As Professor Reeve shows convincingly in this paper, Plato's conception of philosophy did not arise in a vacuum. Rather, Plato constructed \( \phi i\lambda o\sigma o\phi i\alpha \) by analogy with other disciplines that had already succeeded in establishing their legitimacy and prestige. One title that carried great prestige, and which many emerging disciplines attempted to claim as their own, was \( \tau \epsilon \chi \nu \eta \), a term that covered a wide range of skilled activities and that can be translated as "art", "craft", or "science". Already in pre-Platonic writings there was substantial agreement about the standards a discipline had to fulfill in order to be considered a genuine \( \tau \epsilon \chi \nu \eta \).\textsuperscript{1} The Hippocratic writers conceived of a \( \tau \epsilon \chi \nu \eta \) as a systematic set of procedures for preserving health and curing disease, and argued that medicine fully qualified as a genuine \( \tau \epsilon \chi \nu \eta \). A \( \tau \epsilon \chi \nu \eta \) was not just a body of effective procedures; these procedures had to be organized in a systematic way, so that the practitioner could apply them to achieve a given, determinate end. In this paper, Professor Reeve argues that recognizing this background can help us to understand the following features of the ethical wisdom or expertise that Socrates seeks in the early Platonic dialogues (pp. 208):

(W1) it must enable its possessor to produce elenchus-proof accounts of the virtues

(W2) these accounts specify the forms of the virtues

(W3) if one does not know what virtue is, one cannot have any ethical wisdom whatever.

I am in full agreement with Professor Reeve that attention to conceptions of \( \tau \epsilon \chi \nu \eta \) current at the time Plato was writing (what he calls the "craft paradigm") helps to explain why the knowledge that Socrates seeks has these features. I differ from him, however, on two points: first, the character of the craft paradigm itself; and second, the connection between it and the feature (W1), the demand that ethical \( \tau \epsilon \chi \nu \eta \) must enable its possessor to produce elenchus-proof accounts of the virtues.

Professor Reeve identifies two aspects of the craft paradigm: explanatoriness and form-relatedness (pp. 208-9). I certainly agree that, according to some of the central Hippocratic texts, a fundamental feature of \( \tau \epsilon \chi \nu \eta \) was its explanatory character. The author of the \textit{De Vetere Medicina} (\textbf{VM}) writes that it is not enough if a doctor's knowledge is limited to generalities like "cheese is bad food, for it harms those who eat too much of it." The doctor must know what harm it causes, why it causes that harm, and which of the humors or structures in

\textsuperscript{1}See Heinimann 1961 for an account of these standards.
the body are affected by it (ch. 20). And this knowledge is essential if he is going to treat patients correctly (ch. 21). I stress this point because it provides a clear illustration of continuity between Platonic and pre-Platonic conceptions of τέχνη, and also because scholars have sometimes claimed that certain of the Hippocratic writings, VM in particular, reject the search for causal explanations as irrelevant to medicine. Even those Hippocratic texts which are not concerned to identify the cause of diseases, such as the Epidemics, do not explicitly reject the search for causes. In requiring that craft-knowledge be explanatory, then, Plato and Plato’s Socrates follow directly the example set by the medical writers.

I have some doubts, however, about what Professor Reeve calls the “form-relatedness” of the craft paradigm. It is true that some of the terminology of Plato’s theory of Forms, in particular the terms εἴδος and ἰδέα, occurs in the Hippocratic writings. The terms tend to refer to the “class” to which a thing belongs, and the members of this “class” are often identified as such on the basis of their outward appearance or “form.” Thus, for example, the author of VM says in chapter 15 that there is no food that is purely hot, cold, wet, or dry, sharing in no other εἴδος. An εἴδος is a class marked off by the quality its members display to the senses, such as hot or cold. Plato’s Forms, by contrast, serve as epistemological and ontological paradigms, as Professor Reeve points out: they enable one who has knowledge of them to make reliable judgments about particular instances, and they somehow explain why particular instances have the properties that they do (pp. 208-9). Neither of these functions is assigned to εἴδος or ἰδέα in Hippocratic texts or, as far as I know, in any pre-Platonic text. Although Plato and the Hippocratic writers share some of the same language, they use the language to refer to quite different things, and the difference between Platonic and pre-Platonic usage here should not be underestimated.

I move on to my second point of disagreement. A key feature of Socrates’ conception of ethical wisdom is what Professor Reeve identifies as (W1): it enables its possessor to produce elenchus-proof accounts of the virtues. Why does Socrates think that anyone who can legitimately claim this knowledge must...