Appendix One: *L’Homme Révolté* in 40 Premises

Given the persistence of claims that Camus’ *The Rebel* was a “failed great work”,\textsuperscript{1763} and in particular that the conclusions in Part V either/both (a) don’t follow from the critical analyses of Parts II and III; and/or (b) represent the triumph of rhetorical vagaries over a defined political philosophy, it is worthwhile delineating the book’s key premises. As in Appendix Three and throughout the book, ‘rhetoric versus clear thinking’ is one opposition which Camus’ humanism challenges.

*L’Homme Révolté/The Rebel*

*Introduction*

1. Age of organised state-based murder demands question: can murder be rationally justified, excused, adopted as instrument of policy?
2. Method: from *MS*, assume nothing, doubt everything—can’t doubt desire for unity (which animates doubt, demands evidence), in its confrontation with a world not “made to our measure.”
3. If suicide is thus prohibited (life and consciousness necessary for confrontation with absurd), murder is likewise prohibited.
4. Already, a primary value is indicated: “the first step of a mind overwhelmed by the strangeness of things is to realise that this feeling of strangeness is shared with all men and that the entire human race suffers from the division between itself and the rest of the world.”\textsuperscript{1764}
5. (from (3)) Confrontation with absurd involves revolt: against consolations which conceal it (like the picture in front of the man before the firing squad)
6. Assuming nothing beyond revolt, we can still study history of revolt as means of examining our question.

*Part I*

7. The rebel says ‘no!’ (denial, refusal) to particular action, policy, institution; but the ‘no’ supposes an affirmation (‘yes’) to

\textsuperscript{1763} Orme, *Development of Camus’ Concerns*, 152, 249 n. 4. Orme is citing McCarthy.
\textsuperscript{1764} HR 38; R 22.
Appendix One

8. People can, have, do revolt for principles (eg: no deceit, justice), and for sake of others. Thus:
9. The value presupposed by rebellion is (confirming 4) one of solidarity, common dignity, shared suffering, justice in the face of a world ‘beyond our measure’, a demand for relative, humane unity and order in a world ‘beyond human measure’.
10. Nb. This value does not await any end of history; it exists in the present, where it must be (re)created, and its primary objects are ‘really-existing’ people.

**Parts II and III: History of Modern Metaphysical, then Historical Revolt**

11. Strictly speaking, no revolt was possible in pre-modern societies where ‘sacred canopy’ is unquestioned (we note that this could certainly be questioned).
12. the modern age, age of revolt, “begins with the crash of falling ramparts”:1765 against
13. natural evil, as rationalised in Augustinian theodicy (metaphysical rebellion (HR Part II)), as:
   a. Just punishment for sinfulness
   b. Necessary in higher order (Christianised Stoic notion)
   c. Reflection of God’s inscrutable justice (predestination: later theological nominalism, voluntarism)
14. political evil, as the assumption by human agents of the ‘divine right’ to kill, enslave, deceive, exile and expropriate (HR Part III).
15. For early modern rebels, (13) a &/or b &/or c may be true, but
   a. we can’t know if they are, whether we can witness suffering and injustice;
   b. if (13) a, b, or c is true, they are unjust.
16. Hence, modern rebellion, even in its political forms (14), has metaphysical presuppositions and implications.

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1765 HR 45; R 26.