1. **Just armed-conflict principles**

Traditionally, just war principles have been applied to wars between states. Since the end of the Cold War, they (or analogues of them) have also been applied to armed humanitarian interventions. More sweepingly, I shall presuppose that traditional just war principles can be generalized, so that they are applicable to all forms of armed conflict. That is, it is presupposed that they are applicable not only to interstate wars but also to intrastate armed conflicts, armed humanitarian interventions, military operations against terrorists, military operations by UN peacekeeping missions, etc. To avoid confusion with the traditional meaning of the term ‘just war principle’, these generalized principles are called just armed-conflict principles, and the theory about
them is called *just armed-conflict theory*.³ Retaining some traditional names, they include just cause, competent authority, right intention, proportionality, last resort, and discrimination principles. Additionally, there is a principle requiring a reasonable chance of success, which is renamed the *feasibility principle*. For brevity, the question of whether there should be additional principles is set aside.

Acknowledging that there have been disagreements among just war theorists, I want to declare that this just-armed-conflict theory stems from my own understanding of just war theory. In concert with some just war theorists who are involved in the project of rethinking just war principles, my understanding of just war theory is somewhat revisionary.⁴ Let me introduce some core tenets. Ideally, just armed-conflict theory should be a politically (or ideologically) neutral framework within which the justice or injustice of particular cases of armed conflict may be debated rationally.⁵ Just armed-conflict principles morally constrain agents from using military force unjustly. When agents deliberate about whether to use military force, they ought to make the moral presumption that they must not. To override this moral presumption, they have the burden of proving that relevant just armed-conflict principles are satisfied.⁶ To satisfy this burden of proof rightly, they must fulfil a publicity requirement: they have to state their full proofs publicly. A metaethical basis for imposing such a burden of proof is that, because armed conflict regularly involves acts of killing human beings and other very harmful acts, the decision to use military force must be rigorously justified.⁷

In this paper, I shall discuss how just armed-conflict principles are applicable to military operations by a robust UN peacekeeping mission with a Chapter VII mandate authorizing the use of military force against peace agreement spoilers.⁸ I shall term such a mission an armed UN peacekeeping mission. Also, armed conflict between a

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⁴ Of course, the most influential rethinking of just war theory has been Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, New York, 2000. For his later thoughts, see Michael Walzer, *Arguing about War*, New Haven, 2004.


⁶ For a discussion of the role of the ideas of moral presumption and burden of proof in just war theory, see Childress, *supra*, note 5, at pp. 64-73. I discuss the role of intelligence in satisfying the burden of proving that just war principles are satisfied in John W. Lango, “Collective Security and the Goals of Intelligence,” in: *Defense Intelligence Journal*, vol. 16, 2007, no.1. (This issue of that journal is devoted to the subject of ethics and intelligence.)


⁸ For an official introduction to contemporary UN peacekeeping missions, see the *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peace-keeping Operations*, Peace-keeping Best Practices Unit, Department of Peace-keeping Operations, United Nations, December 2003 (hereafter cited as "the UN Peace-keeping Handbook"). For a recent discussion of the ethics of UN peacekeeping, see Daniel S. Blocq, “The Fog of UN Peace-keeping: Ethic-