The manuscript that we publish in this volume under the title “Metaphysik. Vorlesungen von Stumpf” has been transcribed by Husserl himself from notes taken by another of Stumpf’s students during a lecture on metaphysics that he delivered at the University of Halle.¹ It is located in a notebook along with notes from Marty’s lecture on genetic psychology (1889) and fragmentary notes from Brentano’s lecture on descriptive psychology (1887), which are kept at the Husserl Archives in Leuven under the signature Q 10. This manuscript probably dates from the winter semester 1886-1887 (see R. Rollinger, 1999, 201) and has been authenticated by Karl Schuhmann in his article “Carl Stumpf (1848-1936)”, which is a commentary on Stumpf’s syllabi and notes from his Halle lectures. The third part of this section briefly summarizes the content of this manuscript. (K. Schuhmann, 1996, 124-128) Despite the somewhat nebulous origin of this manuscript and some of its shortcomings, its value cannot be doubted both for Husserl studies and for the study of Stumpf’s philosophy. For in Stumpf’s published writings one can only find scattered remarks on metaphysics and Stumpf had not published anything substantial on this topic. However, he repeatedly stresses the importance of metaphysics throughout his writings, especially in his autobiography. (Stumpf, 1930, 414, 435) Stumpf’s interest in metaphysics dates back to his studies with Brentano in Würzburg. (see C. Stumpf, 1919, 97 ff.)² He attended Brentano’s lecture on metaphysics in Würzburg and

¹ The cover page of the manuscript, which was written by Malvine Husserl, bears the name of Carl Deetjen, about whom we only know that he was a student in philosophy at Halle in the late 1880s. The only evidence we have is the list of members of the Goethe Society in Halle published in the Vierte Jahrschrift der Goethe-Gesellschaft in 1888 (p. 34), in which figure the names of the student in philosophy Carl Deetjen and Carl Stumpf in the membership of the city of Halle. (L. Geiger, 1889)
² K. Schuhmann (1996, 114) reports that Stumpf handed over all his lecture notes to
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took extensive shorthand notes in an in-quarto volume of 822 pages. (C. Stumpf, 1919a, 104) These lecture notes served probably as the basis for Stumpf's lecture on metaphysics, which he repeatedly delivered at Göttingen, Würzburg, Prague, Halle and later in Munich.

We also know that soon after his habilitation thesis in Göttingen in 1870, Stumpf began writing a critical history of the concept of substance, a project that he soon abandoned as he explained in his autobiography:

As my first real serious work, I attempted to undertake a critical history of the concept of substance, over which I racked my brain most awfully until I abandoned the problem, and, during Easter of 1872, I took up the psychological [396] theme of the origin of concept of space. With respect to the relation between color and extension I believed, and still believe, to find a striking example or analogue of the relation which metaphysics assumes to exist among the qualities of a substance. Thus the new problem was connected with my old work. (Stumpf, 1930, 395-396)

This is in substance the position he took in § 5 of the Raumbuch. Moreover, in the preface to his edition of Stumpf's last work Erkenntnislehre, his son Felix Stumpf stated that his father had planned a general overview of his philosophy which was to include, in addition to the two volumes on the theory of knowledge published shortly after Stumpf's death, two other books, one on ethics and another on metaphysics. Yet the documents that were to be used for the other two parts of this project appear to have been destroyed during the Second World War. Hence the importance of these lecture notes on metaphysics, as well as the syllabus and lecture notes on logic that survived this destruction. (see D. Fisette, 2015b)

This document written by Husserl is also valuable for this as of yet unknown period in the development of the young Husserl's thought. His debt to Brentano in Vienna (1884-1886) and to Stumpf in Halle

the Brentano archives in Prague.

3 Stumpf explicitly related this critical history of the concept of substance to the central thesis of his Raumbuch in a footnote to the first volume of Erkenntnislehre (C. Stumpf, 1939-1940, 24), in which he claims that the central idea of an inseparable link between size and color, for example, occurred to him during his conversations with Brentano, and this idea refers to the Aristotelian doctrine of an “indivisible content of perception”.