Wyclif’s reputation as a philosopher was restored by J.A Robson, who engaged with the study of *Summa de Ente* in the context of the intellectual environment of the Oxford schools.\(^1\) By this time, the map of late medieval thought had been drawn and the domains and boundaries had been demarcated by generations of scholars,\(^2\) who divided thinkers either as Platonic Augustinian or Aristotelian Thomist. Obviously, this division was not unfounded; the thinkers grouped accordingly were themselves aware of the logical and linguistic problems concerning the difference between Plato and Aristotle, dialectics and categorical thinking, analogical thought and causation, as regards the description

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\(^2\) John Inglis in his *Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy* (Leiden–Boston–Köln: Brill, 1998) identifies the model of the history of medieval philosophy, which has remained effective to the present day, as the Kleutgen-Stöckel model. He also claims that the editors and authors of *The Cambridge History of Late Medieval Philosophy* followed the same paradigm. This model assumes that medieval philosophers, especially Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham were successful in reconciling revelation and reason. He also points out that the chapters of *The Cambridge History of Late Medieval Philosophy*, more than one third of which deal with logic and metaphysics, reflect the false assumption that medievals were basically involved in the study of philosophy, which he understands as the philosophy of nature, instead of the much broader intellectual enquiry into the human condition at their time. I will refer to Inglis’s arguments in my work, although it should be noted that ‘philosophy’ was not necessarily understood purely as the study of nature—especially in Wyclif’s case, who, incidentally, has never been included in the canon of medieval philosophy. For Wyclif, who was considered to be the King of Philosophers by some of his followers, as mentioned earlier, not only ‘the’ Philosopher (Aristotle) or Plato were considered to be philosophers as such, but Moses and Christ, too. See more of this below.

Stephen E. Lahey reconstructs a different tradition of intellectual history, when he refers to Martin Grabman’s ‘dictum,’ according to which papalists are realists, whereas monarchists are nominalists. He also quotes Grabman’s distinction between Aristotelian hierocrats, Thomistic Aristotelians and Averroist Aristotelians, (Lahey, 2002, 81ff). But he does not identify Wyclif as an Averroist, although some of Wyclif’s basic tenets, including the community of being, or potentials, are obviously taken from the ‘Commentator.’
of the order of the world, the work of its creator or prime mover, the hermeneutics of the text of the creator’s testaments, the potentials that we commonly call energies, the physical universe, i.e. nature, the nature of the soul in which the world was experienced, and, in general, the applicability of Aristotle’s universals and categories to Plato’s ideas, and Christian faith. As a further aspect of mutually exclusive categories, scholars also divided late medieval philosophers into realists and nominalists, with their respective political attitudes attached: realists were considered to be hierocratic, nominalists monarchical.3 This division has led to further complicities. By emphasising differences in logic and linguistic philosophy, the problems concerning the integration of the intended meaning of the divinely inspired text and the articles of the faith, most conveniently expressed in the Credo, with lived experience of animated and spirited creatures by the potential of human intellect and reason to find adequate signs, concepts and words to represent them, which, in the first place, new methods of inquiry and logical innovations were intended to clarify, moved out of focus of modern intellectual history. It was in this manner that Ockham’s logic was treated separately from his theology and political views,4 and philosophy, the art of making veritable statements about being, or seeking truth, as Wyclif thought when he referred to Moses as the Philosopher of the Israelites, or Christ as the celestial philosopher, was treated separately. In the same way, the problems concerning the interpretation of

3 The question is discussed more thoroughly in Lahey’s Philosophy and Politics in Wyclif’s Thought, op.cit., 81 ff.

4 Katherine Tachau in her Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, epistemology and the foundations of semantics 1250–1340 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988.) and Jesse Gellrich in his Discourse and Dominion in the Fourteenth Century; Oral Contexts of Writing in Philosophy, Politics, and Poetry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.) create a broader context for the understanding of late medieval philosophy. Tachau discusses Ockham’s philosophy in the context of the search for ‘existential certitude,’ the concordance of intention (divine inspiration) and the terms applied to represent it (revelation). Although she does not deal with Wyclif’s logic or philosophy, her study of the Oxford schools reveals the broader intellectual climate of Wyclif’s Oxford, as well. I shall rely on her work in order to place Wyclif’s innovation of ‘Ioyca Christi’ in context. Gellrich examines Ocham’s and Wyclif’s logic and theory on dominion in the context of orality and the representative value of written texts. The issue is highly relevant with respect to Wyclif’s insistence on the verity of holy scripture and its ‘literate’ sense, also because Wyclif is assumed to be at the source of English literacy and the authority of the written word. However, I shall have to disagree with some of his conclusions when I try to understand Wyclif’s influence on his audience, which cannot be understood from his logic, or from his insistence on the ‘literal’ sense of the scripture.