International Law and Ocean Nuclear Power Plants in the Arctic

This article addresses the international law of ocean nuclear power plants (onpp s) with a particular focus on the Arctic. Encompassing norms under the law of the se a, maritime la w, environmental la w, nuclear energy law and humanitarian la w, the article discusses how existing fundamental legal regulations apply to onpps in the Arctic. Additionally, the legal role of some relevant institution s, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Maritime Organizatio n, and the Arctic Counci l, is considere d. While the military nuclearisation of the Arctic has been the subject of much scholarly concer n, the civil nuclearisation has not – at least not from an international law perspectiv e. International law provides States with a considerable degree of freedom when it comes to the development and deployment of onpps, but there are several challenges and legal gap s, not least regarding special legal regulations for the Arctic.


Introduction
Until recently, ocean nuclear power plants (onpps) seemed mostly a theoretical and futuristic vision.However, technical advances and major economic interests have contributed significantly to the potential of onpps.1 The Arctic, with its vast marine areas, sparsely populated coasts, and rising energy needs, seems a promising region for onpps.While the technical challenges are clearly many, States with prior experience with usage of nuclear power at sea are in a lead position.
Russia, with its history of nuclear icebreakers and submarines, was first to place an onpp in the Arctic.The Akademik Lomonosov was built in Saint Petersburg and towed in 2018 through the Gulf of Finland, across the Baltic Sea and along the Norwegian coast to Murmansk, where it was fully loaded before deployment in the city of Pevek some 5,000 kilometres further to the east.The project was criticised by environmental groups and caused some international concern.2However, Russia has stated that the project boosts the power supply in remote areas with dire development needs.For similar reasons, China has expressed an interest in deploying onpps in the disputed South China Sea.3 The concept of onpps raises many legal and broader conceptual questions relating to several fields of international law.Compared to land-based nuclear power, many legal issues arising from onpps are of specific character and a more transnational nature.The typical need for maritime transport means that more States and communities are affected, for example, the ones along whose coasts the power plant is being transported.The requirement for underwater cables also raises transnational issues.Furthermore, the marine environment is naturally interlinked and unknowing of any borders, making accidents and environmental hazards generally transboundary matters.
In the case of deployment in the Arctic, there is also the special Arctic dimensions -remoteness, harsh weather conditions, sensitive environment, global security issues -which raise special legal questions.For example, the Arctic Sea is the only ocean without a dedicated regional environmental organisation.Even though three binding international agreements have in recent years been concluded within the Arctic Council, it is indisputable that international cooperation concerning the Arctic remains challenging.4 In addition to navigational rights and other salient issues under the law of the sea, more specific maritime law instruments such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (solas Convention)5 and the Arctic Council agreements are relevant.6Moreover, the implications arising from nuclear energy law instruments such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety7 and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage must be considered.8Some relevant institutions include the Arctic Council, the International Maritime Organization (imo) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea).9This article aims to identify and discuss a number of international law obligations and concepts of key relevance to the prospect of onpps 10.1163/15718085-bja10161 | Leopardi The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 in the Artic.It does not seek to fully resolve every legal problem that may possibly arise with respect to onpps.Rather, it is meant to serve as a starting point for a more detailed and thorough analysis.
The legal research presented is based on international legal methodology encompassing international conventions, international custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions, and legal scholarship.Accordingly, the focus is to draw conclusions from already existing and published (legal) sources rather than to seek and compile new data.The main methodological challenge is rather to analyse, interpret, and understand how existing legal regulations interrelate and apply to onpps.

The Concept of Ocean Nuclear Power Plants
The concept of onpps is recent, and not much has been written about the implications under international law.10However, the concept of floating power plants has a notable history.For example, during the winter of 1929-1930, the aircraft carrier uss Lexington was used as a temporary emergency power plant for Tacoma, Washington, in the United States.The world's first power nuclear power barge, the Sturgis, was deployed in the Panama Canal Zone from the late 1960s.Several other locations in Latin America have experience with power plant vessels.
However, the Akademik Lomonsov is significant because it is the first nuclear power barge intended for serial production.11Equipped with two klt-40S reactor systems (compact icebreaker type, each with a 35 MWe capacity) the vessel is 144 metres long and 30 metres wide and has a displacement of 21,000 tons.It has quarters for a crew of roughly 70 persons.The lifecycle is estimated to be 40 years, with a possible extension by up to 50 years.When in operation, the vessel remains in a fixed position (moored) without any need for assistance by another ship.However, the vessel will be transported to a special facility for planned maintenance several times during its lifecycle.Reactors will be refuelled every third year.Spent reactor fuel will be stored on board.According to Russian State authorities, no spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste will be left in the Arctic.After decommissioning, the vessel will be towed to a special deconstruction facility and spent fuel taken to special storage facilities.12 The overall cost of the Akademik Lomonosov has not been disclosed and is unknown.Critics say that the project is unreasonably expensive.However, Russian authorities claim that it is cheaper than alternatives.Even though the upfront investment is admittedly larger compared to wind turbines and solar panels, the overall cost is allegedly lower when divided by the number of kilowatt-hours output over the entire life of the plant.13There are plans to install another onpp in Vilyuchinsk in Kamchatka.14 During the first leg of its route -from Saint Petersburg to Murmansk -the Akademik Lomonosov passed through both national and international waters.Assuming that the route followed regular shipping lanes (traffic separation schemes, deep-water routes), it seems that the towage at times entered the territorial waters of Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, as well as the exclusive economic zones of Finland, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway.15Although the towage plans were discussed at the international level, no State openly protested the transit.However, the Norwegian government made it clear that it had serious safety concerns with regard to the transit along the Norwegian coast.16Following dialogue with Russian authorities, including one unit for us to sell such modules is not enough').within the Norwegian-Russian Nuclear Safety Commission, it was announced that there would be no radioactive fuel on board during the first leg of the route.17Furthermore, upon completion of loading and final tests in Murmansk, Norwegian authorities would continue to 'closely monitor the onward transportation to Pevek … [and] maintain an open dialogue with Russia on operation and maintenance of the power plant in the coming years' .18

Registration as Ships?
While onpps are manned during normal operations, they are generally incapable of steering or self-propulsion and remain moored for extended periods of time.This distinguishes them from ordinary ships.However, because there is no uniform definition of 'ship' or 'vessel' in international law, it is not available at https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumentarkiv/regjeringen-solberg/aktuelt-regjeringen-solberg/ud/dialog_stortinget/stortinget_svar/spm-2017/svar_atomkraft verk/id2558709/: 'Regjeringen er svaert kritisk til … det planlagte slepet … Utenriksdepartementet forventer at Russland kommer med nødvendige forsikringer om at alt er gjort for å redusere alle typer risiko' ['The Government is highly critical … to the planned towage … The Ministry for Foreign Affairs expects Russia to provide the necessary assurances that everything has been done to reduce all types of risks'].Understandably, the classification of an onpp as a ship has significant implications for the applicability of international law norms specifically addressing 'ships' , 'shipowners' , 'masters of ships' , and the like.While this is a matter of general significance to the international legal framework applicable to onpps, it is most clearly seen in the context of navigational rights, which is discussed below.

Territorial Waters
Pursuant to Article 2 of the losc, the sovereignty of the coastal State extends beyond its land territory and its internal waters to the territorial sea, including the air space over the territorial sea as well as its bed and subsoil.24The sovereignty over the territorial sea is, however, not without exception but 'is exercised subject to [the losc] and to other rules of international law' .25The reference to 'other rules' makes it clear that the limitations set out in the losc are not exhaustive.Other sources of international law may imply additional limitations.However, the most significant limitation of the sovereignty of the coastal State over the territorial sea is explicitly provided for in the Convention: the right of innocent passage.
The right of innocent passage allows ships of all States to pass through the territorial sea.26The coastal State must not hamper such passage except in certain special circumstances.27Consequently, if a foreign onpp is classified as a ship under the law of the sea, coastal States have an obligation not to interfere with its passage through the territorial sea.
However, the right of innocent passage is not absolute, there are exceptions, and it only covers navigation that qualifies as 'passage' .While an onpp may not have the technical capacity to navigate at the same speed and manner as a conventional ship with a rudder and a distinctly shaped bow, the meaning of 'passage' under the losc is broad and covers many forms of navigation.Although passage shall be 'continuous and expeditious' , stopping and anchoring also constitute passage 'in so far as the same is incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of providing assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger' .28 In line with the general character of the term, there is little reason to doubt that towage cannot count as 'passage' .29 Furthermore, the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea treats a tug and its wet tow as two vessels.30The opposite view -that the navigation of a ship qualifies as passage but that of its (towed) cargo does not -would be absurd.It

29
For example, in Passage Through the Great Belt, the parties seemed to share the view that a need for towage does not disqualify a ship from being under passage.Even though Denmark argued that oil rigs (semi-submersibles, jack-ups) were not ships, and therefore were not entitled to passage, this was for reasons other than need for towage.would also seem to conflate the navigational purpose of the presence of a ship within the territorial sea ('passage') and the activity of the ship ('innocent').31 The reference to 'ordinary navigation' in Article 18(2) of the losc seems particularly important in the context of onpps because it allows them to pass through the territorial sea at speeds and along routes that do not endanger the safety of the facility.Accordingly, an onpp in transit may make necessary stops and anchor within the territorial sea without releasing the coastal State from its obligation not to hamper the passage, as long as the stopping or anchoring is necessary for navigational purposes.While the duration of presence within the territorial sea seems a natural concern for the coastal State, the broad definition of 'passage' leaves the coastal State with few other options but to accept that the passage of an onpp through the territorial sea may take longer than expected.Given the frequently harsh weather and sea conditions in the Arctic this feature of innocent passage seems especially important in relation to Arctic onpps.
Pursuant to Article 19(1) of the losc, 'passage is innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State' .Article 19(2) includes a list of activities that, if engaged in by a foreign ship during passage in the territorial sea, renders the passage non-innocent.This list encompasses, inter alia, 'any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State' , 'any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind' , 'the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State' , 'any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to the [losc]' , 'fishing' , and 'any other act not having a direct bearing on passage' .However, in the context of onpps, the main concern may not be the temporary activity of the ship but the very character of the craft: the fact that it holds nuclear material and nuclear technology thereby implies a risk of a nuclear accident.
Although it must not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through its territorial sea, the coastal State remains entitled to adopt certain laws and regulations relating to such passage.Such laws and regulations may concern, inter alia, the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic, the preservation of the environment, and the prevention of infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws of the coastal State.32Foreign ships

31
The distinction between 'passage' and 'innocent passage' is central to the regime of innocent passage.See, e.g., losc Articles 18-19, which deal with the 'meaning of passage' and the 'meaning of innocent passage' respectively.32 Ibid., Article 21(2).exercising the right of innocent passage are expected to comply with such laws and regulations.33Nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear material are, furthermore, explicitly required to carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established by international agreements when exercising the right of innocent passage.34However, this does not mean that nuclear ships are excluded from the right of innocent passage.Rather, the explicit stipulation of special requirements in respect of documentation and precautionary measures suggests that such ships also enjoy the right of innocent passage.35 Significantly for present purposes, Article 22 of the losc allows the coastal State to designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in the territorial sea.Like other ships carrying inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials, the coastal State is allowed to require nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear material to confine their passage to such sea lanes.36Notwithstanding their rights to adopt and apply certain safety requirements, coastal States have few legal possibilities under the law of the sea to prevent and stop foreign onpps passing through their territorial sea.Accordingly, onpps enjoy certain navigational rights that coastal States need to respect.37 Naturally, these rights are only relevant when the onpp is in transit, not when it is in operation and remains fixed in the same position and operates independently.Indeed, the navigational rights flowing from the law of the sea 33 Ibid., Article 21(4).34 Ibid., Article 23.In the Mox Plant cases, Ireland requested that the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos) prescribe interim provisional measures under Article 290 of the losc that would, inter alia, require the United Kingdom to ensure that there were no movements of any radioactive substances connected with a plant to make mixed oxide fuel (mox) at Sellafield in northwest England on the cost of the Irish Sea.However, the itlos declined to prescribe the provisional measures sought by Ireland because the situation was not deemed sufficiently urgency.Subsequently, an arbitral tribunal established under Annex vii of the losc also declined to prescribe provisional measures because Ireland failed to establish that any harm caused to the marine environment by the plant would be serious.See also iaea (n 10), at p. 32: 'Sea transport … will be governed by … international law, including the law of the sea.In recent years, the transport of fuel or radioactive waste has revealed some problems and conflicts between States related to transit or innocent passage or navigation on the high seas.However, there is no reason to believe that sea transport of a [transportable nuclear power plant] should give rise to any additional problems or legal requirements' .

International Law and Ocean Nuclear Power Plants
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 are not of such character as to establish a right of deployment within the territorial waters of other States.Accordingly, with the common exception of ships under innocent passage, onpps are subject to the (full) territorial jurisdiction of the coastal State in territorial waters.

International Waters
Although 'international waters' is not a term used in the losc, it is a useful categorisation of marine areas beyond the sovereign territory of any State, that is, parts of the sea that are not internal waters or territorial sea.Consequently, it has become a common term in the law of the sea and maritime affairs discourse.38The relevant maritime zones to consider here are the exclusive economic zone (eez) and the high seas.39 In the eez, the coastal State enjoys sovereign rights regarding natural resources and related jurisdictional rights and other States enjoy the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines.40The eez is an 'area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea'41 ranging up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines.42Because the establishment of artificial islands, installations, and structures in the eez is a sovereign right of the coastal State, the lawfulness of the installation of an onpp in international waters covered by such a zone depends upon authorisation by the coastal State.43In this sense, there is no difference between the installation of 38 Cf. 'areas beyond national jurisdiction' , which usually designates the high seas and the Area.an onpp and the installation of wave generators or floating wind turbinesthe coastal State is equally free to deny the installation of an onpp in the eez as in the territorial sea.44 Navigation rights are different.Notwithstanding the prevalent principle of freedom of navigation in the eez, the coastal State not only has rights but also duties in respect of the protection of the marine environment within that zone.45Such protection may take different forms, including the prevention of marine pollution from shipping.46However, such rules and regulations may not amount to stricter requirements than those adopted within imo, that is, those 'conforming to and giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference' .47The enforcement powers of the coastal State are even more limited: in brief, the only situation in which a coastal State may board and stop a foreign vessel suspected of pollution within its eez is when 'there are clear grounds for believing that [it] has … committed a violation … resulting in a substantial discharge causing or threatening significant pollution' .48The mere suspicion of a violation of a rule or regulation for the prevention of pollution of the marine environment by an onpp navigating within its eez would normally not entitle the coastal State to stop and board it.
Compared to that of the exclusive economic zone, the legal regime of the high seas is more permissive.While the installation of an onpp on the high seas currently seems rather unrealistic -not least bearing in mind natural factors such as distance, weather, and sea conditions -the law of the sea would not be an obstacle: '[the] freedom of the high seas … comprises … freedom economic purposes.See also C Nieuwenhout, 'Offshore hybrid grid infrastructures: The Kriegers Flak combined grid solution' (2018) 12 European Energy Law Report 95-112, at p. 103: 'Interconnection between States, as interconnection, with the purpose of electricity exchange, falls under the "other economic purposes"' .In South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China) (Award of 12 July 2016) pca Case No 2013-19, the provision of shelter for fishermen was considered an economic purpose (p.414, para 1036).While it has been argued that the construction of military installations is generally allowed in the exclusive economic zone, despite not being explicitly mentioned in the losc, it seems that the typical case of an onpp is different.On military installations in general, see T Davenport, 'Island-building in the South China Sea: Legality and limits' (2018) 8(1) Asian Journal of International Law 76-90, at p. 86  to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law' .49The transport of an onpp on the high seas is easier to imagine.Ships on the high seas are, as a rule, subject only to the jurisdiction of the flag State.50Accordingly, States other than the flag State may not interfere with ships on the high seas.However, this does not mean that flag States are free to abdicate their control over ships on the high seas.In addition to the general principle of due regard in the exercise of the freedom of the sea,51 Article 94 of the losc explicitly requires flag States to exercise 'jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters' .52Relatedly, the obligations of States under marpol to impose requirements for the prevention of maritime pollution from ships apply also to ships on the high seas.Likewise, neither the International Code for the Safe Carriage of Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes on Board Ships (inf Code),53 which establishes various safety requirements for carriage of packaged irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium, and high-level radioactive waste on board ships, nor the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (imdg) Code,54 which contain provisions governing the carriage of dangerous goods in packaged form, make exceptions for the high seas.Accordingly, like most vessels carrying nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive wastes, onpps must comply with the requirements of the inf and imdg Codes when navigating on the high seas.In 2009, imo adopted non-binding Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Guidelines).56The aim of the Polar Guidelines is to promote the safety of navigation and prevent pollution from ship operations in polar waters.Further, in 2014, imo adopted the International Code of Safety for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code).57The Polar Code is designed to provide for safe ship operations and the protection of the polar environment by addressing risks present in polar waters.Importantly, the Polar Code confirms that additional demands on ships, their systems, and operation beyond existing global treaties may be necessary in the marine Arctic.However, like the main treaties on pollution by ships (marpol, solas Convention), the applicability of the Polar Guidelines and the Polar Code to onpps ultimately depends on their classification as ships.

International Straits
Pursuant to Part iii of the losc, straits used for international navigation are subject to special passage rights more permissive than the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.Except for so-called historic straits and most areas of internal waters within such straits,58 these rights apply to straits 'used for international navigation between one [area of international waters] and another [such area]' .59In such straits, ships of all States enjoy transit passage, that is, 'the exercise of … the freedom of navigation … for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait' .60States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage, and there shall be no suspension of transit passage.61Accordingly, there is little room for States bordering straits to deny the passage of an onpp through such straits.Notwithstanding the right of transit passage, States bordering straits may designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes, but only to the extent such lanes and schemes conform to generally accepted international regulations and the proposals have been referred to 'the [imo] with a view to their adoption' .62Under similar condi-

The Operational Phase
While the legal categorisation of an onpp in transit is complex, the situation is even more challenging during the operational phase, that is, when the onpp is deployed and operates independently.There are good reasons to argue that an onpp underway constitutes a ship (either because of its own virtues or as part of a tow), while the situation is less clear when the onpp remains fixed in the same position for extended periods of time.Indeed, the capacity to move/navigate is key to the notion of a 'ship' .64 Even so, the situation under the general law of the sea remains relatively straightforward: territorial waters are subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State, and all activities within them, except for the right of innocent passage, are subject to its (full) territorial jurisdiction.The legality of the installation of an onpp in the eez is dependent upon the authorisation of the costal State,65 while on the high seas it is a right of all States as part of the freedom of the high seas.66 The complexities arise in relation to more specific matters, such as the prevention of maritime pollution or safety on board.marpol, for example, applies to 'ships' as does the solas Convention.The same goes for the Polar Guidelines and the Polar Code.Accordingly, an onpp may come within the scope of some maritime law instruments during the transport phase, but not during the operational phase.This means that onpps are in a rather different legal situation compared to that of conventional (land-based) nuclear power plants; an onpp may sometimes (e.g., transport phase) have to comply with various ship-oriented regulations, while at other times (e.g., operational phase) it may be subject to other instruments and standards.67Another distinct fea-10.1163/15718085-bja10161| Leopardi The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 ture of onpps is the need for additional infrastructure, which in turn triggers other legal considerations, such as grid connection, which is considered below.

Submarine Cables
A special feature of onpps is that their deployment depends upon connection to the power grid of the area where the electricity produced by the onpp is to be consumed.While there may in some instances exist other alternatives, a plausible form of such connection is by way of one or several submarine cables.Compared to land-based power cables, submarine cables are relatively easy and cost-effective to install.Indeed, most submarine cables simply rest on the sea floor and do not need to be covered or moored in any specific way.The capacity of submarine cables may also be significantly greater than most land-based ones.The generally low water temperature on the seafloor provides excellent cooling conditions for the myriads of copper threads making up power cables, reducing the risk of melting when high power runs through the cable.
The laying of submarine cables is subject to special regulation in international law.68Within territorial waters, the laying of such cables is subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State.69Accordingly, the coastal State may simply refuse the laying of such cables within its territorial waters without necessarily having to provide any special reasons.Corresponding to the main legal difference between territorial waters and international waters, where the sovereignty of the coastal State is the main rule for territorial waters and the freedom of the sea the main rule for international waters, the situation is different in the eez and on the high seas.Subject to Article 79 of the losc, all States are entitled to lay submarine cables on the continental shelf.Accordingly, the coastal State may not impede the laying of such cables.However, the delineation of the course of the laying of pipelines is subject to the consent of the coastal State.70Importantly for present purposes, there is no similar provision for submarine cables.Notwithstanding the principal freedom of the State laying the cable to determine its delineation, the coastal State remains free to establish

International Law and Ocean Nuclear Power Plants
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 the conditions for cables that enter its territory or that are constructed or used in connection with the operations of an installation on its continental shelf.71 Accordingly, the necessary connection of an onpp to the land-based power grid through the laying of submarine cables is in most situations subject to the same basic condition of coastal State consent as the very installation of an onpp within territorial waters or the eez.However, if an onpp is installed within the territorial waters or eez of one coastal State, and the State receiving the power produced by the onpp is different, the freedom of laying submarine cables on the continental shelf seems a relevant consideration.There is limited opportunity for third States to deny the laying of submarine cables across their continental shelves.72

Emergency Preparedness and Response
Navigation is by nature a risky activity.The gravity of the Earth and the fluidity of water (except for ice) mean that all objects at sea are at risk of sinking.The very purpose of onpps, to produce energy by nuclear means, brings additional hazards.
The delivery of assistance to those in peril at sea is a central principle of life at sea.It is also an ancient obligation of international law and 'one of the traditional hallmarks of the law of the sea' .Relevantly for the present purposes, the duty to render assistance seems to apply both to onpps and in relation to onpps in distress.Corresponding to the reference in Article 98 of the losc to 'any person in danger of being lost' ,76 the solas Convention makes it explicit that the duty to render assistance 'applies regardless of the nationality or status of such persons or the circumstances in which they are found' .77Consequently, masters of ships may, by way of flag State jurisdiction, be required to provide assistance to an onpp in distress at sea.However, it needs to be noted that this duty of shipmasters to render assistance makes leeway for the safety of the assisting ship.A ship without practical capabilities to assist or that can only do so with great dangers for the safety of the ship itself may thus be exempted from this requirement.78Because of the special hazards inherent to nuclear facilities, this caveat seems especially relevant in relation to onpps.
Coastal States are under stricter requirements.They are simply obliged to establish maritime search and rescue services and conduct search and rescue within their areas of responsibility.79Accordingly, a coastal State that allows for the installation of an onpp off its coast within its area of responsibility is expected to have a search and rescue service capable of providing assistance to an onpp in distress.The same applies to States with areas of responsibility where onpps transit; they are similarly required to conduct search and rescue operations.Noting the explicit requirement under Article 98 of the losc for the maritime search and rescue service to be 'adequate and effective' , it is clear that the services must correspond to the risks that may arise within the area of responsibility.80See, e.g., losc (n 22), Article 98(1): 'Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers' (emphasis added); solas (n 5), Chapter v, Regulation 33(1): 'The master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide assistance, on receiving information from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance' (emphasis added).The need for special resources to deal with nuclear materials, alongside the general cost of and limited availability of such resources, makes cooperation a key factor for the effectiveness of nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness and response.This may be even more so in the case of onpps, which are typically intended for deployment in remote areas where infrastructure standards may be exceptionally low.For example, Pevek, the coastal city in northern Russia where the Akademik Lomonosov is deployed, has a population of just a few thousands and development needs far greater than most sites of nuclear power plants.Indeed, before the arrival of the onpp, a special fire and rescue department was set up and special response resources delivered to Pevek.81 The key instruments of the international legal framework for emergency preparedness and response to nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies are the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Early Notification Convention)82 and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention).83The Early Notification Convention, adopted in 1986 following the Chernobyl accident, establishes a notification system for nuclear accidents.A broad definition of 'nuclear accident' , including but not limited to accidents from which a release of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur from 'any nuclear reactor wherever located' as well as 'the transport and storage of nuclear fuels or radioactive wastes' , appears to cover both conventional land-based nuclear power plants and onpps.84Accordingly, a State that runs an onpp, or that has jurisdiction or control over persons or legal entities so doing, may be obliged the seagoing traffic and the navigational dangers, and shall, so far as possible, provide adequate means of locating and rescuing such persons' (emphasis added).81 See to notify and provide information to other States following a nuclear accident on an onpp.85 The Assistance Convention, which was also adopted following the Chernobyl accident, sets out an international framework for cooperation among States Parties and with the iaea to facilitate prompt assistance and support in the event of nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies.States Parties are required to cooperate with each other, as well as with the iaea, to minimise the consequences of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.86Not much is said about the detailed nature of assistance arrangements; they will depend on the requirements of the specific case.The Convention also makes provision for reimbursements of costs and compensation and the direction and control of assistance personnel and the State providing assistance.87Like the Early Notification Convention, the Assistance Convention uses a broad concept of 'nuclear accident' and also covers 'radiological emergency' .onpps seem to fall within its scope.While the Assistance Convention establishes the general framework for cooperation in the event of nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies, more detailed provisions are meant to be set out in bilateral or multilateral arrangements.88 With regards to onpps in the Arctic, there are two binding agreements on emergency preparedness and response adopted by the Arctic Council that need to be considered, namely, the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (2011 Agreement) and the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013 Agreement).The 2011 Agreement seeks to strengthen cooperation and coordination on search and rescue activities and establishes an obligation for States to cooperate in this regard.In a similar vein, the 2013 Agreement seeks to strengthen cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance among the Parties on oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic in order to protect the marine environment from pollution by oil.The basic idea of the Arctic regional agreements is to supplement existing global treaties and to strengthen regional cooperation in this regard.

International Law and Ocean Nuclear Power Plants
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 Notwithstanding the fact that neither of the agreements deals specifically with nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies, they may still be of some relevance also in that context.While the 2013 Agreement seems of limited concern to onpps, as it deals specifically with oil pollution, the 2011 Agreement seems more relevant as it reinforces the general obligations of States to provide maritime search and rescue services.Importantly, the conduct of maritime search and rescue is not dependent on the classification of onpps as ships; the obligations with respect to maritime search and rescue apply regardless of the reason for the distress.89While the 2011 Agreement mainly reinforces already existing obligations of States Parties under international maritime rescue law, its importance should not be underestimated.Like emergency preparedness and response in general, maritime search and rescue is an inherently practical business where effectiveness is to large extent dependent on professional training, regular exercises, and availability of resources.The 2011 Agreement establishes several obligations concerning joint training and exercises and sharing of information and experience.
In addition to the risks that may arise in the area where the onpp is deployed, the mobility of onpps means risks may arise also in other areas where the onpp is present temporarily, for example, during transport, maintenance or loading operations.While the existing legal framework requires coastal States to have some preparedness for maritime accidents off their coasts, it seems inevitable that coastal States from time to time may face accidents for which they had not planned.A sensitive issue in the context of onpps is whether they have a right to access and seek shelter in ports or other places within internal waters.90For understandable reasons, coastal States may be reluctant to welcome potential nuclear or radiological emergencies or incidents to their territories.
This raises questions about obligations under international law.Despite the fact that most ports of the world are open to foreign traffic, there is no general duty under international law for States to accept foreign ships into their ports.The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 seeking shelter in their ports or internal waters.92There is, however, at least one important exception to this rule.Historically, ships in distress have had a right of access to a port or another coastal refuge and there is widespread acceptance that a ship that enters a port in distress or because of force majeure is not subject to the full jurisdiction of the coastal State.93Even though such ships have in practice often been granted certain immunity, there is also evidence of States having closed their ports to ships in distress that pose a substantial marine pollution risk.94How this balance would be struck in the event of a situation where an onpp is in distress is difficult to determine.However, the very reason for the exceptional right of access for ships in distress is still humanitarian considerations.95Accordingly, the legal answer to the question of whether an onpp in distress has a right of access into ports or another coastal refuge seems to a large extent to depend on factual circumstances and whether the risk to human lives would increase or decrease following entry into port or internal waters.The potential saving of property is not determinative of a coastal State's humanitarian duty.96 While a clearer legal framework for places of refuge for onpps might be of practical value, it seems unlikely that such a framework will be established.97 In essence, it does not seem politically opportune for the responsible minister or government of a coastal State along whose coast foreign onpps are being transported (by another State) to welcome potential nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies to its coast, regardless of whether such action would in fact decrease the real risk of such an accident or emergency.that 'the entire liability regime of the [Vienna] Convention was adopted under the common understanding that transportable nuclear technologies require a special legal framework' .102Consequently, it seems fair to conclude that there is currently a great degree of uncertainty about the international law regulation of civil liability for damages resulting from onpps.103Still, the argument that the legal status of an onpp may shift during its operational life raises the question as to whether an installed onpp, which remains fixed and operates independently, is different from a nuclear-powered submarine or vessel.

Security
While it seems that the main focus of the international discussions about the towage plans of the Akademik Lomonosov was safety and pollution concerns,104 security is also a natural concern in relation to onpps.105Energy is essential to the functioning of modern societies, and threats to the energy supply are a common concern for national security.Furthermore, in the context of nuclear power plants, the natural risks associated with nuclear energy also call for special consideration.
In the case of onpps, maritime security is an additional dimension of the general international legal framework for nuclear security.106The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (sua Convention) is key in this regard.107The Convention sets forth a list of example, a barge (arguably, the case could be made that it is in fact the [nuclear power plant] which is equipped with its own means of transport, not the other way round and, therefore, allow this difficulty to be overcome) '  attachment to the seabed may be outside the scope of the sua Convention but within the scope of the 1988 sua Protocol.Conversely, an onpp in operation secured by shore-based moorings is outside the scope of both instruments.This somewhat surprising conclusion -which attaches great significance to practical details such as mooring means -is yet another example of an unintended legal consequence that is the result of the fragmented legal framework for onpps.116

Institutions
The absence of a designated international legal framework for onpps, and the conceivable political will of at least some towards greater legal predictability in this area, begs the question of where such questions may be raised and discussed in a multilateral setting.In the case of the Arctic, at least three institutions can be considered: the iaea, imo, and the Arctic Council.
According to its Statute, the objectives of the iaea are to 'accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world' .117The iaea is 'authorized to establish or adopt standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property, and to provide for the application of these standards' .118Accordingly, efforts to establish a strong, sustainable, and visible global nuclear safety and security regime of onpps would seem a neat fit for the iaea.Furthermore, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which applies to the safety of land-based civil nuclear power plants, was largely the result of initiatives by the iaea.119 However, in the light of rising expectations in recent years regarding the role of nuclear power there are many pressing issues for the Agency to consider.Various issues compete for attention and its institutional capacity is limited.Although the mandate of the Agency seems to cover onpps, there may be International Law and Ocean Nuclear Power Plants The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 specific legal challenges that come within the ambit of other institutions.The need for the Agency to engage with these issues may not be obvious, making it easier for it to give priority to other pressing matters.
Given the maritime nature of onpps, imo could be a relevant forum for discussions.Although the purposes of the Organization are broader,120 the specific focus on maritime safety and previous attention of the Organization not only to nuclear matters (nuclear-powered ships, carriage of nuclear materials) but also to Arctic issues (Polar Code) suggest that Arctic onpps could be discussed within imo.Still, it should be noted that the focus of imo is shipping and that it could easily be argued that onpps are something different.
The Arctic Council was established in 2016.121It is the leading intergovernmental forum for promoting cooperation and coordination between the Arctic States with regard to common Arctic issues, in particular sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.The Arctic Council has six working groups: Arctic Council Action Plan (acap); Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (amap); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (caff); Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (eppr); Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (pame); and Sustainable Development Working Group (sdwg).All eight States with territories within the Arctic Circle are members: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Russia, Norway, Sweden, and the United States.The Arctic Council is thus significantly broader than a regional seas forum; for example, its activities include land-based matters and people-to-people cooperation.
While there are indeed challenges to cooperation within the Arctic Council, the development of a framework with regard to onpps in the Arctic seems a potential matter for the Council to explore.The clear need for international cooperation in emergency preparedness and response, including pooling of resources, makes political progress in this area seemingly easier compared to other areas.In fact two of the three binding agreements adopted by the Arctic Council concern emergency preparedness and response.122Furthermore, out, including the classification of onpps as 'ships' , which affects navigational rights, as well as the applicability of several key maritime law instruments and the obligations of States in relation to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies involving onpps.Furthermore, the ostensible exclusion of onpps from the existing nuclear liability regime is a concern.Understandably, uncertainties about the legal status of onpps and the rights and obligations of States in relation thereto may affect the willingness of States to adopt such technology and also cause tensions between actors with different interests in onpps.128

73
First and foremost, Article 98 of the losc requires every (flag) State to require masters of ships flying their flags 'to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost' and, second, coastal States to 'promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective [maritime] search and rescue service' .74Additionally, the solas Convention and International Convention on Maritime Search 10.1163/15718085-bja10161 | Leopardi The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 and Rescue set forth the details of coastal States' obligations concerning maritime search and rescue.75 79 losc (n 22), Article 98(2); solas (n 5), Chapter v, Regulation 7(1).80 See also solas (n 5), Chapter v, Regulation 7(1): 'Each Contracting Government undertakes to ensure that necessary arrangements are made for … the rescue of persons in distress at sea around its coasts.These arrangements shall include … such search and rescue facilities as are deemed practicable and necessary, having regard to the density of Downloaded from Brill.com 07/06/2024 11:04:35AM via Open Access.This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/International Law and Ocean Nuclear Power Plants The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 10.1163/15718085-bja10161 | Leopardi The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 10.1163/15718085-bja10161 | Leopardi The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 Nuclear Law in the EU and Beyond (Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2014) 175-200; iaea, 'Legal and Institutional Issues of Transportable Nuclear Power Plants: A Preliminary Study' (Technical Report, iaea Nuclear Energy Series, Doc.No. ng-t-3.5, iaea, Vienna, 2013) available at https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1624_web.pdf.11 See, e.g., 'В Росатоме предложили установить малые плавучие АЭС ряду зарубежных стран' Tacc (Tass, 7 December 2020) available at https://tass.ru/ekonomika/10187759,quoting the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia -Plenipotentiary of the President of the Russian Federation in the Far Eastern Federal District Yuri Trutnev: 'Мы только начали строить атомные блоки.Предложения по установке плавучих блоков "Росатомом" 10 See, e.g., J Handrlica, 'Underground repositories, reprocessing facilities and floating nuclear power plants: Liability issues revisited' (2019) 37(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 263-288, at p. 285.See especially R Tscherning, 'Transportable nuclear power plants: An update on regulatory responses in international nuclear law' in C Raetzke (ed), сделаны ряду зарубежных государств.Понятно, что одного блока, чтобы мы продавали такие модули, недостаточно.А их дальнейшее тиражирование создает возможность для России открыть еще одну рыночную нишу, на которой пока еще никого нет' ('We have just begun to build nuclear power units.Rosatom has made proposals for the installation of floating units by a number of foreign countries.It is clear that Downloaded from Brill.com 07/06/2024 11:04:35AM via Open Access.This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/International Law and Ocean Nuclear Power Plants The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 See also A Severance and M Sandgren, 'Flagging the floating turbine unit: Navigating towards a registerable, first-ranking secu- 14 MN Lysenko and AN Vylegzhanin, 'Nuclear safety and security in the Arctic: Crafting an effective regional governance system' (2022) 13 Arctic Review on Law and Politics 191-212, at p. 195.15 The exact route is unknown to the author.16 See, e.g., B Brende, Foreign Minister of Norway, 'Svar på skriftlig spørsmål nr.1295 (2016-2017) om slep av russisk atomkraftverk' (Reply to Written Question, 23 June 2017) International Law and Ocean Nuclear Power Plants The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 straightforward that onpps cannot qualify as such.In fact, what is treated as a ship varies widely between different maritime conventions.19For example, the solas Convention applies to 'ships' or 'vessels' , without providing any clear definition, while the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (marpol),20 defines 'ship' as 'a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms' .21Furthermore, international law leaves States with considerable freedom to determine what qualifies as a ship.Hence, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (losc)22 requires ships to fly a flag without providing a definition of either 'ship' or 'vessel' and does not explicitly require flag States to adopt any position as to what constitutes such.23 17 Russian Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom, 'The world's only floating power unit "Akademik Lomonosov" takes the sea' (Press Statement, 28 April 2018) available See, e.g., RR Churchill, 'Mox Plant arbitration and cases' in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018).35 See, e.g., T Treves, 'Navigation of ships with nuclear cargoes: Dialogue between flag and coastal States as a Method for managing the dispute' in DD Caron and HN Scheiber (eds), Article 60(1).The coastal State also has exclusive jurisdiction over artificial islands, installations and structures (Article 60(2)).Given that energy production qualifies as an economic purpose, there are good reasons to believe that an installed onpp would be covered by the term 'installations and structures for the purposes provided for in Article 56 and other economic purposes' (Article 60(1)(b)).On the broad meaning of this term, see, e.g., G Andreone, 'The exclusive economic zone' in D Rothwell et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) 160-180, at See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly, Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, UN Doc a/conf.232/2023/4*(19 June 2023) Article 1(2).39 Archipelagic waters are subject to similar considerations as the territorial sea: cf.losc (n 22), Articles 49, 52.The special police rights distinct to the contiguous zone seem of little relevance in the onpp context (cf.Article 33).p. 172: 'An almost total exclusivity is accorded to the coastal State to authorize and regulate various kinds of offshore construction, their placement, and their use' .The reference to 'other economic purposes' (Article 60(1)(b)) suggests that all purposes comprised in Article 56, including 'the production of energy from the water, currents and winds' , are Downloaded from Brill.com 07/06/2024 11:04:35AM via Open Access.This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/10.1163/15718085-bja10161 | Leopardi The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 However, being instruments under the solas Convention, the applicability of the inf and imdg Codes ultimately depends on the classification of onpps as ships.55The inf Code was first introduced as a voluntary measure to complement the principal iaea Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material.However, in 2001 the inf Code was made mandatory under solas Convention chapter vii.Adoption of the International Code for the Safe Carriage of Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes on Board Ships (inf Code), imo Doc msc.
55 Cf. inf Code (n 53), Regulation 1.2.1: 'This Code applies to ships engaged in the carriage of inf cargo' (emphasis added); imdg Code (n 54), Regulation 1.1.1.1:'The provisions contained in this Code are applicable to all ships to which … [solas Convention] applies and which are carrying dangerous goods' (emphasis added).Downloaded from Brill.com 07/06/2024 11:04:35AM via Open Access.This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/10.1163/15718085-bja10161 | Leopardi The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 International Law and Ocean Nuclear Power PlantsThe International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30 tions, States bordering straits may prescribe laws and regulations relating to transit passage.63 Downloaded from Brill.com 07/06/2024 11:04:35AM via Open Access.This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ See, e.g., B Mosner, 'The iaea Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency' (1982) 44 Nuclear Law Bulletin 10-23, at p. 12: 'The location of the nuclear reactor and whether it is stationary or mobile is of no importance'; iaea (n 10), at p. 65: 'The broad scope of application set forth in Article 1 makes Downloaded from Brill.com 07/06/2024 11:04:35AM via Open Access.This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ , e.g., A Staalesen, 'As floating nuclear power plant enters East Siberian Sea, emergency services in Pevek make a last check' (The Barents Observer, 6 September Conversely, 'it is … by virtue of its sovereignty that the coastal State may regulate access to its ports' .91Coastal States may thus, prima face, deny onpps line … form part of the internal waters'), 11 ('the outermost permanent harbour works … are regarded as forming part of the coast').91 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits) [1986] icj Rep. 14, at pp. 111−112, paras 212−213.Downloaded from Brill.com 07/06/2024 11:04:35AM via Open Access.This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ . 102 Handrlica (n 10), at p. 286.103 Ibid., at p. 288.104 See above (nn 15-18) and accompanying text.105 See generally iaea (n 10), at p. 43.106 The iaea defines 'nuclear security' as the complex of laws, regulations, institutions, systems, and measures aimed at the 'prevention of, detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities' .iaea, 'iaea Nuclear Security Glossary' (2020) available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/21/06/nuclear_security_glossary_august_2020.pdf.There is no agreed definition of 'maritime security' , but in legal doctrine it has been characterised as 'the protection of a state's land and maritime territory, infrastructure, economy, environment and society from certain harmful acts occurring at sea' .N Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 8-10.107 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Rome, 3 October 1988, in force 1 March 1992) 1678 unts 201 [sua Convention].from Brill.com 07/06/2024 11:04:35AM via Open Access.This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/10.1163/15718085-bja10161 | Leopardi The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2024) 1-30