذكر الحسن، وعـاة عـدة الرسالة، وهي عبارة عن ثلاث روايات (34-36)، عن السيدة عائشة بنت أبي بكر الصديق (ت. 678/58 بدأها عشر مكارم.
- واستـطراد ويشمل المرويات (37-72).
- ثم تفصيل القول في مكارم الأخلاق العشرة المستقاة من حديث السيدة عائشة، وهي المرويات (73-48).

وإذا تناقش هذه المحاور على هذا الترتيب فيما يأتي.

مقدمة في الكرم والمكارم (والاستطراد كذلك) على الوصل بين المكارم والكرم، ويشكـل معًا عند ابن أبي الدنيا الفضيلة المطلقة الجامعة لكل خير، فالمكارم كالمكرم ليست أفعاـً معزولة، بل هيئـة راـصدة في النفس. وإذا كانت هذه المعاني تعدألت بالموروث العربي، فإن الكرم يستمد أيضًا صفة الفضيلة العالية من كونه صفة إلهية وعمود الدين أيضًا. وذيـل تحـظى مكارم الأخلاق - عند ابن أبي الدنيا - لعمـلية تأويل معقدة يمتزج فيها الأخلاقي بالديني.

يبدأ ابن أبي الدنيا رسالة "المكارم" بنفس ما بدأ به رسالة "العقل"، أي بالحديث المرفع المذكور سابقًا وهو "كرم المرء دينه، ومرؤوه عقله، وحسبه خلقه" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 277).
الحافظ ابن أبي الدنيا والتأسيس لأخلاق المكارم

99

ح1)، ويشبه الحديث مرفوع في التقوى (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 272، ح2) ونصه: "قيل يا رسول

الله من أكرم الناس؟ قال: ألقاهم.15 ويعبدهم حديثان (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 278، ح4-5) يطابقان أيضًا بين التقوى والكرم. ويتصل مفهوم «الكرم» عند ابن أبي الدنيا - بمفهوم المكارم - لفظًا ومعنى، فالكرم من معاني الخير، ولكنه عند ابن أبي الدنيا يعني أيضًا الفضيلة المطلقة التي تسمى بجبل الإنسان فتقبلها إلى جوهر كريم شريف كالأجاق الشارقة، وظل بظلها كل الفضائل الجزئية أو الفضائل التامة. وهذه السعة الدلالية لمفهوم الكرمة في الكمال - عند ابن أبي الدنيا - يعبر عنها الراوي الأصفهاني بقوله: "أما اللقمة فاسم جامع جميع الأخلاق والأفعال الحميدة فإن ظهرت بالفعل" (الأصفهاني 2007، 117)، ويوضحها ابن منظور (1311/711) فيما بعد حين يفيد أن الكرمة "الجامعة لأنواع الخبر والشرف والفضائل"، وأنه "اسم جامع لكل ما يُمُنِح، والكرم - فإن كان أصلها صفة للناس - فإنه يستعمل "في الخل والبر والشعر وغيره من الجمع إذا عما العقد". قال: الأعرابي (ت. 231، 846/207). 

وأيضا: "نور جلده ويلين شعره وتطيب رائحته" قال ابن يزيد الفراء (ت. 127/3، 1972).

"نور جلده ويلين شعره وتطيب رائحته"، وهو واله مع ذلك غني القلب لا يملك من الدنيا شيء، ولا يرى الدنيا من الآخرة عوضًا، ولا يرى البخل من الجود، تراه منكسر القلب، ذو هموم قد تفرد بها، مكتوب ميزون ليس له في فرح الدنيا نصيب، إن أتاه منها شيء فرقة، وإن زوِي عنه كل شيء فيها لم يطلبه. قال: ثم يبكي ويقول: هذا والله الكرم! هذا والله الكرم! (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 292، ح6). ومن المؤكد أن ابن أبي الدنيا (على لسان مالك بن دينار) يتوعس في مفهوم الكرمة، يستعمل فرق ما هو معهود من الفضيلة، لأن من يتأمل هذا الكلام لا يملك إلا أن يرى فيها مثالًا من مثل الأخلاق الرواقية التي امتدحها الكوفي والرازي، كالهلان والبلد ون<thead><table></table></thead></table></div>
والقريب)، وفضلات الجود والثبات على الدين وأنكسار القلب، ومن اللافت أن هذه المعاني لا تسمى هنا زهداً بل كرمًا.

ويبدو أن توظيف مفهوم «الكرم» قد أتاح لابن أبي الدنيا الوصول إلى أنه لما كان الكرم هيئة راSTREAMتحة في النفس، كانت طاعة الله إكرامًا للنفس قبل أن تكون إمتثالًا، ومعصيته إهانةً للنفس قبل أن تكون عصيانًا وجحودًا، وسيعبر لاحقًا عن هذا المعنى عند حديثه عن الحياء. ولتأكيد هذا المعنى، يُستناد إلى يحيى بن أبي كثير (ت 64، ح 292، 2000) قوله: 

»لكرم هيئة لكرم، وأكرامك نفسك عن معاصي الله، ولا أهان العباد أنفسهم بمثل معصية الله، وإن أكرم العباد أنفسهم لكرم إلا فيهما.«

ويسند إلى زيد بن أسلم (ت 136/753) قوله: 

»قلت لأخي أن الكرم إلا فيما 16 فكذبه: إكرامك نفسك عن معاصي الله، وإكرامك نفسك عن معاصي الله،«

ويبدو أن توظيف مفهوم الكرم في النص ينطوي على عدة معاني، منها: إكرامك نفسك عن معاصي الله، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالله، والكرم في الطاعة، والكرم في الجود والثبات، والكرم في الأدب والثقافة، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد بالإنسانية، والكرم في الاعتقاد الإ
الحافظ ابن أبي الدنيا والتأسيس لأخلاق المكارم


بيد أنه إن كانت المكارم، من الناحية الموضوعية، تضرب بسبب إلى الأخلاقيات العربية الدنيوية، فإن ابن أبي الدنيا حريص بالقدر نفسه على تديينها. وفي هذا الصدد يروي جملة أحاديث م، ويدعو بها النبي الذي ما بُعث إلا لإتمامها. ففيما أمر بالأخلاق حثًّ؛ فهي تستحث الفاعل على تكريم نفسه وصون مروءته، أكثر منها أخلاقيات تطالببه بالإمتثال. وكرم الذات يزكو في عين الفاعل الأخلاقي عندما يتصور بقاء ذكره الحسن في الناس بعده.


20 وفي الأوسط، وفي إسحاق أبو طالب القسيسي وقته ابن حيان، والأكثر على تزويجه، وجاء عند الطبراني "زُرَجَ خَضْرًا"، وعند البيهقي، والفيضي "زُرِجَة نَحْرَاء"، بدل "زمزدة".

101
أخلاقيّة، أعلاها منحة العنز. لا يعمل عبد بخصلة منها رجاء ثوابها وتصديق موعودها إلا أدخله الله عز وجل بها الجنة (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 285، ح 30). ورغم التباين في العدد، فإن هذه الأخلاق في النهاية -كما ينقل ابن أبي الدنيا عن بعض السلف- "مناخ يمنحها الله من يشاء من عباده" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 286، ح 32، ح 288، ح 43). ومن جاء بأحدها دخل الجنة، وإذا أراد الله عز وجل لهم عز وجل بها الجنة، أما المكارم بما لكرم بما هو صفة إلهي. فعددنا ما دون منيحة العنز من رد السلام وتشميت السفع، وإماطة الأذى عن الطريق ونحوه، فما استطعنا أن نبلغ خمسة عشرة خصلة.

منفعتها، أعلاها منحة العنز. لا يعمل عبد بخصلة منها رجاء ثوابها وتصديق موعودها إلا أدخله الله عز وجل بها الجنة (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 286، ح 32، ح 288، ح 43). ومن جاء بأحدها دخل الجنة، وإذا أراد الله عز وجل لهم عز وجل بها الجنة، أما المكارم بما لكرم بما هو صفة إلهي.

ورواه البخاري (2001، 2/563): "كأنه المهبة، يابس الطالب، وفي نظف اليساري:
"قال حسان بن عطية أحد رواة الحديث: "فقدنا ما دون منيحة العنز من رد السلام وتشميت السفع، وإماطة الأذى عن الطريق ونحوه، فما استطعنا أن نبلغ خمسة عشرة خصلة" ومنحة العنز. كأنه عند ابن أبي الدنيا وغيره. ومنحة العنز. كأنه عند البخاري وغيره. هي أنثى تنطوي عليها المكارم: قيمة الحلم التي يخصص لها ابن الدينية التي من الأفكار المركبة، وهي من الفروع الأخلاقية.


21 رواه البخاري (2001، 2/563): كأنه المهبة، يابس الطالب، وفي نظف اليساري:
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الحافظ ابن أبي الدنيا والتأسيس لأخلاق المكارم

المعاني كاملة في استعمال ابن أبي الدنيا لهذا المفهوم. وإن كان لا يصرّح بها. وفي الروايات المذكورة، يحجم الحلم إجمالًا بوصفه نوعًا من العفو الذي يدفع السيئة بالحسنة: صلة من قطع، والعفو عن ظلم، وإعطاء من منع. ولا يكفي ابن أبي الدنيا بهذا المعاني الأخلاقية الصرفة للحلم، بل يقرنها كالعادة بمعنى الدين، فيجعل العفو شرطًا لبلغ صريح الإيمان (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 282، ح 22)، ووسيلة إلى مقام الرفعة عند الله (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 283، ح 23).

وعلى عادته، يأتي ابن أبي الدنيا في ختام هذه السلسلة (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 283، ح 25) بآية قرآنية هي **خُذِ الْعَفْوَ وَأْمُرْ بِالْعُرْفِ وَأَعْرِضْ عَنِ الْجَاهِلِينَ** (الأعراف: 26)، مع تفسيرها في ضوء ما سبق من خصال الحلم.


حديث المكارم العشر أو واسطة العقد بعد تلك المقدمة، يأتي ثلاث روایات سميتها واسطة العقد في رسالة **المكارم**؛ لأنها تتضمن المبدأ الذي تنتظمه وفقه لأخلاقيات المرويات التي يوردها ابن أبي الدنيا تحت خانة المكارم. وضع هذه الروايات الثلاث هذا الموضوع يمنح التأليف (والتفكير) الأخلاقي عند ابن أبي الدنيا فرادة لا تتأقى فقط من مضمونه الذي عرضناه، بل أيضًا من شكله و نظام عرضه، وأي تشبها، وإلى نفس هذه الحكم خصص زيليو غراندي (Zilio-Grandi 2015، 89). فيعمد مصنفنا إلى سرد المرويات الأخلاقيّة كيفما اتفق، أو تحت أباب أعطى نفسه من متشق تسويعةها والدفاع عنها، بل أخذ من كلام السيدة عائشة إرشادًا مفهوميًامراجعًا وموضوعًا لتنظيم مادة المرويات، فتجيء تنظيم الكتاب

**خصخص ابن أبي الدنيا لغلف رسالة مستقلة، درسها زيليو-غراندي (95–88، 2015).**

(Zilio-Grandi 2015، 95–88)
معقولًا ومحكمًا وإن لم يخل من الاستطراد الذي وصم طريقه المقدم في التصنيف، ولم يجاب
بillez الصواب حين اعتبر كتاب «مكارم الأخلاق» بمثل كتاب الكتب، أي الجامع لما تفرق في
الرسائل أو الكتب الأخرى من خصائص (Bellamy 1963, 111). تقول السيدة عائشة - بحسب
الحديث، وصدق الباس في طاعة الله، وإعطاء السائل، ومكافأة الصنيع، وصلة الرحم، وأداء
الأمانة، والتمدد للجوار، والتمدد للصاحب، وقرى الضيف، ورأس الدين، ورأس الدين، ورأس
الحياة؛ لأنه رأس الدين، رحم ذكره آخراً في كلام السيدة عائشة.
ويتوضّح هذا الحديث المرجعي للحديثين الآخرين للسيدة عائشة أيضًا من قولاً، بحيث يشكل
الثلاثة وعستة العقد. أول هذين الحديثين قوله: "لقد جاء الإسلام وقد نزوع في القرآن وسُوَّى
خصلة، كثيرة وثابتة الإسلام شدة، منها قرية الضيف وحسن الجوار والوفاء بالعدوة" (ابن أبي
الدنيا 2000، 286 ح 35). ويزعم هذا الحديث الفكرية الرائعة عند ابن أبي الدنيا بأن الإسلام
ما أحدث قطيعة مع محصول التجربة الإنسانية التي كانت للعرب في الجاهلية، وخاصة في جنوب
الأمة. أما ثاني الحديثين فقوله في السيدة عائشة: "مكارم الأخلاق عشرة: تكون في الرجل
ولا تكون في ابنه، وكونة في ابنه ولا تكون فيه، وكونة في السيد ولا تكون في عبده، وكونه
في السيد ولا تكون في سيده" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 287 ح 37). وهذا الحديث يدخل التعددية
إلى الأشكال التي تحقق بها المكارم؛ إذ ليس معير الفضيلة واحدًا يقدّم بآداء الأخلاق
لكل الناس من غير تمييز، بل كل إنسان يأتي من المكارم بما يناسب خصائصه النفسية أو وظائفه
أو مواقفه الاجتماعي. 28

روى هذا الحديث في بعض المصنفات المكررة المتقدمة على ابن أبي الدنيا، كالجامع لعبد الله بن
وهب (ت. 917/109) (ابن وهب 1995، 595) من قول عائشة، ورواه البقيعي أيضًا (1961/162 ح 10)
عن عائشة من قولها، ورواه الحكم البلغاري (1983/4، 341/4)، والبقيعي (2003، 161/109)
عن عائشة مرفوعًا. وقد حكم محمد بن دقين بعدم صحة مرفوعًا، قال ابن حبان: "وهذا ما لا أصل له من
كلام رسول الله" (ابن حبان 813/91، 107/109)، وقال ابن الجوزي (1981/4، 224): "هذا حديث لا
يصح عن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم، ولعله من كلام بعض السلف.
27
يقرّ اقلياً أيضًا توجيع معيار الأداء الأخلاقي بين المنتفع والفقير (الرازي 1939، 106–107).
28
كم يقرّاق الأداء الأدبي في حموض المرأة والرجل (الرازي الأدبي 1939، 116). وليس
هذا مستغرقًا؛ فالشعور ما قبل الحديث لم يكن يتفرد في الأفراد نظرة الخدمة؛ أي من زاوية
المساواة المدنية الصورية التي تجعل من كل شخص ذاتية (subjectivity) متضامنة، لا تتطابق ولا
بعد هذه الأحاديث الثلاثة، يتحدث ابن أبي الدنيا بلسانه - ونادراً ما يفعل ذلك - فيشرح لنا خلفته فيما يتبقي من رسالته قائلاً: "ومن ذكرنا في كتابنا هذا في كل خصلة من الخصال التي ذكرت أم المؤمنين - رضوان الله عليها - بعض ما ذكرنا إلينا عن النبي وعن أصحابه رضوان الله عليهم ومن بعدهم من التابعين لهم بإحسان وأهل الفضل والذكور من العلماء؛ لزيداد ذو البصر في بصيرته، وينبغي المقصور عن ذلك من طول غفلته، فيرغب في الأخلاق الكريمة، وينافس في الأفعال الجميلة التي جعلها الله حليته لدينه، وزينة لأولاليه. وقد كان يقال: ليس من خلق كريم ولا فأل جميل إلا وقد وصله الله بالدين" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 287، ح.3).

فمن هذه الفقرة المتنازلة على منطق العرض الذي ستخضع له الروايات اللاحقة، ومن ثم لا يتعلق الأمر بجمع وحفظ مرويات كيفما اتفق؛ بل ثمة هيكل يسند البنيان وقصد يوجّه التصنيف. بيد أن أهم ما في كلام ابن أبي الدنيا هو العبارة الأخيرة التي تعلن عن "الفضيلة" التي تخفى وراء تأليفه رسالته، وربما باقي رسائله الأخلاقية، وهي إثبات الصلة التي أقامها الله بين الدين وكل خلق جميل، أو بالأحرى تجسير الهوة بين الدين والأخلاق، والتي كانت قد بدأت تتسع في زمن ابن أبي الدنيا لصالح تدين شكلي ليس فيه من روح الدين (الأخلاقية) شيء.

تتفصيل القول في المكارم

في ضوء الحديث المرجعي للسيدة عائشة، يشرع ابن أبي الدنيا في عرض المرويات المتعلقة بالمكارم، ومنها ما هو إكرام للنفس، ومنها ما هو إكرام للغير من ذوي القربى، ومنها ما هو إكرام لعموم الناس. وتتفق وراء تأليفه رسالته، وربما باقي رسائله الأخلاقية، وهي إثبات الصلة التي أقامها الله بين الدين وكل خلق جميل، أو بالأحرى تجسير الهوة بين الدين والأخلاق، والتي كانت قد بدأت تتسع في زمن ابن أبي الدنيا لصالح تدين شكلي ليس فيه من روح الدين (الأخلاقية) شيء.

يدل هذا على أن المكارم المرجعية للسيدة عائشة، يشرع ابن أبي الدنيا في عرض المرويات المتعلقة بالمكارم العشر التي تضمن أن تكون من الفضائل العالية، بما أنها أنواع تحت جنس المكارم، فإن ماهية الكرم تعتمد منا ما هو إكرام للنفس، ومنها ما هو إكرام للغير من ذوي القرية، ومنها أخيراً ما هو إكرام لعموم الناس. وفضلا عن ذلك، فإنها ترتب من "المكارم" طابعها الرسولي، أي كونها خلقاً على الحقائق، والحاق - كما عزف المؤلفون المسلمين - هيئة راسخة في النفس تصدر عنها الأعمال ليس متتتحفت في النفس (الجرجاني د.ت.، 89)، وسأذكر الآن هذه المكارم العشر بإيحاء، وتأذر عند الحياة بشيء من التفصيل.

يبدأ ابن أبي الدنيا بشرح ذكرى عن المكارم يمكن اعتبارها متعلقة بإكرام النفس، وهي الحياه والصدق وصدق البلاء، وسواه، ويدول إلى ابن أبي الدنيا بالحياه مبارةً بذلك بالقول: "بدأنا بذكر الحياة وما جاء في فضله لقول أم المؤمنين رضي الله عنها: رأس مكارم الأخلاق الحية" (ابن أبي الدنيا).

أما هو ذات أخلاقية، فلم تكون كينونة الشخص في العصور ما قبل الحديثة تنفصل عن مقامه الاجتماعي، فهو جوهري واحد سواء كان من العامة أم من الخاصة، سيدًا أم عبدًا، رجلاً أم امرأة. (Di Vito 1999، 223، 231) باشر فارس عندما تمت ترجمة "مكارم الأخلاق" إلى الفرنسية بعبارة "الفضائل الرفيعة" (فارس 1939، 37، حاشية 29).

وما كان ابن أبي الدنيا لا يتدخل بوضع تعريفات وحدود للمفاهيم والقيم التي يمتدحها، ماراحنا - فيما يبدو - على وضوح معناها وبابع مدلولها في ذهن القارئ الذي كان يكتب له، لا يبقى أمامنا سوى استباط تعريفات خصبة للمفاهيم من الاستعمال والسياق. هكذا، نستطيع من وصف أحوال الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم في حياته، أن الحياء: "ترك مصارحة الناس بما له عليه وسلم في حيائته، بما في ذلك ترك تنبيههم على ما ينجم عن سلوكهم من أذى للمستحيي (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 297، ح. 80-82); بل هو عند سعيد بن جبير (ت. 95/141): استثقال نهي يوم عن فعل ما يكره (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 304، ح. 110)، وترك الفحش (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 298، ح. 86). ويكشف لنا كلام لأبي بكر الصديق (ت. 13/96) عن آخر لحياء هو ستر العورة ولو في خلاء، تضني من الله (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 300، ح. 92)، وباختصار، إنه غاية النذور، أو غاية الفضل أو الكرم مع الناس.

وربما كان كلام أبي بكر الصديق مرشدًا إلى الحقيقة العميقة للحياة بما هو خجل المرء من عوراته، الجسدي منها والمعنوي، وهو معنى يتأكَّد بمصادر مختلفة تشمل على الحديث (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 298، ح. 87).

**دعوني النفس بعد خروج عينها**

وَلَو طالت إِقَامَتُهُ رِبَاعًا

- اعتذر - إن أطيعك - سبّ نفسك

وعنها يحلل علماء كلامها ومفسرون سلوها: "إن الحيا ليدل على هُنات ذات ألوان، من استحيا استخفى، ومن أتقى وقى" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 301، ح 94). وإن جواب المرأة ليخرج عن المعهود الإسلامي، إذ المعهد استدعاء مقوله "خوف الله وخشتيه" في المواقف التي يعرض فيها المرء للغواية وهو مستخف آمن من الفضيحة أو من تقريع الناس. تستنتج من هذا أن الحيا واعظ ذاتي ومحاسب مدقق، وأنه يحمل على اقتحام الخريزي الذي قد يلحق المرء من نفسه عند فشله في الالتزام بالواجب الأخلاقي، إنه اختصار النفس خوف إيان القبائح.

هذا عن الحيا وهو أهم المكارم في الحقيقة، لأنها نسبياً كورد في كلام السيدة عائشة.

ويأتي بعده ضربان من الصدق يطبعان في إكرام النفس:


طالب والزبير بن العوام (ت. 36/366) وطلبة بن عبيد (ت. 36/366) وخلال بن الوليد (ت. 642/21)

وفي مقابل إكرام النفس، يأتي من المكارم - إكرام الغير من ذوي القربى، ويجمع ذلك

مكرمة صلة الرحم (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 353-352، ح300-263) والبر بالوالدين وخاصة الأم،

فإن أبي الدنيا يورد أخباراً كثيرة عن سير الصالحين في مباغتهم فرب أماناتهم.

أما القسم الأخير من المكارم فقد جمع فيه ابن أبي الدنيا، ما يتعلق بإكرام مطلق الناس،

ويشمل الآتي:

- أداء الأمانة (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 353-352، ح64-535، ح 264-79) حيث يورد أحاديث وآثارًا في

الحدث على أداء الأمانات، ويستهل ابن أبي الدنيا هذا الباب بحديث مرفوع يقرن قرآنًا دالًا

بين الأمانة والحياء، وهو: "أول ما يرفع عن هذه الأمة الحياء والأمانة، فسواهما الله تعالى" (ابن

أبي الدنيا 2000، 353، ح 264).

- التذمم للصاحب (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 357، ح 280-318) وإكرام الأصحاب والسؤال

عنهم وقضاء حوائجهم وديونهم، ورعاية أهلهم.

- التذمم للجار (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 365، ح 372-357، ح 283-354) وهو باب يدور على التحذير من

إيذاء الجار والبحث على الإحسان إليه، وذكر آثار الصالحين في ذلك.

- الحضور على الصالحين (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 373، ح 355-375، ح 286-486) وهو أكبر الأبواب،

وكثر فيه من الأحاديث عن جود النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم، والراشدين والصالحين، وخلفاء

بني أمية، مع شواهد شعرية كثيرة.

تلك هي جملة المكارم. والملاحظ أنه لم يخصص بابًا لقرى الضيف، لجأت الخصال تبعًا لا

عشرًا. ولعل مراد ذلك إلى أن إكرام الضيف داخل في الأبواب الأخرى مثل إعطاء السائل

والتحذير للجار أو الصاحب، فضلاً عن كونه واقعًا تحت ماصّة الكرب بمعناه الشائع.

وهذه المكارم مرتبة ترتيبًا لا يخفى منطقه: مكارم إكرام النفس وهي لاحقة بالحياء (الصدق،

أبو يعلى (1984، 1986، 155/1)، والبيتي (2003، 216/7)، باب الأمانات

31

وما يجب من أدائها إلى أهلها.

32

(انظر ابن أبي الدنيا 1990، 411،)

رغم هذا السبب عنوان ناشير آخر لرسائل ابن أبي الدنيا باب إعطاء السائل ب"الجد وإعطاء السائل"
الحافظ ابن أبي الدنيا والتأسيس لأخلاقيات المكارم

الشجاعة)، ومكارم إكرام الغير من ذوي القرية (صلة الرحم)، ومكارم إكرام مطلق الناس (الأمانة، والتزام الجار، والتزام للصاحب، ورد الجميل، وإعطاء السائل).

حدود أخلاقيات ابن أبي الدنيا ضمن تقاليد المحدثين

وقد أوقعه ذلك حتما في طلب شديد على الرواية أدت به إلى التماس كرم المكارم وبإدارته الفضائل والدين على ابتشديه على قيمة العقل، والترتيب الذي اختاره عند عرض مرويات المكارم، يكون Ibn Abi Al-dunya قد فارق السمة الغالية على الأخلاق الأثرية، ولكنه مع ذلك بقي أمينا لصناعة أهل الأمر، وما تفرضه من قيود على أساليب التأليف، وأبرزها التمسك بقانون الرواية والاستشهاد، وهذا لا يتكلم بلسان نفسه، أي أنه – كما قال بيلي – "يضيق على نفسه بشدة في ما يخص الموارد التي اعتدها" (Bellamy 1963, 109). وقد أوقعه ذلك حتما في طلب شديد على الرواية أدت به إلى التماس مرويات بأي ثمن، فروى أحاديث ضعفها بعض نقاد الحديث فيما بعد، وبالرغم من هذا، فهو يكتسب -في نظره- مكانته في تاريخ الأخلاق الإسلامية بقرده في تحقيق أمرين: الأول اجترار طريق ثالث بين فريقين متناحرين (المستغنون بالموروث الإسلامي عما عاده في مقابل المقيمين - بأنصار- على الموروثات الأجنبية؛ الثاني تصوير الأخلاق عن طريقها صونا للاجتهاد الإسلامي، الإنسان، أو لمروءته وكرم نفسه، وكان الأمر الثاني شرطا لتحقيق الأمر الأول.

وفي الواقع، ينطوي المسئوي الذي انتهجه ابن أبي الدنيا على نوع من التحدي، فقد المكارم والمروءة والاهتداء بالعقل ليست قيمة نصية فقط؛ إذ يمكن تبريرها عقلياً خاصا أيضاً، ودليل ذلك أنها كانت من أمثلة الأخلاق الخالصة لدى العرب قبل الإسلام. فكأنه ابتعد في التأسيس لأخلاقيات عقلية اعتمادا على أدوات نظرية، وقد تحرى في سبيل ذلك عقداً كبيراً ومتنوعاً من المرويات التي جاءت ملائمة جداً لمنظوره الأخلاقي، لكننا -بالمقابل- لا نقع في كتب الحديث الصحيحة، وخاصة صحيحي البخاري (ت 256, 405) ومسلم (ت 256/785). وحسبه خلقه، انتقد بعض المحدثين اللاحقين بعض أحاديثه، كما سبق في حديث "أنا الشاهد على الله؛ لا يعثر عاقل إلا رفعه الله"، وحديث السيده عائشة الذي هو مثبتة قطب الرحي في تصوير الأخلاقي، ينطوي الحال نفسه على حديثين مفتاحيين هما: حديث "كرم المرء دينه وموته عقله وحسبه خلقه"، وحديث "أول ما خلق الله العقل"، فالحديث الأول ضعفه سعد الدين الذهبي (ت 1348/748) وغيره، وحديثه ابن حبان والحاكم النيسابوري (ت 405/1014)، والحديث الثاني اشتم نقد المحدثين اللاحقين له، بل إن ابن تيمية (ت 1328/728) قال فيه: "وهو ل
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
الحافظ ابن أبي الدنيا والتأسيس لأخلاقه المكارم

الحديث - كان حبان الباستي في "روضة العقلاء وزهوة الفضلاء" - من أكثري بجمع الأحاديث والآثار ذات الصلة بالزهد أو الرقائق أو السجن أو الآداب، وقد قدمها حsan بن دنيا أو نبذه، أم من أهل الفلسفة ومن بين الموروثين الفارسي واليوناني محاولًا تأسيسه بالاحتجاج لب ما يؤيده من النقل، فكل الراغب الأصفهاني. فضلاً عن ابن أبي الدنيا إسلامية خاصة أو هذا ما حرص على إظهاره على الأقل، ومضامينه عربية خالصة، ومن ثم فهو أقرب إلى التوجه الإنساني الأخلاقي الذي يدور على قيود المزيدة والمكارم والكرم والكرم وما في متناول القلم.

هذا ما قارناه عمل ابن أبي الدنيا بعمل المكتفين بالمدونة الأخلاقية الإسلامية، نجد أن ابن أبي الدنيا أمتاز عن أترابه من المحدثين بمصنفاته التي استقلت بأغراض خاصة، ولم تكن خادمة للفقه الذي إن عني بالأخلاق مال إلى "فضائل الأخلاق"، ولم يُبِّن جيمس بيامي الصواب عندما رأى أن ابن أبي الدنيا تأثر بممارسة من علماء اللغة والكتاب. وهو وإن كان محدثًا، إلا أن مؤلفاته ليست من النوع الذي يمكن للفقهاء توظيفه لأنها منصورة إلى التقوى الشخصية والزهد بالمعنى الواقعي (106).

وكان جورج جومان، إن "كتب المكارم واحدة من الأجناس المنوية تحت الأدب الأخلاقي ذي المحتوى الدينى، ولا تُعنى بالتفصيلات الفقهية بل بالفضائل الدينية" (16).

وذاك السبب فقد التصور الأدبي لابن أبي الدنيا تأثيره عند منتصف القرن الثالث لصالح كل من التصوف والفهم التشريعي للإسلام (legalistic).

وفي تأسيسه لفكر المكارم، لم يتوسل ابن أبي الدنيا بعده من خارج الموروث العربي الإسلامي، فعلى خلاف ابن قتيبة (ت. 276/889)، لم يجد عنه ذكرًا لحثة بن الهند أو سهولة اليونان أو أنثوث الساسانيين أو حكاية الفرس، بل لا نجد لديه ذكرًا لابن المقفع (ت. 142/760).

وينبغي أن لا يفاجئنا زهده في تراث الآخرين؛ فالمحترم موضوع عربي خلص مبني ومعني، ولا يمكن للشواهد الأجنبية إلا أن توهن قوة ندائها الأخلاقي. وها هو أبو الحسن العامري (ت. 978-900)، المشتر للفلسفة، يكتب كتاب ابن المقفع قيمته، رغم ما فيه من الحث على مكارم الأخلاق قائلا: "ومعري إن للبعوض كتابًا يُعرف ب"أبستا" وهو يأمر ب"مكارم الأخلاق" ويوصي بها، وقد أتى يجعل اللسان أسد الله بuellen مقفع في كتابه المعروف ب"الداب الكبير"، إلا أنه مع تقدمه في ذلك غير لائق شيء منه بالقرآن (العامري 160-159).

ولربما كان العامري "معتراً" في الجملة الأخيرة؛ لأن "مكارم الأخلاق" أوضح وأيسر استخراجاً من السيرة والأحاديث والأثر منها في القرآن.

ولا تبين في موقف ابن أبي الدنيا من مكونات الموروث الأدبي المختلفة، إذ لا يقل تشاذه للموروث اليوناني عن تقليده للموروث الفارسي. وعلى خلاف المتفائلة المسلمين، لم يخف من
العدالة فضيلة الفضائل التي تخف بالفضائل الثلاث «العقلية»، و«الحكمة»، والراحة.

أثناء مفهوم مكارم الأخلاق، كان مفهومًا جامعًا أغناه عنها، كما أننا لا نجد لديه أثرًا لمفهوم الوسط الذي قيله الكثير من مفكري الإسلام بوصفه معيار الفضيلة، وهو بذلك من الذين يصح القول فيهم: إنهم "اعتقدوا أن النفس بتعاليها تحصل الفضائل، وتبسلها تحصل الرذائل، وأنه لا حد وسط بين الأشياء عند النفس" (جرادي 2010، 98)، والأخلاقيات عنه ليست أخلاقيات الحكم اليوناني أو الرواقي السعيد - أباد - بذاته، بل أخلاقيات عنادنا ورسالة عناد ووسادة، أو أخلاقيات محبة.

هي أخلاقيات تحصل فيها السعادة إبساء الأشياء، والأخلاق عنده ليست أخلاق

وإن كانت الأخلاق في الموروث الإسلامي الخالص تتردد بين أخلاقيات أمر مرجعها القرآن، وأخلاقيات قدوة موردها السنة (Goodman 1999، 119)، فإن الأخلاق عند مصنفنا أقرب إلى الثانية منها إلى الأولى، بل إن القدوة عنده لا تتعدى على صاحب الشريعة، بل تشمل كل الصالحين من صحابة وتابعين، وكل ذي عقل وحكمة وروعه وكم من دون تمييز. وهذا معنى، فالأخلاق عندنا - نداء صادر من قدوة تحثنا على الاقتداء أكثر مما هي أمر يطلب بالطاعة والامتثال.

وإذا كان الفرنسي دو بوفون (de Buffon) قد قال في القرن 18: إن "الأسلوب هو الرجل" (ذات السماوي) فلا يبالغ إن قلنا: إن ابن أبي الدنيا يعدّ المكارم هي الرجل نفسه (Dürrenmatt 2010، 66)، فله ذلك ما يرويه ابن أبي الدنيا من كلام عمر بن الخطاب: "لا تعرّكم طنطنة الرجل بالليل - يعني صلاته - فإن الرجل يصل من أدي الأمانة إلى من انتهت، ومن سلم المسلمون من يده ولسانه" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 354، ح 268)، يتعمق الأمر بما حقق الرجل في كليته، لا في بعضه دون بعض. فإذا أبدلا "الرجل" به "المرء" صحّ اعتبار المكارم تحقيقًا للمرء أي للإسلامية (سلم 1986، 9)، وهذا ما فعله جيمس بيلمي عندما قال: إن كلمة (tues) تترجم جيدًا في بعض المواضيع العربية "مكارم الأخلاق" (فضائل) تترجم جيدًا في بعض المواضيع العربية "مكارم الأخلاق".

وضعوا "الفضيلة" مقابلًا للفظ اليوناني "آريتي" (arete)، والحال أن المعنى المستخدم به عند هوميروس ذو إيجابات أرستقراطية، فتكون مقابلًا هو "المرء"، مثلما أن "المرء" هو نفسه الحِلم الملازم للمرء (Arkoun 1982، 298).

* في رسالة الإخلاص والانبياء* - مثلاً - لا يورد ابن أبي الدنيا (2000، 67-77) غير بضعة أحاديث نبوية وسط عدد هائل من أقوال السلف والمرويين عن الأنبياء السابقين.
من هذه الناحية، تلتقي أخلاقيات ابن أبي الدنيا مع الأخلاق الأرسطية من حيث إنهما أخلاقيات فضيلة لا أخلاقيات واجبة (deontological ethics). يبدأ أرسطو بتحديد غايته (flourishing) الشخص الإنساني وتحقيق الكمالات التي له بالقوة (345-342، 2006). وبالمثل، إذا أعدنا بناء مرويات ابن أبي الدنيا مسبعين عليها نسبيًا لا توفر إليها مقارنة بمصنفات أرسطو، ستراه بدأ بالدور مما للإنسان من إنسانية، أي من عقل وروعة وكرم، فستحثه من خلال المرويات والمخاطر الإنسانية الفاضلة على تحقيق مروعة/إنسانيته أو بالأحرى صونها.35 والأخلاقي للإنسان هنا ليس معصية لأوامر خارجية؛ بقدر ما هو فعل في الاستجابة لداء داخلي، ومن ثم إهانة هذه المروعة والكرامة. وإذا جاز لنا تشبيه ساحة الأخلاق بحلبة رهان، فإن ما يراهن به المرء ويخاطر به ليس شيئا آخر غير مروعة ردها.

بذا تفهم تربيع الحياء على عرشه العنصري العناصر المكونة المكارم،36 فما الحياء إلا تهيُّب المرء وتصاغه عند الإقدام أو التفكير في الإقدام على ما ينتقذ من مروعة أو كرم نفسه، كما يبدي أعلاه. والأمر نفسه يصاحب على الصدق وحفظ الأمانة والشجاعة، بل إن كلاً من العطاء والانحدار للجار والتذمم للصاحب إذا تتفقي صون هذه المروعة والكرامة عند الآخرين، على أساس أنه حيثما أهددت كرامة واحد من الناس فكانت أهددت كرامة الناس جميعا، ومن باب حفظ المروعة ألقى مصيرنا بابًا في "ذم المسألة والزجر عنها" ضمن رسالة "ال ואזفة والتعظيم"، وأسند فيه إلى سعيد بن العاص (ت. 579) من قوله: "أذرى الله المعروف إذا لم يكن ابتداء من غير مسألة. أما إذا أتاك [السائلي] تقد ترى دمه من وجهه ونظراً لا يدري أن تعليه أم تمنعه، فوالله لم خرجت له من جميع ما كفاره" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 181، ح45). فالأخلاق عندنا إذا هي صنفر المروعة لمسؤوته أي لإنسانيته. ولأن الأمر يتعلق بإنسانية الإنسان، فقد أتاح له ذلك استعادة المثل الأخلاقي للعرب في حقيقة ما قبل الإسلام من دون حرج، بعيدًا عن موقف الإدانة الأخلاقية الذي طالما طال تلك الفترة.

ذاك ما فطن له الراغب الأصفهاني؛ فقد ذكر الفضائل النفسية الأربع (العقل، والشجاعة، والثقة، والعدالة) فورًا، ورغم ذلك؛ اضطر لأن يضيف: "والإنسانية والكرم يجمعان هذه الفضائل" (الراغب الأصفهاني 2007، 142).

35 وهو كذلك عند المعاصرين، انظر الفصل السادس ("الحياء أساسًا للأخلاق") في: عبد الرحمن (2017، ص 181)
 هذه اتفاقية مكارم الأخلاق لدى ابن أبي الدنيا، وكيف أنها منهجية قادمة بالذات داخل الأخلاق الأثرية، بل داخل الاتجاهات الفكر الأخلاقية في الإسلام عامة. ويبين هذا من نظام التفافين: أولاً، فُضّ هذا المصطلح في عناوين الكثير من المصنفات التي ظهرت جميعها في وقت لاحق على ابن أبي الدنيا،37 حتى إن يلبي يرى أن "كل دراسة لجنس أو أدبيات المكارم في النثر العربي تبدأ حتماً مع ابن أبي الدنيا" (108، Bellamy 1963، 108).

تأتيها - وهي الأهم - فهي تلك "الحياة المديدة الجيدة" التي قُبِّضت لعبارة "مكارم الأخلاق" ضمن حديث "إما بعث لأتمك مكارم الأخلاق"، بالرغم من أن الحديث لا يرد بهذا اللفظ في أي من مدونات الحديث الرئية (الكتاب السنة). 38

لا يحصر عناوان مكتبة تصنيف ابن أبي الدنيا - بين المصنفات الأثرية ذات المنحى الأخلاقي - في الم悰ن والمنشور نفسه، بل يعود إلى الشكل أيضًا، إذ يخضع سرد الروايات عنده لترتيب موضوعي (thematic) ومنطقية بفضل الإطار النظري الموجه الذي اشتهى من كلام السيدة عائشة. وقد حافظ مصنفنا على هذا النسق، رغم العدد الهائل من الروايات التي تميل بالمؤلف عادة إلى الاستطوار وتبني سبيل الوحدة الموضوعية، ولهذا قيل عن مصنفاته على العموم: إنها "بالوحدة الموضوعية، وجودة الترتيب" (ابن حميد وابن ملوح 1998، 72). لكن تصنيف ابن أبي الدنيا تظل مقدمة بما ترفعه صنعته الحديثية، كغياب المؤلف وتواريه خلف سيل الروايات والآثار التي يسندها. وقد رأينا أنه لم يفتح غير كُوّة واحدة صغيرة - في الجدار الطويل المتصل من الروايات - كي يحدث بمسانده مفصحا عن خطة الكتاب، ومُربِّيًا عن رأيه في العلاقة بين الأخلاق والدين. وحتى في هذه اللحمة النادرة من لحاظات اكتشاف ذاتية، وجد ابن أبي الدنيا نفسه مضطرًا إلى نسبة الآتي إلى غيره في صيغة البني للمجهول، فقال: "وقد قبل: ليس من خلق كريم ولا فعل جميل إلا وقد وصله الله بالدين" (ابن أبي الدنيا 2000، 287، ح.38).

بذا نكون قد بّنا أن أخلاقيات ابن أبي الدنيا هي أخلاقيات أثرية المادة عقليّة الصورة، وهي بذلك تشكل جيب مقاومة فريدةً داخل الاتجاه السائد - لدى أثراء - الذي يقرر أن مصدر التحسين والتقييم الشرعي لا عقلي. وضمن مناخ التنوع الأمامي (cosmopolitical).

37 أحسى فارس (1939، 33-34، الحواشي 2-11) عنوان 15 كتاباً يرد فيها لفظ "المكارم"، ولكن لم يحذنا منها إلا القليل.

38 من أجل عرض وافٍ مختلف الصيغ اللغوية التي ورد بها الحديث (انظر فارس 1939، 38-44).
للدولة الإسلامية في النصف الثاني من القرن الثالث الهجري، كانت أخلاقياته - بحسب الماظر - تخاربط المسلمين، لكنها كانت - في العمق - دعوة للناس إلى كلمة أخلاقية سواء، شعر أنه في ذلك أن الفضيلة (مكارم الأخلاق) ضالة المؤمن أيّ وجدها فهو أحق بها، أن المؤمن أمرُ قبل أن يأتيه الدين.

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CHAPTER 5

Narrations on Virtuous Acts in Epitomes of al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’

From Ibn al-Jawzī’s Minhāj al-Qāsidin to Its Reception in Modernity

Pieter Coppens

1 Introduction

The genre of narrative virtue ethics in the Islamic tradition arguably finds its clearest expression in the field of ḥadīth literature, more particularly in the category of virtuous acts (faḍā’il al-a’māl), as well as in sayings attributed to the earliest generations (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ), and in the sayings and stories of prominent early Sufi figures. Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) Iḥyā’ Ulūm al-Dīn (“Revival of the Religious Sciences”) is a rich source for such narrative virtue ethics, which he copied from works from the earlier tradition, mainly Abū Ṭalib al-Makkī’s (d. 386/996) Qūt al-Qulūb (“Nourishment of the Hearts”). His seemingly uncritical incorporation of Prophetic narrations on virtuous acts, that were often classified as weak (ḍaʿīf) or forged (mawḍūʿ), has not been without dispute in the later tradition. Whether unreliable ḥadīth material on virtuous acts can be transmitted uncritically and acted upon plays a prominent role in modern critiques on the reliability of the Iḥyā’.

Historically, the role of this specific point of criticism on the Iḥyā’ was more marginal, although always present. The eventual relative absence of ḥadīth criticism in early polemics against the Iḥyā’ may have to do with the topics for which al-Ghazālī used Prophetic narrations. The Iḥyā’ hardly deals with matters of fiqh, for which scholars historically have always demanded the highest standards of reliability for Prophetic narrations. Most narrations that al-Ghazālī employs are parenetic, stressing certain supererogatory acts of worship, addressing the ethical topics of good manners and virtuous character (adab and akhlāq), as well as “softeners” (raqāʿiq) and “exhortation and dissuasion” (al-targhib wa-l-tarhib), to all of which scholars historically applied different standards of reliability than to creed- and fiqh-related topics.

The idea that this type of ḥadīth material may be held to lower standards of reliability than legal material has a long history in Islamic scholarship. According to many scholars, the positive and ethically desired effects of such narrations legitimised sharing them, despite them being weak or forged. The
dominant position in the premodern period was that unreliable aḥādīth could be accepted in the realm of non-legal virtue ethics to encourage believers to act virtuously (Fudge 2006, 120; Brown 2011, 4; Brown 2014, 224–254; Lange 2015, 82, 84f). This was not an exclusive position of Sufis. The only exception to this permissive viewpoint was a small group of Ḥanbalīs from Baghdad and Damascus, among them Ābī Raḥmān b. ʿAlī Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201), some of the Damascene Maqdisī-family, and a score of scholars influenced by them.

It is to the reception of the Iḥyāʾ by these pivotal Ḥanbalī figures that we will have a closer look in this chapter, through an investigation of the appropriation of the Iḥyāʾ by two prominent Ḥanbalī scholars from the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries: Ibn al-Jawzī’s Minhāj al-Qāsidīn wa-Mufīd al-Šādiqīn (“The Way of the Strivers and the Benefit of the Truthful”), and Āḥmad b. Ābī Raḥmān Ibn Qudāmā al-Maqdisī’s (d. 689/1290) epitome of that work, Mukhtaṣar Minhāj al-Qāsidīn (“Summary of the Way of the Strivers”), as well as their reception in both reformist and puritan Salafi circles of the twentieth century. My purpose is twofold. First, I shed light on their

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1 Ibn al-Jawzī needs no further introduction here as a well-known scholar. The most important academic source for his biography is the work of Merlin Swartz (2002). There is an unresolved discussion about the identity of the more obscure author of Mukhtaṣar Minhāj al-Qāsidīn, who should by any means not be confused with Muwaffaq al-Dīn Ibn Qudāmā (d. 620/1223), the famous author of the Muḥniʿī. According to the ṭabaqāt-works of Ḥanbalī scholars, his full name was Najm al-Dīn Abū l-ʿAbbās Āḥmad b. Ābī Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Āḥmad b. Muḥammad Ibn Qudāmā al-Maqdisī (Ibn Rajab 2005, 4231–232). The introduction to the Mukhtaṣar also names him as Najm al-Dīn Abū l-ʿAbbās Āḥmad, but then names him as the son of ʿĪzz al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad, mentions his grandfather as Shams al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Abū Raḥmān, and his great-grandfather as Abū ʿUmar Muḥammad b. Āḥmad b. Muḥammad Ibn Qudāmā al-Maqdisī al-Ḥanbali. So, there is an extra chain in the lineage (ʿĪzz al-Dīn) that the ṭabaqāt do not mention (Ibn Qudāmā 1991, 9). All names in this lineage belong to a family of prominent scholars from the Ḥanbali school that came to Damascus from Nablus as refugees from the Crusaders. They put their mark on the city, from the sixth/twelfth to the seventh/fourteenth centuries, with a unique combination of thorough knowledge of scriptural sources and religious charisma as popular preachers. The settlement of al-Ṣālihiyya, on the mount of Qāsiyūn, in his age was the gathering place of scholars and followers of the Ḥanbali school, often with roots in Jerusalem (hence the prevalent kunyā al-Maqdisī among scholars from this part of the city). It was known for its vivid tradition of religious education and preaching, and brought forth many prominent scholars of the Ḥanbali school (Leder 1997). The ṭabaqāt-works do not mention much details about his life. As may be expected from hagiographical literature, he is described as someone of noble character, who memorised texts with great ease and had great insight. He was appointed as a judge before his thirtieth, worked as a teacher at the famous Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Ashrafiyya in al-Ṣālihiyya, and was instructor of the Ḥanbali study circle in the Grand Umayyad Mosque of Damascus. The ṭabaqāt sources also report that he regularly bravely participated as a sworded horseman in jihād expeditions. He is said to have fought in the recapture of Tripoli on the Crusaders in 688/1289, under the auspices of the Mamluk sultan al-Malik al-Mansūr
reception of the *Ihyāʾ* specifically on the aspect of narrative virtue ethics, to see what the consequences of their strong opinions have been for the way they dealt with the abundant *ahādīth* and sayings of early pious figures (*āthār*) used by al-Ghazālī in his magnum opus. Second, I explain how and why their works and approach rose to prominence in the twentieth century after being relatively marginal in the preceding centuries.

I contend that the work of al-Ghazālī was appreciated by both of these medieval Ḥanbalīs, and their appropriators in the twentieth century, exactly because of the virtue ethics propagated in it. They raised the bar of *ḥadīth* criticism on this specific aspect to be able to convincingly convey this central purpose of the *Ihyāʾ*, that had their sympathy, to their intended audiences without compromising their specific Ḥanbalī values of *ḥadīth* criticism and rejection of certain mystical aspects of the Sufi tradition. Although they at times also censored and replaced certain narrations to steer the virtue ethics content proposed by al-Ghazālī in a slightly different direction, this was not the main purpose of their *ḥadīth* criticism: their main stake was raising the religious credibility of these propagated virtues. While the intended audience in medieval times mainly consisted of students of religion and fellow scholars, from the twentieth century onwards these epitomes received a more general audience as part of the project of “moral refinement” (*tahdhib al-akhlāq*) in reformist movements. This put the bars of textual criticism even higher: where fellow scholars and students in medieval times had the scholarly tools to distinguish between strong and weak narrations, the general audience should only be presented with the strongest narrations to avoid confusion.

Al-Ghazālī’s *Ihyāʾ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn* is widely celebrated as a classic of Islamic literature and has, as has its author, received generous scholarly attention (Ormsby 2007; Griffel 2009; Garden 2013). The work’s author, structure, and content thus do not need further introduction here. An encompassing reception history of the work, and the story of how it has become a widely spread classic, both praised and criticised, still largely remains unwritten, however. As noted by Michael Cook, “The wide diffusion of the work […] is documented by a mass of evidence that remains largely unstudied” (Cook 2001, 450–451). This still holds true today. Part of this reception history should entail an investigation of the critiques the work received on its use and propagation of narrative virtue ethics in different Islamic intellectual and sectarian environments. This chapter is a first modest step towards such a wider reception history. Through this endeavour I intend to contribute to discussions on the relation between

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Sufism and Hanbali-traditionalism, a field in which more and more key texts are covered by academic research (Makdisi 1979; Anjum 2010; Picken 2011; Post 2016; 2020), as well as their revival and reception in modern and contemporary Salafi circles. In this endeavour I pay particular attention to the field of narrative virtue ethics, as reflected in these works. I intend to uncover how the stress on reliable hadith – especially when pertaining to virtue ethics – in these circles influenced the way the Ihyā’ was received and restructured from the twentieth century onwards.

2 The Virtue Ethics of Knowledge in the Ihyā’ and the Knowledge Discipline of Ḥadith

It has been suggested that al-Ghazālī simply did not know much about hadith and its discipline of knowledge, because of the school of al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) in which he was formally trained. This school allegedly did not pay great attention to the discipline of hadith because of its emphasis on rational knowledge disciplines and disputation (al-Shāmī 1993a, 166–169; al-Qaraḍāwī 1994, 150; Siddiqui 2019, 135–162). In medieval biographical literature, several biographers suggested that al-Ghazālī only delved into the two Ṣaḥiḥs of al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) and Muslim (d. 261/875) at the end of his life. This is most probably a trope to accentuate the importance of the Ṣaḥiḥayn, by showing how even speculative theologians, philosophers and Sufis ultimately returned to the authority of these works (al-Qaraḍāwī 1994, 154–155; Griffel 2009, 56–57). Does al-Ghazālī himself have anything to say about the knowledge discipline of hadith and its practitioners in his Ihyā’ that may prove this perception of him either right or wrong?

The first book of the Ihyā’, Kitāb al-ʿIlm (“The Book of Knowledge”), contains ample reflection on the Islamic knowledge disciplines and the abominable inner state of its practitioners according to al-Ghazālī. One might even argue, as has Garden (2013), that this first Book contains the entire intention of the Ihyā’. The “Revival” that al-Ghazālī proposes may be considered a call to return to virtue ethics for the scholarly class of his age. Al-Ghazālī laments the dry technical state that the Islamic knowledge disciplines have turned into, and how Islamic scholarship has rather become a career path than a path to a good outcome in the Hereafter. Al-Ghazālī envisions a return of the Islamic knowledge disciplines to “knowledge of the path to the Hereafter” (ʿilm ṭarīq al-ākhira), where these knowledge disciplines are only studied for the sake of God and the Hereafter, and not for positions, power, and prestige. He therefore favours knowledge disciplines that deal with the inner state of people,
their hearts and souls, which he considers to be the true knowledge disciplines of the Hereafter, over theology and law, which he ultimately considers this-worldly knowledge disciplines (Garden 2005, 218–219; al-Ghazālī 2011, 1:66–67).

Where does this leave the study of ḥadīth in his project of reviving the Islamic knowledge disciplines in their perceived original goal of attaining the Hereafter? In a passage on individual obligation (fard ’ayn) in knowledge, al-Ghazālī criticises every group of scholars for considering their own branch of knowledge as an individual obligation. Scholars of ḥadīth also have this illusion according to him: “Each group considers his own branch of knowledge as obligatory. (...) The exegetes of the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth scholars say: ‘It is knowledge of the Qurʾān and the Sunna, because, through these, one reaches all disciplines of knowledge’” (al-Ghazālī 2011, 1:54–55). Al-Ghazālī himself classifies ḥadīth as part of the knowledge disciplines that are a communal obligation (fard kifāya) (al-Ghazālī 2011, 1:65–66). He considers them praiseworthy as long as they are studied as an instrumental knowledge discipline, in service of the higher goals of the inward knowledge disciplines and the “knowledge of the path to the Hereafter.” In a commentary on a supplication of al-Sarī al-Saqāṭī (d. between 251/865 and 258/871) for his student al-Junayd (d. 298/910), “May God make you a companion of ḥadīth that is a Sufi, not a Sufi that is a companion of ḥadīth,” al-Ghazālī explains that to be a successful Sufi, one first needs to master the knowledge discipline of ḥadīth and religious knowledge in general as a prerequisite (al-Ghazālī 2011, 1:83). ḥadīth should only be studied to a limited extent, not as a hyper-specialisation. Ironically, he considers the study of the works of al-Bukhārī and Muslim as the absolute minimal, and the works that contain sound (ṣāḥīḥ) narrations as the maximum extent (al-Ghazālī 2011, 1:46–149). The fact that he mentions this as such, makes it more plausible that the reason why he included so many unsound narrations in the Iḥyāʾ is perhaps indeed because of his uncritical copying of passages from earlier works like the Qūt al-Qulūb, trusting in the reliability of their selection, as claimed by Ibn al-Jawzī and Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1354/1935), which we will see later.

3 Premodern Ḥadīth Criticism on the Iḥyāʾ: Minhāj al-Qāṣidīn and Its Mukhtaṣar

The Iḥyāʾ received a lot of criticism during the lifetime of the author himself (Cook 2001, 455–456; Garden 2005). This criticism has persisted throughout the centuries and has increased even further in the course of the twentieth century, mostly due to a general revival of ḥadīth studies, the rise in popularity of Salafi-inclined Islamic scholarship, as well as movements of Islamic reform...
and modernism. These reform movements criticised the work for its use of weak Prophetic narrations, and increasingly problematised (certain aspects of) Sufism and speculative theology (kalâm) as a legitimate part of the Islamic heritage (‘Abd al-Ḥamīd 1988; al-Shāmī 1993a, 157–182; al-Qaraḍāwī 1994, 117–127, 158–159; al-Ṭanṭāwī 2001, 2253). Many of these modern and contemporary critiques on the Iḥyāʾ echo premodern critiques. The three perpetual points of criticism are: al-Ghazālī’s use of problematic Prophetic narratives, his embrace of perceived excesses of the Sufi tradition, and his use of illegitimate philosophical ideas.

In his own age, the Iḥyāʾ already caused controversy in Nishapur, where al-Ghazālī returned to teach after the wanderings that followed his much-discussed crisis. In the Islamic West (the Maghrib), where Sufism was not yet as strongly rooted within Islamic tradition as it was in the Islamic East (the Mashriq), several fierce treatises were written against the work (Garden 2005, 141–184). The controversy reached such heights that al-Ghazālī even felt compelled to write a defence of the work himself, as well as his own epitome in Persian (al-Ghazālī 2011, 10:213–354; Hillenbrand 2013). The main accusations in his own age were propagation of too extreme Sufi ideas, inappropriate philosophical ideas in matters of creed, errors in Arabic grammar, and poor Persian (Garden 2005, 76–78). His use of problematic Prophetic narrations was still only a minor part of the criticism in his own age, not so much aimed at his use of weak (daʿīf) and forged (mawḍūʿ) material, but rather at his laxity in naming sources, and did not play any role in his own rebuttal of the criticisms. These accusations had a social and political angle as well: al-Ghazālī had made enemies because of his critical stance towards the career-minded scholars and governors of the region, a criticism that is at the heart of the Iḥyāʾ (Garden 2005, 118–140).

This perpetual criticism on the Iḥyāʾ, which rose simultaneously with its popularity, also caused another more constructive trend among Islamic scholars. Many scholars from different Islamic intellectual and sectarian traditions sought a middle way between completely renouncing the work and uncritically accepting it. To that purpose they wrote commentaries on the work, or works, classifying the aḥādīth used by al-Ghazālī, in which they articulated their mild criticism, but also showed their praise. Another strategy of finding a balance between criticism and praise was through composition of positive-critical epitomes of the work, in which the composer conserved what he agreed with, and scrapped what he deemed problematic (Ḥaddād 1987; al-Shāmī 1993b; Cook 2001, 453–456; Reichmuth 2009, 269–275).

The works of Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Qudāma belong to that second category of positive-critical epitomes. As scholars of the Ḥanbalī school, and part of the
very vivid Ḥanbali culture of learning in their age in Baghdad and al-Ṣālihiyya, a suburb of Damascus, they summarised the *Iḥyāʾ* in such a way that it would become suitable to teach and consume within their own circles, conforming with their specific religious views. It is likely that these authors very well realised that the popularity and influence of this work had become so pervasive that it was inevitable that scholars and students in their own circles would come into contact with it. Composing a purified version of the work was, possibly, a way to take advantage of the immense popularity of the work to propagate ideas they agreed with.

In his *al-Muntaẓam fī Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa-l-Umam* (“Compilation on the History of Kings and Nations”), Ibn al-Jawzī mentions having composed a treatise more emphatically against the *Iḥyāʾ*, with the title *Iʿlām al-Iḥyāʾ bi-Aghlāṭ al-Iḥyāʾ* (“Informing the Living about the Mistakes in the Revival”). Yet, there is no manuscript left of the treatise. Some of the criticism in this treatise can be found in his entry on al-Ghazālī in *al-Muntaẓam* however (Ibn al-Jawzī 1992, 17:124–127; Brown 2007, 354). In this encyclopaedic work, Ibn al-Jawzī criticises al-Ghazālī for having neglected the knowledge discipline of *fiqh* completely and only focusing on Sufism in an unbalanced and irresponsible way. Ibn al-Jawzī accuses al-Ghazālī of being much too attracted to the works of the early Sufis, like Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī’s *Qūṭ al-Qulūb* – indeed one of the main sources for the *Iḥyāʾ* – which distracted him from remaining within the boundaries of *fiqh*. He, for example, blames al-Ghazālī for including a story on a man who wanted to rid himself of his good reputation (*jāḥ*) and therefore stole a cloak from the bathing house only to intentionally be discovered as a thief. Following the same logic as in his criticism of forged narrations for the sake of *al-targhib wa-l-tarhib*, Ibn al-Jawzī considers these kinds of stories on virtue ethics to have damaging social consequences. It is therefore immoral (*qabīḥ*) to share them with novices, even if the goal is learning. According to Ibn al-Jawzī too much was at stake if such material would be accepted and spread: the whole concept of a noble lie would undermine the integrity and authority of *ḥadīth* as a source of guidance. The extreme behaviour these false narrations often endorsed would lead to undesirable social consequences. These ideas of Ibn al-Jawzī on *ḥadīth* criticism were an exception in his own age and subsequent centuries, and only became more influential in the late nineteenth century. His contemporaries and later *ḥadīth* theorists generally considered Ibn al-Jawzī too strict, and criticised him for not upholding his own standards (Brown 2011, 20–21; al-Khaṭīb 2011, 103–106).

Ibn al-Jawzī gives similar examples of what he considers crucial mistakes of al-Ghazālī, among which is his use of *ḥadīth* in the *Iḥyāʾ*. He rebukes him for narrating a *ḥadīth* attributed to ‘Ā’isha (d. 58/678) in which she says “You are
the one who pretends to be the messenger of God," which according to him has no basis of reliability and simply cannot be true considering its meaning. Ibn al-Jawzi emphatically considers al-Ghazâlî weak in the knowledge discipline of hadîth, which is the reason why, according to him, the majority of narrations in the Iḥyâ’ belong to the category of forged narrations (aḥâdîth mawdū‘a). He suggests it would be better if al-Ghazâlî had his work checked on this aspect by a specialist, because now his transmission is worthless. He does mention that al-Ghazâlî spent the last moments of his life memorising the Qurʾân and occupying himself with the two Ṣaḥîhs, which may be interpreted as a way to further underline his lack of knowledge of hadîth. Ibn al-Jawzi also mentions his own epitome in this entry on al-Ghazâlî in al-Muntaẓam: “Someone craved for the Iḥyâ’ so I pointed out its flaws to him. Then I (re)wrote it for him and left out what was suitable to be left out, and added what was [suitable to be] added” (Ibn al-Jawzi 1992, 17:124–127).

Brockelmann (d. 1956) specifically mentioned Ibn al-Jawzî’s epitome in the context of his zeal for purifying the Sunna from false transmissions, which he considered an exaggerated and extreme application of the Sunna-fanaticism of the Ḥanbalî school (Brockelmann 1909, 177). The entry on Minhâj al-Qâṣidîn in Ḥâjjî Khalîfa’s (d. 1067/1657) Kashf al-Zânuṅ (“Removal of Uncertainties”) also mentions his obliteration of incorrect Prophetic narrations and Sufi ideas: “It follows the method of the Iḥyâ’, but he has removed tenuous Prophetic narrations and ways of the Sufis that have no foundation” (Ḥâjjî Khalîfa n.d., 2a878). Both Brockelmann and Ḥâjjî Khalîfa do not mention Ibn Qudâma’s epitome. This is probably due to the popularity and fame of Ibn al-Jawzi, especially compared to the relative obscurity of Ibn Qudâma.

The introduction of Ibn al-Jawzî’s epitome confirms this motive of purification (Ibn al-Jawzî 2010, 5–9). Ibn al-Jawzî directs his words, as is a common style form in spiritual treatises, to one of his pupils who intends to seclude himself in silence with the Iḥyâ’. Ibn al-Jawzî first praises the student for choosing the Iḥyâ’, which he calls a unique work in its kind. However, he warns his pupil that the work of his choice contains many things that will lead to actions unacceptable in the religion. His first criticism concerns, as can be expected, al-Ghazâlî’s use of hadîth material. According to Ibn al-Jawzi the work contains many weak and fabricated narrations, upon which one cannot build one’s acts of worship. He blames al-Ghazâlî for narrating “halted” (mawqûf) narrations of the Companions as if they are “elevated” (marfû’) to the Prophet, and for uncritically copying them from his earlier Sufi sources.

2 See al-Ghazâlî’s Ayyuhâ l-Walad (“Dear Pupil”) as a comparison to al-Jawzî’s use of this introductory writing style.
He also names the example of supererogatory prayers that Al-Ghazālī falsely attributes to the Prophet. In Ibn al-Jawzī's view, it would be useless to act upon such baseless narrations, since religious acts should always be based on sound knowledge to be valid.

His second criticism concerns the way the work deals with Sufism. Ibn al-Jawzī considers many things that Al-Ghazālī mentions in this regard to be excessive and unnecessarily harsh. As examples, he mentions discourses about annihilation and subsistence (al-fanā' wa-l-baqā'), commanding deliberate excessive hunger, and religious dwellings (siyāḥa). For this, he refers to his arguably most famous work Ṭālḥīs ‘Iblīs (“The Deception of the Devil”), in which he repeats his criticism of Al-Ghazālī’s laxity in blindly copying unreliable aḥādīth, grave transgressions in creedal matters and fiqh, and repeatedly gives examples of Al-Ghazālī’s mistakes in the realm of Sufism (Ibn al-Jawzī 1983, 160).

When his student exclaims his disappointment that Ibn al-Jawzī has made him detest this book after having loved it so much, he promises his student that he will write a version purified from all mistakes and wrong ideas, only narrating the most sound and well-known narrations and well-established meanings:

You said to me: “You have made me uneasy with this book, after my intimacy [with it].” I said: “I wish for you what I wish for myself, so I will write it in a book that does not abandon its merits, and rids it from its bad elements. I will use the most sound and well-known narrations in it, and the most well-established and excellent meanings. I will leave out what is suitable to leave out, and will add to it what is suitable to add. I will not be unnecessarily lengthy”.

Ibn al-Jawzī 2010, 17

He stresses that he will leave out many narrations, not out of forgetfulness, but because he believes them not to be sound. He promises not to repeat his criticism on the Iḥyā', noted down in his other treatise, in this work to keep the reader focused on its positive message.

Ibn Qudāma’s introduction, of his summary of Ibn al-Jawzī’s work, largely consists of a literal repetition of Ibn al-Jawzī’s words (Ibn Qudāma 1991, 9–12). The only thing he adds is praise for Ibn al-Jawzī’s book, adding that it is still too large and that he wished to shorten it further, by leaving out discussions pertaining to details of jurisprudence. He considers these well known in the works of fiqh and does not deem it necessary to repeat them. Both works stick to the same organisation of the Iḥyā’, a total of forty books (chapters) divided
equally over four quarters. Ibn Qudāma’s work merges several books for practical reasons of length. He omits the Qawāʿid al-ʿAqāʾid (“The Foundations of Religious Convictions”) completely, a book that Ibn al-Jawzī also drastically shortens because of his aversion of the knowledge discipline of kalām. The content of the Kitāb al-Samāʿ wa-l-Wajd (“Book on Audition and Ecstasy”), in which al-Ghazālī praises both religious sessions of audition (samāʿ) and the ecstasy they provoke, is also drastically replaced with a complete rejection of the matter. Ibn Qudāma even files it under the Kitāb al-Amr bi-l-Maʿrūf wa-l-Nahy `an al-Munkar (“Book of Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong”) (Black MacDonald 1902; Ibn Qudāma 1991, 143–144; Ibn al-Jawzī 2010, 1:499–502; al-Ghazālī 2011, 4:409–533).

A Sample: Narrative Virtue Ethics on Earning and Livelihood
(al-Kasb wa-l-Maʿāsh)

Let us first have a closer look at al-Kasb wa-l-Maʿāsh (“Earning and Livelihood”), to see how this scrutiny of hadīth material affects the treatment of this chapter on the virtue ethics of acquiring one’s livelihood. This is a good example of narrative virtue ethics in a Sufi context. The issue of whether a wayfarer should earn one’s own livelihood through one’s own acquisition of God’s decree (kasb), or should completely rely on God’s decree without acquiring it oneself, is an old theme in Sufism, closely related to the themes of reliance on God (tawakkul), renunciation (zuhd), and poverty (faqr), as pious ideals (Reinert 1968, 141–156; Gramlich 1995a, 1:158–160; Ritter 2013, 217–226; Melchert 2020, 147–151). Al-Ghazālī was clearly relating to this discussion in this book of the Iḥyāʿ, taking the position that although God is the absolute and only provider of sustenance, one should still work for it oneself and actively acquire one’s livelihood.

This third book of the Rubʿ al-ʿĀdāt (“Quarter of Habits”) is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is most relevant for the topic of hadīth on virtue ethics. It deals with the merits of working for one’s earnings and starts – as is typical for most books of the Iḥyāʿ – with a summary of relevant Qurʾānic verses on the topic, followed by sayings attributed to the Prophet, and, after that, sayings of Companions, Successors, and wise men from earlier generations (āthār) related to the topic. A comparison with the chapter with the same name from Abū Ṭālīb al-Makkī’s Qūṭ al-Qulūb shows that most of this material is directly copied from the Qūṭ (Gramlich 1995b, 3:610–612; al-Ghazālī 2011, 3:239–246). This rules out any deliberate organisation of hadīth material by al-Ghazālī to make some kind of sophisticated ethical point through his composition, to be
discovered by us as readers, and shows that Ibn al-Jawzī and Riḍā were right in their observation that he uncritically copied passages from earlier works.

In this first subchapter, al-Ghazālī mentions fourteen narrations attributed to the Prophet, only one of which can be related back to the six canonical collections, al-Tirmidhī’s (d. 279/892). As is also typical for the Ḥiyāʾ, and as was already the criticism from his early adversaries in the Islamic West, al-Ghazālī himself does not include any chains of transmission or sources for these narrations, he only attributes them directly to the Prophet. Thematically, these narrations all support the idea that earning one’s own livelihood and trade are acts of high religious merit and virtue, and much better than just profiting from others or waiting for one’s livelihood to fall from the sky, such as “There is a category of sins that are only expiated by concern with seeking livelihood;” “The trustworthy trader is resurrected on the day of resurrection with the upright and the martyrs;” “The most permissible food that a man can eat is from what he has earned, and from every blessed sale” (al-Ghazālī 2011, 3:239–242).

The main difference between the Ḥiyāʾ and the epitome of Ibn al-Jawzī in this chapter is in the choice of narrations: Ibn al-Jawzī selects only five narrations, of which only one, a narration that can be traced back to Ahmad b. Ḥanbal’s (d. 241/855) Musnad, corresponds with the selection of al-Ghazālī. The other fourteen do not survive his critical redaction of weak material, an exceptionally high number. The second difference lies in that Ibn al-Jawzī does mention the source of each hadith that he includes. For two narrations, he even lists the full chains of transmission from himself back to the Prophet, transmitting through his direct teachers ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (fl. 6th/12th century) and ʿAbd al-Awwal b. ʿĪsā (d. 553/1159). Ibn al-Jawzī does, thus, not only refer these transmissions back to the compilations in which they can be found, but really shows in his work that he is part of the living tradition of narrating these Prophetic narrations with a full chain of transmission, attaining the highest level of scrutiny of the chains of transmission as possible. From the other three narrations two go back to the collections of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, already firmly canonised as the most reliable compilations, by the time of Ibn al-Jawzī (Brown 2007, 169).

Despite the completely different set of narrations that Ibn al-Jawzī offers, thematically there is no large difference in the hadith material selected. For Ibn al-Jawzī, the main goal in his selection is to show the merit of earning one’s livelihood by the work of one’s own hands or by trade, and a rejection of passivity in awaiting God’s provision. He, for example, mentions a narration that compares earning one’s livelihood to jiḥād, another that mentions the food that one brought forth by one’s own hands as the best type of food, and a narration that describes the professions of Prophets as farmers, carpenters, tailors
Narrations on Virtuous Acts

and shepherds (Ibn al-Jawzī 2010, 1:362–363). While Ibn Qudāma has no major deviations from Ibn al-Jawzī, he only reduced the number of cited narrations to four (Ibn Qudāma 1991, 82–84).

When we look at the āthār, we see a similar dynamic of reducing the number of narrations and sometimes replacing them with other more reliable narrations. Here also, al-Ghazālī mentions fifteen sayings attributed to a mixture of former Prophets, Companions of Muhammad, and illustrious Sufi figures, such as Luqmān the Wise, ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 24/644), Zayd b. Thābit (d. 45/665), ‘Abd Allāh b. Maṣʿūd (d. 32/650), Ibrāhīm b. Adham (d. 161/777–778), the Prophet Job, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and Abū Sulaymān al-Dārānī (d. 215/830) (al-Ghazālī 2011, 3:243–246). The thematic content of these āthār is similar to the Prophetic narrations: working is lauded as jihād and an elevated form of worship, and as a way to become independent from other people. All sayings somehow suggest that begging and preferring worship over working is ethically frowned upon. Of these fifteen āthār, Ibn al-Jawzī preserves only six in his redaction: those by Luqmān, ‘Umar, Job, Ibrāhīm b. Adham, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and Abū Sulaymān al-Dārānī; Ibn Qudāma only leaves Luqmān, Aḥmad and Abū Sulaymān (Ibn Qudāma 1991, 82–83; Ibn al-Jawzī 2010, 1:363). Here, it is harder to say which criteria Ibn al-Jawzī used to narrow these options down, whether it was a critique on their reliability, or a critique on their contents, or perhaps both.

Saliant is that Ibn al-Jawzī censures or changes the sayings attributed to Companions (‘Umar, Ibn Maṣʿūd, Zayd) while he leaves the sayings of Sufi figures like Ibn Adham and al-Dārānī intact. A reason for this might be that he demands a higher level of authenticity for the former, since the Companions have a higher status as a source of religious guidance. From attributions to ‘Umar for example, al-Ghazālī included two sayings directly from Qūt al-Qulūb: “Let none of you sit down from seeking livelihood and say, ‘O God, provide me with livelihood.’ You know that the heaven does not let gold and silver rain down;” and “No place is more beloved to me to have death come to me than a place in which I am trading for my family, buying and selling.” Ibn al-Jawzī replaces these with only one saying attributed to ‘Umar. He thus leaves the authority cited intact as a sign of respect to the original composition, and replaces it with a saying with a similar meaning: “To die between two work-related travels in which I seek livelihood is more beloved to me than to die warring on the path of God” (Ibn al-Jawzī 2010, 1:363). We can state that, in this particular case, Ibn al-Jawzī’s critical redaction did not lead to a shift in the intended parenetic meaning of al-Ghazālī’s selection of sayings on virtue ethics. Rather he shows that, both in the case of hadīth and āthār, more reliable alternatives can be used without losing the scope of the book out of sight.
A Related Sample: Divine Unity and Reliance
(al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Tawakkul)

As stated earlier, the themes of poverty and renunciation (al-faqr wa-l-zuhd), as well as trust in divine providence (tawakkul), are closely related to the theme of earning one's livelihood, and may be considered typical Sufi themes (Reinert 1968), as well as its preceding movement of renunciants (zuḥhād) (Melchert 2020). In the following section, I will therefore analyse the theme of tawakkul as well, to see whether the same approach to narrative virtue ethics can be found here.

To understand al-Ghazālī's coupling of tawḥīd with tawakkul, one should turn to the first book, Kitāb al-ʿIlm, where al-Ghazālī redefines the knowledge discipline of tawḥīd as

that one sees everything coming from God, with a vision that stops one from turning to causes and means, and only sees good and evil as coming from Him. This is an honourable station, the fruit of which is trust in divine providence.

al-Ghazālī 2011, 1:125

Al-Ghazālī complains how it has now become an expression for the art of theological dispute, which was reprehensible among the salaf. He wishes to replace it with a practical theology of virtue, in which an experiential understanding of the unity of God leads to complete reliance upon him: God is the only agent in the universe, and thus the only one upon which one should rely. This is a way for al-Ghazālī to reclaim the definition of tawḥīd as part of the inward knowledge discipline of the heart, related to Sufism, rather than as a knowledge discipline of dialectical disputation and speculative theology as practiced by the mutakallimūn. This definition remains in the epitomes of Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Qudāma, likely because it fit their disapproval of kalām very well, as well as their sober understanding of Sufism (Ibn Qudāma 1991, 19; Ibn al-Jawzī 2010, 1:41). To convey this inward vision on tawḥīd as tawakkul in the book of the Iḥyāʾ dedicated to that specific subject, al-Ghazālī takes his resort to hadith literature and pious examples of earlier Sufi figures quite prominently in this book. I shall now analyse what of that material remains in the epitomes of Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Qudāma.

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3 This speculative theology is also followed in a mild form in Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿAqāʾid (“The Foundations of Religious Convictions”) in the Iḥyāʾ, but profoundly changed in the epitome of Ibn al-Jawzī, and completely censored in the recension of Ibn Qudāma.
As we are used to in the *Iḥyāʾ*, al-Ghazālī also starts this book with a series of quotes from the Qurʾān on the topic, and then moves on to Prophetic narrations and sayings from pious early figures (*āthār*). He quotes a total of six Prophetic narrations, two sayings attributed to earlier Prophets (Ibrāhīm and Dāwūd), and eight sayings from early pious figures. The material he quotes can be categorised in the following themes: (1) those who trust in God alone are guaranteed Paradise without reckoning; (2) those with full trust in God's providence are fully provided for by Him; (3) recourse to anything other than God, like sorcery and superstitions, is detrimental to one's trust in God. None of these themes seem to be something that Ibn al-Jawzī would take offence at from his particular view on matters of creed and Sufism. The *āthār* largely revolve around the same themes, but here a fourth theme is added that is absent from the *ḥadīth* material: sustenance comes to the believer without actively striving for it: this is the greatest proof that God is the Sustainer.

In the recension of Ibn al-Jawzī, the same three basic themes indeed recur in the *ḥadīth* material, and he also quotes six Prophetic narrations in total. However, as we earlier saw in the *al-Kasb wa-l-Maʿāsh*, Ibn al-Jawzī, in some cases, replaces the *aḥādīth* with thematically similar material that he deems more trustworthy. Al-Ghazālī for example cites a *ḥadīth* attributed to ʿAbd Allāh b. Masʿūd, about gathering on the day of ʿArafāt during the Ḥajj season, in which the Prophet states that among those present of his community there will be 70,000 people who will enter Paradise without reckoning, because they fully trust on God and do not engage in sorcery or trickery. This narration in these exact wordings can only be found in the *Musnad* of Abū Dāwūd al-Ṭayālīsī (d. 204/819) (al-Ghazālī 2011, 8:196–197).4 Ibn al-Jawzī replaces this with a *ḥadīth* supported by a full chain of transmission instead, from himself to Ibn ʿAbbās (d. c.68/687), through Aḥmad b. Hanbal, that deals with the same event and the same saying of the Prophet, but with different details in the narrative (Ibn al-Jawzī 2010, 3:1228–1229). Contrary to the narration that al-Ghazālī relates, the narrative attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās can be found in the the two *Ṣaḥīḥs*.5 It likely had higher status in the eyes of Ibn al-Jawzī, especially because he himself had his own unique chain of transmission of the narration through Aḥmad as well, underlining his identity as a Ḥanbalī. Ibn al-Jawzī

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keeps the famous *hadīth* that compares the believer with full trust in God with birds in his recension, but also with his own chain of transmission included to underline its reliability (Ibn al-Jawzī 2010, 3:1229). The other four *ahādīth* that al-Ghazālī quotes, Ibn al-Jawzī leaves out, replacing them with four supplications attributed to the Prophet, that he derived from Abū Bakr b. Abī l-Dunyā’s (d. 281/894) *Kitāb al-Tawakkul* (“Book on Providence”), who had an equal reputation of very cautious scrutiny of *ḥadīth* material, citing them without full chains of transmission (Ibn al-Jawzī 2010, 3:1229–1230; Ibn Abī l-Dunyā 1987).

As in the Book analysed above, here Ibn al-Jawzī radically chooses to replace all sayings that he does not consider reliable enough with narrations that conform to his high standards. He is very consistent in this. He does decide to leave the topics addressed intact however: his objection and censorship, in this particular case, is not related to the content of the narrations, as was the case in *Kitāb al-Samāʿ*, but only with their reliability.

Let us now see what happens to the category of āthār in his epitome, as well as the sayings of early Sufi figures. From the āthār that al-Ghazālī quotes, half of them from unnamed authorities, Ibn al-Jawzī edits none. He replaces them completely with other sayings, all with the authorities named, of which only one authority is overlapping and includes a different saying. Reliability of the chain of transmission was not the issue here however, nor was the supposed creedal integrity of the figures quoted. Here is clearly a case of criticism of the content. The main theme of the sayings quoted by al-Ghazālī can be interpreted as a type of quietism in understanding reliance on God: it comes to the true believer without actively seeking it oneself, indeed a fatalist conception of *tawakkul*. There is a strange conflict here with what al-Ghazālī propagated earlier in *Kitāb al-Kash*, as well as what he propagates in the remainder of *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Tawakkul* (“Divine Unity and Reliance”): he himself is obviously not in favour of such a fatalist conception, and rather agitates against that himself. Al-Ghazālī himself did not seem troubled by this inconsistency however, which further confirms the idea that he was uncritical in copying such sayings from earlier sources. Al-Ghazālī’s selection of sayings seems more motivated by what was accidentally available to him at that moment than by a well-crafted and meticulous selection that fitted what he himself propagated. This was an unacceptable idea for Ibn al-Jawzī. As we have already learned from his introduction discussed above, passively waiting for one’s sustenance was something he considered to belong to the category of unacceptable and excessive forms of Sufism. He thus replaces the narrative virtue ethics that al-Ghazālī offers with a narrative virtue ethics that stresses a sober lifestyle (*zuhd*), remembrance of death (*dhikr al-mawt*), and the fundamental link of *tawakkul* to one’s belief.
In the second part of *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Tawakkul*, al-Ghazālī relates several stories on *tawakkul* from earlier pious Sufi figures (al-Ghazālī 2011, 8:262–265). According to David Burrell, the goal of al-Ghazālī with his presentation of these narratives is “to offer one object lesson after another of a way to take esoteric Sufi lore and allow it to inspire one’s practice” (Burrell 2001, xxvi). This is completely omitted by Ibn al-Jawzī, who clearly did not agree with the approach of these early Sufis. Here the conflict is clearer and harsher, which leads to a more drastic censure than in the case of earlier discussed *ḥadīth* material.

6  The Reception of the *Iḥyāʾ* in Modernity and the Problematisation of *Ḥadīth* on Virtue Ethics

Given the perpetual popularity of and praise for the *Iḥyāʾ* in later centuries, the criticism of Ibn al-Jawzī did not directly lead to a paradigm shift in the tradition after him (al-Shāmī 1993a, 157–161; Cook 2001, 450–456). The very scarce remaining manuscript evidence (only three) of Ibn al-Jawzī’s work, which both the editor and the publisher give as a reason for its late edition, also suggests that it was not a highly popular book in the premodern age, certainly not as popular as the *Iḥyāʾ* itself (Ibn al-Jawzī 2010, i:5, 14–15). The same can be said of Ibn Qudāma’s epitome, the first printed edition of which was also based only on three manuscripts (Ibn Qudāma 1928). Both thus remained relatively marginal within the boundaries of their own school, with the *Iḥyāʾ* itself triumphant. Apparently, their fundamental criticism was not shared widely enough to also be adopted outside their own local branch of the Ḥanbali school.

This only changed in the course of the twentieth century, with the rise of printing. This made many forgotten manuscripts see the light of day as printed texts, often with an agenda of “purification” of the Islamic tradition according to Taymiyyan standards. Both early reformist and later puritan Salafis were keen to make use of printing to advance their causes (Khan 2016, 54–55; El Shamsy 2020, 182–191; Bosanquet 2021). Islamic reform movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century cared deeply about promoting virtues (*faqā’il*), morality (*akhlāq*), and refinement (*tahdhīb*), as part of their “civilisation” (*tamaddun*) programs (Kateman 2019, 96–115). To promote religious virtues and morality in society, the *Iḥyāʾ* remained the most suitable text in their view, but it needed some revisions to fit their broader agenda of textual criticism and critique of Sufi excesses considered to be irrational and too miraculous. Their renewed criticism of weak and forged *ḥadīth* and perceived
irrationalities of Sufism thus had repercussions for the reception of al-Ghazālī’s *Iḥyā‘*. The Salafi-reformist scholar Rashid Riḍā, for example, famously discussed the status of problematic *ḥadīth* material in the *Iḥyā‘* as a response to a reader’s question in the widespread and influential journal *al-Manār* (“The Lighthouse”), an article which is claimed to have been the major impetus for Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī’s (d. 1420/1999) career in *ḥadīth* studies (Riḍā 1909; Brown 2011, 34–35). Riḍā admits al-Ghazālī had weaknesses in his knowledge of the classification of *ḥadīth*, but acquits him from intentionally including weak and forged transmissions in his work. Most of them, claims Riḍā, come from Qūṭ al-qlūb, which al-Ghazālī, according to Riḍā, copied in blind trust of the original author. As we have seen, this indeed was an important source text for the *Iḥyā‘*.

Both Qūṭ al-qlūb and the *Iḥyā‘* were epitomised by the Syrian Salafi-reformist and *ḥadīth*-specialist Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī (d. 1332/1914), who maintained good contacts with Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1323/1905) and his student Riḍā. Al-Qāsimī even summarised the *Iḥyā‘* on personal advice from ʿAbduh, “on condition they be edited to omit weak oral reports and spurious stories” (Commins 1990, 62; al-Qāsimī 2009, 33). Also, his published collection of Friday sermons is largely based on the structure and content of the *Iḥyā‘*, which further confirms the desire of these reformists to bring the virtues propagated in the work to the masses (al-Qāsimī 1907).6 Al-Qāsimī gave an impetus to the revival of the knowledge disciplines of *muṣṭalḥ al-ḥadīth* (*ḥadīth* classification) and *al-jarḥ wa-l-taʿdīl* (impugning and approving) in his circles, mainly through his *Qawāʿid al-Taḥdīth* (“The Foundations of Narrating Prophetic Traditions”), which contains large portions of the works of Ibn al-Jawzī (al-Qāsimī 1925; al-Sarmīnī 2010). In his introduction to his epitome of Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī’s work, *al-Waʿẓ al-Maṭlūb min Qūṭ al-qlūb* (“The Required Exhortation from The Nourishment of the Hearts”), al-Qāsimī mentions purification from problematic Prophetic reports as a main motive:

This book of his has nevertheless never been criticised in this time, on the objectionable reports and narrations among the people of knowledge that it contains. Removing these from it is one of the greatest priorities and the best things to do, because it increases its benefit and use.

AL-QĀSIMĪ 2010, 28

In the introduction to his *Iḥyā‘*-epitome *Mawʿīzat al-Muʿminīn min Iḥyā‘* ‘Ulūm al-Dīn (“Exhortation of the Believers from the *Iḥyā‘*”) he explains that he

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6 I owe this insight to my conversations with Melle Lyklema (Utrecht University), who is preparing a dissertation on the subject of literature on preaching in the Islamic world.
wished to make a version of the *Iḥyāʾ* which would be more accessible to the lay people, who had difficulty understanding the literal readings of the work in public teaching sessions by scholars. He does not make specific reference to the problem of unreliable *ḥadīth*, but does mention how ‘Abduh suggested that it would be the best work for the purpose of instructing Islamic virtues to lay people “after purifying it” (*baʿda tajridihī*) (al-Qāsimī 2009, 41). A glance at the content of the book, however, immediately reveals that he omitted a lot of *ḥadīth* material and mainly focused on summarising its other contents in his own wordings. In his summary of the earlier discussed *al-Kasb wa-l-Maʿāš* for example, he only preserves four narrations from the fifteen in the original redaction of al-Ghazālī, one of which can be traced back to the two *Ṣaḥīḥs*, two to Aḥmad’s *Musnad*, and one to al-Ṭabarānī. Only the last of these is ranked as weak (*daʿīf*) by the editor, the son of the Damascene Salafī scholar Muḥammad Bahjat al-Bīṭār (1893–1976), a close friend of al-Qāsimī and Riḍā (al-Qāsimī 2009, 176–177; Weismann and Adawi 2021). Al-Qāsimī formally held a more lenient position than Ibn al-Jawzī on using weak *ḥadīth*, agreeing with the mainstream position that it is allowed outside the realm of legal opinions, but in his redaction, he remained strict (al-Qāsimī 1925, 94–95; Brown 2011, 31–32).

This renewed interest in the *Iḥyāʾ*, making it suitable for a larger audience than only the learned class, as part of the reformist mission of stimulating moral refinement (*tahdhib al-akhlāq*) among all layers of society, also led to a renewed interest in and printed publication of its medieval Ḥanbalī epitomes. In the preceding discussion, most attention has gone to Ibn al-Jawzī’s epitome, with Ibn Qudāma’s epitome proving to be nothing more than a further curtailment for practical reasons without a deeper ideological agenda. Why then still include Ibn Qudāma in this discussion? This has to do with the modern reception of these works, in which Ibn Qudāma’s work was dominant. Ibn Qudāma’s epitome has seen several editions in the twentieth century, most of them from Syria, where it has been part of Islamic secondary and higher education since the 1930s. The relatively small size of the work, its emphasis on pedagogy (*tarbiya*) and good manners (*adab*), as well as its broad acceptability for different strands of Islamic thought, from traditionalist to modernist, from Sufi to Salafī, made it very suitable for that.

Given their renewed stress on reliable *ḥadīth* material and the irrational excesses of Sufism, it is no coincidence that named epitomes by Ibn al-Jawzī and most notably Ibn Qudāma became specifically popular with the advent of the Salafī movement in the twentieth century. Although the text became popular in a much wider circle and was certainly not limited to this group, their engagement with editions of this work seem relatively larger than other groups. The modern appropriation of the *Mukhtaṣar* starts in 1346/1927–1928, when the Islamic scholar and historian Muḥammad Aḥmad Dahmān (d. 1988),
belonging to the emerging Salafi trend in Damascus, sees the manuscript and edits it for publication for the first time (Ibn Qudāma 1928). According to his own testimony, his purpose was to use it as education material in the religious institutions of higher education (al-kulliyāt al-sharʿiyyya) of Syria, which according to him indeed adopted the work in all major cities (Ibn Qudāma 1978, 5–6).

The most current popular edition seems to be the edition of Shuʿayb al-Arnāʿūṭ (d. 1438/2016) and ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Arnāʿūṭ (d. 1415/2004), which has the endorsement of Dahmān and is based on his earlier edition (Ibn Qudāma, 1991). Both Shuʿayb and ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Arnāʿūṭ are not coincidentally modern major figures in the knowledge discipline of ḥadīth from Damascus, with the latter subscribing to more or less the same Salafi method as al-Albānī, and with a large following (Pierret 2013, 106, 108, 111). Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, an important puritan Salafi publishing house, also has issued its own edition edited by its founder, the Damascene Salafi scholar Zuhayr al-Shāwī (d. 1434/2013). In the introduction, when the editor discusses other existing epitomes, he mentions al-Qāsimī as “the shaykh of our shaykhs.” He explains that in his methodology of classifying its aḥādīth he consulted the works and followed the methodology of “my teacher” Nāṣir al-Din al-Albānī, with whom he indeed stood in close contact (Pierret 2013, 20). Ibn al-Jawzī’s epitome was only critically edited and published for the first time in history in 2010. This critical edition was made by Kāmil Muḥammad al-Kharāṭ, with a preface by Naʿīm al-İraqsūssi (b. 1951), currently one of the most important ḥadīth scholars from Damascus (Ibn al-Jawzī 2010; Blecher 2018, 11–13).

These modern editions show the ongoing engagement of ḥadīth scholars with criticism on this particular aspect of the Iḥyā and the relatively royal embrace of Salafi scholars and publishing houses of this specific text. The involvement of scholars like Shuʿayb al-Arnāʿūṭ and Naʿīm al-İraqsūssi not belonging to the Salafi trend, however, shows that it was also part of a broader trend of renewed interest in ḥadīth criticism in twentieth-century Damascus (İdū 2017; Snober 2020). As we will see, this broader revival of interest in ḥadīth criticism also had its influence on other epitomes in the twentieth century from Syria.

This tradition of epitomes apparently left most of its traces in Syria. This is likely because of the influence of al-Qāsimī on the emerging Syrian (and global) Salafi trend and the edition of Ibn Qudāma’s epitome on the religious educational curriculum. Not only the Salafi scholars of Syria engaged themselves with epitomes of the Iḥyā, the practice also gained ground in Syrian Sufi-oriented circles, with the same criticism of al-Ghazālī’s use of ḥadīth. The scholar and activist Saʿīd Ḥawwā (d. 1989) from Hama, a former leading figure in Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood and committed Naqshbandī, also compiled an
epitome of the Iḥyā’ in the 1970s. In his vision, Islamic political movements, also in their more militant forms, could not be successful without proper spiritual training for their activists (Weismann 1993; 1997). Therefore, books like the Iḥyā’ were direly needed in a more simplified form according to Ḥawwā, since many challenges from al-Ghazālī’s times were similar to theirs (Ḥawwā 2004, 5–10). In his introduction, Ḥawwā also explicitly mentions the question of hadīth, like most authors addressing the issue of weak and forged narrations in the Iḥyā’. He says he has removed weak narrations from his epitome, as well as the thoughts constructed on these narrations, but stresses that they are not equal to forged narrations, since there is still a chance that the weak narrations are really the words of the Prophet. Wherever he has left the problematic narrations from al-Ghazālī intact, he explains, he has added the commentary of al-Ḥāfiz Zayn al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-ʿIrāqī (d. 806/1403) to them, as well as the classification of the strength of the narrations and their sources, but only when they are sound in their meaning. Narrations from Prophets other than Muḥammad he has also excluded, since their reliability cannot be confirmed (Ḥawwā 2004, 5–6). Ḥawwā thus adopted an academic rigour in hadīth criticism typical of the twentieth century in his approach to the hadīth material in the Iḥyā’, stricter than the standards that one would thus far expect in the scholarly circles that he emerged from.

Ṣāliḥ al-Shāmī (b. 1934), the author of a book on al-Ghazālī that reads as an apology for his legacy, produced an epitome as well, in which he is relatively mild towards the problematic narrations al-Ghazālī included (al-Shāmī 1993a; 1993b). In his apology, al-Shāmī recognises that al-Ghazālī did indeed use a lot of problematic narrations, as is the consensus among his critics, and states that “every reader of the Iḥyā’ wished he had not done so” (al-Shāmī 1993a, 166). In his defence he adds that the knowledge discipline of hadīth was not part of al-Ghazālī’s formal training, while he was highly cultured in almost every other discipline of knowledge. He also defends al-Ghazālī’s use of hadīth on the ground, that this was very common in his age for this type of topic. He quotes Abū l-Fidāʾ Ismā’il b. ‘Umar Ibn Kathīr’s (d. 774/1373) defence of al-Ghazālī in this matter, and criticises Ibn al-Jawzī for himself not living up to the high standards on which he judges al-Ghazālī in his own parenetic works, like Dhamm al-Hawā (“Disparagement of Passion”). Even Minhāj al-Qāṣidīn and Ibn Qudāma’s Mukhtaṣar contain weak narrations after all, he states, and also scholars like Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1350), known for his rigour in the knowledge discipline of hadīth, still includes weak material (al-Shāmī 1993a, 166–168). He thus concludes that “therefore the reasonable among the scholars held that the weak narrations in the Iḥyā’ have influence on its value, but do not completely make it lose its status; especially after God made the classification of its narrations easy upon al-Ḥāfiz al-‘Irāqī” (al-Shāmī 1993a, 168). In the
introduction to his epitome, he accentuates that he did not make yet another summary of the *Iḥyāʾ*, but rather a refinement (*tahdīb*), which in its essence still includes everything the *Iḥyāʾ* contains. He does not delve deeply into its critics on the topic of *ḥadīth*, mentioning Murtaḍā al-Zabīdi’s (d. 1205/1791) and Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī’s (d. 771/1370) defenses of the work in this matter as sufficient (al-Shāmī 1993b, 10–11, 15; Reichmuth 2009, 269–334). He does consider offering a version of the texts without weak and forged narrations as a goal, as suggested by al-Qaraḍāwī (d. 2022) in his work on al-Ghazālī, which he explicitly names as an inspiration to compose this refinement (al-Shāmī 1993b, 27).

His summary of the *al-Kasb wa-l-Maʿāsh* shows that he perhaps was the strictest of all in this matter, leaving only three narrations intact, mentioning their classification as either sound (*ṣaḥīḥ*) or good (*ḥasan*). Thus, we also see here that the importance of *ḥadīth* criticism in the twentieth century has become so strong that it is adopted by scholars from trends that historically would not see a problem in citing weak material related to *faḍāʾil al-aʿmāl*. This was increasingly considered important to keep the credibility of the *Iḥyāʾ* intact, not only among scholars, as was already the case in premodern times, but even more when aiming at a lay audience who did not have the scholarly tools to classify the quality of narrations.

The method of Hawwā and al-Shāmī is fundamentally different from Ibn al-Jawzī however: where Ibn al-Jawzī chose to radically replace the material cited by al-Ghazālī for material that he favoured, often with his own isnāds attached, these two modern authors, rather, adopted the milder criticism of al-Ḥāfiẓ al-ʿIrāqī, and kept al-Ghazālī’s own selection as the basis in their works. It is not so much the rigorous method of Ibn al-Jawzī that they adopted, but rather the mindset of *ḥadīth* criticism that had become popular for a much wider audience than only scholars, in the twentieth century, and the new audience created by the rise of the printing press that they likely kept in mind. These epitomes were no longer intended for colleague scholars or religious students only, who would be well aware of the pitfalls of the *Iḥyāʾ*, but would also be read by lay people without any religious training, who would not be able to distinguish reliable from unreliable material themselves. This may have made a rigorous selection of material more necessary in their eyes.

7 Conclusion

This chapter has only scratched a very small surface of the reception of the *Iḥyāʾ* through the ages, only focusing on the aspect of *ḥadīth* on virtue ethics in epitomes from Ḥanbalī and Salafī circles. First, I have shed light on the
aspect of narrative virtue ethics in the Ḥanbalī epitomes of the *Iḥyāʾ* from Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Qudāmah, to see what the consequences of their refusal of using unreliable *ḥadīth* on virtuous acts (*faḍā’il al-aʿmāl*) has been for the way they dealt with the abundant *aḥādīth* and *āthār* used by al-Ghazālī in his magnum opus. It appears that in the case of virtue ethics on earning and livelihood (*al-kasb wa-l-maʿāsh*) thematically Ibn al-Jawzī remained true to the selection of al-Ghazālī, but he replaced all narrations that he considered unreliable with *ḥadīth* material that he considered reliable, often with complete chains of narration (*ismād*) through his own teachers. In the case of reliance on God (*tawakkul*) he changed the themes of the narrations as well, however, because he did not agree with al-Ghazālī’s excessive Sufi opinions on *tawakkul*, for which al-Ghazālī used unreliable *ḥadīth* material as support. Ibn al-Jawzī thus intended to offer his readers and students a summarised version of the *Iḥyāʾ* as an alternative to the original work, which had become too popular among a large audience to debunk or neglect completely. By conforming the work to his high standards of *ḥadīth* criticism he hoped that it would no longer undermine the elevated position of *ḥadīth* in Islamic culture, as was his fear that would happen by the widespread practice of accepting lesser standards in the case of virtuous acts.

Second, I have reconstructed how and why these Ḥanbalī works with their exceptionally strict approach to *ḥadīth* on virtue ethics rose to prominence in the twentieth century after being relatively marginal in the preceding centuries. The rigour of Ibn al-Jawzī on this particular aspect of the *Iḥyāʾ* was an exception in his own age and was only further popularised in the twentieth century, mainly through the impact of Ibn Qudāmah’s summary in reformist circles after its rediscovery and first print in 1928 by the Damascene Salafī scholar Muḥammad Ahmad Dahmān. *Ḥadīth* criticism on the aspect of virtue ethics of the *Iḥyāʾ* had always been present historically but was not the main point of criticism on the work: it was commonly accepted to use unreliable *ḥadīth* on virtuous acts (*faḍā’il al-aʿmāl*). When reformist movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century revived the ideas of Ibn al-Jawzī on *ḥadīth* criticism and consequently no longer accepted unreliable *ḥadīth* on virtuous acts, this gradually changed. This point of criticism on the *Iḥyāʾ* became so paradigmatic in modernity, that even authorities such as al-Šāmī and Ḥawwā, who defended al-Ghazālī on this point in their introductions and were more inclined towards Sufism than Salafism, became extra rigorous on this particular aspect of *ḥadīth* than one would expect from them based on their scholarly persuasions.

Given the small sample presented here of the large reservoir of both premodern and modern epitomes of and commentaries on the *Iḥyāʾ*, we should not
be too hasty in attaching grand conclusions to this revival of ḥadīth criticism on the ʿIḥyāʾ. It would go too far for example to state that the rise of Salafism was so paradigmatic in the twentieth century that it completely changed the approach to ḥadīth on virtue ethics in non-Salafi circles. For that criticism on aspects of al-Ghazālī’s use of ḥadīth has been too persistent in earlier times as well. It may be plausible, however, that non-Salafi authors became extra wary of this criticism to keep their works acceptable for a larger audience than only their own circle, and thus further implicated the scholarly criticism of the likes of al-Ḥāfiz al-ʿIrāqī, now that their works were intended for a larger popular audience than only specialist scholars.

These premodern Ḥanbali epitomes still need further academic study to properly appreciate the reception of al-Ghazālī’s creedal and Sufi ideas in the circles of the Ḥanbalīs of Baghdad and Damascus, and in modern and contemporary Salafism, where these premodern Ḥanbalī scholars found a unique reception history, their works entering completely different dynamics than originally intended. This will not only potentially shed new light on the relation between historical Ḥanbalism, Sufism, and speculative theology, it may also lead to new insight on the historical continuity between premodern Ḥanbalism and modern/contemporary Salafism, a relation that is not yet properly and systematically investigated.

Classics of Islamic literature like al-Ghazālī’s ʿIḥyāʾ deserve a proper reception history to come to a deeper understanding of how this author and work have become such icons of Islamic thought. Epitomes keep appearing all over the Islamic world to this day, in very diverse settings (Garden 2016). I hope to have shown that the tradition of summaries on iconic works may prove rewarding to understand the reception history of these works. The study of commentary traditions has by now become a well-established trend in Islamic intellectual history. Perhaps it is time to place epitome traditions firmly on the map as well.

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Bibliography


1 Introduction

The Ḥanbalī Sufi scholar ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī (d. 561/1166) argues in his works, Futūḥ al-Ghayb ("Revelations of the Unseen") and al-Fāṭḥ al-Rabbānī ("The Sublime Revelation"), that a Sufi may enjoy certain worldly pleasures after struggling through various stages of asceticism (zuḥd). This chapter discusses the scriptural foundation of this idea and how al-Jilānī avoided the contradiction between the enjoyment of worldly pleasures and Sufi ethics, which is based on “self-purification.” We will analyse ḥadīth al-taḥbīb that translates as “I was made to love (ḥubbiba ilayya) from your world women and perfume, and I found the coolness of my eyes (qurratu ʿaynī) in performing the prayer,” and compare al-Jilānī’s interpretation with that of other scholars in pre and post Jilānī era.

Some ascetics and Sufis believed that marriage and family life are hindrances to achieving excellence in the path of Allāh, as evident from different quotations recorded in Sufi and zuhd literature. However, the majority refuted this idea pointing to the life of the Prophet and his encouragement for marital life. At the same time, the former opinion highlights the Prophet’s foresight of later generations becoming worse over time, and in such a time, it will be better for a person to live isolated from people.1 Likewise, some scholars found two key terms in the ḥadīth, “ḥubbiba” and “dunyā” problematic, hence necessitating explanation. How could the Prophet say that he loves things from this world (dunyā), whilst he has described it as a damned place elsewhere. Abstaining from the dunyā has often been regarded as the fundamental principle of asceticism and Sufism. These contradictions have triggered various interpretations and have sometimes placed the Sufis in a defensive mode.

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1 The ḥadīth has been recorded in various corpuses including the Şahīḥ of al-Bukhārī (see al-Bukhārī 1987, 1:155: Kitāb al-Īmān ("Book of Faith"), Bāb min al-Dīn al-Fīrār min al-Fītan ("Chapter on Avoiding/Escaping Temptation belongs to Religion")). Scholars have used this ḥadīth to justify celibacy (see Ibn al-ʿArabī 2003, 3:44).
Furthermore, some have criticised Sufis for enjoying worldly pleasures, and even al-Jilānī himself had faced such criticism. By intertwining ḥadīth with Sufi perspectives, al-Jilānī responded to this criticism and apparent contradictions. At the same time, he tried to establish that the Sufi concepts of fanāʿ and baqāʿ, which refer to the developed form of asceticism, are not contradictory to the Qurʾān and Sunna as some may have claimed. Indeed, the ḥadīth mentioned above is a piece of excellent scriptural evidence to substantiate his stance.

2 Takhrīj and the Form of the Ḥadīth

The ḥadīth was recorded on the authority of Anas b. Mālik (d. 93/712) from the beginning of the third/ninth century in different sources, including those which were arranged according to themes and narrators such as Sunans and Musnads. Yet, among the six canonical ones, only al-Nasāʾī (d. 303/915) recorded it in his compendium.3 Al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī (d. 405/1014) recorded it in his Mustadrak and evaluated it as authentic by the standard of Muslim, though the latter did not record it in his work. Nevertheless, the great ḥadīth scholar and verifier, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1448), treated it as a considerable one (ḥasan) (Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī 1995, 3:249).

In the primary thematic sources of ḥadīth, the ḥadīth of taḥḥīb has been cited to highlight various issues including the status of ṣalāt (prayer) in Islam as found in Muḥammad b. Naṣr al-Marwāzī’s (d. 294/906) Taʿẓīm Qadr al-Ṣalāt (“The Aggrandisement of the Status of Prayer”) (al-Marwāzī 1986, 1:331). Al-Marwāzī stated that ṣalāt is the most significant act of worship in the eyes of Allāh; thus, He made it dearer to His dearest servant. It is also recorded as an encouragement towards marriage in the book of Nikāḥ (“Marriage”), in Abū ʿAwāna’s (d. 316/928) Mustakhrāj (“The Extracted”) and al-Bayḥaqī’s (d. 458/1066) al-Sunan al-Kubrā (“The Great Sunnas”).4 Unlike the latter, the former gave quite a long title for his chapter to project the ḥadīth as an instruction by the Prophet to all Muslims to marry more than one wife whenever possible, to bring forth

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2 See the questions he encountered pertaining to his marriage below.
more good people into their community. For al-Nasāʿī, the hadīth instructs men to observe fair treatment of women. Therefore, he included it in the chapter of Kitāb ‘Ishrat al-Nisāʾ (“Kind Treatment of Women”) under the subheading of Bāb Ḥubb al-Nisāʾ (“Loving Women/Wives”).

On the other hand, the part of the hadīth regarding fragrance has been the concern of other hadīth compilers such as ‘Abd al-Razzāq (d. 211/827) and Abū l-Shaykh (d. 369/979) (al-ʿAṣbahānī 1998, 2:58). The former presented it in a chapter titled Bāb Ḥubb al-Nisāʾ wa-Laysa fi Raqabatihā Qilāda wa-Taṭayyub al-Rijāl (“A Woman Prays without a Necklace on Her Neck and Perfume of Men”) in his Muṣannaf (“The Topically Arranged”), whereas the latter employed it in a chapter titled Bāb Dhikr Maḥabbatihi lil-Ṭībi wa-Taṭayyubihi bihi (“The Mention of the Prophet’s Love for Perfumes”). Quite intriguingly, Ibn Abī ʿĀṣim (d.287/900) in his collection on asceticism alluded to the fact that wives and perfumes could not be considered as something against asceticism. His chapter is titled Bāb Ḥubbiba ilayya min Dunyākum al-Nisāʾ wa-l-Ṭīb (“Wives and Perfumes are Made Dearer to Me [the Prophet]”) (Ibn Abī ʿĀṣim 1988, 1:119).


Though the scholars have no serious disagreement on the authenticity of the hadīth, they have different opinions regarding its textual form. The most significant amongst such debates is the one concerning the number “three” (thalāth) found in some versions of the hadīth, i.e., “three things from your dunyā are made dear to me.” While scholars like Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015), al-Kalbāḏdi (d. 380/990) and al-Ghazāli (d. 505/1111) have tried to justify it, others like Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) have argued that it is not part of the original hadīth; instead, it was later added into the text.5 According to Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī and others, the addition “three” was not found in any primary sources of the hadīth. It was only found in some non-hadīth experts’ works such as ʿIlām al-Dīn (“The Revival of Religious Sciences”) of al-Ghazāli and al-Kashf (“The Revealer”) of al-Zamakhsharī (al-Sakhwī 1985, 1:292).

Finally, another genre that could be said to have also pursued the debate on the literal form of the hadīth is the genre of al-ḥadīth al-mushtahira (viral hadīth). Some of the works of this genre include al-Maqāṣid al-Ḥasana (“The Good Purposes”) of al-Sakhwī (al-Sakhwī 1985, 1:292) and Kashf al-Khafāʾ (“Uncovering the Hidden”) of al-ʿAjlūnī (d. 162/1749) (al-ʿAjlūnī 2000,

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5 See their interpretations below. For Ibn Fūrak's and Ibn al-Qayyim's justifications, see Ibn Fūrak 2015; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 1997, 238.
The authors validated the ḥadīth by referring to various narrations and additions found in different reports. However, both affirmed that the addition of the words “three things” was not found in any narrations recorded in the primary sources. For them, this addition affects the meaning of the ḥadīth because prayer should not be qualified as one of the worldly matters. Nevertheless, al-ʿAjlūnī, a later contributor to this genre, did not object to the views of those who report and interpret the “three things.” He attempted to justify that the third of the three things could have been omitted from the narration. It could be retrieved from a version reported by Ahmad b. Ḥanbal on the authority of ʿĀʾisha (d. 58/678), which reads, “He likes three things from this world: women, perfumes, and food. He gained two but not the third. He got women and perfumes but not the food” (al-ʿAjlūnī 2000, 1:391–393).

3 Ḥadīth of Tāḥbīb: Interpretations in Ḥadīth Commentaries

In the pre-Jilānī era, Sufis and people of zuhd were the individuals most interested in this ḥadīth. After al-Jilānī, the ḥadīth of tāḥbīb can be said to have gained wider attention. The main reason could be the increasing scholarly engagements with the Sunan of al-Nasāʾī. Another secondary source of the ḥadīth, which has also attracted numerous great exegetes to advance worthwhile discussions about its meaning, is al-Shifā (“The Healing”) of al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ (d. 544/1149). The ḥadīth was considered as a part of the shamaʿil (qualities and attributes) of the Prophet, particularly concerning his marital life. Continuous discussion on the ḥadīth within this genre could be appreciated from al-Mawāhib al-Ladunniyya (“The Divine Providences”) of al-Qaṣṭallānī (d. 686/1287). On the other hand, scholars of jurisprudence deduced rulings on fragrance from the ḥadīth. Due to the multidimensional nature of its interpretation, debates surrounding the ḥadīth will be tackled in several sections as follows.

4 Zuhd and Marriage: Conflict or Harmony?

The most critical point with regards to this debate is that, as far as the available sources are concerned, no scholar has connected this ḥadīth with the concepts of fanāʾ and baqāʾ prior to al-Jilānī. A contemporary scholar of al-Jilānī, al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, did discuss this ḥadīth, however with an attempt to suit the ḥadīth to the notion of zuhd (al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ 1987, 1:39–46). He averred that married life does not contradict with the practice of zuhd by citing the examples of married
Prophets. Although there were unmarried Prophets, according to him, the ones who got married and fulfilled their family duties are deemed higher in status. Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ perceived the hadīth as a general promotion for marriage whereas al-Jīlānī undoubtedly proclaimed that nikāḥ is prohibited for a murīḍ, and in terms of murād, he has no choice but to follow what has been determined by God.

Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ’s appropriation of this hadīth to zuhd was a response to those who thought that marriage is a hindrance on the path towards Allāh. In Qūṭ al-Qulūb (“The Nourishment of the Hearts”) of Abū Ẓālib al-Makkī (d. 386/996) and Iḥyāʿ Ulūm al-Dīn of al-Ghazālī, imām Aḥmad was quoted as saying that he had debated a group of scholars regarding Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s (d. 110/728) claim that “if Allāh wishes khayr (goodness) for a person He will not occupy him with family and wealth” (al-Makkī 2005, 2, 413). The well-known Sufi contemporary to Aḥmad, Bishr al-Ḥāfī (d. 227/841) was not married, and when he was asked about it, he replied that he preferred to be engaged with obligatory deeds to the supererogatory ones (al-Ghazālī n.d., 2:23). The great Sufi literature, such as the two mentioned above, discusses both views that encourage or discourage marriage in detail and provide many traditions in support of both arguments.

As mentioned earlier, Ibn Abī Ṭāṣim argues that wives and perfumes could not be considered as something against asceticism. Yet, other works on asceticism included a section on Bāb man Karīha al-Māla wa-l-Walad (“Disinterest in Offspring and Wealth”) in which some ascetics were reported to ask Allāh to be free from offspring and wealth. Astonishingly, when those ascetics wish to pray against anyone, they will pray that Allāh increase the person’s wealth and children, so that he will be burdened with them (Ibn al-Jarrāḥ 1984, 415–417).

On another note, the Mālikī scholar Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 543/1148) attempted reconciliation by exploiting the change of condition across generations. Marriage was not a hindrance in the path of Allāh for the early generation. However, in later times, some scholars and ascetics found that the world had become more challenging, and people became compelled to commit prohibited acts to earn their livelihood and provide for their families. Therefore, the scholars and ascetics rejected family life and preferred seclusion (ʿuzla). Ibn al-ʿArabī viewed this stance as a strong position since the Messenger of Allāh had said: “The best possession of a Muslim will be a herd of sheep with which he retires to the top of a mountain or places where rain is expected to fall (pastures), in order to safeguard his faith from tribulation.”6 However, he made it clear that there is no monasticism in Islam as found in Christianity, and one is

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not supposed to immerse in worship and avoid all worldly matters, including the family. The scholars who seem to favour a life similar to monasticism were actually referring to extraordinary circumstances due to the widespread of crisis (Ibn al-ʿArabī 2003, 3:144).

The tenth/seventeenth century scholar al-Ghazzī (d. 1061/1651) also quoted this hadith to change the perception of people who manipulated the sayings of early scholars to discourage marriage, and to depict it as an act contradictory to asceticism. He treated all these statements as conditional; when a marriage diverts a person’s attention from obeying Allāh and from abiding by His rules, then it is a hindrance in the path of worshipping Allāh. Any comforts with wives and fragrance in this world could not be treated generally as blameworthy. However, he did not provide explanation on how they deviate man from the straight path and how a person can overcome them (al-Ghazzī 2011, 1:184).

A pro-Salafī contemporary interpreter, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Nāṣir al-Barrāk (b. 1933–1934) used this hadith to criticise Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī’s (d. 795/1392) position on Kalimat al-Ikhlāṣ (“The Word of Devotion”). Ibn Rajab stated that “the ārifun have no engagements other than what they have with their Lord and no concerns about something other than Him...” According al-Barrāk, it is nothing but an utterance of some extreme ascetics who transcended the limits with a wrong ijtiḥād due to their ignorance. Al-Barrāk criticised this position on the ground that it contradicts the hadith of tahbīb. He finds no issue in engaging with family, children, and other lawful comforts. However, unlike his predecessors, he resorts to criticising Ibn Rajab instead of offering a reconciling interpretation (al-Barrāk 2014, 110).

5 Material World: Love or Curse?

In his commentary, al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ had given attention to the apparent contradiction between this hadith and the Islamic concept of cursing the material world (dunyā), since this hadith treats three things among worldly matters and depicts the dunyā as the loved one. Therefore, he noted that the Prophet did not see women and perfume as his worldly matters, but he used the words “your worldly matters.” This was concluded from the addition found in some versions, i.e., the phrase ḥubbiba ilayya min dunyākum, which means some of your worldly matters that have been made dear to me.7 According to al-Qāḍī

7 The hadith has been recorded without the possessive pronoun “kum” (see al-Maqdisī 2000, 5:122; Abū Yaʿlā l-Mawsīlī 1984, 6:237; Ahmad b. Ḥanbal 2001, 21:433). So, the meaning would be “I was made to love from the world ...”
'Iyāḍ, the Prophet perceived these matters as his ākhira (the Hereafter) affairs since a Muslim can convert any worldly matter to that of the Hereafter by having the right niyya (insight). Nevertheless, a question remains due to this interpretation – it leaves no specific reason to the mention of only these two things since all worldly matters share the same potential of convertibility.

Other interpretations offered to solve this contradiction are those by al-Kalābdhī and al-Ghazālī. Al-Kalābdhī opines that the article “min” in the ḥadīth could be given the meaning of “fī” which then indicates that women, fragrance, and prayer are the three things made dear to the Prophet during his life in this world (ḥubbiba ilayya wa-anā fī l-dunyā), but they are not part of this world. Unlike later ḥadīth scholars, he treated the word three as a part of the ḥadīth and tried to answer two questions simultaneously: firstly, how can the Prophet love something that is a part of this world? and secondly, how can prayers be attributed as a part of this material world? Hence, these non-worldly affairs are made dear in this world while he was here. He further elaborated that this ḥadīth indicates a very high stage of ʿubūdiyya (worship) achieved by the Prophet. Prayer is the most elegant form of glorification (taʿẓīm) of Allāh, and this ḥadīth implies that the Prophet had attained it. The other two matters, women and fragrance, represent excellent interaction with the creations of Allāh, which should be done by fulfilling their due rights as well as being kind and generous towards them. He further added that fragrance is amongst the rights of the angels, and the Prophet was applying it to fulfil their rights. Indeed, the Prophet himself is the most beautiful fragrance in this world and he does not need any fragrance (al-Kalābdhī 1999, 25). In short, al-Kalābdhī attempted to establish that the love mentioned in this ḥadīth was not a mere love of comforts in the material world, rather it was part of achieving the finest form of ʿubūdiyya and excellent dealing with others.

Al-Ghazālī also viewed this ḥadīth as apparently contradicting with the basic principles of asceticism and Sufism, discussing it in the book of Dhamm al-Dunyā (“Condemnation of the Worldly”). He argued that the things found in the dunyā are of mainly three categories, the first of which are the things that will go to the next world, such as one's knowledge and actions. By knowledge he means the recognition of God, His attributes, His actions and His sovereignty over heaven and earth, and by actions, the actions done for the sake of God. To him, though it is part of the dunyā, it is not blameworthy but praiseworthy. To substantiate his position, he cited the ḥadīth of taḥbib. Even though prayer is classified with the dunyā, it is an action done in the dunyā for the ākhira. Consequently, actions related to marriage and using fragrance, although mentioned as part of the dunyā, do not fall into the category of a blameworthy dunyā (al-Ghazālī n.d., 23).
In dealing with the ḥadīth of taḥbīb, most of the scholars of jurisprudence focused on the subject of fragrance. The Mālikī Ibn al-ʿArabī referenced this ḥadīth in his interpretation of al-Muwatṭaʿ (“The Well-Trodden Path”), titled Kitāb al-Qabas (“The Book of Allusion”), to explain away other ḥadīth that claimed the Prophet applied perfumes during ḥajj whilst it is considered a prohibition to do so during such ritual. Ibn al-ʿArabī grouped different opinions of scholars into four, the first of which is that applying perfumes while performing ḥajj and ʿumra is an exclusive right (khuṣūṣiyya) of the Prophet. It is allowed exclusively to him because it was specifically made dear to him by Allāh. Ibn al-ʿArabī further observed that the Prophet was given some privileges regarding whatever was made dear to him. In terms of prayer, it was obligatory for him to pray at night whilst it was only supererogatory for others. Likewise, he was allowed to marry more than four wives, as well as conduct his marriages without the presence of guardians and witnesses. Therefore, according to Ibn al-ʿArabī, it is not strange to have a special privilege for the Prophet in applying perfume during pilgrimage (Ibn al-ʿArabī 1992, 1:553). Ibn al-ʿArabī also discussed this ḥadīth in his commentary on Jāmīʿ al-Tirmidhī (“The Compilation of al-Tirmidhī”) explaining that the Prophet never rejected perfume when it was offered to him because he needed it and at the same time, it was made dear to him, combining need and love here. It is possible in his case to reject things other than perfume if there is any reason to do so (Ibn al-ʿArabī n.d., 10:236). Obviously, the Prophet does not need fragrance since he himself is fragrant, therefore, by “need,” Ibn al-ʿArabī might have intended his need to fulfill the rights of angels as mentioned above.

Taḥbīb as a Sublime Quality of the Prophet

As seen above, some jurists and Sufis have considered this ḥadīth as addressing a specific privilege of the Prophet. While al-Kalābādhī treated it as an indication of the most excellent form of human beings reserved for the Prophet, Ibn al-ʿArabī treated it as a reason for a concession to marrying more than four wives and applying perfumes during pilgrimage. Likewise, this ḥadīth has been much discussed as part of the Prophet’s shamāʾil (sublime qualities of the Prophet). Al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), in his commentary on Sunan al-Nasāʾī (“The Traditions of al-Nasāʾī”), investigates the wisdom behind the taḥbīb from two different angles. On the one hand, it is a balāʿ (hardship from God) because world matters have been made dear to a person whereas he needs to dedicate
his love solely to God. Therefore, life has become the most challenging task for him. On the other hand, when the enemy of the Prophet accused him as being a sāḥir (sorcerer), or a poet who was oblivious to ordinary life, he became concerned with worldly matters to refute their claims. In that sense, it is not a hardship, but rather a mercy from God (al-Suyūṭī 1986, 61–63).

Al-Sindī (d. 170/787) added that the divine wisdom behind the Prophet's love towards women was educational. His wives could convey many lessons from his private affairs to the coming generations. As for the perfume, it was the dearest thing to the angels and as a prophet who dealt with angels, he was using it to please them. Al-Sindī infers that his ḥubb was not a mere love of worldly matters, but by doing so, he was fulfilling some noble objectives. However, the coolness of the eyes is located in the Prophet's conversation with God during his prayers. It conveys the idea that if a worldly pleasure hinders the love towards God, it is not a praiseworthy thing. It is only laudable when it enhances the love towards God (al-Sindī 1986, 61–62).

On another part, most of the interpreters of Mishkāt al-Maṣābihī (“The Niche of Lamps”) such ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Dihlawī (d. 1052/1642) and ʿAlī l-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) also elaborated on the meaning of the ḥadīth. They have given some attention to the word “ḥubbiba” as it denotes that the love did not originate from the Prophet’s nature or self, but that Allāh compelled him to be so as a mercy for mankind (al-Dihlawī 2014, 8:480; ʿAlī l-Qārī 2002, 8:3294). Though both of them were seen as coming from Sufi backgrounds, they did not relate taḥbīb with the Sufi concepts of baqāʾ and fanāʾ as found with al-Jilānī.

In Nuzhat al-Majālis wa-Muntakhab al-Nafāʾīs (“Unwinding Councils and Precious Selections”), al-Ṣaffūrī (d. 894/1489) narrated a background story, without any isnād, to offer context for the ḥadīth. It says that when the Prophet mentioned this ḥadīth, Abū Bakr (d. 13/634), ʿUmar (d. 23/644), ʿUthmān (d. 35/656) and ʿAlī (d. 40/661) responded one after another by citing the things that were made dear to them. Abū Bakr said that he was made to love three things from this world – to sit in front of the Prophet, to recite ṣalawāt (prayers) upon him and to spend his wealth for him. Thereupon ʿUmar said: “I was made to love three things from this world – to sit in front of the Prophet, to recite ṣalawāt (prayers) upon him and to spend his wealth for him. Thereupon ʿUmar said: “I was made to love three things from this world; commanding good, forbidding evil, and establishing the hudūd (the prescribed punishments).” Then ʿUthmān responded that he was made to love feeding the hungry, spreading salām (peac...
things that He likes most: a tongue that always recites *dhikr*, a thankful heart and a body that is patient during hardship (al-Ṣaffūrī 1867, 1:52–53). Al-Ṣaffūrī commented that when this *ḥadīth* reached the four eponymous founders of the legal *madhāhib* (legal schools), Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) was reported to say: “I was made to love acquiring knowledge throughout the nights, avoiding self-praise and arrogance, and having a heart that avoids the love of *dunyā*.” Mālik (d. 179/796) also related the three things that were made dear to him: being a neighbour to the Prophet’s grave, attachment with his soil, and paying respect to his relatives (*ahl al-bayt*). Al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) said that he was made to love dealing with people with compassion, avoiding things that lead to pretentiousness, and following the way of *taṣawwuf*. Aḥmad responded that he was made to love following the Prophet in his sayings, seeking God’s blessings with his lights, and embarking on the path of his examples (al-Ṣaffūrī 1867, 1:52–53). Indeed, al-Ṣaffūrī’s extended story includes many of the major early Islamic figures, truly providing a lesson of “three” important loveable actions for later generations.

This long narration was repeated with some variations in al-Qaṣṭallānī’s *al-Mawāhib al-Laduniyya* and al-ʿAjlūnī’s *Kashf al-Khafāʾ*. Though the authenticity is questionable, this provides another unique understanding of the *ḥadīth*. It indicates that the things made dearer to people could be of anything apart from women and perfume. In a sense, it is congruent with al-ʿAjlūnī’s concept of *taḥbīb* where certain worldly pleasures are made dearer to specific individuals (al-ʿAjlūnī 2000, 1:391–393; al-Qaṣṭallānī n.d., 2:221).

8 Theosophical Perspective

It is not surprising to find that the one who treated this *ḥadīth* from a theosophical perspective was the renowned Sufi luminary Muḥyī l-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī. He interpreted this *ḥadīth* in *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* (“Bezels of Wisdom”) appropriating it to a theosophical system called by others as “the unity of being” (*waḥdat al-wujūd*). Starting with Adam, each of the 27 chapters of *Fuṣūṣ* is dedicated to a Prophet mentioned in the Qurʾān. The chapters are based on a specific Qurʾānic verse or Prophetic *ḥadīth* that describes the characteristics of the respective Prophet. The final chapter is dedicated to the last Prophet Muḥammad, and its entire discussion is based on the *ḥadīth* of *taḥbīb*.

According to Ibn al-ʿArabī, all things are reflections of a unique and unified Absolute Reality, God. Some things are a greater manifestation compared to others, such as the Prophets amongst other creatures and Prophet Muḥammad amongst other Prophets – he is the highest manifestation. He also believed
that a woman is the one who completes a man’s recognition of the divine, and a man’s witnessing of God in a woman is the most excellent witnessing. After quoting the first part of the *ḥadīth*, “three things from your *dunyā* are made dear to me,” Ibn al-ʿArabī said that among the three, Allāh started with women even before prayer due to this state (Bālī Zādah 2002, 312–313). Unlike other interpreters, he gave much attention to the order stated in the *ḥadīth*. To him, knowing a woman is part of knowing one’s self since she is an excellent manifestation of the oneness of being. Only those who achieve that knowledge can reach the core of prayer, which is a part of knowing God. Whoever knows himself knows his Lord. According to him:

> When man witnesses Allāh in women, his witnessing is in the passive; when he witnesses Him in himself, regarding the appearance of woman from Him, he witnesses Him in the active. When he witnesses Him from himself without the presence of any from him, his witnessing is in the passive directly from Allāh without any intermediary. So, his witnessing of Allāh in the woman is the most complete and perfect because he witnesses Allāh inasmuch as He is both active and passive. For this reason, the Prophet, may Allāh bless him and grant him peace, loved women.
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> *Ibn ʿArabī* 2014, 128

According to his interpretation, the love of women is not a matter of worldly pleasure; instead, it is a medium for acquiring the ultimate knowledge about God, which is called *maʿrifa* (gnosis). He further argued that every subject yearns for its origin. Man yearns for his Lord because He created man in His image by blowing His *rūḥ* (spirit). God loves him, who is in His image. Likewise, He makes loveable to man the woman whom He extracted for him from him and who appeared in His image. When a man loves a woman, he desires their union, and the best way to achieve it is through marriage. Ibn al-ʿArabī states:

> When a man loves a woman, he seeks union with her, that is to say the most complete union possible in love, and there is in the elemental sphere no greater union than that between the sexes. It is [precisely] because such desire pervades all his parts that man is commanded to perform

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8 This is based on the Qurʾānic verse 329, which reads: “Then He proportioned him and breathed into him from His [created] spirit and made for you hearing and vision and hearts; little are you grateful,” and the *ḥadīth* “The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him said, ‘Allāh created Adam in His image ...’” (al-Bukhārī 1987, 5:2299: Kitāb al-Istīḥān (“Book of Asking Permission”), Bāb Badʾ al-Salām (“Chapter on Commencing with the Peace Greeting”)).
the major ablution. Thus, the purification is total, just as his annihilation in her was total at the moment of consummation. God is jealous of his servant that he should find pleasure in any but Him, so He purifies him by the ablution, so that he might once again behold Him in the one in whom he was annihilated, since it is none other than He Whom he sees in her.

Ibn ‘Arabī 2014, 128

In terms of the fragrance (ṭīb), the Prophet mentioned it after women because women are the best perfume. They have fragrance in their form (takwīn) itself, and the best perfume is the embracement of the well-beloved (Ibn ‘Arabī 2014, 128).

Ultimately, within the domain of ḥadīth literature, the association of tahbīb with the concepts of fanāʾ and baqāʾ was only found in the writings of ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf al-Munāwī (d. 1031/1622), an Ottoman scholar from Cairo. He was known for his works on the early history of Islam and the history of Sufism in Egypt, and he was also a disciple of al-Sha’rānī (d. 973/1565). In his seminal work, Fayḍ al-Qadīr (“Revelation of the Omnipotent”), al-Munāwī mentions that some scholars have related tahbīb with fanāʾ and baqāʾ and, to them, the ḥadīth refers to a state after fanāʾ. When an aspirant annihilates in God without having any personal intention and desire, God places some worldly matters in his mind. Yet, al-Munāwī did not mention al-Jīlānī by name. Nevertheless, it is after al-Munāwī that this concept found extensive elaboration in ḥadīth interpretive discourse (al-Munāwī 1937, 3:371).

9 Ḥadīth al-Tahbīb in al-Jīlānī’s Works

The ḥadīth of tahbīb was mentioned two times in al-Fath al-Rabbānī and once in Futūḥ al-Ghayb.9 In al-Fath, the ḥadīth has been quoted as: “I was made to love from your world women and perfume, and the delight of my eyes has always been in the prayer.” In some latest editions of al-Fath, there is an addition of the words “three things,” i.e., “I was made to love three things from your world;” however, they were absent in the earliest one. The addition was also found in the early editions of Futūḥ al-Ghayb. This addition has caught the

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9 This hadith has been mentioned in al-Fath in the seventh discourse on patience, and in the 25th discourse on ascetic detachment in the world (al-zuhd fī l-dunyā) (al-Jīlānī 1988, 44, 114). It has also been mentioned in Futūḥ in the sixth discourse on al-fanāʾ `an al-khalq (al-Jīlānī 1973, 14).
attention of many hadith scholars since it raises some questions as explained above.

The apparent meaning that an ordinary reader gets from the hadith is that the Prophet likes perfumes and women, yet he still found real happiness whilst performing prayers. Qurrat al-ʿayn (literally, the coolness of the eyes) is an Arabic metaphor for enjoyment as the tears become cold when a person becomes extremely happy (Ibn Manẓūr 1993, 12:582).

In the seventh discourse on “patience” in Al-Fath al-Rabbānī, a lecture that al-Jīlānī delivered in his ribāṭ (Sufi lodge) on 17 Shawwāl 545 (13 February 1151), he elaborated on the hadith of taḥbīb uttering the following:

Hate all things and love the creator of all things. Then if He makes you love one of the things you have hated, you may do so in safety, because He is the one giving rise to the love, not you. This is why the Prophet, Allāh bless him and give him peace, said: “I have been made to love three things: perfume, women, and the coolness of my eyes (chief comfort) is in the prayer.” He was made to love them after disliking, forsaking, renouncing, and shunning them. You must now rid your heart of everything aside from Him until He makes you love whatever part thereof, He will.


Again, in his speech on “renouncing worldly affairs” on 19 Dhū l-Hijja 545 (15 April 1151), he quoted the same hadith saying:

When a person is sincere (ṣādiq) in his asceticism, his allotted shares (of worldly things) come to him. He receives them and uses them to clothe himself outwardly, while his heart is filled with abstemiousness toward them and other such things. This is why our Prophet Muḥammad, Allāh bless him and give him peace, was more ascetic than Jesus, blessings and peace be upon him, and the other Prophets, blessings and peace be upon them, although he did say: “I have been made to love three things belonging to this world of yours: perfume, women and my chief comfort is given in prayer.”

He loved all these, despite his abstemiousness towards them and other things, because they were part of his allotted share, of which his Lord, almighty and Glorious is He, had foreknowledge. So, he accepted them in fulfilment of the (Lord’s) commandment. Carrying out that commandment is obedience, so whoever receives his allotted shares in this manner is in a state of obedience, even if he is fully involved in this world.

In the two quotes above, al-Jilānī did not connect the hadīth to the concepts of fanāʿ and baqāʿ, two well-known concepts in Sufism. However, in Futūḥ al-Ghayb, the hadīth was discussed in the sixth discourse on al-fanāʿ ʿan al-khalq (vanishing from the creature). Apart from this, two other stages of fanāʿ were explained here: vanishing from desires, and vanishing from one’s own will, together with the signs of each stage. For the first, a person should completely avoid all social contact with people to free his mind from desiring what they possess (al-Jilānī 1973, 14). For the second, it is a sign to discard all efforts for, and contact, with worldly means in acquiring any benefits and avoiding any harms. Al-Jilānī explained it as:

to not move oneself in one’s own interest and to not rely on oneself in matters concerning oneself and to not protect oneself nor help oneself, instead, leave the entire things to God; because He had the charge of it in the beginning, so will have it till the end, just as the charge rested on Him, when you were hidden in the womb (of your mother) as also when you were being suckled as a baby in the cradle.

AL-JILĀNĪ 1973, 14

The sign of vanishing from one’s will is to maintain the passivity of the organs of his body and the calmness of his heart at the time of the manifestation of the will and act of God, without entertaining any resolve or having any desire. This passivity is not unique to taḥbīb, rather it is discussed with the highest level of almost all other Sufi concepts, for example, riḍā (satisfaction) (Khalil 2014, 378). At this moment, one will not have any feeling of internal need nor any purpose, God will be his only objective (al-Jilānī n.d., trans. Ahmad, 31–32).

Passing these three stages, an aspirant will reach into a phase called baqāʿ (subsistence). Al-Jilānī explains the ultimate stage, baqāʿ, an aspirant reaches by passing through the above-mentioned three different levels:

After this experience, you will never remain broken down. Neither any sensual desire nor any will remain in you like a broken vessel that retains neither any water nor any dreg. And you will be devoid of all human actions so that your inner self will accept nothing but the will of God. At this stage, miracles and supernatural things will be ascribed to you. These things will be seen as if proceeding from you when in fact they will be acts of God and His will.

Thus, you will be admitted to the company of those whose hearts have been smashed and their animal passions have vanished. Hence, they have been inspired by the Divine will and new desires of daily existence.
It is about this stage that the Holy Prophet PBUH, says: “Three things have been made dearer to me ...”

Al-Jīlānī n.d., trans Ahmad, 31–32

In his work, al-Ghunya li-Tālibī Tarīq al-Haqq (“Richness for the Seeker of the Truth”), al-Jīlānī does not reference the ḥadīth neither to encourage marital life nor to promote the use of perfumes as many early and later scholars had done. Unlike his two works mentioned above, al-Ghunya focuses on human faith and actions in day-to-day affairs, including the etiquette of marriage. While readers would expect to find the ḥadīth in the work, with the scholar exploiting its popular sense of promoting marital life and perfuming, this was not the case. Al-Jīlānī’s neglect of the ḥadīth in al-Ghunya while having given detailed discussion in the other two works supports the perception that he did not give any attention to its apparent and popular meaning.

10 Al-Jīlānī’s Interpretation of the Ḥadīth and Taḥbib

In his interpretation of the ḥadīth, al-Jīlānī focuses on the word “ḥubbiba” which means made to love. Given this passive form, a reader would become curious about the actor who influences the Prophet. Who made those things dearer to him? There are four possible answers; he is either controlled by his own passion, by his hawā (desire), by Satan, or by God. For Muslims, the first three are impossible in the case of the Prophet, for a prophet could not be a person who is driven by his desire, passion, or Satan. The basics of Islamic teachings emphasise disobeying satanic inspirations; therefore, it could not be expected from a prophet. The only remaining possibility is God, the Almighty. If that is the case, further clarification is much needed.

Although some scholars have tried to elaborate on the word ḥubbiba, they confine this ḥadīth to the life of the Prophet, as can be learned from the aforementioned discussions of the pre- and post-Jīlānī interpretations. However, al-Jīlānī generalised taḥbib by describing it as a stage in a Sufi’s life, which contributes a significant addition in the ḥadīth interpretive discourse and Sufi tradition. He says: “... Thus you will be admitted to the company of those whose hearts have been smashed and their animal passions have vanished.” Hence, they have been inspired by the Divine will and new desires of daily existence. It is about this stage that the Holy Prophet, peace and blessings of Allāh be upon him, says “Three things have been made dearer to me ...” (al-Jīlānī n.d., trans. Ahmad, 31–32). That means a Sufi may be made to enjoy certain worldly pleasures after struggling through various stages of asceticism (zuhd) to eventually
end up in the ultimate goal, *fanāʾ*. At this stage, God will make him long for some worldly comforts according to His will – and this can be concluded as an act of *taḥbīb*.

Al-Jīlānī applies this concept even to marriage, which is generally perceived as an act of Sunna by the majority of scholars. It indicates that if an act is not an obligatory one, it would be subjected to this theory as well. That is very clear from the application of this concept in his own life. Nevertheless, in his commentary on al-Jīlānī’s *Futūḥ al-Ghayb*, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) attempted to reconcile this theory, and the concept of *fanāʾ* in general, with the principles of Shariʿa by reducing them to worldly affairs usually treated as merely permissible (*mubāḥ*) and not as praiseworthy in Islam. For Ibn Taymiyya, something which is praiseworthy should not be forbidden, even according to the path of Sufism. However, this could be regarded as a bend of al-Jīlānī’s thought, as it does not bode well with what al-Jīlānī himself had proposed and explained, or how he applied it in his own life (Ibn Taymiyya n.d., 31).

The Exemplification of the Concept in al-Jīlānī’s Personal Life

Al-Jīlānī seems to have believed that he had reached the prime stage of Sufism, *fanāʾ*, wherein a Sufi will experience *taḥbīb* in his life. A perfect example for this is his own marriage life. Although Islam encourages marriage, as in various Qur’ānic verses and Prophetic  hadīths, a Sufi’s understanding of marriage is quite different from that of the layman. When al-Jīlānī was asked about marriage, he answered – after giving a brief remark on its jurisprudential aspect – that, from a Sufi perspective, marriage is prohibited for a *murīd*, a person who strives in the path of God and has not achieved his goal. In terms of a *murād*, a person who has reached the prime stage of Sufism, Allāh will engage him either with marriage or with something else, and he need not bother about it (al-Jīlānī 1988, 345).

The above two Sufi terminologies (*fanāʾ* and *taḥbīb*), indicate two different stages in Sufism. However, once a Sufi reaches the paramount, he has no choice to wish something for himself. Instead, Allāh will wish for him something and make him love it, and he will wholeheartedly accept it. After getting married in his forties, al-Jīlānī was addressed with several questions concerning his marriage. He then answered: “I waited for consent from the Prophet until he suggested [to] me to do so [the Prophet appeared to him in a dream]. Then I married four wives. Therefore, they never became a hindrance in my spiritual path” (al-Suhrawardī 1971, 1:343). The marriage, thus, was instructed. One could
also notice from al-Jílání’s response that he considered the Prophet’s instruction through dreams as one of the signs of taḥbīb.

Another exemplification of taḥbīb theory in his life were his own lectures in which he says:

Allāh’s destiny made me sit here although I did not wish to do it. O pupils, I have spoken out, but you are running away and not practising! My name in other countries is akhras (dumb, mute). I used to pretend to be crazy, dumb, or unable to speak Arabic, but it was not correct for me. Destiny brought me out here to you. I was in the underground storage bins when it pulled me out and made me sit on the lecture seat.


Similar expressions about him being exposed can be found in many places in his two major works, al-Fatḥ and Futūḥ. This association with people has been justified as wujūd (existence) after fanā’ (annihilation). It is also represented by other terminologies such as bast (expansion) after qabḍ (contraction), and jam’ (gathering) after tafrīqa (separation), and ṣahw (sobriety) after sukr (intoxication) (al-Jílání 1988, 213, 173, 364).

How does Allāh make a person who reached that stage love worldly affairs and how do we know whether God or others caused that inclination? These are questions that arise from the points mentioned above. As previously mentioned, sometimes the Prophet comes in a dream and gives direction to symbolise taḥbīb. A similar experience was reported to occur to the early Sufi, Abū l-Qāsim al-Junayd (d. 297/910) (al-Jílání 1988, 356). Interestingly, Al-Jílání himself was confronted with these questions as related in the sixty-first discourse in al-Fatḥ al-Rabbānī. Al-Jílání’s reply was:

How to explain to you what notions are? Your notions come from the devil (shayṭān), natural impulses (ṭab’), the passion (hawā) and this world. Your interest (ḥamm) and concern are whatever is more important to you (ahammaka). Your notions correspond in kind to your interest while it is active. A notion (khāṭir) inspired by the Lord of Truth (Almighty and Glorious is He) comes only to the heart, free from anything apart from Him. He said: Allāh forbid that we should seize anyone except him with whom we found our property (Q 12:79). If Allāh and His remembrance (dhikr) are present with you, your heart will certainly be filled with His nearness, and the notions suggested by the devil, the passions and this world will all avoid your company. There is a kind of notion belonging
to this world and a notion belonging to the Hereafter. There is a notion belonging to the angels, and a notion belonging to the lower self (nafs), and a notion belonging to the heart. There is also a notion belonging to the Lord of Truth (Almighty and glorious is He). If you reject the notion of the lower self, the notion of the passions, the devil's notion and the notion of the world, the notion of the Hereafter will come to you. Then you will receive the angel's notion, then finally the notion of the Lord of Truth (Almighty and Glorious is He). This is the ultimate stage.

AL-JİLĀNI 1992, trans. HOLLAND, 417

He further says:

When your heart is sound, it will pause to ask each notion as it arises: What kind of notion are you? From what source do you come? So, they will tell him in return: “I am the notion of such and such. I am a true notion from the Truth (khāṭir ḥaqq min al-ḥaqq). I am a loving counsellor; the Lord of Truth (Almighty and Glorious is He) loves you so love you too. I am ambassador (safir). I am the portion of the spiritual state (ḥāl) of the prophethood (nubuwwa).”

O young man! You must devote your attention to real knowledge (māʿrifah) of Allāh (Almighty and glorious is He), for it is the root of all that is good. If you are constant in obedience to Him, He will grant you real knowledge of Himself.

AL-JİLĀNI 1992, trans. HOLLAND, 418

From his lengthy explanation, it can be understood that, at a particular stage, a person will be able to differentiate between notions, whether they come from God or others. However, it is difficult to explain the form of each notion to someone who has not attained such a status. For those who have attained it, the forms are not at all relevant to them, since they can identify the notions without prior knowledge of the forms.

12  Taḥbīb and the Concepts of Fanāʾ and Baqāʾ

The state of taḥbīb is a stage after fanāʾ, and it can be perceived as a stage associated with baqāʾ, the ultimate goal of an aspirant. Fanāʾ indicates the notion of “dying metaphorically before the real death,” which represents a breaking
down of the individual ego and a recognition of the fundamental unity of God, creation, and the individual self. Individuals who have entered this enlightened state obtain awareness of the intrinsic unity (tawḥīd) between Allāh and all that exists, including the individual’s mind. It is coupled conceptually with baqā’, subsistence, the state of pure consciousness and abidance in God (see fanā’ and baqā’ in Murata 2018).

In Futūḥ al-Ghayb, al-Jilānī related taḥbīb with the concept of fanā’, whereas, in two other places in al-Fath al-Rabbānī, he connected it with two different ideas. In one of them it is related to asceticism, as explained in the first part of this chapter. According to al-Jilānī, zuhd is the way to achieve fanā’, and that is also apprehended when the statements in Futūḥ and Fath are considered together. While he talks about zuhd in Futūḥ, al-Jilānī uses the term fanā’; he says “ifna ‘an al-khalq,” that means to abstain from the creatures. The state represents the beginning of the ultimate fanā’. Zuhd is fanā’ ‘an (abstain from), but the real fanā’ is fanā’ fī, annihilation or dissolution in God. After fanā’ from people, an aspirant should go forward to fanā’ from desires, then, fanā’ from his own will. Eventually, he will acquire fanā’ in God.

The other context wherein this ḥadīth was quoted in Fath is where it was related to ṣabr (patience) or being content with qaḍā’ (divine decree) and qadar (fate). In this regard, al-Jilānī says: “Hate all things and love the Creator of all things. Then, if He makes you love one of the things you have hated.” To hate things calls for zuhd, and only by going through different stages of zuhd, one can reach fanā’ in Allāh and subsequently the stage of taḥbīb.

To denote the stages of fanā’, the central theme of the two books, al-Jilānī sometimes uses different words, such as inkisār (to be broken), and called the heart of such a person “broken hearted.” He says:

This world belongs to one set of people, the hereafter belongs to another set of people, and the Lord of Truth (Almighty and Glorious is He) belongs to yet another set of people, namely the truly convinced believers ... who are grief-stricken and broken-hearted for His sake.

AL-JILĀNĪ 1992, trans. HOLLAND, 53; AL-JILĀNĪ 1988, 37

Broken-hearted here indicates that no self-interest or intention has remained in the heart; it is broken and keeps nothing. Likewise, al-Jilānī’s statement of “al-akhdh (possess) after al-tark (renounce),” indicates that a zāhid fears to take from this world because he fears to lose his beloved, the Almighty (al-Jilānī 1988, 362). But the one who achieved the ultimate zuhd takes from it without any fear, while gnosis emanates from Him. That appears as the meaning of his
statement “al-tark zuhd wa-l-akhdh maʾrifah” (to renounce is ascetism and to possess is gnosis) (al-Jilānī 1988, 362). Whoever reaches this stage attains real happiness in this world (al-Jilānī 1988, 62).

13 Conclusion

ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī, a Ḥanbalī Sufi scholar, can be regarded as first interpreter of the taḥbīḥ ḥadīth who blended it with two essential Sufi concepts; fanāʾ and baqāʾ. However, his interpretation does not attract much attention from the exegetes of ḥadīth, and this was the case for five centuries, until al-Munāwī accentuated this discussion in his seminal work Fayḍ al-Qadīr. Al-Jilānī’s exposition differs from the popular understanding of the ḥadīth. According to him, it could not be treated as an unconditional encouragement for marriage and perfuming, it could have pointed otherwise. Moreover, there is no point, according to him, to restrict the love mentioned in the ḥadīth to only the two subjects. Instead, the ḥadīth refers to a stage associated with baqāʾ (subsistence) that an aspirant has achieved after passing through the different states of fanāʾ (annihilation) by being persistent in asceticism. Once he achieves it, Allāh will make him love some worldly comforts. Yet, in the case of the Prophet, women and perfumes were the things that were made dearer to him. The concept of fanāʾ and baqāʾ was not something new to medieval Sufism. Instead, they were already embraced by al-Jilānī’s great predecessors such as al-Kharrāz (d. 286/899) and al-Junayd. In this regard, al-Jilānī’s approach could be treated as a defensive response to those who depicted Sufis as the adversaries of the Qurʾān and Sunna. This exploration of al-Jilānī’s idea could be appreciated as an invitation to study his attempt to substantiate other Sufi concepts with the scriptural basis, particularly the ḥadīth. This study covered almost all interpretations by the exegetes of ḥadīth in the pre- and post-Jilānī era. However, the influence of al-Jilānī’s new understanding of the ḥadīth on Sufis themselves requires further analysis. Ultimately, the intertwinement of ḥadīth and Sufism can be appreciated as a mechanism for ethical discourse as evident in the scholarship of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī.

Bibliography


CHAPTER 7

Seclusion

An Ethical Imperative Driven by the Ḥadīth?

M. Imran Khan

1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on seclusion (ʿuzla),¹ which is a contentious theme that has barely been analysed, not least from an ethical perspective, as opposed to a mystical one. It behoves us to delve into this topic from the perspective of earlier works and other figures who wrote or compiled traditions on seclusion. I will begin therefore with a brief historiography of ʿuzla in Islam so that we may understand various ideas and works on this subject to better realise ʿAbd al-Ghanī l-Nābulusiʾs (d. 1143/1731) contributions. This will follow with some historical context, followed by a selection of traditions which seem to capture al-Nābulusiʾs motives, while a subsequent section will consider whether withdrawing benefit from society presents a problem, despite corruption within society. Finally, the virtue of humility will be evaluated to consider whether it may be congruent with excluding oneself from society.

Notions of “sociality” or interaction are inevitably bound by judgments of morality and relate to ethics, which means the nature and tensions of these relations may provide valuable insights, but the converse is also true, as argued by John Barbour, who believes that there is an urgent need for an ethics of seclusion (Barbour 2004, 4). This begs the question how seclusion relates to ethics and how this understanding may be achieved. If sociality, synonymous in Arabic with ṣuḥba (companionship) and mukhālaṭa (social interaction) among Muslims, has been understudied, seclusion has had almost no

¹ “Seclusion” has a number of synonyms besides ʿuzla in Arabic which all connote voluntary seclusion, self-imposed isolation or retreat and these constitute a fundamental principle of asceticism (zuḥd): khalwa, waḥda, infirād, inqīṭaʿ (see Knysh 1999, 314–316). A further word introduced by Ibn Bājja (d. 533/1139) is tawāḥhūd for the isolation undertaken by a philosopher, such philosophers are referred to as ghurabāʾ by the Sufis. He does this because he does not live in a virtuous city where people base their actions on rationality and the use of the intellect (see Ibn Bājja 1978, 18–19).
attention. Yet, we are given the impression by al-Nābulusī, in his main work on the topic: *Takmīl al-Nuʿūt fī Luzūm al-Buyūt* (“Perfecting Praiseworthy Qualities by Imposing Home-Seclusion”), that his seclusion was motivated by the *ḥadīth* traditions which urge this practice, primarily in times of severe trials due to moral decline. The ensuing practice is meant to act as a protective buffer from society. Yet, it is undeniable that al-Nābulusī felt little appreciated by society too, and this caused him considerable consternation. In fact, he turned his attention to seclusion partly for having failed to attain a prominent teaching position (Schlegel 1997). As an eminent scholar in an antagonistic society, he felt the need to justify his rationale via the application of the Islamic tradition to his social reality, which thereby granted him the prerogative to seek separation from society on theological grounds. Such an assessment appears in line with the task of moral knowledge, determining the right action in a particular situation, as Hans Gadamer argued, and the requirement for seclusion certainly demanded an appropriate response for a scholar of al-Nābulusī’s stature (Gadamer 1989, 313–317). We may furthermore extend what Gadamer said about law, to the sources al-Nābulusī uses and his approach towards them, that is that they do not exist solely “in order to be understood historically, but to be concretised in [their] legal validity by being interpreted” such that the interpretations may function in contexts (Gadamer 1989, 309). The *Takmīl*’s and *Ghāyat al-Maṭlūb fī Mahabbat al-Mahbūb*’s (“The Peak of the Goal in Loving the Beloved”) self-referential and part-ethnographical appraisals represent al-Nābulusī’s style of argument and showcase his deft use of the *ḥadīth*. Whereas moral texts written by preceding Muslim authors (such as many of those mentioned below) are usually written timelessly and, therefore, offer

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2 One of the most extensive works on ethical social conduct with others is Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) *Kitāb Ādāb al-Ulfa wa-l-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Ṣuḥba wa-l-Muʿāshara* (“The Book of Etiquettes of Affection, Brotherhood, Companionship and Social Interaction”) in *Iḥyāʿ Ulūm al-Dīn* (“Revival of the Religious Sciences”) (al-Ghazālī 2002, 213–299). According to Hellmut Ritter the fervour behind al-Ghazālī’s penning of this section “arises from the spirit of Islamic mysticism” established by Sufis (Ritter 2003, 324–325). Ritter says that Ignaz Goldziher (1888–1890, 1–39) has dealt with the concept of brotherly solidarity in the Islamic social ethic but his concern is chiefly with the early period of Islam: “Muruwwa und Dīn.”

3 For the manuscript of this work, see al-Nābulusī n.d., fols. 356b–376a. There is also an edited version published under *al-Muslimīn fī Zaman al-Fitan Kamā Akhbarra al-Rasīl* (“Muslims in the Time of Strife as Told by the Messenger”), and edited by Majdī b. Maṃṣūr b. Sayyid al-Shūrā (al-Nābulusī 1998), referred to in-text by the author’s original designation: *Takmīl al-Nuʿūt fī Luzūm al-Buyūt*. A non-academic translation of this text exists in English with a lengthy introduction praising the work and lauding its importance, based on the former work, entitled: *The Virtues of Seclusion in Times of Confusion* (al-Nābulusī 2017). Excerpts from passages in the *Takmīl*, which are translated here, are my own translations.
little or no insight into how the authors' practical lives, relations and experiences may have shaped their opinions or determined their intellectual trajectories and lived experiences.\footnote{In arguing for the importance of moral considerations today, Osvaldo Rossi argues that self-perception has now incorporated a new self-subjectivity, a broadly focussed one that centres on relationships: "as a 'self' in front of the others, [which] referred to the world, to meaning, to God and so on" which has led to a more balanced equilibrium between knowing and acting (Rossi 1990, 107–110).}

In Islam interpersonal social links are meant to strengthen people's disposition to act in the correct way, while seclusion is typically discouraged (Leaman 1999, 125). Although al-Nābulusī presents the Prophet as a moral exemplar, he does not make explicit comparisons between his own sequestering and the Prophet's retreats, nor that he is undertaking it as part of his affiliation to the Sufi Naqshbandī path. The main motivation for the Sufis to withdraw from society is \textit{imitatio prophetae} – for our purposes here – the custom of the Prophet Muḥammad to isolate himself in a cave on Mount Ḥira prior to Islam (Knysh 1999, 316). Mahmūd b. ʿAlī al-Kāshānī (d. 735/1334) in the \textit{Misbāḥ al-Hidāya} ("Lantern of Guidance") goes as far as to proclaim \textit{khalwa} (seclusion) an innovation of the Sufis – the Sunna was, in fact, “social engagement” (\textit{ṣuḥba}) and its “excellence excelleth other excellences” – since the Prophet's retreats preceded the sending of the Sunna. Al-Kāshānī does however soften his objection noting that for the seekers of God \textit{khalwa} might be \textit{wājib}, just as Moses required it to achieve propinquity to God so that he could converse with him (Suhrawardī 1891, 41–42). Additionally, when one's faith is at peril we find the requirement to disassociate rather emphatic in the traditions around which al-Nābulusī’s arguments and conduct revolve.

Regarding emulation, “true Islam,” according to ʿAlī Sharīʿatī (d. 1977), must be discovered “not in scripture but in the activity of exemplary Muslims” something our figure is keen to emphasise (Lee 2018, 122).\footnote{According to Sharīʿatī, the knowledge of this authentic version of the religion depends on: the history of Islam, especially in its early days; study of the contemporary world and its needs; familiarity with Islamic scripture, and receptivity to the most mystical elements of religion (Lee 2018, 121).} Indeed, one of the ways in which moral judgements are evaluated, modified and corrected is by “consulting the behaviours of moral exemplars, who are widely acknowledged as deserving emulation," or, at least, looked to for inspiration (Cuneo 2014, 17). Not only did al-Nābulusī achieve such prominent acceptance among his contemporaries, his legacy was also spoken fondly of, even in the mid-twentieth century, although it had faded somewhat in the interim period after a few...
decades since his death. The preeminent Levantine scholar, Yusuf al-Nabhâni (d. 1350/1932), for instance, regarded him to be the “greatest gnostic sage” of the past three hundred years (al-Nabhâni 1983, 194).

Nevertheless, there had to be a higher ethical perspective that ennobled the action and attracted the respect of others even if this may not have initially featured as a motivation for al-Nâbulusî. Indeed, duty, obligation and rightness are but one part of ethics or morality, “there is the whole other area of the values of personal and interpersonal relations and activities” (Stocker 1976, 455). Such values belong to the throbbing centre of the human moral constitution, and, as Mark Sainsbury reminds us, “the throbbing centres of our lives appear to be describable only in vague terms” (Sainsbury 1996, 251). For the purposes of this study then, considering al-Nâbulusî’s arguments in a phenomenological frame will be vital to aver a distinctive epistemological enterprise, and whether his attitude was influenced at all by personal relations. Even though his stated aim is to gather ḥadîth for instance, both the introduction as well as digressions further in the Takmîl expressing moral outrage reveal his discontent and loathing of society. These factors appear so dominant that even his mystical proclivities surprisingly pale beside them. The purpose of this chapter will be to evaluate the ethical stance of al-Nâbulusî regarding seclusion by assessing his use of ḥadîth through a critical analysis of his works which deal with this topic, mainly the Takmîl al-Nuʿūt fi Luzûm al-Bayūt, Ghâyat al-Maṭlûb fi Maḥabbat al-Maḥbûb and briefly the Wasāʾil al-Taḥqîq wa Rasāʾîl al-Tawfîq (“The Means of Truth-Seeking and the Letters of Providential Guidance”).

2 Historiography

Writings on seclusion in the very early period of Islam (around the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries) are mainly compilations of ḥadîth traditions subsumed in various works of ḥadîth literature, usually as chapters with varying lengths of traditions. The genre lodges itself embryonically into the broader works on zuhd (asceticism), which overlap chronologically with the earlier works on ḥadîth (sometimes even preceding them) and often taking the form of mere compilations of traditions. We begin to see some philosophical observations with more original theological contributions on the topic in the fourth century by Abû Sulaymân Ḥamd b. Muḥammad al-Khaṭṭâbî (d. 386/996 or 388/998) which reaches its apogee in Abû Ḥamdîd al-Ghazâlî (d. 505/1111), whose disquisition is the most thorough of all works reviewed on this topic. Al-Nâbulusî’s work blends this latter trend with a concerted delivery
of two chapters of traditions with virtually no commentary, while in other areas of his work, he veers into a sociocultural critique interspersed with invectives aimed mostly at fellow scholars.

ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Mubārak’s (d. 181/797) al-Zuhd wa-l-Raqāʿiq (“The Renunciation and Heart-Softening Reports”) has 1627 traditions and according to Fuat Sezgin (d. 2018) it is the oldest book to have reached us from this period on the topic of *zuhd* (renunciation). According to Yunus Yaldız’s study on Ibn al-Mubārak, seclusion was generally practiced by ascetics and renunciants (Yaldız 2016, 46, 145). *Zuhd* is also connected to the idea of *ṣamt* (silence) and *dhikr* (the recollection of God), as these are related acts of obedience which acquire greater significance during seclusion, as exemplified in the lives of personalities such as the Companion Abū Ḥudhayfa b. al-Yamān (d. 36/656) and Rabī’ b. Khuthaym (d. 62/682). In fact, *ṣamt* and *dhikr* were sometimes used as metonyms for *khālwa* and ‘*uzla* (Yaldız 2016, 164–165). Although the latter work is not about “seclusion” per se it contains abundant traditions that refer to it.6

Abū Bakr b. Abī l-Dunyā al-Baghdādī (d. 281/894) compiled a work, *al-ʿUzla wa-l-Infirād* (“Seclusion and Isolation”), which continues in the vain of the early *muḥaddithīn* by including a *sanad* (chain of transmission) for each report, many of which are statements by the *salaf* who gave importance to seclusion. In one such report a man comes to Shuʿayb b. Ḥarb (d. 196/811 or 197/812) and says he has come to socialise with him, whereupon he tells him that he has taken to isolation for forty-years. Ibn Abī l-Dunyā thereupon beseeches: “O God: I seek refuge in propinquity to one whose closeness distances me from you” (Ibn Abī l-Dunyā 1997, 94). Ibn Abī l-Dunyā does not directly share his own thoughts on the topic although it seems quite likely that discussion of the subject arises from a favourable sentiment towards seclusion.

The earliest systematic monograph dedicated to the topic of seclusion appears to be *Kitāb al-ʿUzla* (“The Book of Seclusion”) by al-Khaṭṭābī who was a Shāfiʿī jurist and litterateur. Al-Khaṭṭābī was not promulgating isolation by

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6 This work is representative of a genre of works which include al-Zuhd by Hannād b. al-Sariyy (d. 243/857) and a work of the same title by Abū Bakr b. Abī Ṭāsin (d. 287/900); al-Tafarrud wa-l-ʿUzla (The Tract on Aloofness and Isolation) by Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-ʿAjurrī (d. 360/972); al-Risāla al-Muḥniyya fi l-Sukūt wa-Luzūm al-Bayūt (“The Comprehensive Epistle on Silence and Connubial Confinement”) by Abū ʿAli al-Ḥasan b. Ṭāsin; ʿAbd Allāh al-Baghdādī (d. 471/1078); Izz al-ʿUzla (“The Honour of Isolation”) by Abū Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad al-Samāʿī (d. 562/1166); al-ʿUzla (“The Tract on Seclusion”) by Abū l-Faraj ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. ʿAlī al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201); Uns al-Munqatīn išā Ḥbidat Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn (“The Congeniality of those Sparing themselves for the Worship of the Lord of the Worlds”) by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 623/1223); al-ʿĪbādat wa-l-Khālwa (“The Tract on Worship and Seclusion”) by Muḥammad b. Shākir al-Dārānī; Shākir al-Kutbī (d. 764/1363).
any means, rather, he was arguing for avoiding the company of bad associates even if that meant quarantining oneself. He argued: “an excess in all things is reprehensible. The best of affairs is in moderation; virtue is flanked by evil” (al-Khaṭṭābī 1990, 236). Moreover, isolation, does not entail leaving the Friday or quotidian congregational prayers nor avoiding greeting others or abandoning various noble customary practices – although the latter may be “conditional exceptions” (fa-ʾinnahā mustathnāṭun bi-sharāʾīṭihā). Al-Khaṭṭābī pragmatically explores beyond textual precepts to advise people (by which he means scholars), who are uniquely fit to undertake this practice to consider whether they have the independence to distance themselves, and, if it is the case, then, the choice is theirs to make individually. But this should never extend to shunning members of one’s household and neighbours. Excessive socialising is the main target of his reprobation (al-Khaṭṭābī 1990, 58–59). In a commentary of several Qur’anic verses and a tradition by an early Muslim scholar on the theme of animals, al-Khaṭṭābī demonstrates his expository skill by linking them to represent the variation in dominant human character traits and then uses, among others, the metaphor of a dog’s barking as being zoomorphic for an irascible person’s pugnacity. He then attempts to provide some psychological relief for those that must endure such incivility by stating that they are to regard such individuals as their animal counterpart and not pity them since their physicality is not like that of an animal, for which they supposedly have sufficient a respite (al-Khaṭṭābī 1990, 159–163). This nuance by the author highlights the rich variation in the way in which seclusion has been retreated.

References to isolation were made in works even prior to al-Khaṭṭābī, albeit these were typically brief, including a single page in al-Waṣāyā (“The Commandments”) of al-Ḥārith al-Muhāsibī (d. 243/857).7 The latter argues that one ought not to part with their religion when the devils from jinn and humans inspire one another (towards heedlessness) with adorned speech. Two types of people’s company should be kept: one type is those who inspire you to virtue and reverence of God, the other type is those that assist one in their temporal affairs. If both needs may be fulfilled by one person, then others besides that individual should be avoided. Only the helper to virtue is not harmful to one’s religion, which is why the most meritorious act and safest precaution is keeping aloof from people, it is greater than that which is feared. He advises his companions not to mix with people, yet acknowledges that few

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7 Avoiding people was a common trope that was frequently mentioned in works of exhortation. Gibril Foud Haddad gives several references to the practice of “silence” (ṣamt) which al-Muhāsibī mentions, namely, that nine tenths of worship is in avoiding people (see Haddad 2017, 101).
people can accept this advice because enduring patience in this regard is difficult to bear (al-sabr ʿalā l-wahda shadid). He then delimits sociality by saying “shun people from the heart, afford them connection [only] through greetings and by means necessitated as per their rights as Muslims” (al-Muḥāsibī 1986, 104). There is also a book attributed to al-Muḥāsibī entitled Kitāb al-Khalwa wa-l-Tanaqqul fi l-ʿĪbāda wa-Darajat al-ʿĀbidīn (“The Book of Seclusion and Movement in Worship, and the Levels of Worshippers”), which according to Gavin Picken, extolls the virtues of spiritual retreat (khalwa) from worldly life and particularly when it is simultaneous with frequent recitation and reflection upon the Qurʾān. The one pursuing seclusion is advised to adopt silence and to view necessary speech “as a disaster that has struck” (Picken 2010, 83).

Scholars have also discussed seclusion’s relationship to travel, and how the two can further one’s relationship with God. Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. 298/910) stated, for example:

I came to love withdrawing in seclusion (khalwa) at home, as well as going forth into the [deserted] countryside. And I would wander about in the ruins and amongst the tombs situated near the city. This was my constant practice. And I sought sincere companions who might be of assistance to me in this matter, but I did not succeed and I withdrew into those ruins and places of retirement.

RADTKE and O’KANE 1996, 17

These words seem to have been expressed after al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s return from pilgrimage in Mecca, where he underwent a spiritual experience that led him to resolve to live a life devoted to God. However, he was unsuccessful in finding kindred spirits on his sojourn, nor effective spiritual tutelage. It is especially important to consider al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī as his popularity ascended greatly due to the theosophist-mystic Muḥyī l-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī’s (d. 638/1240) writing on him; who, of course, greatly influenced al-Nābulusī (Radtke and O’Kane 1996, 17). Indeed, Ibn ʿArabī whom al-Nābulusī considered al-shaykh al-akbar (his greatest master) deemed šamt and ʿuzla as some of the prerequisites that the traveller ought to strive to acquire on his journey toward union with God (Ateş 1968).

Not only did seclusion play an important role in the thought of Muslim scholars, but also a central one in the rituals of many Sufi orders. Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī’s (d. 458/1066) al-Zuhd al-Kabīr (“The Major Epistle on Asceticism”) has one section of six on the theme of “seclusion and obscurity” (al-ʿuzla wa-l-khumūl). While Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 632/1191) dedicates three chapters of his ʿAwārif al-Maʿārif (“The Esoteric Insights of
the Gnostics”) describing the rules of khalwa (retreating). Khalwa played an important role in the rites of Sufi orders, including the Kubrāwiyya,9 the Qādiriyya,9 the Shādhiliyya,10 and the Khalwatiyya,11 which derives its name from it (Knysh 1999, 314–316). Both in earlier examples of zuhd among Sufis and their later counterparts, including al-Nābulusi, the focus is usually a lifestyle preoccupied with interior conscientable concerns and scrupulous behaviour (Yaldiz 2016, 165).

The most extensive and systematic work on the topic is al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’ Ulūm al-Dīn’s (“Revival of the Religious Sciences”) sixth book from the quarter designated for “worship,” which lists the preconditions of undertaking ‘uzla; he also covers the topic broadly in his Minhāj al-Ābidin (“The Curriculum of the Worshippers”) and his Minhāj al-‘Arifin (“The Curriculum of the Gnostics”). The arguments for both sides are presented in the Iḥyā’ and al-Ghazālī sets out to explain these meticulously. He proffers seven benefits of socialising with people (which receives virtually no treatment in al-Nābulusī’s main work on the subject), and offers a partial retreat as an alternative. He stresses that seclusion might even be undertaken for selfish ends, such as gaining a reputation as a mystic, or other such sanctimonious purposes (al-Zabīdī 2012, 380–416). Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī’s (d. 1205/1790) commentary on the Iḥyā’ entitled Iḥṭāf al-Sāda al-Muttaqīn (“The Benefactions of the Cultivated-Faithful”) expands on the seminal work by adding useful explanations and inputs. For example, al-Zabīdī says that certain early Muslim scholars believed every believer had the power of intercession and that this ought to be a motivating factor in forging abundant relations with other “believers” – rather than secluding oneself – since you may ultimately benefit from a specific believer whom you had befriended (al-Zabīdī 2012, 314–317). Al-Nābulusī does not address the conundrum of scholars withdrawing in times of corruption, and unwittingly further perpetuating corruption through their absence from the role of publicly guiding people, although he may have appealed to his dedication to publishing works and teaching some students in his defence (al-Nābulusī 2010, 138). Again, al-Ghazālī is far more exacting and nuanced in his treatise on this point as on so many others on the subject.

8 A Sufi order founded by Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 618/1221) which is based on al-mawt al-trādi (death by volition).
9 A Sufi order founded by ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī (d. 561/1166) rooted in service to humanity and submission to the will of God.
10 A Sufi order founded by Abū l-Ḥasan al-Shādhili (d. 656/1258) that is known for lifelong learning and gratitude to God, for which it is sometimes known as the tarīqa of gratitude.
11 This order was founded by ʿUmar al-Khalwātī (d. 800/1397) which was fundamentally about withdrawing from the world for mystical purposes.
More recently scholars have examined the *Takmīl* and discussed the spiritual seclusion practiced by Muslim scholars. Gibril Fouad Haddad critiqued the *Takmīl* of al-Nābulusī in a journal article that also mentioned accounts of various Muslim renunciants (Haddad 2017, 91). The nature of isolated retreats by prominent Muslim figures are worth considering in light of Hermann Landolt’s point in his entry on *khalwa* for the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*: “spiritual isolation from the world was considered higher than material seclusion and it is clear that periodic retreats rather than permanent seclusion were practiced in reality” (Landolt 1977). Even prolonged durations away from interaction with people tended to be punctuated by occasional visits to others or receiving guests as al-Nābulusī’s case reveals.

### 3 Historical Context around the Time of al-Nābulusī’s Seclusion

The first half of the eighteenth century was argued by Ottoman specialists, such as Andre Raymond, to be a period of urban development and commercial expansion, rejecting the theory of decline (Aladdin 1985, 23). Lejla Demiri and Samuela Pagani agree that “decline” is no longer an acceptable descriptive term to characterise the Ottoman period in the Arab-speaking territories while cautioning that concepts differ across civilisations (Demiri and Pagani 2019, 6).

Intriguingly and perhaps in contradistinction to “urban development and commercial expansion” salving the decline narrative, al-Nābulusī’s primary disquiet with the sociocultural atmosphere of late eleventh/seventeenth century Damascus was, in fact, its “decline,” albeit in morality. “Moral degeneration” was posited as the primary justification for his retreat from public life (al-Nābulusī 1998, 25–26). Negative moral influences are not the only reason why al-Nābulusī confined himself to his house in Damascus for several years. At the same time, to interpret his actions as motivated merely by a desire for spiritual edification would be to overlook its complexity. The immediate cause seems to have been captured in the following remarks:

> I was severely affected by the wretched state of affairs that seriously affected our land, Damascus, as well as the dangerous pronouncements and severe calamities which had befallen her. These state of affairs determined that I cease meeting with people except a few who believed in what I had to say and shared the same convictions. I resolved not to leave my house except if necessary. This was due to the appearance of disbelief and its spread between them [the Muslims] without any compunction.
I counted and relied on God in bearing harm, patience at misfortune, excessive hypocrisy, the appearance of schisms and felt much alienation from people when I did not find anyone who agreed on the clear truth, let alone someone helpful, due to the incredible amount of corruption of this age, sinfulness, widespread misguidance among laity and scholars alike.

**Al-Nābulusī 1995, 130**

Abdul-Karim Rafeq highlights the disaffection al-Nābulusī had felt when he had been informed about the injustices of excessive taxation “inflicted on the peasants by the sipahis, the feudal lords, which resulted in the emptying of the countryside” (Rafeq 2009, 10). This urbanisation led to prominent ‘ulamā’ from the four schools of Sunnī jurisprudence to issue verdicts censoring the sultanic orders and the feudal practices which had led the sipahis to drive this poor class from their villages and their “homeland” (waṭan). They urged the peasants to take a stand against their oppressors who were brazenly contravening the Sharī‘a. Al-Nābulusī himself had issued a fatwa on this issue entitled: *Takhyīr al-‘Ibād fī Suknā al-Bilād* (“Giving People the Option to Live where they Choose”). He rebuked the sipahis (Ottoman cavalrymen) for attempting to coerce the peasantry to return to ruralisation and till the lands so that tax revenues may be collected after having driven them out in the first instance (Rafeq 2009, 10–11). His unequivocal denunciation of those in power demonstrates how earnestly al-Nābulusī treated issues of social justice.12

Al-Nābulusī was not retreating as a monadic hermit who simply sought to indulge in esoteric practices for personal spiritual gain but, rather, or perhaps also, someone that was deeply concerned with the social injustices affecting his people. The withdrawal therefore was, in some regards, a protest and many of his writings during this period were the medium by which he raised his voice and deep dissatisfaction.13 This supports Nir Shafir’s observation that the widespread pietistic turn in the tenth/sixteenth and eleventh/
seventeenth centuries Ottoman Empire as captured by its “morality literature,” or the naṣīḥat-nāma (advice book) genre which mushroomed in the period, was not simply religious in the devotional sense but had political implications and, indeed, was sometimes motivated by overwhelmingly political events, as the above case shows.

4 Motives for Withdrawal: A Selection of Aḥadīth from the Takmīl

The Takmīl was compiled during al-Nābulusī’s retreat and its first two chapters seek to justify his seclusion by reference to sixty-two hadīths that are occasionally interspersed with brief social commentary.14 In this way, al-Nābulusī revealed how he personally read the contemporary state of affairs to which the traditions were meant to apply.15 The first chapter of his work pertains to

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14 This combination of hadīth and social commentaries marries elements of timelessness and contemporary social issues. The Qur’ānic and hadīth sources foreground the first half of the book, several digressions notwithstanding, while the latter half of the book refers to the corruption besetting society and with which those sources are in conversation. For more on the commentarial impulse to timeliness/timelessness (see Blecher 2018, 184–145). The disadvantage of this approach, rather than a more specific but not necessarily atomistic one, is that we do not attain a nuanced insight into exactly which traditions are used for which particular purpose, or how some are even relevant to the argument being made. Even if the current work is not hermeneutically sophisticated it manifests a thorough engagement with the tradition in the first half, before assessing the practices and views of other Muslim scholars which are used as auxiliaries. This opposes the accusation of intellectual decline by showing the vibrancy of al-Nābulusī’s production on this theme. Even the longstanding military decline had some recovery in the eleventh/seventeenth century, albeit embedded in centuries of steady decline. To say that the military decline, or irregularities in the provincial governments’ rule (such as the rise of “dynasty governors”), signifies intellectual decline is unfair, as it compares the modernisation of the thirteenth/nineteenth and fourteenth/twentieth centuries with the “allegedly static” tenth/sixteenth, eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries (see Barbir 1980, 3–6). Furthermore, due to inflation and the rise of an expanding janissary army in Istanbul, the livelihoods of the military forces spread throughout the Ottoman provinces were threatened. This resulted in the need to strengthen the governors of those regions to maintain local order. The state also resettled thousands of janissaries away from Istanbul to keep them away from brewing trouble in the political heartland; which led to trouble elsewhere (see Barbir 1980, 16–17).

15 In al-Nābulusī we see the fleshing out of the eschaton “end” when using hadīth traditions. Eschatological discourse is either futuristic or realised. In futurist eschatology, the eschaton foretold by the scripture is still to happen; eschatological events are still in
disassociating from the public in times of “tribulation” (*fitna*), the second is on shunning the *imāms* of *fitna* in the mosques. My focus will be on the first of these chapters as it has a broader application, applied as it is to the masses.

Al-Nābulusī’s use of the *ahadīth* to bolster his case for seclusion is somewhat selective. It is notable that the general thrust of *ahadīth* in the major *hadīth* collections on “the ethics of sociality” (*ādāb al-ṣuḥba*) push in the direction of prioritising companionship (*ṣuḥba*) and brotherhood (*ukhuwwa*).16 *ʿUzla* removes one from fulfilling the ethical imperatives promulgated in these *ahadīth*, even though *ʿuzla* in itself is not considered an absolute virtue, in the same way that “compassion” or “generosity” are considered (both of which, ironically, require others).17 Usually Sufis are thought to have other higher spiritual objectives which lead them to pursue isolation from society. This does not seem to be the case with al-Nābulusī. As we will see from a sample of some of the *ahadīth* considered below, there are traditions which portend various

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16 The requirement for *ʿuzla* is much more subjectively determined and applies to a narrow range of circumstances. This is different from saying, in the Nietzchean conception, that references to absolute values are futile and that one must guide their actions or limit them by the “juridical sanctions of positive law” (see Rocci 1990, 219–225, 219). Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī’s commentary *Iḥāf al-Sāda al-Muttaqīn* on al-Ghazālī’s *Iḥyāʾ Ulūm al-Dīn, Kitāb Adāb al-Ulfa wa-l-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Ṣuḥba wa-l-Muʿāshara* (“Book on the Etiquettes of Affection, Brotherhood, Companionship and Social Interaction”) stretches to three hundred pages while his commentary on *ʿuzla* amounts to a mere one hundred pages, highlighting the importance placed on both topics but the predominance of the former.
ominous circumstances where Muslims have been told to withdraw from society on account of certain problems within that society.

Some *ḥadīth* refer to specific types of events, usually internecine conflict, while others address a generally foreboding time in the distant future, and may have application in a variety of situations. An example of a specific event during “the time of strife” (*zaman al-fitna*) when the Prophet’s companions were at war is alluded to in the following tradition. In response to whether he should carry his sword, Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī (d. 32/652) was told by the Prophet that if the olive trees are sullied by blood (in reference to the trees in Medina) then: “stick to your houses” (*kūnū ahlāsa buyūtikum*) (al-Nābulusī 1998, 7).

Of those traditions which describe a general state of widespread corruption or anarchy several problems arise to which attention will now be drawn. The ethical precept in many such *ḥadīth* either recommends or strongly proposes one to withdraw from society given various states of tumultuous affairs. Both Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 97/778) and al-Ghazālī were of the opinions that it was permissible to isolate oneself from society. Referencing their opinions al-Nābulusī goes one step further by claiming it is “*wājib* and *farḍ*” (both terms implying varying degrees of obligation with it being intensified in the latter) to isolate oneself from society in his time. He does not provide specific “evidence” (*dalīl*) for this point, instead proclaiming:

It is equivalent to Islam and faith (*īmān*) in our times. Whoever therefore ignores this and intermingles with people then his Islam and *īmān* are mere lip service without a reality in the heart, like the Islam of a hypocrite.

AL-NĀBULUSĪ 1998, 22

Another *ḥadīth* which al-Nābulusī refers to is the tradition narrated by Abū Burda (d. 103/721 or 104/722 or 723):

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18 The *ḥadīth* is related by Abū Dāwūd 2009, 6:319: *Awwal Kitāb al-Fitan* (“Book of Tribulations”), *Būb al-Nahy ‘an al-Sā’yfi l-Fitna* (“Chapter on the Prohibition of Engaging in Vice”). *Hils or halas* is a cloth used to prevent saddle-sore on the back of a riding beast. The metaphor aptly compares material which is pressing upon the animal and is firmly in place with the way a person should remain confined to his house. The cloth also prevents major friction which is painful to the animal, just as a person avoids civil strife by withdrawing from society.

19 There were others who held this belief too such as: Ibrāḥīm b. Adham (d. 161/778), Dāwūd al-Tā’ī (d. 165/782), Fuḍayl b. ‘Iyāḍ (d. 187/803), Yūsuf b. Asbāṭ (d. 110/810) and Bishr al-Ḥāfi (d. 227/841) (see al-Zabīdī 2012, 317).

20 For al-Nābulusī’s understanding on Islam and *īmān* see (al-Nābulusī 2000, 95–128).
There will be strife, hostile separation and grave disagreement. When that time arrives you must take your sword and break it. Then sit in your house, until a sinful hand comes to you or a preordained death.

**Al-Nābulusī 1998, 9**

Abū Burda confirms that the prophecy of the Prophet was realised when he says: “what the Prophet Muḥammad said, happened” (al-Nābulusī 1998, 9). Al-Nābulusī’s reliance on this hadīth suggests that he favours withdrawal from society in times of strife, as well as adopting a passive acceptance of one’s fate in such times. The act of isolation, itself, in such traditions is justified by those facing unpalatable circumstances, rather than stemming from a mystical or spiritual motive for those with a surfeit of numinous stamina. This externalist approach of al-Nābulusī impresses upon the reader that it is the situations highlighted in the traditions and their attendant precepts that are the cause of his motivation to withdraw.

5 **Corruption, Deprivation of Benefit to Others and Obligations to Society**

It is important to explore al-Nābulusī’s views of “others” during his seclusion from mainstream society. A paradox occurs with his decision to seclude himself which involves the relationality between the individual and society. His ethical outlook, informed by his epistemology, required him to disengage from the corruption of society. However, some of the aḥadīths he relied upon suggest it is society rather than al-Nābulusī that may benefit most from his withdrawal. For instance, in one hadīth which he quotes, Abū Sa‘īd al-Khuḍrī says the Prophet Muḥammad was asked: “Who is the best person?” Among the people mentioned is a believer in a valley (or a barren area) who fears his Lord and distances people from his evil (al-Nābulusī 1998, 10).22 Muḥammad

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ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mubārakpūrī (d. 1353/1934) explains its rationale thus: “So he does not wrangle with people nor argue with them” (al-Mubārakpūrī 2011, 296). The above tradition is quoted by al-Nābulusī, but another which he does not mention might reflect upon him more positively and would better explain his actions:

I heard the Prophet – upon him blessings and peace – say, “People will see a time when the best property will be sheep. A person leads them to the summit where it rains, fleeing for the sake of his religion away from strifes.”

The former narration depicts the isolationist as sparing society his own harm, while the latter sees him fleeing from society’s harm.

Although some of the aḥadīth which al-Nābulusī quotes seem to suggest that society may benefit from the seclusion of certain difficult individuals, al-Nābulusī’s own view is that seclusion from a corrupt society benefits the individual who chooses such an isolated path. Irrespective of which attitude is adopted, arguably, the path of seclusion contains a paradox. On the one hand, if society is corrupt, surely an ethical individual – not least a scholar – has a duty to engage in and reform that society, a point captured in a number of letters which al-Nābulusī writes (al-Nābulusī 2010, 121). If, on the other hand, an individual is corrupt, while his withdrawal may benefit society, it is unlikely that a corrupt individual will seclude himself simply to benefit society. Nonetheless, it could also be argued that the semi-isolation of some of the spiritual elite might raise the spiritual aspirations of ordinary believers by representing an exemplary ethical standard and this may have partly motivated al-Nābulusī. Such a strategy may confer religious repute to those who practice seclusion (as it certainly did to al-Nābulusī) and help gain admiration which results in a following. This may, in turn, benefit society if the secluded individual is a virtuous person seen as worthy of emulation.

Withdrawing from society, while it faces moral upheaval rather than seeking to improve it from within, does have its antecedents in Islamic literature. Precisely such a line of argument is enlisted by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) in Ṣayd al-Khāṭir (“Capturing the Mind’s Destructive Tendencies”): “that I benefit myself alone is better than I benefit others while harming myself” (Ibn al-Jawzī 2011, 140). This reasoning may well be based on the understanding that privileging spiritual self-care is one’s primary obligation. Does
the pursuit of spiritual self-interest in the midst of such corruption then constitute [Shari’a-justified] “psychological egoism,” a term used by Joel Feinberg. Psychological egoism being a theory which states that humans pursue their own self-interests. Al-Nābulusī’s position, however, might be better described as “ethical egoism:” all people ought to pursue their own well-being; it is about what ought to be the case (Feinberg 2013, 167). This stance indicates, “saving” oneself – however an individual defines it so – is given precedence over contributing to the welfare of others and it seems that this is al-Nābulusī’s outlook during the said period. In al-Nābulusī’s own words the following were some of the intolerable moral and ethical problems he encountered that led him to focus inwardly:

Know that the tribulations which demand seclusion from people in our age, have been enumerated by the Prophet, as narrated in the explicit traditions quoted earlier. These include corruption becoming rampant and widespread. It is now so pervasive and has burgeoned to the extent that people have declared its permissibility, they have been assisted in that by the wicked scholars who ridicule a person and then declare: “He is a public sinner and backbiting a public sinner is not considered unlawful.” As for the laity they say: “We have only spoken the truth.” It also includes: honouring materialistic people, to the extent that they pardon every transgression of theirs and call it “obedience;” out of coveting their wealth, while severely despising the destitute, whom they consider bereft, wretched. They say: “If God was pleased with them, he would have provided them with material provisions and enriched them.” It also includes the dominance of evil people over the people of truth so that you will see the pious believer fearful religiously and personally from slipping in front of a hypocrite, a profligate and criminal who is undeterred what religion he belongs to (even after claiming Islam and of having faith). You will see this believer around such type of people suffer considerably, at the hands of those who excoriate him and attack him with despicable actions and words relating to his honour, his religion, his intellect, assisted by a coterie of wicked people. Various other examples exist that would prolong this work. These matters then and their likes, are corruptions like a “sliver of the dark night,” [to those who do] not find anything wrong in them in the slightest and indulge in them without compunction. They do not recognise them as problematic and nor consider them consequential. Some conceited folk even consider this age superior to the past, praising their contemporaries out of sheer ignorance, blind hearts, an extinguished insight due to eating the unlawful: “And whoever God wants to
try with strife, you will not avail him from God in the slightest” [Q 5:41]. How incomparable: that age of mutual love to this age of hypocrisy, tyranny and hostility?

AL-NĀBULUSĪ 1998, 25–26

The Qur’ānic call to pay heed to one’s own affairs (which appends his work dedicated to the theme of seclusion), as well as al-Nābulusī’s interpretations in the previous quote, apparently gave him the justification to withdraw the benefit of his presence from others and to focus on preserving himself.

This leads us to the question of whether spiritual self-preservation amounts to tacit harm of others and how to determine benefit and harm for oneself and society. Indeed, al-Ghazālī, but not al-Nābulusī, suggests that one drawback of seclusion is that it prevents one from “inviting to virtue and curtailing evil” (al-amr bi-l-ma’rūf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar). Echoing this, albeit politically, according to Abū Naṣr al-Farābī (d. 339/950), the virtuous political regime is one in which its inhabitants’ souls are all as healthy as possible: “the one who cures souls is the statesman and he is also called the king” (Butterworth 2010, 42; al-Farābī 1971, 24).24 However, al-Nābulusī forestalls such objections of social and political apathy by bringing a tradition of Anas b. Mālik (d. 93/712) where he asserts that someone asked the Prophet when should inviting to virtue and curtailing evil be ceased:

He said: “If what manifested in previous communities (umam) manifest in you.” “We said: O Messenger of God what was it that manifested in previous communities.” He said: “Sovereignty among the young, depravity among senior folk and knowledge being the lot of those who are despicable (wa-l-ʿilm fi rudhālatikum).”

AL-NĀBULUSĪ 1995, 32

Here al-Nābulusī brings in Zayd b. Yahyā b. ‘Ubayd al-Khuzā’ī (d. 463–464/1071) to explain the meaning of the latter phrase as: “if knowledge is borne by the

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24 According to Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), virtuous friendship is the crucial element that was missing in al-Farābī’s utopian vision. “The best friendship is the love between good and virtuous men, who share a hunger for perfection and for the Divine” (Gianotti 2015, 82). It seems it was precisely this quality of friendship which al-Nābulusī searched for but could not find.

profligate" (idhā kāna al-ʿilmu fī l-fussāq) and then elaborates who the “fussāq” (profligates) are in his opinion:

The profligate are those who insist on backbiting in their gatherings, spreading gossip, envy, arrogance, self-conceit, consuming the unlawful, hypocrisy, ostentation, giving verdicts to curry favour with popular sentiments and in order to side with their objectives, and the use of subterfuge “in legal matters” (Sharīʿa), to make falsehood truth and truth falsehood, to terminate endowments and ownership, to meddle in Sharīʿa contracts for the sake of temporal gains and other such matters which would be too long to illustrate and which would be unsavoury to spread.

AL-NĀBULUSĪ 1995: 33

It appears that there are more sinister affairs that are rife in society, and that al-Nābulusī does not deign to mention these matters because he finds them deeply abhorrent. His emphatic outbursts elsewhere are not similarly truncated which supports the idea that al-Nābulusī’s arguments and condemnation for virtually excommunicating his entire society are not expressed in full in the Takmīl.

In order to further disambiguate the moral dimension which he mentions we must delve into another of his texts, the Ghāyat al-Maṭlūb. This work offers a more integrated insight into the struggles al-Nābulusī faced, and which led him to perceive his contemporaries so morally wanting that he could not bear to associate with them.26 Although his opinion of people was derogatory, and possibly contemptuous, he did not go so far as to insinuate that they were “ruined” and perhaps he proves that by eventually abandoning his retreat. In the discussion on “gazing at beautiful faces” (al-naẓar ilā wujūh al-hisān), al-Nābulusī appeals to a ḥadīth, for his own defence, in which the Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said: “If you hear a person say that people are ruined; assuredly, most ruined is he.”27 He appeals to the commentary of Yahyā al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) to clarify two possible interpretations of this depending on whether the word “ruined” (ahlak) is in the nominative or accusative case. If in the former case, then it means that the person referring to them, is himself the most ruined among the people. While in the latter situation it

26 This text was also written during al-Nābulusī’s seclusion and hence complements some of the critiques made about society contained in the Takmīl.

means that he presumes them to be ruined, not that they are, in reality, ruined (al-Nābulusī 1995, 83). Were one to say that “people are ruined”, the supercilious pronouncement belies a callous proclamation of omniscience which, unsurprisingly, al-Nābulusī does not use in the Takml, even though his opinions regarding fellow residents of Damascus seemingly betrayed such an attitude.

After relaying numerous incidents from the Prophet Muḥammad's times concerning the “dissolute conduct of some Muslims,” including sexual liaisons and prostitution, al-Nābulusī says the “acts of ignorance” (jāhiliyya) during that period were greater than his own era's corruption and evil (al-Nābulusī 1995, 87). As further examples to highlight the impiety characteristic of that age – yet similarly present in his own time – he mentions theft, fraudulent activity, armed robbery, homosexuality, extra-marital sex, drinking alcohol, false accusations, hurling insults and having the worst suspicions about others (al-Nābulusī 1995, 88).28 Al-Nābulusī further clarifies that one is not to think that iniquity, evil, abhorrence and licentiousness are an exclusive feature of his times and that the past, even the virtuous era, was somehow empty of such decadence.29 The prominent wars between the companions are better forgotten and not spread, he says, as well as those that occurred after them. Evil is present in all times, and much in that way could be mined from the books of “ḥadith, narrations and history” (al-Nābulusī 1995, 83). Still, licentiousness, false testimonies, and calumny were sparse in the first “three-favoured-centuries” (khayr al-qurūn) which represented greater virtue, it is later that these vices became widespread (al-Nābulusī 1995, 89). The predecessors would consider thinking ill of one another as being forbidden, spying as unlawful and it would only be hypocrites who would fall foul of such sins. Nowadays, he inveighs, “no one thinks such things to be forbidden; very few individuals are free from

28 Ḥadith commentaries, even the non-conventional type, like al-Nābulusī's Takml, may function as “an exegetical history that connects the audiences' current social and historical context to the past” (see Blecher 2018, 177). Al-Nābulusī was not a historian, yet his overview of Damascene society portrays insights that are useful for analysing his moral thought. In this sense, his value might be likened to when al-Ṭabarī writes contemporary history as its author, rather than a compiler or editor; his self-authored section is recognised as “highly distinctive” and valuable (see Shoshan 2004, xxxiii). Al-Nābulusī's decision to seclude himself because of corruption appears to contradict his confession of the Prophet's era being mired more in vice than his own, unless, it may be argued that, certain vices of his age – and he does differentiate between the two – were more malignant and nefarious, thus compelling his drastic course of action. It may also be the case that he was more personally affected by the issues prevalent in his society, hence, the need to consider his emotional state. Perhaps he was overwhelmed as the target of hatred, which evoked such an extreme reaction from him.

29 This is said in reference to the first three generations of Muslims, beginning with the first who witnessed the Prophet Muḥammad in their lives and so forth.
them” (al-Nābulusī 1995, 91). His arguments continue to pivot almost entirely on the explicitly moral.

One understands the moral duty to speak boldly which al-Nābulusī feels (and duly responds to in writing) when he quotes a tradition on the authority of Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī (d. 74/693) that the Prophet Muḥammad said in a sermon: “Let a man not be prevented, out of awe for the people, from speaking the truth if he knows it.” Al-Khudrī then cried and said: “by Allāh we saw things and were ‘timorously reticent’ (fa-ḥibnā) (al-Nābulusī 1995, 91).” In yet another instance he quotes the Prophet:

Let none of you detest himself. The companions asked: “O Messenger of God, how are we able to detest ourselves?” He said: “He sees an affair pertaining to the rights God speaks of, and about which he should interject, but he refrains from doing so. God will say to him on Judgement Day: ‘what prevented you from speaking about such and such?’ He will say: ‘fear of people.’ God will respond: ‘It was me from whom you should have been more afraid.’”

Al-Nābulusī 1995, 17

Silence, al-Nābulusī goes on to say, would be tantamount to a blemish in the character of the Prophet Muḥammad, contradicting God’s epithet for him in the Qurʾān: “Your virtues are indeed magnificent” (Q 68:4; al-Nābulusī 1995, 17). By mentioning this, al-Nābulusī presents himself as someone following in the footsteps of the Prophet by making knowledge-driven interventions.

Indeed, many of the scholars al-Nābulusī includes as practitioners of isolation taught from the privacy of their homes and did not entirely deprive others of their knowledge, even if the number of their beneficiaries may have dwindled post-isolation. This is referred to by Gibril Haddad as “qualified asociality” and quite accurately sums up the manner in which most scholars mentioned in the Takmīl practiced seclusion (Haddad 2017, 91). Withholding knowledge, besides being a condemned practice, is evidence of miserliness. Knowledge


32 Al-Nābulusī clearly laments the lack of enthusiasm among people who have not appreciated their scholars and have consequently not preserved their scholars’ written or
is the foundation of love, a silent person who is knowledgeable cannot uplift others ethically. Through the generosity of his speech, however, he can bring deliverance and tranquillity to them (Khalifa 2010, 227). One might still incline to charging a recluse like al-Nâbulusî with ingratitude as Abû ʿUthmân ʿAmr al-Jâḥiz (d. 254/868 or 255/869) states: “you cannot show gratitude to God; you cannot show it except through speech” (al-Jâḥiz 1906, 136; also quoted in Khan 2008, 54). Al-Jâḥiz’s argument seeks to convince his reader of the inferiority of silence – a typical characteristic of seclusion – “were silence more preferable … the superiority …[of] human beings over other [creatures] would not be recognised” (Khan 2008, 155). If one were to accept the above premise as a charge against al-Nâbulusî, ignoring his thirsty pen during his retreat would ironically mean this narrow interpretation would itself lend to an uncharitable constriction of generosity, the pen too has a tongue. Moreover, al-Nâbulusî permits occasional access to himself which vindicates him from this charge.33 Considering this, to reinforce the earlier point of al-Nâbulusî’s engagement, it is likely that he did not see himself as being taken to silence and he certainly did not forego all human contact, as a small flock of his close associates maintained visits. Therefore, contrary to a lone undertaking concerned solely with interior progress and spiritual unveilings, al-Nâbulusî continued to seek engagement with and benefit society especially through his prodigious output.34

6 Attitudes to Seclusion: A Reflection of True Humility or False Humility?

Demonstrating humility to God is different from showing humility to fellow humans. Al-Nâbulusî’s departure from the view of earlier self-deprecatory scholars, who believed that one should ascribe corruption to themselves, ostensibly appears arrogant. The argument might be inferred from those intellectual legacy. This clarifies his stance on knowledge-sharing as being a bountiful act from which others may benefit (see al-Nâbulusî 1995, 132).

33 He does feel unvalued; gaining respect was seen as important for him as a public figure (see al-Nâbulusî 1995, 130). Reference to respect as an important interpersonal commodity can be seen in many works such as the following example where ʿAbd al-Rahmân Ibn al-Jawzî contrasts two people, one of whom has far greater knowledge but due to a particular obnoxious sin is disgraced by people and they no longer pay him respect. His counterpart with far less knowledge, fulfils the rights of God and is held in higher esteem in people’s hearts (see Ibn al-Jawzî 2011, 277).

34 We know al-Nâbulusî had great faith in books having the power to educate and transform people. As Bakri Aladdin has pointed out, it was the books themselves that were the real teachers of al-Nâbulusî (see Aladdin 1985, 82–84).
earlier scholars, that in order to preserve one’s spiritual integrity, assumption of exogenous corruption was woefully self-defeating, as it would lead to one’s ego assuming one was better than others.\(^\text{35}\) Rather, despite evident societal dissolution, one is required to reflexively contort their perception, and to regard themselves as being of a lesser moral standing than people in society, or at least to outwardly manifest this position. The empirical reality to undergird the Damascene shaykh’s dismay with his social circumstances is supported \textit{prima facie} by his personal account, our limited accessibility to the effects on his personal state notwithstanding. Therefore, should al-Nābulusī have affected self-diminution if he was unable to genuinely view himself as being corrupt and society as virtuous, in contradistinction to the advice of others such as al-Ghazālī and Abū l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1073) who thought it proper to view oneself as being the party guilty of moral deficiencies in such a scenario?\(^\text{36}\) Al-Nābulusī was unwilling to do so and thus radically departs from what would seem a fundamental commitment to any serious spiritual-mystical sojourn in the lives of some earlier practitioners of this type of seclusion, perhaps even undermining its spiritual essence.

To reiterate, self-perception when considering isolation is explained in the following two ways: one leaves society because people are noxious or, conversely, that one regards themselves as objectionable and ethically-wanting. Al-Ghazalī and al-Qushayrī say one must view themselves as being corrupt and loathsome. This latter position, al-Qushayrī asserts, emerges from having crushed one’s ego while adopting the former stance is to manifest superiority over creation. Whoever effaces his ego is humble; he who feels supercilious towards any individual is arrogant (al-Qushayrī 2013, 138). Al-Nābulusī adopts the opposite position. Among the \textit{ahadīth} which address this conundrum are two \textit{prima facie} paradoxical traditions. The first suggests seclusion to stave off one’s evil from people; the second that seclusion is meant to protect one from the evil of others. Nonetheless, sequestering oneself in the above \textit{ahadīth} is meant as a protective measure rather than to prevent corruption, either to oneself or others. Therefore, one who solely seeks spiritual edification through

\(^{35}\) This is a common trope in Sufi discussions on humility. In Sufi parlance, humility, is to see everything which comes to you as coming from God. Al-Shiblī is said to have asked Yūsuf b. Asbāt about the extreme limit of humility. He replied: “when you come out of your house, you consider everyone you see better than yourself” (Nurbaksh 1988, 81–82). Fuḍayl said: “Whoever sees himself as having worth has no share in humility,” while Bayazid said humility was when a person “sees himself as possessing neither station nor state and sees no one among God’s creatures worse than himself” (Nurbaksh 1988, 86).

\(^{36}\) Philosophers during the Enlightenment such as Spinoza (d. 1677), Friedrich Nietzsche (d. 1930) and David Hume (d. 1776) vehemently opposed this view, disparaging humility and disregarding it as a virtue; ostensibly they would laud al-Nābulusī’s stance on this point (see McPherson 2016, 163, 212).
reclusion is not *ipso facto* directly acting on those *ahadīth* which encourage isolation, based on al-Nābulusī's compilation. Al-Nābulusī does not seem to be acting primarily for the achievement of such esoteric rewards and nor therefore sees “humility” as an important issue to address within the *Takmīl*.

If the content of al-Nābulusī's literary output and others' high-esteem of him and his self-perception were to be taken at face value, then it seems he was justified in taking his stance: society was corrupt, he was not. This does not seem contrary to humility or objectionable on moral grounds albeit, the stance is highly controversial in light of the principles of Sufi thought discussed above. Given al-Nābulusī's extensive use of source-texts we must admit that his rationale for seclusion was to some degree motivated by the Prophet through his traditions. In addition, it is incontrovertible that his emotions and sentiments clearly influenced his undertaking. It is arguable that if al-Nābulusī was less morally incensed and sensitive he may not have been incentivised by the *ahadīth* alone to forego contact with mainstream society, particularly if he had achieved a prominent teaching position. This seems realistic given that he gave up his seclusion in 1098/1687 and led an integrated public life buttressed by a swell in following that will ostensibly have helped subdue residual feelings of emotional detachment and pain (Shafir 2019, 613–614). The emotions and feelings evinced by al-Nābulusī give us a better idea of his attitude in a way that a list of *ahadīth* or impersonal anecdotes of others who undertook this practice would never disclose. After all, “emotions are part and parcel of ethical deliberation” (Nussbaum 2009, 172).

As illustrated above, the foundation of al-Nābulusī's moral epistemology is seen through the lens of received tradition and is heavily supported by his personal interpretations and experiences. Neither the religious elite nor the common-folk are spared vitriolic diatribes, effectively dismissing them as wastrels. Together the *Takmīl* and *Ghāyat al-Maṭlūb* – both of which were written during the seven-year seclusion – functioned as justifications for al-Nābulusī's extreme measures and sought to persuade readers of his moral judgement about the unbearable inhabitants of his city. What makes this period of his life relevant to study is that solitary action produces reflexives, these are insights that are developed when alone through sustained, focussed, concerted effort, which lead to a “culturally skilful development of thought” (Cohen 2016, 153–155). The salience of this self-society relation almost *in absentia* through a written corpus expresses al-Nābulusī’s reading of his milieu and his subsequent ascription of meaning to religious texts, which reflect the underlying spirit of those texts according to his view, and in application to his particular circumstances. Hans Gadamer would concur that the undertaking of the interpreter of a text is that he must relate it to his situation in order to understand it at all
(Gadamer 1989, 324). Historical interpretation expresses not merely the linguistic expression of texts, but what the texts betray by delving “behind them and the meaning they express to inquire into the reality they express involuntarily” (Gadamer 1989, 336). Texts need explication, so that they are understood not only in terms of what they say but also what they exemplify (Gadamer 1989, 336). What al-Nābulusī’s arguments exemplify is that he was eminently capable of weaving the rich ḥadīth corpus to his context and skilfully apply it in a demonstrably favourable manner in congruence with his moral constitution.

7 Conclusion

The underlying rationale and the hermeneutic employed in al-Nābulusī’s analysis of severing social ties with most others is generously expatiated in the Takmīl. Beyond quoting ḥadīth extensively in the latter work, the Ghāyat al-Maṭlūb further captures his arguments related to the prevailing social and moral injustices which undergird his case for seclusion (al-Nābulusī 1995, 130). Together these texts display considerable insight into his moral sentiments at the time of writing. The theoretical basis of al-Nābulusī’s claim uses ḥadīth to support his actions, but it is clear they were not the only motivating force. Of course, al-Nābulusī may have felt compelled by the influence of religious texts to withdraw from society around 1090–1091/1679–1680, but arguably other forces were also at play, like unbearable societal corruption and his feelings of alienation (Nābulusī 2010, 97). Even though he was palpably a Sufi, the mystical element appears dim in his considerations to “withdraw” or practice ʿuzla from society.

The Takmīl and Ghāyat al-Maṭlūb are personal attempts by al-Nābulusī to combine his judgement on society with his religious hermeneutics to justify the drastic measures he takes. Written prior to the conclusion of his retreat, the former does not account for the reasons why he subsequently gives it up. Yet, it does show that moral issues were the significant rationale for his social disengagement even as no coherent moral theology is exposited. Together with other works written during the seclusion, much about his self-perception and personal struggles is revealed, giving us a glimpse of this understudied perspective about him which, as the above analysis demonstrates, in this instance,

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The context, which for brevity I do not delve into here, plays a crucial part in convincing al-Nābulusī to seek refuge from social interactions. It is worth noting: “People often over-estimate the degree to which language itself determines meaning and underestimate the role that context plays in every act of interpretation” (see Camper 2018, 17).
was driven largely by his moral theology. We also better understand his independence in the conclusions he came to, based on his reading of the texts, history and his specific context, for example, in the discussion on humility. This shows Islam to be a discursive tradition that may diverge considerably on ethical issues which are not straightforward to navigate based upon a simple reading of primary texts. Indeed, the texts about seclusion provided the necessary rationale for both engagement with, and the abdication of, the lauded social responsibilities towards others so emphasised in Islam. The application of these texts may change based on the subjective judgement of an individual, not only due to the reading of such texts, or even external socio-political circumstances, but also subject to the vicissitudes of inner emotional rifts caused, to some extent, by society's reception of one's ideas and their personal admiration or dislike of a public figure. Useful as the ṯākmīl is, it would be a stretch to attribute a coherent ethics of seclusion to al-Nābulusī's writings on this topic, yet, that he was ethically motivated in his withdrawal from society is undeniable, and it was the ahādīth that were ostensibly the mainstay of such an undertaking.

Bibliography


CHAPTER 8

The Ethical in the Transmission of Sunna

Rethinking the ‘Ulamā’-Quṣṣāṣ Conflict

Safwan Amir

1 Introduction

In a world of information-at-your-fingertips, the idea of transmitting knowledge from a pious individual to others, as seen in the Sunna’s case, might seem regressive and antithetical. While contemporary knowledge practices are but numerous chains of signifiers producing a further number of contexts, the Islamic tradition has held on to a unique system that tries to maintain its link to the Prophet Muhammad. What is the relevance of such hand-picking and fixation around establishing these links? How can a premodern method of knowledge transmission provide us with material to realise our dissonances in modern comprehension?

This chapter addresses early Islamic ethics and transmission through the premodern ‘ulamā’-quṣṣāṣ dichotomy. I argue that the qāṣṣ-ʿālim (preacher-scholar) relationship was one of a methodological approach rather than conflict that triggered true and false traditions of knowledge. This can better be characterised as a large scale premodern jadal (argumentation) and munāzara (debate) that took its gradual course within the Islamic tradition and was not specifically attuned to the operations of rupture or continuity as ascribed by contemporary historians. With the Prophetic tradition being a main site of contention for these two groups, I will first compare ḥadīth and qīṣṣa with an overarching idea of sunan in the background, then I look at that which is desired, in place of a telos, through the activities of the storyteller-preachers and ḥadīth scholars. The chapter moves on to elucidate the kind of selves (and selflessness) the two groups cultivated and disciplined. This allows us to locate possible genealogies of the isnād and matn approach, shaped by the muḥaddithūn, and how the ‘ulamā’ came to privilege it. Finally, I will end with a suggestion on how to approach such dispersed categories in history without falling for continuity and rupture as the only way out.

Absence and presence are two interconnected themes that direct this chapter – be it mediums analysed or characters cast. Since storyteller-preachers...
are seen as marginal entities, and are extinct in later centuries, present scholarship has engaged sparsely with them. This chapter then draws attention to the exuberant life of the qāṣṣ and his indubitable role in the everyday ethics of Islam. The work is historical but does not entitle any specific period in the premodern, and rather seeks to contribute to anthropological debates around transmission and inculcation of ethics.

2 The Scholar Meets the Preacher: Tradition and Authenticity

This chapter begins with an intriguing account. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), the revered Sunnī scholar, and his friend and hadīth transmitter Yaḥyā Ibn Maʿīn (d. 233/847) were in for a shock one day after the noon prayers. They heard a Baṣran qāṣṣ preaching:

Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal and Yaḥyā Ibn Maʿīn once related to me, on the authority of ‘Abd al-Razzāq (d. 211/827), from Maʿmar (d. 153/770), from Qatāda (d. 117/735), from Anas (d. 93/712), that the Messenger of God is reported to have said: “He who says lā ilāha illā Llāh causes a bird to be created from every word, with the beak made of gold, and feathers of pearls …”

Juynboll 1983, 158–159

The qāṣṣ went on for an equivalent of twenty pages while the two scholars conferred among themselves if either had transmitted this hadīth. Testifying that neither had heard this narration till date, they signalled to the qāṣṣ after his session and enquired from whom he had learnt this hadīth. The qāṣṣ immediately replied,

“Yaḥyā Ibn Maʿīn and Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal.” Ibn Maʿīn said: “But I am Yaḥyā Ibn Maʿīn and this man here is Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal and we have never heard of this mentioned as a Prophetic tradition.”

Juynboll 1983, 159

To this the qāṣṣ retorted “grinningly,”

I have always heard Yaḥyā Ibn Maʿīn is stupid … As if there were in the whole world no other Yaḥyā’s or Aḥmad’s except you two! I have
written down traditions from seventeen different people called Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal apart from this one here.

*Juynboll 1983, 159*

This is a classic example of an academically studied encounter with a *qāṣṣ* (pl. *quṣṣāṣ*) in medieval Islamic literature.

The linear story of the storyteller, *qāṣṣ*, is not new to students of premodern Islam. It begins in the initial centuries, following the death of Prophet Muhammad (d. 11/632), with the *qāṣṣ* or storyteller-cum-preacher seen as instrumental in spreading the tradition. Acting as a bricoleur, the *qāṣṣ* dons several religious odd-jobs that include, more frequently, narrating tales of an edifying nature, reciting Qurʾān (*qurrāʾ*), instructing, admonishing and exhorting (*wuʿʿāẓ*), as well as being transmitters of *sunan*, and, occasionally serving a *s qāḍī* (judge) and *khaṭīb* (Macdonald 1927; Goldziher 1971; Pellat 1976; ῈAthamina 1992; Armstrong 2017).

With a clientele that usually involved a large following of the masses, they were hastily concluded as “popular preachers” (Berkey 2001). Drawing ire of more well-trained ‘*ulamāʾ* and *muḥaddithūn*,² the *qāṣṣ* were severely criticised and ridiculed for their exaggeration and lack of authenticity. The storytellers’ tale, then, was bound to be a tragic one. The fall of the *qāṣṣ* was ensured by subsequent generations of ‘*ulamāʾ* who saw to it that they put an end to the storyteller’s lies (Halldén 2006; Firestone 2006). Few were roped in, and most were vilified. While the dominant position within academic scholarship has been to read this compelling story from the perspective of the ‘*ulamāʾ* and *muḥaddithūn*, in descending linear time, few (Afsaruddin 2002) have been sympathetic to the *qāṣṣ* by showcasing their gradual loss in social standing to the ‘*ulamāʾ*. However, what remains common in these two seemingly opposite standpoints is that the *qāṣṣ*’s hazy modes and vague means evolve into the ‘*ālim*’s certain and coherent ones. The Baṣran *qāṣṣ* instance above highlights this very movement (and moment) of imprecision to a more concrete approach towards the Islamic tradition. By exhibiting and asserting what fabrications are, these discourses have also, inadvertently, enabled definitions of

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1 Many modern academics cite this example showcasing premodern scholar’s contempt for the preacher (see also Juynboll 1983, 158–159; Goldziher 1971, 151–152). The story was cited in Ibn ‘Asākir 1995, 652-27; al-Dhahabi 1985, 11:86; Ibn Ḥajar 2002, 13:95. Al-Dhahabi (d. 748/1348) said: “this is a weird story (ḥikāya ‘ajība). Its narrator, [Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abd al-Wāḥid] al-Bakrī is not known to me. It might be forged by him.” Ibn Ḥajar (d. 852/1449) also said: “I don’t know him. He narrated unbelievable story (ḥikāya munkara). It might be forged by somebody else.”

2 Primarily, my comparison is between the *muḥaddithūn* and *quṣṣāṣ*. I use the term ‘*ulamāʾ* because in the end they privilege the *Isnād* and *Matn* form and method of the *Ḥadīth* scholars.
the contours of truth within what came to be known as the Islamic tradition, and more importantly how one needs to go about labelling authenticity.³

The earlier example, however, can generate other possible readings besides typical insinuations. The Baṣran qāṣṣ appears to playfully engage the two scholars – challenging their certitude and critiquing their method. He is quick in his responses, uses the right amount of rhetoric, and leaves the scholars irresolute for a short period. We only get to learn bits of the preacher’s content but can, undeniably, contend that the imaginative expanse being built-up was beautiful to the spectators’ ears. The scholars are left dumbfounded and forced to leave without any comeback. It is also important to observe the interesting oral to written comparison the scholar makes when he equates the length of the preacher’s utterance to a twenty-page entry (Goldziher 1971, 151). Apart from being a testimony to the fact that the quasiṣṣā have left us with scant written evidence, we also catch glimpses of the rugged terrain in these mediums of transmission. It is accurate that influential premodern scholars have chastised storytellers.⁴ Nevertheless, it goes unwarranted to state that this represented a major practice among scholars post third/ninth century. Nor does it justify the teleological premise that the qāṣṣ paved way for the ‘ulamā’. What can be said, in the least, is that the ‘ālim and qaṣṣ entered into contestations over practices now and then, but this did not define/limit their relationship.

3 Hadîth and Qiṣṣa: A Comparison of Sunna

Works of tabaqāt (Islamic biographical literature) help us understand the lives of scholars, as ‘ilm al-riyāl (the study of hadîth transmitters/narrators) is an important criterion for discerning the validity of a hadîth. There are special biographical genres for hadîth transmitters (tabaqāt al-muḥaddithîn) and the same can be found for the fuqahā’ (jurists), quḍāt (judges), Sufis, etc. However, there is a strong absence of tabaqāt works specifically revolving around the quasiṣṣā. And yet, the qaṣṣ is mentioned across most tabaqāt and similar biographies in passing. While we have to leave the reasons for this particular omission for later sections, we can nevertheless begin by observing the material the scholars and storytellers undertook.

³ Before entertaining the idea that this work takes a Shahab Ahmed (2015) turn, I would like to maintain that my interests are exceedingly around how modern academia have engaged with such discourses, rather than showcase supposed internal contradictions within the tradition.
The origins of both the ḥadīth and qiṣṣāṣ lie in the sunan, and yet the Sunna itself was never a fixed category. The sunan (guidelines for exemplary conduct) were never the sole purview of Prophet Muḥammad, especially in the initial centuries after his death. This does not mean that the Prophet’s mode of conduct was not ideal, or that the companions competed with the Prophet’s Sunna, but that the earlier phase of Sunna in the Islamic tradition included conducts of the Prophet’s companions as well (athar), as there was no consensus on the use of terms like “ḥadīth” (Ansari 1972, 256). The companions, as well as people of particular cities (Medina, for instance), considered various aspects of Prophetic and non-prophetic modes of conduct as sunan out of their deep connection with the Prophet. Wael Hallaq locates the history of Sunna and distinguishes between “practice-based sunan” and literary ḥadīth, by elaborating on how the former was primarily transmitted by storytellers, while the latter found prominence after the proliferation of a class of mobile traditionalists by the end of the second/eighth century (Hallaq 2009, 39–43). Such practice-based Sunna has to be identified with the very living processes of early everyday Islam, and even though the proliferation of literary ḥadīth at the hands of these newly emergent traditionists gains primacy, the role of the qāṣṣ and his transmission of sunan does not reduce in any way. Though the literary and living can be said to coalesce and overlap in this era, they do not have to eclipse each other. Let us focus on the two separately to understand the fine points with which they approached the Sunna.

Ḥadīth transmitters can be cited as some of the first to develop the isnād and matn (source and content) form. Thus, the entirety of any ḥadīth would include a set of proper names (kunya, nicknames, regional affiliations would also be included) to indicate the sanad that has been followed in capturing a particular Prophetic tradition. Such traditions are usually actions and sayings of the Prophet, as recounted by his companions, and these make up the matn (main content), the primary text within quotes. These narrations can also be followed by commentaries made by various scholars across time and space. Memory and religiosity (ethicality rather) are primary considerations that ḥadīth transmitters have to demonstrate for the validity of ḥadīth. While uṣūl al-ḥadīth has many ways of dealing with a ḥadīth and its transmitter, I am interested in these fundamental ones because it gives us a sense of the basic

5 Literally means “trace.” They are modes of conduct as well and can include artefacts related to the Prophet and his Companions.

6 The best example is to think of how the Qurʾān was never considered as learnt but as embodied. See Rudolph Ware (2014) for “embodiment as epistemology.” More on this in subsequent sections.
premises with which the scholar engages in such activities. Even within the domains of memory, the method was made further rigorous by the inclusion of only that Sunna that could be recollected verbatim. Contrarily, in a famous instance, while al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728) knew a Prophetic Sunna regarding a theological position, he was unable to give a "verbal transmission" attesting the same (Hallaq 1997, 14). Can the religiosity/ethicality of a noted tābi’ī (companion of the Companions) like al-Baṣrī be contested? Or does memory dictate the certainty of a sunna? How can such Sunna find life under such strenuous measures? One way is to go by the standards set by the muḥaddithīn themselves and consider the varying degrees of ḍaʿīf (weak), maqībūl (acceptable), ḥasan (good), and ṣaḥīḥ (authentic) ḥadīth. And yet, this approach is only attained after a long and arduous procedure of sieving that gave these Sunna their respective degrees. It is perhaps for this reason that Louis Massignon, the French scholar of Islam, said:

If the muḥaddithīn had succeeded in imposing their method and eliminating all ḥadīth with apocryphal isnād from the “authentic” collections, believers would now have only dried meat to feed meditation: a few prescriptions concerned only with hygiene and civility, sandal cleaning, and the right wood for making toothpicks.

Massignon 1997, 85–86

What happens to the remaining sunan? Are they never to be actualised in the Islamic tradition?

The quṣṣāṣ place us in a unique predicament given that they are hardly studied in any relevant manner, especially regarding how they engaged ethically or their transmission of Sunna. The fact that focus has never been on the qāṣṣ, even at the minimal level of a storyteller, is indicative of an issue of obsession around who wrote over who spoke. Much of the qiṣṣa that are available from early Islam are anonymous entries, repetitions, and a combination of various ḥikāyāt (stories). Lyall Armstrong writes:

The term qiṣṣa (pl. qiṣṣas) is more problematic; “story” does not adequately encompass the breadth of the term ... [A] qiṣṣa, during the period of time in question, seems to indicate any general piece of instruction given by a qāṣṣ [preacher/storyteller] ... The term incorporates number of different types of instruction, including actual stories, verses of poetry, legal rulings, ḥadīth, as well as martial statements given on the field of battle.

Armstrong 2017, 9
My concern is not with the written author or the original narrator, but with those who related and passed on the qīṣa generation after generation. These “storytellers” are never mentioned or given their due because western scholars have indulged in a larger historian’s disdain for the storyteller in studies on the Islamic tradition. In doing so, they follow the legacy of historians like John Wansbrough (1977) and Patricia Crone (1987) who saw the storyteller with suspicion and as a source of inauthenticity in the tradition (Armstrong 2017, 81). This absence and dearth of sources then imply that we must look at other places for answers. Concentrating on the root q-ṣ-ṣ, we learn from Arabic lexicons (especially Ibn Manẓūr’s (d. 711/1311) Lisān al-ʿArab (“The Tongue of the Arabs”)), from the eighth/fourteenth century onwards, that the words “trace,” “echo,” and “footprint” are equally important when locating the multiple definitions of the term “qāṣṣ.” A shared quality of traces, footprints, and echoes is that they do not have an ever-active presence, and yet their absence is never fully realised. Derrida (d. 2004) puts it succinctly:

Trace is not a presence but is rather the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond itself. The trace has, properly speaking, no place, for effacement belongs to the very structure of the trace.

DERRIDA 1973, 156

This peculiar potential of the term qāṣṣ needs to be read as a built-in mechanism that challenges standard mnemonic practices and mediums.

To illustrate the same, let us look at the narrative strategies employed by the qāṣṣ in their qīṣaṣ. Stories (qīṣaṣ) did not take the prominent isnād and matn form, but the storyteller (qāṣṣ) took the Prophet Muḥammad as their model (Abbott 1967, 14). The quṣṣāṣ played a major role in extending the Prophetic imagination in the initial centuries after his death. The form of the qīṣa would generally include narratives of and around the Prophet. The Prophet would appear in various ways – in dreams or in other spatio-temporalities (al-isrā’ wa-l-miʿrāj being an example), or, simply, in the Ḥijāz. There would be an added local flavour to these stories – generally a story of how the ruler of the locale embraced Islam and how he felt intense love for the Prophet. They would also include the ṣaḥāba (Companions), tābiʿūn (Companions’ companion), and other well-known Islamic figures. Tellings of qīṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ included stories of other Prophets and these would usually lead to a story of the Prophet Muḥammad. Emphasis and inclination always tend to the Prophet

7 To cut, narrate, and shear are other meanings.
and this is the widespread rule of the *qiṣṣa*. Reception is of key importance here and the audience enters into the world of the storyteller (Berkey 2001, 43–52; Armstrong 2017, 161–163).

The *qāṣṣ* does not rely much on memory and improvises most of the time. These improvisations were often called *bidʿa* (innovations) and admonished by scholars. An interesting example is the reason for the ninth/fifteenth century scholar al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) writing *Tadhkir al-Khawāṣṣ min Akadhī al-Quṣṣāṣ* (“A Warning to the Retinue against the Lies of the Storytellers”). The grand ʿālim says that he had come across a *qāṣṣ* (preacher/storyteller) who was transmitting a Prophetic Sunna without verifying or attributing it to the “right sources.” The preacher retorted to this blatant criticism by saying, “I will verify them with the people!” and the audience who were witness to al-Suyūṭī’s admonishing turned against the ʿālim and threatened to stone him (Berkey 2003, 255–256).

We have two interconnected points to reflect on: one, an organic relationship between the larger public (the masses) and the *qāṣṣ* as seen in this instance, and second, the concept of “verifying with the people.” When the preacher says that he derives his verification from the people, he is not implying a popular idea of religion or subscribing to a status of the popular. The *qāṣṣ* observes the community he is attached to, interacts with people, is knowledgeable about their issues, spends time with them, is privy to their moral fibre, recognises the various classes, gives advice when sought, and prays for them.8 It is for this reason that Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201) notes:

The common people ... rarely meet a jurist, so they discuss things with [the preacher]. The preacher is like the trainer of animals, who educates them, reforms them and refines them.

BERKEY 2001, 24

Coming back to the genre of the *qiṣṣa*, we learn from al-Khāzin (d. 741/1340) that a *ḥikāya* (story) is called a *qiṣṣa* because the “narrator releases the story bit by bit” (bin Tyeer 2016, 12; see also al-Khāzin 2004, 2:511). This releasing in piecemeal is deliberate and is based on the depth and breadth of knowledge the audience is accustomed to. The *qāṣṣ* is careful not to overdo the amount of preaching and storytelling, and is highly receptive to the moods and sentiments of the audience. In such instances, the *qāṣṣ* has to then “verify” with

8 Ideally, the *qādi*, should intimately know the society where he is placed or know ethically sound people from the society who have knowledge in these matters. It comes as no surprise that the *qudâḥ* and *quṣṣâs* were one and the same for a brief time in Islamic history. It is highly possible that those whom the *qādi* sought for intimate social knowledge were the *qāṣṣ*. 

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the people as to what they want and how well they can be instructed and narrated appropriate tales worthy of that period. These could vary from specific Islamic months, impending war, water scarcity, famine, extensive fitna, severe debt, and social crises to numerous everyday personal issues. In all these cases, the qāṣṣ would narrate and mention the Prophet, instil hope, and bring about unity among people. In short, these were not mere qiṣāṣ but aḥsan al-qaṣaṣ (the best of stories) as the fifth/eleventh-century exegete and mystic al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1074) maintains – such qiṣaṣ would mention the beloved Prophet Muhammad and his beloveds, usually contain imitable and inspiring “ideal behaviour,” and are not “explicitly didactic (command/forbid)” as these could induce “feelings that insinuate shortcomings” (bin Tyeer 2016, 12; see also al-Qushayrī 2000, 2:166–167).

4 Medium beyond Absence and Presence

In one of his earlier works, Jacques Derrida rereads the origin myth of writing through Plato (d. 347 BCE). He shows how Western philosophy privileges speech over writing since it was believed that the latter was a mere representation of higher forms of truth and presence (Derrida 1981). Muslim societies privilege a “culturally specific logocentrism,” in the Derridean sense, of the spoken word via recitation (both textually and from oral/rote memory) (Messick 1993, 25). The dichotomy between the written and spoken word can be seen right from the beginning of Islam, with various close associates and teacher-student ties diverging on this question (Afsaruddin 2002, 20). And yet, our previous discussion on the quṣṣāṣ and their trace-based characteristics, points to different modalities of absence/presence from the western one. Regarding a mark or trace, Derrida believes that absence is key to communication, and words can be grafted onto other contexts which results in endless chains of signifiers, divorced from its origins and a metaphysics of presence (Derrida 1982). It is crucial to locate Derrida’s idea of absence/presence in more concrete terms. His commentary on communication and transmission of ideas vis-à-vis absence is an apt representation of the conditions with which modernity moves about. Rather than the mere breakdown of authority or specific sites of dissemination, absence involves the blurring of ethical contours that were in place.

I propose reading Derrida’s transformation of a metaphysics of presence to an ontology of absence as an insightful reading of the very shift from premodern knowledge practices (like the ones seen in the Sunna) to a modern-day information explosion. While the written and oral came to be identified as
modes that changed due to its explicit nature, the ethical has often gone unrecognised as the larger site for transformations. Derrida’s re-reading of the origin myth of writing in Plato is crucially an attempt to showcase the ethical value at stake in the written and oral. The various Gods involved in this reading are not tropes to give an essential Greek flavour but attempts to provide metaphors to the deep shifts that are studied and witnessed by Derrida.

In this chapter, I invoke the Derridean trace only because there are no clear concepts of absence and presence in an immediately available language of Islam. In a different spatio-temporal context, the hadith, as chains of transmission that harbour on pious individuals throughout the premodern, allowed for some kind of presence. This can be seen as late as al-Suyūṭī who wrote Kitāb al-Farq Bayna al-Muṣannif wa-l-Sāriq (“Book on the Difference Between the Compiler and the Thief”) to expose another ʿālim’s “misdoings” (Abdel-Ghaffar 2018). The latter’s crime was that he had not attributed a particular work to al-Suyūṭī. The work in question is not one that al-Suyūṭī composed himself, rather his labour was in organising, gathering, and ordering narrated accounts of the Prophet. This book is “a tissue of quotations” and al-Suyūṭī believed that proper attribution to the one who found them, gathered them from a variety of sources, and ensured their authenticity is essential to respect the effort put into to make the book’s knowledge available (Abdel-Ghaffar 2018). The book is not al-Suyūṭī’s words and yet the kind of attribution that he seeks is one of presence or harbouring around pious individuals who could authorise the content within. Al-Suyūṭī’s concerns, almost like a premonition, also give us a sense of the world that was about to emerge (early modernity/colonialism) – a strong threat to both knowledge and ethics wherein it could be communicated in absence. Thus, we learn that the ‘ulamāʾ were not necessarily attacking the quṣṣāṣ alone but were wary of an impending approach to knowledge and ethics, and it was the realm of practices that they sought to redress.

All the same, what did presence and absence mean to the qāṣṣ and his followers? It can be noted that various qiṣṣās were translated into the written format at the hands of author-jurists and scholars who attended their sessions

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9 Without doubt, fanāʾ might be one. However, the term has been so closely associated with the mystical that reimagining it, or working through its standardised meaning, might be difficult.

10 “Allowed” in the past tense, because hadīth and other Prophetic sayings are almost always used in the present, out of context, or contexts are given to them when people use them for various purposes, including rhetoric and polemics, in their lives. Modernity has made it possible to by-pass the pious individuals they usually were harboured around. “So and so” reports “such and such” is only important for the text and content that is iterable and graftable to new contexts.
in the sixth/twelfth century, and onwards. People and their qāṣṣ, nonetheless, do not seem interested in this transitional phase. If anything, it has probably only been of application for later day historians. To advance the question we have set for ourselves at the beginning of this section, it is pertinent to tap into multiple potentials of the trace within the qāṣṣ.

The legendary tale of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and the marauders give us a starting point to think of the diverging ways in which presence/absence plays in an Islamic setting. The story goes that a group of raiders stopped al-Ghazālī’s caravan and robbed him of his most prized possession—numerous books he had written, collated, and held close to heart. A desperate al-Ghazālī tells the chief raider to take away his possessions except for his cherished books. To this the chief retorts that if al-Ghazālī requires the presence of these books then the scholar has not benefited from studying them (Macdonald 1899, 76). This leaves the great ʿālim in deep reflection and initiates his second phase of heightened truth-seeking. The thief is not coincidental here, just like nothing else is in the Islamic tradition. His statements are not mere statements but are quite similar to those of the qāṣṣ. They are effective and powerful. They hit exactly where they are supposed to and Imām al-Ghazālī undergoes a thorough transformation thereafter. I am not suggesting that the thief is a qāṣṣ in disguise. Rather, the potential of the verb “qāṣṣ” can only be found in such extreme or unusual instances. The thief is interesting because, in his act of thievery, he is also advising (naṣīḥa) al-Ghazālī. The advice is also not a direct statement issued to al-Ghazālī, which is quite similar to the edifying content of the qiṣṣa. He is not commanded to enjoin right or forbid wrong (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar). And yet, the nature of this transformation is an ethical one.

In an important essay on the category of maʿrūf, Kevin Reinhart comments that ethical content and reflection must be found outside the Qurʾān in relation to changing environments (Reinhart 2017). He also suggests that solutions to “socially fraught situations” (especially those that concern the micro doings of people) that require Muslims to enact maʿrūf cannot be directly found in the Qurʾān. Reinhart’s premise is based on the closing of tradition in the early centuries of Islam and postulates that people in the present end up distorting the

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11 While I agree that maʿrūf can include lots of possibilities beyond a fixed category of “good,” my case is against those who try to read Islam’s entire ethical content through a shallow rendition of al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar.
Qurʾān, a debate that I will not enter into. Reinhart, nevertheless, mentions in passing that such social situations demand “tact,” and “creative openness,” and these are “qualities” that the “Sīra emphatically attributes the Prophet himself” with (Reinhart 2017, 67). The essay works towards the scripture with an overt presence, privileging the written, and yet, it cannot do this without mentioning (even in passing) an aspect that he considers to be absent – the Prophet’s unique life. What the scholarly analysis fails to do is take up this crucial aspect of the sīra when it comes to dealing with maʿrūf, ethics, and the Qurʾān itself. This could stem from modern scholarship that presumes law and ethics as confused in the Shariʿa, or a predominant focus on the textual without bringing out their deeply embodied characteristics. The human body is disciplined to bring about necessary ends, with the ethical being an important one.

In his exceptionally brilliant ethnography, Rudolph Ware examines Qurʾān schools in Africa to show that the Qurʾān and knowledge that emanates from it is not learnt, but, rather, embodied. The Prophet, simply, is the walking Qurʾān, while the hadīth cannot be treated as scripture but “are best understood as historical traces of normative practice that can also be known through chains of embodied transmission” (Ware 2014, 13). The medium then is not about written or oral, but about the very person who transmits the Prophetic Sunna.

If so, ethics and maʿrūf (and the diverse possibilities the term offers) need to be understood through the ways in which they are actualised through the body rather than consider them as a mental process of choices to be found in quotes or texts. But how do we understand this embodiment in the case of the qāṣṣ? How do we think of the qāṣṣ as a medium beyond absence and presence in the usual Western philosophical sense? al-Qushayrī cites Abū ‘Alī l-Thaqafī (d. 328/940) in his Rīsāla (“Epistle”) to say:

12 For more on the closing of the gate tradition and ḥijāthād, see Hallaq 1984. For more on the modern construction of the Muslim subject vis-à-vis fundamentalism, see Mamdani 2004.

13 The idea of habitus is relevant here while thinking of knowledge, bodies, and their intimate connections. Habitus are those aspects of tradition that are effective, learnt, and acquired by the body through transmission which includes essentially oral, imitative, and repetitions among others (Mauss 1973; 2006). Ibn Khaldūn (d. 838/1436) theorised the concept of “malaka” which can be said to be a forerunner of the concept of habitus (Messick 1993, 261).

14 This is not to return to the debate between “lived” and “textual” Islam, but to look at the very nature of tradition as primarily embodied discourses (Asad 2015).
If someone could absorb all the sciences ... he would still be unable to attain the rank of the real men (lā yablughu mablagha al-rijāl) unless he engages ... in exercises under the supervision of a master (shaykh), religious leader (imām) or a sincere preacher (muʿaddib nāṣih).

AL-QUSHAYRĪ 2007, 63

This move beyond the usual sciences in the attainment of higher degrees of being is characterised by exercising on the self with the help of a set of experts. That the sciences alone could not get one to a higher degree of piety or closeness with his Lord is stressed here. Thus, we come to realise an aspect of knowledge through the potential of the trace. It is to such experts and exercises that we need to turn to realise what and who the storyteller-preacher is. The qussāṣ as a medium beyond the oral, written, presence, and absence point to their trajectory as ethical repositories.

5 Self and Self-Lessness

Let us focus on this bodily aspect of ethics in detail. As we have seen in the previous section, the one who moves beyond nominal knowledge and sciences makes use of assistance from particular experts to attain the “rank of real men.” But, how does such assistance work out? One of the standard ways in which internalisation of ethics is understood is via what Foucault has given currency to – “technologies of the self.” However, the subject does not transform themselves on their own in all scenarios. They avail “the help of others” to orient their “own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being” to attain particular states of living (Foucault 1988, 18; 1997, emphasis added). Within an Islamic context, especially picked up by the anthropology of Islam, such operations on the self (and soul) have been studied in detail to show how the body becomes a site for the cultivation of virtues and discouraging of vices as defined by the tradition (Asad 2003; Mahmood 2005; Hallaq 2013).

What interests me are these “others” who “help” people with their desired ethical practices and states of living. What kind of disciplining do they go through to ensure this service? There is literature available on how the fuqahāʾ, ‘ulamāʾ, and Sufis go through disciplinary training, and yet, as indicated earlier, the kind of attitude historians have taken towards the qussāṣ, the

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15 Whether al-Ghazālī’s thief was “muʿaddib” is, nevertheless, contested. We do, however, know through this very Risāla, that thieving marauders can undergo events which set deep transformations in motion (al-Qushayrī 2007, 18, 399).
question of internalisation and pedagogic exercises can hardly be found even among those who studied the various facets of the storyteller-preacher. To reach this point of what went into training the qaṣṣ, we are forced to look for answers elsewhere again. We learn from multiple sources that preachers were generally associated with or mentioned alongside zuhd in premodern Islam (al-Qushayrī 2007, 37–38; Massignon 1997, 112–115; Berkey 2001, 50–53; Afsaruddin 2007, 142). The concept of zuhd is a complex one to explain predominantly due to the easy translation in “asceticism” that it receives. While numerous premodern scholars have defined and thought about this in detail, I will (due to my limitations) merely term it here as “moving away from the self.” Controlling the self or nafs is a common trope in the Islamic tradition, and it comes as no surprise that the qaṣṣas took it up as an important component of their work while preaching and narrating.

Exploring the subtle details of preaching led me to locate a few significant roles that the storyteller-preacher engaged in. Healing in its multiple dimensions happened to be a role that the qaṣṣas took up, or had to pick up, given the intimate nature of their relationship with the society they were placed in or visiting, as mentioned earlier. A couple of verses composed, as late as the ninth/fifteenth century, in honour of a preacher is illuminating here:

Our imam preached [waʿaṣa] to mankind – the eloquent man who poured out the sciences like an ocean filled to overflowing and healed hearts with his knowledge and his preaching for only the preaching of a righteous man [ṣāliḥ] can heal.

BERKEY 2001, 39

“Healing hearts” can be said to have a spiritual angle to it. However, the heart is also about the body – a body that is at once individual and social.

16 The nafs is again differentiated into many types and is beyond the scope of this chapter. Imām al-Ghazālī’s works have influenced much scholarship to this day on this subject.

17 A good example is Qiṣṣat Shakarwati Farmād or “Tale of the Great Chera King” (Kugle and Margariti 2017, 362) where the qaṣṣ includes a separate prayer seeking features of zuhd, and pushes the audience to think and reflect beyond their selves.

18 Which is not to divide the spiritual from other aspects of life. Rather, my point is to extend this argument alone.

19 A famous sahiḥ hadīth goes like this: “You see the believers as regards their being merciful among themselves, showing love among themselves and being kind among themselves, resembling one body, so that, if any part of the body is not well then the whole body shares the sleeplessness (insomnia) and fever with it.” Al-Bukhārī 1997, 8:36: Kitāb al-Adab (“Book of Good Manners”), Bāb Raḥmat al-Nās wa-l-Bahāʾīm (“Chapter on Being Merciful to the People and Animals”).
qāṣṣ with his intimate approach to people allows for not merely an advisory or counseling relationship, but one where he is in the centre of things. A deeply grounded kind of ḥikma (wisdom) arises from such intimacy. This is an organic relationship and needs to be addressed and read in that manner. By interacting and intervening in social issues that take the breadth and expanse of day to day problems, family complications, bodily ailments, mental issues, the qāṣṣ attempts solutions. Ḥikma now expands in prospect and we get to see multiple meanings of the concept in play. There is a sense of signifying “wisdom” which is also about holding things in equilibrium and harmony. The body (social and individual) needs to be healed to maintain its equilibrium. The qāṣṣ would initially diagnose a problem and try to come to a point that attempts to balance issues. This can be found in the case of a heated argument between two families where the qāṣṣ would play the role of a moderator and try to ease the tension by alluding to simple examples or sayings. This moderator role can be found among many learned men, but the qāṣṣ stands out for uniquely submitting themself to this particular role. Thus, the zuhd that they engage in can be seen to derive from moving away from their selves in the service of others. I term this as technologies of selflessness.

But, we are still not clear on the exact nature of this pedagogical training that the qāṣṣ enters into. How does one discipline the self to move away from the self? A point that goes hand-in-hand with this is the anonymous nature of the qiṣas that the storyteller-preacher-hakīm (wiseman) entertains the society with. Why do they remain anonymous when we have seen scholars, like al-Suyūṭī, take strong positions on attributing and referencing people? Why have the qāṣṣ remained anonymous to the extent that there are no specific ṭabaqāt that discuss them as their primary topic? Humility is an overarching concept of zuhd and is perhaps the most common among all who have practiced selflessness (al-Qushayri 2007, 134–138). Thus, anonymity was part of the humility that the zāhid-qāṣṣ cultivated which led them to stay unnamed, care less for titles or labels, and, at times, forget their designations.

It is important to take this point in direct comparison with that of the ʿālim, not to privilege a dichotomy, but to understand the divergent ways in which selves can also be thought of.20 One primary goal in a fast-changing world, that the scholars had rightly anticipated throughout – the idea of ensuring proper attribution, is also part of moving away from this world and still being

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20 I do not want to engage with the self in terms of a telos because a set of ethical practices only lead to another or affirm/better the ongoing ones. Thus, to read the disciplining of selves as aimed only for the next world can limit the potential of thinking around cultivation of ethical selves.
remembered and prayed for. Al-Suyūṭī’s purpose in writing *al-Farq* is also to ensure this very aspect of life and afterlife (Abdel-Ghaffar 2018). As part of cultivating humility and other virtues, the *qāṣṣ* went about preaching and narrating without naming themselves but would often name others. By attributing others – fictitiously and genuinely – they were not entering into the realm of what constitutes honesty/dishonesty, but were ensuring that one of the goals of the scholar lives on. It is this kind of service that needs to be thought of when we take up narratives like that of Ibn Ḥanbal and Yaḥyā Ibn Maʿīn which we saw in the beginning. Thus, the grin that appears on the Baṣran *qāṣṣ* needs to be rethought through what the Prophet taught: “*smile, it’s Sunna.*”

6 Transmission and Development

Having learnt the divergent approaches to disciplining the self, we are now left with the question of transmission, itself. Once again, the lives of the ‘*ulumā’* and *quṣṣāṣ* need to be read as intertwined if we are to unearth the ways in which transmission took place among the *qāṣṣ*. We are aware of the presence of scholars in various *qāṣṣ* sessions – *imām* al-Ghazālī being quintessential here (Berkey 2001, 53). Easy deductions allow us to say with some clarity that preachers attended other preaching sessions. This is seen through numerous renditions of the same story in several *qiṣṣ* – few characters and a basic narrative stand while additions play out now and then. A storyteller follows another storyteller only to the extent where the fundamentals of the story are intact. The rest is left to what has been accused as innovation/imagination (*bidʿa*).

Let us focus on this imaginative aspect of such “accretions.” While charges against the *quṣṣāṣ* are that of giving free rein to people’s imaginations, the counter can also be claimed. By being highly performative and moving beyond ordinary conventions of *lisān* (linguistic abilities), the world that the storyteller-preacher presents are minutely detailed. This richness in description can be compared to the Geertzian “thick description,” for a lack of a better analogy. The ethnographer utilises this method to describe the field in

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21 Various instances of the Prophet smiling are commonplace in all major *ḥadīth* sources. “Your smiling in the face of your brother is charity (*ṣadaqa*), commanding good and forbidding evil is charity ...” Al-Tirmidhī 2007, 4:62: Kitāb Abwāb al-Būr wa-l-Ṣila (“Book on Righteousness and Maintaining Good Relations With Relatives”), Bāb Mā Jāʿa fi Ṣanāʾī al-Maʿrūf (“Chapter on What Has Been Related about Various Kinds of Good Deeds”).

22 On a detailed engagement of the *qāṣṣ* with *lisān*, please refer to Armstrong (2017, 157–159).

23 Clifford Geertz (d. 2006) is an anthropologist of fame for developing the ethnographic method of “thick description” which is still used and taught in the discipline of
detail – taking in every aspect, big or small, a wink or a fight, while analysing the various subjective positions and meanings that can be generated – the same can be said of the storyteller. The “twenty-page” equivalency that the writer imputes to the Başran qāṣṣ’s preaching in the initial example can be understood as a kind of thick description. We get to learn only the introductory bit and are left to imagine what may have followed. However, the storyteller’s audience is enthralled by the kind of “thick description” they are privy to. In short, the qāṣṣ steers the imagination of the audience and limits their capacity to do so on their own. Perhaps a hadith, in contrast, with its short and crisp layout might evoke an untethered imagination in the contemporary era.

As the qāṣṣ were ethical repositories, a point we have delved in detail in earlier sections, it can also be safe to add that theimaginative they encouraged via these “thick descriptions” was well within the boundaries of the ethical. In a way, if the ‘ulamā’ were attentive to scrupulousness in sources, the quṣṣāṣ can be said to have shown scrupulousness in the daily lives of the people around them. This is not to say that the ‘ulamā’ were not careful of their outward behaviour, but it can be said that their over emphasis on texts might have kept them aloof from the laity. The qāṣṣ, on the other hand, derived their sources from other ethically sound qāṣṣ (quite similar to the muḥaddithūn). The only difference happens to be their diverging approaches to presence and absence on a longer duration. The qāṣṣ are aware that the qiṣaṣ have been transmitted through a kind of presence that is almost-ever absent, while the ‘ulamā’ are wary of losing an ongoing presence within the tradition.

To further this argument, it is necessary to recognise the kind of transformation the qāṣṣ went about themselves. This will also partially answer questions on the public nature of their preaching and the idea of public religion. The evolution of the quṣṣāṣ is to be read along lines with the evolution of the guild system post the fourth/tenth century. The close association of the qāṣṣ with the guilds provide us some direction as to how transmission itself was undertaken. Association with a guild was the only credential to possessing knowledge and later being able to transmit it (Makdisi 1993, 377). However, associating with guilds would also mean opening up the category of the storyteller to include other vocations – that of the blacksmith or the barber or any occupation that would ensure humility while staying mobile.

anthropology (Geertz 1973). However, subsequent anthropologists have critiqued the method for being ahistorical and limiting the idea of “religion,” see Asad (1993), especially chapter one. The analogy here is strictly to describe the lengths to which the storyteller goes into describing a narrative.
The *isnād* and *matn* approach has been the major site of methodology in most contemporary scholarship on Islam. But, once again, it should be noted that during the premodern period it was a matter only for those who were concerned about it. Or rather, to put the same idea in another way – fixating around absence and presence in terms of authority/authenticity was not the concern of all scholars. While many modern scholars are quick in pointing to “political” issues, especially that of the Kharijīs, as the reason for obsessing around authenticity (Juynboll 1983), we have already seen that the ethical can be equally important. However, we have hardly been able to think of the context in which the ethical has been placed by and for the scholar. Reception might give us a faint idea in this regard. Scholarly works were read, copied, transmitted, and memorised by a group that, though spread across time and space, were overtly beginning to identify themselves as one. Their interlocutors, and quite often concerns, were not the people or the larger masses directly. The *qāṣṣ*, on the other hand, was one among the people, their audience was the common mass, and the society they were placed in were their interlocutors. By this comparison, the aim has been to suggest that the idea of the ethical when it comes to scrupulousness need not be the same for the *ʿulamāʾ* and others.

When we approach the *isnād* and *matn* method in this fashion, we need to admit that it was more a scholarly engagement among a few, rather than a methodology to approaching Islam as a whole, till at least the tenth/sixteenth century.

But the question remains how did we, in modern academia, come to privilege the *isnād* and *matn* approach as the only one? I believe the issue stems from how we have looked at the concept of trust itself. If anything, our entire argument till now shows that the dialectic between the *ʿulamāʾ* and *quṣṣāṣ* has been based on various ideas that take the breadth and length of methodology, approach, and sources but not overarchingly around trust. How people came to trust their peer in the premodern has nothing to do with how contemporary scholarship has come to trust and obsess around positivist facts and phenomena.

7 Conclusion

Rather than summarising what has been done in this chapter, I would like to conclude by suggesting that reading premodern Islam through the historical methods of both conflict/rupture and continuity need not be the only ways in which the past needs to be studied. While they do make for important analyses, one is left wondering whether our privileging of such binary methods
can explain and expand the scope of matters that have deeper non-material underpinnings.24 Rather than seeing the qāṣṣ and ʿālim (preacher-scholar) relation as one of conflict that spurred separate traditions of knowledge, I have tried to argue that the issue was one of a methodological approach to knowledge itself. This chapter should not be read as overemphasising the scholar versus preacher-storyteller theme to reimpose a binary, but to recognise how important the scholar is to any historical understanding of knowledge in the Islamic tradition. It is through a comparison with the scholar that the storyteller’s method can be traced and closely read.

Further their diverging methods of transmission also converge at many junctures, and hence they need not be seen as drastically in opposition to one another. They were not in competition but were interested in maintaining and propagating their approach (and the subsequent chains of transmission) as the best/unique one for their varied reasons. This can better be characterised as a large scale premodern jadal (argumentation) and munāẓarah (debate) that took a gradual course over time within the Islamic tradition and was not specifically attuned to the operations of rupture or continuity as ascribed by historians. Or, this can be thought in terms of how learned members of the society would balance practices that stretched between overt-piety and extreme laxity. Ḥikma (wisdom) would be sought in these cases to, then, induce a new set of dialectics in place. While the ʿulamāʾ did come to represent all walks of engagement with knowledge in the Islamic world, knowledge itself came to be defined by historians within the ambit of “religion.”

The history of the quṣṣāṣ is a way to initiate discussion into preconceived notions of what knowledge meant, how they were authorised, and in what ways people responded to them. It also attempts to think of the ethical beyond literal scriptures and manifest in pious individuals who walked across the length and breadth of the premodern world, imitating the Prophet Muḥammad. While the chapter attempted to answer the question of what happened to all the sunan that did not go through the rigorous method of isnād and matn, we are left with another matter to end with: What happened to the quṣṣāṣ after the early period of transmission? Where did they disappear into with the coming of stronger authorities and established knowledge traditions?

To attempt a history of the storyteller beyond the initial centuries of the Islamic tradition will then require us to also move along with these preachers and enter into domains away from the “centre.” The periphery, in a way,

24 The attempt is to include the non-material, or rather immaterial. This does not mean that the material is a separate domain or cannot be perceived through the non-material. Rather, privileging the material is contested.
being the site for conversion and future conversations, allows for a richer history of the storyteller-preacher. The preacher’s connection with guilds and the way they moved about preaching the word of Islam will give us a better lead to the lives of these storytellers that is not limited to the activity of storytelling. This will also mean analysing not only the standard ḥikāya or qiṣṣa, but also the multiple forms that such genres would later merge with such as shadow puppetry, kissa pattu, dastangoi, and other storytelling forms in South and Southeast Asia. The storyteller, if anything, is yet to complete his tale.

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Chapter 9

Abū Shuqqa’s Approach to the Ḥadīth
Towards an Egalitarian Islamic Gender Ethics

Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir

1 Introduction

Over the past three decades, many feminist and progressive Muslims have criticised the Ḥadīth and dismissed them from their projects on egalitarian gender ethics in Islam. Fatima Mernissi (d. 2015) argued that all Ḥadīths demeaning women are traditions of misogyny falsely attributed to the Prophet and accordingly are not authoritative sources of Islamic teachings (Mernissi 1991). Riffat Hassan (b. 1943) and Ali Asghar Engineer (d. 2013) also contended that the Hadīth is a source of patriarchal Islam and are not authoritative enough to construct a notion of egalitarian Islam (Hassan 1991; Engineer 2001). On the other side, many contemporary religious scholars still utilise Ḥadīth to perpetuate entrenched traditional interpretations of Islam that discriminate against women.

On the basis of traditional interpretation and some Ḥadīths, many religious scholars have reduced the ideal Muslim woman, in this contemporary age, as completely invisible from the public domain. They forbid women to drive cars, walk in the middle of the road, travel alone, work in public (especially in radio or television stations), or participate in political activities. They have also conceptualised that the ideal Muslim woman a domestic role of being an obedient wife whose religious duty is to serve and please her husband. This Ḥadīth-based interpretation is observed in the works of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn Bāz (d. 1999) and of Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn (d. 2001) (Ibn Bāz 1988; 1994; and 1995; al-ʿUthaymīn 1989; and 1998), the most revered scholar for contemporary Wahhabī Muslims. This traditional interpretation is also visibly observed in the contemporary Ḥadīth collections on gender issues by Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Hāshimi (d. 2015), Muḥammad Farīja, and Ṣādiq b. Muḥammad al-Hādī (al-Hāshimi 2013; Farija 1996; al-Hādī 2009).

Other scholars seem uneasy with interpretations adopted about women by traditional religious scholars, but they also do not want to disregard the authority of Ḥadīth in Islam. They generally accept the Ḥadīth literature and
prefer rather to circumvent the seemingly harsh element of literal meanings of ḥadīth texts. They attempt to find an ethical message from each ḥadīth to draw out a more women-friendly interpretation. This approach is noticeably observed in the works of many scholars, such as Ghāda al-Khurasānī, Muhammad al-Ghazālī (d. 1996), Kaukab Siddique (b. 1943), Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwī (d. 2022), Hiba Raʿūf ʿIzzat (b. 1965), and Mohja Kahf (b. 1967) (al-Khurasānī 1979; al-Ghazālī 1989; Siddique 1990; al-Qaraḍāwī 1991; ʿIzzat 1995; Kahf 2000).

In line with this interpretative approach is the work of ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Muhammad Abū Shuqqa (d. 1995) in his book, Tahrīr al-Marʿa fi Ṭārīkh al-Risāla: Dirāsa ’an al-Marʿa Jāmīʿa li-Nuṣūṣ al-Qurʾān wa-Ṣaḥīḥay al-Bukhārī wa-Muslim (“The Liberation of Women at the Time of the Message: A Study on Women Composed of the Qurʾānic Texts, and the Ṣaḥīḥs of al-Bukhārī and Muslim”). It is the first work that collects a large number of the ḥadīths on women’s issues. It brings many inspiring interpretative examples from the ḥadīth that have influenced some conservative Muslims to hold more women-friendly opinions (al-ʿAwwā, 2000, 13–14). It has also been used by some Muslim women activists to challenge male authority within Islamic spaces that often restrict women’s mobility (Berglund 2011, 505–508). The book was even celebrated at a 2003 international conference held in Cairo on Islam and the liberation of women (al-Lajna al-Islāmiyya al-ʿĀlamīyya lil-Marʿa wa-l-Ṭifl 2004). It also inspired some female scholar-activists on gender justice to argue that some ḥadīths can be the basis to claim necessary social recognition of Muslim women’s roles in both the private and public spheres (Abū Bakr and Shukrī 2002). Indeed, Abū Shuqqa’s work is transformative for gender justice discussions within Islamic interpretation at the start of the 21st century.

This chapter analyses the methodological approaches of Abū Shuqqa disclosed in the Tahrīr to present some enabling interpretations of the ḥadīth, and establish a theological basis for an egalitarian gender relations ethics from within an Islamic perspective. I argue that the work of Abū Shuqqa can be regarded as a genre of “conflicting ḥadīths” (mukhtalif al-ḥadīth) in the sciences of ḥadīth (ʿulūm al-ḥadīth), since it prefers to circumvent seemingly harsh elements of the literal meanings of some ḥadīth and attempts to find an ethical message to present a more women-friendly interpretation. In his interpretation, Abū Shuqqa suggests promising approaches towards the ḥadīth to produce more favourable interpretations of egalitarian gender relations ethics by promoting an Islamic ethics of mutuality and reciprocity between women and

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1 While this chapter cites the 2002 edition of Abū Shuqqa’s work, his collection was first published in 1990.
men, both in domestic and public spheres. I argue that the Tahrīr has paved the way for methodological approaches to the ḥadīth that establish the means for interpreting an Islamic egalitarian gender ethics.

2  Abū Shuqqa’s Interpretation on Gender Relations

The main elements of Abū Shuqqa’s interpretation of egalitarian gender relation can be identified in four themes: the humanity of women; a non-segregated society as an ideal Muslim community; the active agency of women in public activities; and mutuality and reciprocity in all matters related to spousal relationship, including sexual intimacy. He suggests that his work is a form of Islamic women’s liberation that differentiates from and repairs conservative interpretations. In his perspective, liberation means to free women from the burden of oppressive and discriminatory interpretations, by promoting teachings of Islam towards the humanity of women (insāniyya) and the equality of gender relationships (musāwāt) (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:28–61).

Abū Shuqqa argued that, in Islam, women and men are human and should be principally treated equally in all matters of life. He emphasised six principles to avow the humanity of women. They are: the entitlement of women to human dignity; their ability to be responsible for their own labour; their right to freedom and independency; their potentiality for human perfection, just like men; their capability to play their roles in the public sphere; and their ability to have proper personalities as normal human beings.

To prove his argument, Abū Shuqqa refered to verses of the Qurʾān that assert the humanity of women. In fact, the term musāwāt, which means “no other than equality,” is the first word he used to open his entire interpretation. He quoted Qurʾānic verse 4:1 to state that women and men are created from the same entity. Based on the verses 3:190–195, 4:124, 16:97, and 40:40, he also affirmed that Islam demonstrates the equal responsibility of women and men. The personality of women, and men as well, is respected and dignified in Islam on the grounds of many verses of the Qurʾān (see for example Q 24:11–12, 33:35, 48:5, 48:25, 57:12, 57:18 and 71:28). In dealing with the reward and punishment by God, these verses demonstrate equal treatment of women and men. Moreover, the verses 66:10–12 maintain the independency of women from their husbands in terms of their own responsibility towards God (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:69–110). Indeed, these verses, according to Abū Shuqqa, clearly reveal the idea of equality between men and women in Islam, allowing him to argue for equality in his interpretation of ḥadīth.
Abū Shuqqa established the humanity of women from the *ḥadīth* of Umm Salama (d. 62/681).² To my knowledge, there has been no attempt prior to the *Tāḥrīr* that uses a *ḥadīth* to demonstrate the equal humanity of women in Islam. Abū Shuqqa reinterprets the *ḥadīth* of Umm Salama to affirm that a woman, in the Prophet’s time, was declared as a member of humanity and, thus, as equal to men. This attempt has been acknowledged and appreciated by Omaima Abou Bakr during her opening discussion on Islamic feminism. On the grounds of Umm Salama’s saying, alongside other *ḥadīths* that detail female questions and demands, she argues that women in Islam are encouraged to engage in social matters, to obtain acknowledgement and praise by the society, and that their voices should be heard, and their problems solved in any stage of history (Abū Bakr and Shukrī 2002, 14–16).

Abū Shuqqa established the equality of men and women as the principle of Islam on the grounds of the saying of the Prophet, “women are the counterparts of men” (*al-nisāʾ shaqāʾiq al-rījāl*).³ Based on this saying, he starts to establish the principle of gender equality, aiming intentionally to criticise the basic assumption about women prevalent in the traditional interpretation. This saying along with his discussion in the *Tāḥrīr* becomes, borrowing the argument of Mohammed Fadel, “an explicit textual basis for a presumptive norm of gender equality” (Fadel 2012, 13). In his introduction of the main argument of the *Tāḥrīr*, Abū Shuqqa quoted the phrase, “women are the counterparts of men,” alluding to the equality of women and men (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:30). This phrase is also quoted to point out the importance of women’s position in Islam, which has been neglected for centuries. It is included mainly as an epitome of the whole discussion of *ḥadīths* on the characteristics and personality of women in Islam. This phrase is conflated with the statement of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 23/644), who argued that Islam guaranteed the rights of women. It is repeated again as the opening remark of Abū Shuqqa’s second volume on equal participation of women and men in public activities. When Abū Shuqqa reinterpreted the temptation of women, he also quoted this phrase to emphasise equal partnership between two sexes in avoiding unlawful sexual attraction, rather than focusing on the temptation of one sex only (Abū

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Abū Shuqqa’s Approach to Hadīth

Abū Shuqqa’s interpretation is one of gender equality in all situations, including perceived fitna. Indeed, Abū Shuqqa’s interpretation is one of gender equality in all situations, including perceived fitna.

The argument for equality (musāwāt) in the Taḥrīr appears in three forms: women as individuals, women as part of the family, and women as members of society. As individuals, women are described by Abū Shuqqa as equal to men in all essential rights and duties towards Allāh, the Absolute. They are created from the same essence (nafs wāḥida) as men, not from the crooked rib of men. To Abū Shuqqa, Allāh makes no distinction between women and men in the origin of creation. They are addressed by the revelation equally for faith and its teachings. They are also to be equally rewarded or punished for their deeds. In terms of moral responsibility, both women and men are equally accountable for their actions. In terms of legal status, women are allowed to have their own contracts, to run their own business, to possess their own property, and to vote based on their own political choices equally and independently from their husbands or any relatives (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:67–147 and 295).

As part of the family, women are equal to men in all principal rights and duties in the familial relationship. To begin family life, consent of both bride and groom is essential in Abū Shuqqa’s interpretation. A woman, therefore, cannot be forced to enter into marriage without her agreement; indeed, she has the right to withdraw from a marriage to which she does not agree to. In daily familial life, both women and men are equally required to treat and to be treated with mutuality and reciprocity when it comes to taking care, respecting, and serving each other. Familial relationships in Abū Shuqqa’s interpretation are based on the principle of respect, mutual understanding, and helping each other. This principle is emphasised in his discussion of the notions of male leadership (qiwāma) and guardianship (wilāya), and conjugal rights and duties among the spouses (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:47–48, 128–130, 173–175, 296–311, 315, 53, 216 and 5: 96–214).

In contrast to interpretations that enforce gender hierarchy, Abū Shuqqa conceptualised the wilāya of fathers over their daughters, or of brothers over their sisters, and the qiwāma of a husband over his wife as the right of mushāwara, or giving consultation in the interest of the daughters, the sisters, and the wife. It is, rather, a responsibility to guarantee protection, safety, maintenance, and the well-being of family members than a right to lead and command them. This right also should be exercised in a friendly manner and for the good purpose of the wife and other members of the family. Otherwise, a wrongly practiced right should be redressed so that it results in its initial purpose. Abū Shuqqa presented examples of hadīths to show how guardians were required, when they arbitrarily misused their right of guardianship, to turn back to the purpose of the hadīth to result in what was best for the ward,
women or wife. For example, Abū Shuqqa points to how the Prophet asked Maʿqil b. Yasār (d. 58/678) not to prevent his sister from marrying a man of her choice; how the Prophet enforced Khansāʾ bint Khidām's right to annul her forced marriage by her father; the way he let the aunt of Jābir b. ‘Abd Allāh (d. 76/697) work outside her home during the waiting period after divorce (ʿidda); to how the Prophet forbade men from preventing their wives from going to the mosque; and to how the Prophet rejected the desire of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) to marry another woman without the consent of his wife Fāṭima bint Muḥammad (d. c.18/605) (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1296–299).

In this regard, the qiwāma of a husband over his wife along with her obedience (ṭāʿa) to him are discussed in Abū Shuqqa’s interpretation as the right of both partners to – and their responsibility for – caring and protection. To ease these rights and responsibilities, the husband is charged with the responsibility of qiwāma and maintenance while the wife is entitled with the responsibility of rearing children and managing the house. This division is, however, subject to change and negotiation under the notions of “helping each other” (taʿāwun), and “giving and getting consultation” from each other (mushāwara), particularly when realities require the exchange. These notions of taʿāwun and mushāwara are very fundamental in Abū Shuqqa’s interpretation of all aspects of the marital relationship, which is rooted in the norms of mutuality, reciprocity, and partnership. For instance, the wifely duty of obedience is interpreted as being part of helping the husband fulfil his duty to manage the matters of the whole family and to take care of them. When the qiwāma is practiced outside of this purpose, the wife has the right to disobey her husband and to rectify his qiwāma by giving him an alternative. This giving of an alternative is part of the notion of mushāwara. In turn, the husband embracing the opinion proposed by his wife is part of mushāwara and taʿāwun as well. During the absence of the husband, the wife’s taking of qiwāma and riʿāya becomes necessary as a part of the requirement that spouses help each other (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 5:99–115).

To Abū Shuqqa, nafaqa (marital financial support) is primarily a duty of the husband, not the wife. However, since there is the principle of taʿāwun, to him, the wife is also encouraged to provide maintenance for the family depending on her capacity and capability. During the absence of the husband, for instance, or his lack of capacity to provide, it becomes a wifely duty to feed the family. We find in the Tahrīr examples of women from the early Islamic period who worked for their family during the life of the Prophet, such as Jābir b. ‘Abd Allāh’s aunt, Umm Mubashshir al-Anṣāriyya, and Zaynab (d. after 32/653), the wife of ‘Abd Allāh b. Masʿūd (d. 32/653). We can also mention Umm Shurayk (d. c.50/670), who was well known for her richness, generosity, and her strong work ethic (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 2:343–345, 359–364 and 5:109–115). Indeed,
these women are examples of taʿāwun that present wives actively providing for their families.

Whereas the husband maintains the health of his family by working outside the house, the wife is obliged to rear children and manage the house at home. This responsibility of the wife appears and takes form in the Tahrīr as her obedience to the husband within the spirit of helping him to fulfil his responsibility as the holder of qiwāma. However, the principle of taʿāwun here operates also to encourage the husband to do the rearing, caring, and managing of domestic matters while he has time at home, particularly if the wife is very exhausted, or busy with her profession outside of the home. Indeed, women should have access to the benefits of cultural activities outside of their homes. Doing the rearing, caring, and managing of domestic matters, in turn, may become the obligation of the husband when the wife is obliged to go out to work for the family, for society, or for the sake of developing her own personality. In ordinary circumstances, argues Abū Shuqqa, a believing Muslim should follow an example of the Prophet as he served his family while he was at home (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 2:364–366, 5:132–133).

On this basis, women are equal to men in all aspects of enjoying and participating in public activities that relate to building society. In Abū Shuqqa's interpretation, women not only have full freedom but should also be encouraged to develop their personalities by participating in and shaping a better society for the sake of all. To prove his claim, Abū Shuqqa draws from the images of virtuous women during the time of the first generations of Muslims. They are portrayed as individuals who actively took part in public life; who went to the mosque for prayers and took part in other social activities with men; who joined their colleagues in migration for faith; who sought knowledge and taught it to other people; who engaged with men in military expeditions; who worked and looked after the maintenance of the family; and who gave alms to the needy. Essentially, they participated in all aspects of religious, social, economic, and political spheres, bringing benefits to society. Since this equality is mandatory, Abū Shuqqa urges men and all members of society not to burden women alone with domestic responsibilities in which they are prevented from their participation in public life. Indeed, this public participation is beneficial to women's self-development, and women's participation is beneficial to society (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 2:15–72).

3 Abū Shuqqa's Methodological Approach to Ḥadīth

There are many sources in the Tahrīr on which Abū Shuqqa based his interpretation to advocate for his notion of gender equality (musāwāt). The sources are
verses of the Qurʾān, *hadīth* texts, *hadīth* commentaries of classical scholars, events from the past, history related to the subject, opinions of classical and contemporary scholars, as well as experts’ analysis of the context of contemporary social changes. However, *hadīth* texts are the primary sources in the *Taḥrīr* while the other sources are complementary. As his concern is mostly interpretation, Abū Shuqqa did not discuss the issue of authenticity. He followed the judgments of *hadīth* texts as *ṣaḥīḥ* and *ḥasan* made by classical scholars such as al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 261/875), Abū Dāwūd (d. 275/889), al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892), and Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449), and even by contemporary scholars such as his teacher Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (d. 1999).

With regard to methodological approach, I suggest that there are five main approaches to the *ḥadīth*, through which Abū Shuqqa established his interpretation in the *Taḥrīr* for what he called gender equality (*musāwāt*). As the next sections will explore, he advocated for an inclusive definition of the *ḥadīth* which focused on examples of the female Companions of the Prophet, for pairing the *ḥadīth* with the Qurʾān on gender issues, for a reorganisation of themes in the *ḥadīth* (*tarājim al-abwāb*), for a hermeneutics of equality (*musāwāt*), and for a reinterpretation of problematic *ḥadīths* (*taʾwil mushkil al-ḥadīth*).

### 3.1 Inclusive Definition of the *Ḥadīth*

Abū Shuqqa used the terms Sunna and *ḥadīth* interchangeably, as one is identical to other. Both are about general principles and examples of the Prophet understood from detailed case law and teachings recorded in the *ḥadīth* literature. Following the definition of the term “*ḥadīth*” that includes sayings and deeds of the Companions of the Prophet (ʿItr 1985, 27–30; al-Bughā 1990, 9–10), Abū Shuqqa regarded the experiences of female Companions as part of the definition of “*ḥadīth*” of the Prophet. He also attributed prophetic guidance (*hady al-nabī*) to the deeds of ʿĀʾisha (d. 58/678), Umm Ḥarām (d. c.27–28/648–649), and Zaynab bint Jaḥsh (d. 20/641) (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:28–31).

The following texts are examples of how Abū Shuqqa focused on the experiences of female Companions, in addition to the actions and statements of the Prophet, and unlike the *Ṣaḥiḥs* of al-Bukhārī and Muslim:

Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī [d. 74/693] reported that a woman came to Allāh’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) and said: “Allāh’s Messenger, men receive your instructions (*dhahaba al-rijāl bi-ḥadīthik*); kindly allocate at your convenience a day for us also, on which we would come to you and you would teach us what Allāh has taught you.” He said: “You assemble on such and such a day.” They assembled and Allāh’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) came to them and taught them what Allāh had taught him
and he then said: “There is no woman amongst you who sends her three children as her forerunners (to the Hereafter) but they would serve for her as a protection against Hell-Fire.” A woman said: “What about two and two and two?” Thereupon Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) said: “Even if they are two and two and two.”

This text above is found in the Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī in a chapter titled Taʿlīm al-Nabī Ummatahū Min al-Riḍāl wa-l-Nisā’ (“On the Teachings of the Prophet to His People, Men and Women”), and in the Ṣaḥīḥ of Muslim in a chapter titled Faḍl Man Yamūt wa-lahu Walad fa-Yaḥtasibuh (“The Merit of the One Who Dies while He has a Child, through Whom He Will Be Rewarded”). A similar text is placed by al-Bukhārī in a chapter titled Ḥal Yujʿal lil-Nisā’ Yaʾwm ‘alā Hīda fī l-ʾIlm (“Should a Specific Day be Allocated to Women for Knowledge?”), and in another chapter titled Faḍl Man Māt wa-lahu Walad fa-Ḥtasab (“On the Merit of the One Who Died while Leaving a Child through Whom He Will be Rewarded”) (al-Bukhārī 2000, 1:28, 235). However, In the Tāḥrīr of Abū Shuqqa, the above text is placed in a chapter titled: Namādhiḥ min Quwwat Shakhsiyyat al-Mar’a al-Muslima wa-Ḥusn Idrākihā li-Ḥuqūqihā wa-Wājibātihā (“On Examples of Strong Characteristics of a Muslim Woman and Her Good Discernment on Her Rights and Obligations”) in a sub-chapter about women who demanded the Prophet have more chances for his teaching (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:171). Thus, the chapters of Abū Shuqqa are focusing on the experiences of female Companions.

The following is the second example of female Companions presented by Abū Shuqqa.

Narrated by Ibn ‘Abbās [d. c.68/687]: ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb said: “It so happened that I was thinking about some matter that my wife said: ‘I wish you had done that and that.’ I said to her: ‘It does not concern you and you should not feel disturbed in a matter which I intend to do.’ She said to me: ‘How strange is it that you, o son of al-Khaṭṭāb, do not like anyone to retort to you, whereas your daughter retorts to Allah’s Messenger (peace be upon him) until he spends the day in vexation.’” ‘Umar said: “I took hold of my cloak, then came out of my house, visited Ḥafṣa [d. 41/661] and said to her: ‘O daughter, (I heard) that you retort upon Allah’s
Messenger (peace be upon him) until he spends the day in vexation,' whereupon Ḥafṣa said: ‘By Allāh, we do retort upon him.’ I said: ‘You should bear in mind, my daughter, that I warn you against the punishment of Allāh and the wrath of His Messenger (peace be upon him). You may not be misled by one whose beauty has fascinated her, and the love of Allāh’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) for her.’ I (ʿUmar) then visited Umm Salama because of my relationship with her and I talked to her. Umm Salama said to me: “ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, how strange is it that you meddle with every matter so much so that you are anxious to interfere between Allāh’s Messenger (peace be upon him) and his wives?” And this perturbed me so much that I refrained from saying what I had to say, so I came out of her quarters.”

For the classical scholars of ḥadīth, such as al-Bukhārī and Muslim, the text above is only referenced as evidence that a man often loves one of his wives more than the rest, or that the husband may let his wives choose to leave him if they dislike to live with him. However, for Abū Shuqqa, the text is a lesson that women at the time of the Prophet were strong and knowledgeable (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 2:153).

Thus, Abū Shuqqa applies the term “ḥadīth” and “Sunna” inclusively, not only for the traditions of the Prophet, but also for sayings and deeds of the Companions of the Prophet. These experiences, according to Abū Shuqqa, represented the origin of prophetic guidance on gender relations. He named these experiences “practical and applied ḥadīths” (aḥādīth ʿamaliyya taṭḥiqiyya) on the relationship between men and women in diverse aspects of life (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:28). Indeed, all of his work concentrated on including experiences of female Companions as religious authorities to which Islamic teachings on gender relations should refer.

### 3.2 Pairing Qurʾān with the Ḥadīth

For his interpretation on egalitarian gender relations (musāwāt), Abū Shuqqa paired the Qurʾān with the ḥadīth to dig up meanings of the latter which are suitable to principles of the former. This attempt is made on the grounds that there should be unity and coherence in telling the truth, since both are authoritative sources of it. Abū Shuqqa recognised the prevalent argument in Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) about the certainty of the Qurʾān and probability of

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5 Muslim 2000, 1:617–618: Kitāb al-Ẓalāq (“Book of Divorce”), Bāb fī l-Īlā ("Chapter on Keeping away from One's Wives").
ABŪ SHUQQĀ’S APPROACH TO ḤADĪTH

231

the ḥadīth, but he did not polarise these two sources. Rather, he brought both
together to figure out the truth about the equality between women and men.

The Ṭahrīr is a collection of ḥadīths on women’s liberation, but it also pre-

sents verses of the Qur’ān related to the subject in question. He put the verses
in the beginning of the collection to set up what he conceived as principles
of Islamic teachings with regard to women. There are about thirty pages of
the first volume where some verses of the Qur’ān are presented to support his
argument about the equality of men and women when it comes to: the respon-
sibility of women as human beings, the liberation of women from oppression,
a recognition of their personality, their place in the family, their participation
in public life, and celebrating stories of virtuous women in the Qur’ān. Indeed,
there are 474 places in the Ṭahrīr where Abū Shuqqa supported his interpreta-
tion with verses of the Qur’ān.

His main argument, that men and women are from the same essence, is
established from verse 41 of the Qur’ān. The humanity of women, the nobil-
ity of their personality, and the independency of their responsibility of their
own good and bad deeds, are also drawn from verses of the Qur’ān (3:190–195,
4:124, 16:97 and 40:40). He often starts his major topics with presentation of
verses and follows by listing ḥadīths on the subject in question. He establishes
the major argument from the Qur’ān and put it in his title headings before he
listed ḥadīth related to the subject. He then composed title headings inspired
by Qur’ānic verses to categorise the ḥadīth he interpreted. His interpretation,
then, of ḥadīth is coloured by his weight to principles deduced from Qur’ān;
and evidenced in three major topics of the Ṭahrīr, female participation in pub-
lic, familial relationship, and sexual intimacy.

In some cases, Abū Shuqqa interprets the ḥadīth in light of the Qur’ān. The
ḥadīth-text that states that people will not achieve their prosperity when led by
a woman, for instance, is interpreted in favour of gender justice with the fact,
which is recognised by verses 27:23–44 of the Qur’ān, that a woman (Bilqis)
ruled a kingdom successfully and that her people were happy and prosperous.
In other cases, however, he interprets a verse from the Qur’ān using the
teachings and practices of the Prophet. This is obvious in the verse of the right
of men to slap their wives. The Qur’ān has dictated that wives who disobey
(nushūz) their husbands are subject to being slapped after receiving advice
if they still persist in disobeying (Q 4:34). In Abū Shuqqa’s explanation, how-
ever, this right is explained under restricted conditions drawn from the teach-
ings and practices of the Prophet, who did not condone wife-beating. Thus,
whether the Qur’ān is interpreted through the ḥadīth, or vice versa, is defined
by the question of what the meanings signify to the reader. There is no specific
approach to textual interpretation that applies in all conditions and for all
texts, other than the principle of reciprocity and equal humanity.

3.3 Producing Themes Using Chapter Headings (Tārājim al-Abwāb)

Before delving into discussing chapter headings, it is important to discuss
the structure of Abū Shuqqa's collection. The titles of the six volumes of the
Tahrīr are (1) Ma‘ālim Shakhshīyāt al-Mar‘a al-Muslima (“Characteristics
of Muslim Women”), (2) Mushārakat al-Mar‘a al-Muslima fi l-Ḥayāt al-Ijtima‘īyya
(“Women’s Participation in Public Social Life: Activities of Women During
the Time of the Prophet”), (3) Ḥiwarāt ma‘ al-Mu‘āridīn li-Mushārakat al-Mar‘a fi
l-Ḥayāt al-Ijtima‘īyya (“Extended Evidence of Women’s Participation in Public
Activities”), (4) Libās al-Mar‘a al-Muslima wa-Zinātihā (“Dressing and
and (6) al-Thaqāfā al-Jīnīyya lil-Zawjāyn (“Sexual Education”). Each volume
is divided into chapters and each chapter contains sub-chapters followed by
texts of ḥadīth. The first volume contains eight chapters (faṣl); two are
dedicated to the presentation of the verses of Qur‘ān and six to the texts of ḥadīth.
The third to eighth chapters of the first volume, that are designated for the
texts of ḥadīth, are titled (3) Ba‘ḍ Ma‘ālim Shakhshīyāt al-Mar‘a (“Landmarks of
Characteristics of Women”), (4) Mawāqif Nisā‘īyya Karīma (“Noble Feminine
Stances”), (5) Namādījīn min Quwwat Shakhshīyāt al-Mar‘a al-Muslima wa-Ḥusn
Idrākhīhā li-Ḥuqūqihā wa-Wājibāhīhā (“Examples of Strong Characteristics of a
Muslim Woman and Her Awareness of Her Rights and Her Responsibilities”),
(6) Shakhshīyāt Nisā‘īyya (“Biographies of Virtuous Women”), (7) Aḥādīth Ṣaḥīha
‘an Shakhshīyāt al-Mar‘a Asā‘a l-Ba‘ḍ Fahmūhā wa-Taḥbīquhā (“Religiously
Sound Texts of the ḥadīths on Women, Understood and Applied Incorrectly by
Some People”), and the last (8) Ta‘qībāt ‘alā Ma‘ālim Shakhshīyāt al-Mar‘a al-
Muslima (“Comments on Landmarks of Characteristics of Muslim Women”).

Abū Shuqqa also came up with new themes using chapter headings to
emphasise that women are visible, knowledgeable, have good characteristics,
and that they should be active participants of domestic and public activities.
The themes of familial relationships are also presented in much more favour-
able perspectives, as a partnership between women and men. All of these
newly created themes are observed in the chapter headings of the Tahrīr.
Starting from the title of the book, Abū Shuqqa declares that women have been
liberated since the time of the Prophet. His themes, as emphasised in his chap-
ter headings are, then, composed to serve his notion of women’s liberation,
which is about the humanity of women and the rights of women to access
public spheres.
The fifth chapter of the first volume, as an example, has 18 sub-chapters, each of which is followed by one or two texts from the two canonical collections, the Sahih of al-Bukhari, the Sahih of Muslim, or both. The first ten sub-chapters that prove women's visibility, knowledge, and good characteristics are; al-Nisa ‘Yuṭālibnna al-Rasīl bi-Maṣīd min Furaṣ al-Talīm (“Women Demand the Prophet More Opportunities for Education”); Ṣumā’ bint Ṣahkl Tughālib al-Hayā’ li-Tunfiquh fi l-Dīn (“Ṣumā’ bint Ṣahkl (d. 73/692) Overcomes Her Shyness to Spend it on Religion”); Sabī’a bint al-Hārith Ta‘rif Kafiy Tātaharrā lī-Taṣīl ilā l-Yaqīn (“Sabī’a bint al-Ḥarīth Knows How to Search in Order to Come to Certainty of Knowledge”); al-Mar’ā al-Khath‘amīyya – wa-Hiya Shābbā – Yushghiluhā Ḥukm al-Ḥajj ‘an Abīhā (“A Woman of Khath‘amiyya – and She is Young – is Concerned with the Provision of Performing the Pilgrimage on behalf of Her Father”); al-Mar’ā Tatamassak bi-Ḥaqqihā fi Ḥiktiyār al-Zawj (“A Woman Upholds Her Right in Choosing a Husband”); al-Mar’ā Tatamassak bi-Ḥaqqihā fi Mufāraqat al-Zawj (“A Woman Upholds Her Right in Repudiating Her Husband”); ‘Ātika bint Zayd Zawj ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb Tatamassak bi-Ḥaqqihā fi Shuhūd al-Jamā’a (“‘Ātika bint Zayd the Spouse of ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb Upholds Her Right to Attend the Congregation”), al-Mar’ā Tumāris ba’d al-Ḥiraf li-Kasb al-Māl wa-Tataṣaddaq (“A Woman Works to Earn Money and to give Alms”); al-Nisā’ Yulabhīn al-Da’wa ilā Jtimā’ Āmm bi-l-Maṣjid (“Women Come to a Public Meeting in the Mosque”); and Umm Kulthūm bint ‘Uqba Tufāriq Ahlahā Jamī‘an wa-Tuhājir Fīrāran bi-Dīnīhā (“Umm Kulthūm bint ‘Uqba (d. 33/654) Leaves All of Her Family and Migrates for Her Religion”) (Abū Shuqqā 2002, 1169–176).


The second volume is dedicated to exhibiting women’s roles in public activities in the early period of Islam. Again, Abū Shuqqa here presents facts

In the rest of the volumes, there are many other chapter headings that indicate Abū Shuqqa’s interpretation with regard to women’s liberation. The above-mentioned sub-chapters show women as the subjects of stories and as the active agents in the early period of Islam. Thus, Abū Shuqqa has approached the ḥadīth by inventing a new tarjama (translation) of the ḥadīths in which women are visible to contemporary Muslims in the canonical collections. The Prophet, in Abū Shuqqa’s perspective, was surrounded by powerful, honourable, and knowledgeable women in every part of his duty in delivering a revelatory message to the people at that time. In other words, women in the time of the Prophet are described by Abū Shuqqa as believing firmly in the faith, as caring to others, as being generous with their wealth for society, as active in social and public activities, as participating in very hard moments such as migration and war, as creative in their suggestions and demands for their own rights and the society, as independent of their marital rights, and as intelligent when it comes to the important knowledge of the time they lived. All of these descriptions of early women in Islam are apparent in Abū Shuqqa’s chapter titles and sub-chapter headings.

Abū Shuqqa also categorises care, love, and sexual pleasure under a chapter titled *al-Ḥuqiq al-Mutamāthila lil-Zawjān* (“Mutual Rights between the
Spouses”) (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 5:6–9). There is a title heading in the *Tahrīr, al-Ṭā’a Mas‘ūliyyat al-Mar’a (“Obedience is the Obligation of the Woman”), but it is followed by a discussion of mutual consultation in the sub-chapter *al-Ta‘āwun bayn al-Zawjayn (“Collaboration between the Spouses”) to emphasise mutual obligation (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 5:103–109). This organisation reveals that “obedience” is for the sake of both, not only for the sake of one side. In other words, it connotes that the husband is also obliged to obey his wife in order to help her obligation of bringing goodness to the family. Rearing the children is discussed under *al-Mas‘ūliyya al-Ulā lil-Mar’a (“The First Obligation of the Woman”) as well, but it is followed directly by *al-Ta‘āwun bayn al-Zawjayn min Ajl Kamāl Adā‘ Mas‘ūliyyat al-Mar’a fi l-Ḥādāna (“Collaboration between the Spouses to Accomplish the Obligation of Nurturing the Children”) (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 5:116–126). Under this title, there are sub-titles that explain that rearing the children was also done by the Prophet and many men. The same is for the obligation of managing the house. The *Tahrīr classifies it under the obligation for the wife, but this is directly followed by *al-Ta‘āwun bayn al-Zawjayn min Ajl Kamāl Adā‘ Mas‘ūliyyat Tadbīr Shu‘ān al-Bayt (“Collaboration between the Spouses to Accomplish the Obligation of Managing the House”) (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 5:126–130), which discloses that this obligation should be shared in the sense that the husband is also obliged to help his wife in accomplishment of managing the house. There are also sub-titles about the Prophet and male Companions managing their homes. This entire approach, which centres women in the very organisation of the text, when compared to classical works of ḥadīth on women’s issues and contemporary ones as well, makes the *Tahrīr a very impressive and promising text for further attempts to read the ḥadīth literature through the lens of gender justice.

3.4 Inclusive Hermeneutics on Gender

Abū Shuqqa also came up with a method termed the hermeneutics of equality (*musāwāt) to help dig up new meanings in the ḥadīth. Given that Arabic is a gender-specific language, in which expression of all things is classified either as male or female, Abū Shuqqa explains the rule of textual interpretation with regard to this matter. He suggested that the revelatory texts, the Qurʾān and ḥadīth, apply equally to both sexes, men and women, even though the language that is used is generally in male form. He acknowledged that there are limited texts delivered particularly to women, but the rule remains that both sexes are addressed intentionally, while the gender-particular texts are exceptional. To prove this argument, Abū Shuqqa quotes the sayings of Abū Bakr Ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 543/1148), Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), and Ibn al-Qayyim (751/1349) on the matter. Among classical scholars, however, the issue of whether the
male form of sentence includes women is debatable since Arabic is originally a gendered-specific language (al-Ḥasanī 1992, 69–70).

According to Abū Shuqqa, every usage of masculine form in any sentence of the Qurʾān and hadith is intended to include both male and female, equally, unless it includes a specific indication for its exclusive application to a male or female (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:70). Though Abū Shuqqa did not explain this rule, he exemplified it with many texts of the hadith. There are at least twelve texts in the masculine form interpreted to include women as the subjects of meaning. These texts are about teachings that relate to building society, taking care of its members, giving advice and counsel, doing good deeds for the community, bringing peace to people, giving alms to the poor, and helping all the needy (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 2:394–396).

This perspective of understanding the Arabic language as gender inclusiveness, though the form is not so, leads to the belief in gender equality stated by Abū Shuqqa, in interpreting the Qurʾān and hadith. This belief made him approach the hadith in a way that treats women and men equally as subjects. Its meanings should not discriminate against women in particular. Even though he knew that the Arabic language is gender-specific, he attempted to propose an inclusive interpretation in which women are included in the statement of the masculine form and men are included in that of the feminine form as well.

He was additionally aware that many texts are composed literally, not in favour of women, and they side-line and reduce the existence, role, and participation of women in public and private life. Moreover, he was cognisant of prevalent understandings of the available texts among people, the subject of his contention. He objected to an understanding that discriminated against and violated women’s humanity. He also rejected any interpretation that maintained that women are bodily alluring and thus damaging to the “community,” which positions them as sources of religious immorality.

Just after establishing his hermeneutics of inclusivity when it comes to the Arabic language, Abū Shuqqa goes directly to name the sub-chapter with the phrase “that man and woman are created from one origin.” The example is stated in the Tahrīr as an interpretation of the Qurʾān, which states that God created “you” (both sexes) from one soul or self, then, from it, God creates its pair, then from both, He created other men and women (Q 4:1). The “you” or kum in Arabic is composed in a male-gendered form. In the traditional interpretation, the verse means that the human being (kum, you) is created from Adam, then from his rib God created Eve, and then He created the rest of human beings, men and women (Ibn Kathīr 1999, 2:206). Abū Shuqqa was likely motivated by the traditional interpretation, which is argued by almost
all classical exegesis, and moving to an interpretation that “man and woman are created from one origin” (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:70). Here, unlike traditional interpretation, Abū Shuqqa argued that the verse of creation does not exclusively address men, but is inclusive of both women and men, and that their creation, then, is the same from one origin.

He also inclusively interprets the verse of consultation (Q 42:38) which is composed in the plural masculine form, “and their affairs are consulted among them” (wa-amruhum shūrā baynahum), in favour of gender neutrality and, thus, applying equally to both men and women. In terms of specific familial life, in his interpretation, this verse prescribes a husband to consult his wife and a wife to consult her husband as well. It is odd to him that women are advised to consult men while men are not advised to do the reverse, for many women are wiser than men. Consultation is good conduct in Islam, and it is good for both man and woman to consult one another. He brings forth, then, many hadīths to show how the Prophet also consulted his wife in matters of both religious and ordinary life (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 5:103–109).

He also reads many hadīths with this hermeneutics of equality in mind. Among them is the following hadīth:

Narrated by Anas (d. 93/712): The Prophet said, “None of you will have faith till he wishes for his (Muslim) brother what he likes for himself.”

This hadīth is composed in the Arabic masculine form which is then translated into “he,” “his,” “brother” and “himself” (lā yuʾminu aḥadukum ḥattā yuḥībbā li-akhīhi mā yuḥībbu li-nafsīh). Abū Shuqqa included this hadīth in his discussion about the principles of affection among spouses in familial life. To him, this hadīth directs both husband and wife to love each other and to do her/his best for her/his spouse, since bringing affection to the family is the responsibility of both of them, together. In this regard, the verse of affection in the Qurʾān (30:21),7 when interpreted from this inclusive linguistic perspective, is interpreted by Abū Shuqqa reciprocally in two directions, from husband to wife and vice versa (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 5:98, 144, and 163).

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6 Al-Bukhārī 2000, 1:8: Kitāb al-Īmān (“Book of Faith”), Bāb min al-Īmān an Yuḥībbu li-Akhīhi mā Yuḥībba li-Nafsīh (“Chapter on Desiring for One’s Muslim Brother What One Desires for Himself is Part of Faith”).

7 “And one of His signs is that He created for you spouses from among yourselves so that you may find comfort in them. And He has placed between you compassion and mercy. Surely in this are signs for people who reflect” (Q 30:21).
Another example is the *ḥadīth* of Abū Hurayra (d. 57/678, or slightly later) which is composed in clear gender-specific language, and addressing a husband about his wife. However, Abū Shuqqa reads this *ḥadīth* reciprocally address the wife about her husband (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 5:164).

Abū Hurayra (Allāh be pleased with him) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) said: A believing man should not hate a believing woman; if he dislikes one of her characteristics, he will be pleased with another.⁸

Having these hermeneutics of equality, then, he attempted to counter traditional hermeneutics that put the onus only on women as responsible for everything regarded to be religious deviation. He has called for a balance of this meaning by centring women in the stories of the *ḥadīth* text. For example, the following report on a saying of the Prophet operates with two indispensable features, by awakening consciousness of the discriminatory context of the text and moving to that of an egalitarian understanding of it as well.

Narrated by Abū Mūsā (d. c.48/668): Allāh’s Apostle said: “Many amongst men reached (the level of) perfection but none amongst the women reached this level except Āsiya, Pharaoh’s wife, and Mary, the daughter of ‘Imrān.”⁹

This *ḥadīth* is recorded in the Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī and the Ṣaḥīḥ of Muslim. Abū Shuqqa put it in conversation with other traditions about virtuous women, making a specific argument under the heading *al-Mar’ā wa-Bulūgh al-Kamāl* (“Woman and Achieving Religious Perfection”). In its explanation, he begins to quote opinions of classical scholars such as Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/925) and Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī claiming that women can be prophets and indeed there are many female prophets such as Eve, Sara, Āsiya, the mother of Moses, and Mary the mother of Jesus. Characteristics linked to prophecy, as quoted from Ibn Ḥajar, are indeed evidenced in many women of the world, but heard of little. The *ḥadīth* mentions three virtuous women, and female prophets. Having this report on female prophets and its interpretation in classical works,

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⁹ Al-Bukhārī 2000, 2:672: *Kitāb Aḥādīth al-Anbiyāʾ* (“Book of Traditions of the Prophets”), *Bāb Qawl Allāh Taʿālā wa-Ḍaraba Allāhu Mathalan lil-Ladhīna Āmanū* (“Chapter on Allāh Almighty’s Statement: ‘And Allāh Sets Forth as an Example to Those Who Believe’”).
Abū Shuqqa made his argument by drawing from this hadith, explained in the seven points below (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:312–315):

1. The nature of being elevated to religious perfection (kamāl) is initially embedded in both men and women. Abū Shuqqa has argued that women and men have equal potential to become elevated to the state of religious perfection.

2. This potential will be possible only by having a readiness for religious consciousness, and the ability to conduct religious activities that may elevate one to the state of being religiously perfect. Learning, teaching, and preparing supportive conditions for both women and men are necessary to reach this state. The more these conditions are accessible for her or him, the more possibilities are open for her or him to move towards perfection.

3. Taking the two notes above into consideration, Abū Shuqqa clarified that the little number of virtuous women stated in the report above is not because they are women, but because the society they lived in encouraged them to have other duties that were not considered part of “religious perfection,” such as getting pregnant, giving birth, rearing children, and taking care of all familial matters. In such conditions, women are not prepared by society to become elevated to the state of religious perfection. Muslims should open equal spaces to women as they do to men for this elevation to perfection.

4. Abū Shuqqa has also questioned his readers; does the hadith above indicate only the perfection that has been seen, known, and heard by people? Thus, could there be other perfection, particularly pertaining to women, that has not been seen, known, and heard by them? This question comes to mind from reading verses 66:11–12 of the Qurʾān. Indeed, according to him, there are many honourable and perfect women who are not known yet.

5. Since public spaces, in which acts take place such as worship, teaching, and preaching, through which one may be elevated to perfection are already occupied by men, Abū Shuqqa proposed that “female spaces” should also be considered as grounds for this religious perfection. Activities related to taking care of the family are considered commonly

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10 “And Allāh sets forth an example for the believers: the wife of Pharaoh, who prayed, ‘My Lord! Build me a house in Paradise near You, deliver me from Pharaoh and his [evil] doing, and save me from the wrongdoing people.’ [There is] also [the example of] Mary, the daughter of ‘Imrān, who guarded her chastity, so We breathed into her [womb] through Our angel [Gabriel]. She testified to the words of her Lord and His Scriptures, and was one of the [sincerely] devout” (Q 66:11–12).
as mundane. Since these activities are very important, even from a religious perspective, they should be reconsidered as religious and spiritual and thus as a pathway towards perfection. Unfortunately, these activities are unseen, unknown, and unrecognised by society, and those who participate in these activities are also unseen, unknown, and unrecognised. The unknown, to him, does not mean unimportant. Indeed, he argued that there are many unknown soldiers who save society and who make its history. In his view, women are the unknown soldiers of society.

6. The *ḥadīth*, according to Abū Shuqqa, encourages women to be part of those who elevate to perfection. It does not state that women are not able to elevate. Natural hindrances such as menstruation may prevent women from certain types of worship, primarily prayer and fasting, but they may conduct many other good things that will take them to perfection. Abū Shuqqa has asked those who experience reproductive duties and dedicate themselves to familial responsibilities to be patient, aware of their important position, and faithful when educating people in their arms. This will elevate them to religious perfection.

7. Abū Shuqqa has also urged contemporary Muslims to do their best to support women in elevating to religious perfection and to make them visible in society. If all *ḥadīth*s are approached with such hermeneutics, we will have many more interpretations of egalitarian gender relations from an Islamic perspective.

3.5 Reinterpreting Problematic Ḥadīths

In classical discussion of the sciences of Ḥadīth, there is a branch that explains interpretative attempts made for Ḥadīth that literally contradict each other or contradict the principles of Islam derived from the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth. These contradictory Ḥadīth are called *mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* and *mushkil al-ḥadīth*, which literally mean “conflicting Ḥadīth” and “problematic Ḥadīth,” respectively. The classical scholars often defined conflicting or problematic Ḥadīth as accepted Ḥadīth despite apparently contradicting the principles of the Qurʾān or other authoritative texts, so a serious attempt to avoid a literal understanding of these Ḥadīth is necessary (al-Ghawri 2010, 2:169). In the classical discussion, only very few reports concerning gender issues are deemed to be problematic Ḥadīth. In modern times, many Ḥadīth concerning gender issues and which appear to condone discrimination and marginalisation of women are subjects of reinterpretation; thereby, they are considered as conflicting and problematic Ḥadīth.

Abū Shuqqa also discussed the genre of problematic Ḥadīth, and in the Taḥrīr, there are many valid Ḥadīth regarded as conflicting and problematic.
Since women's participation in public spaces is Sunna, Abū Shuqqa reinterpreted many hadiths that are traditionally understood literally to be contrary to the principle of Sunna, and, thus, problematic. The hadith: “[the] jihād of women is pilgrimage,”\(^{11}\) for instance, according to Abū Shuqqa, is not to ban women from the jihād of military expedition. The hadith is to explain that women may make pilgrimage if they want to receive the rewards of jihād. This hadith is rather to acknowledge the physical paucity of women to be as involved as men in war. Women are still, however, allowed to go on military expeditions. There are many hadiths showing that the women of early Islam were involved in this activity, preparing food, nursing the wounded, and even bearing arms. Fifteen women, for instance, took part in the war of Khaybar (7/628). Umm Sulaym bore arms in the war of Ḥunayn (8/630). Umm ‘Ammāra (d. 13/634) bore arms and protected the Prophet in Uḥud (d. 3/625) when the Muslims were defeated and most of the men ran away to save themselves, leaving the Prophet unprotected (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 1:31, 177, 2:53–45, 221–222, 3:36–38). Thus, Abū Shuqqa interprets the above-mentioned hadith of jihād in a different way: that this hadith acknowledges the conditions of women in society but does not discriminate against them.

The hadith “[the] prayer of a woman in her house is better than in the mosque” (Ahmad b. Ḥanbal 1996, 45:37–38) does not contradict the right of women to pray in the mosque. This hadith should be understood in its context, which is the busy woman with domestic duties. This hadith, according to Abū Shuqqa, appreciates domestic activities and acknowledges the hardships that might exhaust a woman who works in her house, and also longs to pray at the mosque. This hadith, he argued, does not require women to conduct prayer at the house, as many female Companions were active in praying at the mosque. When the Prophet heard a woman's baby cried during congregational prayer, he did not command her to pray at her house; he still welcomed her come to the mosque. Moreover, when the Prophet was reminded that ‘Ishā’ prayer was conducted late at night, and thus women and children would not be able to attend as they were sleeping, he performed it in the early evening. All of these hadiths, according to Abū Shuqqa, reveal that women are not to be kept away from the mosque and that their houses are not better than the mosque. The main message addressed by the hadith is that a woman's hardships should be acknowledged and her work should be appreciated. In this context, only when a woman is exhausted from domestic work, or when a prayer is conducted very

late at night and could jeopardise her safety, then, her prayer at home is better for her than in the mosque (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 3:27–31, 39 and 53).

Furthermore, Abū Shuqqa argued that hadiths on the prohibition of hand-shakes between men and women, and preventing men and women from being in seclusion with each other, are not meant to bar them from jointly participating in social activities. These hadiths are understood by Abū Shuqqa, alongside other teachings such as veiling women and lining them behind men in congregational prayers, as advice to men and women on how to meet each other, while also practicing self-dignity, honesty, and modesty. Abū Shuqqa also cites many hadiths in his text that show how on many occasions the Prophet was in a situation where he touched and was touched by a woman and was in seclusion with a woman as well. For example, Anas b. Malik related that “Any of the female slaves of Medina could take hold of the hand of Allah’s Messenger and take him wherever she wished.” This assures Muslims that for many good purposes, a man may touch a woman and he can be in seclusion with her as long as they maintain self-dignity and honesty, while avoiding illicit sexual intimacy. There are also many hadiths quoted by Abū Shuqqa regarding this point that support his suggestion. He puts them under the title Nuṣūṣ Tufīd Jawāz al-Lams ‘ind al-Hāja bidūn Shahwa (“Texts of Ḥadīth Denoting the Permissibility of Touching (Woman and Man) If Need Be without Temptation”) (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 2:91–93). Indeed, according to Abū Shuqqa, the hadiths do not ask men to stay away from women, or even prescribe separate societies for women and men.

There is also a famous Ḥadīth recorded in the collection of al-Bukhārī where the Prophet says: “I haven’t left behind any fitna (trial or affliction, etc.) that is more harmful to men than women” (mā taraktū ba’di fitnatan hiya adarr ‘alā al-rijāl min al-nisā’). This Ḥadīth often becomes the grounds for conservatives to perpetuate the idea that women are dangerous sources of temptation, explicitly using the word fitna. From their perspective, in order to prevent men from destruction stirred by women, there should be abundant restrictions placed upon women. They should be veiled, segregated, confined at home, and their public activities should be significantly restricted. Abū Shuqqa suggested that conservative exaggerations of texts on the temptation of women are shaped mainly in the spirit of “oppression of women by men and arrogance of men over women” (istiḍʿāf al-dhakar lil-unthā wa-sti‘la’ al-rijāl wa-stikbāruhum

13 Al-Bukhārī 2000, 3:3064, Kitāb al-Nikāh (“Book of Marriage”), Bāb mā Yuttaqā min Shu’m al-Mar’ā (“Chapter on What Evil Omen of a Lady is to be Warded Off”).
Abū Shuqqa’s Approach to Ḥadīth

ʿalā l-nisāʾ) (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 3:203). This is evidenced in the way conservatives selectively emphasise only the temptation of women while they deliberately omit other texts that focus on the temptation of family, wealth, and social status.

In Abū Shuqqa’s description, the notion of *fitna*, or temptation, is a general term for the state of condition in which one may be allured from the right path to conduct a wrong deed. Abū Shuqqa criticised conservatives who exaggerate the notion of the temptation of women by inferring restrictions that confine the freedom of women, while they do not create any restrictions to keep away from the temptations of family and wealth (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 3:200–203). The only reason for this is, according to him, because restrictions on temptation when it comes to family and wealth might harm men’s freedom and rights. Hence, conservatives prefer to control women and restrict their mobility, while they allow men to widely enjoy their freedom. This kind of conservative interpretation contradicts the principle of equality, partnership, and mutuality between men and women. It also contradicts the principle that women have equal humanity to men. Here, argued Abū Shuqqa, *fitna* should be understood inclusively as a general test of life, addressed to both women and men, that can take the forms of any kind of worldly desires that may turn them away from the truth. Women, family, and wealth are only examples of those forms.

Unlike the conservatives, arguing on the grounds of verses in the Qurʾān (specifically 12:23, 24, 31 and 33), Abū Shuqqa explained that both women and men are susceptible to sexual temptation, they both are reciprocally attractive to and attracted by each other. Abū Shuqqa recognised the potential temptation of both women and men, to each other. The Ḥadīths, according to him, advise people to establish relationships between the different sexes with self-dignity without labelling one sex as the only source of temptation. In other words, the notion of sexual temptation applies to men as they are attractive to women and to women as they are attractive to men. Being attractive to and attracted by is natural. Indeed, it is not the concern of the Ḥadīths on this issue. Rather, the Ḥadīths pertaining to this issue are about how to behave in relation to one another in a respectful manner and about not luring each other to illicit sexual intimacy. To burden women with the onus of all immoralities that happen in the society is an obvious injustice and not intended by the Ḥadīths. This way of giving a reciprocal meaning to the Ḥadīths when it comes to sexual desire is, to my knowledge, only observed in the Tahrīr of Abū Shuqqa. Moreover, the consciousness that male biases may influence Ḥadīth-based interpretations concerning the temptation of women is also only observed in the Tahrīr.
In the discussion on the interplay between text and context, Abū Shuqqa also maintained that problematic hadiths should be reinterpreted by focusing on their main message. For instance, the hadith that says: “A woman should not travel unless accompanied by her husband or her relative,”¹⁴ is to guarantee a woman’s safety during her trip, not to restrict her from travel. According to Abū Shuqqa, the hadith is not to ban women from travelling or any activity in public spheres. The task of providing safety is also not necessarily performed by her relative since there are many other means to guarantee safety. In fact, a woman is allowed to have any person, man or woman, whom she trusts to accompany her when she needs it for her travel (Abū Shuqqa 2002, 2:280–282). This is to say that the main message of the hadith is not to require male accompaniment for a woman during her trip, but to provide for her safety. With this approach, the hadith is not used as the basis for banning women from their basic rights to travel, study, and work. Rather, it encourages society to facilitate women’s complete safety when traveling for study, work, or other purposes.

4 Conclusion

Abū Shuqqa’s interpretive attempts, when it comes to the hadith texts, are generally characterised by his acknowledgement of male biases within prevalent interpretations of the hadith; hence, his seeking of strategies to centre women is inevitable, and can be observed in particular by the way he mainstreamed the notion of partnership, mutuality, and reciprocity. Compared to the traditional and conservative views, Abū Shuqqa’s interpretation ensures that women’s involvement in public activities is not only allowed in Islam, but is also recommended; thereby, society is encouraged to provide proper inclusion for women. Though he still envisages traditional divisions between gender roles as important and primary, they are neither universal nor immutable.

From the methodological approaches of Abū Shuqqa, analysed above, this study finds that there are possibilities for reinterpreting hadith to encourage egalitarian gender ethics. Indeed, this study finds three favourable approaches of the Taḥrīr with regard to advocacy for gender equality. First is its inclusive concept of hadith in which experiences of the female Companions are imparted as a constitutive element of the Prophetic guidance. Second is its reorganisation of the hadith in themes that make female agency observable and recognisable. Third is its equality-based reading of the texts in which

¹⁴ Muslim 2000, 1:548: Kitāb al-Ḥajj (“Book of Pilgrimage”), Bāb Safar al-Maʿr’a maʿ Mahram (“Chapter on A Woman Travelling With an Unmarriageable Kin or Her Husband”).
women's perspectives are centered much more than the readings of the conservatives and the moderates. Its conception that Islamic sources have established three principles on human dignity, independency, and responsibility of both women and men is also favourable for the development of this ethics.

The above discussion was a hermeneutical analysis about the reinterpretation of the hadīth within the context of Muslims’ contemporary struggle for equality between women and men. It was concerned with an interpretative attempt in which the hadīth is perceived positively, as a source of Islamic teachings for a meaningful life and just relations between women and men. I used the Tāḥrīr of Abū Shuqqa to point out some of its enabling moments when it comes to reading Islamic sources, as practiced by advocates of gender equality within Islam. While Abū Shuqqa’s interpretation of egalitarian gender relations is debatable, his methodological approach to the hadīth deserves ample appreciation, as his work suggests that reinterpretation of hadīth in the light of women’s and men’s equality can retrieve key aspects of the texts that have been neglected through tendentious assumptions prevalent among many Muslims. His interpretation of mutuality when it comes to the relationship between women and men in domestic and public spheres therefore deserves further study as we work towards egalitarian gender ethics in Islam.

Bibliography


CHAPTER 10

Islamic Ethics and the Ḥadīth of Intention

*Ali Altaf Mian*

1 Introduction

The capacity of the doer to give purpose and meaning to the deed, or intentionality, is a major theoretical and practical concern of Islamic ethics. This chapter illuminates this concern by recourse to a study of the Prophetic report often called the Ḥadīth of intention: “Actions are indeed [evaluated] according to intentions.” I approach this report as an entry point into broader debates on human agency in Islamic ethics. To that end, this chapter pursues the following questions: What is the relationship between intention and action? Does the former cause the latter, or does action construct inner life? How do commonly shared motivations create community and how are such motivations cultivated? Where have Muslim jurists and Sufis converged and diverged in their approaches to intentionality? Are intentions performative (embedded in devotional practices and social transactions) or a matter of the heart (presupposing a self that stands behind bodily actions)?

I grapple with these questions in three conceptual frameworks, which is to say that I relate the Ḥadīth of intention to (1) the dialectic of inside (bāṭin) and outside (ẓāhir), (2) communal formation, and (3) the distinction between the transcendental and empirical aspects of juridical-moral norms. My argument, simply put, is that studying the Ḥadīth of intention in relation to these conceptual frameworks reveals the resourcefulness of Ḥadīth discourse for thinking about ethical agency, since the commentarial literature on this report elaborates a complex view of intention as a psychosomatic orientation that conjoins the self to the Other, the individual to the community, and morality to legality.

At the outset, I find it apropos to mention my personal motivation for pursuing the question of intentionality and Ḥadīth discourse. I suspect that this chapter is an attempt on my part to grapple with the challenges posed to intentionality by psychoanalysis, especially the writings of Sigmund Freud (d. 1939) and Jacques Lacan (d. 1981). I have especially struggled to come to terms with two challenges stemming from my study of their writings. First, they hold that the subject of consciousness is not fully self-transparent and one often acts without total knowledge of one’s latent motivations. Second, they contend that it might be impossible to constantly orient oneself towards a transcendental
signifier, that is, to constantly focus on God, when most of one's actions are embedded in social networks of recognition.

The commentarial literature on the hadīth of intention allows us to think creatively about both challenges posed by psychoanalysis. This is so because Muslim ethicists have elaborated nuanced views of interiority that approach inner life as a theatre of struggle between instinct and reason. They have also acknowledged the social nature of action as well as the communal, even political, import of intentionality. Thus, I read the Islamic ethical insistence on the necessity of introspection, the struggle to purify motivation, as an attempt to constantly destabilise the moral certitude practitioners of piety might enjoy about their actions. In other words, by linking intention to self-probing ethical reasoning, the Islamic ethical tradition posits moral action as a site of self-transcendence.

Now, a note on what follows. I commence with a brief discussion of the hadīth of intention that locates my inquiry in the turn to practice on the part of religious studies scholars. This section also illuminates how thinking about intention through the lens of religious practice involves attention to its historical scene of emergence, its meaning in concrete social contexts, and the “discursive formations” (or what I have called conceptual frameworks) in which it has been historically understood. To that end, the following sections consider the biography of the hadīth scholar who popularised this report in the middle of the second/eighth century (section 3); how this report has been linked to political action and communal formation (section 4); the textuality of its citation in its locus classicus, namely, al-Bukhārī’s (d. 256/870) Ṣaḥīḥ (“Authentic”) (section 5); the reception of this report, and intentionality more broadly, in classical-era Sufi writings (section 6); the necessity of approaching intention in Islamic ethics as simultaneously empirical and transcendental (section 7); finally, the conclusion considers the methodological salience of using hadīth texts to think about key concepts in the study of Islamic ethics.

2 Intention and the Turn to Practice

The three conceptual frameworks I mentioned above are alluded to in the “the hadīth of intention,” which I cite below:

Actions are indeed [evaluated] according to intentions, and in fact what belongs to a man is what he intends. So, whosoever migrates towards God and His Messenger, let it be known that his migration is for God and
His Messenger. So, whosoever migrates to pursue the world or to marry a woman, let it be known that his migration is for what he migrates towards.

Al-Bukhārī 2011, 1:180–181

The report’s ethical significance was clear to classical-era Muslim religious scholars. For instance, the famed jurist Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) allegedly said: “This hadith contains seventy portals into ‘religious understanding’ (fiqh) ... and encompasses one-third of ‘religious knowledge’ (ʿilm).” This Prophetic report has thus been cited copiously and continuously in Muslim religious discourses to underscore the ethical principle that the doer’s motive is an important source for determining the moral status of the deed. The hadith fleshes out this principle by recourse to an example, what I call “ethnographic illustration,” that is, an example considering how people might practice the principle at hand.

The hadith of intention places motive at the heart of action, a move that has wide-ranging purchase in both legal and Sufi ideas about human agency (that is, the capacity to transform oneself and one’s social world through action). Yet the Islamic ethical principle concerning intention (niyya) is not only about being conscious of one’s motivations; it also involves truthfulness and sincerity: “intention signifies sincerity; it is a unitary act for the sake of God, the One without peers” (Ibn Ḥajar 1969, 1:12). This is what we might call the pietistic understanding of intention, which has often been elaborated in Sufi texts. At the same time, the idea that Sufi theologians are concerned solely with the transcendental aspects of intentionality is also problematic. As the foremost Sufi theologian and Muslim mystical author of the seventh/thirteenth century Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) writes: “While intention is unitary with respect to its essence, it changes with respect to its object, and so the consequence of an intention, too, depends on its object” (Ibn ʿArabī 1997, 1:256). Niyya thus concerns how one desires in the heart but also what one desires in the world. Muslim jurists, in turn, consider the moral status of devotional rituals, social transactions, and criminal behaviour. The key question here is: How does empirical action mirror inner motive? Jurists answer this question on a case-by-case basis, complicating our understanding of the inside-outside relationship.

1 This hadith, which is the first report recorded by al-Bukhārī in his Ṣaḥīḥ, appears with slight modifications in six additional “books” of this collection. Here, I cite the opening version in Kitāb Badʾ al-Wahy (“Book of the Beginning of Revelation”), Bāb Badʾ al-Wahy ʿalā Rasūl Allāh (“Chapter on How the Divine Revelation Started to Be Revealed to Allāh’s Messenger”). For an insightful analysis of this report, see de Francesco (2013).

2 The first saying is cited from al-Khaṭīb’s (d. 463/1071) al-Jāmiʿ (“The Compendium”) and the second from al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066) (al-Suyūṭī 1986, 42–43).
The broader ethical principle underlined by this hadith thus becomes: because bodily action can reveal, conceal, and displace inner motive, we must approach niyya in contextual, concrete terms. This is another way of underscoring the centrality of practice and contingency in ethical theory. The fact that Sufis and jurists have accentuated different aspects of this ethical principle does not necessarily imply that we are talking about two different religious practices. Rather, we can take the Sufi insistence on the inside and the juristic emphasis on the outside as reflecting the two sides of religious practice: the transcendental and the empirical. I address the latter conceptual dichotomy below. Here, let me say more on the advantages of approaching intentionality through the lens of religious practice.

Several scholars of religion have argued for nuanced approaches to religious practice. In her influential ethnography of Egyptian Muslim women’s participation in the so-called Islamic Revival of the 1990s, anthropologist Saba Mahmood underscores “the morphology of moral actions” (Mahmood 2005, 25, 119). She argues that when examined as micropolitical strategies, Muslim women’s practices of piety can no longer be depoliticised as docile submission to authority, as is often done within secular liberal feminist frameworks. In her focus on practice as a site for understanding ethical life, historian of religion and social ethicist Anna Peterson posits practices of “morality as a living, collective, and active undertaking” (Peterson 2020, 6). The sociologist of religion Robert Wuthnow argues that intention cannot be ignored in any examination of religious practice, since practitioners use rituals to “articulate and enact their intentions” (Wuthnow 2020, 104). He further argues that we must attend to the macrostructures in which religious practices are situated and in which intentions are “reinforced, aligned, and favorably [or unfavorably] assessed” (Wuthnow 2020, 104). These macrostructures include “power dynamics, social interactions, and discursive formations” (Wuthnow 2020, 13). The turn to practice in religious studies, therefore, allows us to place intentionality in Islamic ethics in multiple historiographical, political, and conceptual frameworks. In what follows, I have especially attempted to situate the hadith of intention in relation to its salient “discursive formations,” namely, the dialogue of the inside and outside, political action and communal formation, and the transcendental and empirical aspects of juridical-moral norms.

3 The Popularisation of the Ḥadīth of Intention

To appreciate how this report underscores the dialogue between the inside and outside (as well as the implications of this dialogue for the practice of
Islamic ethics), it is important to first study its historical scene of emergence. It was the traditionist Yahyā b. Saʿīd al-Anṣārī (d. 143/760 or 144/761) who first brought this report into wide circulation in the middle of the eighth century. A student of the so-called “seven jurists of Medina,” Yahyā b. Saʿīd was a famed scholar of Prophetic traditions and a master-jurist in his own right. His pre-eminent status as a man of piety – according to some observers he was an urbane ascetic – made him attractive to the administrators of law and order in the Islamic imperium. The Umayyads appointed him judge (qāḍī) of Medina around the year 743 (Judd 2014, 158). The ‘Abbāsids followed suit and appointed him qāḍī when they established rule in the Iraqi city of Hāshimiyya. The prosopographical literature remembers Yahyā for emphasising sincere intentions and pious actions. The Damascene historian and ḥadīth scholar Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348) informs us that “Yahyā is the [chief] narrator of the Prophetic report about actions and intentions, and it is from him that this ḥadīth became popular. It is said that around 200 people narrated this report from him” (al-Dhahabī 1996, 5:476–481).

Yahyā is therefore the “common link” between narrators of this report before his time period and the succeeding generations of narrators. The term, “common link,” was coined by the Orientalist Joseph Schacht (d. 1969) to refer to the narrator who popularised a tradition: “the existence of a significant common link (N.N.) in all or most isnāds of a given tradition would be a strong indication in favour of its having originated in the time of N.N.” (Schacht 1979, 172). The Dutch historian of ḥadīth G.H.A. Juynboll (d. 2010) brought a more nuanced view to this phenomenon and joined Schacht in using “the common link” to “establish the date and place of origin of individual ḥadīths” (Motzki 2004, xxxviii). Yet both Schacht and Juynboll associated the common link phenomenon with forged reports. Harald Motzki (d. 2019) challenged their view by insisting that the common link is not necessarily the forger of a tradition, but in many instances a narrator who might be “characterised as an early systematic collector who professionally passed his material on to students in a teaching circle” (Motzki 2004, xl). This view is more sympathetic to the approach of Muslim traditionists, since for them the common link phenomenon did not automatically imply forgery or invention; rather, it only signalled one of the many defects of transmission that must be considered in evaluating a report’s authenticity and normative evidentiary status (Aghaei 2020, 114–115).

The point to underscore here is that it was Yahyā who popularised the ḥadīth of intention, as is brought out in Juynboll’s “chain of narration” (isnād) for this report:
We can only speculate why Yaḥyā might have frequently engaged in the teaching of this ḥadīth, since “the early historical literature on ḥadīth and ḥijāl does not contain a single clue as to the reason why ... Yaḥyā ... may have brought the tradition into circulation” (Juynboll 2007, 677). At the same time, Juynboll does insinuate that Yaḥyā’s “judicial activities may have dictated the need for such a niyya maxim” (Juynboll 2007, 677). This is a valid interpretation because intention is an important aspect to consider when judging human actions in juridical settings. Let me suggest two additional interpretations.

First, the time period in which Yaḥyā was a qāḍī coincided with the tumultuous decades that witnessed the transition from the Umayyads to the ʿAbbāsids. While recent scholarship has emphasised a continuity between the two empires instead of the “rupture” presumed by earlier scholars, the two decades of the 740s and the 750s nonetheless saw significant transition in power and patronage. The era was therefore ripe, one might argue, for proliferating a Prophetic teaching that used intention to emphasise loyalty to religion, including in acts of migration. In fact, Yaḥyā himself migrated from Medina to Iraq. This contextualisation allows us to appreciate how ethical ideas accrue value, and how moral practices become normative, in relation to particular social and political dynamics.
Second, the biographical literature on Yaḥyā portrays him to be incredibly learned in hadith and jurisprudence and also exceptionally committed to devotional religion (al-Bukhārī 1941–1964, 4.2:275–276; al-Mizzī 1983, 3:346–359; al-Dhahābī 1996, 5:468–481; Juynboll 2007, 668). I would like to suggest that he might have popularised this hadith for the sake of exhorting his co-religionists to monitor their motives and to cultivate sincerity. Thus, his profuse transmission of this hadith might be seen as an antidote to the habituated, dry practice of devotional religion.

4 Community and Political Action

The attention to Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd enables us to identify the possible social and political contexts in which early Muslims might have cited this report. Yet it is important to underscore that this hadith’s linking of intention to political action resonates generally with how intentionality figures in the broader hadith discourse. This section first mentions those reports that maintain this link and then discusses the political implications of intention. To begin with, let me mention a report mentioned in Shīʿī sources:

Actions are indeed according to intentions, and in fact what belongs to a man is what he intends. So, whosoever fights for the sake of what is with God the loftiest, he will surely find his reward with God the loftiest. And whosoever fights desiring something of this world, then there is nothing for him except what he intends.

al-Majlīsī 1983, 6:212

3 Let me mention here a few Shīʿī reports in order to illustrate the fact that intentions are central in both Sunnī and Shīʿī hadith canons. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 95/713) is reported to have said: “No action is valid without intention.” The Prophet Muḥammad is reported to have said: “The intention of a believer contains more goodness than his action, whereas the intention of the unbeliever contains more wickedness than his action, and every doer does according to his intention.” Here, action only brings forth a part of the intention, which contains more goodness in case of a good action and more wickedness in case of an evil action. This view of intention coheres with Ibn ʿArabī’s views discussed above, as soul and meaning are the standing reserves of potentiality from which bodies and words derive their actuality. Several reports attributed to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765) are especially illuminating. For example: “The needy and believing servant of God prays, ‘Oh Lord! Grant me so that I can do this or that act of goodness. So, because God the Most Sublime and Sanctified knows the truth of his intention, God grants him the same reward that he would have received had he performed that action, for God is All-Encompassing and Ever-Kind.” In another narration, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq justifies the eternity of hellish punishment and paradisiacal pleasure based on the fact that
Consider also the tradition, “There is no migration after the Conquest of Mecca, but in terms of armed struggle and intention and if you are called to go forth, then go forth [in armed struggle]” (al-Bukhārī 2011, 6:7–8).

In his discussion of intention, the famed Muslim moral theologian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) mentions the following reports that further link intention to political acts such as warfare and migration:

– Anas b. Mālik (d. 93/712) reports: “The Prophet said during the Tabūk campaign: ‘There are many in Medina who, while still in the city, are joined with us in every valley we have crossed, every path we trod that vexed the unbelievers, every provision spent or hunger felt.’ The Companions asked, ‘How could it be, O Messenger of God, if they were not with us?’ He replied: ‘They were excusably detained and partook by way of good intention’” (al-Ghazālī 2010, 6:132; al-Ghazālī 2013, 6; al-Bukhārī 2011, 8:619–620).

– “He who fights with the intention only to have his share [of the booty] shall have only what he intends” (al-Ghazālī 2010, 6:133; al-Ghazālī 2013, 6).

– “Fighters fight according to intentions” (al-Ghazālī 2010, 6:134; al-Ghazālī 2013, 7).

– “When the two rows meet, the angels descend to record men their rank: so-and-so fought for the world (dunyā); so-and-so fought zealously (ḥamīyya); so-and-so fought for clan (ʿaṣābiyya). Therefore, say not that this person fell in the path of God, for only he who fights to make God’s word supreme is on God’s path” (al-Ghazālī 2010, 6:135; al-Ghazālī 2013, 7).

While scholars have questioned the authenticity of some of these reports, these reports do enable us a glimpse of how later authors such as al-Ghazālī underscored the political context in which intention mattered as a concept in early Islam. These reports suggest that communal belonging and political action were especially relevant to early Muslims’ ethical thought and practice. Thus, Kevin Reinhart identifies “membership in/leadership of the community” as one of the two primary concerns of formative “Islamic theological ethics,” the other being “predestination/moral responsibility” (Reinhart 2005, 250). He insightfully explains that these two issues were “inextricably bound together” and posed a major question for those who aspired to the “moral rigorism of early Islam:” Does “moral failure mean expulsion from the community?” (Reinhart 2005, 250).4 The moral failure that was linked to political belonging included failures in both devotional rituals and pious intentions.

God has perfect, eternal knowledge of believers’ and unbelievers’ intentions. For all reports, see al-Māzandarānī 2008, 8:265–268.

4 Roy P. Mottahedeh briefly discusses the link between niyya and political loyalty with reference to vows in fourth/tenth century Būyid contexts (Mottahedeh 1980, 65–67).
How do intentions become political? The hadith of intention uses the example of migration, namely, the migration of the early believers from Mecca to Medina. We know that according to the standard biographical tradition, the Prophet Muhammad migrated to Medina after thirteen years of preaching in his hometown of Mecca. For a believer to migrate with Muhammad implied leaving behind home and family ties. Migration was thus an act of fidelity, which demonstrated one’s commitment to an ideological community (instead of a tribal community). However, what if a believer had migrated for a reason other than pleasing God and joining Muhammad’s community? What if one had migrated for the sake of a prospective marriage partner or to sell one’s merchandise in a new market? Is this migration also an act of fidelity and does it also secure political belonging? The hadith of intention questions this type of migration. Hadith commentators state that this report is about a person who had allegedly migrated from Mecca to Medina for the sake of marrying a woman named Umm Qays (Ibn Ḥajar 1969, 110; al-Suyūṭī 1986, 37–38). Consequently, the man became known as “the migrant of Umm Qays” (muhājir Umm Qays). While the story is hard to verify, it does furnish us with the context needed to understand the practical, and in fact political, implications of intention. The strong connection we see between the hadith of niyya and community-forming political actions, such as migration and warfare, suggests that the idea of pure intentions served to consolidate loyalty in believers’ hearts, so that the onset of adversity and adversaries would not weaken believers’ attachment to the faith community. The particular example of “the migrant of Umm Qays” gives an incredibly political charge to intention, signifying intentions as personal and political.

5 Al-Bukhārī’s Creative Citation

The above explanations underscore the point that the hadith of intention is deeply connected to the dialectic of inside and outside and that intentionality is at once a matter of private devotion and political belonging. I now turn to the locus classicus of this hadith, namely al-Bukhārī’s Ṣahīh, to examine some further aspects. This famed collection of Prophetic speech commences with this report, and it is significant that al-Bukhārī placed it at the beginning of a chapter concerning the lofty theme of divine revelation (waḥy), suggesting, albeit implicitly, that the Prophet’s sincere search for truth was rewarded in the form of Qur’ānic revelation, for God gifts one according to one’s intentions. Recall the Prophet’s foundational migration, one that took him from commercial engagements to contemplative experiences on the Mount of Light. By
taking up solitude in a cave outside Mecca, the Prophet Muḥammad intended to find transcendent meaning and message. Because what God gifts people corresponds to their intentions, the Prophet received divine revelation as the reward of his foundational quest/intention to find God. Here, at least two questions must be addressed. First: Why does al-Bukhārī include the ḥadīth of intention at the beginning of “The Book of Revelation?” Second: What is the significance of starting with “revelation?” The ḥadīth commentator, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449), addresses both questions.

Ibn Ḥajar speculates about al-Bukhārī’s possible intent behind the textual decision to commence with this ḥadīth. Imagine, the commentator asks his readers, the following words on al-Bukhārī’s lips: “I intended to collect the revealed Sunna transmitted from the Prophet Muḥammad – who is the best of all created beings – so that my [sincere] intention would ensure the goodness of my action [of compiling ḥadīths]” (Ibn Ḥajar 1969, 1:8; see also al-Qaṣṭallānī 1996, 1:67). Note how these words posit the Sunna a revealed text, hearkening back to al-Shāfiʿī’s point that the Prophet’s speech was “cast into his heart” by God. This is also the reason that al-Bukhārī begins a collection of ḥadīth with “revelation,” accentuating the revealed or scriptural nature of Prophetic speech. Thus, the reader is encouraged both to think of ḥadīth as revelation and to engage in an act of purifying his or her intention for engaging in the study of ḥadīth. In other words, the reader is indirectly being directed to contemplate this question: What motivates my engagement with divine revelation? In this way, al-Bukhārī’s textual decision to commence his collection by coupling revelation and intention performs the communicative work that is usually reserved for exhortative prefaces.

Ibn Ḥajar mentions that some commentators have suggested that al-Bukhārī cites this report in lieu of an opening “sermon” or khutba (“exhortative preface” in this textual context). This is so because in some traditions it is reported that the Prophet’s companion ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 23/644) recited this ḥadīth “on the pulpit,” and in another narration, the ḥadīth begins with the Prophet saying, “O people! Actions are indeed according to intentions.” These textual cues lend support to the idea that this ḥadīth is exhortative in substance, an ideal Prophetic aphorism befitting the sermon genre. We must also mention that by opening with this ḥadīth, al-Bukhārī might be merely following tradition, an

5 The ḥadīth scholar Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj (d. 261/875) opens his collection with “Faith,” while “Purification” opens the other four books of the six canonical books (al-kutub al-sitta) in Sunnī Islam.

6 In his al-Risāla (“Epistle”), al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) remarked: “Both [the Qurʾān and the Sunna] came to him [Muḥammad] from God’s grace, just as God intended, and just as other acts of grace came to him” (al-Shāfiʿī 2015, 48–49).
established custom of his righteous predecessors. In this regard, the following
textual fragment from another Mamluk-era commentator, namely, Badr al-Dīn
al-ʿAynī (d. 855/1451), sheds some light: “The predecessors [of the community]
have preferred starting their discourse with the ḥadīth of intention for the sake
of indicating their sincerity” (al-ʿAynī 1970, 113). Note that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b.
Mahdī (d. 198/814) is reported to have said, “he who wants to write a book, let
him start with the tradition: works are to be judged by their intentions (man
arāda an yuṣannifā kitāban fa-l-yabda’ bi-ḥadīth al-aʾmāl bi-l-niyyāt)” (Juynboll
2007, 676).7 These explanations attest to al-Bukhārī’s success in compiling a
text that invites such rich observations on the part of commentators and read-
ners. Let us now examine how other Muslim scholars approached the theme of intentionality.

6 Intention in Sufi Writings

The interplay between inside and outside as being a major feature of the
Islamic ethical tradition’s understanding of intentionality is especially brought
out in Sufi writings.8 In his al-Riʿāya li-Huqūq Allāh (“Observing God’s Due”), a
text that was “composed in the form of counsels given to a disciple in response
to questions on his part” (Smith 1935, 44), the mystical theologian al-Ḥārith
al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857) defines niyya as “the resolution on the part of the
believer to align his action to an idea from among ideas. Hence, when he
determines that he will perform this particular action for this particular idea,
then such a resolution is called nīyya, be it for God’s sake or for another’s”
(al-Muḥāsibī n.d., 246). Furthermore, al-Muḥāsibī says, “intention thus covers
two meanings: the resolution to do a particular action and doing something
while desiring a particular meaning [object of thought]” (al-Muḥāsibī n.d.,
246). It is in this sense that I term nīyya a psychosomatic orientation; it is an
inner movement that is expressed by and embodied in physical action.

In his Qūṭ al-Qulūb (“Nourishment of the Hearts”) Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī
(d. 386/996) adopts a holistic approach to the centrality of nīyya in everyday
ethics: intention pervades not only the formal practices of piety but, also,
eating, drinking, attire, sleeping, and marital relations, since these are all
actions for which one shall be questioned [by God]. If one performs these
actions for God’s pleasure, then they increase his tally of good works.

7 Ibn Taymiyya (2004, 18:246) makes a similar point in his analysis of this ḥadīth.
8 This paragraph and the next two are also discussed in Mian 2022.
However, if one undertakes these actions in pursuit of lust or for the sake of another's pleasure, then they end up amplifying the tally of evil deeds. This is [the meaning of the Prophet's words] for every man is what he intends.

Al-Makkī 2001, 3:1342

Al-Makkī additionally says that *niyya* is a gift of God and that a single action can contain multiple motivations. In this way, a single action becomes a source of plentiful merit. Such merit, however, is contingent on not only the doer's knowledge of and assent to the revealed norms but also the grace of God (al-Makkī 2001, 3:1343).

In al-Ghazālī's thinking we find a finessed account of *niyya*. He retains the link between action and what al-Muḥāsibī calls idea (that is, between *ʿamal* and *maʿnā*) and also al-Makkī's idea of "multiple intentions." However, instead of "idea" or "meaning" (*maʿnā*), al-Ghazālī opts for a more psychologically-laden word, namely, *gharaḍ* (aim or purpose). To that end, he cites the *ḥadīth* under study in this chapter in a refined discussion of intention as well as sincerity (*ikhlāṣ*) and truthfulness (*ṣidq*).9 For al-Ghazālī intention becomes especially relevant for highlighting the dialogue between the inside and outside, since he defines *niyya* as an “intermediate attribute” (of the soul). He writes, “intention is the soul’s springing forth, direction, and inclination towards what it perceives as its purpose [intended object], in this life or in the hereafter” (al-Ghazālī 2010, 6:155). “The springing forth of the soul” – *inbiʿāth al-nafs*, which one might even translate as the flow of the inner onto the outer – is a beautiful phrase that captures the dynamic way in which *niyya* mediates the inside and outside.

Ibn ʿArabī illuminates the relationship between the inside and outside through three analogies. Intention is like the body’s soul; it is similar to the rainwater that nourishes the ground of action; finally, action and intention are akin to word and meaning (Ibn ʿArabī 1997, 1:256–259). These multiple analogies allow us to view intention as source, sustainer, and substance of action. Yet Ibn ʿArabī also encourages us to approach intentions as taking place in a liminal space that is the scene of both coherence and displacement, unity and difference. He further complexifies this view when he posits the relationship between water and intention as ontological and not merely analogical. He does so in his discussion of purification rituals, where he elaborates the

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9 Al-Ghazālī approaches *niyya* under five subheadings: the virtues of good intention, its reality, how intention is superior to action, the relationship between action and intention, and the difference between intention and choice.
ingenious insight that the reason why some jurists do not require intention as a necessary condition for ritual ablution is because of the role water plays in this practice. Recall that according to Qur’anic discourse, water is the source of all life (Q 21:30). In Ibn ʿArabī’s imaginal schema, life/soul and intention are structurally identical (niyya for him is ḥaʿmaʿa). Thus, because water is life, its use in the practice of ablution already presupposes the presence of the soul (read: intention). Hence, there is no need to identify formal intention-making as a condition of ritual ablution, since the liquid substance one uses in this practice assumes the same relationship to flesh as intention does to action (Ibn ʿArabī 1997, 1:397).

7 Scholarship on Intentionality in Islamic Ethics

The deep resonance between the inside and outside insofar as the concept of intentionality in Islamic ethics is concerned has not always been appreciated by scholars. Paul Powers has studied the ritualistic and performative dimensions of niyya in Islamic law. He finds fault with those scholars who deploy niyya “to look for a ‘deep’ or spiritual component of ritual” (Powers 2006, 64). For Powers,

Niyya is what one does with the mind while making certain ritualised bodily movements and verbal utterances ... The legal texts do not indicate a capacity or mental mode such as “will” that is separate from, and which directs, the niyya. Rather, one simply intends, formulates niyya, and this is the inner self in a ritual mode. There is nothing “further inside” than niyya, no “self” standing back while the mind/body performs the acts of ritual.

POWERS 2006, 203

While Powers rightly draws attention to the “physical, bodily, and praxis-oriented qualities so central to Islamic ritual law and practice,” his limited sources reflect only a provisional and partial view of niyya in Islamic law and ethics (Powers 2006, 72). For Talal Asad, this position sees ritual prayer, for example, as “an external effect” even if “will and intent are viewed as a conjoined internal cause” (Asad 2018, 81). On my reading, however, Powers effec-

10 Asad further states: “What worries me about this way of looking at the problem is that the most important point of the prayer (the subject learning to articulate her faith) is missed, and the traditional norm being learned is confused with the experience of the performed – that is, with what she thinks the prayer means. The recited words and body
tively partitions the inside and outside, leaving little room for understanding the meaning and function of ritual in the broader framework of Muslim piety.

I thus question Powers’ hasty conclusion about “no self” in ritual worship. Unfortunately, he does not engage with works of moral philosophy and legal theory, which do presuppose a moral self and discuss the transcendental consequences of actions. Pre-modern Muslim jurists in fact cited the *ḥadīth* of intention in both works of substantive law and in texts of legal theory. I provide two illustrations to make this point.

My first illustration comes from the Andalusian jurist and littérateur Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064). He justifies his jurisprudential approach to the issue of buying and selling musical instruments by recourse to the *ḥadīth* of intention. On the one hand, the sale of musical instruments is forbidden, argues Ibn Ḥazm, when the buyer intends to use such instruments in sinful behaviour (*fisq*), such as listening to music in a way that arouses illicit sexual desire. On the other hand, the purchase of the same instruments is permissible for someone who seeks self-comfort and pleasure (*tarwīḥ al-nafs*), which in turn might strengthen one’s willingness to perform the devotional rituals. “He seeks to enliven himself by means of music,” explains Ibn Ḥazm, “and he is obedient and virtuous, and his action [of buying these instruments] is valid” (Ibn Ḥazm 2003, 7:567; cited in Kaddouri 2013, 234). It is noteworthy that Ibn Ḥazm makes repeated references to a self that intends and becomes either pious or impious due to the effects of intention. The invocation of this “self” thus problematises Powers’ claim about the lack of a self behind ritual performance.

My second illustration comes from a text of legal theory. The Egyptian Ḥanafi jurist Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1563) discusses *niyya* in a major text on legal rules and axioms. He invokes the *ḥadīth* of intention in his discussion of the juristic maxim, “there is no reward except with *niyya*.” He explains that the *ḥadīth*

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11 Missing from Powers’ account are several important treatments of *niyya* by pre-modern and modern Muslim jurists and theologians. A broader view of *niyya* reveals that a host of traditionists and jurists themselves recognise its spiritual dimensions. See, for example, the following works on *niyya*, which are all missing from Powers’ book: Ibn Abī l-Dunyā (d. 281/894), *al-Ikhlāṣ wa-l-Nīyya* (“Sincerity and Intention”); al-Ṣuyūṭī (d. 911/1505), *Muntahā l-Āmār* (“Ultimate Hopes”); al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606), *Tahīr al-Tawīyya* (“Smoothening the Folds”); al-Kūrānī (d. 1101–1690), *I’mal al-Fikr* (“Activate the Thinking”); Ibn ‘Ajiba (d. 1224/1809), *Tashīl al-Madkhal* (“Simplifying the Introduction”); al-Husaynī (d. 1332/1914), *Kitāb Nihāyat al-Iḥkām* (“Book on the Goal of Legislation”). In addition to these monographs, there are countless texts in various genres where Muslim authors from a range of disciplinary backgrounds comment on *niyya*. 

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*movements in prayer aim not at creating a belief (an intellectual doctrine) but an attitude of reverence and a desire (intention) to get closer to God. I stress that I refer here not to the private experience of every performer but to the point of the prayer as stipulated by the discursive tradition* (Asad 2018, 81).
of intention occasions “a verdict on or a moral assessment of actions” (*ḥukm al-aʿmāl*), which is of two types: transcendental and empirical. The first verdict or assessment “pertains to the afterlife and concerns the question of reward or punishment” (Ibn Nujaym 1999, 17). We can call this the transcendental *ḥukm*, to borrow words from Ebrahim Moosa (1998). The second assessment – or, “the empirical *ḥukm*” – concerns “the validity or invalidity of actions in this world” (Ibn Nujaym 1999, 17). While a jurist often has to restrict himself to determine the empirical validity or invalidity of human actions, Ibn Nujaym acknowledges that intentions also have consequences in the afterlife and implicate a soul or self, a moral subject (al-Ḥamawī 2011, 1:63–67). The Ḥanafi jurist Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ḥamawī (d. 1098/1687) further clarifies that the Ḥanafīs – as opposed to the Shāfiʿīs – lack consensus on the necessity of *niyya* as a prerequisite for the empirical validity of an action. Yet, the Ḥanafīs unanimously affirm the transcendental implications of *niyya*, that is, its significance for thinking about reward or punishment in the afterlife (al-Ḥamawī 2011, 1:63–67). Thus, the transcendental *ḥukm*, which pertains to the afterlife and implicates a soul, forms a part of the legal discourse about *niyya* (Moosa 1998).

These two illustrations – the first from Ibn Ḥazm and the second from Ibn Nujaym – serve to demonstrate my point, namely, that jurists are cognisant of moral subjectivity and attend to both the empirical and transcendental aspects of norms. I thus remain wary of the claim, on the part of Powers, that Islamic substantive law does not presuppose a moral self. Below I consider how other scholars have studied intention to highlight some alternative perspectives on the subject matter in the study of Islamic ethics.

The legal historian Oussama Arabi has studied *niyya* in the context of modern legal reform by concentrating on the Egyptian jurist ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī’s (d. 1971) efforts to modernise Islamic law. The latter activated a subjectivist notion of intentions in legal practices by turning to the Ḥanbali, and to a lesser extent Mālikī, treatment of intent or ulterior motive in contract law. The “pietist subjectivist bent of Ḥanbali law” emphasises both the intent of the buyer and the seller (for example, with reference to an arms seller whose

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12 See also Ibn Kamāl Pāshā’s (d. 940/1534) discussion of this point in his treatise on the first “book” of al-Bukhārī’s *Ṣaḥīḥ* (*Majmūʿ al-Rasāʿil al-ʿAllāma Ibn Kamāl Bāshā* [“Collection of Treatises of the Scholar Ibn Kamāl Pāshā”]). Already in the late third/ninth and early fourth/tenth centuries, the Egyptian Ḥanafī jurist Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭahāwī (d. 321/933) argued that the report, “actions are indeed according to intentions,” does not establish “the principle that the appropriate intention must accompany a speech act for the act to be deemed legally valid. He reinterprets the *ḥadīth* as confirming simply that Divine reward in the hereafter for a given action correlates with the agent’s intention in performing the action” (Syed 2017, 160).
customer might use a purchased weapon to execute a mass shooting) (Arabi 1997, 220). This subjectivist bent appealed to al-Sanhūrī because of its resonance with "the modern French theory of the determining cause or motive" (Arabi 2004). Al-Sanhūrī’s reformist efforts illustrate that Islamic legal traditions can be read in multiple ways to support different ideas about ethics and moral responsibility.

The historical anthropologist Brinkley Messick directly approaches the question of subjectivity: is there a theory of the self that is implied in Islamic legal thought and practice? For Messick, the writings of Muslim theologians and jurists on intention elaborate “crucial components of the legal theory of the sharʿī subject” (Messick 2001, 153). Messick emphasises the usefulness of contextualising this ethical subject within “a history of the self and the individual” that is distinct from Eurocentric conceptualisations of subjectivity and individuality (Messick 2001, 151). The contours of the Muslim ethical self also become clear when this self is posited in relation to God. While a “separation of intentionality and expression” does not characterise the divine word, human language indicates a lack of equivalence between thought and expression (Messick 2001, 178). It seems to me that the crucial point here is to appreciate the vulnerability and uncertainty that infuses all human intentions and actions. Thus, a moral action, according to the Islamic ethical tradition, expresses the agency of a self, but its immediate and final meaning remains contingent on two factors that exceed the self, namely, public interpretation and divine judgment.

Arabi and Messick both highlight the need to situate the jurisprudence of intent in broader social, political, and intellectual contexts. Likewise, it is also important to acknowledge the complex intersectional realities in which contemporary Muslims observe norms that they take to be divinely sanctioned, that is, norms based in the Shariʿa. Muslims’ everyday practices are situated in networks of local and global histories (of nation-states, market economies, and ethical traditions) as well as vectors of embodied differences, such as race/ethnicity, class, gender, sexual orientation, and bodily capacity. As historian of Islam and Muslim feminist scholar Kecia Ali points out, “Our experiences differ dramatically based on our race and socio-economic status, our family configurations, our sexual orientations, our marital statuses, our geographic locations” (Ali 2016, 205). Thus, in our bid to identify the moral self, or ideas about interiority and subjectivity, we have to be cautious. The sources might reveal a reified self at work, but this generic “un-marked” self will not do for everyone. In other words, after recovering a moral self in classical Islamic law, there still remains the question: How do we bridge the gap between the legal tradition’s idealised moral self, one who thrives in textual spaces, and ordinary
Muslim selves, those who survive in physical spaces? The key is to engage in critical and creative acts of translation, whether translating between textual representation or social reality, or interior states and physical actions.

The need to approach intentionality within the contingencies of social life was acknowledged by Muslim moral theologians such as al-Ghazālī. For Ebrahim Moosa, al-Ghazālī saw intention as the elixir that purifies knowledge and practice. A focus on inner motive, Moosa argues, has the capacity to humanise those moral acts that appear as improper or subversive (Moosa 2005, 131). Thus, our judgments about our own actions and others’ actions should resist the convenient but crude binary of good and evil. Sometimes, evil intentions lurk behind good deeds and vice versa. It goes without saying that the interpretation of intention is not so easy, but the point here is that attention to intent and motive complexifies, and can thus humanise, a range of actions whose moral status we might not understand at first sight. In his insightful commentary on al-Ghazālī, Moosa also theorises the central dyad that concerns us in this chapter, namely, the relationship between the inside and outside. These two terms animate a paradox that consists of an “inwardness of faith that is incommensurate with its outwardness – an exterior of faith not identical with its interior” (Moosa 2005, 132). This incommensurability, however, sets the stage for approaching Islamic ethics as a project of self-transcendence.

8 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the salience of hadīth texts as important sources for the study of Islamic ethics as well as the need to engage with ethical themes and questions on the part of researchers in hadīth studies. In the above analysis, I have situated “the hadīth of intention” in three discursive formations that illuminate its analytical purchase for the critical study of Islamic ethics. Intentionality in this ethical tradition is a psychosomatic orientation that presupposes the dialogue of self and society and relates to communal formation as well as the legal/moral divide of human actions (which I explored by looking at how intention is important for both the empirical and transcendental valences of juridical-moral norms). To a large extent, these three conceptual points of reference enabled me to grapple with the psychoanalytical challenges to the intentional subject. In the Islamic ethical tradition, the spiritual and material dimensions of intentionality are not easily separable. The actions we undertake with our limbs both extend and inform psychic life. The movements of the heart, too, seek bodily forms. Intention, therefore, is irreducible to inner experience or linguistic or bodily performatives. I have also suggested above that this view of intentionality resonates with scholarship on religious
practices. Finally, I underscored the need to engage in critical and creative acts of translation when thinking about intention at the threshold of the inside and outside.

**Bibliography**


Chapter 11

Consult Your Heart

The Self as a Source of Moral Judgment

Mutaz al-Khatib

1 Introduction

The dichotomy of God versus human is central in Qur’anic discourse and permeates most reflections in ontology, epistemology, and ethics. For example, God’s roles as the Bestower of bounty (al-Mun‘īm) and the Speaker (al-Mutakallim) have been the focus of inquiries into the ethical obligations placed upon humans and the sources of knowledge in Islamic scholarship. The search for understanding this dilemma pushed Muslims to explore a methodology for understanding God’s discourse and uncovering His will – either through the Qur’ān or through the Prophet Muḥammad’s words and deeds.

The difference in methodology between jurists and Sufis around what is apparent (ẓāhir) and what is inward (bāṭin) formed a central axis in discussions within the fields of tafsīr (Qur’ānic exegesis), ḥadīth (Prophetic reports), fiqh (Islamic law), uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory), and Sufism (Islamic mysticism). However, the search for the sources of ethical knowledge against the universality of the Lawgiver stimulates serious inquiry into the role of the individual in ethical judgment. The question of individual moral knowledge prompts us to explore interrelated issues such as: (1) the capacity to know an ethical judgment inwardly, which relates to the source of the judgment and its evidence; (2) the competence to understand the Lawgiver’s intent addressed to individuals; (3) the ethical responsibility in applying general judgments and principles, or the fatwā (legal opinion) of the muftī (jurisconsult) to specific private realities (scrutiny and caution); and (4) individual moral responsibility and choice in the face of contradictions in muftīs’ legal opinions – for example, in the case of different opinions on a particular case, how should the individual choose?

1 Recently, few studies discussed the moral role of the individual in Islamic law. Mohammad Fadel discussed the ethical dilemma facing muqallids (imitators) as a result of the ethical pluralism generated by uṣūl al-fiqh’s individualist ethical paradigm, and he proposed that “the muqallid plays a central role in maintaining the integrity of Islamic law by monitoring
The issue of individual moral knowledge is not only limited to questions of ethical responsibility but also connected to the concept of “conscience” understood as

The faculty within us that decides on the moral quality of our thoughts, words, and acts. It makes us conscious of the worth of our deeds and gives rise to a pleasurable feeling if they are good and to a painful one if they are evil.

Despland 2005, 3:1939

The concept of “conscience” in the Islamic tradition is a controversial issue for Western scholars. For instance, William Tisdall appealed to the Arabic language to prove that Islam lacks the ethical conception which is called “conscience” (ḍamīr) claiming that “[n]either in the Arabic itself nor in any other Muhammadan languages is there a word which properly expresses what we mean by conscience” (Tisdall 1910, 62). This approach led the Encyclopedia of Religion (Despland 2005, 3:1944) to conclude that: “The notion of conscience as internal organ is not found outside of Christianity. As commonly understood, it is peculiar to the West.” This debate on the existence or non-existence of “conscience” in Islam began at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ignaz Goldziher’s insight was critical when he noted: “The assumption that a word alone can be taken as a credible proof of the existence of a conception, has shown itself to be a prejudice” (Goldziher 1917, 16). Indeed, he quoted the two ḥadiths under study here to prove that

didactic sentences, principles mirroring ethical conceptions, should be tested by more than a word, a terminus technicus, such as those which are used in the consideration of the “question of conscience” in Islam.

Goldziher 1917, 16

In this vein, Bryan W. Van Norden coined the term “lexical fallacy” to argue that simply because a word for a concept does not exist in a particular tradition, it does not mean that the concept is not operative in it (Ban Norden 2003, 101–102). Rashid Riḍā (d. 1354/1935) argued that the “qalb” (heart), in a specific context, refers to what is known in modern Arabic as “ḍamīr” (conscience).

would-be mujtahids to ensure that they conform to Islamic ethical ideals” (Fadel 2014, 106). Similarly, Baber Johansen suggested a differentiation between forum internum and forum externum inherent to Islamic Law which, “like most legal systems, obliges those that appeal to it to choose their own options and to take ethical decisions” (Johansen 1997, 20).
It means knowing from oneself through spiritual and emotional engagement (al-wijdān al-ḥissī wa-l-ma’nawī). He also quoted the first ḥadīth “consult your heart ...” to prove this meaning (Riḍā 1367/1948, 9:419).²

The concomitant dichotomy of reason and revelation has also dominated modern discussions about Islamic ethics,³ hindering further inquiry into conscience and its authority in the Islamic tradition. The present study unveils understudied spaces where Muslim jurists, legal theorists, Sufis, and ethicists have discussed the role of individual conscience in the development of moral judgments from different perspectives.

In order to flesh out these issues, this study shall investigate two central ḥadīths: “consult your heart and consult your self⁴ and “righteousness is good conduct, and sin is that which rankles in your chest and which you would hate for other people to look upon.” These two ḥadīths have been chosen for their content and special status in the field of Islamic ethics. The two ḥadīths point to the innermost dimension in humans – that which takes place in the heart, stirs in the self, and occurs within thought – in order to distinguish between the righteous and the sinful. The special status of these two ḥadīths is attested by the fact that they were included by Imām al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) in his collection of forty ḥadīths, wherein each is considered

A core fundamental among the fundamentals of religion, described by scholars as [the core] upon which Islam is premised, or as being half of Islam, or one third of it, or something approximating that.

AL-NAWAWĪ 2004, 14–15

The reception of the two ḥadīths will be explored within the disciplines of ḥadīth commentaries, usūl al-fiqh, fiqh, and Sufi literature. Looking at Muslim jurists’ and theorists’ engagement with these ḥadīths, I shall focus on al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) understanding of wara’ (abstinence), Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 728/1328) approach, and al-Shāṭibī’s (d. 790/1388) interpretation of ījīthād al-mukallaf (exerting one’s reasoning for personal judgment). My approach investigates the specific ethical question of the inward aspect (bāṭin) on three levels. First, it looks at meta-ethics, as it explores the theoretical and epistemological basis relating to the sources of judgment and the criteria for specifying

² For more discussion about “damīr” see Heck 2014, 292–324 and Leirvik 2006.
⁴ Lit. “seek fatwā from your heart and seek fatwā from yourself.” The variant narrations of the two ḥadīths will be discussed below.
righteousness and sin. Second, I examine the scriptural ethics, represented by key hadiths as the primary gateways for the study of ethics within the hadith corpus. And third, I turn to applied ethics, which focuses on specific cases and individual applications.

2 References to the Inward Dimension (Bāṭin) in the Ḥadīth Corpus

The hadiths associated with the issues of the role of the individual’s inward dimension may be approached through scrutiny of the transmission and narrations, and/or interpretation, both direct and indirect. While the locus of direct interpretation can be accessed in the books of hadith commentary, indirect interpretation may be gleaned from the titles of books and chapters in hadith compendiums that employ the device of chapter and topic headings directly addressing this subject.

2.1 The Ḥadīths of the Inward Dimension (Bāṭin)

There are two central hadiths that refer to the inward dimension of the human in the attainment of knowledge of righteousness (birr) and sinfulness (ithm): the hadith of Wābiṣa b. Maʿbad (d. 89/708) and that of al-Nawwās b. Samʿān (d. 50/670). It was reported that Wābiṣa came to ask the Prophet about righteousness and sinfulness, so the Prophet said:

O Wābiṣa! Consult your heart and consult your self (three times). Righteousness is that towards which the self feels tranquil, and sinfulness is that which rankles in the self, and wavers in the chest, even when people have offered you their opinion time and time again.
As for al-Nawwās b. Sam’ān, it was transmitted that he said:

I asked the Messenger of God about righteousness and sinfulness, so he said: righteousness is good conduct (ḥusn al-khuluq), and sinfulness is that which rankles in your chest and which you would hate for other people to look upon.\(^8\)

There is a slight difference in the narrations of the hadith of Wābiṣa. Consultation is reported to be sought from both the heart and the self together in some narrations,\(^9\) but in others, consultation is reported to be sought from

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the self alone.10 Whereas Wābiṣa’s version enquires about the knowledge of righteousness and sinfulness, others seek the knowledge about the permissible (ḥalāl) and the prohibited (harām), and some hadiths even report mention of certitude (yaqīn) and doubt (shakk).11 The sign of righteousness or certitude is occasionally expressed as “tranquility (ṭumāʾīnī) of the heart or the self,” and on other occasions as “stillness (sukūn) of the heart or the self.” Sinfulness is expressed on one occasion as “that which rankles in the self;” on another as “that which rankles in the heart and wavers in the chest” (Aḥmad 2001, 29:528), and on yet a third occasion as “that which rankles in the chest” (Abū Ya‘lā 1984, 3:162). Sufis have engaged in extended discussions on the self and the heart, but these hadiths do not help in differentiating between the self and the heart, because they add in the term “chest.” However, the central formulation in the hadith of Wābiṣa is “Consult your heart. Consult your self” and the common denominator among all the narrations is turning towards the inner dimension of the human being. This is meant to distinguish between righteousness and sinfulness, between the permissible and the prohibited. The hadith is connected to the dichotomy of the apparent (ẓāhir) and the inward (bāṭin), which manifested strongly thereafter, particularly in the writings of the Sufis, who speak of “the scholars of the apparent” (ʿulamāʾ al-ẓāhir) in opposition to “the scholars of the inward dimension” (ʿulamāʾ al-bāṭin), as we find, for instance, in Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī’s (d. 386/998) work (al-Makkī 2001, 1:326, 423–424, 443).

The hadith variant that mentioned certitude (yaqīn) and doubt (shakk) can be linked to the intensive discussions on knowledge (ʿilm), its definition and process as we find in philosophy, theology, and ʿusūl al-fiqh. The Muʿtazilīs considered sukūn al-nafs (lit., “tranquillity of the soul”) a condition for knowledge. Thus, when conviction does not correspond to reality (muṭā baqāʾī al-wāqīʿ), it should be considered ignorance; which was criticised harshly by Sunnī ʿusūl al-fiqh (al-Bāqillānī 1998, 178–182; al-Shirāzī 2003, 4; al-Kalwadhānī 1985, 1:36). The Muʿtazilīs defined knowledge as “believing a thing to be as it is to one’s tranquility” (iʿtiqād al-shayʿ alā mā huwa bihi maʾa sukūn al-nafs ilayh),12 and a similar definition can be found in philosophy in relation to rhetorical argument. ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025) developed an epistemology of sukūn al-nafs as mental persuasion that corresponds to outward realities (al-muṭābaqa fi l-khārij), and he understood it as an additional attribute of scholarship (ʿālim) and not as an essential element of the definition of ʿilm itself. Hence,

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12 It seems that the Muʿtazilīs’ definition of ʿilm has been developed and revised by some late Muʿtazilī scholars (see ʿAbd al-Jabbār n.d., 12:13; al- Bsāri 1964, 110; al-Māzarī 2002, 97).
the subjective standard of inner conviction must be reinforced by an objective standard, and, thus, the tranquillity of the self belongs to rationality rather than psychology, because lay persons, *muqallids* (people who follow others’ opinions), psychologically can have the tranquillity of the self without its rational basis (‘Abd al-Jabbār n.d., 12:16–33; al-Kindī 1950, 1:171; Butterworth 1977, 63; Rosenthal 2007, 47f, 63, 211; Wilmers 2018, 151–152, 156, 163; Elkaisy-Friemuth 2006, 58–60, 169; Goodman 2003, 148–149). Note, however, that this understanding of *sukūn al-nafs* is outside the scope of this paper as it is related mainly to the rational process of attaining knowledge and not to the inward dimension and conscience.

Going back to the two mentioned *ḥadiths*, I should note that they have provoked disagreement, as is clear from the words of Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), who spoke of jurists being divided into two groups according to their stance:

> A group among the predecessors (*salaf*) advocated deeming them authentic (*ṣaḥīḥ*) and acting upon that which is indicated by their apparent meanings..., then there are reports attributing to others a position advocating attenuating them, deeming them weak (*ḍaʿīf*), and reinterpreting their meanings. \(^{14}\)

As for the group, who ascribed a weak validity to these *ḥadiths*, they did not only discourage people to act upon them, but also saw a contradiction between those *ḥadiths* that restrict guidance (*hidāya*) to the Qurʾān and the Sunna and those that refer to consultation of the heart and the self. For, in their view, God is the Legislator (*al-Musharri*) and He has clarified all matters of religion either directly or indirectly. Indeed, even the Prophet had been commanded in the Qurʾān to rule between people according to what God had shown him (Q 4:105), not according to his own opinion, nor by what his self had instructed. If this was the case with the Prophet himself, then it is all the more applicable

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\(^{13}\) For more discussion on *sukūn al-nafs*, see al-ʿAskarī 1998, 81; Bouhafa 2019, 67; Johansen 2013, 127–144.

\(^{14}\) After relating a number of *ḥadiths*, both *marfūʿ* (attributed to the Prophet) and *mawqūf* (attributed to a Prophetic companion (*ṣaḥābī*)), al-Shāṭibī summarised the words of al-Ṭabarī from his book *Tahdhib al-Āthār* (“Refinement of the Traditions”) (al-Shāṭibī 1992, 2:659). We do not know precisely which *ḥadiths* have been deemed weak (*daʿīf*), as some *ḥadiths* to this effect have been verified in the two authentic books of *ḥadith* (al-Bukhārī and Muslim) or in one of them. Also, the extant copy of *Tahdhib al-Āthār* is incomplete and does not contain this discussion, nor could I find anyone else who has cited these words from al-Ṭabarī.
to others. Whosoever is ignorant of God’s proclamations is obligated to ask the
scholars who understand God’s intention, not to ask his self. The scriptural
evidence is the sole reference for knowing the permissible and the prohibited,
the meaning of which is affirmed by a number of hadiths and reports. It would
seem that the choice for which this group has opted in order to resolve the
supposed problem is to weigh between the hadiths that gives preference to
one over the other. This is done without attempting to interpret or harmonise
them, or even claim abrogation – the available options for dealing with
It would have been possible to restrict consultation of the heart to cases in
which scriptural texts are absent or in cases where divergence exists between
scholars on a particular issue. However, this too was ruled out based on the
aforementioned argument regarding the status of the scriptural text as the sole
authority with proclamations encompassing all realities.

As for the other group who advocated classifying these hadiths as authen-
tic (ṣaḥīḥ) and acting upon their apparent meanings, al-Shāṭībī reported some
disagreement but did not convey the arguments through al-Ṭabarī, although
they are mentioned in the books of uṣūl al-fiqh. It appears that al-Ṭabarī opted
for an intermediate position between the two groups, so he interpreted the
hadiths in a restricted manner,

either because he considered the hadiths to be authentic, or because he
considered those among them that indicate their [apparent] meanings
to be authentic.

AL-SHĀṬĪBĪ 1992, 2:663

However, the position advocating the attenuation of these hadiths, deeming
them weak (ḍaʿīf), did not continue after al-Ṭabarī. We find no clear trace of
this position in the various sources of hadith.15 It would appear that numer-
ous hadiths that reported on this topic within the hadith corpus precluded the
endurance of the position advocating such hadiths to be deemed forgeries.
This is especially the case because these hadiths buttress each other’s reliabil-
ity, due to the abundance of their sources and the trajectory of their chain

15 With the exception of that which appears, in a very limited fashion, in the criticism of
the chain of transmission of the “consult your heart” hadith, connected to the weakness
of a particular transmitter, or one transmitter not hearing the narration from another
transmitter. In all cases, this is a criticism directed at the chains of transmission, not to
the hadith in its origin, which is transmitted through numerous paths (see Ibn Rajab 1999,
2:94–95).
of transmission, as they were imparted from seven Companions (ṣahāba) and one among the Successors (tābiʿūn).

2.2 Interpretations of the Ḥadith
With the decline of the position advocating the weak reliability of these ḥadīths, the discussion turned to their interpretation and the search for their intended meaning. These ḥadīths provoked a central dilemma connected to the sources of knowledge, namely the authority of the heart and the self. The interpretations of the scholars of ḥadīth reflect their positions vis-à-vis this issue. For if we examine the chapter headings under which these ḥadīths have been included, we will find them revolving around ethical content, such as: righteousness and sinfulness; manners and good conduct; temperance, piety, and abstaining from ambiguous matters; in addition to some jurisprudential topics, such as the books of sales, testimony, judgments and rulings. The discussions of the ḥadīth commentators revolved around three central issues: (1) the boundaries of the authority of the heart and the self; (2) the concepts of righteousness and sinfulness; (3) How to reconcile and harmonise between the ḥadīth and others that might contradict it. We now turn to these issues in more detail.

2.2.1 The Authority of the Heart
One group rejected the authority of the heart and the self, and on this basis, deemed these ḥadīths to be weak. Another group took the opposite position and embraced the apparent meaning of these ḥadīths. Al-Ṭabarī was opposed to taking these ḥadīths in their general apparent meaning. He argued that the meaning of these ḥadīths is restricted, “not as those have presumed, that it is a commandment directed to the ignorant (juḥḥāl) to act according to what their selves have arrived at and reject whatever they deem repulsive, without asking their scholars” (al-Shāṭibī 1992, 2:664). Thus, two central questions arise here: what are those things that one should refer to the heart? And is this applicable to all hearts?

Al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316) determined that

the self (nafs) possesses an awareness, rooted in the fitra (innate disposition), of outcomes or results that are praiseworthy and those outcomes which are not. However, the appetite (shahwa) can overcome inner restrictions in such a way that it can obligate the person to act in a way that is self-harmful, such as the thief who is overcome by the appetite to steal, [despite] being afraid of the punishment that may befall him.

AL-ṬŪFĪ 1998, 204
Ibn Rajab (d. 795/1393) affirmed the same meaning, maintaining the position that consultation of the heart is connected to those ḥadīths that speak of the innate disposition that God has built into people (al-ḍīra al-lātī faṣṭar al-nās ‘alayhā).16 However, something might arise that may corrupt this ḍīra, as a result of the actions of devils or parents. Thus, truth and falsehood are not ambiguous for the percipient believer – rather, he knows the truth from the light that surrounds it, so his heart accepts it; and he recoils from falsehood, so he condemns it and does not affirm it (Ibn Rajab 1999, 99–101).

However, because the ḍīra may become disturbed by external influence, the authority of the heart remains, on the one hand, imprecise and ill-suited for generalisation to all individuals and, on the other hand, also ill-suited for all issues about which one seeks consultation. The position advocating the authority of the heart in absolute terms would, thus, infringe upon the authority of the scriptural text and that of the scholars. It is possible here to distinguish between three interpretations.

The first interpretation followed the apparent meaning of the ḥadīth, while restricting its applicability to the person seeking an answer alone, namely Wābiṣa b. Maʿbad, for the specificity of the person’s condition such as the tranquillity of his self in comparison to others, and being gifted with a light that distinguishes between truth and falsehood (al-Munāwī 1972, 1:495–496). However, the ḥadīths on this topic clearly demonstrate that Wābiṣa was not unique, as the question was reportedly raised by others. Because some ḥadīths are articulated in a general form, there is no rationale for such specification.

The second interpretation holds that the ḥadīth is not specific to the person seeking an answer. Rather, it is specific to a particular kind of heart. Thus, it is addressed to a person whose chest God has expanded with the light of certainty when he was given an opinion based on mere conjecture or inclination without ẓarʿī (legal) evidence (al-Munāwī 1972, 1:495). Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. 320/932) predates others in advocating this meaning, as he specified that the heart an individual seeks consultation from should be the heart of “the truthful” (muḥiqqūn). By this, he means the people of truth possess a path towards God and their appetites have been controlled to the extent that their selves have become consorts of their hearts (al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī 2010, 2:39–40). However, Ibn ʿIllān (d. 1057/1647) held that the intended meaning here is the self and the heart of a person among the people of ijtihād; for if this were not the case, then the person would be obligated to ask a mujtahid (Ibn ʿIllān 2004, 5:41). Thus, he reverts the entire issue to the actions and choices of the jurist, not to those of the muqallid (follower) of a madhhab (legal school), or the person seeking consultation.

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16 On ḍīra, see Vasalou 2016; Holtzman 2015, 163–188.
The third interpretation attests that the *ḥadīth* is meant for all believing hearts, but that it is specific to ambiguous issues, or to the field of transactions (*buyūʿ*) in particular. Thus, whoever has said that seeking consultation of the heart is specific to ambiguous issues in general has interpreted the *ḥadīth* of Wābiṣa in light of the *ḥadīth* of al-Nuʿmān b. Bashīr, who narrated from the Prophet:

> That which is permissible is clear, and that which is prohibited is clear, and between these two are ambiguous matters that many people do not know.

*Al-Bukhārī* 1895, 3:53; *Muslim* 1991, 3:1221

Al-Ṭabarī was among the first to advocate this position, as he dealt with the juristic applications of these *ḥadīths*. Therefore, he “did not apply them in every domain of *fiqh*” (al-Shāṭibī 1992, 2:663). Thus, seeking consultation from the heart does not apply to the legislation of actions or instituting acts of worship, nor to leaving aside Shariʿa rulings. The authority of the self and the heart, then, lies in issues that are licit (*mubāḥ*) or in cases where sinfulness has been cast in doubt. It covers the area of mundane choices (*muʿāmalāt*) in life where people find themselves hesitant about a decision.

Some of the jurists who have commented on the *ḥadīth*, such as al-Ṭūfī and Ibn Rajab followed al-Ṭabarī’s construal. Ibn Rajab attempted to create a balance between the authority of the self, on the one hand, and the authority of the scriptural text and the *muftī*, on the other. Thus, he divided thoughts that occur in the self into those addressed by scriptural texts and those that are not. In the case of issues addressed by scriptural texts, the believer has no option but to obey God and his Prophet, and what occurs in the self is of no consequence. As for cases that have not been addressed by scriptural texts, authority belongs to the evidence, if it exists, or to the self of the tranquil believer, if no evidence exists (Ibn Rajab 1999, 2:103). This implies that Ibn Rajab remarkably narrowed the space in which one can refer to the heart, privileging the scriptural text, the actions of the predecessors (*salaf*), and the authority of the *muftī*.

### 2.2.2 The Concepts of Righteousness and Sinfulness

Wābiṣa and al-Nawwās had both inquired about righteousness and sinfulness but were provided different answers, which led to different interpretations by scholars. Righteousness, in the *ḥadīth* of Wābiṣa, is “that towards which the self feels tranquil (*mā ʿiṭmaʿannat ilayhi al-nafs*),” whereas in the *ḥadīth* of al-Nawwās, it is “good conduct (*ḥusn al-khuluq*).” Al-Ṭahāwī (d. 321/933) strived
to bring the two *ḥadīths* into harmony and suggested that since good conduct is occasioned by the tranquillity of the self, the two answers are in agreement (al-Ṭañāwī 1994, 5387). However, Ibn Rajab considered the difference in the Prophet’s explanation of righteousness to be due to a variance in the meaning of the term itself, as it carries two connotations. In the context of the treatment of the rest of creation, it means doing good (*iḥsān*), which includes doing good to one’s parents (*birr al-wālidayn*). It also means performing all acts of obedience, both apparent and inward. Ibn Rajab considered the *ḥadīth* of al-Nawwās to encompass the second meaning, because “by good conduct, one might mean adopting the ethics of the Sharīʿa and the manner of God.” However, he did not clarify which meaning is applicable to the *ḥadīth* of al-Wābiṣa (Ibn Rajab 1999, 2:97–99). As for al-Rāghib al-Īṣfahānī (d. 502/1108), the *ḥadīth* of Wābiṣa does not explain the concepts of righteousness and sinfulness, but somewhat clarifies their legal status (*ḥukm*) (al-Rāghib al-Īṣfahānī 2009, 64). This is because the meaning of righteousness is amplitude (*saʿa*), and the meaning of sinfulness is delay (*ibtāʾ*), for “righteousness (*birr*) is amplitude in knowing truth (*ʿilm al-haqq*) and doing good (*fī al-khayr*),” and sinfulness (*ithm*) “is a name for actions that inhibit reward (*muḥtīʿ an al-thawāb*)” (al-Rāghib al-Īṣfahānī 2007, 160; 2009, 114).

It seems, as such, that al-Rāghib wanted to suggest that the abundant commission of good actions bequeaths the self an expansion in the chest and tranquillity in the heart. As for al-Ṭūfī, he considered that if righteousness is opposed to sinfulness, then it pertains to what the Sharīʿa demands in terms of obligations or recommendations, sinfulness pertains to what the Sharīʿa prohibits; whereas if righteousness is opposed to ingratitude, then it means doing good (*iḥsān*). The *ḥadīth* of al-Nawwās includes two signs of sinful acts, namely, its effect on the self and its wavering within it, because of its sense of an ill outcome, and hating for others to look upon the thing. However, al-Ṭūfī gave preponderance to there being a single composite sign (al-Ṭūfī 1998, 204–205).

Al-Ṭūfī and Ibn Rajab attempted to translate righteousness and sinfulness into the juristic categories of human actions (*al-aḥkām al-fiqhīyya*). On the one hand, Al-Ṭūfī categorised the signs of righteousness and sinfulness into four possibilities: (1) *ithm* (sinfulness) or *ḥarām* is that which rankles in the self, with fears that other people will observe it, such as *zinā* and *ribā*; (2) *birr* (righteousness) is that which does not rankle in the self and there is no fear of the observation of others such as ‘*ibāda*, eating and drinking; (3) *mushtabih* (ambiguous) is that which rankles in the self but with no fear of other people observing (4) or where one fears other people observing him but it does not rankle in the self. The last two (3 and 4) oscillate between sinfulness and righteousness and are encompassed by the category of abhorred acts from which...
one ought to distance oneself (*al-karāha al-tanzihīyya*). Guarding against ambiguous acts is considered to be obligatory (*wājib*). Coming into contact with them is sinful, whereas guarding against them is a path to absolution for the religion (*dīn*) and honour (*‘irḍ*). This is obligatory, for the path to what is obligatory is, in turn, also obligatory (*al-Ṭūfī 1998, 210*).

Ibn Rajab, on the other hand, considered sinfulness to be of two levels: the higher level is where both signs are established. The lower level is where the action is objectionable to the performer of the action. This is only applicable if the heart is among those that have been expanded by belief and the muftī offers his opinion merely on the basis of supposition (*ẓann*) or inclination toward whim (*mayl ilā hayawā*) without *sharīʿ* evidence where he grants the person the right to an individual review. However, Ibn Rajab did not clarify the legal status of referring to what is in the self in this case. Rather, he defined righteousness as that which is permissible (*ḥalāl*) and sinfulness as that which is prohibited (*ḥarām*). In so doing, he recognised the tranquil heart for which the chest expands (*mā sakana ilayhi al-qalb wa-inshara ilayhi al-ṣadr*) is righteous and permissible, while its opposite is sinful and prohibited (*Ibn Rajab 1999, 2:101*).

Righteousness and sinfulness are ethical principles. Yet, commentators such as *al-Ṭūfī* and Ibn Rajab occupied themselves with the translation of the significations of righteousness and sinfulness into a juristic language within the system of the permissible and the prohibited (*manzūmat al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām*). Thus, the idea that righteousness implies amplitude, for example, pushes one to search for its constituent parts in an attempt to regulate and specify what is righteous and permissible, what is sinful and prohibited – and what is ambiguous. No acts of righteousness fall outside being either recommended (*mandūb*) or obligatory (*wājib*), as pointed out by *al-Ṭūfī*.

However, righteousness, in its qualification as an ethical principle, refers, in my opinion, to a broader conception than that as it encompasses two things: truthfulness (*ṣidq*) in action, i.e., achieving the intended aim of the action, and good conduct (*iḥsān*) in action, i.e., performing it in the most perfect way. This means that righteousness is a concept that refers to quality, not to quantity or the degree of obligation in action (obligatory and recommended). It thus aims to transcend the formalism of apparent judgments or mere performance apart from consideration for the intent or the anticipated value of actions. This meaning remains unexamined in the books of *ḥadīth* commentary. For righteousness is a concept that surpasses juristic language and transcends to the ethical sphere.

*Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhi* held the position that ambiguity only occurs for the scholars of the apparent (*‘ulamāʾ al-zāhir*), because “they found no revelation in its regard, nor any tradition attributed to the Prophet, so it appears to them
as ambiguous, sometimes as permissible and at other times as prohibited, and they corrupted the witness (shāhid) that is within their hearts and the proof (hujja) with which God provided them” (al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī 2010, 2:42). But this does not occur for “the truthful ones” (muḥiqqūn) who find within their hearts the clarification of ambiguous matters. Whatever makes their hearts feel tranquil, they count among the permissible, and whatever makes their hearts waver and from which they recoil, they count among the prohibited. For in the view of “the truthful,” no ambiguous matter falls outside what is either permissible or prohibited, and this is a level of reflection at variance with the aforementioned ambiguous matters with which the jurists occupied themselves. An ambiguous matter for the jurist does not fall outside the category of abhorred acts from which one ought to distance himself/herself (al-ḥarām al-tanzihīyya), as made clear by al-Ṭūfī. However, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī counted that towards which the heart feels tranquil as permissible, and that for which the heart wavers as prohibited. I surmise that he had in mind a meaning specific to the jurists, which he clarified in another book when he spoke of abstaining from appetites and avoiding desires for the purpose of refining the self and training it so that the heart is not corrupted – not in the sense of prohibiting that which is permissible (al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī 1993, 64). This meaning is connected to the principle of striving for perfection of action, which transcends the action of the people of the apparent (ahl al-ẓāhir).

These opinions have generally sought to present interpretations that preserve the authority of the scriptural text and that of its specialists and prevent the transformation of normative judgments into individual subjective judgments. This is particularly the case as the self is susceptible to contingencies, such as desires and appetites, which disrupt the objectivity of its judgments. Accordingly, there were three interpretations; the first interpretation understood “consulting the heart” as a reference specifically to the hearts of the people of truth who relinquished their appetites and submitted to psychological exercises that refined them and rendered their judgments as trustworthy. The second interpretation specified consulting the heart over ambiguous issues, where the line between permissible (ḥalāl) and prohibited (ḥarām) is blurred. This ambiguity occurs mainly in individual choices and in the absence of evidentiary arguments. Here individuals are addressed by the Shari‘a because they are aware of the innermost aspects of their selves. The third interpretation understood consulting the heart as a reference to the heart of the independent jurist (mujtahid) or the critical hadith scholar (al-muḥaddith al-nāqid) who has acquired cumulative evidentiary knowledge. In all these interpretations, scholars tried to minimise the subjective role of the individual in favour of the objective judgment of the scholars in general.
Consulting the Heart: Rational Proofs and the Sources of Knowledge

The previous discussion revolved around the text of the hadîth in two aspects: that of the hadîth being firmly established, and that of its signification and its relation to other scriptural texts. However, the authority of the inward dimension (bâṭin) is connected to discussions and branching issues that fall under the domains of fiqh, usûl al-fiqh, and Sufism. This is because the authority of the inward dimension relates to a central issue – namely, the sources of knowledge by which sharîr knowledge is established and the arguments for the rulings (ahkâm) of actions, which are matters where the jurists differ from the Sufis. The hadîths of consulting the heart or referring to the stirrings of the heart (hâwâzz al-qulûb) are connected to numerous issues; among them are inspiration (ilhâm), juristic preference (istihsân), blocking the means of prohibited actions (sadd al-dharâʾî), piety (waraʾ) and caution (iḥtiyât).17

3.1 Inspiration (Ilhâm) and Rational Proofs

The jurists based their knowledge on a master principle: theoretical speculation (naṣar) and evidentiary inference (istiidlâl). In doing so, jurists held that in every ruling (ḥukm) there must be a fundamental principle (asl) upon which it is based. Thus, they did not deem it permissible for a legally obligated individual (mukallaf) to undertake an action if they do not know its sharîr ruling. These rulings were specified according to an established methodology in usûl al-fiqh, which inquires into the evidence and proofs upon which fiqh is based. They applied this method to assess particular actions by attributing to them a specific ruling in the science of fiqh. However, inspiration (ilhâm) is neither

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17 Istihsân is defined by some Hanafis as a nuanced and subtle evidence that the mujtahid is unable to express properly (dalîl yanqadi hu ù naṣ al-mujtahid taqṣuru ‘anhu ‘ibâratuh), although he/she feels it in his/her heart. This definition, according to Shams al-Dīn al-Barmâwī (d. 831/1428), makes istihsân close to ilhâm in the Ḥanafi view (al-Barmâwī 2015, 5418), but istihsân, in contrast to Ibn ʿĀzîz’s (d. 576/1132) view, is classified as a sort of evidence, not personal preference (tashahhîd) (see al-Dabûsî 2009, 3669, 403; al-Taftâzânî n.d., 2363; Ibn Hazm n.d., 660). Furthermore, conceiving ijtiḥād as a malaka (faculty) that enables the mujtahid to do his job spontaneously, makes istihsân acceptable even beyond the Ḥanafi school (see al-Ṭûfî 1997, 3292). As for sadd al-dharâʾî, al-Shawkâni (1999, 2396; see also al-Bâji 1995, 2697–698) considered this hadîth as evidence that supports it; in the sense that the individual shall consult his heart in the case of doubt or uncertainty and leave out some permissible actions to avoid what is prohibited. These two concepts belong to the toolbox of the mujtahid per se. The other concepts belong to the space of individual moral judgment. Hence, the following headings will be dedicated to discussing them in detail.
theoretical speculation (naṣar), nor evidentiary inference (istidlāl), and, therefore, it has been a cause for controversy in usūl al-fiqh (Ibn ‘Aqīl 1999, 1:18; Abū Ya‘lā 1990, 1:82). Can fiqh be based upon the inspiration of the heart? Is seeking the adjudication of the heart an action of the independent jurist (mujtahid) or the madhhab-follower (muqallid)? What is the authoritative reference if all proofs are absent? These questions fall directly under our discussion of the ḥadīths under study.

The evidentiary inference has been employed with the “consult your heart” ḥadīth in order to prove the authority of inspiration. This is an area of inquiry where the positions of the usūlis (legal theorists) have differed and three positions are distinguishable.

The first position holds that inspiration is an absolute sharī‘ī proof and an inward revelation analogous to rational theoretical speculation and evidentiary inference. It would appear that the rejection of the authority of inspiration in the books of usūl is related to two issues: the jurists’ conceptualisation of what may be deemed as adequate “proof” in their convention; and their response to those who pay no heed to rational theoretical speculation holding that “there is no proof except inspiration.” So, they give precedence to it over rational theoretical speculation (al-Samarqandi 1984, 679; al-Māwardi 1994, 16:53; al-Dabūsī 2009, 3:369–391; al-Fanārī 2006, 2:445).

The second position holds that inspiration is not proof, neither with respect to the individual who is inspired (mulham), nor with respect to others, i.e., regardless of whether it is transitive or intransitive. The reason for this is the absence of divine basis and the distrust towards those who carry fallible meditations (al-Subkī 2003, 111; Ibn Amir al-Ḥājj 1983, 3:296). Ruling out inspiration as a path to knowledge or as a proof among other proofs is due to the paths of knowledge and to the conceptualisation of the validity of proofs. The paths of sharī‘ knowledge were restricted by al-Shāfī‘ī (d. 204/820) to the scriptural text. He clarified elsewhere that resorting to ijmā‘ (consensus) and qiyyās (analogy) is within the category of ḍarūra (exigency) (al-Shāfī‘ī 1938, 39, 599). This means that the locus of sharī‘ knowledge is either a revealed scriptural text, or, in absence of a direct scriptural text, rational theoretical speculation regarding a revealed scriptural text. However, the usūlīs who came after al-Shāfī‘ī agreed upon the convention of istidlāl (evidentiary inference), which is to search for proofs outside the four sources (Qurʾān, ḥadīth, consensus, and analogy). Istidlāl is based upon rational theoretical speculation, thereby excluding

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The third position is that it is obligatory to act upon true inspiration, but only with respect to the individual who is inspired. It is impermissible to invite others to it. Al-Dabūsī and al-Samarqandi (d. 540/1145) attributed this position to the majority of scholars (al-Dabūsī 2009, 3:369; al-Samarqandi 1984, 679; Ibn Amir al-Ḥājj 1983, 3:296; al-Zarkashi 1994, 8:14; Ibn al-Najjār 1993, 1:330–332; Ibn Rajab 1999, 2:104). However, those who hold this position consider inspiration to be conditional proof, not self-standing independent proof. Thus, it is not permissible to act upon it, except in the absence of all other proofs (al-Dabūsī 2009, 3:369; al-Samarqandi 1984, 679; Ibn al-Najjār 1993, 1:330–332).

According to the first position, inspiration is considered as a path to knowledge that is established in the heart without theoretical speculation or evidentiary inference. The testimony of the heart without proof holds precedence over the proof-based opinion of the muftī. This has been understood from the hadith of Wābiṣa itself, meaning that the heart of the individual occupies a dynamic role in the ethical valuation of actions, owing to the fact that the inspiration of the heart is analogous to revelation. However, the problem with this position is the possibility that inspiration can stand independently from all other proofs, or in opposition to them (al-Dabūsī 2009, 3:388). Even if it is indeed an “inward proof” (ḥujja bāṭīna), the characteristics of proofs sanctioned by the usūlis in rulings do not apply. Proofs, according to them, are the rational proofs that depend on the one hand on scriptural texts and, on the other, on theoretical speculation and evidentiary inference. Further, among the necessary conditions of proof is that it should be expressed first, whereas in the case of inspiration, “the scope for expressing it narrows” (al-Ghazālī 1971, 177). A proof must be suitable for debate and be binding upon another (al-Dabūsī 2009, 3:377; 1:133–134), meaning that it is open to generalisation. Obligation and generalisation, however, are established upon the characteristic of what is apparent to everyone, which is not the same in the case of inspiration.

The majority of scholars did not deem inspiration to be entirely without merit, but they only resorted to it in cases of exigency where worthy proofs were absent. What is implied by this is that proofs vary in degree, so direct scriptural proofs are given precedence over indirect scriptural proofs. Thus, qiyās (analogy) and ijmāʿ (consensus) were considered to be an exigency in the absence of a scriptural text. If all apparent proofs are lacking, the individual who is inspired resorts to inspiration as an exigency. Such a ruling is established for the individual alone, so others should not be invited to it. Obviously, this avoids the arbitrariness of judgment and ensures stability while still allowing
for some discretion in cases where no apparent evidence is available. This view remains consistent with the theory of the *uṣūlīs*.

### 3.2 The Heart That Offers Opinion: al-Ghazālī, on Piety and Caution

The *ḥadīth* of Wābiṣa, and others, are a fundamental principle within scholarship that addresses the subject of piety (warāʿ). The two *imāms* al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) and al-Ghazālī deemed it foundational within their chapters on this topic. Al-Ghazālī spoke of what he called “the heart that offers opinion (al-qalb al-muftī),” and he drew a parallel between the opinion (*fatwā*) of the heart and that of the muftī in terms of ethical responsibility and the jurist’s connection to the actions of the heart. The individual “is taken with respect to his self – between himself and God – by the opinion of his heart” (al-Ghazālī 1982, 3:3; 2:113; see also al-Juwaynī 2007, 15:320). At the same time, the actions of the heart fall outside the authority of the jurist due to two reasons: the first is because the theoretical speculation of the jurist is specific only to the rulings of the actions of the limbs and that which becomes apparent from inward actions. In other words, the jurist is concerned only with what can be regulated and is general to all legally obligated individuals. This differs from “the piety of the God-conscious (muttaqūn) and the righteous (ṣāliḥūn),” who aspire to a station higher than that of the generality of the legally obligated. For that reason, the latter do not only stop at the boundary of the obligatory and the prohibited, rather, they abstain from everything in which there is ambiguity; and they also abstain from some things that are licit out of fear that they may lead to what is illicit. Then, if their station is elevated further, they abstain from many licit fortunes which distract them from the pleasure of proximity to God. The second reason is that the jurist “does not discuss the stirrings of the hearts and how to act upon them,” because his theoretical speculation relates to the earthly world (*dunyā*) (al-Ghazālī 1982, 1:19, 2:113, 4:213). On this basis, the individual shoulders the majority of the heart’s actions themselves since it is s/he who is acquainted with their own particulars. While this is a broad conception of piety that al-Ghazālī discussed at length, he did not grant the legally obligated individual complete authority to determine what is valid or invalid in piety in case he passes over into obsessiveness and affective overburdening. Some piety falls under the laws of *fiqh* in terms of regulation and codification, and that which cannot be regulated is deferred anew to the legally obligated pious individual (al-Ghazālī 1982, 2:112).

Importantly, consultation of the heart is not absolute. It is subject to restrictions and particulars at which one must stop for it not to disrupt the system of apparent rulings. This is because the purpose of scrutinising the conditions of the inward dimension is to arrive at a higher station of devotion in worship.
On this basis, al-Ghazālī stipulated that the intended meaning of consulting the heart is,

that which the muftī has declared permissible. As for that which he has declared prohibited, it is obligatory to refrain.

al-Ghazālī 1982, 2:118

Here, it is possible for us to distinguish between two cases. The first is the case of conflict between the opinion of the muftī and the opinion of the heart, which is implied by the hadīth of Wābiṣa (al-Ghazālī 1982, 1:224), i.e., that the opinion of the heart is given precedence over that of the muftī, because the heart is the locus of accountability for blame and the acquisition of reward.

So, if the heart of the muftī ruled in favour of deeming something obligatory and it was mistaken in so doing, he is rewarded for that. Indeed, whoever presumed that he had performed ritual purification must pray, then if he prayed and then remembered that he had not performed the ablution, he receives a reward for his action. If he remembered and then left performing it, he is punished for it ... and all that is by considering the heart to the exception of the limbs.

al-Ghazālī 2011, 5:153

Moreover, the heart might be harmed by accepting that in which there is a stirring. It is obligatory, therefore, to listen to it. Venturing upon any action with a stirring in the heart harms it and brings darkness upon it, irrespective of the reality of the ruling as determined by God or its formulation by the muftī (al-Ghazālī 1982, 2:113).

The second case is doubt and ambiguity, involving two competing beliefs, each with its own proper ground. Al-Ghazālī attempted to regulate the implications of ambiguous matters. He determined that in cases of doubt, the legally obligated individual shall consult his heart in the same way the Messenger of God commanded Wābiṣa to consult his heart. Al-Ghazālī thus calls upon the legally obligated individual to go beyond simply avoiding what is prohibited and to shun ambiguous matters. For a while the opinion of the muftī is grounded on probabilities, the opinion of the heart pertains to piety and needs to be shielded from ambiguous matters. Such a station is higher than the theoretical speculation of the jurist which stops at clear-cut boundaries. Although al-Ghazālī attempted to regulate the fundamental principles of ambiguous matters (shubah) by means of the logic of the jurist, the details and
applications of these ambiguous matters cannot be regulated. On this basis, he delegated them to the heart, not to the muftī (al-Ghazālī 1982, 2:99, 103, 86, 118).

The heart’s stirrings, in terms of their capacity as a standard in determining what is ethical, do not only depend on the heart as the locus of legal obligation. They also depend on the heart possessing “insights into discrete contextual indicants for which the scope of speech narrows” (al-Ghazālī 1982, 2:125). Thus, it is not possible to regulate them according to the laws of fiqh, but they may be realised by means of “the contextual indicants of conditions (qarāʾin al-āhwal)” (al-Ghazālī 1982, 4:213).

Because the heart’s stirrings differ according to individuals and realities, it is possible to posit a general fundamental principle for them. Namely, “that which he finds to be closer to his whim and to that which is implied by his nature, the opposite of it is more worthy” (al-Ghazālī 1982, 2:170). Because these issues and conditions are in the utmost of subtlety, “not every heart can be depended upon” (al-Ghazālī 1982, 2:118). For that reason, “[the Prophet] did not refer everyone to the consultation of the heart. Rather, he only said that to Wābiṣa because of what he had known of his condition” (al-Ghazālī 1982, 2:117). This does not mean that consultation is to be restricted to the hearts of specific individuals, but rather that the command revolves around specific characteristics that adorn hearts, which may be attained through cultivation, watchfulness, and avoiding ambiguous matters. For hearts are two extremes and a median: the two extremes are an obsessive heart that recoils from everything and a covetous indulgent heart that is at ease with everything, and these two hearts are to be given no consideration. Rather, consideration is owed to what al-Ghazālī on occasion called “the heart of the scholar who has attained success that is watchful of the subtleties of conditions,” which on another occasion he called “the pure moderate heart (al-qalb al-sāfī l-muʿtadil)”. Even though al-Ghazālī admits to the scarcity of this type of heart, he opens the door to whoever “does not trust his own heart” to “solicit the light from a heart bearing this description” in order that he may present his case to it (al-Ghazālī 1982, 113, 118).

3.3 The Heart as Exhorter: Ibn Taymiyya and Giving Preponderance to the Heart

Ibn Taymiyya reaffirmed the authority of the scriptural text, by holding the position that any belief or action needs to be grounded in shariʿi evidence (Ibn Taymiyya 2001, 2:101; 2005, 10:477; 1991a, 1:244; 2005, 18:65; 2005, 22:27; 1987, 5:134). According to him, the scriptural evidence reflects God’s intent and what He loves and abhors. Hence, it behaves the legally obligated individual
to examine the evidence without yielding to his or her whim. However, the Lawgiver's ruling may be absolute or specific. As clarified by the Lawgiver, absolute rulings are principles and generalities which encompass an infinite number of particularities (Ibn Taymiyya 2001, 2:102; 2005, 10:478). Specific rulings, on the other hand, are those technically termed “establishing the ratio legis (tahqīq al-manāṭ).” If a specific scriptural text exists in which the ruling is clarified, this expresses God’s intent more clearly. However, if God’s intent is hidden due to the absence of evidence or its ambiguity, or because the proofs contradict one another, establishing what God loves and what God abhors becomes the locus of ijtihād.

It is here that Ibn Taymiyya cites three schools: the first is to give preponderance to one position by the mere choice and will of the legally obligated individual. This is the position of the theologians, jurists and some of the Sufis. However, he determined that,

Giving preponderance to one position by mere will, without relying on any scholarly basis, whether hidden or apparent, is not a position that is held by any of the imāms of knowledge and temperance.

Ibn Taymiyya 2005, 10:269; 2001, 293

The second is to refer to pure qadar (divine decree), because of the absence of overriding authoritative reasons (al-aspāb al-murajjiḥa) from the perspective of the Sharī’a, and to avoid the introduction of personal will and whim into the action. This is because the introduction of whim dithers between being prohibited, disapproved, or descending from the station of perfect obedience to God. Surrendering to qadar here is to give preponderance by means of something that cannot be attributed to the individual and in which he has no will. It is God’s action with regard to the individual. This is, according to Ibn Taymiyya, the method of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī (d. 561/1166) and his like among the great Shaykhs. The third is to give preponderance to one position based on an inward reason, such as taste (dhawq), inspiration (ilhām), or inclination of the heart (mayl qalbī). Here, Ibn Taymiyya added that if the heart that is abundant in God-consciousness (al-qalb al-ma’mūr bi-l-taqwā) gives preponderance to a position by its will, then it is a sharī‘i overriding authority (tarjih sharī‘ī) with respect to itself. Guiding indications may occur within the heart of the believer regarding things that cannot be expressed. This is because God has built within his servants an innate disposition (fitra) towards the truth, and has placed within the heart of each believer an exhorter (wā’iz), just as he placed an exhorter for the believer within the Book and the apparent Sharī’a. Within each of the two exhorters, there are commandments and prohibitions,
accompanied by exhortations and admonitions. This implies that there is a correspondence between apparent commandments and inward commandments. And in the case of the heart that is abundant in God-consciousness, the commandments and prohibitions that occur within the believer’s heart are identical to the commandments and prohibitions of the Qurʾān, so one is strengthened by the other. Thus, there is sinfulness and righteousness “roaming and wavering” (taraddud wa-jawalān) within the chests of creation. If the servant exerts their utmost in obeying God and guarding against God’s wrath, God becomes his or her hearing and sight and comes to be within his or her heart and sense. Indeed, he or she mostly wills what God loves and detests that which He abhors. When a heart becomes abundant in God-consciousness, matters are disclosed and become open to it, unlike the darkened ruinous heart. The action of this heart (i.e., al-qalb al-ma’mūr bi-l-taqwā) here is stronger upon its bearer than the weak and illusory analogies, just as it is stronger than the many apparent meanings and claims of continuity (istiṣḥāb) that the jurists cite as proof (Ibn Taymiyya 2001, 2:98–99; 2005, 20:27–29, 44–46, 19:280–285, 10:268–273, 477; 1986, 8:70; 1991b, 1:7).

Resorting to the inward overriding authoritative factor (al-murajjīh al-bāṭīn) here takes place after the exhaustion of all apparent evidentiary indicants. The believer in this case may either opt to give preponderance to this inward reason, or to give preponderance merely based on his or her will and choice. However, giving preponderance to something merely on the basis of personal choice is to be avoided because it can be unstable, oscillating between prohibition or disapproval, or descending from the station of perfect obedience to God. The servant may also be requested to contradict his or her whim.

3.4 Everyone Is Their Own Jurist: al-Shāṭibī and Establishing the Ratio Legis

Al-Shāṭibī argued that these hadiths are connected to the legally obligated individual’s ijtihād in establishing the ratio legis (taḥqīq al-manāṭ). When it comes to knowing its ruling, every action is in need of two exercises in theoretical speculation: the first is an exercise in theoretical speculation with respect to the scriptural evidence of the ruling (dalīl al-ḥukm). This is something in which the heart has no place. For deeming something detestable based on the extent to which the self feels at ease without any scriptural evidence is the methodology of the people of innovation (bidʿa), and opposed to the ijmāʿ of Muslims. The second is an exercise in theoretical speculation regarding the locus in which the ruling is revealed (maḥall al-ḥukm), as many of its applications are deferred to the legally obligated individuals without requiring them to meet the condition of fulfilling the status of ijtihād or of Shariʿa
knowledge. If the layperson were to ask the muftī about actions that are not of the type performed in prayer – whether their commission by a person during the performance of prayer would render their prayer invalid – the muftī would answer: if the action is negligible, it is forgivable, but if it is excessive, it would invalidate the prayer. The layperson here is in no need of clarification from the muftī in specifying what is excessive and what is not, for such specific judgment goes back to each legally obligated individual self to decide. This means that judgments of validity and invalidity depend upon the self of the legally obligated individual, i.e., deferring to the heart is restrictive in nature, so it does not undermine the scriptural evidence of the Shari‘a (al-Shāṭībī 1992, 2:666–667; 1997, 2:300, 516–17, 25). As for determining general rulings, engaging in theoretical speculation on scriptural evidence and establishing the ratio legis that require ījtihād, they are to be referred to the jurists. This is because the ruling authority of jurists rests on shar‘ī knowledge, which is specific to their domain and distinguishes them from others. To refer to the jurist is to refer to the Shari‘a, and the muqallid is in need of an exemplar to follow (al-Shāṭībī 1992, 2:858–862). This means that consultation of the heart does not nullify the authority of the jurist.

Al-Shāṭībī stresses the regularity of the Shari‘a, the generality and consistency of its rulings, and its exemption from loopholes, and thus runs on a singular law encompassing all legally obligated individuals. This regularity, however, does not nullify the variances and differences between individuals, whether in terms of the difference in their conditions, or the variance in their cognitive abilities. On this basis, al-Shāṭībī determines that the purpose of shar‘ī rulings relating to customs (such as transactions and adjudications), as well as many acts of worship, is the regulation of the avenues of benefits, so that people’s affairs may become well-ordered. Regulation, to the extent that it is possible, is closer to abiding by God’s intent. As for matters that cannot be regulated, they are deferred to the trust and private affairs of legally obligated individuals (amānāt al-mukallafīn), such as prayer, fasting, menstruation, ritual purity, and other such matters (al-Shāṭībī 1997, 2:526–527). Furthermore, absolute
commandments and absolute prohibitions (i.e., those for which the Lawgiver has not specified particular boundaries) are intended to be unregulated by the Lawgiver and are delegated to the theoretical speculation of the legally obligated individual to engage in ījtihād. This is because the commandments and prohibitions must have intelligible meanings that can be understood independently but are still left without regulation. The aim here is to accommodate individual differences and conditions and variances in the performance of duties, which fall outside the circle of well-regulated obligations in which all are equal (al-Shāṭībī 1997, 2:148). This includes commandments such as those in favour of justice, goodness, forgiveness, patience, and gratitude, and prohibitions against injustice, indecency, bad conduct, and transgression (al-Shāṭībī 1997, 3:235, 392–398, 401). This point opens the door for the individual creative effort, which differentiates between people in their goodness, and for distinctions between ethics and fiqh where the ethical realm goes beyond what is licit.

As for the stirrings of the hearts, they cannot be regulated, and they encompass personal revelations (mukāshafāt) and miracles (karāmah). These cannot validly be taken into consideration except on the condition that they do not contravene a sharʾī ruling nor a religious principle. Moreover, the domain of acting upon mukāshafāt and karāmah is in matters that are licit, or desirable pursuits in which there is room for manoeuvre, such as warning, giving glad tidings, and the pursuit of benefits that one hopes may successfully be attained. All this is based upon the fundamental principle determined by al-Shāṭībī, namely that the Sharīʿa is general and not specific. Its fundamental basis cannot be contravened and its consistency cannot be broken (al-Shāṭībī 1997, 2:457, 466–468, 471–473).

Al-Ghazālī discussed exhaustively what cannot be regulated among the actions of legally obligated individuals under the topic of “piety (waraʾ),” and included a cryptic part to guide the pious scholar. Al-Shāṭībī, however, addressed the same point under what he called the theoretical speculation of legally obligated individuals (naẓar al-mukallaf), or under the fiqh of the self, which generally revolves around “establishing the ratio legis.” The two approaches are complementary, as they refer to the individual’s effort and role in the valuation of actions. Overlapping occurs between the approaches of al-Ghazālī and al-Shāṭībī in that issues of piety intersect with issues of establishing the ratio legis. If piety is taken to mean the avoidance of ambiguous matters, then establishing the ratio legis is a broader category, because it

20 It seems that Draz coined what he called “effort créateur” (creative effort) based on what al-Shāṭībī mentioned here. For more details see Draz 2008, 257 f.; al-Khatib 2017, 107–108.
addresses ambiguous matters and other issues. Al-Shāṭibī even made space for that which the Lawgiver deliberately left unregulated so that the legally obligated individual may move freely based on their *ijtihād* and according to their condition. Al-Ghazālī primarily occupied himself with the responsibility of the individual from a Sufi perspective, and therefore opened the door to the stirrings of the hearts in order that some licit things that may harm the self may be avoided. Al-Shāṭibī, on the other hand, occupied himself with the regulation of the fundamental principles of the Shariʿa. He thus posited a cohesive theoretical framework for it, closing the door to the stirrings of the hearts except when they do not contravene *sharīʿ* principles or rulings, such as *mushtabīḥāt* or licit actions, to exclude what some extremist Sufis did when they followed their inspiration and freed themselves from the juristic rulings.

4 The Sufi Discourse on Consciences

Ibn ʿAjība (d. 1224/1808) noted that “among the foundational principles of the people of *taṣawwuf* is to refer to God in all things” (Ibn ʿAjība 2002, 2:417). However, this absolute recourse to God cannot be achieved by sticking to the method of the jurists only and contenting oneself with the apparent actions. The Sufis, thus, expanded in two directions: first, in valuating human actions in such a way as to encompass actions of the heart, and that there are rights owed to God in the beliefs of the hearts and what they acquire. These are referred to as “the inward knowledge” (*ʿilm al-bāṭin*),21 which pertain to what the Sufis call musings (*khaṭarāt*), which are, as al-Muḥāṣibī (d. 243/857) says, “the causes for hearts to turn to every good or evil” (al-Muḥāṣibī 2003:84–85). The second expansion came in the direction of the sources of knowledge of divine will, which governs people’s actions. This will encompass “apparent commandments” (*awāmīr ḥāẓira*), expressed by scriptural texts, and “inward commandments” (*awāmīr bāṭina*), embodied in inspiration (*ilhām*) and the consultation of the heart. Al-Qushayrī’s (465/1073) definition of musings reflects this aforementioned expansion, as he defined musings as “a discourse that comes upon the consciences” (*khīṭāb yariduʿ alā l-ḍamāʿir*) (al-Qushayrī 1989, 169). This is a definition that encompasses two meanings:

21 *ʿIlm al-bāṭin* refers to what al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāṣibī called “inward worship” (*ibāda bāṭina*) which consists of the inward actions and virtues such as *waraʿ* (piety), *ikhlāṣ* (sincerity), and *niyya* (intention). In contrast, the apparent knowledge (*ʿilm al-ẓāhir*) consists of the knowledge of *ḥalāl* (permissible) and *ḥarām* (prohibited). This classification of knowledge emerged with al-Muḥāṣibī, and then became popular in Sufi literature such as Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī’s work (see al-Muḥāṣibī 1975, 81–88; al-Makkī 2001, 1:363–380).
The first meaning is that the heart is a discrete power (quwwa khaфиyya) or a divine spiritual subtlety (latifa rabbаниyya rühаниyya). This is the discerning aspect of the human that is addressed, punished, admonished, and answerable. The khatarät, which come upon this heart, vary based on their sources and types and are differentiated by means of signs and terminologies. Al-Muḥāsibī divided the musings of the hearts into three types: a forewarning from the Most Gracious (which may be direct, without an intermediary, or through the mediation of an angel), a command from the self, and a whispering from the devil. Al-Qushayrī clarifies that each of these types takes a convention specific to it, “so, if it is from an angel, it is inspiration (ilhām); if it is from the self, it is called presentiments (hawājis); if it is from the devil, it is the whispering (waswās); and if it is God who has placed it in the heart, it is a true musing (khāṭir ḥaqq)” (al-Muḥāsibī 1986, 297–299; al-Qushayrī 1989, 169–170). The Sufis were thus cognisant of the complexities of that which roams within the human and the different causes that prompt actions. This is a vision that is more layered and complex than that of the Greek philosophers regarding the three powers of the soul: the appetitive power, the irascible power, and the rational power. This complexity can be explained based on the spiritual experience and the scriptural sources.

The second meaning is that the Sufis’ inquiry into divine will (and what God loves and abhors) generated their interest in the varieties of discourse, both apparent and inward. With regard to the inward discourse, they considered all its forms regardless of the source because they believed that the inward revelation complements the apparent revelation. Inquiry into the inward revelation requires differentiating it from what may be confused with it, such as the whisperings of a devil or the whims of a self. The inward revelation takes two forms: inspiration from an angel and the true musing from God, each of which represents a source for the valuation of the individual’s actions. On this basis, al-Suhrawardī (d. 632/1234) considered that “the esoteric sciences (al-ʿulūm al-ladunniyya) within the hearts of those devoted to God are a kind of communication” (al-Suhrawardī 2000, 2:37). However, this differs from the way of the jurists, who restricted themselves to knowing the discourse of revelation (scriptural texts) which represents the general and apparent divine will. In the absence of scriptural evidence, jurists had to negotiate how much leeway they were willing to give to the heart within the non-textual sources. By contrast,
the Sufis did not have the same concern for they operated within the realm of the heart and had more space to elaborate and theorise. For jurists, it remained limited to psychology in relation to what is evident and what is apparent in terms of testimony, while for the Sufis it became completely grounded in the deep psychological domain of the heart, beyond the domain of what is apparent. While some *uṣūlīs* objected to the rejection of inspiration, for the lack of grounding of its source, the Sufis posited standards and signs that aid in differentiating between one musing and another.

From the sum total of their discussions, it is possible to say that the distinction between musings is based on two things. The first rests on the consideration of the musing in light of the apparent revelation. The second is premised on the special characteristics linked to taste and experience. The divine musing is in concord with a fundamental *sharīʿi* principle, untouched by license or whim, and followed by a sense of calm and expansion (*burūda wa-inshirāḥ*). The musing of the self mostly invites following an appetite or a sense of pride, which is not in accord with a fundamental *sharīʿi* principle. It also admits licenses and is followed by a sense of dryness and tightness (*yubs wa-inqibāḍ*). The angelic musing brings nothing but good, whereas the satanic musing mostly invites us towards sin, although it may also bring good, which is cause for ambiguity. The differentiating factor between the angelic and satanic muse is that the first is supported by evidentiary indicants and is accompanied by an expansion, contrary to the satanic, which turns one away from evidentiary indicants and is accompanied by restrictiveness. If a person is confused regarding the origin of their musing, it is up to them to stop and ascertain, either by looking into their heart or asking the scholars. Thus, according to Ibn ‘Ajība, it is among the characteristics of the people of *taṣawwuf* “to consult the hearts regarding those matters that occur [to them],” i.e., if they did not find an apparent revelation in its regard (al-Muḥāsibī 2003, 89; al-Qushayrī 1989, 169–170; al-Jilānī 1976, 26–27; Zarrūq n.d., 288–289; al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī 2010, 2:42, 54; Ibn ‘Ajība 2002, 3:14; 2:417).

The principle of referring to God in all things also affected the Sufis’ way of gauging actions on the basis of the principle that all the servant’s movements and moments of stillness ought to be through God. This is because referring to God absolutely demands following commandments that may be divided into two kinds: the first is to take from the earthly world (*dunyā*) sustenance (*qūt*) which is the self’s right to avoid whims and desires (*ḥaẓẓ al-nafs*), and to perform obligations and become occupied with avoiding sins, both apparent and inward. This is the adherence to apparent commandments. The second is to follow the inward commandment, which comes from the exalted Truth. God commands His servants and prohibits them by means of true musing or
by the inspiration of an angel. This inward commandment is linked to what is licit with no ruling in the Shari'a and is left to the servant's choice. However, here, the individual may relinquish choice and await the inward commandment regarding the issue at hand – and if he is then commanded, he complies. Indeed, al-Jīlānī and others “command the performance of that which is recommended and not obligatory, and proscribe that which is discouraged and not prohibited” (Ibn Taymiyya 2005, 10:265). Thus, there remains no scope for the five legal rulings23 with respect to the specific individual. This is because the recommended (mustaḥabb) is subsumed into the obligatory (wājib), the discouraged (makrūh) is subsumed into the prohibited (ḥarām), and the licit (mubāḥ) does not exist, because it becomes appended either to commission or to omission. In fact, al-Jīlānī calls for the abandonment of those musings which, upon consideration in light of the Book and the Sunna, it becomes clear that they are of the self and its licit appetites (such as eating, drinking, sexual intercourse, and other such things).

Ibn Taymiyya highlighted the disputation among the jurists over the meaning adopted here by al-Jīlānī and others because the jurists affirm the five legal rulings. However, the work of the jurists applies to rulings in general (ʿumūm) and the work of the Sufis applies to the rulings of the elect (khawāṣṣ). Thus, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī differentiated between “refining the self,” by barring it from some licit appetites and “prohibition,” positing that by barring the self from its desires, the training of the self is achieved such that it is subdued and softened. Therefore, the renunciation of the heart is meant to purify the heart. For the sake of these meanings, fiqh24 for the Sufis is the science of the path of the hereafter, as clarified by al-Muḥāṣibī, al-Ghazālī, and others (al-Jīlānī 1976, 26–28; Ibn Taymiyya 2005, 10:296–299; al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī 1993, 63–65). This provides room to both distinguish between fiqh and ethics and give more scope for the individual creative effort that is based on self-discipline.

5 Conclusion

This study has shown that the inward dimension, with its various interpretations and the scope of its authority, has occupied an important space in various disciplines of the Islamic moral tradition. However, taking the perspective of how the two hadīths were interpreted offers a different outlook to what is often

23 The five legal rulings in fiqh are: obligatory (fard), recommended (mustaḥabb, mandūb), permissible/licit (mubāḥ), discouraged/disapproved (makrūh), and prohibited (ḥarām).
24 Lit., “comprehension; understanding.”
gleaned from Muʿtazilīs’ and Ashʿarīs’ discussions on the sources of moral value judgments (taḥṣīn and taqbiḥ). Moral conscience is a third category, besides reason and revelation, used to assess the moral quality of our thoughts, words, and deeds. This chapter proves that the common assumption of the absence of individual decision making in Islamic ethics is an oversimplification.

The contemporary scholarship about Islamic ethics has reduced Islamic ethics to two meta-ethical theories: ethical rationalism and ethical voluntarism (divine command theory). This taxonomy has implicitly emphasised the common understanding among some Western scholars that the Islamic conscience is an external scriptural conscience. This study identifies the rich Islamic discussions on individual conscience and its authority in ethical judgments. The inward dimension of the soul is substantiated through the discussion of three concepts: (1) inspiration (ilḥām) (2) the musings (khawāṭir) that come upon the individual conscience in general, and (3) the preponderation of the heart (tarjīḥ al-qalb) and its inclination towards a particular action or judgment.

Traditionally, there were two main positions vis-à-vis the two key ĥadīths discussed here. The first is represented by ĥadīth commentators who reinforced the authority of the scriptural text and the scholars to prevent the transformation of juristic rulings into individual judgment based upon human whims. On this basis, the apparent or general meaning of the ĥadīth was rejected. Jurists, uṣūlis and Sufis adopted the second stance and sought to negotiate the strength of the authority of the conscience. In fact, the majority of uṣūlis considered that in the absence of rational proofs, inspiration plays the role of an inward proof with respect to the individual who receives inspiration to the exception of others. In so doing, the recourse to inward dimension is needed as a departure from the apparent sense-determinate towards the individual inward dimension that cannot be made apparent, generalised, or regulated. The Sufis, however, have a vision of divine command that is broader than that of the jurists. For them, the issue is no longer limited to the commands and prohibitions stated in the scriptural texts, nor to those dos and don'ts that can be gleaned from the apparent meanings of these texts, but also encompass the inward dimensions of individuals and the actions of hearts. In order for their position to be made feasible, Sufis needed to broaden the sources of knowledge of divine will. On this basis, they discussed “the inward revelation,” represented in inspiration and consultation of the heart, because it is deemed a divine discourse, coming either directly from God or through the medium of an angel.

In the negotiations over the authority and space of individual conscience, some scholars such as al-Ghazālī, Ibn Taymiyya, and al-Shāṭibī pursued a middle route, through which they attempted to reconcile between the apparent
and the inward in terms of the discussions about consultation of the heart and to give preponderance to it. Al-Ghazâlî argued for “the heart as muftî,” with the hadith as a fundamental principle for piety (warâ‘). This piety directs itself towards the actions and choices of individuals, an issue that does not occupy the jurist. The individual takes charge of the majority of the actions of the heart, as it is the individual who is acquainted with its particularities. The heart becomes the locus of legal and moral obligation and possesses “insights into discrete contextual indicants,” which cannot be regulated by the laws of fiqh.

Ibn Taymiyya weighs between the action of the heart and some of the preponderations that the jurists adopt (such as weak analogy, the apparent meaning, and claims of continuity [istiṣḥâb]), and considers that the inclination of the heart in this instance is stronger with respect to the individual than the overriding authoritative claims of the jurists.

Al-Shâṭibî, while refusing the heart as a source of evidence or a source of issuing rulings, established a balance between the absolute and the individual, the regulated and unregulated, and the authority of the scriptural text and the jurist on the one hand, and the responsibility of the legally obligated individual on the other. Those issues that cannot be regulated are to be deferred to the trusts and private affairs of legally obligated individuals. Indeed, there are spaces which the Lawgiver intended to leave unregulated by delegating them to the theoretical speculation of legally obligated individuals so that they may engage in ījtihâd according to their capacity, cognition, and condition. This is because affairs of the conscience come down to intelligible meanings in which individuals differ.

To conclude, subjective interiority was inherent in the Islamic tradition and not necessarily imported and introduced by modernity.25 This goes against the widespread Weberian notion that the normative structure of Islamic law leaves no room for individual ethical decisions and moral resistance against legal authority and political power. According to Max Weber (d. 1920), a “sacred law” is unable to develop the concept and the institutions of a formally rational justice because the weight of material religious ethics will always force the judge to define justice in the light of material considerations inherent in the case which he has to try. It will, therefore, produce “Kadi-Justiz.” The mixture of ethics and law is considered to be an efficient impediment against the formal rationalisation of law.

JOHANSEN 1997, 2

25 Although Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen defended the opposite of this position (1997, 23–25, 384).
Mohammad Fadel (2014), Baber Johansen, and Talal Asad also proved that this assumption is untenable and the latter emphasised that,

subjective interiority has always been recognised in the Islamic tradition ... what modernity does bring in is a new kind of subjectivity, one that is appropriate to ethical autonomy and aesthetic self-invention – a concept of “the subject” that has a new grammar.

Asad 2003, 225

The classical discussions around the authority of the inward dimension and the boundaries of its investment in ethical knowledge fall within the core of hadith-centric discussions around the idea of the ethical conscience and its role in specifying right and wrong, which in turn is worthy of attention in further studies.

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Bibliography


ت.، (1985، 15-16)
ومن شأن هذا الفهرست أن يكون مرجعًا يوقفنا على ثراء المضامين الأخلاقية عند المحدثين أولًا، وأن يعرض الباحثين على دراسات مستقبلية في هذا الميدان الناشئ والخصب ثانيًا، حيث يمكن لهذه الدراسات أن تنتج نهجًا متعدد التخصصات يتوافق مع الطبيعة التي اكتسبها علم الأخلاق اليوم حيث إن أهم سماته أنه حل متعدد التخصصات وعابر لها، من حيث إنه يتناول الأفعال الإنسانية وتقويم الفاعلين أنفسهم، ويستجيب إلى أي أن الأخلاق الحديثية من شأنها أن تحدث تأثيرًا في حقل الحديث وحقل الأخلاق معًا. قبل أن نستعرض فهرست المصنفات الحديثية في الأخلاق، سأتناول في هذه المقدمة التحليلية ثلاثة محاور رئيسية. في الأول منها سأوضح الأبعاد الأخلاقية لفترة الحديث، وفي الثاني...
منها سأقترح تصنيفًا للأخلاق الحديثية. أما الثالث فهو مخصص لبيان المعايير التي جرى - على أساسها - اختيار هذه الكتب واستبعاد غيرها من هذا الفهرست، ثم يأتي في المخر الربع قائمة المصادر نفسها مرتبة تاريخيًا.

المصادر الأخلاقية لمدونات الحديث

يمكن تصنيف مدونات الحديث عمومًا - إلى ثلاثة أقسام: الأقوال والأفعال والصفات، وهذه القسمة تنص بالنقاشات الأخلاقية الحديثة التي تجري عادة وفق مجموعات الفعل (أو أخلاق الأفعال) والخلق (أو أخلاق القبيلة). وتمتد الأقوال والأفعال هي الغالبة على مصادر الحديث، ومن ثم سعى إلى جمعها واستيعابها كل من خلال الباحث السيوطي (ت. 910/1505) وعلاء الدين المقي الهندي (ت. 758/1568) (السيوطي 2005، والمنهج الهندي 1981)، أما الصنات أو وعبر عنها بلفظ الأخلاق إن تعلقت بالصفات غير الخلقية فقد استوحبت نوع أخرى من المصنات، ككتب السيرة والشمائل النبوية التي تتناسب الصنات الجسدية والخلقية معًا، كما تناولتها كتب مفردة حملت عناوين مثل "صفة النبي" أو "أخلاق النبي"، وصنف فيها محمد بن حارون (ت. 962/353) وابن الشيخ الأصفهاني (ت. 979/369) وأبو حيان الأصفهاني (ت. 1038/429)، وضياء الدين المقدسي (ت. 1245/643) وغيرهم.

وقد علبت هذه الأقسام الثلاثة (الأقوال والأفعال والصفات) على تثبيت مرجعية الحديث أو السنة التي صارت مصدرًا ثانياً من مصادر التشريع بعد القرآن الكريم، كما ساهمت في رسم شخصية النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم بوصفه مثالًا أعلى أو ممأذجًا يُحتذى في هديه: قولًا وفعلًا وأخلاقًا (بمعنى الصنات الخلقية)، ثم ربطت له حقوقة على المؤمنين تبدأ من أن حب النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم من الإيمان، وتنبئي بالحقوق الوافرة على المسلم في الحياة، فقد جمعها القاضي عياض (ت. 746/1149) في كتاب نصمه "الشفاع في حقوق المصطفى" (2013).

1 انظروا كتب الحديث الرئيسي على فصل خاص (يُسمى كتابًا) بالفضائل أو المنافع، ويدرج تحته بعض ما يتعلق بصفات النبي ومشامه، وفي "أبواب البر والصلة": أدرج بعض المصادر الحديثة الخاصة يحقق النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم، كما فعل أبو عيسى الزهراوي (ت. 729) في جامعه مثلًا، في حين أدرج غيره من أصحاب كتب السن تحت أبواب أخرى ككتب الأدب مثلًا عند أبي داود (ت. 889/275).

2 انظر مثلًا البخاري (1422 هـ، 2001/125) كتاب الإمام، باب حب الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم من الإيمان.
و بالإضافة إلى المثل الأعلى والغايات، يستوعب المضمون الأخلاقي لمدونة الحديث نوعين من الأفعال: الأول: الأفعال الظاهرة أو أفعال الجوارح، والثاني: الأفعال الباطن التي نشأت لها مصنفات مفردة وكُتِب في بعض موضوعاتها ابن أبي الدنيا (ت. 281/894) وأبو محمد الحسن بن إسماعيل الضراب (ت. 392/1002) وغيرهما، وأدرجت أيضًا تحت أبواب مختلفة من كتب الحديث: الوضعية، وخاصة كِتابِ الرِّقاق من صحيح البخاري (ت. 570/392) ومن صحيح ابن حبان، وأبو محمد الحسن بن إسماعيل (ت. 894/281) مفردة وكُتَب في بعض موضوعاتها ابن أبي الدنيا (ت. 739/1339)، وكِتابِ البر والصلة والآداب من صحيح مسلم (ت. 870/354) وكتاب ابن أبي الدنيا في بعض موضوعاته. وأُدرجت أيضًا تحت أبواب مختلفة من كتب الحديث: الأحاديث الفردية التي تعالج قضايا جزئية أو حالات محددة (casuistry)، والثاني: الأحاديث الكلية التي تقدم مبادئ عامة، كالحاديث الذي أشتهل عليها: "الأربعون النووية" لـ البعد الذي يتصل

وإن مشينا على المفهوم الموسّع للأخلاق، سنجد المضمون الأخلاقي موزعين على العديد من الكتب - وفق التسمية الكلاسيكية للقصول - داخل جامعات الحديث، ككتاب الأحكام، والكائن، والكائن، والكائن، والكائن، وغيرها من صحيح البخاري مثلًا. أما إذا مشينا على المفهوم الضيق للأخلاق، فسنجد أحاديث الأخلاق في نوعين من المصدر: الأول: الكتب الواقعة التي أُفردت إلهام موضوع محدد كـ "الأربعة النووية"، أو لباب من أبواب الأخلاق كـ "الأربعة النووية". وسنأتي على تصنيف هذه الكتب لاحقًا. والثاني: جامعات الحديث الرئيسي حيث تجد بعض أحاديث الأخلاق مصنفة ضمن أبواب محددة مثل كتاب الأدب من سنن أبي داوود، ويُعتبر ضمن إشتمال على أكثر من 300 حديث (ت. 153/767)، ومن كتاب البر والصلة، والكائن، والكائن، والكائن. ومن الواضح أنه تم التمييز هنا بين "الأداب" و"الأدب"، ثم جاء بعض العلماء، بعدها، توجهكم إلى المجمّعات الستة لحفل خاتم الكتاب. 

ومن مجموع عناوين الكتب التي انطوت عليها جامعات الحديث الرئيسي، أن ما يتصل منها بالأخلاق - بالفصول - يشمل الكتب الآتية: كتب المناقض الذي ينطوي على بعض الفصول، وكتاب الأدب، والكائن، والكائن، والكائن، والكائن. ومن الواضح أن أحاديث الأخلاق - بالمعنى المقصود - توزع على كتب عامة في صحيح مسلم 3: كتب السلم، وكتاب ألفاظ من الأدب، وكتاب البر والصلة، وكتاب الأدب، وكتاب الفصول، وكتاب التوبة، وكتاب الذكر والدعاء، وكتاب صفات المنافقين، وكتاب الزهد. ومن الواضح أنه تم التمييز هنا بين "الآداب"

3° بُنَّ مسلم بن الماجح (ت. 261/875) كتابه، ولكنه لم يترجم للأبواه، ثم جاء بعض العلماء بعده، وعندما برز في الأدب، وكتب الانقطاعات، وكتب السلم، وكتب الذكر والدعاء، وكتب الفصول، وكتب التوبة، وكتب الزهد.
تصنيف كتب الأخلاق الحديثة

3

ستتجاوز هنا ما سبق ذكره من الكتب الفرعية والأبواب التي اشتملت عليها جامع الحديث الرئيسي، كما ستتجاوز المفهوم الأخلاقي المعني الذي يشمل أيضًا أجزاء من كتب الأحاديث الأخلاقي التي غلب عليها المظهر الفقهي، وستركز فقط على الكتب المفردة في الأخلاق الحديثة التي هي محل اهتمامنا في هذا الفهرست، ويمكن أن نصنفها على ثمانية أقسام هي:

- كتب الأدب، وتشمل الأدب المفرد وأنواعًا أخرى من الأداب المتعلقة بالفروع المعرفية المختلفة، كأعمال القاضي والسمع، والفقيه والمتفقه، والمعلمي والمسمى وغيرها، بالإضافة إلى أدب النفس، والآداب الوالدين، والآداب الصحبة، وأداب العصرية، وقضاء الحوائج وغيرها من الكتب التي تشكل طرائق الحديث في رواية الأحاديث المنددة، سواء إلى النبي أم من دونه.

- كتب مكارم الأخلاق أو معاني الأخلاق، ومساواها، وقد تحولت إلى لون من ألوان التصنيف المفرد، ويدرس ضمنها الحديث عن أخلاق النفس وطياتها وفضائلها وردائها وصفاتها الفاضلة والرذل، وكتب الخصائص والخصائص، وكيفية تهذيب النفس ووعظها وترقيقها ومواساتها وبيان عللها إلى غير ذلك.

- كتب الترغيب والترهيب، وكتب فضائل الأعمال التي تنشغل بفضائل ومذام الأعمال، وتشمل على جوانب تعبدية وأخرى أخلاقية.

4

ومن بعض المصنفين في أحاديث الأحكام مفهوم "الأحكام" تشمل غر الفقهيات أيضًا، ومن هنا ضم عبد الحق الإشبيلي (ت. 81/85) إلى "أحاديث الأحكام" بعض أدباء الأخلاق بالفروع المميزة - وقال إن جمع في كتابه "لوذم الشرع وأحكامه حلاله وهرائه، وضربو من الترغيب والترهيب وذكر الثواب والعقاب"، لأن هذه الأحكام تُسمى "العمال بها" (الإشبيلي 1318/93)، فهو قد وضع مفهوم "الأحكام" من جهة، وربطه باغته تحصيل السعادة من جهة ثانية، وكذلك فعل ابن جبر العسقلاني AGAIN) (1449/852) فقد ضم - في كتابه - إلى الكتب الفقهية مادة كتاب "كتاب الجامعة" على طريق فقهاء الملكية، وأدرج ضمنه ستة أباب هي: الأدب والبلغة، والذكى والدعاء، والذهاد، والرغبة من مسائير الأخلاق، والترغيب في مكارم الأخلاق، والذكى والدعاء. وقد اشتملت هذه الأباب على 313 حلماً من مجموعة 1582 حلماً (ابن جبر العسقلاني 1318/93، 469-461).
كتب شعب الإيمان التي تسعى إلى رصد شعب الإيمان الواردة في الحديث المشهور، وهي

- يتعين على بعض وصين أو بعض وسوعن شعبة، ويدخل في هذه الكتب الأبعاد الكلامية والفقهية والأخلاقية، كما يتداخل الاعتقادي والعملي.

- كتب المناقش والفضائل، وتتنوع هذه الكتب بحسب الأشخاص والأفعال والأزمنة وغيرها.

- فكأنها تذهب إلى مدى أبعد من مجال الأخلاق، ولكنها تتمثل على أبعاد أخلاقية تصل

- بأخلاق الفضيلة.

كتب الزهد والورع والرقائق التي أفردت منذ زمن مبكر في القرن الثاني الهجري، وهي من

- أوائل الكتب التي ظهرت في التصنيف على الأبواب.

كتب هدي النبي وأخلاقه وشمائله التي أفردت بالتصنيف، وقد كانت جزءًا من السيرة

النبوية، بالإضافة إلى سير الخلفاء الراشدين والصحابة والصالحين، وهي تقدم النموذج الأخلاقي الذي يجب أن يُحذى، وتشكل كتب الطبقات كذلك مصداً ثريًا هنا وإن كان من العسير

- إدراجها ضمن كتب الأخلاق، لأنها ليست كذلك وإن اطغى على أبعاد أخلاقية.

كتب المخصصة لموضوع واحد من موضوعات الأخلاق، كذم الدنيا، وذم الرياء، واعتلال

القلوب، والصور على فقد الأولد، والعزلة، والفناعة، والكذب، والتفاق، والصبر، والعدل،

والزهد، والتوابع، والكبر، والرقة والبكاء، والرحمة، والفترة، والعيا، والآمر

بالمعروف والمنكر، وغير ذلك، وقد ضرب ابن أبي الدنيا (ت. 281/984) مثالًا بارًا

في هذا الباب.

ويمكن أن تضيف - إلـ ما سبق - بعض كتب الأربعينات؛ لأننا يمكن أن نميز فيها بين

ملسكيين: الأول: يقوم على معايير تقنية أو اصطلاحية أو لطائف إسنادية وهو كثير، أما الثاني

فيعتبر بالتصنيف على الأبواب والأخلاق والحاديث الكلية، وقد أدرجت عدًا منها في هذا

الفهرست، ومن أمثلة الأول الكثيرة جمع أربعين حديثًا من أربعين شيخًا أو من أربعين بلدًا,

وجمع أربعين حديثًا في المساواة، وهي أن يساوي الجامع في إسناده عدد رجال محدث آخر إلى

النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم ولكن بإسناد غير إسناد، أو جمع أربعين حديثًا في المواصفة، وهي أن

يوافق الجامع شيخ محدث آخر في الإسناد بإسناد عال يقبل عدد رجاله عن رجال الذي وافقه

فيه، أو جمع أربعين حديثًا في الأدب الوعوي، والبدل أن يتقدم للجامع الحديث بإسناد عال عن

غير شيخ محدث آخر، أو جمع أربعين حديثًا متبنيًا السماع، أو جمع أربعين حديثًا مسلسلًا على

صفة معينة، أو جمع أربعين حديثًا عشيرة، إلى غير ذلك مما يتنوع ويكثر، وكلها اعتبارات لا

مدخل لها هنا في حقل الحديث والأخلاق، ولذلك كان من الصعب أن ندرج نوع الأربعينات

في القسمة الثمانية السابقة.
مصنفات المحدثين في الأخلاق

معايير اختيار الكتب وترتيبها

محور الاهتمام في هذا الفهرست هي الكتب ذات الصلة بالأخلاق والحديث. يمكن تصنيف عوام الكتب على هذا الشرط إلى نوعين: الأول يضم المصادر الحديثية غير المطبوعة التي حدثت عنها كتب التراجع وهفارات المخطوطات، وهي تتوزع بين ما لا يعرف له أثرًا أو ما مقود بالفعل، وبين ما لا يزال مخطوعًا. ورغم أنّي جمعت قائمة أولية بهذا النوع إلا أنني عدت عن إدراجها في هذه الطبعة من كُلها هذا على الأقل. أما النوع الثاني فيتناول المصادر المطبوعة فقط، وهو ما خصصت له هذا الفهرست. لا يمكنني الإدعاء بأن هذا الفهرست استقصى كل المصادر ذات الصلة، ولكن شرطي في أن أجمع ما أمكنني الاطلاع المباشر عليه، وقد ذلت جهدي في تخريط الطبعة الأصلح للكتاب التي طُبعت على نسخ خطية إن وجدت أو أمكنني ذكر ذلك. وبالنظر إلى خصوصية علم الحديث، فإن أهمية القصوى هنا للمصادر المبكرة؛ لما تنطوي عليه من قيمة معنوية، فهي تنتمي إلى المرحلة التأسيسية وتقل فيها الوسائط من جهة، وتتمثل على أحاديث وآثار مسندة، أي تتبع طريقة المحدثين في عصر الرواية. ومع ذلك استقصيت - ما امكن - المصادر المتاخرة التي بلغت إلى حدود القرن العاشر الهجري تقريبًا، وإن كانت تمت أربعة مصادر أُخرى عن هذا التاريخ، آخراً مجموعة حديثيّ صنفه الشيخ يوسف بن إسماعيل النبهاني (ت. 350/1932). ويبعد الرؤى عن بناء استنتاجات تنص حركة التأليف في الأخلاق الحديثية بالاستناد فقط إلى هذا الفهرست وذلك لسببين على الأقل: الأول أنني لا أستطيع الزعم بأنه شامل لكل ما تُطبع في هذا المجال، والثاني أن تتمّ كُلًا أُخرى كثيرة لم تدرج هنا وهي بين مقود ومخطوع.

وبالنظر إلى مجموع مصادر هذا الفهرست، نستطيع أن نخلص إلى أنها تنطوي على خمسة:

1. أ üzere ودائع عالمية علم الحديث، فإن أهمية القصوى هنا للمصادر المبكرة. لما تنطوي عليه من قيمة معنوية، فهي تنتمي إلى المرحلة التأسيسية وتقل فيها الوسائط من جهة، وتتمثل على أحاديث وآثار مسندة، أي تتبع طريقة المحدثين في عصر الرواية. ومع ذلك استقصيت - ما امكن - المصادر المتاخرة التي بلغت إلى حدود القرن العاشر الهجري تقريبًا، وإن كانت تمت أربعة مصادر أُخرى عن هذا التاريخ، آخراً مجموعة حديثي صنفه الشيخ يوسف بن إسماعيل النبهاني (ت. 350/1932). ويبعد الرؤى عن بناء استنتاجات تنص حركة التأليف في الأخلاق الحديثية بالاستناد فقط إلى هذا الفهرست وذلك لسببين على الأقل: الأول أنني لا أستطيع الزعم بأنه شامل لكل ما تُطبع في هذا المجال، والثاني أن تتمّ كُلًا أُخرى كثيرة لم تدرج هنا وهي بين مقود ومخطوع.

والنظر إلى مجموع مصادر هذا الفهرست، نستطيع أن نخلص إلى أنها تنطوي على خمسة:

خصائص رئيسة:

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الخطيب

الخصائص الأولى: أي أن أدرج هنا - في الغالب - أعمال الحديث أو من له اشتغال بالحديث بما
له صلة بالأخلاق، فالكتب المدرجة هنا تختص أشكالًا مختلفة فهي كتب رواية تجمع الأحاديث
والآثار المنسدة التي يذكر فيها مؤلفها أسانيد للأحاديث، أو كتب جمعت أحاديث وأثارًا في
موضوعات أخلاقية، وإن لم تعن بذكر الأسانيد، ولكن مؤلفها عزا فيها الأخبار إلى مصادرها، أو
هي كتب بنية على الأحاديث والأثار وإن لم تكون كتب رواية خالصة، فعندنا هنا الجمع بين
الحديث والأخلاق معاً، وبناء على هذا المعيار استبعدت من كتب الحديث أنفسهم ما لا يشكل
الحديث والأثر مكونًا رئيسًا فيها، وأدرجت بعض كتب الأدب التي كتبها محدثون، شكل
الحديث مكونًا رئيسًا فيها تظهر فيه صنعتهم في الرواية والإسناد.

فبناء على معيار حضور الحديث والرواية في الكتاب أدرجت من مجموع كتب الحكم
التمريدي - مثل - كتب الحديث خاصين، بما نواصر الأصول، والمغنيات، وكتبَا آخر غلب
عليه في الاستشهاد بالحديث والأثر، ككتاب طالب النعمة دون بقية كتبه، وأدرجت من
كتب الحافظ المحاسبي (ت. 243/857) كتابًا واحدًا هو «آداب النعمة»، وأدرجت أيضًا كتاب
أخلاقيات القرن لأبي بكير الجرجي (ت. 360/970)؛ فقد قال في كتابه: "جرب ما ذكرته وما
سأذكر إن شاء الله، بيانه في كتاب الله تعالى في سنة رسوله صلى الله عليه وسلم، ومن قول
صحابته رضي الله عنهم (العجريب 2008، 37)، وقال: "واعلموا -Range Rgham-i - أنى قد رويت
فيما ذكرت أخبارًا تدل على ما كرهه لأهل القرآن فإن أذكر ما حضرني... (العجريب 2008،
70) وكذلك كتاب "العذرة" لأبي سليمان الخاطبي (ت. 388/989) الذي ليس هو كتاب حديث
خالصًا ولكن الحديث يكون رئيس فيه وصاحب محدث.

ولكن يمكن أن نجد هنا شكلين لحضور الأحاديث والأثر في هذه الكتب: أولهما: مسلك
السند والرواية الذي يجري على الأدب أو الذي يتحرر حول فكرة محددة، ويمكن أن نسميه
الاحتجاج غير المباشر لنصرة فكرة أو الدعوة إليها، وهذا المسلك هو الغالب هنا في هذا الفهرست،
وثانيه: مسلك التحقيق والاستدلال المباشر لفكرة معينة، ككتاب «تبيين الغافلين» لـ النحاس
(814/1411)؛ فقد مرح فيه مؤلفه بطرقتين: طريقة الفقهاء وطريقة علماء التحقيق وخاصة
المصحوبة، وقد استدل - في كتابه - بكم كبير من الأحاديث والأثار إلى جانب أقوال العلماء
والفروع الفقهية التي أوردها، وشدد أيضًا الكثير من المناهج التي تقل فيها عن الحكم الترعرع
والكثير من مدونات الحديث.

وكون المؤلف محدثًا له وزنه هذا، وإن توسع في مصادره حتى شملت فنون الأخبار وأنواع
الأشعار، ومن ثم أدرجت كتب «عوين الأخبار» لابن تيمية (ت. 276/888) وروضة العقلاء
لا بن حبان (ت. 354/965) في هذا الفهرست. فإن تقنية محدث ومتكلم وأديب، وهو من
المتقدمين أصحاب الإسناد، وكان من أوائل من كتب في علم مختلف الحديث، ابن حبان
مصنفات المحدثين في الأخلاق

حدث مشهور صاحب أحد دواوين الحديث الكبرى وإن كان الكتابان ليسا كتابي حديث خالصين، أما كتاب عيون الأخبار فقد احتوى على الكثير من الآيات القرآنية والأحاديث النبوية المسندة كما يضحى من فهارسه، وأما ابن حبان فقد جعل كتابه على خمسين بابًا، وقال: إن "بناه كل باب منها على سنة رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم (أبو حبان 1949)، وفي المقابل، استبعت كتابه احتوى على أحاديث ولكن مؤلفته أدباء، فهم وإن افتخروا بأبواب كتبهم بأيات وأحاديث إلا أن صنعهم الأدب، ككتاب "غزر الخصائص الواضحة وغرر النقائص الفاضحة" مثل لأبي إسحاق الوطواط (ت. 718/1318)، فقد جمع أخبارًا في "المحمود والمذاة المخلة لها نفوس الخواص والعوام" (الوطواط 2008: 7)، ولكن كتابه أليق بحقل الأدب لا الحديث.

الخصائص الثالثة: أنني حاولت قدر الطاقة أن أراعي خصوصية حقل الأخلاق من خلال التركيز على الموضوعات الأخلاقية، بالإضافة إلى أولوية الصلة بين الحديث والأخلاق أو كيفية استمرار الحديث نفسه في المجال الأخلاقي، فكل الأخلاق حقيقة متعدد التخصصات لا يعني أن يذهب في حقل الحديث فيصيحًا شيئا واحدا، ومن ثم مضت صفحات عن إدراج مدونات الحديث الكبرى من جوامع وصحاح ومساند وسنن ومعاجم ومصنفات، ولم أدرج - أيضًا - كتاب السيرة النبوية، بالرغم من أنها تنطوي على أبعاد أخلاقية تتعلق بأخلاق الفضيلة؛ فالسيرة - كالسنة - هي ما زعم ليحتذى أو يتأثر به، ولكنما غلب عليها النحى التاريخي لم أدرجها هنا، ولم أدرج أيضًا - أيضًا - كتب أحاديث الأحكام وهي كثيرة لغله المنظور الفقهوي عليه، وكتب شروح الحديث، كشروح كتاب "الشهاب" لأبي عبد الله الهاشمي، والأشهر والأربعين النووية، وكتب الشمائل، وكتب أحاديث مفردة مثل حديث القبض، وكتب الدعاء، وكتب المفردة لفضائل أشخاص أو شخص معين، فإن ذلك مما يعرر استيعابه، التوسع فيه من شانه أن يجعل الأخلاق حقيقة سائلا يتضمن كل مصادر الحديث والسيرة والتاريخ، فوجود أبعاد أخلاقية للموضوع غير كاف لادراجه في هذه القائمة وإن كانت تلك الأبعاد مما يسمح أن يَدس في حقل الحديث، وكذلك كتب "اليمن" لأبي عبد السلام ياسين، ولكن الكتب التي كتبها بعض المعاصرين كتالك التي جمعها صاحب السدران (ت. 2017) في الخصائص، وفي ذلك.

مع صاحب بن غانم السدران- مثال - مجموعة من الأربعينات في أحاديث الأخلاق، وقد أفرد لكل أربعين منها كتابًا مفردا، بدأ بالأحاديث التي كل حديث منها خصلة واحدة، ثم كل حديث حصلتان، وهكذا حتى وصل إلى الأربعين التي كل حديث منها عشر خصلات، وهي مطبوعة.
وفي الختام، لا بد من الإشارة إلى أنني رتبت المصادر ترتيبًا تاريخيًّا، وسأذكر التاريخ الهجري لفاة المؤلف مضافًا إليه التاريخ الميلادي، والله الموفق.

مصادر المقدمة

ابن حبان، أبو حاتم محمد. 1949. روضة العلماء، وزهوة الفضلاء، تحقيق وتصحيح محمد حبي الدين عبد الحكيم. ومحمد عبد الرزاق حمزة، محمد حامد الفقي. القاهرة: دار الكتب العلمية.


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أبو داود، سليمان بن الأشعث. 2009. ابن أبي داود، حقيقه وضبط نصه وخرج أحاديثه وعلق عليه شعب الأئمتين. ومحمد كامل قرط بالي، بيروت: دار الرسالة العالمية.


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الترمذي، أبو عيسى محمد بن سورة. 1996. الجامع الكبير. تحقيق ومحمد عبد الرحمن، فتحه وخرج أحاديثه وعلق عليه شارع عود. بيروت، بيروت: دار الرسالة الإسلامية.


عبو، بشر. 1979. مباحث غريبة، القاهرة: دائرة المعارف ومكتبة الج preco.


مسلم، محمد بن الجاحظ. 1949. صحيح مسلم، تحقيق وطبعه وتحقيق صوصو، وترقيمه محمد فؤاد عبد الباقى. القاهرة: دار إحياء الكتب العربية.

7 - اقتصرت - في هذه القائمة - على المصادر التي لم يرد ذكرها في فهرست المصصطفدات الحديثية في الأخلاق، أما المصادر الأخرى التي وقعت الإحالة إليها ولم يرد ذكرها في هذه القائمة فتمكن الرجوع إليها في التهريست أدناه.
الرواي، محي الدين، 1929. صحيح مسلم بشرح النووي، القاهرة: المطبعة المصرية بالأزهر.

الطواطي، أبو استحاق محمد بن إبراهيم الكتبي، 2008. غرر الخصائص الواضحة وغرر النقائص الفاضحة، ضبطه وتحقيق ووافق حافزية إبراهيم شمس الدين، بيروت: دار الكتب العلمية.

ياسين، عبد السلام، 1929. شبه الإمام، جرى أحاديثه عبد الطيف أيت حبي، وراجعه وشرح غريبه عبد العلي المسؤول، بيروت: دار لبنان للطباعة والنشر.


6 فهرست المصنفات الحديثة في الأخلاق

القرن الثاني/الثامن

ابن المبارك، عبد الله (ت، 181/797)، الزهد والرقائق، تحقيق حبيب الرحمن الأعظمي. الهرد: مجلس إحياء المعارف، بيروت: مؤسسة الرسالة، 1966.


هذا الكتاب من رواية الحسين بن الحسن المروزي عن ابن المبارك، وقد زاد المروزي روایات أخرى كثيرة على ابن المبارك بلغته نحو 373 روایة، كما أن يحيى بن صاعد (ت، 318/930) الذي سمع الكتاب على المروزي سنة 245/859 زاد عليه روایات أخرى عن ابن المبارك أيضًا، وقد أُلحق بالكتاب ما رواه نعيم بن حماد (ت، 228–229) في نسخته زائدًا على ما رواه المروزي عن ابن المبارك. ومع وجود روایات أخرى في الكتاب عن غير ابن المبارك فإن الكتاب أشتر باسم ابن المبارك، لأن أكثر من ثلاثة أرباعه عن ابن المبارك.

9 هذه النسخة مطبقة لكتاب البر والصلة المنشور باسم ابن المبارك، وقد نشر محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وقد نبه محمد سعيد بخاري إلى أن كتب نسخة الخطية المحفوظة في المكتبة الظاهرية بدمشق، وروى عن غير ابن المبارك (200 روایة)، انظر مقدمة تحقيق محمد سعيد بخاري لكتاب البر والصلة عن ابن المبارك وغيره، الرياض: دار الوطن، 1419هـ (1998).
الخطب


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القرن الثالث/التاسع


الدائمي، أبو الحسن علي بن محمد (ت. 797/1819) التعبير المنقوص، تحقيق إبراهيم الفرعي. بيروت: دار البشائر، 2003.

أبو عبد الله، القاسم بن سلام (ت. 224/838) الخطب والمواعظ والحض على أعمال البر وطلب الخير. تحقيق محمد رضا القهوجي. بيروت: دار البشائر الإسلامية، 1999.


ابن حبلان، أبو عبد الله أحمد (ت. 241/855) كتاب الورع، رواية أي بيكر المرودي (أحمد بن محمد بن الحاج ت. 275/888) وموضع租车 الورع، رواية تلقيها أي بيكر الوراق (أحمد بن محمد بن عبد الخالق). تحقيق مصطفى بن محمد //= "التحقيق على الغلاف بالعنوان الآتي فقط: "المواضع والخطب".

اللهجلة، محمد بن سعد بن عبد الرحمان بن محمد بن عبد الله بن الحجاج المروري، ج1، 888 هـ.

وهناك طبعة أخرى بعنوان "المحاسن" (1997) بتحقيق مهدي الرجائي، يتميز فيها الجمال في الطبع والزخارف، وهي أحدث من الطبعة الأولى.

زمياد كثيرة، بتحقيق ودراسة محمد بن عبد الله السريع، طبعتها دار الحديث الكتانية سنة 2019.
الخطب


مصنفات المحدثين في الأخلاق


في الطبع التي نشرها أبو بكر بن عبد الله السعداوي (الشراقية: المنتدى الإسلامي والمركز العربي، بيروت 2000، ص 497): "رسالة الاعتبار وأعقاب السرور والأحزان، وهي هكذا في النسخة الخطية من المنتقى من الكتاب التي اعتمدها أيضًا خلف! جاء عنوان الرسالة في النسخة الخطية التي اعتمدها المحقق، ولكن جمع عنوان الكتب ما بين الموقعين. ورغم أن النسخة الخطية التي اعتمدها أبو بكر بن عبد الله السعداوي (2000، ص 34) جاءت بنفس العنوان، إلا أنه جعل عواناتها هكذا: "رسالة الرضا عن الله والصبر على قضائه" 

طبعها أبو بكر السعداوي (2000، ص 63) وعنوان "الصمتم وحفظ اللسان".
ابن أبي الدنيا، أبو بكر عبد الله (ت. 281/894)، الإسلامية، الولادة والانفراد. ضبط نصه وقدمه وعلق عليه وخرج أحاديثه، أبو عبيدة مشهور بن حسن آل سلمان، الرياض: دار الوطن، 1997.

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ابن أبي الدنيا، أبو بكر عبد الله (ت. 281/894)، الفرح بعد الشدة، تحقيق ياسين محمد السواس وعبد القادر الخياط، مكتبة الغرباء الأثرية، القاهرة، 2000.

ابن أبي الدنيا، أبو بكر عبد الله (ت. 281/894)، القناعة والتعفف، تحقيق مصطفى عبد القادر عطا، بيروت: دار ابن القيم، 1997.

ابن أبي الدنيا، أبو بكر عبد الله (ت. 281/894)، notions et comportements, Etudes sur la théologie et la philosophie, زاهد كورتي، عزت العطار الحسيني، دار البشائر، دمشق، 1996.

ابن أبي الدنيا، أبو بكر عبد الله (ت. 281/894)، العقوبات، تحقيق محمد خير رمضان يوسف، بيروت: دار حزم، 1996.

ابن أبي الدنيا، أبو بكر عبد الله (ت. 281/894)، الفرح بعد الشدة، تحقيق ياسين محمد السواس وعبد القادر الخياط، مكتبة الغرباء الأثرية، القاهرة، 2000.

ابن أبي الدنيا، أبو بكر عبد الله (ت. 281/894)، القناعة والتعفف، تحقيق مصطفى عبد القادر عطا، بيروت: دار ابن القيم، 1997.

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ابن أبي الدنيا، أبو بكر عبد الله (ت. 281/894)، العقوبات، تحقيق محمد خير رمضان يوسف، بيروت: دار حزم، 1996.
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بيروت، 1986.
ولاين أبي الدنيا رسائل عديدة فقدت أو لم تطبع والحفي، أبو إسحاق إبراهيم بن أبي الدنيا (ت. 828/938)، إكرم الصيف، تحقيق عبد الله عاطف الغراز، راجعه وقدم له مقبل بن هادي الوادعي، طبعت مكتبة الصحابة، 1987.

16.


17.

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18.

وللجميع كتاب أخرى ذات صلة بالأخلاق لم أرها مطبوعة.


16.

17.

18.


الخزيم

الخطيب، جعفر بن محمد بن نصير (ت. 348/959–969)، الفوائد والزهد والرقائق والمراثي، تحقيق مجدى فتحي السيد، طنطا، 1991.

الأنصاري، محمد بن هارون (ت. 353/964)، صفة النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم وصفة أخلاقه وسيرته وأدبه وخشوع جناحه، تحقيق وشرحه أحمد البرز، دار المأمون للتراث، 2003.

ابن جبان، أبو حامد محمد (ت. 354/965)، روضة العقلاء، دراسة وتحقيق محمد عايش، عمان: دار أروقة، 2003.

الطبراني، أبو القاسم سليمان بن أحمد (ت. 360/970)، مكارم الأخلاق، تحقيق أبي بسطام محمد بن مصطفى، بيروت: دار البشائر الإسلامية، 2013.

الآنجري، أبو بكر محمد بن الحسين (ت. 360/970)، أخلاق حملة القرآن، تحقيق غانم قدوري الحمد، عمان: دار عمارة، 2008.

الطبراني، أبو القاسم سليمان بن أحمد (ت. 360/970)، كتاب الأربعين حديثًا، تحقيق+Badr بن عبد الله البدر، الرياض: أئمة السنة، 2000.

الآنجري، أبو بكر محمد بن الحسين (ت. 360/970)، ذم اللواط، دراسة وتحقيق مجدى السيد إبراهيم، القاهرة: مكتبة القرآن للطبع والنشر والتوزيع، 1990.

الطبراني، أبو القاسم سليمان بن أحمد (ت. 360/970)، أدب النفوذ، تحقيق علقت عليه وخرج أحاديثه أبو عبيدة مشهور بن حسن آل سلمان، عمان: دار الخرّاز، بيروت: دار ابن حزم، 2001.

طُبع الكتاب طبعات عدة مع اختلاف جزئي في العنوان، ففي طبعة محمد عاشق (عمان: دار أروقة، 2003) جاء العنوان على الغلاف هكذا: "روضة العقلاء"، وقد استخدم المحقق على ست نسخ خطية إحداها تمثل الإشارة الثانية للكتاب. وفي طبعة محمد بن عوض بن عبد الغني المصري (الجاهلة العلماء: دار الميراث النبوي، 1997) جاء العنوان هكذا: "روضة العقلاء وما يحتاج إليه الملوك والنبلاء". وقد استخدم المحقق على أربع نسخ خطية. أما طبعة وارث محمد بن أحمد حمزة، وهو العناوين الذي حملت الطبعة القديمة التي حملها محمد حمزة، فقد جاء عنوانها هكذا: "روضة العقلاء ونزهة الفضلاء". وقد طُبعت هذه النسخة لاحقًا وأُسقط منها اسم الشيخين محمد حمزة ومحمد حمزة، وهو النقص الذي حققه بعض completeness في بعض النسخة. وقد زعم المحقق أن النسخة المنشورة، وهي النسخة التي حملت الكتاب، كانت تشمل النسخة المنشورة قبله ناقصة.
الآجري، أبو بكر محمد بن الحسين (ت. 360/970)، كتاب الغرباء، تحقيق بدر البدر. المكتبة الإسلامية، 1983.


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الخطيب
فهرس

آداب السلوك 89
ألذاب الشرعية 89
آداب النفس 312
آدم 97
الإتقان في الدين 65
ابن أبي الدنيا راجع أيضاً 310，309

آداب الشرعية 89
حدود أخلاقتهما 109
رسائله في الأخلاق والرقائق 88
العقل وفضله 87
العقل في الأخلاق 97-91
عن النفس الشخصية 11
مكارم الأخلاق 87

ابن أبي زيد الفيروزاني 65-67
ابن أبي داوود عبد الله 64-63
ابن الأثير الجوزي، ضياء الدين 55
ابن الأعرافي، أحمد بن محمد 62，99
ابن بلين 308
ابن تجري يردي 88
ابن كيما راجع أيضاً 109

ابن جبير، سعيد 106
ابن جريج، عبد الملك 95

Ibn al-Jawzi، ‘Ali b. 'Abd al-Rahmān
ابن حبان راجع أيضاً 104

Ibn Hibbān

Ibn Hajar

Ibn al-Dayf

Ibn Qutarīa

Ibn al-S̭arāa al-Gumrī

Ibn Abī-i Dunyā
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>صفحات</th>
<th>المحتوى</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>أبو الزناد</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 – 63</td>
<td>أبو عبد القاسم بن سلام</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>أبو هريرة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69 – 73</td>
<td>راجع أيضاً</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>أحاديث الأخلاق 307–309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>أحاديث الكلية 48–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>313</td>
<td>Abū Hurayra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>309–308</td>
<td>أحاديث الفقهية والأحاديث الكلية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>338</td>
<td>أصل من الأصول في موضوع معين</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>تأريخ 72–72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–68</td>
<td>عند الأئمة المتقدمين</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68–72</td>
<td>عند المتآخرين</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>تعداد 72–72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>تعبير عن الشريعة بكلتها</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>تقدير العدد</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–68</td>
<td>ثمانيات الأمر والنهي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>صلة بين القواعد الفقهية والأحاديث الكلية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>قواعد الدين</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>طغمةناك</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>مناقش</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>التصريح</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>الوعز</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>الجوامع بين الجوامع المصلحة بين الجوامع المصلحة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>يوم الآخر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>أخبار الصحليين</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>الإخلاص 78–77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>الأخلاق الأبرة 89–91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>الأخلاق الأخلاق 307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>أركان الإسلام 63–64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>أخلاق الأعمال 306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>الأخلاق التحليلية 307–307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>أخلاق الفضيلة 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
<td>أخلاق العمل</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>309</td>
<td>أخلاق النبي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>الأخلاق باعتبارها صوتاً لإنسانية الإنسان</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>إكرام الجار 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>إكرام الفضيلة 307–307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>الإخلاص لله 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ذكرى</td>
<td>صفحة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الإخلاق حملة القرآن</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأخلاق الحالية</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأخلاق العربية الدينيَّة</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأخلاق المكارم</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأخلاق فضيلة</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأخوة</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أداء الأمانة</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأرمينية النووية</td>
<td>56-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأرمينية النووية</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أرسطو</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أركان الإسلام</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أركون، محمد</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>إستفت قلبك</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الإسماعيلية</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأصبهاني، أبو نعيم</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأصفهاني، أبو حيان</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أكثم بن صيفي</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>إكرام الضيف</td>
<td>109-108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>إكرام الجار</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>إكرام الضيف</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>إكرام الذي من ذوي الكبد</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأمامة</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أمر الآلهة</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأنصاري، محمد بن هارون</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الأندلسي، عبد الله بن حبيب</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

المؤلف: Muhammad al-Bukhari, Abū 'Abd Allāh Ismā'īl b. بدر الدين العظيم

-bعدة 52
- بستان العارفين 51
- الطرزنة المكية، أبو العباس 72
- البوطي 78
- بيبليه، جميس 93
- البوطي، أبو بكر 67
- التجهيز، القاسم بن يوسف 64, 66, 72
- التلميذ للمجار 108
- التلميذ للضاحب 108
- الترجمي، الحكم 78
- تصنيف السنن 49
- تصنيف على الأبواب أو الموضوعات 48-49
- تصنيف على المسند 48-49
- تصنيف في الحديث 48
- تصنيف كتب الأخلاق الحدث 309-310
- كتب الأدب 309
- كتب الترقب والترهيب 309
- كتب الزهاد والوزاع والرقيق 310
- كتب شعب الإمام 309
- كتب فضائل الأعمال 309
- كتب مكارم الأخلاق 309
- كتب المناقب والفضائل 310
- كتب هادي النبي وأخلاقه 310

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### تفسير (أولى الأيدي والأبصرى)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>صفحة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75, 99, 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### تذيب الأسماء واللغات

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>صفحة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111, 99, 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### تمييز المعقول والخصى في الفكر الأخلاقي في الإسلام

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>صفحة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ثمانية الفعل

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>صفحة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### الجابر، محمد عابد

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>صفحة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89, 95, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### جامع العلوم والحكم في شرح خمسين حديثًا من جوامع الكلم

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>صفحة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
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<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### جبريل

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>صفحة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49, 59, 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
فهرس

رسالة «مكارم الأخلاق» 107–96، 98
أحد أعمدة الدين 103
مقدمة 96–98
الرقائق 90
» روضة العقلاء ونزهة الفاضلاء 111
الزبير بن العوام 108
الزهد 90
زيد بن أسلم 100
السدنال، صالح 313
سعداوي، عبد الله 88
السعد، عبد الرحمن بن ناصر 56
سعيد بن العاص 111
سعيد بن المسبب 94
السكر 54
سلطان، عبد الملك 94
سنن أبي داود 308
سنن الترمذي 309
سير الخلافاء الراشدين والصحابة والصالحين 310
السيرة النبوية 310
السويطي، جلال الدين 307
الشافعي، محمد بن إدريس 78
شرعية العقل في الأخلاق 92–91
شعر الأعرابية 107
شكل الحديث 312
الشهاب في الحكم والآداب 71
صالح الشامى 73
صحيح ابن حبان 308
صحيح البخاري 66، 308
صحيح مسلم 50، 498، 496–98، 107
الصدى 107
صدق البأس 108–107
صدق 70
صفة النبي 397
صلاح الرجل الصالح 96
الضحاك بن مراحم 93
الضراب، أبو محمد الحسن بن إسماعيل 308
طاعة الله 100
طلاحة بن عبد الطاهرة 59
الطاف، نجم الدين 151، 54، 57، 60–61، 49، 76
عانشة 62، 61–103
العقلاء مرادفًا للمؤمن الكامل 95
العالي، أبو الحسن عبد الجبار 100
عبد الرحمن بن ميدي 49، 60–62، 49، 71
الله بن أحمد 82
عبد الله بن عمر 103
عبد الله بن سعد بن إبراهيم القرشي 93
عمر، نور الدين 56
عنوان بن عفان 159
العدل والعقل 93
العرابي بن سارية 69
العقل 97
كالفاروق الذي يُعرض عليه دين
المرء 96
وضمّنة 88
وملكات الإنسان 94

- 978-90-04-52593-1
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فهرس

العقل الفطري والعقل المكتسب 93

هـ

فهرست المصنفات الحديثية في القيم الأخلاقية 307–335

المادة العقل ومعناه 93

كتاب المذمومات 88

كتاب المسند للرحلة والاتهام 70

كتاب «مكارم الأخلاق» 94

كتاب المناقب 308

كتاب القيم 90

همص 105

الكتب الستة 114

كتاب الكني، حزيمة بن محمد الكنيدي، أبو يوسف 95

كتاب الأذكار 50

كتاب البر 308

كتاب بنوك العقل 67

كتاب المذمومات 88

كتاب نقطة العقل 88

كتاب الرد والكل 308

كتاب روضة العقلاء 312

كتاب الرده 308

كتاب السنين لأبي داود 65

كتاب الشفا بتعريف حقوق المصطفى 312

كتاب طبع النقص 312

كتاب الرده 308

كتاب عين الأخبار 312

كتاب غنر الخصائص الواضحة وغير القائص 313

كتاب غرر الخصائص الواضحة وغرر النقص 308

كتاب غرر الخصائص الواضحة وغرر النقص 308

كتاب جمال الدين 308

كتاب المناقب 90

كتاب الكني، حزيمة بن محمد الكنيدي، أبو يوسف 95

كتاب الأذكار 50

كتاب البر 308

كتاب المذمومات 88

كتاب الرد والكل 308

كتاب روضة العقلاء 312

كتاب الرده 308

كتاب السنين لأبي داود 65

كتاب الشفا بتعريف حقوق المصطفى 312

كتاب طبع النقص 312

كتاب الرده 308

كتاب عين الأخبار 312

كتاب غنر الخصائص الواضحة وغير القائص 313

كتاب غرر الخصائص الواضحة وغرر النقص 308

كتاب غرر الخصائص الواضحة وغرر النقص 308

كتاب جمال الدين 308

كتاب المناقب 90

كتاب الكني، حزيمة بن محمد الكنيدي، أبو يوسف 95

كتاب الأذكار 50

كتاب البر 308
المقدسي، ضياء الدين 307
المقدسي، نصر بن إبراهيم 90-91
مكارم الأخلاق 87
مكارم ولحرم 98
المروة 98
المكارم والحرم 92
المكارم والحرم 93
المكارم والحرم 94
المكارم والحرم 95
المكارم والحرم 96
المكارم والحرم 97
المكارم والحرم 98
المكارم والحرم 99
المكارم والحرم 100
المكارم والحرم 101
المكارم والحرم 102
المكارم والحرم 103
المكارم والحرم 104
المكارم والحرم 105
المكارم والحرم 106
المكارم والحرم 107
المكارم والحرم 108
المكارم والحرم 109
المكارم والحرم 110
المكارم والحرم 111
المكارم والحرم 112
المكارم والحرم 113
المكارم والحرم 114
المكارم والحرم 115
المكارم والحرم 116
المكارم والحرم 117
المكارم والحرم 118
المكارم والحرم 119
المكارم والحرم 120
المكارم والحرم 121
المكارم والحرم 122
المكارم والحرم 123
المكارم والحرم 124
المكارم والحرم 125
المكارم والحرم 126
المكارم والحرم 127
المكارم والحرم 128
المكارم والحرم 129
المكارم والحرم 130
المكارم والحرم 131
المكارم والحرم 132
المكارم والحرم 133
المكارم والحرم 134
المكارم والحرم 135
المكارم والحرم 136
المكارم والحرم 137
المكارم والحرم 138
المكارم والحرم 139
المكارم والحرم 140
المكارم والحرم 141
المكارم والحرم 142
المكارم والحرم 143
المكارم والحرم 144
المكارم والحرم 145
المكارم والحرم 146
المكارم والحرم 147
المكارم والحرم 148
المكارم والحرم 149
المكارم والحرم 150
المكارم والحرم 151
المكارم والحرم 152
المكارم والحرم 153
المكارم والحرم 154
المكارم والحرم 155
المكارم والحرم 156
المكارم والحرم 157
المكارم والحرم 158
المكارم والحرم 159
المكارم والحرم 160
المكارم والحرم 161
المكارم والحرم 162
المكارم والحرم 163
المكارم والحرم 164
المكارم والحرم 165
المكارم والحرم 166
المكارم والحرم 167
المكارم والحرم 168
المكارم والحرم 169
المكارم والحرم 170
المكارم والحرم 171
المكارم والحرم 172
المكارم والحرم 173
المكارم والحرم 174
المكارم والحرم 175
المكارم والحرم 176
المكارم والحرم 177
المكارم والحرم 178
المكارم والحرم 179
المكارم والحرم 180
المكارم والحرم 181
المكارم والحرم 182
المكارم والحرم 183
المكارم والحرم 184
المكارم والحرم 185
المكارم والحرم 186
المكارم والحرم 187
المكارم والحرم 188
المكارم والحرم 189
المكارم والحرم 190
المكارم والحرم 191
المكارم والحرم 192
المكارم والحرم 193
المكارم والحرم 194
المكارم والحرم 195
المكارم والحرم 196
المكارم والحرم 197
المكارم والحرم 198
المكارم والحرم 199
المكارم والحرم 200
المكارم والحرم 201
المكارم والحرم 202
المكارم والحرم 203
المكارم والحرم 204
المكارم والحرم 205
المكارم والحرم 206
المكارم والحرم 207
المكارم والحرم 208
المكارم والحرم 209
المكارم والحرم 210
المكارم والحرم 211
المكارم والحرم 212
المكارم والحرم 213
المكارم والحرم 214
المكارم والحرم 215
المكارم والحرم 216
المكارم والحرم 217
المكارم والحرم 218
المكارم والحرم 219
المكارم والحرم 220
المكارم والحرم 221
المكارم والحرم 222
المكارم والحرم 223
المكارم والحرم 224
المكارم والحرم 225
المكارم والحرم 226
المكارم والحرم 227
المكارم والحرم 228
المكارم والحرم 229
المكارم والحرم 230
المكارم والحرم 231
المكارم والحرم 232
المكارم والحرم 233
المكارم والحرم 234
المكارم والحرم 235
المكارم والحرم 236
المكارم والحرم 237
المكارم والحرم 238
المكارم والحرم 239
المكارم والحرم 240
المكارم والحرم 241
المكارم والحرم 242
المكارم والحرم 243
المكارم والحرم 244
المكارم والحرم 245
المكارم والحرم 246
المكارم والحرم 247
المكارم والحرم 248
المكارم والحرم 249
المكارم والحرم 250
المكارم والحرم 251
المكارم والحرم 252
المكارم والحرم 253
المكارم والحرم 254
المكارم والحرم 255
المكارم والحرم 256
المكارم والحرم 257
المكارم والحرم 258
المكارم والحرم 259
المكارم والحرم 260
المكارم والحرم 261
المكارم والحرم 262
المكارم والحرم 263
المكارم والحرم 264
المكارم والحرم 265
المكارم والحرم 266
المكارم والحرم 267
المكارم والحرم 268
المكارم والحرم 269
المكارم والحرم 270
المكارم والحرم 271
المكارم والحرم 272
المكارم والحرم 273
المكارم والحرم 274
المكارم والحرم 275
المكارم والحرم 276
المكارم والحرم 277
المكارم والحرم 278
المكارم والحرم 279
المكارم والحرم 280
المكارم والحرم 281
المكارم والحرم 282
المكارم والحرم 283
المكارم والحرم 284
المكارم والحرم 285
المكارم والحرم 286
المكارم والحرم 287
المكارم والحرم 288
المكارم والحرم 289
المكارم والحرم 290
المكارم والحرم 291
المكارم والحرم 292
المكارم والحرم 293
المكارم والحرم 294
المكارم والحرم 295
المكارم والحرم 296
المكارم والحرم 297
المكارم والحرم 298
المكارم والحرم 299
المكارم والحرم 300
المكارم والحرم 301
المكارم والحرم 302
المكارم والحرم 303
المكارم والحرم 304
المكارم والحرم 305
المكارم والحرم 306
المكارم والحرم 307
Index

'Abbāsids 252–253
'Abd al-Awval b. ʿĪsā 130
'Abd al-Jabbār 273
on taḥbīb 158–165
'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Mahdī 258
'Abd al-Wahhāb b. al-Ḥāfīz 130
'Abdu, Muhammad 136
absence (Derridean concept) 206–208
Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. 'Umar b. Rashīd 21
Abū 'Ali l-Thaqafi 209
Abū ʿAwāna 148
Abū Bakr. See also ʿAbd ʿAlī Dār al-Ghifārī on ʿAbd al-Wahhāb 9
Abū Banūs 156
Abū Ḥudhayfah b. al-Yamān 174
Abū Hurayra. See also ʿAbd ʿArafāt
Abū Musā 238
Abū Saʿīd al-Khūḍrī 183, 228
Abū l-Shaykh, ʿAbd Allāh 2
Abū Shuqqa, ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad 5–6, 221–245
Abū ʿUbayda Majmūʿ al-Muḥādha 37
Adab al-Imlāʾ wa-l-Iṣṭimlāʾ (Manners of the Scrib
Adab al-Kātib 41
Adab al-Nuḥfī 10
Adab al-Ṣuhba 10
adab (pl. ādāb manner, etiquette) 2, 4, 16, 23
ādāb al-sulāk (etiquette of spiritual 9
wayfaring) 9
ādāb al-sharʿīyya 9
conceptual shift in Islam 35–38
definition and ethical dimension 30
historical conceptualisation 32–33
in hadith collections 38–43
pre-Islamic use 32
adīb (educator [in etiquette] or educated) 32, 36
afʿal al-bāṭin (inner actions) 14
ahādīth al-ākhām (traditions on fiqh rulings) 16
al-ahādīth al-mushtahira (viral hadith) 149
al-ʿAjlūnī 149, 156
al-ʿArabī 182
akhlāq (ethics) in Islam 10
akhlāq al-ṣāḥīḥīyya (narration-based 14–15
ethics) based on hadith 1–2, 4, 19–22
applied studies 25
comparative studies 25
history and development 23–24
nature of 24–25
primary sources 6
Sunna as a source 25
terminology and concepts 23
conception of 14–15
conscience (the heart/self) as a 269–271, 282–292
source
Sufi discourse on 292–295
gender 221–222
Abū Shuqqa on 223–242
intention 248–251, 260–264
in Sufi writings 258–265
of seclusion (uzla) 170–173, 181–192
Sūfī 147
the inward (bāṭin) dimension 271–281
virtue 120–124
al-ʿArābī, Ṯālib 155, 226
Ali, Kecia 263
ʿAli al-Qārī 155
ambiguous matters (shubab) 286
Anas b. Mālik 148–149, 186, 242, 255
annihilation and subsistence (al-fanāʾ wa-l-baqāʾ) 128
al-Anṣārī, Yahyā b. Saʿīd 252
anti-Arab sentiment (shuʿābīyya) 41
anwāʿ ʿulām al-ḥadīth (types of hadith 19
sciences) in Sufi writings 18
al-Aqṣāl al-Aḥkāʾī al-ʿArabī 1, 8
Arabi, Oussama 262
ʿArafāt 133
al-ʿArbaʿūn al-Nawawīyya 18
Arkoun, Mohammed 21
Armstrong, Lyall 203
al-Arnâ‘ūt, Shu‘ayb 138
al-Arnâ‘ūt, Abū al-Qâdir 138
Asad, Talal 260, 298
al-Asbahâni, Abû l-Shaykh b. Ḥâyyân 17, 22, 149
al-Asbahâni, Abû Ḥâyyân 17
asceticism (zuhd) 2, 9, 18–19, 40, 129, 132, 134, 147, 150–151, 158, 161, 165–166, 170, 173–174, 177, 211–212
and marriage 150–152
al-Ash‘arî, Abû l-Ḥasan 238
āṭhâr 133–134, 141
al-Attar, Mariam 13
authenticity of traditions 199–201
ʿĀwârîf al-Ma‘ârîf ("The Esoteric Insights of the Gnostics") 176
ʿĀisha 34, 126, 150, 228
Badr al-Dîn al-ʿAynî 258
Baghdad 126
banquets (in adab literature) 32–33, 35–37
baqá’ 148, 150, 155, 158, 160, 164
al-Barrâk, Abû al-Rahmân Nâṣîr 152
bâṭîn. See inner
al-Bayhaqî, ʿAbd Ḥusayn b. Ḥusayn 22, 33, 148, 176
Beaumont, Daniel 43
begging 131
Bilqîs 231
bîr (righteous virtue) 33–34
Bishr al-Ḥâfi 151
al-Bîṭâr, Muhammad Bahjat 137
blocking the means of prohibited actions (sadd al-dhârâ‘î) 282
bodily aspect of ethics 210
Brockelmann, Carl 127
brotherhood (ukhuwwâ) 181
and the hadîth of intention 256–258
Burrell, David 135
Carra de Vaux, Bernard 8
casuistry in hadîth 18
cautions (ṭib‘î) 282
certitude (yaqîn) 273
classification of books on hadîth-based ethics 21–22
common link between hadîth narrators 252
companionship (ṣuḥb) 181
Companions of the Prophet (ṣaḥâba) 202–203, 276
conflicting hadîths (mukhtalîf al-hadîth) 222
conscience in Islam 269–270
counsel (ṣâliḥ) 13
authority of the heart 276–278
Sufi discourse on passion 292–295
consultation between genders 237
Crone, Patricia 204
al-Dâbûsî 284
Damascus 138
al-Dârânî, Abû Sulaymân 131
al-Dârâbî, Abû Muhammad al-Ḥasan b. Ismâ‘îl 18
Demiri, Lejla 178
Derrida, Jacques 204, 206
al-Dhahabi, Shams al-Dîn 252
Dhâm al-Dunyâ ("Condemnation of the Worldly") 153
Dhâm al-Hawâ ("Disparagement of Passion") 139
dhikr (the recollection of God) 174
al-Dîlawi, Abû al-Ḥaqq 155
al-Dîlawi, Wali Allâh 20
al-Dinawari, Abû Bakr 9
Donaldson, Dwight M. 10
doubt (shakk) 273
Drâz, Muḥammad ʿAbd Allâh 8, 21
Dahmân, Muhammad Ahmad 137, 141
du‘â’ (supplication in prayer) 37
earliest generations (al-salaf al-ṣâlih) 120
earthly world (dunyâ) 147, 285, 294
egoism 185
El Calamawy, Sahair 43
Encyclopaedia of Islam 11
Engineer, Ali Aghar 221
equality (musâwît) of gender relationships 223–228, 230, 235
esoteric sciences (al-‘ulūm al-ladunniyya) 293
establishing the ratio legis (taḥqīq al-manāfīt) 288–292
Ethical Theories in Islam 1
ethics 30, 39–41, 268–271, 291
ettiquette. See adab (pl. ādāb manner, ettiquette)
evidence of the ruling (da‘īl al-ḥukm) 289
ettiquette inference (istiḍāl) 282–283

Fadel, Mohammad 224, 298
Fakhry, Majid 1, 11
family life 147
fanā‘ (annihilation) 128, 148, 150, 155, 158, 160, 162–166, 207
al-Farābī, Abū Naṣr 186
Farīja, Muḥammad 221
al-Fath al-Rabbānī (“The Sublime Revelation”) 147
Fāṭima bint Muḥammad 226
Feinberg, Joel 185
female prophets 238–239
“female spaces” 239
fitra (innate disposition) 276–277, 288
Foucault, Michel 210
fragrance. See perfume
Freud, Sigmund 248
Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (“Bezels of Wisdom”) 156
Futūḥ al-Ghayb (“Revelations of the Unseen”) 147

Gabriel 155, 239
Gadamer, Hans 171
gazing 187
Geertz, Clifford 213–214
gender ethics 5–6
gender relations
and the Arabic language 235–236
hermeneutics on 235–240
in hadith 228–230
in the Qur‘ān 230–231
Gharīb al-Ḥadīth (“Strange Traditions”) 37
Ghāyat al-Matḥūlāt fi Mahabbat al-Mahbūb
(“The Peak of the Goal in Loving the Beloved”) 171, 173, 187
on the study of hadīth 123–124
al-Ghazālī, Muḥammad 222
al-Ghazzī 152
al-Ghunya li-Tālībī Ṭariq al-Haqq (“Richness for the Seeker of the Truth”) 161
Gibb, Hamilton 11
giving and getting consultation from each other (mushāwarā) 226–227
Goldziher, Ignaz 269

Haddad, Gibril Fouad 178, 189
al-Ḥādī, Ṣadiq b. Muḥammad 221
hadīth 6, 35
and the Arabic language 35, 41
as a corpus on ethics 15–19
as examples of wisdom 42
as intermediary divine communication 35
as khabar (narrative) 43
categories of hadīth content 17
classifying and compiling 20–21
criticism 120–123, 138–140
etymology and relation to adab 31
forged (mawdū‘a) 120–121, 125, 127
inaccessibility to non-Arabs 13
inclusive definition of 228
in contemporary scholarship on ethics 8–15
maqtū‘ 16
marfū‘ 15–16
mawqūf 15–16
of intention 248–264
isnād and popularisation 251–254
on the inward dimension (bātin) 271–275
pairing the Qur‘ān with 230–231
position after Qur‘ānic verses 42
reinterpretation of problematic hadīth (tawil muskīl al-hadīth) 240–244
rejection (‘titbār) of 21
reorganisation of themes (tarājim al-abwāb) 232–235
scope 15–16
texts (mutti, sing. matn) 16
transmitter of (musnad, pl. masānīd) 16
verbal transmission of 202–203
hadīth (cont.)
weak (daʿīf) 120–121, 125
works on
adab 22, 38–43
al-targīḥīb wa-l-tārīḥīb (persuasion and
intimidation) 22
manāqib (merits) and excellences
(fadāʾil) 22
noble virtues (makārim al-akhlāq) 22
Prophetic guidance (hady al-nabi) 22
shuʿab al-imān (branches of faith) 22
hadīth al-taḥbīb 4–15,
5, 147, 154–156
in al-Jilānī’s works 158–165
theosophical perspective 156–158
hadīth collections 39–40
Abū Dāwūd 13, 18, 39–42, 228
al-Bukhārī 12, 14, 18, 20, 39–42, 123–124,
130, 137, 228–229, 249
Ibn Ḥibbān 18
Ibn Māja 39
Muslim 12–14, 18–19, 39–42, 123–124,
130, 137, 228–229
al-Tirmīdī 39–42, 130, 228
hadīth of taḥbīb 148
Ḥājī 133
Ḥājī Khalīfa 127
al-Halāmī 22
Hallaq, Wael 202
al-Hamawi, Ahmad b. Muḥammad 262
al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. See also 203
al-Ḥāshimi, Muḥammad ʿAli 221
Ḥāshimīyya 252
Hassan, Rifāʿ 221
hawā (desire) 161
Ḥawwāʾ, Saʿīd 138–140
heart (qalb) 6
helping each other (taʿāwun) 226–227
ḥijra (migration from Mecca to Medina)
256
ḥikma (wisdom) 212
historical science of ethics (ʿilm al-akhlāq
al-tārīkhī) 19
Hourani, George 11, 21
Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, ʿIzz al-Dīn 18, 21
Ibn ʿAbī l-Dunyā. See also 3, 5,
18, 21–22, 24, 49, 134, 174
Ibn ʿAbī ʿĀṣim 149, 151
Ibn Dīyah al-Kalbī, Abū l-Khaṭṭāb 18
Ibn al-Ḥasan, Muḥammad 23
Ibn al-Jawzī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAli. See also
Abū l-Jawzī 5, 120–121, 124–141, 184, 190,
201, 205
on Sufism in the Iḥyāʾ 128–129
Ibn al-Mubārak, ʿAbd Allāh 20, 22, 174
Ibn al-Munayyir 20
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿa 23
Ibn al-Qayyim 139, 236
Ibn al-ʿ Ṣalāḥ. See also 4, 19, 21
Ibn al-Sikkiṭ 36
Ibn al-ʿArabī, ʿAbū Bakr 235
Ibn ʿArabī, Muḥyī al-Dīn. See also 22, 147, 151–152, 154, 156–157, 176, 250,
254, 259–260
Ibn Bāz, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 221
Ibn Ṣāfī al-Makki 149
Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī. See also 20–21, 148–149, 200, 228, 238,
250, 256–257
on al-Bukhārī 257
Ibn Ḥanbal. See also 22, 130–131, 133, 149–150, 183, 189, 199–200,
213
Ibn Ḥārūn, Muḥammad 17
Ibn Ḥazm 261–262, 282
Ibn Ḥībān. See also 2, 18, 272
Ibn Kathīr, Abū l-Fīḍāʾ Ismāʿīl b. ʿUmar 139
Ibn Ṣāfī al-Makki, Muḥammad 237, 204
Ibn Māʿīn, Yāḥya 199, 213
Ibn al-Muḥāqqiq, Sirāj al-Dīn 18
Ibn ʿUmar 261–262
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyya 149
Ibn Qūdāmā 5, 121, 125, 127–129, 131–132,
135, 137–141
Ibn Qutayba. See also 41–42
Ibn Ṣāfī al-Makki, Muḥammad 237, 204
Ibn Ṣāfī al-Makki, Muḥammad 121–122, 152, 272, 275,
277–280, 284
Ibn Rushd 236
Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhīrī 33
Ibn Ṣāfī al-Makki, Muḥammad 162, 201, 258,
270, 287–295, 297–297
Ibn ʿAbbās. See also 133
Ibn ʿAjība 292, 294

347
Index

Ibn ‘Illān 277
Ibrāhīm b. Adham 131
Iḥyā‘ ʿUlūm al-Dīn ("Revival of the Religious Sciences") 24, 120–140, 149, 151, 177, 181
ijtihād 152, 209, 270, 277, 282, 288–292, 297
īlm al-rijāl (the study of hadith transmitters/narrators) 201
inclination of the heart (mayl qalbī) 288
inner (bāṭin) 6, 14–15, 18, 248, 268, 270–271, 273, 282, 289, 292
in hadith compendia 271–281
innovation (biḍ'a) 205, 213, 289
inspiration (ilhām) 282

intentionality in Islamic ethics 260–264
modern legal reform and 262–263
ritualistic and performative dimensions 265–262
subjectivity 263

intention (nīya') 248–249
and action 250–251
and political action 254–256
in Sufi writings 258–260
of religious practice 251
inward knowledge (īlām al-bāṭin) 292
al-ʻIrāqī, al-Ḥāfiz Zayn al-Dīn ʻAbd al-Raḥīm 139
al-ʻIrāqī, Na‘īm 138
Islamic legal theory (usūl al-fiqh) 1
īsnād 43, 141, 198, 200, 202–204, 215–216, 252
al-ʻUzla wa-l-Infīrād ("Seclusion and Isolation") 174
istīshāb (continuity) 289, 297
Ithbāf al-Sāda al-Muttaqa ("The Benefactions of the Cultivated-Faithful") 177
ʻIzzat, Hība Ra‘īf 222
Iṯām al-ʻAḥyā‘ bi-Aqḥāt al-Iḥyā‘ ("Informing the Living about the Mistakes in the Revival") 126
Jābir b. ʻAbd Allāh 226
al-Jāborī, Muhammad ʻAbd 1, 8
jadāl (argumentation) 198
al-Jāhiz, Abū ʻUthmān ʻAmr b. Bahr 41, 190

fāmī al-Tirmidhī ("The Compilation of al-Tirmidhī") 154
al-fāmī li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān ("Compilation of the Rulings of the Qurʾān") 36
al-fāmī li-Akhlaq al-Rāwī wa-Adab al-Sāmī 16
Jam' al-Jawāmī 1
al-jarīḥ wa-l-ta‘dīl (impugning and approving) 136
jihād 241
Job, Prophet 131
Jobanssen, Baber 298
al-Junayd, Abū 1-Qāsim 124, 163, 166
jurisprudential categories of human actions (al-akhām al-fiqhīyya) 279–281
jurisprudential preference (istihsān) 282
al-Juwaynī 123, 285
Juynboll, G.H.A. 252
Kahf, Mohja 222
al-Kalābādī, Abū Bakr 214, 149, 153–154
al-Kāmil fi l-Lughā wa-l-Adāb ("The Comprehensive Work on Language and Manners") 42
Kanz al-ʻUmmāl fi Sunan al-Aqwāl wa-l-Afāl 16
al-Kasb wa-l-Ma‘āsh ("Earning and Livelihood") 129, 140
al-Kāshānī, Mahmūd b. 'Alī 172
Kashf al-Khafā‘ ("Uncovering the Hidden") 149
Kashf al-Zunān ("Removal of Uncertainties") 127
al-Kashshāf ("The Revealer") 149
Khalidi, Tarīf 31, 39
al-Khalīl b. Ahmad al-Farāhīdī 32
khālwa (seclusion) 172
as an innovation of Sufis 172
attitudes towards 190–193
benefits of 183–189
historiography of 173–178
in time of strife and corruption 182–183
motives for 180–183
al-Kāndīhlawī, Muḥammad Zakariyyā 20
Ghansā bint Khīdām 226
al-Khārīṣī 22
Khārijīs 215
al-Kharrāt, Kāmil Muḥammad 138

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INDEX

al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr 10
al-Khaṭṭābī, Abū Sulaymān Hamd b. Muhammad 173, 174–175
al-Khāzīn 205
al-Khudrī 189
al-Khurasānī, Ghāda 222
al-Khužā’ī 186
al-Kindī, Abū Yūsuf 23
Kitāb al-ʿAdāb (“Book of Manners”) 40
Kitāb al-ʿAfaẓ (“The Book of Words”) 36
Kitāb al-Amr bi-l-Maʿrūf wa-l-Naḥy ʿan al-Munkar (“Book of Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong”) 129
Kitāb al-Bīr ʿr wa-l-Ṣila wa-l-ʿAdāb (“Book on Virtue, Maintaining the Ties of Kinship and Manners”) 40
Kitāb al-Farq Bayna al-Muṣannif wa-l-Sāriq (“Book on the Difference Between the Compiler and the Thief”) 207
Kitāb al-Khawlā wa-l-Tanaqqul fi l-ʿĪbāda wa-Darajāt al-ʿĀbidīn (“The Book of Seclusion and Movement in Worship, and the Levels of Worshippers”) 176
Kitāb al-Qabas (“The Book of Allusion”) 154
Kitāb al-Samāʾ wa-l-Wajd (“Book on Audition and Ecstasy”) 129
Kitāb al-Tawākkuṭ (“Book on Providence”) 134
Kitāb al-Tawhīd wa-l-Tawakkul (“Divine Unity and Reliance”) 134
Kitāb al-ʿUzla (“The Book of Seclusion”) 174
Kitāb ʿIshrat al-Nisāʾ (“Kind Treatment of Women”) 149
knowledge seeker (tālīḥ al-ḥadīth) 19
knowledge, sources of 282–291
knowledge, withholding of 189–193

Lacan, Jacques 248
Landolt, Hermann 178
legal categories in Shariʿa 13
Lisān al-ʿArab (“The Tongue of the Arabs”) 37, 204
livelihood and work, ethics of 129–131
Lucas, Scott C. 13
Luqmān the Wise 131
Mahmood, Saba 251
Makārim al-Akhlāq (“The Noblest Moral Character”) 40
al-Makki, Abū ʿṬalib 120, 126, 129, 136, 151, 258, 273, 292
al-Maktūb al-Īslāmī 138
male guardianship (wilāya) 225
male leadership (qiwāma) 225
Mālik b. Anas 42
al-Manār (“The Lighthouse”) 136
manner. See ʿadāb
al-Maqāṣīd al-Ḥasana (“The Good Purposes”) 149
Maqāyīs al-Lugha (“Analogical Templates of Language”) 36
al-Maqdisī, Diyar al-Dīn 17
March, Andrew 10
marriage 147–148, 151–153, 157, 161–162, 166, 225–226, 256
al-Marwāzī, Muḥammad b. Naṣr 148
Massignon, Louis 203
material world (dunyā) 152–153
matn 16, 43, 198, 200, 202, 204, 215–216
al-Mawāhib al-Ladunniyya (“The Divine Providences”) 150
al-mawrīth al-ʿarabī (Arab heritage) 10
Mawʿīzat al-Muʾminīn min Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn (“Exhortation of the Believers from the Iḥyāʾ”) 136
Maʿqūl b. Yaṣār 226
maʿrīfā (gnosis) 157
maʿruf (known or prescribed) 208–210
Medina 253
Mernissi, Fatima 221
Messick, Brinkley 263
Minḥāj al-ʿĀbidīn (“The Curriculum of Worshippers”) 177
Minḥāj al-ʿArifīn (“The Curriculum of the Gnostics”) 177
miracles (karāmāt) 160, 291
Misbāḥ al-Hidāya (“Lantern of Guidance”) 172
Miskawayh, Abū ʿAlī 23
misogyny 221
Moosa, Ebrahim 262, 264
moral exhortation (mawāʾiḍ) 16
Motzki, Harald 252

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INDEX

al-Sunan al-Kubrā ("The Great Sunnas"). See also ḥadīth collections 148
Sunan al-Nasāʾī ("The Traditions of al-Nasāʾī") 154
sunān (exemplary behaviour) 16
Sunna 17–18, 42–43
sustenance (qūt) 294
al-Suyūṭī, Jalal al-Din. See also the Sunan al-Nasāʾī ("The Deception of the Devil") 16, 19, 21, 37–38, 41, 154–155, 201, 205, 207, 212–213, 250, 256, 261
ṭabaqāt (Islamic biographical literature) 201–202
al-Ṭabarānī 22, 137, 149
al-Ṭabarānī, Muḥammad b. Jarīr 274–276
tābiʿūn (Companions’ companion) 204
Tabūk campaign 255
tadhhib al-nafs (disciplining the self) 14
Tahdhir al-Khwāsīn min Akadhīb al-Quṣṣās ("A Warning to the Retinue against the Lies of the Storytellers") 205
Ṭaḥrīr al-Marʿa fi ʿĀṣr al-Risāla ("The Liberation of Women at the Time of the Message") 222
Ṭakhrīr al-Ḥāʾid fi Suknā l-Bilād ("Giving People the Option to Live where they Choose") 179
Ṭakmīl al-Nuʿūt fi Luzūm al-Buyūt ("Perfecting Praiseworthy Qualities by Imposing Home-Seclusion") 171
Ṭalbīs Iblīs ("The Deception of the Devil") 128
al-Tanūkhī, Abū ʿAli 41
taste (dhaqw) 288
tawakkul 129, 132, 134–135, 141
tawḥīd 132
tawḥīd as tawakkul 132–135
al-Tawḥīdī, Abū Ḥayyān 42
al-Tawshiḥ ʿalā ʿI-Jamīʿ al-Ṣabīḥ ("The Strophic Work on the Authentic Collection") 37
al-Ṭayālīsī, Abū Dāwūd 133
Ṭaʿẓīm Qadr al-Salāt ("The Aggrandizement of the Status of Prayer") 148
Thābit 38
The Moral World of the Qurʾān 8
theoretical speculation (naẓār) 282–283
al-Tirmidhī 19, 22
al-Tirmidhī, al-Ḥakīm 21–22, 176, 277, 295
Tisdall, William 269
"tribulation" (fitna) 181
al-Ṭūfī 276, 278
ʿubādiyya (worship) 153
ukhūwwa 171, 181
ʿulāmāʾ-qusṣās dichotomy 198
ʿulām al-shariʿa (Islamic sciences) 1
ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb 131, 155, 224, 229–230, 233, 257
Umayyads 252–253
Umm Ḥarām 228
Umm Mushashir al-Anṣāriyya 226
Umm Qays 256
Umm Shurayk 226
unity (tawḥīd) 165
unsound ḥadīth (ḥadīth al-duʿāʾī) 21
uṣūl al-ḥadīth (sciences of ḥadīth) 19
al-ʿUthaymin, Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ 221
ʿUthmān 155
ʿuzla. See seclusion
al-ʿUzla wa-l-Infīrād ("Seclusion and Isolation") 174
Van Norden, Bryan W. 269
virtuous acts (fadāʾil al-ʿamāl) 120, 141
Wābiṣa b. Maʿbad 271–273, 277
wahdat al-wujūd 156
Walzer, Richard 11
Wansbrough, John 204
Ware, Rudolph 209
al-Wasāyā ("The Commandments") 175
al-Waʿz al-Maṭlaḥī min Qāt al-Qulūb ("The Required Exhortation from The Nourishment of the Hearts") 136
Weber, Max 297
wisdom (ḥikma) 42
women 5–6, 147, 153, 157–159
and jihād 241
as fitna 242–243
humanity (insānīyya) of women 223–224
liberation 234–235
meeting and touching men 242
Muslim ideal of 221–222
women (cont.)
  praying in mosque  241
  religiosity of  233
  roles in public activities in early Islam  234
  sexuality in Islam  235
  travelling  244
  working outside the house  227
wuţūd (existence)  163
Wuthnow, Robert  251

ţāhir. See outer
al-Zamakhshārī  149
Zayd b. Thābit  131
Zaynab bint Jahsh  149, 226, 228
Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh  138
al-Zuhd al-Kabīr ("The Major Epistle on Asceticism")  176
zuhd. See asceticism
al-Zuhd wa-l-Raqā‘īq  174