At the end of the last chapter, we noted that one important issue in regard to Type-2/Variation A NO's remained to be solved. Given that the agent experiences some sort of cognitive dissonance and unsettledness as a result of the MOI lingering by means of one's performance of ContinualComp on it, how is she to recognize that unsettledness specifically as a warning that needs to be heeded. If she does not so recognize it, it is not clear how she can be regarded as having voluntarily neglected the warning. Any consequences, such as the NO, would thus seem not to be imputable.

In chapter 3, we saw how Anselm's understanding of the affectiones of the will led to certain problems in his understanding of initial sin. In particular, his overall understanding of the will and the devil's sin led to the logical conclusion that the devil's initial sin had to be some form of NO. We further observed that it was his characterizing the affectiones in terms of what is called a 'strong conditional' (if the object of an affection comes to mind, then the will wills to have that object either immediately or at the appropriate time) that caused much of the problem.

In this third chapter on Scotus, I will use his distinctive adaptation of Anselmian affectiones to accomplish two tasks. First, I will show that although Scotus follows Anselm by adopting the affectiones doctrine, he does so in such a way as to avoid the negative implications we observed in Chapter 3. By Scotus's understanding of the affections, it may, but need not, be the case that the devil's first sin was a NO. Moreover, it will be indicated how, even if the devil's first sin was a NO, subscription to the dual-affection doctrine can be consistent with ascribing blame for that first sin.

Second, I will offer an affectio-based answer to the question of how an agent can be expected to recognize the unsettledness caused by a MOI/LII as a warning to be heeded. This will solve the one remaining issue related to Type-2/Variation A NO's. Of course, this solution is based upon assuming a theory of action that incorporates affectiones of the will. Since many do not share this notion, I will subsequently offer
an alternative answer in the final chapter and conclusion to the book. Nonetheless, I point out a different solution here to note that Scotus has, within his own writings, the resources with which to deal with one important type of NO.

I. Scotus’s Adaption of Anselm’s ‘Will as Affectio’

A. General Description: The Affections and ‘Will’ vs. ‘Nature’

Like Anselm, Scotus believes the will can be understood as having two affectiones or inclinations/dispositions for willing: the affectio commodi (AC) and the affectio iustitiae (AI). His understanding of them begins to depart from that of Anselm, though, and more puzzles begin to arise when he maps these two affections onto his distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘will.’

Recall that Scotus sharply distinguishes between potencies characterized as ‘natural’ and those characterized by ‘will.’ A natural potency is one that “of itself is determined to act, so that so far as itself is concerned, it cannot fail to act when not impeded from without.”¹ ‘Natural’ potencies are thus not free; they act deterministically in service to an individual’s or specie’s perfection. By contrast, the ‘will’ is free. It is a self-determining power for opposites on account of superabundant sufficiency.

Given that ‘will’ is contrasted with ‘nature,’ one would not expect to find a ‘natural’ appetite per se in the will. In Scotus’s description of the will’s affectiones, however, this is precisely what is found. Following Anselm, Scotus says that according to the AC “nothing can be willed save with reference to self.” Although this limitation on the AC’s influence alone does not entail that it is ‘nature,’ he goes on to imply that the AC, of itself, does not impart any power for opposites. Instead of freely choosing, an agent with only the AC would follow the dictates of the intellect’s decision of what is most advantageous just as “sense appetite follows sense cognition.”² Viewing the AC in terms of ‘nature’ instead

¹ aut enim potentia ex se est determinata ad agendum, ita quod, quantum est ex se, non potest non agere quando non impeditur ab extrinseco (QMet IX, q.15, n.22; Wolter, Will and Morality, 151).
² Secundum autem affectionem commodi, nihil potest velle nisi in ordine ad se, - et hanc habetur si praecise esset appetitus intellectivus sine libertate sequens cognitionem intellectivam, sicut appetitus sensitivus sequitur cognitionem sensitivam (Ord. III, d.26, n.110, translation from Wolter, Will and Morality, 179). All texts of Ord. III, d.26 are from the critical (Vatican) edition.