1 Introduction
‘Decolonizing’ is a social and political process aimed at resisting and undoing the multi-faceted impacts of colonization and re-establishing strong contemporary Indigenous Peoples, Nations, and institutions based on traditional values, philosophies, and knowledge systems.
A decolonizing mindset requires people to consciously and critically question the legitimacy of the colonizer and reflect on the ways we have been influenced by colonialism. According to expert in Indigenous research methodologies Margaret Kovach, the purpose of decolonization is to create space in everyday life, research, academia, and society for an Indigenous perspective without its being neglected, shunted aside, mocked, or dismissed.1
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC), and the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (the National Inquiry) all emphasize ‘relationships’ as a central piece of moving forward together in a positive way. The latter, in particular, emphasizes the need to look at not only the structural and institutional relationships between Indigenous peoples and the Crown, but the way those play out in the lives of individuals through what the National Inquiry refers to as ‘encounters.’2 Relationship-building requires human interactions, or encounters, which means there must be compassion for the multigenerational experiences and intergenerational traumas of Indigenous peoples. Such compassion is not possible unless there is an understanding of the true histories and realities of Inuit and the Inuit-Crown
2 The Role of Ships in Facilitating the Mistreatment and Attempts to Assimilate Inuit
There is no shortage of stories and publications on the history of shipping in the Canadian Arctic and the roles ships played in the ‘development’ and ‘defence’ of the region,4 most of which are written by, for, and from the viewpoint of the colonizers themselves. Here, though, the intent is to highlight the role that ships played in some of the assimilative initiatives undertaken by the federal government that are often less talked about in the context of the history and governance of shipping: residential schools, the High Arctic Relocation, and the tuberculosis epidemic. In alignment with the decolonizing focus of this chapter, the findings of the RCAP, TRC and the National Inquiry will be centred. The author does not attempt to speak in any depth to the experiences of Inuit or Indigenous peoples out of respect for those who lived the events described herein and/or who continue to be impacted today.
2.1 Mission Schools, Residential Schools, Boarding Schools, Day Schools and Hostels
The federal residential school system commenced its policies and programs aimed at assimilating Indigenous peoples in southern Canada in the 1800s, but in the North, the ‘school’ system was run by Anglican and Catholic missionaries. Similar to the southern federal system, though, the intent was to change Inuit, in
Ships also brought the goods and materials necessary for some of the mission-run schools to operate, including food. Given the challenges in transportation at the time, food was often scarce, and sometimes the schools would rely on local food sources gathered through hunting and trapping, sometimes even by the parents of the children attending the school. The fish caught would have to be preserved, but, as Bill Erasmus explained to the TRC when speaking of his father’s experience, this was not always done properly. The result was that the fish would rot, “but they would still feed them to the kids, and they were forced to eat that.”9 Not surprisingly, “disease and death [were] common in the northern mission schools.”10
Some students recalled positive moments of their time at the schools. Masak, for example, attended the Anglican All Saints Residential School in Aklavik in 1937 and told the TRC of traveling by the school barge to berry-pick along the Mackenzie River.11 These moments would not discount the unpleasant memories and long-lasting traumas, though. In her same testimony, Masak spoke of becoming ashamed of her language and divided from her family because she could not speak to them or participate in their way of life.12
It would not be until the 1940s that the Government of Canada would begin to turn its attention North. Throughout the Second World War there was a strong American military presence in the Canadian North, and American officers and civilians publicly questioned Canada about the poverty and lack
Even though the federal government ‘took over’ the educational aspects of the schools, the Anglicans and Catholics continued to be responsible for boarding the students, creating a hostel-day school system as opposed to the residential school system known to the south.17 “The classroom learning [was to] provide the theoretical lessons about modernity and life in Canada, and the hostel would make these lessons concrete.”18 For some, the experiences in the classroom, “although extremely strict”, were positive;19 the education was “top notch” and “the classroom was a safe haven” from the physical and sexual abuse that took place in the hostels after school hours.20 “The overall assessment, however, was that their time at the school had alienated them from [their] communities, broken their links to their culture, and diminished their capacity to serve as effective parents.”21
This system operated until the end of the 1960s, after which time the Governments of the Northwest Territories and Yukon took over responsibility. This means that there are many people in communities today who had to
2.2 The High Arctic Relocations
In 1934, in the name of sovereignty through occupation, the federal government sanctioned the relocation of Inuit to the High Arctic for the first time. The Hudson Bay Company, with authorization from the federal government, sought to establish a trading post at Dundas Harbour on Devon Island. By this point, whalers and traders had already been relocating Inuit for years, with reports dating back to the early 1900s,22 but this would be the first time such an act was undertaken with the express permission of the Government of Canada. As part of the agreement, the Hudson’s Bay Company was fully and solely responsible for the welfare of any individual it transferred from Cape Dorset. The press release of the relocation experiment at the time highlighted the importance of occupying the Arctic to ensure other States did not try to claim territory.23
Less than two decades later, the Government of Canada executed another plan to relocate Inuit to the High Arctic, this time from Inukjuak (Nunavik) and Pond Inlet (Nunavut) to Craig Harbour and Resolute Bay. In July 1953, the C.D. Howe left Inukjuak with seven families, stopping in Pond Inlet late August to pick up an additional three families. The C.D. Howe first stopped in Craig Harbour where it split the groups into two: one group would remain in Craig Harbour while the other would continue onboard the d’Iberville with the intent of continuing on to Cape Herschel and Resolute Bay. Inuit were not aware upon departing Inukjuak that they would be separated, and “were suddenly forced to make decisions on how to split into two groups” while aboard the C.D. Howe.24 The vessel was unable to reach Cape Herschel due to ice conditions,
Over the years there have been debates about the reasoning behind the federal plan, but the findings of the RCAP are that this was another case of the federal government experimenting with Inuit, this time through a rehabilitation program intended to restore Inuit to a lifestyle that relied on the land as opposed to federal handouts.26 At the time, many Inuit around Inukjuak had become part of the fur trade and accustomed to the lifestyle that came with monetary income and the amenities of living near the settlement itself. By the 1950s, the community had a Hudson’s Bay Company post, a police post, church missions, a school, a nursing station, a Department of Transport weather station and radio facility, and a port facility.27 However, with the collapse of the fur trade, the income was scarce, the result being “substantial continuing reliance [of Inuit] on government income support in the form of family allowance, old age security and relief.”28 The federal government’s solution to this ‘economic and social’ problem was to try to return Inuit to their traditional lifestyle, which did not depend on the federal government, with the added strategic benefit of asserting Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic.29 The experiment was to determine whether the land around Craig Harbour or Resolute Bay could support Inuit,30 and whether Inuit from Inukjuak could adapt to these new lands thousands of miles from their homes and families.31 The latter is the reasoning for relocating Inuit from Pond Inlet; as existing residents of the High Arctic, they were brought to help the Inuit of Inukjuak adapt to the resources of the area and teach them to survive the extreme cold and months-long darkness.
In addition to the physical suffering of trying to live without enough food, clothing or shelter, Inuit also suffered the psychological hardships of being separated from family, community and home. The federal government was fully aware of the cultural connections between Inuit and the land and the potential impacts of removing them from their homes and families.40 But the best interests or wellbeing of Inuit were never the priority. Although the
Those [Inuit] testifying [to the RCAP] said that the RCMP were persistent and insistent that the people should go; that many people did not understand that they had the right to refuse to go; that the agreement to go was given reluctantly and was induced by misrepresentations and promises such as the promise to return [after two years]; and that some people went because members of their immediate or extended families were going and they did not wish to be separated from their relatives.42
Responsibility for the ‘relocation project’ and all Inuit affairs at the time fell to the Department of Resources and Development. Although the project was never discussed by Cabinet, the Department did not execute the project alone. The RCMP was responsible for supervising Inuit in the new communities and the Department of Transport operated the annual ship supply. These two organizations, along with the Hudson’s Bay Company, were engaged early to gain their support and co-operation to ‘rehabilitate’ Inuit.43 In the end, these other organizations supported the Department of Resources and Development and participated in a project that ultimately “exceeded the government’s legal authority … was inhumane in its design and its effects,”44 and was based on “the fundamental denial of individual freedom, human equality, and personal dignity.”45
2.3 Tuberculosis Epidemic
While the High Arctic Relocation project and the residential school system were more direct efforts to colonize Inuit, the provision of health care by the federal government to Inuit is also considered an element of colonization by the National Inquiry.46 As part of the social movement that followed World
Of all the diseases brought to Inuit Nunangat (the Inuit homeland in Canada), tuberculosis in particular wreaked havoc on Inuit. At the time that Matavik was patrolling the Arctic shores, it was anticipated that one-third of Inuit were infected with tuberculosis, and by 1956, over 1,500 were being treated for the disease.50 The federal approach to providing this treatment was “especially notorious” for causing social harm to Inuit, in addition to the obvious impacts of the disease itself.51 If the onboard medical exam revealed tuberculosis, the individual was marked with ‘TB’ on their hand and immediately transported to a sanatorium south of Inuit Nunangat. Their age did not matter, and most often there was not an opportunity to collect belongings, to say goodbye, or to make any arrangements to ensure families were cared for.52 Annie B., for example, told the National Inquiry about being removed from Pangnirtung, Nunavut at the age of four or five and transported, by herself, to a treatment facility in Toronto.53
The forced and immediate removal of Inuit from communities and families had major implications both for those removed and for those left behind.54 Elder Elisapi Davidee Aningmiuq, for example, spoke to the National Inquiry about “how the forced separation of children from their families resulted in emotional trauma for Inuit and alienation from their families because of the length and distance of separation.”55 As with the experience of children in residential schools, those who were removed often did not return for years, in part because of the short shipping season.
3 Recognizing the Rights of Inuit and Indigenous Peoples
The rights of Indigenous peoples in Canada would not be formally acknowledged until 1982 when the Canadian Constitution was amended to recognize and affirm “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada”59 and to provide a guarantee that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms would “not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including” those “recognized by the Royal Proclamation” and “that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.”60 Today, there are five Inuit land claims and self-government agreements in place: the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (1984); the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (1993); the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (1975) and the Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement (2006); and the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement (2005). Collectively, these four settlement areas (the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, Nunavut, Nunavik and Nunatsiavut) comprise Inuit Nunangat, the homeland of Inuit in Canada. This space includes marine waters
In 1982, the same year amendments to the Canadian Constitution were introduced to recognize Indigenous rights, the United Nations established a Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) under the Economic and Social Council’s Sub-Commission for Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The WGIP was instructed, among other items, to analyze information on the promotion and protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous peoples and to give “special attention to the evolution of standards concerning the rights of Indigenous populations.”63 Indigenous peoples’ representatives, including the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), which represents Inuit internationally, participated directly in the discussions of the WGIP,64 and it was from this Working Group that the vision of an international declaration concerning the rights of Indigenous peoples emerged.65 In 2007, the vision materialized with the adoption of UNDRIP at the United Nations with an “overwhelming majority.”66 UNDRIP itself is not a legally binding document, but is considered to reflect the state of customary law with regards to the rights of Indigenous peoples, and thus is an important
At the time UNDRIP was adopted, Canada was one of only four States (alongside the United States, New Zealand and Australia) to withhold their support for UNDRIP due to the perceived veto power of the right to free, prior and informed consent. Canada changed its position on UNDRIP in 2010 to one of support, though with qualification; it was interpreted by Canada as “a non-legally binding document that [did] not reflect customary international law nor change Canadian laws.”71 In 2016, however, the Government of Canada changed its position again, this time to one of full support and with a commitment to implement UNDRIP in Canada,72 and on 21 June 2021, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act73 (UNDRIPA) received Royal Assent. The UNDRIPA acknowledges UNDRIP as the framework for reconciliation74 and affirms Canada’s commitment to taking effective legislative, policy and administrative measures at both the national and international levels to achieve its objectives.75
Over the course of the decades (and centuries) that Canada was implementing various assimilative efforts towards Indigenous peoples, now understood as acts of cultural genocide,76 the international shipping regime was taking shape, including through the establishment of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)77 and the foundational international marine safety and environmental protection conventions that remain in place today.78 Canada’s domestic regime was also being developed, and, in the 1970s, Canada brought into force the first polar-specific maritime legislation: the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act79 (AWPPA). In 2009, the international shipping community also decided to pursue mandatory requirements to address the unique risks of operating ships in polar waters; up until the adoption of the Polar Code in 2014–2015, the IMO only had guidelines for ships operating in Arctic ice-covered,80 polar,81 and remote waters.82 Rather than develop a new convention, the IMO decided to build on the existing framework to add aspects specific to polar navigation.
That same year, the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group of the Arctic Council83 released the widely known and referenced Arctic
The IMO’s efforts to add polar-specific provisions to the existing framework evolved into a significantly more comprehensive regulatory overhaul and development, which was strongly supported by the Arctic Council Member States.89 The result was a new Chapter XIV in the International Convention for the
Throughout the work to negotiate and develop the Polar Code, the potential concerns of Indigenous peoples with respect to polar navigation were only considered briefly in the context of environmental protection provisions. Individual Inuit were brought to the IMO by environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGO s) to speak during the lunch hour of a Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) session on the Polar Code about their concerns, but were not given any formal platform upon which to present their perspectives; they did not participate in negotiations, nor did they prepare submissions to the Committees or Sub-Committees working on the Polar Code. Some of their interests were presented by ENGO s within these negotiations and submissions,94 which included, as articulated in the submissions, concerns
Although “Canada played an instrumental role in the development of the Polar Code” at the IMO,100 it was generally silent with respect to formally representing its Inuit treaty partners during this time. There are only three Canadian authored or co-authored submissions to IMO sessions during the development of the Polar Code that acknowledge ‘Arctic communities,’101 none of which reflect a recognition of the rights or potential roles of Indigenous peoples in the region. “This begs the question as to how the delegations of these Arctic rim countries were, if at all, advancing the interests, concerns or perspectives of Inuit specifically or Arctic Indigenous peoples generally.”102
It is important to note that Article 42 of UNDRIP calls upon specialized agencies of the United Nations to “promote respect for and full application
Even though Inuit were not permitted a direct voice at the Polar Code development tables, nor were they a part of Canada’s delegations to the IMO, they were still vocal with respect to their concerns and interests for Arctic shipping on the international stage, namely through the ICC and its Canadian branch. For example, in 2008, ICC Canada released a report in contribution to the AMSA project that provides Inuit perspectives on transportation in the Arctic, highlighting the linkages and connectivity between the lives and culture of Inuit.108 After the release of AMSA, ICC convened a workshop to understand and develop an Inuit response to the report, and to document Inuit sea ice use across Inuit Nunaat (the circumpolar Inuit homeland).109 They also prepared a second report on Inuit perspectives with respect to their use of the
Canada also seemed to be shifting how it considered and treated Inuit with regards to international shipping matters around this time; in a 2016 submission to MEPC co-authored with the United States, the Government of Canada portrayed its relationship with Indigenous peoples at the IMO in a different way.115 The item under discussion was the potential ban by the IMO for the use or carriage for use of HFO in the Arctic. A group of ENGO s had submitted a paper that outlined the risks of oil spills and subsequent impacts on ecosystems, wildlife, and the food security of Indigenous peoples, and argued for the need to safeguard coastal communities and Indigenous peoples.116 Canada and the United States agreed that remote Indigenous populations needed to be considered, but now articulated that both States intended to identify issues and possible options to address them through work with stakeholders, including
5 Towards a Renewed Inuit-Crown Relationship
The difference in Canada’s presentation of its relationship with Indigenous peoples at the IMO occurred at the same time as many other changes regarding the consideration of Indigenous peoples, their interests, and their rights that align with the election of the Liberal Government led by Justin Trudeau in October 2015, including the aforementioned change to fully adopt and implement UNDRIP. One of the consistent elements of this Liberal Government’s platform has been a renewal of the relationship between Indigenous peoples and Canada within the mandates of all federal ministers, officials, and other employees. One of the ways a renewed relationship is being fostered is through the creation of the Permanent Bilateral Mechanisms (PBM) with each of First Nations, Métis, and Inuit. In February 2017, the Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee (ICPC), the Inuit-specific PBM, was established117 to serve as a forum for Inuit and the Government of Canada to work together ‘to collaboratively identify and take action on shared priorities’ towards greater socioeconomic and cultural equity between Inuit and other Canadians. As the name would imply, the ICPC represents a partnership that is based on the recognition of the rights of Inuit as Indigenous peoples. Over the course of its first five years, the ICPC has made much progress towards its goals,118 the most recent of which is the co-development of the Inuit Nunangat Policy.119
On 21 April 2022, the Inuit Nunangat Policy was endorsed at the ICPC Leader’s Meeting and announced by the Prime Minister and the President of Inuit
5.1 A Renewed Relationship in the Context of Shipping Governance?
The cornerstone of the Government of Canada’s efforts to change its relationship with Indigenous peoples and coastal communities in the maritime context has been the Oceans Protection Plan (OPP). Launched shortly after the 2015 election, this CDN$1.5 billion investment aimed at four pillars of work: (1) developing a world-leading marine safety system through prevention and response; (2) preserving and restoring marine ecosystems; (3) establishing a strong evidence base to improve decision-making; and (4) strengthening Indigenous partnerships.122 In order to enable the engagements necessary to start to build relationships and perhaps even partnerships, both the federal government and Indigenous peoples were supported to participate. Transport Canada was particularly well-resourced, with funding to create six engagement hubs: one in Ottawa and each of its five regions (Pacific, Arctic, Ontario, Quebec, Atlantic). Public servants working within these hubs were supported with healthy budgets to travel to communities, and Indigenous peoples were supported to participate in engagements through the Indigenous and Local
The Arctic Engagement Hub was co-chaired by Transport Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard and had dedicated staff to support engagements and the relationship-building process, namely with Inuit. For its first year, this group traveled across Inuit Nunangat meeting with Inuit leaders to introduce themselves and to understand the interests of Inuit in the OPP and how they would like to be engaged over the program’s lifetime. The Arctic Engagement Hub also supported initiatives of the OPP in Transport Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard, including through internal workshops, liaising with Inuit partners to support the initiation and planning of events, accompanying initiatives to workshops and presentations to support the conversations and relationship-building process across the departments, and the internal dissemination of ‘What We Heard’ reports following engagements.124
All those working under the OPP that were to be engaging with Indigenous peoples, including those in the Arctic Engagement Hub, were given the opportunity to participate in a unique training opportunity over three, two-day sessions led by an Elder in a healing lodge. Instead of providing participants a step-by-step checklist for engaging Indigenous peoples, participants were asked to engage with the Indigenous ceremony of Circle and with concepts including Creator, the Ancestors, and the Universe. The training was personal and required participants to look inwards and reflect on feelings of judgement, leadership, and forgiveness, among others. “Bringing the personal into the professional learning space had a profound impact on many of the individuals that participated,” and subsequently on their own interactions with Indigenous peoples; it changed reconciliation from a federal agenda item to a personal obligation and responsibility.125
The outcomes of many of the OPP initiatives suggest a culture change may be underway within Canada’s maritime administration. One such initiative is Proactive Vessel Management (PVM), which aims to explore mechanisms “to reduce conflicts, improve safety, and provide environmental and cultural protection in local waters” with affected stakeholders, including Indigenous peoples.126 The initiative was launched in September 2017, and was advanced
Canada’s consideration of Inuit also changed in the context of its international work. As committed to in 2016,131 Inuit were engaged as part of the process to evaluate the potential positive and negative impacts of a ban on the use and carriage for use of HFO in Arctic waters.132 Inuit are considered throughout the assessment, which notes the downstream implications of environmental impacts for Inuit, and the potential consequences of increasing costs for industry on their own lives. This is a stark contrast from the lack of reference at all in Canadian submissions prior to the change in government in 2015. Under the OPP, Canada also invited a member of the Inuvialuit Game Council to participate as an observer to Canada’s delegation to the IMO for the 7th session of the Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and Response where the potential ban of HFO was being discussed.133
The domestic Arctic shipping regime has recently been amended to replace the Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations138 with the Arctic Shipping Safety and Pollution Prevention Regulations139 (ASSPPR) to implement the Polar Code in Canada. However, for various reasons, including a limited timeframe, the scope of the review was solely focused on Polar Code implementation.140 Therefore, outside the Polar Code amendments, the Arctic-specific regime in Canada continues to exist within the same framework as when it was developed, with Inuit portrayed as wards of the State as opposed to a people who could enter into agreements or arrangements with ministers with respect to the implementation of maritime legislation.141 As described by Fraser (Transport Canada), there is an acknowledgement by Transport Canada that the ASSPPR do not address all the environmental concerns of shipping in Canadian Arctic
6 Conclusion
Since colonization began, Inuit have been victims of State-led human rights violations. Federal organizations such as Transport Canada were directly involved in the assimilative programs of the federal government, including by removing children from their homes and delivering them to residential schools, relocating families to the High Arctic on false pretenses, and removing Inuit from their families to isolate them in tuberculosis sanatoria for undetermined amounts of time, sometimes until their far too early death. Inuit have tirelessly advocated for their rights to their culture, way of life and land at the national and international levels. They continue to advocate for their participation in domestic and international forums that affect their interests, including with regards to shipping throughout Inuit Nunaat. While Inuit have been faced with many barriers along this path, they have also achieved many successes, most recently being the granting of provisional consultative status at the IMO and the endorsement of the Inuit Nunangat Policy. This should serve as testament to the strength and perseverance of Inuit and to their ability to advance their interests and rights even in the face of adversity over generations.
We must be active participants in decolonizing Canada. We must challenge all institutions, governments and agencies to consciously and critically challenge the ideologies that govern them. We must critically examine our systems of laws and governance to identify how they exclude and oppress Indigenous Peoples. We must challenge and call on all leaders to protect and uphold the humanity and dignity of Indigenous … peoples. And when they fail to do so, we must hold them accountable.144
National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls volume 1a (Ottawa, 2019) [MMIWG], 78, citing Margaret Kovach, Indigenous Methodologies: Characteristics, Conversations, and Contexts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
Id.
Call to Action #57 of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) also calls for education on the “history and legacy of residential schools,” Indigenous rights and law, and Indigenous-Crown relations (TRC, Calls to Action (Winnipeg, 2015)).
See Lajeunesse and Lackenbauer in this volume.
Willem Rasing, Too Many People: Contact, Disorder, Change in an Inuit Society, 1822–2015, 2nd ed. (Iqaluit: Nunavut Arctic College Media, 2017).
TRC, The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada Volume 2, Canada’s Residential Schools: The Inuit and Northern Experience (Winnipeg: 2015).
Id., 39.
Id., 17.
Id., 33.
Id., 27.
Id., 38.
Id.
Id., 51.
Id., 54.
Id., 52.
Id., 82.
Id., 83.
Id., 87.
Id., 88.
Id., 99.
Id.
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), The High Arctic Relocation: A Reporting on the 1953–55 Relocation (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996), 43.
Id., 42.
Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC), Submission of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Inuit Tapiriiksat Kanatami, 1994), 96.
RCAP (n 22).
Id.
Id., 75.
Id., 52.
Id., 53, 133.
“The government did not conduct extensive or systematic surveys of game resources in the area” prior to actioning this plan, and soon after the relocation “government officials were beginning to express concern that perhaps the game in the area would not support more people.” (Id., 110).
Id., 96.
Id., 36–37.
Id., 95.
Id., 27.
ITC (n 24), p. 96.
RCAP (n 22), p. 25.
Id., 74.
ITC (n 24), p. 96.
RCAP (n 22), p. 89.
Id.
Id., 150.
Id., 16.
Id., 69.
Id., 160.
Id., 151.
MMIWG (n 1), p. 307.
Id., 271.
Id., 307.
Id.
TRC (n 6), p. 74. Inuit, today, continue to consistently experience higher rates of tuberculosis than any other group in Canada; in 2016, “the rate of TB among Inuit was almost 300 times higher than the rate in the Canadian-born, non-Indigenous population” (Canada’s Chief Public Health Officer (CPHO), The Time Is Now: Chief Public Health Officer Spotlight on Eliminating Tuberculosis in Canada (Ottawa: Public Health Agency of Canada, 2018), 8).
MMIWG (n 1), p. 307.
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), Inuit Tuberculosis Elimination Framework (Ottawa, 2018), 8.
MMIWG (n 1), p. 475.
ITK (n 53), p. 8; CPHO (n 50), p. 7.
MMIWG (n 1), p. 475.
ITK (n 52), p. 8.
RCAP (n 22), p. 39.
Id.
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) 1982, c 11, s 35.
Id., s 25.
Department of Justice, Principles Respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous Peoples (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2018), 3.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007) [UNDRIP].
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, ECOSOC Resolution 1982/34, UN Doc E/RES/1982/34 (1982), para 2.
Asbjørne Eide, “The Indigenous Peoples, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” in Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, eds., Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2009), 32.
Erica-Irene A Daes, “The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations to the Genesis and Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” in eds., Charters and Stavenhagen (n 64), 48.
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), Partnering with Indigenous Peoples: Experiences and Practices (no date), 6.
UNDRIP (n 62), Article 43.
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Report of the UNPFII on its 10th Session, UN Doc E/2011/43-E/C.19/2011/14 (2011), para 25.
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Progress Report on the Study of Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-making, UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2010/2 (2010), para 34; UNGA, Final Report of the Study on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-making, UN Doc A/HRC/18/42 (2011), para 20; James Anaya, “The Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era,” in eds., Charters and Stavenhagen (n 64), 184.
UNGA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples by James Anaya, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34 (2009), para 41.
“Canada’s Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (12 November 2010) archived at Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1621701138904.
Carolyn Bennett, Announcement of Canada’s Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Speaking Notes for the Honourable Carolyn Bennett, Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs for the UNPFII (New York: United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 2016); Governor General of Canada, A Stronger and More Resilient Canada, Speech from the Throne to Open the Second Session of the Forty-third Parliament of Canada (Ottawa, 2020).
SC 2021, c 14.
Id., Preamble, para 1.
Id., Preamble, para 13.
MMIWG (n 1).
The International Maritime Organization was originally called the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). It was established by the Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 6 March 1948, 289 UNTS 3 and 1520 UNTS 297 which entered into force on 17 March 1958. The Convention was amended to the Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 9 November 1977, 1276 UNTS 468, and the name of IMCO was changed to the International Maritime Organization in 1982.
For example: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 November 1974 (in force 25 May 1980), 1184 UNTS 2, as amended [SOLAS]; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973, 1340 UNTS 184, as amended by the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 17 February 1978 (both in force 2 October 1983), 1340 UNTS 61 [MARPOL].
RSC 1985, c A-12 [AWPPA].
Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters, IMO Doc MSC/Circ.1056, MEPC/Circ.399 (23 December 2002).
Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, IMO Resolution Doc A.1024 (26) (2 December 2009).
Guidelines on Voyage Planning for Passenger Ships Operating in Remote Areas, IMO Resolution A.999(25) (29 November 2007) [Guidelines on Passenger Ships in Remote Areas].
The Arctic Council was established in 1996 as an intergovernmental and political forum where Arctic States (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Russia) and Indigenous peoples (Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council) promote and practice cooperation and coordination on common Arctic issues, particularly those surrounding sustainable development and environmental protection.
Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report (April 2009).
Louie Porta et al., “Shipping corridors as a framework for advancing marine law and policy in the Canadian Arctic,” Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 22 (2017): 63, at 81.
Arctic Council (n 84), p. 6.
Id., 100.
See note 85.
Aldo Chircop, “Jurisdiction over Ice-Covered Areas and the Polar Code: An Emerging Symbiotic Relationship?” Journal of International Maritime Law 22 (2016): 275, at 286.
SOLAS (n 78).
MARPOL (n 78).
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), IMO Resolution MSC.385(94) (21 November 2014, effective 1 January 2017); Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, IMO Resolution MSC.386(94) (21 November 2014, effective 1 January 2017); Amendments to MARPOL Annexes I, II, IV and V, IMO Resolution MEPC.265(68) (15 May 2015, effective 1 January 2017).
Introduced through amendments to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping, 7 July 1978 (in force 28 April 1984), 1361 UNTS 2 (in force 28 April 1984), as amended) [STCW Convention] and the Seafarers’ Training Certification and Watchkeeping Code (STCW Convention, Annex, as amended).
WWF, Work Programme of the Committee and Subsidiary Bodies: Mandatory requirements for polar shipping, IMO Doc MEPC 59/20/7 (2009); FOEI et al., Proposed Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Shipping management issues to be addressed, IMO Doc DE 53/18/3 (2009); FOEI et al., Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Additional MARPOL provisions for the Polar Code, IMO Doc DE 54/13/8 (2010); FOEI et al., Proposed Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Wider environmental provisions for the Polar Code, IMO Doc DE 54/13/9 (2010); WWF et al., Reports of Sub-Committees: Outcome of DE 55: Arctic shipping and cetaceans, Recommendations regarding mitigation measures and the development of the mandatory Polar Code, IMO Doc MEPC 62/11/6 (2011); FOEI et al., Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Heavy fuel oil use in Arctic waters, IMO Doc DE 56/10/10 (2011); FOEI et al., Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Developing a Strong Polar Code, IMO Doc DE 56/INF.14 (2011).
DE 53/18/3 (n 94), para 6.
DE 56/INF.14 (n 94), Annex, p. 21.
DE 56/10/10 (n 94), para 11; FOEI, WWF and Pacific Environment, Any Other Business: Arctic indigenous food security and shipping, IMO Doc MEPC 70/17/10 (2016), para 3.
MEPC 62/11/6 (n 94), para 14.
Dalee Sambo Dorough, “The Rights, Interests and Role of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants” in Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States, eds., Robert C Beckman, Tore Henriksen, Kristine Dalaker Kraabel, Erik J Molenaar, and J Ashley Roach (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 68, at 99.
Drummond Fraser, “A Change in the Ice Regime: Polar Code Implementation in Canada,” in Governance of Arctic Shipping, eds., Aldo Chircop, Floris Goerlandt, Claudio Aporta, and Ronald Pelot (Springer Polar Sciences, 2020), 285, at 285.
One submission in 2009 mentions subsistence hunting in the context of the impacts of air emissions on the environment (United States and Canada, Interpretations of, and Amendments to, MARPOL and Related Instruments: Proposal to Designate an Emission Control Area for Nitrogen Oxides, Sulphur Oxides and Particulate Matter, IMO Doc MEPC 59/6/5 (2009)) and two in 2014 regarding the need to ensure that the Polar Code did not have the effect of reducing supply to Arctic communities by introducing an administrative burden so great that companies either no longer consider charters for Arctic voyages and/or cannot meet deadlines (Canada, Liberia, and Marshall Islands, Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Reduction of Administrative Burden, IMO Doc MEPC 67/9/11 (2014)), or because they are unable to source a crew that meets training requirements (Canada, Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments: Draft International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) – Clarification of Certification and Consideration of Administrative Burden, IMO Doc MSC 94/3/11 (2014)).
Dorough (n 99), p. 100.
ECOSOC (n 68), para 31; noted in Annexes 17–37 in IMO, Report of the MEPC on its 62nd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 62/24/Add.1 (2011), Annex 20, 3.
This wording first arose in IMO, Report of the MSC on its 93rd Session, IMO Doc MSC 93/22/Add.3 (2014).
This wording first arose in IMO, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, IMO Doc SDC 1/3 (2013), Annex, 49.
Guidelines for Voyage Planning, 25 November 1999, IMO Resolution A.893(21), IMO Doc A 2/Res.893 (4 February 2000).
Guidelines on Passenger Ships in Remote Areas (n 82).
ICC Canada, The Sea Ice is Our Highway (Ottawa: Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2008).
ICC Canada, Circumpolar Inuit Response to Arctic Shipping Workshop Proceedings (Ottawa: Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2013).
ICC Canada, The Sea Ice Never Stops (Ottawa: Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2014).
See Ell-Kanayuk and Aporta in this volume.
The Pikialasorsuaq is the North Water Polynya that lies north of Baffin Bay between Nunavut and Greenland. A polynya is a body of year-round open water, and as such, is often highly important ecologically.
ICC, “Inuit led Pikialasorsuaq Commission to Study the Important Northwater Polyna”, ICC Press Release (19 January 2016).
Relations with non-governmental organizations, IMO Resolution A.1169(32) annexed in the Report on External Relations with Non-governmental Organizations, IMO Doc A 32/20(c) (15 November 2021). For more, see Ell-Kanayuk and Aporta in this volume.
Canada and United States, Any Other Business; Comments on document MEPC 70/17/4 – Heavy fuel oil use by vessels in Arctic waters, IMO Doc MEPC 70/17/11 (2016).
Id.
The ICPC was established with the signing of the Inuit Nunangat Declaration on Inuit-Crown Partnership (Office of the Prime Minister, Inuit Nunangat Declaration on Inuit-Crown Partnership (Ottawa: Office of the Prime Minister, 2017)) by the Prime Minister of Canada, the President of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, and the leaders of the four Inuit land claims organizations in Canada: Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, Makivik Corporation, and the Nunatsiavut Government.
For details, please see “New permanent bilateral mechanisms,” Government of Canada, last modified 21 April 2022, https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1499711968320/1529105436687?wbdisable=true.
Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, Inuit Nunangat Policy (2022), https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1650556354784/1650556491509.
Office of the Prime Minister, Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee Endorses Historic Inuit Nunangat Policy to Better Support Inuit Self-determination (Ottawa: Office of the Prime Minister, 2022).
Inuit Nunangat Policy (n 119), para 3.1.4.
Office of the Prime Minister, Canada’s Oceans Protection Plan (Ottawa: Office of the Prime Minister, 2016).
Leah Beveridge, Demystifying Shipping Governance in Canada: Engagement of Indigenous Peoples (Clear Seas Centre for Responsible Marine Shipping, 2021).
Robert Brooks, former co-chair of the Arctic Engagement Hub, Canadian Coast Guard, interview with author, Ottawa, 21 September 2021.
Beveridge (n 123).
Transport Canada, Draft National Framework: Proactive Vessel Management (2019) online, p. 5.
Cambridge Bay.
Beveridge (n 123).
Canadian Coast Guard, Vessels Intending to Navigate in Kitikmeot Region in Canada’s Northern Waters, Notices to Mariners 1 to 46, s A3 Notice 7C (Montreal: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2021).
Beveridge (n 123).
MEPC 70/17/11 (n 115).
Canada, Development of Measures to Reduce Risks of Use and Carriage of Heavy Fuel Oil as Fuel by Ships in Arctic Waters: Assessment of the benefits and impacts associated with a ban on the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil as fuel by ships operating in the Arctic, IMO Doc PPR 7/INF.16 (2019), para 9.
IMO, List of Participants at PPR for its 7th Session, IMO Doc PPR 7/INF.1 (2020).
SC 2001, c 26 [CSA 2001].
SC 2019, c 1 [WAHVA].
CSA 2001 (n 134), ss 10(1)(c); id., s 6(1). The only exception is section 11 of WAHVA, which pertains to the exclusion of vessels and wrecks from the provisions of WAHVA by means of an order.
AWPPA (n 79), Preamble, para 2.
CRC c 535 (repealed).
SOR/2017-286.
Fraser (n 100).
The CSA 2001 (n 134) and WAHVA (n 135) apply in arctic waters, and therefore Inuit are able to enter into agreements with the Ministers with respect to exercising powers or performing duties under these two Acts.
Fraser (n 100).
“Debate and Direction of Arctic Shipping Policy”, Transport Canada, accessed 9 June 2022, https://tc.canada.ca/en/marine-transportation/arctic-shipping/debate-direction-arctic-shipping-policy.
MMIWG (n 1), p. 10.