Jaap Mansfeld's elegant and instructive paper seems to me largely persuasive in its relative evaluations of the positions of Chrysippus, Posidonius and Galen. In it he makes it clear that he is concerned neither with will in its trivial sense as the wish to act—no one could deny that the Greeks had that concept—nor with will as in "free will." His aim is rather to try and locate, within the chosen ancient psychological theories, that mental power which has the causal efficacy to translate thought or intention into action.

Even that may seem to leave at least two separate questions: (a) what enables us to do this at all? (b) what power is it that is present more abundantly in strong-willed than in weak-willed people?

Galen's anatomical exploitation of the nervous system, in the wake of the less informed speculations of Aristotle about the heart and the pioneering researches of Herophilus and Erasistratus, seems directed at the first question. But moral psychology tends to be concerned principally with second. Certainly the two questions can in principle be brought under a single theory, such as the Stoic theory of pneumatic tension. Galen's physicalist approach to mind, especially in works like QAM, likewise gestures towards a unitary solution. But it remains important to recognize that the two problems had very different histories, and I am not sure that both can constitute one and the same problem of the will. I shall say no more about the
specifically physiological issues, except to congratulate Mansfeld on his neat critique of Galen's stance at the end of the paper.

The second question has a strongly Socratic history, and we can never afford to forget the Socratic origins of Stoic moral psychology. Socrates himself implicitly denied the distinction in question (b) between strong- and weak-willed people: everyone is fully motivated towards what they believe to be good. Reason itself is desiderative of good, and, since there is no conflicting mental force over which reason has to exert itself, there is no place or need for an autonomous will.

Plato, in introducing the tripartite soul, rescues the empirical distinction between strong and weak will. Mansfeld suggests the Greeks had no concept of the will as an autonomous function or part of the psyche, distinct from reason on the one hand and desire or the emotions on the other. But isn't the Platonic thumoeides a strong candidate for this role? In Rep. 4 the thumoeides is our internal police force, analogous to the policing role of the auxiliaries in the state. Cf. Tim. 70a, "That part of the soul which partakes of courage and spirit, since it is a lover of victory, they planted nearer to the head, between the midriff and the neck, in order that it might be obedient to the reason and, in partnership with it, forcibly control the tribe of desires when they completely refused to yield voluntary obedience to the rational orders from the citadel." In Rep. 4 the thumoeides functions as the natural ally of reason, unless corrupted by bad upbringing, and even then, we are told, it could never take the side of appetite against reason. Just as the rulers in the state are too few numerically to enforce their dictates without the help of the auxiliaries, so too the reasoning element in the soul is too small (cf. 442c5) to control the appetites without the spirited element's support. Reason is itself motivated towards good, but it lacks the motivating force to drive the whole soul.

This sounds awfully like willpower. Even the story of Leontius, who knew he shouldn't gawp at corpses but gave in, to the dismay of his thumoeides, is a story of failure of