CHAPTER TEN

RISE AND HEYDAY OF LATER SCHOLASTIC PSYCHOLOGY

The psychological views of late Scholasticism drew their inspiration from a large variety of ancient, medieval and Renaissance sources. Discussions of the intelligible species during this period tended to be strongly syncretizing. At the time of the Second Scholasticism, the doctrine of species was no longer the controverted issue that it had been during Middle Ages and Renaissance. Although later schoolmen frequently polemized with predecessors and contemporary authors, there was a general consensus with regard to the need for intelligible species, and doctrinal differences concerned only matters of detail.

In the first section, I examine the positions of the first generation of Spanish schoolmen, including authors such as Toletus and Suarez, whose influence would affect the thought of later schoolmen as well as that of many modern, non-Aristotelian philosophers. The second section is a discussion of the first Scholastic manuals and early seventeenth-century commentaries on De anima. In the final section I examine the position of the last ‘pre-Cartesian’ Scholastics.

§ 1. SCHOLASTIC PSYCHOLOGY FROM PALACIOS TO SUAREZ

1.1. Michael de Palacios

The first commentary on De anima to be printed in Spain was written by a relatively unknown author, Michael de Palacios1. It already had the characteristic features that would be typical of the

---

1 Michael de Palacios, fl. in the 16th century; from Granada; studied at the University of Salamanca; between 1545-1550 professor of philosophy there; in 1549, doctor theologiae there; between 1550-1554 professor of theology.
way in which later and more famous Spanish schoolmen expounded Aristotelian psychology: frequent references to medieval Scholastics, a tendency toward syncretism and eclecticism, and the idea of an 'ancient opposition' against species.

Palacios started his question on whether there are intelligible species with raising a number of objections: (1) the soul cannot be seen as the 'subject' of cognitive contents, because then it would become "lapideus" when conceiving a stone; (2) according to Themistius one knows the "species suscepta"; hence, no instrumental species are required; (3) Henry of Ghent (who was evidently seen as a reliable authority here) rejected the species. Against these objections Palacios placed the authority of Thomas and Augustine, to which he added the argument from the three states of the intellect (potential, actual, and habitual). He then turned to an opinion which he initially ascribed to Alfarabi, but which he also presumed to be that of Caietanus, namely, the view that the intelligible species can be defined as "ipsa notitia intellectus".

According to Palacios, a similar view is held by certain "juniores" who regard the species as "actio intelligendi". Having established that "nostrates philosophi" maintain a distinction between notion and species, Palacios proceeded to give his own view of the matter.

Against Alfarabi and Avicenna, Palacios argued that intelligible species are produced and preserved in the possible intellect. Their

---

2 See In tres libros Aristotelis de anima commentarii, una cum quaestionibus in locos obscuriores subtilissimis, Salamanticae 1557, 257vb-258rb. As regards Augustine, Palacios referred to his argument in behalf of an intellectual memory in Confessiones, X.8.

3 As we have seen in ch. I, § 3, Latin translators of Arab philosophers did not use "species", but "intentio" for ma'na or ma'qul. That the species can be identified with "notitia" was held by Henry of Ghent; see Quodlibetum IV, q. 21, 201va; idem, q. 7, 148vb-149ra: Augustine's concept of "notitia" should be interpreted as "species expressa". On f. 150ra-51ra, Henry distinguished between three meanings of species in Augustine; the third is "notitia in cognoscente".

4 In tres libros Aristotelis de anima, 258va. The juniors in question were Agostino Nifo, De intellectu, V, c. 5, and Aureol, In II Sent., d. 2, q. 4. See ch. VI, § 3.2, and ch. IV, § 2.3, respectively.

5 Notice that, by (tacitly) subscribing to the intra-mental production of mental representations, Palacios managed to skirt a number of puzzles regarding mind and body, in connection with the exact nature of the cooperation between phantasm and agent intellect in the generation of species.