Professor Hankinson's topic is Plato's argument for the immortality of the soul at *Phaedrus* 245c-246a. He is rightly struck by the self-consciousness of its presentation, would-be rigorous yet hyper-concise in a manner we rather associate with Aristotle. It invites attention by its style, and demands it by its content: it is at once perhaps the best, and (if it goes back to Alcmaeon) the earliest, of arguments to that conclusion. It has been fully discussed recently by Richard Bett, in an exemplary article to which I would have little to add. Hankinson now brings it to life again, with imagination and intelligence. Unfortunately, there are many points of non-incidental detail where I cannot follow him. It is not because that may be a confession that I say it reluctantly; having little to contribute myself, I shall concentrate almost entirely, I hope not too finickingly, on a selection of those points. Today, at any rate, he is present to help his λόγος.

I start with Hankinson's translation and articulation of the argument (pp. 2-3), borrowing the letters by which he labels its clauses. To an extent, the two go together. Thus (c) and (d) are rightly separated within different "independent stretches of argument" on his construal of (c), which is also Vicaire's. However, like Vicaire, he omits a word that matters within (d): δή; in a deductive context that can barely, by well into the fourth century, mean anything but "therefore" (as standardly in Aristotle). Unless we adopt Philoponus's variant δέ, it is better to view (c) as the converse of (d), understanding what matters

within (c) as Bett does: "That which... is moved by something else, since it admits of a cessation of movement, admits of a cessation of life" (1986, p. 4). Thus [II] will lose (d) and (δε) to [I]; it must also lose (f) to [III], as Hankinson will in fact assume (p. 15). His translation of (f) is itself surprising: nothing in the Greek justifies his phrase "the other things it moves" in place of a literal "the other things that are moved." His version of (j) discards the MSS reading οὐκ ἄν ἔξ ἄρχης γίνοιτο (d3); needlessly, if (like Verdenius, deVries, and Bett 1986, p. 8, n. 14) we understand the subject not to be the putative ἄρχη, but πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον (d1).

Hankinson does not discuss his rendering of (f). What motivates it? Presumably that it fits his emphatic view that, despite the ambiguity of 245c5, Plato’s argument is intended to prove the immortality not of collective soul, but of individual souls (no one of which moves all that is moved). It is not only because, as he will eventually agree, the argument so construed evidently fails that I am doubtful of that contrast. I select three points among many:

(i) He writes, "A ψυχή is an animator. Different individual things presumably have different individual animators, otherwise your demise might, in a literal sense, be the death of me" (p. 4). That might follow from the nonsense that they have one and the same animator, whose mere existence (irrespective of its presence or absence) is necessary and sufficient for the life of each one—so that the death of one is the death of all. But whether ψυχή is a mass-term or a count-noun, one thing’s dying (i.e., being deserted by ψυχή) may leave other things alive.

(ii) On the meaning of "All soul is immortal," and its relation to "Every soul is immortal," I find Bett persuasive. Taking ψυχή within the only arguments explicit in the text as a mass-term, he relates the two propositions as follows:

5. In fact, I take the ambiguity of ψυχή πᾶσα ὑθάνατος (245c5) to be resolved by the context c2-4, and would paraphrase: "Soul as such is immortal, human as well as divine." The same will hold of the recurrence of ψυχή πᾶσα at 246b6 (cf. a7-b6).