
Ptolemy's On the Kriterion is not one of the most familiar works of ancient philosophy to the non-specialist. Nonetheless, it forms a most successful focus for this Festschrift for George Kerferd, for at least two reasons. One is that all the contributors have written on some aspect of the central theme of the criterion of truth; thus the volume is more than usually coherent as a Festschrift, forming a useful (and exceptionally low-priced) collection of good papers on a single theme. The other is that the text, translation and notes on the text of Ptolemy are the product of extensive study in fortnightly meetings in the early eighties of the Liverpool-Manchester Seminar on Ancient Philosophy. George Kerferd was long a pillar of this seminar, and the Ptolemy translation, the article on Ptolemy by A.A. Long, who was then Professor of Greek at Liverpool and participated in the seminar, and the other articles following up aspects of 'the problem of the criterion' all form a fitting tribute to Kerferd's own work and to the kind of joint intellectual co-operation represented by this long-running seminar.

Kerferd's own work (of which the book contains a full bibliography) has ranged from the sophists to the Hellenistic schools, and it is appropriate that the papers offered here range from Parmenides to Proclus. David Furley studies early uses of elenchos, applying the results to Parmenides' challenge to his audience to judge his poludērin elenchon by logos. Joachim Classen writes about Protagoras' famous claim that man is the measure
of all things (chrēmata); it does not properly apply to itself, he claims, since it applies only to chrēmata and cannot itself be regarded as a chrēma. Robin Waterfield's paper aims to solve a problem made prominent by Vlastos by arguing that for Socrates, the consistency of belief that the Socratic elenchus tests for is a criterion of truth. Harold Tarrant urges us to take seriously the variant reading found in the Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus of Meno 98a: the received text says that correct opinions become knowledge when bound by 'the calculation of the reason' (aitias logismōi), whereas the Commentator, whose text is our earliest witness, reads, 'by the reason for the calculation' (aitiāi logismou). J.B. Skemp discusses epistemological implications of Timaeus 37b-c. D.W. Hamlyn discusses Aristotle's views on a standard of truth, arguing that this is different from a criterion, and Pamela Huby reconstructs Theophrastus' views from the later tradition about the Peripatetics.

There is much here already to surprise those who thought that concern with a criterion of truth was a peculiarly Hellenistic worry. The essays, taken together, show that there were plenty of antecedents for the systematic pressure put by the Hellenistic theories on the issue of what we are entitled to claim to know.

The essays concerned with the Hellenistic and later period concentrate more on details of already familiar epistemological theories. David Sedley discusses an Epicurean papyrus on common sensibles, and Ian Kidd gamely adds to the attempts to understand a puzzling passage where 'right reason' is said to be a criterion of truth for the Stoics. R.W. Sharples writes learnedly and interestingly on the criterion of truth in Philo, Alcinous and Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Henry Blumenthal similarly on the contributions of Plotinus and Proclus. And between the Stoics and Philo we find the text, translation and notes on Ptolemy's On the Criterion, together with an invaluable essay by A.A. Long.