449b4. Περὶ μνήμης καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν ... The archetypal manuscript reading is the one here presented. But this leaves the De memoria the only text of the Parva naturalia not beginning with a connective particle. It would perhaps be better to follow C:Mi in including the last line of what is traditionally taken to be the text of the De sensu as the beginning of De memoria. Alternatively, one could simply read Περὶ (δὲ) at the beginning of De memoria (with mvZ`).

449b9. ... τὰ μνημονευτά. The article is omitted in β, but all editors rightly adopt it, focusing on the objects of memory, in accordance with the method that was proposed in the De anima (cf. An. I.1 & II.4).

449b17. ... θεωρῶν καὶ ἐννοῶν. Since, as shown by the following sentence, this phrase is supposed to parallel (with an example of knowledge) the former example of perception, modern editors have preferred the reading of α (ὅτε θεωρῶν τυγχάνει καὶ ἐννοῶν), which prima facie provides a more exact parallel. But β, omitting ὅτε and τυγχάνει and writing νοῶν for ἐννοῶν, is actually an equally exact parallel, understanding οὐδεὶς ἂν φαίη μνημονεύειν as the basis; ὅτε and τυγχάνει are both likely interpretative insertions. Thus, I believe the reading of β to be superior, although I accept α’s ἐννοῶν instead of νοῶν. Even some α manuscripts have been corrupted into νοῶν.

449b19. ... τῶν ἐγγυῶν ... This was most likely the reading of β, but α and U read τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, which may perhaps then be said to have slightly greater authority. It seems, therefore, that one of the two readings is a gloss on the other, and I believe that τῶν ἐνεργειῶν is more likely to be so. One might initially interpret τῶν ἐγγυῶν as “the [external] objects” (which may actually be the correct interpretation), but the gloss indicates that some commentator wanted the phrase to be taken in the sense of the excersising of the relevant faculties, in accordance with the distinction that Aristotle makes in EE. 1219a13–18.
449b20. ... οὖν μέμνηται [τὰς τοῦ τριγώνου ὅτι δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι] ... Freudenthal’s and Ross’ omission of τὰς τοῦ τριγώνου ὅτι δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι is, I believe, correct. Annas (1992a) 301η calls the position of the phrase awkward but believes that it is arbitrary simply to omit it, and Siwek retains it. However, in the position given by the manuscripts the phrase is not only awkward but very difficult to explain, since an example given here would have to include both epistemic and perceptual examples; this phrase only includes the former. Furthermore, the corruption is easily explained, since this is one of Aristotle’s favourite examples elsewhere in the Corpus Aristotelicum (e.g. APb. 71a20–21; further examples in Bonitz (1870) 770b, s.v. τρίγωνον), and ancient and Byzantine commentators will have known this. Thus, in the present instance the phrase was originally inserted in the margin or as an interlinear gloss to explain τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἐμαθεν ἢ ἐνόησεν but mistakenly crept into the text. Gohlke suggested reading the sentence after τὸ θεωρώμενον in l. 17, which is certainly better than the transmitted variant, but I believe that Freudenthal was right in excising the text.

449b23. ... ἤκυσεν ... Freudenthal suspected this word to be an intrusion, and it does read somewhat strangely in the sentence, followed by the two general verbs ἦσθετο and ἐνόησεν. But Aristotle is not being very careful here, and ἦσθετο may well be meant as broadening the perspective to perception generally.

450a13. ... τοῦ νοῦ μὲν ... The archetypal reading seems to have been τοῦ νοομένου, which some copyists (e.g. the copyist of X) took as meaning τοῦ νοητοῦ. But this reading cannot be correct. We need (1) something to correspond to τοῦ πρῶτου αἰσθητικοῦ in the following parallel sentence, and (2) it would be preferable if this was also signaled by the particle μὲν. Thus, the reading of C-Mi makes perfect sense and should, in my view, be adopted. This does not, however, provide the reading with manuscript authority, since these manuscripts descend from E; the reading is the result of emendation. The reading of P (τοῦ νοητικοῦ) is also acceptable, and it is probably a scribal emendation based on the corresponding αἰσθητικοῦ. Zeller proposed νοοῦντος or νοῆς, Bywater proposed διανοουμένου. Brentano followed another line of thought and wrote τοῦ πρῶτου αἰσθητικοῦ instead of τοῦ πρῶτου αἰσθητικοῦ.