Levi-Strauss’s ideas about ‘sociétés à maison’, or ‘House’ societies, were introduced as a means of resolving a number of impenetrable problems in the analysis of a particular kind of amorphous kinship group in a broad array of societies, spanning Europe, aboriginal North America, and Indonesia. Its application has become so widespread in its various senses that the editors of a recent collection of essays, About the house, concluded: ‘In the end the problem is not one of discovering which societies are “house societies” but of discovering which ones are not’ (Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995:18). The breadth of application of the concept has given a new impetus to the study of social organization in the Indonesian archipelago, but in so doing, the concept faces the danger of becoming too unwieldy to offer incisive analysis (Waterson 1995:68). It was suggested in an earlier collection of papers that the noble institution (as in the ‘House of Windsor’) should be capitalized to distinguish it from its alternate meaning, a ‘dwelling place’ (Sellato 1987:196). This helpful suggestion has been only inconsistently followed.

Ironically, I suggest that the H(h)ouse concept can be clarified with an equally ambiguous term, ‘E(e)state’. In one sense, ‘Estate’ (upper case) is synonymous with the German word ‘Stand’, and refers to a ranked social category of persons in a system of such categories (Rousseau 1978:85). The word, like the House concept, is derived from Europe’s feudal past; most of the examples of ‘sociétés à maison’ cited by Levi-Strauss, with the exception of the Kwakiutl Indians of the northwest coast of Canada, were feudal. This has led some to confuse feudalism with hierarchy in asking whether hierarchy was an essential feature of House societies (see, for example, Waterson 1995:53-4). However, the common thread running through all of these examples is, rather, that they were stratified by Estates. The conflation of ranked Estate with economic class has helped obscure the special kinship dynamic of House societies.

Albert Schrauwers is Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology at York University and holds a PhD from the University of Toronto. He is the author of Colonial ‘reformation’ in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, 1892-1995, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000, and ‘The benevolent colonies of Johannes van den Bosch: Continuities in the administration of poverty in the Netherlands and Indonesia’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 43-2, 2001, pp. 298-328. Professor Schrauwers may be contacted at the Department of Anthropology, Vari Hall, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON, Canada M3J 1P3.
The word ‘estate’ (lower case) also has a secondary connotation, that of ‘inalienable goods’, a familial inheritance of sacred objects, which is a core feature of Lévi-Strauss’s original formulation of the House concept. It is important to underscore that ‘inalienable goods’ acquire their power to create social difference precisely through their owners’ ability to withhold them from their exchange networks (Weiner 1992).

I will argue that the kinship systems of both noble House and commoner kindreds are broadly similar (as noted by Geertz and Geertz (1975) in the Balinese case), but that the exchange system by which the two are linked is used to prevent commoners from acquiring an estate of the kinds of inalienable goods by which a House is defined; lacking such an estate, they are prevented from asserting their social difference (that is noble Estate). E(e)state thus serves to link hierarchy to the House; it is in relation to their estate – or lack of it – that a social category of persons define themselves and their House. Such social categories of people approximate emerging classes, but are not synonymous with them. This can be seen most clearly in the case of slavery, where one Estate forms the estate of another. Since the estate is the crucial defining feature of one’s class and Estate, a variety of structurally incompatible kinship strategies may be bent pragmatically to the purpose of maintaining its inalienability. In other words, House ideology is a malleable strategy which serves to preserve social difference and legitimate class through the preservation of the inalienable property of one group, while denying it to another.

Bloch (1995) has described a similar situation in the Merina kingdom of Madagascar, where the encompassing royal House identified itself with the kingdom at large as a means of distinguishing itself, and preventing the formation of a House ideology among its potentially competitive subordinates. Of interest, then, are the particular means by which such ‘encompassing Houses’ establish hierarchy, monopolize ‘House’ ideology, and leave their subordinates with ‘kinship’ instead. It is, I believe, this situation which Lévi-Strauss attempted to capture when he described the noble House as a solution to the problems of societies where political and economic interests had not yet ‘overstepped the old ties of blood’ and where class divisions were still represented in a pre-class ideology of shared descent and alliance.

The remainder of this article will dwell on the relationship of ‘H(h)ouse’ to ‘E(e)state’ among the various groups of ‘Toraja’ in central Sulawesi (broadly defined).1 At the turn of the twentieth century, most of the members of these diverse groups were nominal subjects of the Bugis kingdom of Luwu’, whose capital of Palopo lay on the north end of the Bay of Bone. Luwu’ was regarded

1 The province of Central Sulawesi includes only the north half of the centre part of the island. The area described in this article includes parts of the province of South Sulawesi.
Map 1. Kruyt's division of the East, West and South Toraja (adapted from Kruyt 1931)
as the cradle of Bugis civilization, although the Bugis made up only a small proportion of the kingdom’s population (Van Braam Morris 1889:531). These groups were originally divided into three major ethnic categories, the ‘East’, ‘West’, and ‘South’ Toraja by Dutch ethnographers and colonial officials for reasons of administrative efficiency (Schrauwers 1998); only the ‘South’ Toraja retain the ethnonym today (Map 1). ‘To Pamona’ is the anachronistic name now given to a large number of highland traditional law communities amalgamated as the ‘East Toraja’. As will be seen, this cluster of diverse peoples varied in important ways, particularly in the institutionalization of slavery. The To Pamona of Central Sulawesi, one of those apparently rare groups which are not a ‘House society’, were nonetheless encompassed within a more hierarchical House-based polity. Their inability to achieve ‘Househood’ points to the importance of the dual meanings of this previously underemphasized characteristic of ‘sociétés à maison’: the role of inalienable goods (an estate) in establishing social difference (Estate) and hence political power.

_Lévi-Strauss on the House_

Given the variety of interpretations of Lévi-Strauss’s sparse writings on House societies, it is necessary to restate what are perhaps his most succinct statements on the subject. A House, he writes, is:

A corporate body holding an estate made up of both material and immaterial wealth, which perpetuates itself through the transmission of its name, its goods and its titles down a real or imaginary line considered legitimate as long as this continuity can express itself in the language of kinship or of affinity and, most often, of both (Lévi-Strauss 1983:194).

There are three features of this definition of the House which I would like to underscore. The first is that the House is a corporate body (moral person) holding an estate made up of both material and immaterial goods. The phrase ‘inalienable possessions’ as utilized by Annette Weiner (1992) captures the unique characteristics of the real and symbolic capital which comprises such an estate. In the property system of feudal Europe, for example, such ‘inalienable possessions’ were referred to as ‘immovable property’, and contrasted with ‘movables’ which could be exchanged. Drawing on Mauss’s seminal ideas, Weiner argues that the inalienability of such objects derives from the impartability of persons and particular kinds of things in ‘archaic’ societies; the House, as a particular kind of ‘moral person’, is similarly fetishized in a collection of objects which are imbued with the social identity of the group. The estate thus provides an alternate metaphor for the social ‘body’, replacing ‘blood’ in defining the social identity of the kinship group.
Such goods recapitulate the origins of the group, and are distinguishable by their absolute value; like crown jewels, they are irreplaceable, and hence withheld from exchange.

The persistence of a House is thus predicated upon the degree to which it can maintain the inviolability of its estate and its 'cosmological authentica-
tion' – its symbolic linkage with the estate's origins. In western Europe, it is
the pastoral estate with its manor house which differentiated those of noble standing from those who were not. The manor house came, as Lévi-Strauss
(1987:155) argues, to fetishize the continuity of the larger inalienable estate.
This is his sole interest in the dwelling place. Nowhere in his discussions of
the House does he elaborate on the symbolic or architectural features of the
dwelling place (Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995:12), as is characteristic of the
more recent work on House societies; as a result, recent work frequently con-
fuses houses for Houses. There is, however, no reason that the dwelling place
rather than some other part of the estate should serve this function. So many
of those analysed as 'House' societies, do not, in fact, appear to utilize the
dwelling space as the cardinal metaphor for their group; the Iban, to cite one
example, speak of hearths rather than dwellings.² Errington (1983), in turn,
focuses upon the importance of regalia in the Centrist Houses of the kingdom
of Luwu'. Regalia include such disparate objects as knives, flags, porcelain
and sometimes bodily remains, whose value lies in their being 'placeholders',
the material support for the ineffable spiritual potency of the founding
ancestors who descended from the sky. We must question, then, why we
persist in using the essentially western metaphor of house for Houses, which
only encourages this confusion; it could be that our imposition of a western
metaphor obscures more than it helps, a problem which mere capitalization
will not resolve.

The third point I would like to underscore is the unequivocal need for con-
 tinuity of the estate. The 'moral person' of the House ideally transcends time,
and in particular, the death of its members; transcending death, however,
requires fetishes of a long-lasting nature. While such fetishes are easily manu-
factured, their legitimacy depends upon their transmission through time, a
process which transforms them into 'placeholders' for the founding ancestors.
Continuity is of such a high priority that the kinship rules by which the estate
is transmitted can be considered conditional, at best. It is the very diversity
of kinship principles utilized to maintain the estate through time which Lévi-
Strauss (1983:184) sought to explain through the House concept:

patrilineal descent and matrilineal descent, filiation and residence, hypergamy and
hypogamy, close marriage and distant marriage, heredity and election: all these

² The Iban are a problematic case in that some argue hearths are the fetish of Houses, others
the padi pun, or sacred rice.
notions which usually allow anthropologists to distinguish the various known types of society, are united in the house, as if, in the last analysis the spirit (in the eighteenth-century sense) of this institution expressed an effort to transcend, in all spheres of collective life, theoretically incompatible principles.

This theoretical confusion between structural kinship principles and the features of the House can be clarified with Bourdieu’s useful distinction (1977:36) between formal and practical kinship. The House is such a paradox because these formal kinship principles are strategically invoked with the practical aim of maintaining inalienable estates and hence hierarchical standing, and not because it is the product of these structural rules.

In an early article, ‘Marriage strategies as strategies of social reproduction’, which predates the literature on the House, Bourdieu (1972:117) describes the peasants of Bearn in the Pyrenees, who ‘ensure the reproduction of their lineage and their rights to the means of production’ through marital strategies which have a ‘marked statistical regularity’ but which should not be viewed as ‘the result of obedience to fixed rules’. The case described by Bourdieu bears striking similarity to those characterized as ‘sociétés à maison’ by Lévi-Strauss. But where Lévi-Strauss focuses upon the House’s lack of formal regularity, Bourdieu highlights the implicit logic of social reproduction required to maintain the continuity of the estate. ‘Contradictions’ of the ‘rule’ represent unusual situations requiring innovative marriage strategies. Unlike Lévi-Strauss, Bourdieu (1972:118) argues that it is practical kinship needs, rooted in production and reproduction of the House, which account for the ‘by no means necessarily compatible’ strategies utilized for the ‘transmittal of the undiminished patrimony and the maintaining of the family’s social and economic position’.

Bourdieu’s discussion of the practical considerations of social reproduction highlights the uncertainties of the transmittal of the House’s estate and the challenges which must be overcome to ensure its continuity. While it is relatively easy to fashion a long-lasting fetish, I would argue that the significance of this object lies in its being an emblem of the resources through which the group reproduces itself, and not simply in its being a symbol of group identity. The strategic use of at times contradictory kinship principles to ensure the continuity of the House is, in this view, secondary to the existence of an estate to transmit. Where an estate is composed primarily of symbolic rather than real capital, how do we assess the continuity and exclusivity of that estate over time? What prevents its appropriation, its dilution, or simply its being forgotten? Weiner (1992) refers to such situations as ‘the defeat of hierarchy’. This issue is rarely addressed explicitly in the literature, where inheritance strategies are generally treated in ideal, formal terms, the continuity of the House assumed rather than its failures recounted. If teknonomy
is considered future oriented, an expression of an as yet unassured hope of persistence, and if genealogical amnesia is a characteristic of the Centrist Archipelago, how do we assess the continuity of the House? What, indeed, constitutes continuity? How many generations must an estate survive before we can assure ourselves of a House’s ability to socially reproduce itself?

I will argue that the ‘encompassing House’ is predicated upon the monopolization of the types of inalienable goods needed to form the core of a House’s estate and that it does so through competitive exchange systems not unlike the Potlatch of the Kwakiutl. Their ability to engage in these exchanges and ‘win’, thus depriving others of their ‘Househood’, depends upon the possession of larger material estates. In turn, the exchange of these elite goods grants access to the resources which form the inalienable estate (regalia) of the House. It is only these elite groups who show continuity, usually well documented despite the general tendency to genealogical amnesia. House and estate are thus inextricably intertwined in ways which discussions of dwelling places alone do not capture.

Why the To Pamona don’t have Houses

Shelly Errington (1989) argues that the cognatic Houses of the kingdom of Luwu’ were ‘server groups’ for regalia – the sacred goods associated with the divine beings who founded the realm. The regalia remained with the highest ranked member of the server group, the member with the ‘whitest blood’ who formed the ‘navel’. Members of the server group were responsible for providing goods and services to the holder of the regalia to meet specific ritual needs. This individual would also arrange endogamous marriages within the server group to maintain its coherence, to tie particular lines back into the more immediate family of the title holder. These arranged marriages followed no fixed kinship rule, but were, rather, a strategy for strengthening and maintaining the alliances within the descent group.

Similar marital strategies were pursued by the To Pamona. However, the kinship groups of the To Pamona had no ranked centre and no enduring regalia or estate to objectify their constituent alliances. I have characterized the constituent ‘corporate kinship groups’ of the To Pamona as ‘proto-Houses’ elsewhere (Schrauwers 1997). The proto-House attempted to establish a political ‘centre’, to assert their Househood and hence relations of absolute rank, but ultimately broke into smaller egalitarian units tied only by ritual exchanges during feasts. It failed to maintain its cohesion as a House because feasting and the exchange of elite goods by which individual status was established, a political centre defined, and the kinship group tied together, dissipated the communal estate of the group. Unlike the regalia of Luwu’, the elite goods
which made up the To Pamona estate were exchange goods (movable property), rather than inalienable possessions (immovable property).

Around 1900, the To Pamona were egalitarian swidden cultivators. That is, the To Pamona had neither ranked standings, nor landed estates (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14). Their estates consisted, rather, of elite goods such as cattle and imported cotton cloth, which were used in ritual exchanges only. They lived half the year in their isolated field huts, and the other half in nucleated hamlets centred around a village temple (lobo). The village temple was utilized for rituals associated with head-hunting and secondary funerals at which the exchange of these elite goods took place; these rituals brought villagers together both for their performance, and also for their mutual protection from other similarly aggressive groups. The temple was also home to the spirits of the village founders (anitu), who established and guarded its customs (adat); it is thus comparable to the kahyangan tiga temples of the Balinese by which the desa adat, the ‘customary law’ community, is defined (Geertz and Geertz 1975:14). The lobo was not a H(h)ouse, just as kahyangan tiga temples were different from the origin-temple of a Balinese dadia (House). Unlike the Balinese, the dwelling places of the To Pamona were not named, were not the site of ancestor-focused ritual, and did not display the continuity essential for the formation of a House. Apart from the lobo there were no other ancestor-focused origin-temples.

Potentially, there are two types of intertwined ‘kinship groups’ which could be considered Houses. The first, the santina, was a group which included ‘close’ relatives up to third cousins. The santina was the kinship equivalent of the Luwu’ House, except that its regalia and hence its hierarchical ‘centre’ was absent. The santina was defined by common descent from an apical ancestor (usually a sibling set); this divided ego’s kindred into numerous non-unilinear descent groups among whom he/she could claim membership. These santina, like the Luwu’ House, were an ‘occasional’ kinship group who came together on specific occasions, marriages and funerals, to fulfil specific exchange obligations (to mosintuwu). The santina was ideally corporate (that is, a moral person), holding an inheritance of elite exchange goods in common, although rarely so in practice (resembling, rather, a dispersed kindred). It is precisely those occasions which brought the santina together, which dissipated its estate or centre, through their exchange obligations. The santina thus lacks the essential continuity by which a House is able to transcend death, and perpetuate the kinship group as a ‘moral person’.

The second type of ‘corporate kinship group’ was a constituent unit of the

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3 As noted earlier, the To Pamona are an ethnic amalgamation of a number of adat communities which differed in a number of important respects, most pertinently, in terms of institutionalized slavery. The egalitarian model of the To Pamona described here is representative of groups such as the To Pebato, and the To Wingke mPoso (among whom I did most of my fieldwork).
santina. This, the proto-House, consisted of a descendant sibling set (to saana, children of one mother) and their families, who shared an undivided inheritance of exchange goods (panta ndapojuyu). Such property remained undivided and was managed by the matrifocal stem family for several generations on behalf of its non-resident male kin (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14, 1:151-3). Among some groups of To Pamona the matrifocal core of the group was co-resident in a longhouse (banua). This estate-owning longhouse, I would argue, forms the core of a ‘proto-House’. Figure 1 attempts schematically to present the process by which this ‘proto-House’ seeks to incorporate its wider santina through ‘centripetal marriage alliances’ in the same manner as the Luwu’ House. It represents the santina of a single apical ancestor through time. Ego, when a junior, was a member of a proto-House which owned a shared inheritance of elite goods controlled by his grandparents, and whose ownership was limited to his first and second cousins (represented by the upper box). By the time Ego has become a senior (represented by the lower box), the corporate group’s shared inheritance has been dispersed (most likely utilized in the secondary funeral of Ego’s grandparents). The shared inheritance of his deceased parents forms the basis for a descendant proto-House, linking those who, at the most junior generation, are second cousins. The proto-House thus has no

Figure 1. A santina (Ego is shown in black)

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Adriani 1932:36. Kruyt’s description of the ‘communal group’ is far less precise. He refers to this group as ‘family’, or ‘maagschap’, the literal translation, in Dutch, of the Pamonan word ‘kasangkompo’ (of one womb). The word refers to those of shared descent, usually including third cousins and beyond, if the tie is remembered.
house, estate and class

continuity, but breaks up into a *santina* over time; it, no less than the *santina*, is unable to transcend death or perpetuate the group. Longhouses themselves also had a relatively short life, the building falling into disrepair and its members dispersing around their own matrifocal cores.

Although the proto-House lacks the essential continuity of a House, it should be equally apparent that related proto-Houses seek to maintain their alliances in the absence of a fetish. Related proto-Houses within the wider *santina* maintained their ties through exchanges at feasts, and through the renewal of marriage alliances. Centripetal marriage, like those practised by Luwu’ Houses, ensured that recently divided proto-Houses re-established their alliances within their *santina* (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14, I:153). The *santina* was an ideally endogamous group; the closest permissible marriage (with payment of a fine) was with a second cousin (which would preserve a common inheritance). If second cousins were members of a single corporate group, the marriage of third cousins can be seen to rejoin two proto-Houses which had only recently divided in the previous generation. The key figures in re-establishing these centripetal marriages were the members of the senior living generation who possess the genealogical knowledge necessary to make a strategic alliance. These senior figures would include Ego and his cousins, who at one time were members of a single corporate group, but whose descendants (now third cousins) are not. The *santina* thus represents both a source of bridewealth as well as the ideal source of a spouse.

These senior members of the *santina*, no longer members of an enduring corporate group, maintained their ties through exchanges (*posintuwu*) of the elite goods such as cotton cloth, water buffalo and brass trays which they had once owned in common. These elite goods had ritual functions during marriage and secondary funerals. In each case, the gift of these elite goods constituted the kinship tie, reaffirming that the participants were *santina* even if the majority of its members could no longer remember the exact genealogical tie. The continued exchange of these gifts (*posintuwu*) was also a sign that the exchange partners were living in harmony (*mosintuwu*), thus establishing an important political relationship between otherwise autonomous villages. The *santina* can thus be contrasted with Errington’s conception (1983) of the Centrist House in Luwu’ in that it was not a ‘House’ centred around the highly ranked custodians of an immovable estate but was, rather, an exchange group within which goods constantly circulated. Whereas in the encompassing House some prestige goods were ‘inalienable possessions’, withheld from exchange and hence able to symbolize the social difference between standings (Estates), the *santina* ultimately dissipated its estate through ‘Big Man’ (*kabosenya*) status competitions predicated upon giving more than they received. Their fame was unfortunately short-lived, and dependent upon continuing exchanges; it was never a definitive assertion of standing rather than status.
These ‘Big Man’ status competitions took place during secondary funeral feasts in the village temple. The size of the feast was determined by the deceased’s exchange network, thus indicating the breadth of their alliances. In celebrating a secondary funeral for such an individual, those who demonstrated harmonious relations through attendance and material contributions established their santina as a group, with the deceased as the apical ancestor (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14, II:118-21). An obvious parallel can be drawn with the secondary funerals typical of the Sa’dan Toraja highlands (Volkman 1985:83-115). In the Toraja feast, the greater one’s material and organizational contribution to the feast, the higher one’s status, and the greater the debts created for eventual repayment. Similarly, in the highlands around Lake Poso, each feast had a host, usually the proto-House of the deceased, whose leader organized the building of the feast huts for the guests, the slaughtering and cooking, and oversaw the performance of the ritual. In organizing the ritual, the leader of that proto-House, its kabosenya (‘Big One’, male or female), demonstrated that they were able to fulfil the exchange obligations of the deceased. The demonstration of this ability was cardinal to the survival of the santina thus established, as a group.

The santina established at the secondary funeral had to have its ties periodically renewed through these rotating exchanges since the group lacked a corporate symbol of its continuity. These ties are forgotten by those of descending generations if their ‘Big One’ did not maintain exchanges with more distant relatives; a stingy ‘Big One’ found his family shrank over time through ‘genealogical amnesia’ (Geertz and Geertz 1975:85-94). If, however, the ‘Big Ones’ maintained relations with a broad network of relatives throughout their lifetime, and continued exchange relations with the proto-Houses of their second, third and fourth cousins, these latter will attend the ‘Big One’s’ secondary funeral, and recognize their ties as santina. The funeral, however, will be organized by one of their children who must demonstrate the abilities by which their parent became prominent: organizational ability and generosity (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14, I:117-8). Such a demonstration of ability was essential, since the inheritance of the santina, which tied the deceased’s first and second cousins together, may be used up in performing the onerous demands of the funeral. Referring to Figure 2, the secondary funeral is the moment at which the proto-House, as defined by Ego as a junior, was reduced to the proto-House when Ego is a senior. The extended ties to those who are the deceased’s first and second cousins (once members of the deceased’s proto-House) are now maintained through ritual exchanges only. In establishing an apical ancestor for the santina, its very centre (its inheritance of powerful goods) is dissipated. Yet because of genealogical amnesia, this ancestor soon becomes one of the nameless ancestors whom younger generations do not know, and cannot trace ancestry to. These ties will only be
remembered through the exchange network maintained by Ego.

The failure of the proto-House to maintain its continuity was tied to its need to pour all of its resources into its exchange relations to attain political coherence and individual leadership status. That is, leadership was the ephemeral product of status competitions, of exchange, and this directly undermined the establishment of permanent E(e)states; the proto-House was unable to keep any of its elite goods back, and without an immovable estate, it could not establish its permanent difference in rank from any of the other similar groups in To Pamona society. The failure to establish Househood is thus also a failure to establish an Estate system. Without an enduring estate rooted in the group’s origins, no perennial differences between categories of people could be drawn. This point is more easily made through comparison with the South Toraja highlands.

The tongkonan, a South Toraja House

I have argued that the To Pamona proto-House was a structural transformation of the encompassing House of Luwu’ as described by Errington (1983). Trapped in exchange relations by which political status was established, it squandered its elite goods, its communal estate which defined its kinship centre. I would like to contrast this dynamic with a second case, that of the Sa’dan or South Toraja, whose tongkonan is the archetype of the noble House described by Lévi-Strauss. Culturally, there are many similarities between the South and East Toraja, such as the importance of secondary funeral feasts already noted. To a large extent, they shared a common cosmology, and widely similar shamanic and head-hunting traditions. Kinship in both societies is cognatic, and they shared a teknonymic system which encouraged genealogical amnesia. Importantly, they differed in their agricultural practices and in their degree of stratification. The Sa’dan Toraja cultivated wet-rice fields, or sawah, which were largely owned by noble Houses. Commoners may also have owned some land, but many survived by working the land of nobles (Nooy-Palm 1979:44). The last Estate, that of slaves, were owned by nobles. Unlike the To Pamona, Sa’dan Toraja society is thus marked by a confluence of landed estates, symbolically significant dwelling places (houses), an Estate system and Houses.

Despite these differences, Sa’dan Toraja society can be viewed as yet another variation of the To Pamona proto-House and the Luwu’ encompassing House. Only a minority of Sa’dan Toraja dwelling places served as the symbolically significant ritual centre of an extended, cognatic kin group (marapuan). The marapuan was similar in structure and breadth to the santina (Nooy-Palm 1979:22-8). However, at its centre each marapuan had a tongko-
the dwelling house founded by its ancestors. The ceremonies performed in the tongkonan were referred to as ‘smoke rising’ rituals and were associated with the generation of life. The ‘smoke rising’ rituals associated with the House can be contrasted with the ‘smoke descending’ rituals associated with the secondary funeral, slaves, ritual exchanges and the slaughter of buffalo. That is, the ritual focal point of To Pamonan society, the secondary funeral, is ideologically subordinated while retaining a central, oppositional role within Sa’dan Toraja life. Although celebrated for its life-giving properties, the tongkonan, like the To Pamonan proto-House, is the major participant in the jousting for status associated with secondary funerals. Importantly, such jousting among the Sa’dan Toraja translates not simply as status, but also as control over the estate of the House and rank.

Membership in a marapuan, like the santina, was calculated by cognatic ascent; what was of importance was the ability to demonstrate a line (through either affinal or consanguinal links) connecting the individual with its noble founders (Waterson 1995:55). Given the general genealogical amnesia then prevailing, such links, as in the Balinese dadia, frequently involved little more than a demonstration that one’s parents or grandparents were members. Membership in the marapuan carried ritual responsibilities towards the owners of the marapuan’s tongkonan, and established a network of patronage through which access to land and workers was gained. It can be contrasted with possession of the actual dwelling and estate by the titleholder, which was inherited through descent, usually in the male line (Nooy-Palm 1979:26-7). That is, while marapuan membership is inclusive, consisting ideally of all descendants of the founders, inheritance of the estate (including the tongkonan) is exclusive, aimed at limiting the rights of other claimants. Without these principles of exclusion, the estate – and hence standing – would disappear. The principal means by which other claimants were excluded is the secondary funeral and its attendant ritual exchanges of elite goods, the ‘politics of meat’.

The exchanges which took place during the secondary funeral were the means by which ownership of the tongkonan and an estate of wet-rice fields was determined. Rights of inheritance were conditional, gained through the exchange of elite goods much like those used by the To Pamona in their secondary funerals. Full children of a titleholder had rights of inheritance of fields in proportion to the number of cattle they slaughtered at the secondary funeral of their parents (Nooy-Palm 1979:39-40). They thus engaged in a ‘politics of meat’ in which they invested cattle in the secondary funerals of their affinal kin, and reclaimed these debts at the secondary funeral of their parent (Nooy-Palm 1979:27). A generous noble would invest cattle widely, thus allowing him to compete with his siblings for as large a share of the familial estate as possible. The exchange of movable property thus made the preservation of an immovable estate possible. The more that was given, the
greater the share of immovable property retained. Weiner (1992) refers to this paradoxical phenomenon as ‘keeping-while-giving’.

These strategies were not uniformly followed across the various Estates, which again highlights the possibility of failure, that some Houses were unable to maintain their continuity. Those commoners who possessed land could lose effective control over it during the secondary funeral. Nobles were permitted to contribute cattle to the secondary funerals of their dependants, and so received a share of the commoner estate (Nooy-Palm 1979:40). The nobles were entitled to the use of this land for the remainder of their life, after which it reverted to the original commoner tongkonan. Their use of the land, however, improved their ability to accumulate both followers and cattle through the production of greater surpluses which could be used to gain a larger share of their own tongkonan’s estate.

These differences between Estates are also seen in the marital strategies pursued; these differences are not the product of structural rules, but as Bourdieu first pointed out in a different context, the manipulation of these rules with the practical intention of maintaining the estate. A common practice among nobles was first-cousin marriage, despite the considerable fine which had to be paid. Such a transgression of the traditional ‘norm’ only made sense when viewed in reference to the aim of consolidating the land ownership of a tongkonan (Nooy-Palm 1979:32). The payment of a fine, usually in cattle, prevented lower standings from utilizing this strategy. It demonstrates the same pattern as the secondary funeral sacrifices, however, in that the giving of cattle increases one’s share of an inalienable estate.

Another common tactic of nobles eager to gain a hold over their tongkonan’s estate was to take a second wife from a lower Estate. Although titles were generally inherited in the male line, one’s standing was determined by one’s mother (Nooy-Palm 1979:26-7). Thus, all the children of a slave mother would be slaves, with no rights of inheritance (Nooy-Palm 1979:48). The children of a second wife could thus provide the manpower required to work the expanded land holdings consolidated through the first marriage, and the ‘borrowing’ of commoner land. They also served to enlarge the estate itself, since slaves became the property of the tongkonan. These familial retainers produced absolute surpluses which could be expropriated and invested in the ‘politics of meat’ so as to strengthen the noble’s claim to his own tongkonan’s land.

The Sa’dan Toraja marapuan and the To Pamona santina can be seen as structural permutations of each other. Both shared a common cognatic kinship system which recognized the same degrees of siblingship, a teknonymic naming system which encouraged genealogical amnesia, and a practice of ‘centripetal marriage’ which sought to renew old alliances with those still recognized as ‘siblings’ (cousins). The Houses of the Sa’dan Toraja possessed
an estate which they sought to maintain through the ‘politics of meat’ at secondary funerals, through close marriage, and through marriage with slaves. The tongkonan, the inalienable estate, was associated with religious rites of life which symbolized its eternal continuity, linking ancestors with the descendants which the teknonyms made the focus of the kinship system. This served to ideologically subordinate the exchange of alienable goods such as cattle during secondary funerals, symbolically associated with slaves and death, through which access to the estate was gained. The tongkonan, associated with life and the origins of the community, established social difference, and hence hierarchy (an Estate system).

The proto-Houses of the To Pamona, in contrast, had no estate to preserve. Lacking an estate to form the centre of a House, they were faced with a different kinship challenge: maintaining the alliances between the various proto-Houses within the santina through distant-cousin marriage, and preserving the remembrance of these alliances through further exchanges. The necessity of these further exchanges undermined attempts to maintain a communal estate of elite goods, and hence the santina disintegrated under the weight of genealogical amnesia. Lacking an estate, these proto-Houses could not establish enduring social differences, and hence the status acquired through feasting failed to establish any permanent differences in Estate. The same strategies were pursued to the same ends by both the Sa’dan Toraja and the To Pamona, but very different outcomes ensued.

Class and Estates

I have described what is, in fact, a confused and heterogeneous situation in each of these two groups in terms of ideal-type, polar oppositions, so as to clarify the dynamics of what I perceive to be two sides of the same coin. That is, the proto-Houses of the To Pamona, like the lower standings of more hierarchical societies like the Sa’dan Toraja, were struggling to assert their Househood, while noble Houses faced the constant challenge of preventing their decline into mere proto-Houses through the dissolution of their estates. The success or failure of these proto-Houses in establishing any continuity depended upon particular kinds of resources (movable goods) which they had at their disposal. Their access to inalienable goods, such as land in the case of the Sa’dan Toraja, was dependent upon their participation in ritual exchanges during secondary funerals, described here as the ‘politics of meat’; ironically, the more elite goods (movable property) like cattle exchanged, the greater the House’s ability to retain its other, inalienable possessions like land or slaves.

These ideal, polar oppositions have not been described with the aim of
creating a new kinship category, the proto-House, which can be utilized to further categorize the kinship systems of the Centrist Archipelago. I do not believe that a positive definition of the proto-House can be given; it is, above all, a shadow of the noble institution, struggling to acquire similar coherence and continuity. I have defined this concept in terms of what it is not. It is clearly a structural transformation of the centrist House as it is found among the Sa'dan Toraja and the Bugis noble Houses of Luwu'. The point is, rather, to underscore the common dynamic of both kinship systems, and so highlight the centrality of estates, hierarchy and exchange to an analysis of complex Southeast Asian state systems. Leach (1964) describes a similar common dynamic among the diverse groups of Kachin highlanders in Burma which sought, unsuccessfully, to emulate the Shan states. The various To Pamona groups, like the equally diverse Kachin, are part of a single political system linking them to the House-based polities of groups like the Sa’dan Toraja and Luwu’. However, unlike Leach, I argue that this common political dynamic is not the product of formal kinship rules; rather, it arises out of the strategic competition over material and symbolic resources.

The Sa’dan case in particular points to the importance of class relations in the development of House ideology out of a pre-class ideology of shared descent and alliance as among the To Pamona. Inalienable property, in this case an estate of land vested in the tongkonan, is of central importance in establishing the class relations lying behind the Estate system. As Marx noted, property is a reification, or fetish, of a relationship between people. The House and its estate thus serve to establish and symbolize the relationships between classes of people in Sa’dan society. Of importance, however, is the question of why class is expressed in an Estate system, and why such a system is based upon the attenuation of kinship and its replacement with a new idiom, that of the House, rather than blood, to symbolize group identity.

It is here that the To Pamona and West Toraja examples are instructive, in that here we find a co-relation between slavery and the emergence of Houses which clarifies the class contradiction that House ideology helps overcome. As noted above, the ideal-type model of To Pamona society developed here obscures a confused and heterogeneous situation. The To Pamona are a colonial amalgamation of a number of ‘traditional law’ (adat) communities which differed from each other in important respects. The relatively egalitarian political system described here was typical of the peoples living around Lake Poso and to the west of the Poso river. Those on the east shore of the river and in the Laa and Kaleana river valleys differed in two important respects – differences which ceased to have effect in the colonial period, hence the amalgamation of these groups into a single ethnic category by the Dutch (Schrauwers 1998). These latter groups differed from the egalitarian model described here in two important and related ways; each of these latter groups
had a distinct slave Estate, and had shifted from multiple-family longhouse dwellings to single-family dwellings.

Slave-owning groups such as the To Lage and the To Onda'e, like the more egalitarian groups around Lake Poso, were swidden cultivators who lacked landed property. The absence of landed property does not, however, preclude the development of class relations. Slaves through capture and inheritance, could themselves become an inalienable estate (which could be neither sold nor traded) for the proto-Houses of these stratified groups. Slaves, no less than the wet-rice fields of the tongkonan, are property. Importantly, when a proto-House defines itself around its estate of inalienable slaves, it simultaneously establishes an Estate system; slaves, an estate, are simultaneously a juridical Estate. Slavery thus provides the clearest link between an estate, Estates, class and Houses.

As among the Sa'dan Toraja, the system of slavery practised by these groups was open, allowing for a kinship-to-slavery continuum, rather than a radical disjuncture between categories (Watson 1980:9-12). Since marriage between Estates was possible, nobles, commoners and slaves flowed together in ways which allowed some of one’s descendants to fall within one category, and the rest in another. Slave standing was ascribed on the basis of one’s mother’s Estate; free men could marry slave women, their children all being slaves.\(^5\) As a result, the Estate system could not be legitimated in terms of differences in substance, that is blood, the primary metaphor of kinship among the cognatic To Pamona. The To Pamona viewed the father as the ‘seed’ from which the child sprouted; women were merely the ‘field’ by which which the ‘seed’ was brought to maturity (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14, II:42). The free father and his slave child thus shared the undeniable biological substance upon which kinship was recognized. The child could only be redeemed, its free status granted, through the payment of a fine by the father to his kin group. Since such slaves shared common ‘blood’ with their masters, and were ultimately able to transcend their ascribed Estate, their subjection had to be legitimated in alternate terms. It is this central contradiction which gives rise to ‘House ideology’ as an alternate vocabulary to ‘blood’ kinship. Kruyt noted that among the egalitarian To Pebato, debt-bondsmen referred to their masters as ‘\textit{papa}’, father, whereas among the Estate-stratified To Lage, inherited slaves referred to their masters as ‘\textit{pue}’, lord (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14, I:156).

It is in this context that I interpret the shift from multiple-family longhouses to single-family dwellings among the slave-holding groups. Faced with the problem of legitimating absolute differences in the Estates of masters and

\(^{\text{5}}\) Free women could not, however, marry slave men, as this would enable slave fathers to command free children.
slaves, but unable to do so in terms of blood, they have begun the process of vesting their group identity in alternate symbols which could express their sacred origin, their social difference. As I noted above, the kinship systems of both To Pamona and Sa’dan Toraja were inclusive; House ideology, in contrast, is based upon exclusion and the establishment of social difference within this inclusive field. And so we come full circle to the ‘encompassing House’, which seeks to establish hierarchy through its monopoly on ‘House’ ideology, leaving its subordinates with ‘kinship’ instead.

A critical process by which exclusive control of the proto-House’s estate of slaves is maintained within the inclusive field of kinship is, as among the Sa’dan Toraja, through the exchange of elite goods (movable property) like cattle, cotton cloth and the copper plates used in adat ritual, and as the medium for the payment of adat fines. As I have noted elsewhere (Schrauwers 1997), these elite goods were clearly associated with coastal kingdoms like Luwu, Mori, Parigi and Sigi, through whom they were acquired. Cattle were the basic unit (wia), for which imported cotton cloth served as a substitute (kamba) (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14, I:190). Men who married within their proto-House (a preferred marital strategy in the slave-holding groups) (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14, I:153), gained control of the proto-House’s slaves, thereby becoming its kabosenya, or Big One. They used these slaves to collect damar resins and rattan, which they traded on the coast for cotton cloth in greater amounts than otherwise possible for a single individual (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14, I:165). They used these stockpiles of cloth to pay the fines of their extended kin group, thus enlisting them as palili, or followers. Indebted individuals who failed to find a patron within their kin group risked becoming debt-bondsmen of outsiders, a step closer yet to slavery. The ‘price’ of a debt-bondsman was four cattle (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14, I:162). The kabosenya’s greater wealth in cattle and cotton cloth also made it easier for them to pay adat fines, thus excluding others from control of the proto-House’s estate of slaves; examples of these fines are the cotton cloth ‘paid’ a slave mother to claim her child, the head of cattle needed to marry a slave, or the one-cattle fine for marrying within the proto-House (thus allowing the man to remain within the matrifocal family which retained ownership of the slaves) (Magido 1987:20-2). The process which Weiner dubbed ‘keeping-while-giving’, the exchange of alienable ‘elite’ goods to maintain an ‘inalienable’ estate/Estate, would thus seem to be clearly in operation.

While not arguing for a necessary evolutionary progression (indeed, by trying to demonstrate its impossibility given the monopolizing nature of the ‘encompassing House’), it is nonetheless possible to discern all possible variations on these themes in the highlands of central Sulawesi. The complexity of House development (and its potential failure) can, for example, also be seen in the Lore valley of the West Toraja group (Kruyt 1938, I:191-308).
Inhabitants of the Lore valley had long adopted wet-rice cultivation despite the relatively high elevation. Although linguistically distinct from either To Pamona or Sa’dan Toraja, their social organization most closely resembled the To Lage and the To Onda’e with whom they were frequently at war, that is, a nascent chiefdom. They were unique, however, in that each village had a number of temples of two different types (Kruyt 1938, II:38-41). Several temples of the familiar lobo type could be found in each village; each of these ‘village’ temples served a ‘ward’ of the village. When Kruyt (cited in Kaudern 1925:358) asked the origin of these wards, he was told ‘the first inhabitants of the village gave their houses a name: when their families increased in number, they had to establish themselves in various houses, but each group of houses was still referred to by the name of the first house’. By the time of Kruyt’s visit, many of these wards could no longer support their own ‘village temple’, an indication of the lack of continuity of some of the original founding Houses. However, amongst the more prosperous of these village wards a second type of temple could also be found. In Napu, for example, a small number of slave-owning Houses had begun to ideologically elaborate the life-giving qualities of their dwelling spaces in a manner similar to the Sa’dan Toraja tongkonan. The To Napu thus retained both a village temple associated with head-hunting, as well as a limited number of ‘noble Houses’, sou eo, in which shamanic life-giving rituals took place. These sou eo were still relatively rare among the West Toraja, limited to those areas with a strong noble Estate. However, there is clearly a correlation between degree of social stratification and the elaboration of House ideology.

The To Napu and To Pamona examples underscore the point with which I began, that Estates are predicated upon the continuity of estates. The House is always in danger of dissolving into a mere proto-House as its control of inalienable wealth is whittled away by its exchange obligations. Slaves by their very nature cannot form Houses; but slave-owning groups may also fail to maintain their estates (of slaves) and thus lose their Estate. The Estate system is thus inherently unstable, tending to multiply the number of social categories (Kruyt 1895:120). The To Napu were thus stratified in three Estates: noble, commoner and slave. Proto-Houses do not become slaves simply because they are unable to maintain their estates, their Houses, and hence their Estate. Rather, as a mere proto-House, a commoner shadow of the noble House, they form a separate Estate. Class relations are thus captured within an Estate system, without being synonymous with it (Rousseau 1979).

The encompassing House in historical theoretical perspective
The encompassing House, predicated upon a system of Estates, the preservation of inalienable wealth, and competitive exchange of elite goods, seeks to monopolize House ideology, thus leaving its unsuccessful competitors with a shadowy imitation, lacking the exalted continuity which links nobles with their ancient origins. By couching my description in this way, I draw extensively on the work of E.R. Leach (1964) in *Political systems of Highland Burma*. Although using a different theoretical vocabulary, Leach (1964:159) similarly sought to underscore the paradoxical nature of the Kachin ‘lineage,’ which is ‘simultaneously segmentary [and hence egalitarian] and class stratified’. ‘As the process of lineage fission proceeds, there comes a point at which choice has to be made between the primacy of the principle of rank or the principle of kinship’ (Leach 1964:203). Aristocratic (gumsa) lineages vest their interests in rank rather than kinship, accumulating slaves, ritual wealth, and establishing their apartments within the longhouse as ritual centres. And yet, with this rank comes responsibility, the obligation to give more than they receive; this potent threat to their store of exchangeable elite goods ultimately causes their dissolution into more egalitarian gumsao forms. The oscillation between gumsa and gumsao forms resembles the dynamics of the ‘political systems of Highland Sulawesi’, where proto-Houses collapse, their continuity challenged by the weight of their exchange responsibilities.

Leach’s emphasis on dynamic change underscores the challenges faced by Kachin society in socially reproducing rank and class – and opened, for the first time, the prospect of structural paradox and failure. Here, I have attempted to demonstrate that meeting this challenge was dependent upon having the resources required to ensure continuity of the proto-House (Friedman 1975). On the one hand, this may appear overly materialistic, arguing, as Bloch (1975:220) has in the Madagascar case, that ‘theoretically, at least, the adaptation of the Zafimaniry kinship system into the Merina one is an almost automatic result of the type of property introduced as a result of settled agriculture’. However, the complexity of the To Pamona case amply shows that even swidden agriculturalists can be riven by class; class is introduced through the Estate system by which the slave Estate is simultaneously property (estate), standing (Estate), and class. The dividing line between the shadowy proto-House and the noble House lies not in the introduction of new agricultural techniques, but in the introduction of class.

All three of these examples, Sulawesi, Burma and Madagascar, are also similar in that, in straddling the class barrier, the formal kinship system remains essentially the same. It is for this reason I have emphasized that the proto-House cannot be defined as anything other than a structural transformation of the noble House. These structural transformations emerge, how-

And as the Kwakiutl example demonstrates, perhaps even hunter-gatherers as well.
ever, through the very insecurity of class privilege. While formal kinship remains the same, practical concerns rooted in production and social reproduction shape and mould the utilization of these principles. As Bloch (1975: 220) notes: 'The Zafimaniry had no preferential marriage rules; their de facto marriage pattern was produced by the concerns of ensuring mobility and building links for cooperation [for swidden agriculture]. As they change their marriage policy [as a result of shifting to irrigated rice production] they are only doing what they had done before: followed their own interests, which have changed as a result of their new concerns with land.' In other words, it is perfectly possible for relatively egalitarian peoples, in following their own interests, to subject themselves to a paradoxical hierarchy to which they may be ideologically opposed. It is this ideological struggle which ultimately gives rise to the elaboration of 'House' symbolism, a strategic rejection and reworking of egalitarian kinship principles.

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