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After five years of work, the UN organs did not succeed in formulating suggestions for the reform of the UN system which would lead to greater competences of the United Nations concerning development issues, and which would integrate the G-7/8-states and the Bretton Woods institutions more effectively in the work of the United Nations.

There is a lack of practical political will to launch the necessary reforms in the economic and social sector, which would also make a revision of the Charter (→ Charter of the UN) inevitable. Notwithstanding, problems and necessities were recognized, but the overall critique of the “Agenda for Development” by Boutros-Ghali in 1994, that the agenda was not action-oriented and lacked concrete suggestions, turned out to be a boomerang. Thanks to thorough and diplomatic adept preparations devised by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who used skillfully a kind of “millennium impetus”, in September 2000 the “Millennium Summit” of the → General Assembly adopted an eight-part “United Nations Millennium Declaration” (UN Doc. A/RES/55/2) which contains a number of concrete development goals, called “Millennium Development Goals”, to be reached by the year 2015. Kofi Annan succeeded not only in operationalizing selected economic and social development goals, but also in committing the member states to reach those targets within a given time period. The “Millennium Development Goals” were reaffirmed in the final document of the UN World Summit 2005, the “2005 World Summit Outcome” (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005, para. 17ff.).

Most probably not all targets will be reached by all member states concerned, but an annual road-map indicates which progress has been made so far and allows necessary corrections (cf. for example the “Millennium Development Goals Report 2007”, United Nations 2007).

Klaus Hüfner
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Peacekeeping; → Peacekeeping Operations).

At that time it was not possible to foresee that some of the major UN operations which followed, such as the administration of a referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO, from 1991), the UN Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNAMIC and UNTAC, 1991-94), and the UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR from 1992, later split into UNCRO in Croatia, UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and UNPREDEP in Macedonia), were to prove partial failures. In the optimistic mood after the end of the Cold War, many UN staff members overlooked the fact that the UN is ultimately not an actor per se (and was never intended to be), but rather serves as a stage for the member states, and is dependent on their national interests and their political will – as further developments in the nineties would prove this.

A remarkable document of this optimistic “atmosphere of departure” is the report to the Security Council by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (→ Secretary-General) in 1992, subsequently published as “Agenda for Peace” (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992). The Council had asked the Secretary-General to report on possibilities for international intervention in conflicts. Although often misinterpreted as a definition of different types of intervention (the terms used by Boutros Boutros-Ghali are still used in discussions about peace operations to this day), it is really a model chronology of the development of a conflict.

Phases of conflicts and of international action following the Agenda for Peace by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992

Preventive diplomacy
Preventive deployment

Peacemaking
Good offices, negotiations, enforcement, sanctions

Peace-keeping
Observers, troops...

Peace-building
Elections, police, democracy, refugees resettlement...