One of America’s most prolific authors and speakers on medieval warfare, Kelly DeVries, wrote in 2008 that the Hundred Years War was not a unitary conflict that involved only England and France. It was instead, he asserted, a set of linked military actions that ranged from the Low Countries to the Holy Roman Empire to the Iberian states.¹ All of these international arenas of conflict, though originating from local causes with long and extremely complex histories, were eventually caught up in the widening struggle between the French and the English. A perfect example of this transformation of indigenous conflicts in the great maelstrom of international warfare was the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366), a contest between Castile and the Crown of Aragon that steadily expanded after the treaty of Bretigny (1360) freed mercenaries serving English and French masters to seek lucrative employment on the Spanish side of the Pyrenees.² To gauge how this Iberian military struggle altered as it was swept along by the burgeoning influence of the Hundred Years War, this paper will focus on the changing dynamics of generalship demonstrated by its two protagonists: Pere III of Aragon (r.1336-1387) and Pedro I of Castile (r.1350-1366/69).

I. Iberia’s Asymmetrical Warfare

Thanks to the influence of the imperial military writer, Vegetius, it has long been understood that in the Middle Ages defensive operations were much

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¹ Kelly DeVries, “The Hundred Years Wars: Not One but Many,” in The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008), 2-32.

preferred to those of an offensive nature, except in the case of extended raids (chevauchées) which could carry great damage to the enemy with minimal risk.\(^3\) In the Iberian Peninsula with long stretches of extremely fertile coastline divided from the interior by bleak grasslands and harsh uplands marked by the absence of readily accessible water,\(^4\) the maxim of holding one's fire and waiting for the enemy to make a mistake seemed a prudent one. Because the Iberian landscape was even further dominated by strategically placed fortresses, all warfare in the region, no matter who engaged in it, was normally of a much reduced scale. The principal combat technique was the “lightning raid” (algara, aciefa, cabalgada), unleashing on the landscape what one modern military historian has called a “warfare of gradual erosion.”\(^5\) This regime of raiding normally existed without pitched battles, but instead put a force of under 1000 horsemen in enemy territory for a week or two. The aim of such operations was to produce maximum damage with minimum risk.\(^6\) This was done by having the raiding force constantly on the move while dealing heavy blows to enemy territory by damaging settlements, destroying crops, rustling livestock, and taking numerous prisoners.\(^7\) One fifteenth-century observer aptly described

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\(^6\) Manuel Rojas Gabriel, *La frontera entre los reinos de Sevilla y Granada en el siglo XV (1390-1481): Un ensayo sobre la violencia y sus manifestaciones* (Cádiz, 1995), 16-17.

\(^7\) Archivo de la Corona de Aragón [hereafter ACA], Cancillería real, Registro[hereafter R] 46, f. 283v; R. 236, f.222; Andrés Giménez Soler, *Don Juan Manuel: Biografía y estudio crítico* (Zaragoza, 1932), 339, 359-60 (docs. 155, 186); María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, *Entre la Paz y la Guerra: La corona catalano-aragonesa y Castilla en la baja Edad Media* (Barcelona, 2005), 324; Juan Torrers Fontes, *Instituciones y sociedad en la frontera murciano-granadina* (Murcia, 2004), 175, 481-82; Manuel Rojas Gabriel, “La nobleza como élite militar en la