Though weakened, the draft SAPL survived to see another day. AG Ōhashi’s beachhead had been established with some losses. Prime Minister Yoshida reshuffled his Cabinet once again to strengthen his hand in managing the issues stemming from the signing of the Peace and Security Treaties and internal security. AG Ōhashi was shifted to Minister of State for National Police and National Police Reserve, in reality a political demotion at the time; Kimura Tokutarō became the AG. It should be noted that Kimura had been the Minister of Justice in the first Yoshida Cabinet in 1946–47, then politically purged and subsequently de-purged, a prominently lawyer from before the war and a practitioner of kendō. The first item in his in-box was a resolution of the difficulties surrounding the draft SAPL and create an acceptable alternative draft.

Premier Yoshida called a meeting at the Foreign Minister’s Official Residence on December 26, 1951 of AG Kimura, Minister of Construction Noda Uichi, Minister of State for Administrative Management Hashimoto Ryūgo to discuss the governmental structure for maintaining internal security and strengthening the self-defense forces. As a member of the Cabinet Ordinances Consultative Committee, AG Kimura had earlier prepared a private report to PM Yoshida recommending one Ministry, Ministry of Public Security (Chianshō), responsible for all security forces, the National Police Reserve (the nascent Japanese Army), the Maritime Safety Board (Kaijō Hoanchō), National Police and the SIB. Now that he had become the AG, Kimura called for the separation of those forces with a defense coloring, the National Police Reserve, and Maritime Safety Board, from those responsible for internal security, the National Police and the SIB. AG Ōhashi had envisioned a parallel system of an enlarged SIB and the National Police and a system to assure their mutual cooperation because he was concerned about the potential resurrection of the old
police powers of the prewar Ministry of Home Affairs. Apparently, AG Kimura put greater stress on this cooperation, not much on expanding the SIB. That would suit the National Police in its bureaucratic rivalry with the SIB—this relationship will re-surface a number of times as the drafting process moved forward. Yoshida supported Kimura’s concept for internal security arrangements. This gave AG Kimura a relatively freer hand but not a decisive hand to guide the creation of a new draft bill on internal security. This support from the PM would give only a temporary edge and the new and revised draft would still be subject to the prickly and contentious internecine maneuvering by former now de-purged senior officials of the defunct Ministry of Home Affairs. It placed this responsibility into the hands of a conservative nationalist, AG Kimura, who had not been a prewar career official of the government but was himself a de-purgee. His pedigree in that sense was excellent, impeccable and difficult to challenge.¹

Nevertheless, the proposals concerning the future of the internal security arrangements were complicated by the wholesale de-purging of former government officials in 1950–1951. Those of particular interest in this instance were the groups of officials from the former Ministry of Home Affairs and especially in light of their direct connections to the top levels of the Liberal Party, e.g., Masuda Kaneshichi, Liberal Party’s Secretary General and former member of the Police Bureau in that Ministry, Yoshitake Eichi Chairman of the Party’s Policy Research Council and later Labor Minister, member of the Social Affairs Bureau, and Ōhashi Takeo, former AG and now Minister for the National Police and the National Police Reserve, formerly with the Home Ministry’s National Lands Bureau (Kokudokyoku). The Ministry of Home Affairs (Naimushō) group was disunited in pushing one set of detailed structural concepts except for the re-creation of one centralized influential Ministry of National Affairs (Kokuseishō). If any of these plans were materialized, they might endanger local government embodied in the new Constitution and guide Japan toward a re-emergence of the prewar system of government. These ideas and concepts were being pushed by about 150 de-purgees from the Home Ministry who were reported to have met to try to arrive at a unified plan. Their conflicting plans might be described as centering around the idea to re-centralized police powers pushed by the Police Bureau

¹ Asahi 1/11/1952.