No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an idea upon which to base it. But in the development of this science ..., the first idea given to this science is very seldom adequate. For this idea lies within reason, like a germ in which the parts are hidden, undeveloped, and barely recognizable, even under the closest observation. Consequently, since sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest, we must not explain and determine them according to the description that their founder gives of them, but in conformity with the idea that, out of the natural unity of the parts that we have assembled, we find to be grounded in reason itself. For then we shall find that its founder and often even his most recent successors are groping around for an idea which they have never succeeded in making clear to themselves, and consequently they have not been able to determine the proper content, articulation (systematic unity), and limits of the science.

Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 834, B 862)

In the following conclusion, I would like to provide (1) a thematic summary of our exegetical engagements, (2) a brief review of a competing (and in fact the standard) interpretive position on the character and significance of the doctrine of inner sense, and (3) a final series of reflections upon the wider significance of the identification of the aporia of inner sense, and the possible directions for research that it reveals.

This essay attempted to set out systematically Kant’s doctrine of inner sense, and provide a basis for a scholarly estimation of each of Kant’s various—and variant—indications of its structure and significance. This exegesis also attempted to isolate the reasons according to which Kant’s variant formulations of the doctrine were not merely arbitrary or peripheral, but necessary and central to the architectonic of human cognition. The horizon for this necessity was found in the wider argumentative intentions definitive of transcendental idealism, to both “limit” and “secure” the possibility of synthetic a priori judgment.
The contravening claims upon inner intuition were found to consist in (a) the constructive intention to demonstrate the possibility of synthetic a priori judgment within the sphere of outer intuition and in (b) the critical intention to demonstrate the impossibility of synthetic a priori judgment within the sphere of inner intuition. The first exigence required that the conditions for the synthetic cognition of a spatial and substantial object obtain also within the form and sphere of inner intuition, in order that it perform its function within the *ordo cognoscendi*. But the second exigence required that the conditions for the synthetic cognition of a spatial and substantial object be excluded from the form and sphere of inner intuition. The aporia of inner sense, then, across its aspects, consists in the constrictive effect that the formal requirements for Kant’s critical intentions exerts upon Kant’s constructive intentions.

No thesis was more central or determinative to the latter intention in particular than was the heterogeneity thesis thereof, as this was set out first in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (2, II, 1–3, above). The heterogeneity thesis consisted first in Kant’s division between time as “form of inner sense” (A 30, B 46) and space as “form of outer sense” (A 22, B 37). By means of this *divisio*, Kant also assigned the sphere of application of each sensible form, and the (in)capacities of each. Inner intuition was thus subject to a “limiting condition,” that resulted from its formal character or structure (B 159). This condition yielded Kant’s claim to (a) the *inconstancy* rather than constancy of inner sense; within inner sense, only a “mere flux, chaos” of perpetual succession could appear (A 33, B 49–50; B 291). This condition also yielded the claim to its (b) *indeterminacy* rather than determinacy; time, “the sole form of our inner intuition, has nothing abiding and therefore yields knowledge only of the succession of determinations,” and “not of any object that can thereby be determined” (A 381). From this indeterminacy was derived the *incapacity* of inner intuition; only in space and hence in outer sense “is shape, magnitude, and mutual relation determined or determinable” (A 22, B 37).

Time, then, did “not pertain to any shape or position” (A 33, B 50). For the absence of these conditions, inner sense could yield within its manifold neither “empirical location” (R 6315) nor the conditions for individuation, or determinate objectivity (A 263, B 319). Within its succession, Kant asserted, “no object whatever is presented.” Within it, “nothing is distinguished from anything else” (A 197, B 243). Each incapacity characteristic of inner intuition was contrasted to the determinacy and “steady