But since we call ‘knowing’ in two ways (for both the one having but not using knowledge and the one [having] and using are said to know) it will matter whether one has [knowledge] but is not contemplating it or [both] has and contemplates it [when one is doing] those things which one must not do. For this [i.e. doing that which one should not do when both having and contemplating knowledge] seems amazing [sc. impossible], but it is not amazing [for one to do what should not be done] if one is not contemplating [the knowledge]. Further, since there are two kinds of premises, nothing prevents one who has both premises from acting against knowledge while using only the universal [premise] but not the [premise] about the part [or, “not the particular premise”]. And [to help explain how this is possible and not amazing after all] there are different types of universals [in both the universal and particular premises];

for on the one hand there is (a) that which refers to the agent and on the other hand there is (b) that which refers to the object. An example [of this] is that (‘A1’ - the universal premise with a focus on universal term ‘a’) dry things are profitable to every human being, and that (‘A2’ - particular premise with focus on universal term ‘a’) he himself is a human being, or that (‘B1’ - a somewhat universal but less universal premise than the universal premise proper, with focus on universal term ‘b’) this such-a-thing is dry; but whether (‘B2’ - particular premise with focus on universal term ‘b’) this thing is this such-a-thing, either [the one who acts against knowledge] does not have this knowledge or does not use it. Now according to these [different premises which we have just delineated] it matters to a great extent which ways [i.e. premises] that [one knows], so that it does not seem out of place [to have acted against knowledge] when one knows in one way [i.e. when lacking ‘B2’], but [to act against knowledge] when knowing in another way [i.e. ‘B2’] is amazing [or impossible].

Further, it is possible for human beings to have knowledge in a different way from those ways we have now described; for we see a split in the way of having knowledge but not using it [i.e. there are
different ways of having but not using knowledge], so that in a way one can both have and not have [this type of knowledge, i.e. knowledge which is not being fully used]. Examples of these are the sleeper and the mad person and the drunk person. But, truly they who are affected by feelings (or, passions) are disposed in this way;

1147a16 For emotions and sexual desires and others such as these clearly even change the body, and even produce madness in some people. Therefore it is clear that it must be said that the akratics have [knowledge] in the same way. And saying the words which come from knowledge is no sign; for those who are in these states will recite geometrical demonstrations and say verses of Empedocles,

1147a21 And people learning for the first time on the one hand will speak words, but they do not yet know them; for it is necessary that the knowledge the words express grow into them, and this takes time. This leads us to a result (hōste) that one must suppose that it is in the same way as actors repeating lines that akratics say the words. Further, we can also investigate the cause [of acting against knowledge] in reference to human nature. For on the one hand there is a universal belief, 1147a26 and on the other hand there is the different particular belief, sense perception already being the master [of the latter]; and whenever one [belief] arises out of these, it is necessary there for the soul to affirm the conclusion which has been drawn, and [further] when it is in regard to practical things to act immediately [on the conclusion]. For example, if everything sweet must be tasted, and this one particular this is sweet, it is necessary for the one who is able and not hindered to do this [i.e. taste it] at the same time.

1147a32 Therefore suppose that on the one hand there is the universal belief hindering one from tasting, and on the other hand the belief that everything sweet is pleasant, and that this is sweet (and this latter belief is active), and appetite is present in the situation. Therefore, on the one hand the belief says to flee this, but on the other hand appetite leads one on (for it is capable of moving each of the parts). Hence it comes to pass that one acts akratically in a certain way because of reason and belief. The [second] belief is not contrary to correct reason in itself, but coincidentally [or, according to coincidence] (for the appetite is opposite to correct reason, but not the [second] belief). For this reason wild animals are not akratic,

1147b5 because they do not have universal judgments, but they only have particular images and memory. But how is the ignorance removed and the akratic to regain his or her knowledge? The same account that