1 Introduction
Within the global discourse concerning the so-called ‘race for the Arctic,’ one major element that is often held as a metric of competition in the region is the
This chapter will examine the history of Canada’s 2010 National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS, originally known as the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy) from the perspective of its icebreaking component, which initially aimed to replace the CCG’s current fleet of aging icebreaking vessels through new domestic construction.6 Despite early goals that aimed to balance timely delivery of replacements with establishing an enduring Canadian shipbuilding industry, no new icebreakers have begun to be built ten years after the Strategy’s promulgation. This has resulted in some disruption within the Canadian shipbuilding sector as shipyards that did not succeed in the initial NSS bids have been able to convince both the government and industry partners to incorporate them into the NSS over the past three years.7 Meanwhile, the
2 Icebreaker Missions in Canada: Challenges and Requirements
The CCG is the sole federal operator of dedicated icebreakers as well as the sole government agency in charge of the Government of Canada’s civilian vessels. Its icebreaking areas of operations include not just the Arctic (defined as north of the northern tip of Labrador), but Atlantic Canada, the St. Lawrence Seaway,
In the Arctic, then, the Canadian Coast Guard employs its fleet of icebreakers for the following services: route assistance; ice routing and information services; harbour breakouts; Northern resupply; and Arctic sovereignty.12 Scientific and hydrographic surveys are also included, albeit subsumed under Arctic sovereignty.13 The term ‘icebreaking’ refers specifically to the organized program whose objectives are to employ ice-capable ships to carry out these four major sets of services in the Arctic. The icebreaking program includes additional services that apply to the southern parts of Canada, such as flood prevention in the St. Lawrence River, but those will not be discussed here.
The service of route assistance is probably the one that is most commonly associated with the popular conception of what icebreakers do. It includes “freeing vessels beset in ice, maintaining shipping routes, escorting ships through ice-covered waters, [and] organizing convoys (escorts of 2 or more ships) to maximize services in favourable conditions.”14 In Arctic waters, these services are provided only during the summer months in order to support other users of the seas and science missions.15 The act of ‘escort’ in this context refers to the literal breaking of sea ice by the escorting icebreaker as it sails closely in front of other ships that are not capable of independent sailing through and maneuvering within that ice. An alternative to this approach would be what is often done in southern Canada, where icebreakers maintain a relatively clear
While there had been an increasing number of maritime transits through and to the Canadian Arctic, the COVID-19 pandemic drastically curtailed the number of such voyages due to restrictions on non-essential users. For example, the 2020 summer saw only eight vessels, which included cargo and CCG icebreakers, making complete transits of the Northwest Passage (NWP) in comparison to 27 such transits in 2019.16 A similar phenomenon occurred for the number of ice escort missions, though with a much lower disparity: 45 escorts occurred in 2020, 51 in 2019, an unusual 93 in 2018, and around 50 in 2017.17 These figures suggest that the vast majority of CCG escort missions in the Arctic are for escorting commercial resupply vessels, which are vital to Arctic communities and which must continue regardless of the pandemic situation. Indeed, a list of all NWP transits by Cambridge University’s Scott Polar Research Institute shows most vessels simply passing through NWP do so without CCG escort.18 The spike in activity in 2018 illustrates a busy season for CCG icebreakers, which would also result in local users of sea lanes to seek an alternative solution to CCG icebreaking services.
While close escort of shipping is one of the CCG icebreakers’ core purposes, the limited number of icebreakers means other vessels are best served by taking routes that do not require icebreakers. This is enabled through the provision of ice routing and information services by the CCG in close coordination with the Canadian Ice Service.25 The information for this is provided by a combination of icebreakers, aerial assets, satellites, and other sources that are processed and made available via land-based CCG centres. Some of this information is disseminated by the CCG as it deems necessary while maritime users in the Arctic can request more specific information tailored to their needs. The information collected by the CCG’s various sources range from the tactical to the strategic, which describes the level of fidelity regarding the state of the ice in relation to the user’s position and objectives.26 Users who are entering ice-infested waters will be prioritized for this information while those who are still in the voyage planning stages will be deprioritized.27
Harbour breakouts refer to breaking ice that is preventing vessels from both accessing port infrastructure and leaving their ports for open water. This applies to both commercial and fishing harbours, though the latter are a “low priority compared to the other icebreaking services.”28 Indeed, it is not offered for the CCG’s Arctic region, though it is offered for the Labrador and Newfoundland coasts.29 The response times for icebreaker assistance for fishing harbour breakouts are also the longest out of all icebreaking services regardless of region, with a target response time of twenty-four hours instead of eight to twelve for more highly prioritized services in both Arctic and southern Canada.30 Commercial harbour breakouts do occur in the CCG’s Arctic area of operations, though it is not common. In the 2018 and 2020 seasons, for example, there was only one instance.31
In rare instances, attempts to conduct resupply fail due to excessive ice, such as 2014’s efforts to supply Kugaaruk, which resulted in the temporary storage of goods in Churchill, Manitoba.37 This incident helps illustrate the need for powerful icebreakers even as the Arctic undergoes rapid warming. Kugaaruk no longer depends on CCG resupply, with arrangements made after the 2014 failure of its CCG deliveries to receive direct commercial resupply via Nunavut Sealink and Supply Incorporated’s vessels, which can deliver the increasing volume of
Finally, the ‘Arctic sovereignty’ mission includes several core CCG responsibilities that are also conducted in southern Canada: search and rescue, environmental response, and Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS).43 These efforts, made possible in part by the physical presence of CCG icebreakers, “elicits recognition of Canadian sovereignty, through requests for, dependence on, efficient government support to authorized foreign ship transits. Historic occupancy and the ability to monitor and manage activity in an area are sovereignty characteristics exercised by CCG icebreaking operations.”44 While physical challenges to Canadian sovereignty over its Arctic waters have
The number of occurrences of each of these five services helps to illustrate the limited, though regionally vital, demand for the CCG icebreaking fleet. Unlike Russia’s maritime Arctic, Canada’s Arctic has relatively little in the way of frequent maritime trade that requires the massive number of ships in Russia’s fleet.46 This being said, the gradual reduction in the number CCG Arctic icebreakers since the 1990s has led to increased strain on the remaining fleet, especially as they increase in age and require more time in maintenance or refits.47 This has led to the CCG’s decision to lease five icebreakers between 2018 and 2038 to help meet demand as the older vessels undergo life extensions.48 This relationship between supply of and demand for CCG icebreaking services is reflected in the CCG’s documents and plans, most notably in the Icebreaker Requirements, which has been updated every five years since 2009.49 The latest version covers the years 2017–2022, and thus one can expect an updated version by the time this volume has been published.
To provide the services above, the CCG’s icebreaker fleet of mid-2022 includes two heavy icebreakers, six medium icebreakers, and nine multi-purpose vessels/light icebreakers.50 Two air-cushioned vehicles (hovercrafts) are also employed for icebreaking duties in southern Canada, while an additional second-hand medium icebreaker and light icebreaker are currently undergoing conversion for CCG service after their purchases from previous commercial owners. With the exception of the hovercrafts and the second-hand light icebreaker, the remaining ships are expected to contribute to Arctic icebreaker services during the summer navigable season in accordance with their respective capabilities.51 This includes the light icebreakers, which have operated in the Arctic though not regularly or frequently.52 The navigable season changes year by year depending on ice conditions, but it can be expected to last between July and October, inclusive.53
Many of these icebreakers are approaching or are past thirty years of age and require increasing numbers of refits and maintenance that prevent them from being in service.54 This may not be such a major problem if the CCG operated only in the Arctic, as that would allow them ample months during the winter to conduct such maintenance when Arctic traffic is absent.55 However, both heavy and medium icebreakers, alongside their light cousins, are also needed during the winter for icebreaking in southern Canadian waters.56 While there are more icebreakers in the fleet than the five that industry and the CCG deem the minimum necessary for the Arctic, the fact that winters also require one heavy and all medium icebreakers dramatically limits the opportunities
Much has been noted about the icebreaker fleet’s age and the urgency of its replacement. This is certainly accurate for some of the most well-known members of the fleet, though others are younger than the average age of the much-touted Russian fleet, which Russian media has pegged at 39 years old by 2022.59 For instance, while the Louis St. Laurent, the largest and most capable of Canadian icebreakers, was built in 1969 and is the focus of most discussions regarding the CCG’s aging fleet, its fellow heavy icebreaker Terry Fox was built much later in 1983. The four mediums built for CCG service were constructed between 1978 and 1987. Rounding this out, the light icebreakers of the high-endurance multitask vessels were built in 1986–1987.60 More recently, the interim medium icebreakers (Captain Molly Kool, Jean Goodwill, and Vincent Massey) purchased from private European owners in 2018 were built in Norway in 2000–2001.61 Compared to the Russian figure of 39 years, Canada comes out slightly ahead at 37.5 years old for the average age of its icebreakers. There are limits to these figures, as it is unknown how the start date of each ship’s ‘life’ is determined: is it the day they were launched, the day they underwent sea trials, the day they had their naming ceremonies, the day they were delivered to their owners, or the day they were commissioned? This could make several years of difference in the final figures. Regardless of the exact age of the Russian or Canadian ships, it becomes clear that their average ages are not as far apart as the ‘icebreaker gap’ discourse suggests. While some may critique the inclusion of light icebreakers into the calculations, limiting the list to only the medium and heavy icebreakers that provide the bulk
Ultimately, the age metric should not be used at the expense of other key characteristics of the icebreakers themselves and the contexts in which they serve. There are qualitative issues at play, for instance, most notably that six of Russia’s icebreakers in 2022 are nuclear-powered with much greater endurance and icebreaking capability.62 At the same time, it has been noted above in this chapter and elsewhere in this volume that commercial traffic in the Canadian Arctic is relatively limited and a capability like Russia’s fleet of nuclear icebreakers remains far in excess of need (see further Lasserre in this volume). The continual but unpredictable accumulation of loose multiyear ice in the western Canadian Arctic due to the Beaufort Gyre and other circulation regimes is expected to continue into the mid-century with its attendant suppression of commercial traffic through the region.63 In this context, the future of the CCG icebreaking fleet needs to mainly focus on its replacement rather than numerical expansion, which the following section will address.
4 The National Shipbuilding Strategy and the Future Coast Guard Icebreaking Fleet
Despite the favourable average age of Canada’s icebreaking fleet compared to Russia’s, the fact that the most powerful Canadian ship, the Louis St. Laurent, is over 50 years old means that Canada’s ability to reliably carry out heavy icebreaking is much more curtailed than the overall fleet age suggests. At the same time, the lengthy decade-long timeframe required to procure and construct large complex vessels like icebreakers means even the younger vessels needed to have their replacements planned by the late 2010s. This replacement effort has been subsumed under the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), formerly
Davie Shipyard in Quebec was also in the running for one of the NSS shipyards, which was a status they employed to attract one or more potential purchasers to resolve their debts.65 The lengthy attempts at canvasing the global market for potential buyers took up much of the time allotted to potential shipyards to prepare their bids. One of the failed negotiations was Italy’s Fincantieri shipyards, while Davie Shipyards was eventually sold to a consortium of Upper Lakes Group, SNC-Lavelin, and South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering just shortly before submissions were due for the NSS shipyard bid.66 Davie itself attributes its failure to become one of the two major NSS partners to “its poor financial position at the time,” during which 1,600 workers had been laid off and the yard was shuttered. It was eventually rescued on a more permanent basis when British firm Zafiro Marine bought Davie’s yard in November 2011.67 Zafiro would eventually become part of Inocea Group, which is now the parent company behind Davie.68 As will be seen below, Davie would make a come-back at the end of the decade as the
One of the top priority builds for Seaspan was the polar icebreaker, dubbed the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker as early as 2010.69 It is expected to replace the Louis St. Laurent, which was already recognized as reaching the limits of its service life. However, a number of factors have led to the Diefenbaker remaining just a set of digital drawings by 2022. Firstly, even though Seaspan was selected in January 2012 to build its package of ships, the yard required massive modernization to make it suitable for building modern large vessels, which was compounded by the need for special machinery to work with the heavy steel plates of a polar icebreaker.70 This CDN$170 million modernization was completed nearly three years later in October 2014, funded by Seaspan itself.71 Secondly, the polar icebreaker would not be built until the completion of three offshore fisheries science vessels (OFSV s) and one offshore oceanographic science vessel (OOSV), while uncertainty concerned whether the Diefenbaker or the Navy’s two joint support ships (JSS) would come first.72 Consequently, this meant the construction of the Diefenbaker could not begin at the shipyard until nearly a decade after the yard finished its modernization due to the limited capacity to build multiple ships at once. The order of construction within this non-combat package had been a subject of some debate, though many noted the need to ensure the yard gained sufficient experience building the relatively simple OFSV s before tackling something as complex as the Diefenbaker. By 2022, Seaspan had delivered the three OFSV s, and the first JSS is well underway, having been decided as the greater priority.73 The OOSV has been rescheduled to fit in between the first and second JSS.74 The Diefenbaker itself,
Citing these delays and the importance of having a polar icebreaker in a timely manner, the Liberal Government in June 2019 announced that they would remove the Diefenbaker from Seaspan’s order books, replacing it instead with sixteen multipurpose vessels (MPV s) similar to the existing light icebreakers while looking to build the Diefenbaker elsewhere.76 Seaspan argued the MPV s were already promised by the Harper government, though records only indicate five such vessels and five offshore patrol vessels.77 But less than two years after the removal of the Diefenbaker from Seaspan, Trudeau’s Liberal Government made an abrupt about-face. In May 2021, it announced that not only would the Diefenbaker return to Seaspan, but that it would be accompanied by a sistership, bringing the total number of heavy Arctic icebreakers to two.78 This second ship would go to a third yard that is in the process of being added to the National Shipbuilding Strategy’s main partners: Davie Shipbuilding. The yard that had failed to win either of the NSS packages a decade
The original NSS plans only included the polar icebreaker and the light icebreakers, leaving the workhorse mediums untouched. In August 2019, this was addressed when Trudeau’s Liberal Government authorized six ‘program icebreakers’ to replace the Terry Fox heavy icebreaker and the four Cold War-era medium icebreakers.79 These are planned to be built at Davie Shipbuilding as well, and indeed were planned to be Davie’s bread and butter for much of the 2020s and 2030s. It remains to be seen how the program icebreakers and the newly-added second heavy icebreaker will be prioritized in Davie’s shipyard, which requires its own modernization akin to that carried out by Seaspan a decade ago.80 Although Davie has styled itself as an icebreaker specialist with multiple refits and conversions of existing icebreakers under its belt, it has not built an icebreaker from scratch since 1969, and the last vessels it built were a pair of large ferries in 2018.81
Ultimately, the CCG’s icebreaking fleet is at or nearing ages that require their replacement. At present, all of them are covered by existing government plans to build new ships in Canada to replace them. At the same time, the delays, prioritization of other construction, and limited capacity of Canadian shipyards have led to several temporary ‘interim’ measures to cover for the periods when the original fleets need to be taken out of service for their modernizations and refits. These consist of the three medium icebreakers converted from commercial vessels, as well as the ongoing process to convert a light icebreaker acquired in 2021. This latter project is perhaps indicative of the Canadian shipbuilding industry’s perceived capacity limitations. Despite its small size and presumably quicker pace of construction compared to medium and heavy icebreakers, the Canadian Coast Guard and Public Services and Procurement Canada were not willing to publicly discuss the possibility of a new build, whether in
Yet, the unique size and draft requirements of Canada’s Great Lakes canal locks meant there were very few international options that existed in a surplus State. Nonetheless, one was found from an unlikely source: Turkmenistan.84 Originally acquired for use in supporting the country’s oil and gas projects in the Caspian Sea, the recent oil price collapse likely led to a reduced need for the twelve-year-old Mangystau-2, providing an opportunity for Canada to acquire it as a rapid solution to the reduced availability of its light icebreaking fleet as they enter their vessel life extensions.85 While this appears to have little direct relevance for Canada’s Arctic, it must be remembered that even light icebreakers occasionally visit the Arctic, which limits the number of vessels available for duties in the south either due to lack of available hulls or refit cycles. Having an interim vessel can help fill gaps resulting from such operational and maintenance demands. Indeed, one of the question-and-answer documents for the initial 18 February 2019 request for information regarding the prospective interim light icebreaker explicitly mentioned that the new vessel would “supplement the operational capabilities of multiple ships, not just
5 Making Use of Presence: Lessons from Danish Naval Ships in Greenland for RCN AOPS Vessels
Clearly, the CCG’s icebreaking capacity is at a critical juncture where it is meeting its mission requirements in the Arctic but is at risk of no longer being able to do so due to a series of delayed procurement projects aimed at renewing its aging ships. Several interim measures have been implemented to alleviate such concerns, but construction contracts have yet to be signed for the replacement vessels that will each require approximately a half-decade to build. As the CCG fleet ages and the replacements await their time in the water, there will likely be increasing stress on the existing fleet’s availability and reliability, requiring alternative solutions.
One possible path for alleviating this strain would be to order from foreign shipyards with greater experience and capacity that can provide quicker replacements than Canadian yards. Proposals for such an approach have been put forth for the combat portion of the NSS but less so for the CCG’s icebreakers.88 However, this approach ignores the complex engineering work that is required to convert a ship’s design into instructions and materials that a foreign shipyard can work with, as well as the limited number of available yards.89 In the last decade, there have only been two icebreakers built in Western shipyards that approach the capabilities of the CCGS Louis St. Laurent, the one most urgently in need of replacement. Australia’s heavy research icebreaker RSV Nuyina was built in Damen’s shipyards in Romania, which took approximately five years to enter service.90 The United Kingdom’s RRS Sir David Attenborough,
One near-term solution may be to leverage the Harry DeWolf-class Arctic and offshore patrol vessels, six of which are currently being built under the combat portion of the NSS in Halifax for the Royal Canadian Navy with two more on the order books for the CCG after suitable modifications.93 These ships have not been designed as icebreakers. They were not built with the width or power to carve routes in heavy ice while escorting large civilian and commercial vessels. Nonetheless, the first two ships that have conducted their ice trials have demonstrated a respectable ability to operate in the Canadian Arctic in February–March when no other vessels are in the region. During these trials, they have shown an ability to exceed their designed ice capability of 1.2 m of first-year ice with multiyear inclusions, with HMCS Margaret Brooke encountering limited amounts of 2 m first-year ice.94
This performance by the 6,700 t AOPS is important. It exceeds the empirical performance of the Royal Danish Navy’s 3,500 t Thetis and 2,000 t Knud Rasmussen-class patrol ships operating in and around Greenland, which have considerably lower ice ratings of 80 cm of ice with occasional encounters
With eight AOPS s to enter service by 2027, Canadian authorities would be prudent to explore the use of these new assets to help support the CCG’s icebreaking service in similar ways to their Danish counterparts. It should be kept in mind, however, that the sea ice conditions in western Greenland are much different from that in different parts of the Canadian Arctic, which limit the utility of the Danish comparison. Still, while the AOPS s were not designed as icebreakers and the RCN is unlikely to make their ships available to the CCG as regular ‘on call’ assets for the icebreaking service, they may nonetheless
While the AOPS s will not be able to replace the CCG icebreakers in their core task of escorting large commercial vessels through ice, they will likely be able to take some of the burden in situations where less ice capability is required. In some emergency search and rescue (SAR) scenarios, for example, there is a high likelihood that most Arctic traffic will stay in waters relatively clear of ice anyway, making the AOPS s more than adequate for coming to a vessel in need of assistance (assuming no heavy ice is along the way). While Joint Rescue Coordination Centres already utilize all public and private elements to carry out such SAR activities, new levels of coordination between the RCN and CCG will be required for other tasks requiring icebreaking and pollution control capabilities. This may be accomplished under a memorandum of understanding and/or the embarkation of CCG subject matter experts who specialize in those areas. The latter can help reduce the challenges caused by the ‘up and out’ nature of naval promotion, which sees the departure of personnel from their ships as they are promoted higher in rank soon after they have acquired the specific skills necessary for specific tasks. Regardless, the presence of eight new ships capable of significant operations in sea ice provides an opportunity that cannot be ignored while long-term replacements for the CCG icebreakers are being built. Much as navies often employ a mixed fleet of high-end and low-end combatants each suitable for an array of tasks, the
6 Conclusion
The future of shipping in the Canadian Arctic remains somewhat uncertain. While popular media observers expect dramatic increases in the coming years, the past several years have shown a fairly steady level of activity that remains just barely capable of being met by the CCG’s Arctic icebreakers. At the same time, the future remains uncertain especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. While non-essential voyages (i.e., anything other than community resupply) slowed down dramatically during the pandemic, the post-pandemic period is already seeing a limited resurgence of commercial and leisure activities in Canada’s Arctic, and several cruise operators have already been booking tickets for the 2022 summer season.102 In this context, there is a need to ensure Canada has the ability to maximize its assets capable of providing icebreaking service in the Arctic. With the limited number of CCG icebreakers at present and reduced availability as they further age, there is a need to look elsewhere for additional solutions. The new AOPS s may provide such a solution for very limited situations, which can help free up the medium and heavy CCG icebreakers for tasks that require their unique capabilities. As an indicator of the
For examples, see the following: Charlie Gao, “Icebreaker Technology: Is America Losing the Race for the Arctic?,” The National Interest, 23 December 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/icebreaker-technology-america-losing-race-arctic-198230; AFP, “Russia Races to Build Giant Ice-breakers for Arctic Dominance,” France24, 15 July 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210715-russia-races-to-build-giant-ice-breakers-for-arctic-dominance; Rebecca Kheel, “GOP Rep to Trump: Russian Activity in Arctic a ‘Tremendous Concern’,” The Hill, 21 February 2017, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/320475-gop-rep-to-trump-russian-activity-in-arctic-should-be-tremendous-concern/.
For examples and critiques of the “icebreaker gap” discourse, see Charlie Gao, “The ‘Icebreaker Gap’: How Russia is Planning to Build more Icebreakers to Project Power in the Arctic,” The National Interest, 19 August 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/icebreaker-gap-how-russia-planning-build-more-icebreakers-project-power-arctic-29102; Jen Judson, “The Icebreaker Gap,” Politico, 1 September 2015, https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/09/the-icebreaker-gap-000213/; Keith Johnson and Dan De Luce, “U.S. Falls Behind in Arctic Great Game,” Foreign Policy, 24 May 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/24/u-s-falls-behind-in-arctic-great-game/.
Milosz Reterski, “Breaking the Ice: Why the United States Needs Nuclear-Powered Icebreakers,” Foreign Affairs, 11 December 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-12-11/breaking-ice; Gregory Noddin Poulin, “America Must Build More Icebreakers or We’ll Lose the Battle for the Arctic,” Wired, 5 January 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/01/america-must-build-more-icebreakers-or-well-lose-the-battle-for-the-arctic/; Ragnhild Grønning, “Expert: No Icebreaker Race with Russia in the Arctic,” High North News, 2 November 2018, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/expert-no-icebreaker-race-russia-arctic; Lin A. Mortensgaard and Kristian Søby Kristensen, “The ‘Icebreaker-Gap’ – How US Icebreakers are Assigned New, Symbolic Roles as Part of an Escalating Military Competition in the Arctic,” Safe Seas, 5 January 2021, http://www.safeseas.net/the-icebreaker-gap-how-us-icebreakers-are-assigned-new-symbolic-roles-as-part-of-an-escalating-military-competition-in-the-arctic/; Paul C. Avey, “The Icebreaker Gap Doesn’t Mean America is Losing in the Arctic,” War on the Rocks, 28 November 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/the-icebreaker-gap-doesnt-mean-america-is-losing-in-the-arctic/; Craig H. Allen Sr., “Closing the US Strategic Gap in Icebreaker Capacity,” Pacific Maritime (November 2017): 36–39; United States Congressional Research Service, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress: Updated April 1, 2022, by Ronald O’Rourke, RL34391 (1 April 2011), 5.
Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), “Icebreaking Fleet of the Canadian Coast Guard,” Government of Canada, last modified 12 May 2021, https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/icebreaking-deglacage/fleet-flotte-eng.html; CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard’s Latest Icebreakers,” Government of Canada, last modified 9 February 2022, https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/fleet-flotte/icebreaker-brise-glace-eng.html; K. Joseph Spears, “The Arctic Icebreaker ‘Gap,’” FrontLine Safety and Security 10:3 (Fall 2015): 29; Megan Drewniak, Dimitrios Dalaklis, Anastasia Christodoulou, and Rebecca Sheehan, “Ice-Breaking Fleets of the United States and Canada: Assessing the Current State of Affairs and Future Plans,” Sustainability 13:2 (2021): 716; Stewart Webb, “Mackenzie Institute Report: Returning to Port: A Needed Course Correction to Keep the National Shipbuilding Strategy off the Rocks,” DefenceReport, 9 May 2017, https://defencereport.com/mackenzie-report-returning-to-port/; Ron R. Wallace, “Canada and Russia in an Evolving Circumpolar Arctic,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics, eds., Ken S. Coates and Carin Holroyd (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 363.
Robert David English and Morgan Grant Gardner, “Phantom Peril in the Arctic: Russia Doesn’t Threaten the United States in the Far North – But Climate Change Does,” Foreign Affairs, 29 September 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-29/phantom-peril-arctic.
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Government of Canada announces National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy,” Government of Canada, News Release, 3 June 2010, https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2010/06/government-canada-announces-national-shipbuilding-procurement-strategy.html.
Seaway Marine & Industrial Inc. was one of the original bidders for the NSPS, though its Port Weller/St. Catharines drydocks at 340 Lakeshore Road has been taken over by Heddle Shipyards since 2017 and it is this company that has teamed up with Seaspan Vancouver Shipyards to build their polar icebreaker; Davie Shipyards in Quebec, meanwhile, is in the midst of government negotiations to become the third NSS construction yard to build the second polar icebreaker and six medium icebreakers. Tom Ring, “The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy: How Did We Get to Where We Are Now,” Policy Update, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, March 2016, https://www.cgai.ca/the_national_shipbuilding_procurement_strategy; “Seaway Marine Gets Big Contract,” Niagara This Week – St. Catharines, 6 February 2012, https://www.niagarathisweek.com/news-story/3263517-seaway-marine-gets-big-contract/; “The Port Weller Dry Docks has a Bright Future,” Heddle Shipyards, 29 January 2020, https://heddleshipyards.com/news/the-port-weller-dry-docks-has-a-bright-future/; Seaspan Shipyards, “Seaspan Shipyards and Heddle Shipyards Join Forces in Bid to Deliver to the Polar Icebreaker to the Canadian Coast Guard,” Seaspan, 9 June 2020, https://www.seaspan.com/press-release/seaspan-shipyards-and-heddle-shipyards-join-forces-in-bid-to-deliver-the-polar-icebreaker-to-the-canadian-coast-guard/; Public Services and Procurement Canada, “Government of Canada Receives Chantier Davie’s Supporting Materials to Become Third Shipyard Under National Shipbuilding Strategy,” Government of Canada, 14 July 2021, https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/comm/vedette-features/2021-07-14-00-eng.html.
CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard’s Latest Icebreakers” (n 4).
Public Services and Procurement Canada, “Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships-Canadian Coast Guard,” Government of Canada, last modified 28 April 2021, https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/arctique-coastgd-eng.html; Public Services and Procurement Canada, “Large Vessel Shipbuilding Projects,” Government of Canada, last modified 7 May 2021, https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/grandnav-largeves-eng.html.
CCG, “Icebreaking Operations Directive: 1. Provision of Icebreaking Services and Harbour Breakouts,” Government of Canada, last modified 26 July 2019, https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/publications/icebreaking-deglacage/icebreaking-operations-directives/provision-services-eng.html.
Id.
CCG, “Icebreaking in Canada,” Government of Canada, last modified 31 March 2022, https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/icebreaking-deglacage/program-programme-eng.html; George Da Pont, Canadian Coast Guard: Levels of Service: May 2010 (Update) (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2010), 18.
CCG, “Icebreaking in Canada” (n 12).
Id.
CCG, “Icebreaking Requirements 2017–2022: 3. Icebreaking Services,” Government of Canada, last modified 18 November 2019, https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/publications/icebreaking-deglacage/requirements-besoins/icebreaking-services-eng.html.
CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard Finishes Unique 2020 Arctic Operations Season,” Government of Canada, News Release, 11 December 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2020/12/canadian-coast-guardfinishes-unique-2020-arctic-operations-season.html.
Id.; CCG, “2019 Arctic Operations for the Canadian Coast Guard Complete,” Government of Canada, News Release, 2 December 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2019/12/2019-arctic-operations-for-the-canadian-coast-guard-complete.html; CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard 2018 Arctic Operations Coming to an End,” Government of Canada, News Release, 19 November 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2018/11/canadian-coast-guard-2018-arctic-operations-coming-to-an-end.html; Fisheries and Oceans Central & Arctic Region, “Arctic Season Winding Down but Coast Guard Continues to Support Industry and Programs in the North,” Cision, 12 October 2017, https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/arctic-season-winding-down-but-coast-guard-continues-to-support-industry-and-programs-in-the-north-650602733.html.
R.K. Headland et al., “Transits of the Northwest Passage to End of the 2021 Navigation Season,” Scott Polar Research Institute, 12 November 2021, https://www.spri.cam.ac.uk/resources/infosheets/northwestpassage.pdf.
The Baltic Times Staff, “Estonian Icebreaker Botnica Embarks on Journey to Canadian Arctic,” The Baltic Times, 28 June 2021, https://www.baltictimes.com/estonian_icebreaker_botnica_embarks_on_journey_to_canadian_arctic/.
Tom Hoefer, “Logistics in the Northern Minerals Industry,” NWT & Nunavut Chamber of Mines, presentation to the Arctic Security Working Group, 28 November 2018, 43, https://www.miningnorth.com/_rsc/site-content/library/Infrastructure/2018-11-28_ChamberMines-for-Arctic-Security-WG.pdf.
J. Mark MacKeigan, “Decision No. 23-W-2021,” Canadian Transportation Agency, 12 April 2021, https://otc-cta.gc.ca/node/570013.
Amarok had proposed their Polar Prince, Arctic Wolf, and Thorbjorn. MacKeigan (n 21); Tyler Mugford, “Northern Ranger to Sail Again on Labrador Coast,” CBC News, 3 January 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/mushuau-innu-first-nation-buys-northern-ranger-1.5413360.
MacKeigan (n 21).
Id.
CCG, Ice Navigation in Canadian Waters (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2012), 8.
CCG, Icebreaking Operations: Levels of Service (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2001), 17.
Id., 18.
CCG, “Icebreaking Operations Directive: 1” (n 10).
Glen Whiffen, “Spring Ice-break on Hold,” The Northern Pen, 11 April 2018, https://www.pressreader.com/canada/northern-pen/20180411/281835759277729.
Da Pont (n 12), p. 18.
CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard Finishes Unique 2020 Arctic Operations Season” (n 16); CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard 2018 Arctic Operations Nearing Mid-season,” Government of Canada, News Release 30 August 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2018/08/canadian-coast-guard-2018-arctic-operations-nearing-mid-season.html.
Sarah Rogers, “Western Nunavut Community Gets Rare, Direct Sealift Delivery,” Nunatsiaq News, 8 September 2015, https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/65674kugaaruk_gets_direct_sealift_delivery/.
CCG, “Icebreaking Operations Directive: 1” (n 10); Lisa Gregoire, “Multi-year Ice-pack Blocks Sealift Delivery to Nunavut Hamlet,” Nunatsiaq News, 7 October 2014, https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/65674ice_pack_ends_sealift_re-supply_to_nunavut_hamlet/.
Gregoire (n 33).
CCG, Icebreaking Operations: Levels of Service (n 26), p. 30; “Government Welcomes Canadian Coast Guard Ships Home After Successful Trip to the Arctic,” Government of Canada, News Release, last modified 8 November 2012, https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2012/11/government-welcomes-canadian-coast-guard-ships-home-after-successful-trip-arctic.html.
Gregoire (n 33); Sarah Rogers, “GN to Ship Portable Classrooms to Fire-damaged Kugaaruk this Summer,” Nunatsiaq News, 8 March 2017, https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/65674gn_to_ship_six_portable_classrooms_to_kugaaruk_this_summer/; Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Runway Rehabilitation, Eureka, NU: Addendum No. 1,” Government of Canada, 9 January 2015, https://buyandsell.gc.ca/cds/public/2015/01/09/d8a6c97ff73476d7b1a712724fe47b40/ABES.PROD.PW_PWZ.B014.E9286.ATTA005.PDF.
Gregoire (n 33).
Rogers 2017 (n 36); Rogers 2015 (n 32).
Jane George, “NEAS Sails Off with Big Nunavut Sealift Contract,” Nunatsiaq News, 26 April 2019, https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/neas-sails-off-with-big-nunavut-sealift-contract/.
CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard Begins 2021 Arctic Season,” Government of Canada, News Release, 22 June 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2021/06/canadian-coast-guard-begins-2021-arctic-season.html; CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard 2021 Arctic Season,” Government of Canada, News Release, 9 June 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2020/06/canadian-coast-guard-2020-arctic-season.html; CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard 2019 Arctic Season Underway,” Government of Canada, News Release, 19 June 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2019/06/canadian-coast-guard-2019-arctic-season-underway.html.
For more discussion of northern resupply by commercial vessels, see Lasserre in this volume.
CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard Arctic Operations Nearing Mid-season,” Government of Canada, News Release, 28 August 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2017/08/canadian_coast_guardarcticoperationsnearingmid-season.html.
CCG, “Icebreaking in Canada” (n 12).
CCG, Icebreaking Operations: Levels of Service (n 26), p. 33.
“Marine Transportation Safety Investigation M18C0225,” Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 21 May 2021, https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/marine/2018/m18c0225/m18c0225.html.
For detailed comparison between Russia and Canada on their respective traffic levels and users, see Lasserre in this volume.
CCG, “Icebreaker Requirements 2017–2022: 6. Planned Icebreaker Deployment,” Government of Canada, last modified 18 November 2019, https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/publications/icebreaking-deglacage/requirements-besoins/icebreaker-deployment-eng.html.
Fabian Manning and Marc Gold, When Every Second Counts: Maritime Search and Rescue (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, 2018), 12.
CCG, “Icebreaker Requirements 2017–2022: 2. Background,” Government of Canada, last modified 18 November 2019, https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/publications/icebreaking-deglacage/requirements-besoins/background-eng.html.
CCG, “Icebreaker Requirements 2017–2022: Appendices,” Government of Canada, last modified 18 November 2019, https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/publications/icebreaking-deglacage/requirements-besoins/appendices-eng.html. The heavy icebreakers were formerly known as Type 1300 and the mediums as Type 1200. The light icebreakers are also known as high/medium endurance multi-tasked vessels, with the high endurance ships known as Type 1100 while the medium endurance ships are known as Type 1050.
CCG, Icebreaking Operations: Levels of Service (n 26), p. 34.
“Maiden Voyage to Arctic for Coast Guard Ship,” Welland Tribune, 16 July 2018, https://www.wellandtribune.ca/news/niagara-region/2018/07/16/maiden-voyage-to-arctic-for-coast-guard-ship.html.
CCG, Icebreaking Operations: Levels of Service (n 26), p. 34.
CCG, “Icebreaker Requirements 2017–2022: Appendices” (n 50).
CCG, “Vessels Ten Year Maintenance Calendar,” Government of Canada, last modified 30 April 2021, https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/fleet-flotte/vessel-maint-navire-2021-22-eng.html.
CCG, “Icebreaker Requirements 2017–2022: Appendices” (n 50).
Id.
Id.
“Russia’s Fleet to Receive Ten New Icebreakers by 2030,” TASS Russian News Agency, 3 November 2020, https://tass.com/defense/1219675.
CCG, “Icebreaker Requirements 2017–2022: Appendices” (n 50).
CCG, “CCG Fleet: Vessel Details: CCGS CAPTAIN MOLLY KOOL,” Government of Canada, n.d., https://inter-j01.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fdat/vessels/2243; CCG, “CCG Fleet: Vessel Details: CCGS JEAN GOODWILL,” Government of Canada, n.d., https://inter-j01.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fdat/vessels/2424; Davie Shipbuilding, “Canadian Coast Guard Icebreaker CCGS Vincent Massey Leaves Davie Drydock,” Cision, 25 March 2022, https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/canadian-coast-guard-icebreaker-ccgs-vincent-massey-leaves-davie-drydock-862316207.html. Vincent Massey’s conversion had not been completed at the time of writing and is expected to be completed in Fall 2022.
Thomas Nilsen, “Second Giant Nuclear Icebreaker Handed Over to Rosatomflot,” The Barents Observer, 25 December 2021, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2021/12/second-giant-nuclear-icebreaker-handed-over-rosatomflot.
D.G. Barber et al., “Climate Change and Ice Hazards in the Beaufort Sea,” Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene 2: (2014): 10, https://doi.org/10.12952/journal.elementa.000025.
Martin Shadwick, “The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN),” Canadian Military Journal 12:2 (2012): 77.
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP, “No.: 200-11-019127-102, Province of Québec, Canada. Motion for Authorization to sell substantially all of the assets of the debtor and for the issuance of a vesting order and to extend the stay of proceedings,” Montréal, 19 July 2011, 5, https://www.insolvencies.deloitte.ca/Documents/ca_en_insolv_Davie_MotionAuthSellAllAsset_VestingOrderExt_071911.pdf.
Allison Martell, “UPDATE 3-Canada’s Davie Yards Sold Ahead of Federal Contract,” Reuters, 21 July 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/canada-shipbuilding-idUSN1E76K20P20110721.
Chantier Davie Canada Inc., The Davie Strategic Journey: Generation 2040 (Inocea Group, 2020), 16, http://www.davie.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Davie-Shipbuilding-SJ_Final_EG_web1.pdf; Mark Cardwell, “Ahoy Davie! British Shipbuilders, American Investors Team Up to Refloat Canada’s Oldest and Biggest Shipyard,” Canadian Sailings, 16 December 2013, https://canadiansailings.ca/ahoy-davie-british-shipbuilders-american-investors-team-up-to-refloat-canadas-oldest-and-biggest-shipyard/; Matt Powell, “Davie Shipyard Relaunched,” Plant: Advancing Canadian Manufacturing 72:8 (November/December 2013): 12–13, https://www.plant.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/PLNT_N0vDec2013DE.pdf.
Cardwell (n 67).
“Shipbuilding for the Canadian Coast Guard,” Government of Canada, News Release, 4 July 2010, https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2010/06/shipbuilding-canadian-coast-guard.html.
Author’s tour of Seaspan Vancouver Shipyards, 2014.
R. Bruce Striegler, “Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards Yard Modernization Complete: First Blocks for Coast Guard’s Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels under Construction,” Canadian Sailings, 29 December 2014, https://canadiansailings.ca/seaspans-vancouver-shipyards-yard-modernization-complete-first-blocks-for-coast-guards-offshore-fisheries-science-vessels-under-construction/.
Id.; Shadwick (n 64), p. 79.
Anita Anand, Canada’s National Shipbuilding Strategy: 2020 Annual Report (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2021), 4; Seaspan, “Photo Gallery,” Seaspan, 2022, https://www.seaspan.com/photo-gallery/?_image_gallery=vancouver-shipyards; Manning and Gold (n 48), p. 12.
Jane Seyd, “Seaspan to Cut Steel on Offshore Science Ship This Month,” North Shore News, 9 March 2021, https://www.nsnews.com/local-news/seaspan-to-cut-steel-on-offshore-science-ship-this-month-3526538; Public Services and Procurement Canada, “Government of Canada Takes Next Step Toward Construction of Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel for Canadian Coast Guard,” Government of Canada, 18 February 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/news/2021/02/government-of-canada-takes-next-step-toward-construction-of-offshore-oceanographic-science-vessel-for-canadian-coast-guard.html.
Lee Berthiaume, “Vancouver Shipyard Renews Fight to Build Coast Guard’s New Polar Icebreaker,” CBC News, 21 September 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/seaspan-canadian-coast-guard-new-ship-1.5732309.
Paul Withers, “Trudeau Government Moves Heavy-icebreaker Job Out of Vancouver,” CBC News, 12 June 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/icebreaker-vancouver-seaspan-national-shipbuilding-strategy-1.5173027.
Seaspan ULC, “Seaspan to Build 10 More Canadian Coast Guard Ships,” Professional Mariner: Journal of the Maritime Industry, 8 October 2013, https://professionalmariner.com/seaspan-to-build-10-more-canadian-coast-guard-ships/; Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Vancouver Shipyards to Build Medium Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessels and Offshore Patrol Vessels for the Canadian Coast Guard,” Government of Canada, News Release, 7 October 2013, https://www.seaspan.com/wp-content/uploads/Federal-New-Release-10072013.pdf.
Lee Berthiaume, “Vancouver, Quebec Shipyards to Each Get New Heavy Icebreaker; Cost Remains a Mystery,” The Globe and Mail, 6 May 2021, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-ottawa-to-reveal-plans-for-building-long-overdue-heavy-icebreaker-for/; CCG, “Government of Canada Announces Polar Icebreakers to Enhance Canada’s Arctic Presence and Provide Critical Services to Canadians,” Government of Canada, News Release, 6 May 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2021/05/government-of-canada-announces-polar-icebreakers-to-enhance-canadas-arctic-presence-and-provide-critical-services-to-canadians.html.
CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard’s New Icebreakers,” Government of Canada, Backgrounder, 2 August 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2019/08/canadian-coast-guards-new-icebreakers.html.
Public Services and Procurement Canada, “Government of Canada Receives Chantier Davie’s Supporting Materials” (n 7); Public Services and Procurement Canada, “Canada’s National Shipbuilding Strategy Process to Add a Third Shipyard,” Government of Canada, Backgrounder, 2 August 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/news/2019/08/canadas-national-shipbuilding-strategy-process-to-add-a-third-shipyard.html.
Berthiaume 2020 (n 75); Tim Colton, “Davie Shipbuilding,” Shipbuilding History, 7 May 2021, http://shipbuildinghistory.com/canadayards/davie.htm; Chantier Davie Canada Inc. (n 67).
Murray Brewster, “Shipbuilding Industry Pushes Back as Federal Government Shops for Used Icebreaker,” CBC News, 6 October 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/shipbuilding-icebreaker-coast-guard-great-lakes-1.5751143.
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Brise-glace léger, Solicitation No. F7013-180034/A, Amendment No. 004,” Government of Canada, March 29, 2019, Signing Sheets, https://buyandsell.gc.ca/cds/public/2019/03/29/2d6e7f310e26637275fcd7fadf45f749/ABES.PROD.PW__MB.B003.E27203.EBSU004.PDF.
CCG, “Canadian Coast Guard Announces an Addition to the Southern Icebreaking Fleet with the Purchase of Light Icebreaker from Atlantic Towing Limited,” Cision, 10 November 2021, https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/canadian-coast-guard-announces-an-addition-to-the-southern-icebreaking-fleet-with-the-purchase-of-light-icebreaker-from-atlantic-towing-limited-831919031.html.
“Canadian Coast Guard Buys Light Icebreaker for Great Lakes; Vessel Currently in Turkmenistan,” Welland Tribune, 14 November 2021, https://www.wellandtribune.ca/news/niagara-region/2021/11/14/canadian-coast-guard-buys-light-icebreaker-for-great-lakes-vessel-currently-in-turkmenistan.html; “Caspian Offshore Construction (COC),” Offshore Technology, 2022, https://www.offshore-technology.com/contractors/vessels/caspian-offshore-construction/; Bruce Pannier, “Plunge in Oil Prices Deals Another Blow to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 23 April 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-plunging-oil-prices-kazakhstan-turkmenistan-economic-problems/30572905.html; Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Solicitation No. F7013-180034/A, Amendment No. 004” (n 83).
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Solicitation No. F7013-180034/A, Amendment No. 004” (n 83), p. 5.
Welland Tribune 2018 (n 52).
Eric Lerhe, Fleet-Replacement and the ‘Build at Home’ Premium: Is It Too Expensive to Build Warships in Canada? (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2016), 3.
Timothy Choi and Jeffrey F. Collins, “If Only Warships Grew on Trees: The Complexities of Off-the-Shelf Defence Procurement,” Policy Perspective (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, March 2022), https://www.cgai.ca/if_only_warships_grew_on_trees.
Australian Antarctica Division, “New Icebreaker RSV Nuyina Heads South,” Australian Government, 23 December 2021, https://www.antarctica.gov.au/nuyina/stories/2021/new-icebreaker-rsv-nuyina-heads-south/; Australian Antarctica Division, “Australia’s New Icebreaker – RSV Nuyina,” Australian Government, 24 September 2020, https://www.antarctica.gov.au/antarctic-operations/travel-and-logistics/ships/icebreaker/.
Jonathan Amos, “Ceremony Marks Start of Attenborough Polar Ship Construction,” BBC News, 17 October 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-37648915; British Antarctic Survey, “RRS Sir David Attenborough,” Natural Environment Research Council, n.d., https://www.bas.ac.uk/polar-operations/sites-and-facilities/facility/rrs-sir-david-attenborough/.
Choi and Collins (n 89).
Public Services and Procurement Canada, “Large Vessel Shipbuilding Projects” (n 9).
Irving Shipbuilding, “ICYMI … From Halifax Harbour to Canada’s North,” (@IrvingShipbuild, 24 March 2022), https://twitter.com/IrvingShipbuild/status/1507068233781706752; technical briefing provided by high level personnel involved with Margaret Brooke’s ice trials and the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships project, 30 March 2022.
Timothy Choi, “Maritime Militarization in the Arctic: Identifying Civil-Military Dependencies,” in Arctic Yearbook 2020, eds., Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot, and Justin Barnes (Akureyri, Iceland: Arctic Portal), 71.
I. Eskadre, “5. Besætning på inspektionsskibet TRITON,” Facebook, 15 July 2020, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3087079501375849&id=776180525799103.
Marinestaben, “Inspektionsskibet TRITON Brød Isen for Forsyningsskib,” Værnsfælles Forsvarskommando, 8 April 2015, http://forsvaret.dk/MST/Nyt%20og%20Presse/nationalt/Pages/InspektionsskibetTRITONbroedisenforforsyningsskib.aspx, archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20150429101207/http://forsvaret.dk/MST/Nyt%20og%20Presse/nationalt/Pages/InspektionsskibetTRITONbroedisenforforsyningsskib.aspx.
Jonas-Løvschall-Wedel, “Triton Hejælper Fiskere,” Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa, 29 March 2015, https://knr.gl/da/nyheder/triton-hj%C3%A6lper-fiskere.
Arktisk Kommando – Joint Arctic Command, “Isbrydning Ved Uummannaq,” Facebook, 2 June 2022, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=589198116113038.
Arctic Command (@arktiskkommando), “Lauge Koch Breaks Ice at Nuussuaq,” Instagram reel, 8 June 2022, https://www.instagram.com/reel/Cei6b3Qjgwl/.
For more on low-impact shipping corridors, see Dawson and Song in this volume.
Trine Jonassen, “Canada Prepares Increased Cruise Traffic Due to Climate Change,” High North News, 21 April 2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/canada-prepares-increased-cruise-traffic-due-climate-change; Karli Zschogner, “Inuvik, N.W.T., Braces for Surge in Tourism,” CBC News, 6 April 2022, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/inuvik-tourism-boom-1.6409630; Joanne Stassen, “Tour Operators in Thaidene Nëné Indigenous Protected Area Poised for Post-pandemic Boom,” CBC News, 30 January 2022, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/thaidene-nene-lutselk-e-tourism-1.6332375; CBC News, “‘A Light at the End of the Tunnel’: As Flights Return to the N.W.T., Tourism Operators Prepare for Guests,” CBC News, 9 March 2022, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/flights-return-to-nwt-tourism-1.6377958; “As Arctic Marine Tourism Increases, How Can We Ensure It’s Sustainable?,” Arctic Council, May 10, 2021, https://arctic-council.org/news/as-arctic-marine-tourism-increases-how-can-we-ensure-its-sustainable/; “Canadian Arctic Cruises,” Ponant, 2022, https://en.ponant.com/destinations/canadian-arctic; “View All Departures,” Quark Expeditions, 2022, https://www.quarkexpeditions.com/ca/departures?f%5B0%5D=departure_destination%3Acanada; “Itinerary and Pricing: Heart of the Arctic,” Adventure Canada, 2022, https://www.adventurecanada.com/expedition-cruise/heart-of-the-arctic/heart-of-the-arctic-2022.
Marc Mes, Canadian Coast Guard Director General Fleet and Services, interview with author and public remarks, Westin Ottawa, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Defending the Continent: A Pan-Domain and Pan-Canada Approach, 19 May 2022.
Sheldon Gillis, “The @RoyalCanNavy ships @HMCS_NCSM_HDW, #MARGARETBROOKE and #GOOSEBAY will sail with our Danish allies in #HDMSTRITON this summer for CA’s #OPNANOOK22” (@HighSeasSkipper, 13 June 2022), https://twitter.com/HighSeasSkipper/status/1536511677470068741.