A concluding chapter brings together her findings. Her purpose has been to probe the diverse pieces of evidence available to us, to uncover manifestations of the culture of ordinary Greeks and of their slaves. Her enterprise, it seems to me, succeeds up to a point, and certainly brings to the fore a variety of curious and little-known stories (most of them previously unknown to me, I must confess); but it also serves to remind us how very difficult it is to get close to the lives or perspectives of the ordinary ancient Greek in the street — or, *a fortiori*, of his women or his slaves. The book is excellently annotated and indexed, and there is a most useful bibliography.

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Cooper’s ‘Six Ways’ are the Socratic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Epicurean/Sceptic and Platonistic, primarily as described by Plotinus. As an exposition accessible to an educated non-specialist reader, it is a tour de force by a distinguished scholar of ancient philosophy. Certainly there are many people who turn to philosophy for guidance in living their lives, and they are likely to be disappointed by what they find in contemporary philosophical traditions. But if one turns to the ancients, we gain a rich selection of several ways in which philosophy may be relevant to the lives of reasonable people.

Modern students are often introduced to ancient ways of philosophical life through reading Socratic dialogues, and Cooper does not disappoint in beginning from that point. He assumes, more or less without argument,9 that Gregory Vlastos’ distinction between the Socratic Socrates and the Platonic Socrates is entirely valid, so he limits his scope almost entirely to the dialogues generally agreed to be ‘Socratic’. Indeed there is a ‘way of life’ describable from the *Apology* and some other dialogues.10 It is what we must take to be Socrates’ own way of life, often admired and rarely seriously imitated.

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9 Cooper says that the ‘non-Socratic dialogues’ constitute Plato’s philosophy (p. 62). Since Socrates appears in all the dialogues except the *Laws*, it is difficult to be sure what that means. Vlastos’ views are presented notably in his *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Ithaca, 1991).

10 Cooper emphasizes the *Apology* and *Protagoras*, but also refers to *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, *Republic* I, *Euthyphro*, *Alcibiades* I, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Crito*, and nods towards the autobiographical passage in the *Theaetetus* and to Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*. 
I do feel that a quibble is in order. Cooper argues that the Socratic way of life seems to be the first significantly philosophical way of life in ancient philosophy. Certainly there’s no reason why he actually needs to argue that — all he needs to say is that it is the first well-documented philosophical way of life. Did Socrates come up with his commitment to questioning everyone all on his own (or with the help of Apollo, as he suggests)? What about the examples of the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus, Empedocles? Cooper more or less dismisses them (p. 32), although he recognizes that the Pythagoreans of the time of Socrates ‘do seem to have had a philosophy, and also a way of life. Unclear is the extent to which the two may have affected one another’. In order to say that, Cooper has to take the Phaedo as entirely unhistorical, since we there see Socrates giving a lesson in Pythagoreanism to two students of Pythagoreanism! We don’t need to claim that the historical Socrates believed in Pythagorean metempsychosis to realize that Simmias and Cebes were among Socrates’ followers and that Socrates doubtless knew a good deal about the teachings of the Pythagorean school.

John Cooper is first and foremost an authority on Aristotle’s ethics, and that is entirely evident in his chapter on the two ways of life. The Nicomachean Ethics famously proposes two roads to eudaimonia, the political and the contemplative; Cooper presents that theory masterfully, and uses it as a kind of baseline against which to compare the ‘ways of life’ presented later in the book. Perhaps more could be said about Aristotle’s experiences in the Academy, since Plato explored both avenues during Aristotle’s time with him, and about Aristotle’s own life, with an apparent stint as a diplomat for the Macedonian crown, along with his life-long dedication to theoría. We should also note that Cooper regards the Eudemian Ethics, with its more unitary conception of the best life, as an early work, supplanted by the Nicomachean Ethics (p. 405 n. 11).

Cooper remarks that ‘Aristotle does not enter into moral “case studies”, of the sort that are described and discussed with “scenarios” about trolley cars and the like in our contemporary philosophy’ (p. 104). In a general way, that’s true, but there are some striking examples or illustrations of bits of his theory, even in the Nicomachean Ethics — throwing the cargo overboard, being forced by a tyrant to do something bad to save one’s family (III.1, 1110a5–10), the rather detailed description of the megalopsychos in IV.3, the references to characters in classical tragedies, especially in VII, and the gruesome examples of brutishness in VII.5. But modern case studies are typically focused on finding the right action, and Aristotle is generally more concerned with describing virtues (and vices). To be sure, Aristotle gets down to cases more frequently in some parts of the Politics, for example V.3, with its numerous examples of political turmoil, organized more or less according to the causes of the turmoil. For ‘ethical’ examples, one might well turn to the Rhetoric,