2. HYPHENATING DEMOCRACY: GERMANY, JAPAN, & THE CONFLICT THESIS

**Argument**

Just as the *wave* argument gained post-Cold War circulation, so too did an alternate thesis postulating the causal role of conflict.¹ Often embedded in nation- or state-building tasks,² or directed at countries in transition, the *conflict* school shared with its *wave* counterpart an interest in changing regimes. Whereas the wave school kept this interest primarily at the observation and analytical levels, the conflict approach gave it legs: Used as an instrument, conflict could not only change an undesirable government, but also recreate governance along more desirable lines. The only mystery remained the trigger; what it would take to respond to an undesirable regime once limits of peaceful inducement had been crossed. Previously embedded in explanations of authoritarianism, studies more recently invoke rogue state or weapons of mass destruction rationales. Iraq illustrates this approach, Afghanistan the pure retaliation Japan faced in World War II.

One of the first instances of conflict-driven democratization surprisingly, did not need explanations nor justification: It was the product of actual war in which establishing democracy was not a causal factor. Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan were targeted by the Allies, not for the types of regimes in power, but for their military expansion, which rudely altered the balance of power. After meeting Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain even talked about “peace in our time” in 1939.³ However, the more their defeat looked inevitable, the more the post-war plans gravitated towards the kind of government to install after victory. The rest was amazing history: Both not only became

irreversibly democratized, but also models of how to instrumentalize democracy. If Cold War wrangling prevented democracy lessons from being heeded for four decades, the post-Cold War era, with its real or imagined end-of-history mentality, is more ripe for that purpose.

Just as the wave argument elevates endogenous development within a democratizing country, the conflict alternative invites exogenous and external dimensions. By endogenous is simply meant the set of features springing out of democracy and the democratizing process, and exogenous pertaining to all other features from the outside. For example, electoral procedures and institutions would be endogenous, conflict as exogenous. Similarly, domestic democracy initiatives, like those of the Polish Solidarity under Lech Walesa, or Latin America’s neo-liberal shifts catalyzing the rendezvous with democracy in the 1980s, differ from the externally-imposed or externally-induced routes to democracy. Whereas conflicts illustrate the former external type, the European Union’s (E.U.’s) Copenhagen membership criteria of 1993 and the 1995 Euro-Med Partnership (EMP), for example, show a different non-conflicting externally-engineered type. Just as the E.U. has been associated with democracy promotion (DP) or democracy consolidation (DC) with its non-conflictual instruments, the literature vividly identifies the United States as promoting similar ends using conflict as the means.

Afghanistan and Iraq certainly don’t exhaust recent cases of U.S.-led conflict-driven democratization, but since they are not the first, two questions beg attention: (a) How similar have both cases been to Germany and Japan after World War II, since only by comparing discrete cases can the general picture conducive to theory-testing or theory-building be clarified? (b) Regardless of how clear the emerging general picture becomes, have Afghani and Iraqi democratization experiences encouraged or discouraged other conflict-driven democracy pursuits? Chapters 3–8 take up the second question in comparative detail. This one addresses the first.

---