Professor Smith opposes the view that Aristotle’s Organon is a Methodenlehre, which is calculated to show how scientists and philosophers should proceed in their inquiries. In the place of such a view, he puts the idea that the Organon aims at the characterization of epistemological virtue. Its goal is not to teach epistemological and methodological skills, but to effect a conversion to epistemologically virtuous life. The nature of the wisdom so achieved he elucidates by comparing it to the clarification of the foundations of mathematics, which notoriously does not make one a better theorem-prover. As an example of an argument calculated to bring about such clarification he discusses Aristotle’s argument against infinite regress in Post. An. A 19-22. According to Professor Smith, the argument has nothing to do with finding the first (atomic) premises of a science, but merely to establish that there must be such primitive premises. Prof. Smith does not in his paper analyze Aristotle’s argument, but he does indicate some of Aristotle’s theses. As to Aristotle’s cryptic remarks at the end of An. Post. on how most general premises are established by means of nous, he relies on the idea Aristotle flaunts in De Anima. According to this idea, in thinking of X, my soul in a sense (viz. formally) becomes X. In a tantalizingly short paragraph Professor Smith applies this idea both to God and to us humans. He acknowledges here a debt to a paper by Stephen Menn.

By and large, I like what Professor Smith says by way of a positive account of Aristotle’s views. However, it seems to me that
he does not make the most of his own suggestions. Hence, instead of offering a line-by-line commentary of Professor Smith's paper, it might be more illuminating to offer some general comments on his line of thought and to try to see where it leads us.

I applaud Professor Smith's quest for new angles on Aristotle's *Organon*. I also think to some extent unlike Smith that there is no reason for us to try to keep up with the contemporary Joneses who try to judge Aristotle by means of such hopelessly inadequate measures as the contrasts between dialectical argumentation vs. scientific demonstration, discovery vs. justification (or discovery vs. explanation), rationalism vs. empiricism, foundationalism vs. naturalism in epistemology, etc., or the idea of mathematical activity as theorem-proving. Furthermore, I find Professor Smith's basic idea of approaching Aristotle's methodology and philosophy of science as a special case of Aristotle's ethical theory intriguing and suggestive. However, the main question prompted by such an approach is: So what? If we try to assimilate Aristotle's conception of epistemic excellence to the other virtues he was interested in, we must keep in mind the pertinent features of Aristotle's background. First, virtue was for a Greek like Aristotle an extremely wide concept, not restricted to what we would recognize as forms of moral excellence. Hence, to propose to study epistemology as a theory of epistemological excellence is undoubtedly very much in keeping with Greek ways of thinking, indeed so much that for the ancients it would have been a virtual tautology.

To this it might be responded that by considering epistemology as a study of epistemological virtue might enlighten us as to what the *structure* of epistemological-cum-ethical enterprise looks like. But it is patent that ethical argumentation and ethical theorizing were carried out in Aristotle's work essentially in the same way as scientific argumentation and scientific theorizing. Theoretical proofs were according to Aristotle carried out by means of theoretical syllogisms, while our actions were prompted by practical syllogisms which closely parallel theoretical