3.1 Safety

The number of Canadian agencies, departments and local community volunteers involved in ensuring safe, efficient shipping in the Arctic is staggering. In fact, there are roughly a dozen federal departments/agencies that are responsible for the governance of maritime activities in Canada. According to Meagan Greentree and Aldo Chircop, however, Canada is an outlier.⁹ Whereas many States have one agency responsible for maritime administration,¹⁰ Canada has multiple actors. This means, for example, that to obtain a permit as a passenger vessel to navigate Canada’s Arctic waters, ship operators must seek permission from representatives of the federal government, territorial governments and rights holders (Indigenous peoples).¹¹

If we focus on safety issues only, the referent of concern is the protection of human lives and secondarily, environment and wildlife (Table 7.1). The activities within the safety column include waterways maintenance, search and rescue (SAR), oil spill cleanup, charting activities, ice management services, assistance to communities and vessels in time of natural or other disasters, and education, outreach and certification. The immediate concern of safety is consequence management. If there was fault, criminal activity or even malfeasance, investigations, prosecutions and seizures are secondary to survival and often the domain of other agencies. Consequently, the organizations charged with safety generally do not have officer powers that allow for the enforcement of laws and regulations. Rather, their primary focus is on saving lives and protecting the environment. We anchor our analysis on the protection of crews and passengers especially.

Some of the safety agencies include CIS (for ice condition reports), Transport Canada (for regulations), CHS (for continued charting of the NWP), the CCG (for maritime search and rescue, aids to navigation, Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS), icebreaking services, as well as primary responsibility for oil spill cleanup in the Arctic when the polluter is not known, unwilling or unable to assist). The most likely responders to provide community and small vessel safety services in the Arctic, however, are local community groups via the CCG Auxiliary and Inshore Rescue Boat student program. As well, the Indigenous Guardians program will begin training soon, and the Inuit Marine Monitoring Program (IMMP) assists by establishing land-based AIS. Surprisingly, the majority of small fishing vessel SAR and community-based disaster assistance support is provided by local volunteers, not paid professionals.¹² Larger vessels, especially cruise ships, or those carrying dangerous materials, require rescue by the CCG, often with assistance from the CAF and very occasionally, vessels of opportunity.

The volunteer auxiliary arm of the CCG is a case in point.¹³ It provides maritime SAR from local Arctic hamlets. The CCG has observed areas of higher SAR cases in western Hudson Bay, Gjoa Haven, the Labrador coast, Iqaluit and the Beaufort Sea. Rankin Inlet has a CCG Inshore Rescue Boat Station operated during the summer months by Indigenous post-secondary students under the supervision of an experienced CCG officer. In 2020, the CCG Auxiliary responded to 32 incidents, the Inshore Rescue Boat Station responded to 6 SAR cases, and the CCG icebreakers (the professionals) to 12.¹⁴ Since 2017, the CCG has provided vessels under the Oceans Protection Plan to hamlets across the Arctic in recognition of the increased number of SAR incidents, and to support their participation in the Auxiliary.¹⁵ These statistics, however, need to be put into context because of ‘station generated statistics.’ When a station is opened, their new station statistics increase dramatically because they are there, not because the incidents suddenly increased. Local SAR cases, however, are less likely to be reported to the federal system unless there is an auxiliary unit in place.

The top ten Arctic Canada cruise vessel destinations in terms of passenger/crew member movements accounted for 50.1 percent of the movements into/out of hamlets in 2019. They include Pond Inlet, Beechey Island, Dundas Harbour, Croker Bay, Cambridge Bay, Demarcation Point, Ulukhaktuk, Gjoa Haven, Iqaluit, and Queen’s Harbour which is equivalent to 38,552 tourists and crew members.¹⁶ (Recall, the population of the Canadian Arctic is approximately 135,000.) Cruise vessel transits were banned for the 2020 and 2021 summer shipping seasons because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The CCG has found that there are approximately five times more SAR incidents than are reported to the federal SAR system (Table 7.2).¹⁷ At the same time, areas of historical elevated risk are subject to Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) notification. The CCG is targeting these areas for additional CCG auxiliary units (i.e., trained volunteers).

The CCG is finding success by assigning the same CCG contacts to the same community year-after-year. Further, the CCG is working to reduce the administrative burden and provide administrative training to volunteers compiling claims and compensation reports.

The Indigenous Guardians program is a federal government-funded pilot project to empower Indigenous peoples to monitor and steward resources.¹⁸ While some of the projects are land-based, many are marine-based given the importance of the marine environment to the cultural and economic well-being of Arctic residents. Via data collection on species, as well as tracking fishing and hunting activities, the local communities are often the first to learn of and respond to accidents and disasters. For example, when the MS Clipper Adventurer ran aground in 2010 near Kugluktuk, Nunavut, the passengers were evacuated to the community, where they were fed and sheltered.¹⁹

The IMMP takes an innovative approach to vessel monitoring in Nunavut that couples Inuit marine monitors with real-time vessel tracking technology, using AIS, especially for smaller fishing vessels. IMMP was developed because there has been a recent increase in shipping around Nunavut. With this increase, the communities have many concerns, such as potential accidents, increased pollution and oil spills, wildlife disturbance, and interference with hunting and traditional practices. The monitoring program helps Nunavut communities implement policy guidelines for the NWP. The program also provides Inuit with a greater role in shipping management and monitoring. The IMMP collects information of ships travelling through the Arctic, including:

1. –ship characteristics such as the vessel type, colour, and flag;
2. –wildlife, noise, and pollution concerns;
3. –location, speed, and heading of vessels;
4. –behaviour, activity and timing of ships;
5. –any suspicious vessels in the area; and
6. –concerns identified by the community.²⁰

While approximately 14.8 percent of Canadian Arctic waters have been surveyed to either modern or adequate standards, most of the surveyed area is found along the low-impact shipping corridors where the Government of Canada wishes vessels to transit to minimize potential effects of shipping on wildlife and respect culturally and ecologically sensitive areas.²¹ That means, outside of the corridors, there is a high likelihood that there will be insufficient bathymetric and other navigational data. There have been only three groundings, outside well-charted corridors, of passenger vessels and one chartered yacht in the Canadian Arctic since 1996 with no lives lost,²² because most ships navigate only along charted paths. The Hanseatic ran aground in Simpson Strait in 1996,²³ the Clipper Adventurer ran aground in 2010 near Kugluktuk, and the Akademik Ioffe ran aground in 2018 off the Gulf of Boothia, Nunavut. All of these vessels ventured outside of chartered waters, failed to take additional precautions and made assumptions about the navigability of the narrows. Safety concerns associated with groundings, therefore, are associated with vessels that ignore the warnings and information provided by the Government of Canada and pursue routes outside of tested transit ways. However, it might also be a case of sheer luck that there have been so few disasters. The potential for complicated and dangerous SAR scenarios increases as vessel traffic increases and because professional rescue services are often very far away.

Efforts to augment CHS surveys have been focused primarily on the main shipping corridors, especially those used to resupply Arctic hamlets, with no timeline for completion in other areas of the Arctic.²⁴ The need for multiple, verifiable and government documented soundings, coupled with the limited shipping season compared to the size and scope of the area, means that the NWP likely will never be fully charted. However, experienced, professional mariners are expected to stay within chartered waters. The most likely sources of future groundings and disasters are with irresponsible seafarers who may succumb to providing ‘never seen before views’ and fishers searching for new fishing grounds.

Of course, in most safety incidents the shipping operators themselves are the first to take action to mitigate damage and loss of life. The Polar Code, as implemented by regulations under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, and the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) provide standards for navigational and other safety equipment that must be onboard ships.²⁵ They are critical to avoiding accidents in the first place. Even the smallest commercial fishing vessels must comply with Transport Canada regulations, including being equipped with specific navigational, life saving and fire-fighting equipment and the hope is that the 2012 Cape Town Agreement, which is designed for fishing vessels, will come into force soon.²⁶ The Cape Town Agreement is an internationally-binding instrument that includes mandatory international requirements for stability and associated seaworthiness, machinery and electrical installations, life-saving equipment, communications capabilities and fire protection, as well as fishing vessel construction. Whether or not it is sufficient for polar conditions, however, is unclear.

In addition to regulations, shore-based and floating navigational aids are in place to support small vessels. Several CCG navigational aids have been changed to be operational all year so that users can take advantage of them during winter snowmobile operations. With more unpredictable ice movement, vessel and snowmobile operators can find themselves in trouble with no cellphone coverage and hundreds of kilometres away from rescue services.

Some of the key safety responsibilities of ship operators are to ensure that they have the latest ice conditions information, up-to-date charts, including the CCG’s Notice to Mariners or NOTMAR (for archival information), Navigational Warnings (NAVWARN s)²⁷ and Notice to Shipping (NOTSHIP), which provide necessary information to update all charts and nautical publications, advise of new initiatives, services and important announcements concerning the maritime community. Ships entering Arctic waters are expected to have all of this information on hand prior to their voyage. If they are not fully equipped, including with all documents, they are deemed to be unseaworthy, which has consequences for marine insurance cover. Circumstances en route can change, however, and if new information is needed while in the Arctic, difficulties can arise. Satellite linkups are often necessary to access government information, which not all vessels have, especially smaller ones.

The other safety responsibility of ship operators is to have sufficiently trained officers and crew to operate in ice-infested waters. This can take decades of practice. Ice navigation and ice piloting require weeks of training, months of in-ice ship operation and certification. The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) and STCW Code²⁸ require specific bridge officers on certain ships to possess certificates of proficiency in either polar waters basic or advanced training, and experience navigating in polar waters is required before the advanced certificate can be issued. However, these requirements do not specifically ensure competence in operating in ice-covered waters. The only internationally recognized certification in ice navigation is provided by the Nautical Institute Ice Navigator Certificates. Applicants must possess the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) STCW other recognized mariner bridge watchkeeping officer qualification and have completed both a Level 1 and Level 2 course and accumulated sufficient and acceptable watchkeeping time in ice-covered waters.²⁹

Transport Canada delegates Marine Safety Inspectors to provide oversight on regulated vessels within the Canadian Arctic using statutory inspections, risk-based compliance inspections, port State control inspections of foreign vessels and by providing oversight to vessels transiting through ice using the Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System (AIRSS) or equivalent risk indexing systems. When a non-compliance or violation is identified, Transport Canada Marine Safety Inspectors use a scaled approach to choose the right enforcement instrument and penalty amount. They may issue a verbal warning, written warning, assurance of compliance or administrative monetary penalty (AMP). In certain cases, where appropriate based on the violation or non-compliance, Transport Canada may pursue penalties based on a summary conviction in a court of law. It should be noted that AMP s are not an enforcement tool under the AWPPA or Arctic Shipping Safety and Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASSPPR) as those violations are not listed in the Administrative Monetary Penalties and Notices (CSA 2001) Regulations.³⁰

3.2 Security

Security issues are often related to a violation of Canadian laws, damage to property and infrastructure, or hybrid tactics, such as illegal surveillance while posing as a research vessel or smuggling goods or people. The agencies assigned to the security portfolio generally have officer powers, meaning they can enforce Canadian laws and seize a vessel and/or arrest and/or prosecute individuals and entities. Agencies connected to security and constabulary functions include the RCMP, Transport Canada, and fishery officers from DFO. Sometimes members of the CAF, RCMP and Transport Canada are given temporary fisheries’ officer powers. Additionally, as of 2019, the CCG has enforcement powers to address damaged or hazardous vessels. A hazardous vessel is defined as one that could cause harm to infrastructure, the environment, economic interests of the public, a vessel significantly degraded, dismantled or incapable of being used for safe navigation—the latter being in the purview of the CCG.³¹ Under the Wrecked, Abandoned, or Hazardous Vessels Act (WAHVA), CCG has powers to address hazardous vessels³² by providing risk-based assessments and enforcing directions to shipowners or take appropriate actions on hazardous vessels (e.g., fix, move, or remove and dispose of vessel).

Canada has more than fifty regulations under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 (CSA 2001) alone.³³ The main legislation of concern include the CSA 2001, Coasting Trade Act, Marine Liability Act, and Marine Transportation Security Act, and four Arctic-specific legislation; namely, the AWPPA, Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NORDREG), Shipping Safety Control Zone Order and the ASSPPR.³⁴

As a coastal State, Canada regulates navigation of domestic and foreign vessels within Canada’s territorial waters, including the coastal waters surrounding the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. As a flag State, Canada subjects Canadian flagged ships to Canadian safety, pollution prevention and security rules and standards wherever they are. Transport Canada and the DFO and its special operating agency, the CCG, combined have the regulatory mandate to implement various risk mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood and consequences of a vessel running aground in Arctic waters, stop IUU fishing and pollution.³⁵ As noted in the safety section above, regulations do not ensure that accidents and dangerous navigation and/or perilous conditions disappear, however. There are of course additional regulations of goods and people which fall to the CBSA, Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada and the RCMP.

Transport Canada conducts port State control inspections of foreign vessels in accordance with Paris and Tokyo MOU s and inspects domestic vessels under the flag State control program. Transport Canada also carries out a risk-based inspection when required, under the CSA 2001 and the AWPPA. Vessels entering the Canadian Arctic are subject to reporting requirements and are monitored throughout their passage. Transport Canada maintains 24/7 duty officers monitoring the shipping traffic in close conjunction with the CCG and other government agencies. Prior to entry into Canadian waters, operators are required to report to Transport Canada advising that the vessel meets requirements such as being in possession of a Polar Ship Certificate (which indicates the vessel meets Polar Code requirements) and bridge watchkeeping officers meet minimum Polar Code training requirements for the vessel and ice conditions expected.³⁶ Any deficiencies are required to be reported, but this of course depends upon the truthfulness and understanding of the operator. Operators new to polar operations may be simply ignorant of some of the fine details of regulatory requirements. Without a physical inspection, intentional or unintentional non-compliance may not be caught in the reporting process. Nevertheless, regulations like NORDREG,³⁷ which require ships to provide important identifying information prior to entering the Arctic, coupled with AIS and the other statutes listed above, allow security organizations to identify potential vessels of interest. Vessels of interest (VOI) are vessels of potential police, intelligence or counter-intelligence value because of a vessel’s registry, cargo, route, behaviour or activities.³⁸ Screening and risk assessment of all vessels allows security agencies to direct their surveillance and enforcement efforts more efficiently toward those constituting a threat.

Cruise ship operators, for example, are eager for early detection and early processing of international passenger lists. When the Crystal Serenity made its voyages through the NWP in 2016 and 2017, carrying nearly 1,800 passengers and crew from around the world, the challenge became screening everyone by CBSA personnel in the Arctic. With no permanent CBSA offices in the Arctic and unable to pre-screen from Alaska, the decision was made for CBSA officers to board the Crystal Serenity in Ulukhaktok, NWT on the west coast of Victoria Island to process everyone. This meant that the Crystal Serenity was already deep into Canadian territory. For companies like Crystal Cruises, which are rule abiding, and because passengers had also been processed by United States’ officials in Alaska, this was an acceptable risk. For nefarious companies and actors, this is a potential loophole. For non-commercial vessels carrying fewer than 50 passengers and crew, the CBSA has developed a Private Vessel Remote Clearance (PVRC) project to address the challenges of reporting in remote areas of the Arctic region.³⁹ The PVRC pilot project is intended to simplify and expedite the clearance process for non-commercial pleasure craft looking to enter Canadian waters in the Baffin Island and Northwest Passage region of Nunavut. Of course, the PVRC project is dependent on the compliance of scrupulous operators to pass along the correct and authentic papers for processing.

As there are numerous national, territorial and regional regulations that are essential for passenger vessels operating in the Arctic, Transport Canada created the Guidelines for Passenger Vessels Operating in the Canadian Arctic to highlight the myriad regulations and considerations.⁴⁰ For example, the Guidelines outline some basic rules for cruise ships that offer helicopter rides for passengers for sightseeing. They bring together the requirements of seventeen different agencies and responsibility centre requirements. Thirty-eight separate acts, or regulations are listed, and many apply to vessels other than those of the passenger/cruise/expedition sector operating in the Arctic.

Finally, fishing vessels engaging in illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing can be prosecuted thanks to aerial surveillance patrols conducted by DFO and Transport Canada’s National Aeronautical Surveillance Program (which is a more flexible instrument for monitoring and supporting prosecution of violations in many domains regulated by the Government of Canada). In April 2022, for example, a Nunavut Court of Justice sentenced a man under the Fisheries Act for fishing illegally.⁴¹ Prosecuting violators of safety, environment and navigation violations in small vessels, however, can be challenging given their size and the fact that many are not required to have AIS. Education, outreach and training are important tools used in local communities to make operators aware of the regulations.

3.3 Defence

The defence portfolio of issues is seemingly bottomless. The CAF has the remit to defend the State of Canada with deadly force if necessary.⁴² Most of the time, especially in the Arctic, it serves in a support capacity for other government agencies. Nevertheless, the calls for more CAF presence in the Arctic are growing from both external and internal sources. Externally, as members of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and as a close ally of the United States, increased attention by these alliances and/or the United States to the Arctic maritime domain requires Canada to follow in kind or at least satisfy important allies that it is not a weak link in the partnership.

Given the rise in strategic competition between the United States, Russia and China, “command of the commons”⁴³ (or domination of the world ocean) becomes vital to ensure deterrence, global reach and, for the United States, continued hegemony. Given the proximity of Russia to the United States via the Arctic, North America is an avenue of approach for any air or marine-based attacks. While a ‘hot’ conflict in or about the Arctic Ocean is unlikely and all eight Arctic States and observer States readily point to various international agreements to ensure that the Arctic remains rules-based, all domain awareness is the goal of all States to deter potential State and non-State adversaries.

The CAF is instrumental in providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) information (coordinated acquisition and processing of data and intelligence) to support command and alliance decision-making. Via its ships, satellites, radars, and intelligence, the CAF and its various capabilities are an important tool of deterrence. The CAF also depends heavily on the information from civilian agencies and other allied partners. Not only does the CAF need to have a common operating picture of the Arctic and all activities within the (especially Canadian) Arctic, but it needs to be able to defeat any threats if detection, deterrence and denial tactics fail. As the United States has pivoted its attention to the Arctic (as evidenced by every US service issuing an Arctic strategy),⁴⁴ Canada can expect pressure to ensure ISR and defeat capabilities are sufficient to protect Canada and its allies. RCN frigates, coastal defence vessels, and submarines are not capable of operating in ice-infested waters. They are open-water platforms that are not suited for warfighting in an Arctic context. It is also unclear if the RCN’s future platforms (the surface combatants and Protecteur class joint support ship) will be suitable in ice-infested waters either. The latter two, however, are on the ‘pointy end’ of Canada’s deterrence and defeat capabilities and will be used to enhance Canada’s support to NORAD and NATO operations.

Internal Canadian agency and government requests account for most of the increased calls for more CAF presence in the Arctic. Municipal, territorial governments and other federal agencies can turn to the CAF for assistance. The CAF is meant to be the last resort. The reasons for the national calls for assistance from the CAF are two-fold. First, the CAF is the only agency in Canada with the air-lift capacity (for goods and personnel) and until very recently, limited maritime capacity, to reach the Arctic. Second and related, CAF personnel are the only public servants with unlimited liability—they can be sent into dangerous situations that may result in death.⁴⁵ While police, fire and search and rescue personnel do put their lives on the line every day, legally they cannot be forced to act when they know it will result in death. Given the vast distances and lack of infrastructure and rescue capabilities in the Arctic, it is this latter expectation that is the most worrying regarding the expanded scope of operations in the Arctic. While the unlimited liability has never been resorted to, CAF members accept and understand that they are subject to being lawfully ordered into harm’s way under conditions that could lead to the loss of their lives.

The CAF (and particularly the Royal Canadian Air Force) has the primary responsibility of providing aeronautical SAR services (searching for a downed aircraft for example) and the CCG is responsible for maritime SAR services. (RCMP, Parks Canada officials and local volunteers are responsible for land SAR operations.) SAR responses are always jointly coordinated by RCAF and CCG personnel at JRCC s and they employ whatever assets—military, civilian, commercial, auxiliary, vessels or aircraft of opportunity—that are available to assist in saving lives.

4.1 Safety First

Let’s begin with the safety portfolio. Search and rescue in the Arctic continues to be a mainly voluntary and civilian-led affair. With fewer than 135,000 people living in 40 percent of Canada’s land mass that contributes to the largest coastline in the world, without spending eye-watering amounts of money, there is no way to achieve southern levels of emergency service in Canada’s Arctic. Instead, as has been the trend, volunteers, with access to more equipment and surveillance and navigational aids to assist with small vessel responses, have been the pragmatic and practical solution. There are, however, restrictions as to what they can do, and the training is limited. Transport Canada, the CCG and CHS are working on a low-impact shipping corridors project that will provide preferred navigation routes through the NWP.⁴⁷ The routes, when deemed ‘completed,’ will be supported by navigational aids and adequately charted to modern standards, with SAR resources and services prepositioned. The voluntary compliance of use of these corridors is of particular concern to those living in the Arctic. And, of course, some vessels may choose to venture into unchartered waters for which there are much greater risks.

Assuming the Canadian government will never spend billions to preposition professional safety services within minutes of reaching any accident or disaster in the Arctic what is the solution? Partnerships and self-rescue.

At the international level, the CCG represents Canada on the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) which, until Russia’s attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, brought together all eight Arctic States to share best practices related to search and rescue, oil spill cleanup procedures and to promote safe, secure and environmentally responsible shipping in the Arctic.⁴⁸ The ACGF was created via a recommendation of the Arctic Council’s Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working group. The ACGF is chaired by the State which also chairs the Arctic Council (on hiatus since 3 March 2022). The ACGF met twice annually to share best practices and conduct a few tabletop exercises. Some State members of the ACGF have security and even defence organizations as their representatives, which is reflective of how they organize SAR activity nationally. All members agree, however, that defence issues are not discussed in this forum.

The 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue⁴⁹ and the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic⁵⁰ bring together the eight Arctic States to work on SAR and oil spill cleanup missions. The United States and Denmark (Greenland) are particularly important partners for Canada given the locations of entrance/exit of the NWP.

Of course, the closest rescuers are likely to be volunteers in hamlets along the NWP and vessels of opportunity in the area. The CCG has been working closely with many communities to provide training, establish auxiliaries and ease the administrative burden that inevitably comes with partnering with government agencies. Organizations, like the volunteer Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA), have been vital to SAR efforts everywhere in Canada, including the Arctic, but they are dedicated to land surveillance, not maritime surveillance. There are technical and capability limits as to what volunteers can provide, especially for large vessels and/or dangerous cargo.

The challenge, especially in the Canadian Arctic, is too few people in the hamlets, who are also often CAF Rangers (a reserve arm of the Army that contributes vital Indigenous and local knowledge to CAF exercises and operations), volunteer firefighters and emergency coordinators. In a crisis, the same people are often wearing multiple hats which means they can be overstretched very quickly. However, communities are organizing and receiving more training. For example, Kikkert et al. in this volume discuss training operations in the Kitikmeot region of Nunavut.

It is clear that ship operators are key to professional, secure and legal navigation in Canada’s Arctic. Vessel operators in the Arctic must prepare well in advance to ensure that their ship and crew are up to not only the regulatory requirements, but the geographic and meteorological conditions inherent in Arctic shipping. The Polar Code requires operational assessments to be completed, covering region and season of operation relative to specific ship capability prior to developing a Polar Waters Operations Manual (PWOM) to guide crew in risk mitigation and operations in polar waters.⁵¹ The PWOM is required to provide specific guidance on self-reliance in polar waters, keeping in mind the lack of infrastructure and potentially greater incident response time for SAR and environmental emergencies. Mitigation measures can include increased onboard capability (increased fuel capacity, survival equipment, voyage ‘duration’ ability, such as carriage of greater food stores) and the significant work the CCG does with cruise operators to ensure they are prepared. This includes tabletop and live exercises. Other mitigation measures, such as tandem operation of cruise/expedition vessels, which is common in the Antarctic, or as seen with the two voyages of the Crystal Serenity, or charter of an accompanying support ship, are best practices for Canada’s Arctic.

4.2 Complying with Regulations

As shipping numbers increase, more maritime enforcement will be expected to ensure that international and Canadian laws are respected. The promise of States to follow internationally negotiated treaties and respect the national jurisdiction of States, is said to be ‘challenged’ with a rise in new powers seeking to interpret differently or even rewrite some of the rules and/or non-State actors who benefit from operating illegally.⁵² Leaving aside the fuzziness of what the rules based international order is, which specific rules are included or the debate about its state of crisis,⁵³ we begin with the assumption that maritime and shipping laws in an Arctic context are desirable given the dangerous navigational conditions of Canadian Arctic waters that can create safety problems.

The other issue is that should Canadian laws become systematically violated (which is not the case currently), particularly if by State-sponsored actors, incidents can escalate to become a de facto challenge to Canadian sovereignty which could require a diplomatic, constabulary or, and as a very last option, a defence response. To date, there have been relatively few blatant violations of Canada’s Arctic specific maritime statutes and regulations. This is partly a function of the low number of commercial ships that navigate Canada’s Arctic waters and the general respect mariners have for the shipping laws in place. Despite certain States decrying the legality of Canada’s NORDREG vessel traffic system when first made mandatory⁵⁴ and the grumblings around the cost of compliance with the IMO’s now mandatory Polar Code, shipping in compliance with international standards is more cost effective than illegal shipping. However, that does not mean that this eliminates certain economic or political gains to be had by violating regulations.

Another issue is that many of the regulations are intended for large, commercial vessels. In some areas of regulation, small private, recreational and fishing vessels lack similar robust regulatory guidance beyond safety requirements and fishing quotas.

Canada’s Marine Personnel Regulations are currently under revision to incorporate new polar waters training and certification requirements.⁵⁵ Until the coming into force of the amended Marine Personnel Regulations, the following interim measures have been put in place: Since 1 July 2018, basic and advanced certificate of proficiency for personnel on ships operating in polar waters has been required for deck officers at the operational and at the management level.⁵⁶ These are regulatory measures implementing the amended STCW Convention and the accompanying STCW Code to address polar seafaring.⁵⁷ It will be mandatory for all personnel on ships operating in polar waters to be familiar with the procedures and equipment contained or referenced.⁵⁸ These STCW requirements, however, do not adequately address the necessity to have acceptable competence operating ships in ice-covered waters.

The issue of compliance with regulations is multifaceted. For the flag State, compliance starts with ship registration and continues with regular ship surveys. For the port State, compliance is based on inspections to ensure observance of the key safety and security regulations. Substandard ships may be detained in port. The real weakness likely lies with the coastal State, that is, Canada in the Arctic. Canada relies on NORDREG reporting, but the requested information is minimal. Under the AWPPA and CSA 2001, the Minister is empowered to direct the movements of any ship, for example, to a port for inspection, but there are no ports in the Arctic.⁵⁹ Instead, what are needed are more inspections before ships enter Canadian Arctic waters, especially in the non-Arctic ‘staging’ ports (e.g., Halifax, St. John’s, and Quebec City).

Monitoring vessel movement via AIS is not sufficient to ensure regulatory compliance. Non-SOLAS vessels are not necessarily required to have AIS on board. And AIS can be switched off during transit by vessels that do not want to be monitored. AIS can provide awareness of vessel location and transit information, but it is not the entire answer. AIS only tells government officials where the vessels that are transmitting are physically located. It does not reveal anything about how well trained their crews are, or how compliant the ship is. Finally, an AIS signal is not infallible (a tug was recently reported as noncompliant because the AIS signal indicated it was running in excess of a local speed limit, which it was, to get to a ship dragging anchor and prevent an environmental catastrophe).⁶⁰ Separating the false positives from true crises often requires additional, direct information. However, volunteer ‘monitoring’ from communities is not without its issues, mainly due to a lack of response capabilities.

4.3 Avoiding Geopolitical Mishaps, Accidents and Incidents

The Department of Defence and CAF have one of the largest budgets of any of the federal agencies and have 64+ years of experience defending the Arctic aerospace approaches to North America with the United States via NORAD. Given current geopolitical tensions, when ‘more’ needs to be done in the Arctic, the Canadian public seems to turn to its military forgetting that many of the civilian agencies and local communities are key providers of vital security responses. Nevertheless, many of the legacy gravel runways and NORAD radar systems, which benefit civilian operations as well, were initially constructed mainly by the United States during World War II and the Cold War. Canada has a very modest military footprint in the Arctic centred around its Joint Task Force North Headquarters in Yellowknife and the Rangers—part of the Reserves of the Canadian Army—who help to patrol remote areas of Canada, including in the Arctic, and support the CAF on deployments in the Arctic.⁶¹

The RCN has only recently returned to operating in the Arctic outside of Arctic military exercises, such as the Operation NANOOK series.⁶² The RCN has never had a purpose-built Arctic ship⁶³ until now with the Harry DeWolf-class offshore patrol ships, but it is only suitable for first year ice up to 1–1.2 metres in thickness (Polar Class rating of 5). But the type of ship is only part of the equation. Mariners must have the skills to operate in polar waters, skills that take years to develop. The current rotation schedule of CAF members means they are unlikely to spend decades in the same role, which is required to gain such expertise.

The United States has made quite a dramatic and recent pivot to the Arctic as noted by the release of an Arctic strategy for every military service.⁶⁴ The policies concentrate more on the Bering Strait and the north Atlantic, not Canada’s Arctic. The United States does not currently have any ships, other than the two USCG icebreakers (the Healy and Polar Star), which are designed for polar conditions. The pivot to the Arctic, therefore, is mostly driven by concerns about Russian and Chinese intentions in the world, not specifically about the Arctic.⁶⁵

Two regional Arctic-specific military fora have been affected by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. The annual Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff discussions (involving the heads of the militaries of the eight Arctic States) have been on hiatus since 2014 until 2022 (without Russia), while the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) (which included military representation from the eight Arctic States and the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands) continues to meet, but without Russian participation. ASFR is hosted by the US military’s European Combatant Command Commander and aims to discuss the Arctic region’s security dynamics and architecture, as well as the full range of military capabilities and cooperation. While Russia has expressed interest in rejoining these fora, there is no appetite by Western allies to ‘reward’ Russia’s egregious behaviour. Instead, academics have called for a code of unplanned encounters at sea⁶⁶ (similar to one that exists for the South and East China Sea) to apply in the Arctic to limit the escalation of tensions during an accident, incident or mishap.

However, recent Chinese military activity in the Bering Strait, coupled with a focus on homeland defence writ large for the United States,⁶⁷ may put added pressure on the RCN to assist with more patrols in the Arctic. In the late summer of 2021, the US Coast Guard (USCG) encountered Chinese warships near Alaska’s Aleutian Islands unexpectedly.⁶⁸ While the warships were not breaking any international laws, in geopolitically-contested times, unplanned encounters between great powers can lead to unintentional incidents and possible escalation. If the United States Navy and USCG engage in more patrols in the Bering Sea and the approaches to North America, the RCN may be expected to backfill to provide coverage pulling focus from the RCN’s support to other government agencies in the NWP.

The other area of concern is an approach outside of Canada’s Arctic, but a strategic maritime liability for NATO. The Greenland, Iceland UK-Norway Gap (GIUK-Norway Gap), which connects the North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean has returned as an area of concern because of increased Russian activity, and also NATO’s disappearance of a former position that ensured surveillance of the Gap. This absence was only recently reimagined with the reformation of the US 2nd Fleet (in 2018, fully operational at the end of 2019) and NATO’s new Joint Force Command Norfolk (established in 2019 and fully operational in 2021). These commands, headed by the same commander, patrol the North Atlantic (including GIUK-Norway Gap) and the Arctic. Canada has personnel embedded in both and a Canadian has been the Vice-Commander of the 2nd Fleet since 2018.

For now, the assessment of the CAF is that there is unlikely to be a military-related threat in Canada’s Arctic, but that could change. A ship carrying dangerous goods may require CAF crisis management expertise and geopolitical conditions can change unexpectedly as the conflict in Ukraine demonstrated strikingly. The challenge for the CAF generally is that current recruitment and retention levels means that there is 10,000+ deficit in numbers of trained professionals.⁶⁹ For the RCN specifically, the Halifax-class vessels’ inability to operate in the Arctic for most of the year was an impediment to acquiring Arctic operating skills. Now that the first of the Harry DeWolf-class vessels is deployed there will be an improvement, although the RCN is still limited in its ability to project power and influence in the Arctic due to its fleet composition.

5.1 Maritime Domain Awareness and the MSOC East

The ‘separation’ of jurisdictions is important for legal, operational and capability reasons. CAF members, for example, cannot arrest civilians nor does the CCG have the capabilities and resources to conduct anti-submarine warfare. In the Arctic, given the vastness of the maritime territory, whole-of-government and society responses are vital, which means creating fora, exercises and common platforms for responders to come together, share information and important lessons learned. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) is the essential starting point for all of the safety, security and defence functions; if you do not know what activity is taking place and the nature of the vessels operating in a region, then safety, enforcement and defence actions cannot be planned and conducted.

Canada’s MDA definition is “the effective understanding of anything in the maritime environment that could adversely affect Canadian security, safety, economy or environment.”⁷⁰ Some of the MDA priorities include: 1) preventing terrorist attacks and criminal, harmful or hostile acts across the maritime domain by State and non-State actors; 2) protecting population centres and critical infrastructure; and 3) minimizing damage to, and expedite recovery of, the maritime transportation system and related infrastructure in the wake of human-made or natural disasters.

Prompted by the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States, recommendations of a binational planning group chaired by the Deputy NORAD Commander (to date always a Royal Canadian Air Force Lieutenant General) resulted in the creation of new organizations and bilateral enforcement programs. The concern was that if North America could be attacked from its own airspace, better surveillance of maritime, cyber and land activity was needed. Recognizing the limited resources versus the enormous maritime security territory to surveil, the main safety and security agencies, along with the CAF, created multi-organizational intelligence fusion teams to improve common domain awareness among the various agencies. In 2004, the Canadian federal government, through its National Security Policy,⁷¹ established three Maritime Security Operation Centres (MSOC s); two under the administrative coordination of the Department of National Defence and co-located respectively on the West Coast with Regional Joint Operation Centre (RJOC) Pacific and on the East Coast with RJOC Atlantic. The third, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway MSOC, is located on the Great Lakes at Niagara, and is under the administrative coordination of the RCMP as a function of its focus on transnational crime in the Great Lakes. MSOC East is responsible for the Arctic as well as the east coast.

The MSOC s, despite the name, are neither ‘operation’ centres nor ‘security’ centres. MSOC s are more rightly called maritime intelligence analytical fusion centres. The impetus for their creation was to facilitate the sharing of intelligence⁷² among the six federal government agencies concerned with marine-based threats that could negatively affect safety or security. The CAF, CCG, Transport Canada, CBSA, RCMP, and the Conservation and Protection arm of DFO are represented at the MSOC s.⁷³

There is a daily situation update to share intelligence from the various agencies that is focused on a fulsome maritime picture in Canada’s area of operations at the MSOCs. It includes vessels that are deemed to be of interest to one or more partners, as well as information related to surveillance flights, radar satellite passes, weather and ice updates, and potential protests or similar activities. MSOC East was the driving force behind the creation of a weekly Arctic MDA teleconference hosted by DND during the Arctic shipping season. Plans are afoot to replace the teleconference by another avenue through which to communicate important Arctic information with national and international stakeholders in the future.⁷⁴

Knowing what is happening in the Arctic is vital to being able to share information to enforce Canadian laws, share air surveillance time, and preposition the right people to enforce laws for which they are mandated. Satellite information and AIS are vital to creating a maritime picture of vessels of interest. Increasingly, Canada is sharing and using information from allies to help with risk mitigation measures and identify early potential problems.

What is missing is regular and formalized information from local Arctic communities other than via federal agencies in situ who can report activity and/or ad hoc community level reports. Likewise, while the domain awareness ‘picture’ for the Arctic is shared with federal and international law enforcement and military allies, it is not shared with local Arctic communities. Therefore, for example, if a VOI (perhaps carrying dangerous materials) is operating in the Arctic, local communities will not be told via MSOC East. While the safety and security of the information must be protected, there may be a way for local communities to have access to some of the information in the future, especially given that they are often the first responders on scene for disasters and/or will be essential to house victims until they can be relocated south.

5.2 AOPS and Exercises

The other important tool of integration of the various maritime partners is the AOPS (Harry DeWolf-class vessel). While currently a CAF capability, the AOPS’ most important feature is as a platform from which to bring other government departments (including health experts or any service provider) directly to communities and one which the CCG will adopt in the future. The first vessel only just finished operational trials in 2019 and made the first circumnavigation of North America in the summer of 2021. While not exclusive to the Arctic, it will be used mainly in a support capacity. The AOPS have the following capabilities:

1. –Conducting armed presence and surveillance operations throughout Canada’s waters, including in the Arctic;
2. –Supporting the CAF in sovereignty operations;
3. –Participating in a wide variety of international operations, such as anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, and international security and stability;
4. –Contributing to humanitarian assistance, emergency response and disaster relief domestically and internationally;
5. –Conducting SAR and providing communications relay to other units, as required;
6. –Supporting CAF core missions, including capacity building in support of other nations;
7. –Supporting other government departments in their ability to enforce their respective mandates by providing government situational awareness of activities and events in regions of operation; and
8. –Conducting a diverse range of missions worldwide.⁷⁵

The first two bullets on the list (bolded) are the only capabilities that fall exclusively in the defence portfolio (i.e., protecting the State). They require unpacking. First, all RCN vessels are limited to operating in the ice-free summer months. (Recall, the Harry DeWolf-class vessels are limited to a Polar Class 5 rating.) Next, the AOPS have limited fire power. Its Mark 38 25mm machine gun system and M242 autocannon were designed to support domestic law enforcement actions, not State-on-State armed aggression or anti-missile capabilities. Indeed, the AOPS have the potential to be the quintessential whole-of-government tool. The AOPS, for example, can produce potable water for communities. It has a helicopter pad and can accommodate a small utility aircraft up to the new CH-148 maritime helicopter. The stern of the ship can accommodate multiple payload options, such as shipping containers, underwater survey equipment, or landing craft. The ship is also equipped with a 20-tonne crane, providing self-load and unload capability. It has multi-role rescue boats that can reach speeds of 35+ knots (~65 km/h) and are 8.5 metres long. They can be used in support of rescue operations, personnel transfers and boarding operations.⁷⁶

The NANOOK series of Arctic exercises (of late, four different foci named Tuugaalik, Tatigiit, Nunkaput, and Nunalivut) are held year-round. It began as one, yearly fall exercise beginning in 2007. With the creation of four exercises held at different times of the year, multiple scenarios, capabilities and partners are included. Some of the exercises focus on interoperability with other allied partners, such as the United States, Denmark, and Norway, while others involve whole-of-government partners and have a particular maritime focus, such as a series of presence activities along the Northwest Passage or a maritime domain defence and security exercise or disaster response focus. For example, OP NANOOK-TATIGIIT 2021 addressed the Government of Nunavut’s drive for a whole-of-government response to a cruise ship incident that delivers many passengers to a small community on a few hours’ notice. At sea there was a concurrent mass rescue operation rehearsal, separate from the onshore portion. OP NANOOK-NUNAKPUT 2021 integrated Northern partners in a series of presence activities along the NWP supported by the Canadian Army, the RCN, the Royal Canadian Air Force, the CCG, Transport Canada and Indigenous government agencies to develop domain awareness, foster greater interoperability and increase overall readiness. OP NANOOK-TUUGALIK 2021 integrated multinational partners in a combined joint maritime domain operation in northern Labrador, Nunavut and Greenland and was designed to foster greater combined and joint interoperability. The RCN was joined by the Royal Danish Navy, the French Navy, and the United States Navy.⁷⁷

5.3 Arctic Security Working Group

Finally, the Arctic Security Working Group (ASWG), hosted by the CAF’s Joint Task Force North in Yellowknife, brings together all federal and territorial agencies and departments with a safety or security nexus. It is hoped that, in the future, ASWG will include the land claim areas of Nunatsiavut and Nunavik to ensure a full, Canadian Arctic perspective. It meets biannually, often with academic observers, and rotates among the territorial governments to co-lead the discussions. Participation by local Indigenous groups has helped the ASWG to focus on the immediate concerns and work on realistic and local solutions to challenges in the maritime and land domains. For example, attention to critical infrastructure (especially heating and water supplies) has been an important topic of late. Community evacuations are a last resort and therefore, in situ problem solving is paramount.⁷⁸