PART III

SYSTEMATIC-THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY
CHAPTER NINE

PERFECT WILL THEOLOGY: A MODAL ARGUMENT

9.1 Introduction

Reformed theology is Perfect Will theology. Moreover, its model of divine agency seems to be the only consistent one. Now, it is time to consider the modal power of Perfect Will more closely. How does the classic Reformed doctrine of God figure within possible worlds? The aim of this chapter is rather modest: it does not offer a strict proof of Perfect Will theology, but tries to explore how this way of thought is further strengthened by possible world semantics. So, I refrain from extensive discussion with relevant secondary literature in order to develop the train of thought more directly.¹

9.2 The Best Possible Person and Possible Worlds

Perfect being theology works with a superlative degree in the category of being: it concerns the Best Possible Being. Being as such also connotes goodness in various degrees. As we have seen, being was defined in synchronic contingent terms as a non-repugnancy to exist.² There is something that can be. This rather minimalist concept of being is utilized both to form a concept of the highest being and to prove his existence.

Leydecker develops the concept of God in a threefold way: by way of causality, negation, and eminence. All finite being is contingent, and in itself, can be and not be. Therefore, it cannot be self-caused. Moreover, its perfections suppose that its Maker himself is more perfect. Contrary to contemporary evolutionary theories, this kind of philosophy assumes that lower kinds of being can only be caused by higher ones. Everything that is below comes from above. So, there must be a higher

¹ For instance, Alvin Plantinga has produced an interesting modal version of the ontological argument, see Plantinga, Nature of Necessity (see above, ch. 7, n. 41), pp. 196–221.
² See 1.5.