While the Greeks of the mainland struggled to shape their imperfect peace, events elsewhere were anything but pacific. From 366 to 360 two major, loosely related episodes shaped the volatile history of the northern Aegean. In eastern Macedonia and the Chalkidike Athens renewed efforts to establish an empire divorced from its broader maritime League. During the same period Athens also dabbled in the Satraps’ Revolt that convulsed the northeastern Aegean and all of Asia Minor. In the west Athens struggled to subdue Amphipolis to which it had laid claim since the fifth century. It attacked neighboring Olynthos, Torone, Poteidaia, and Pydna in the process. In the east Athens cautiously supported the rebel satrap Ariobarzanes in its effort to win control of the European side of the Hellespont. Athens pursued a traditional policy aimed at putting the resources of the Aegean under its control but attempted to do so without seriously provoking the King. Its meddling in the Satraps’ Revolt amounted simply to circumspect adventure calculated to take advantage of any opportunity that the situation offered. The ability of Athens to pursue a course that in many aspects violated its various treaties with the King arose only because of the general turmoil then troubling western Anatolia. This period saw legalities become unenforceable inconveniences, and the Satraps’ Revolt itself proved a riot of chaos and confusion. Even a precise chronology of the period lies beyond recovery, so nothing lapidary will be offered here. Yet enough evidence survives to provide a reasonable, reliable sequence of events.\footnote{For background see Judeich, \textit{Kleinasiatische Studien}, 190–220; Hornblower, \textit{Mausolus}, 170–203; Weiskopf, \textit{Satraps’ Revolt}, 45–68; Ruzicka, \textit{Persian Dynasty}, 56–78; Heskel, \textit{North Aegean Wars}, 101–122.}

If one incident can be said to have triggered the entire subsequent chain of events it must surely be the revolt of Ariobarzanes,
satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. His satrapy stretched along the northwestern coast of Anatolia from the satrapy of Lydia, the northern border of which was the Hermos valley, along the littoral to that of Kappadokia on the Halys river, and southwards inland to Gordion on the border of Phrygia Proper, or Greater Phrygia. Its expanse along the southern coasts of the Euxine or Black Sea made it particularly vital to Athens, which was so dependent on foodstuffs from this entire region. As early as 368 Ariobarzanes, as seen above (pp. 316–317), had signalled his looming treachery by lending mercenaries to Sparta and by so helping Athens that it granted both Philiskos and him citizenship. Artaxerxes had additional reason to suspect the loyalty of his satrap. The rightful governor of the satrapy was Pharnabazos’ son Artabazos, who was to assume his duties upon his majority. At that point Ariobarzanes was obliged to relinquish his satrapy to him; and now in 366, when the youth had come of age, he wanted his patrimony. The situation was anything but simple. In addition to placing Athens and Sparta in his debt, Ariobarzanes had used his Greek lieutenant Philiskos to seize control of the Hellespont. He won on the Asian side of the straits, as was the satrap’s right. Philiskos, however, also occupied Sestos and Krithote, while maintaining a band of mercenaries in Perinthos, all in Europe and none a part of Ariobarzanes’ satrapy. When Ariobarzanes received the King’s command to surrender his office, he refused, thus beginning the most serious phase of the Satraps’ Revolt. He called upon Athens and Sparta to repay their debts to him; and owing to the King’s recent decisions at Sousa, they responded to his appeal as well as they could. Ariobarzanes meanwhile braced for the attack. His peril was great, for the loyal Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, advanced onto Assos, driving a wedge into the line of his coastal possessions. Assos, even without its magnificent walls, held a very strong natural position on the coast. Steep heights virtually isolated its harbor from the interior, but its port proved a vital link in coastal traffic. Mausolus also arrived at Assos with a fleet of 100 ships, some of which he deployed against Sestos. Kotys, king of Thrace, furthered Persian efforts by beleaguering Sestos from inland. Sestos controlled the main road between Europe and Asia and overlooked an excellent bay on the straits. At Sestos and Abydos across from it the channel widens, but a shoal reaching from the Asian shore forces ships to the European side. The combination of Assos as a staging area together with Sestos and Abydos ensured Ariobarzanes’ mari-