These three articles cover between them considerably more time that any other of the six parts of this collection.

*Formal Properties of ‘Now’* is the oldest and perhaps also the most demanding paper in the collection, at least for someone who has the patience and stamina to have a closer look at the theorems and their proofs. From a formal point of view its results are still intriguing in that they show that the operator *(it is) now (the case that)* is eliminable from systems of propositional logic in an extremely general sense, but when quantifiers are added this is no longer so. Once you have seen why quantifiers block the elimination procedures for the propositional case, you may feel like you have understood why elimination of the *now* operator from formulas of tense predicate logic isn’t possible in general. But it turns out to be quite hard to prove that this is so. There may be simpler ways to establish this result than the proofs given in the paper, but so far I haven’t seen one.

In a way this paper is strangely at odds with developments in the domain to which it was meant to be relevant—the properties of and interactions between temporal and aspectual expressions in natural languages such as English. The central idea of using double indexing to treat *now* as a sentential operator, rather than as an (‘indexical’) individual constant, dates back to 1967, when tense logic had only recently been discovered and looked like a very powerful and conceptually plausible tool for investigating the role of time and tense in language and thought. But it was realized not long after, and even less time after the appearance of the paper in print, that from a conceptual and linguistic point of view treating *now* as an operator doesn’t have much to recommend it. Using double indexing may have been a bit of a technical innovation at the time and computer scientists have picked it up for other reasons and purposes. But if we want to do justice to what *now* does in language, and arguably also in thought, the older and simpler assumption that it is an indexical constant will do much better.

By the time *Events, Instants and Temporal Reference* was written, this battle had already been irrevocably lost by the aficionados of operators. Adverbials that look like they refer to dates, such as *August 1914, tomorrow*
night, the first of April, half an hour ago, do not only look like referring terms; refer to instants and periods of time is what they actually do. And now is in this regard no different from all the others. It is part and parcel of this view that what such expressions refer to are first class citizens of the ontology, along with you, me, Mount Everest and the rest. What was still much in dispute at this time was what tenses, as well as expressions like temporal adverbials and temporal conjunctions, exactly have to do with states and events. The literature on aspect seemed to take it for granted that verbs and their projections describe such entities as states, events and processes. The question here was just what kinds of entities are described by different verbs and by the phrases built from them. But the scientific community that had only recently struggled free from the nearly compulsive idea that everything in the temporal domain should be understood in terms of overt or concealed operators hadn't yet quite graduated to such a conception. Times had been, if reluctantly, accepted, but they were still thought of as times at which certain propositions are true, or at which certain objects satisfy certain predicates. That verbs, tenses, temporal adverbs were all bound together in a complex grammatical structure for describing eventualities of various kinds and for locating them temporally—in relation to each other, to us speakers and hearers and along the line of our unfolding narrative history—was a further step, which I at least wasn't able to take without a further struggle. Events, Instants and Temporal Reference was part of that struggle. It developed out of the intuition that tense forms often have to tell us as much about aspect as they tell us about temporal location. Crucially for my own further development, some of the clearest manifestations of how they can do those two things at the same time is their capacity to connect what is described by their verbs to what was described in preceding sentences of the text or discourse. Making discourse the focus of linguistic and conceptual analysis emerged as the key to getting a theoretical grip on this aspect of the contributions that tenses and other linguistic devices of temporal reference can make to discourse meaning and interpretation. This concern with the discourse-related dimensions of tense and aspect naturally led to the conviction that discourse must play a central part in the theory of linguistic meaning generally. It would be another two years before I found what seemed convincing evidence for this suspicion in anaphora. That discovery also enabled me to give a formal discourse-based semantics the more definitive shape of DRT in A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation.

The main thrust of Deixis in Discourse. Reichenbach on Temporal Reference is backward-looking. The paper is an elaboration of the Reichenbach Lecture of 1999, delivered at UCLA in the spring of that year. It tries to trace and