
In postcolonial Indonesia the constitution guarantees freedom of religion, but this right comes with considerable qualifications. Firstly, religious liberty does not include freedom from religion. Moreover, the post-1965 eradication of ‘atheistic communism’ saw to it that non-religiosity has become a term of opprobrium, while all Indonesian citizens are obliged to be affiliated with one of the recognized religions, namely Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and (fairly recently) Confucianism. Secondly, what is officially understood as religion is only *agama*, ‘the peculiar combination in Sanskrit guise of a Christian view of what counts as a world religion with an Islamic understanding of what defines a proper religion: divine revelation recorded by a prophet in a holy book, a system of law for the community of believers, congregational worship, and a belief in the One and Only God’ (p. 3).

In this clear and thoughtful book, several noted specialists discuss the politics of *agama* in Java and Bali. The preface (pp. xi-xv) neatly summarizes the contents of the case studies that follow, while in the introduction (pp. 1-20) Michel Picard helpfully elucidates the crucial concepts of *agama*, *adat* and *Pancasila* that play such an important role in Indonesian discourse on religion. The first chapter (pp. 23-47) by Remy Madinier addresses the Javanization of Christianity by focusing on the missionary strategy of the Dutch Jesuit Franciscus van Lith in the early twentieth century. The latter’s educational and political action not only greatly contributed to the recognition of a foreign religion of colonial origin, but also created a well-educated nationalist Catholic elite which would play a disproportionally large role in national politics. The second chapter by Andre Feillard (pp. 48-70), too, deals with the accommodation of a universalist religion to local circumstances. She examines the stance of Islamic theologians on Javanese pre-Islamic traditions in the 1930s news bulletins of the *Nahdlatul Ulama*, the largest traditionalist organization. From her analysis, it appears that missionary activities directed against Reformism carried greater weight than the question of local traditions. Traditionalist Islam appears as an instrument of Islamization with limited defence of...
indigenous culture. However, already from the beginning, *Nahdlatul Ulama* was ‘crossed by divergent identity currents’ (p. 68), still continuing today, with some advocating an increased Islamization of the law, while others approving *Pancasila* rather than an Islamic state. The title of Robert W. Hefner’s contribution poses the intriguing question of ‘Where have all the *abangan* gone?’ (pp. 71-91). As he points out, the ‘public religious elements’ (p. 72) of non-standard varieties of Islam are in severe decline. *Islam Jawa* or Javanese Islam, in Hefner’s terminology *abanganism*, is ‘a religion of place’ and as such it is in direct conflict with Indonesian religious politics endorsing ‘*agamaization*’. The governmental strategy of standardization had its desired effects: ‘The children of *abangan* villagers were subjected to government-mandated religious education. A generation of Javanese youth came of age who found rituals of obeisance to ancestral and guardian spirits quaintly obsolete, if not religiously repugnant’ (p. 88). It is quite ironic that this push for a delocalized Islam was largely pursued during New Order, which François Raillon in the next chapter (pp. 92-113) calls ‘Javanese politics’ with Soeharto as ‘a quintessential Javanese general’ whose regime was ‘felt to be deeply influenced by culture—Javanese culture at that’ (p. 93). In Raillon’s essay about debates of *Pancasila* in the post-Soeharto period we read about ‘bearers of Javanese culture’ (that is, Hefner’s *abangan* Muslims) who (together with other groups) oppose a scripturalist vision of Islam (p. 92). Paradoxically, Islamic parties laying claims of authority in matters of faith and dogma have succeeded in denying various localisms’ entry into the sphere of religion, relegating them to the realm of traditional lore (*adat*) and culture (*kebudayaan*), but in the field of realpolitik (as both Hefner and Raillon show), support for parties advocating an Islamic state has not risen. In fact, there is ‘a general weariness of the public towards religious radicals, political censors and other moral supervisors’ (p. 109).

The second part of the book is concerned with the way *agamaization* plays out in Bali. Michel Picard (pp. 117-41) sketches the trajectory of religion in Bali where only after years of lobbying, *Agama Hindu Bali* (Balinese Hindu Religion) was finally acknowledged, in 1958, by the Ministry of Religion. Here, too, the state stipulated that normative religion should be universalist without ethnic components, leading to the subsequent renaming into *Agama Hindu* (Hindu Religion). However, in the post-Soeharto period with its far-reaching administrative decentralization, a return to *Agama Hindu Bali* could follow. As Picard makes clear, terminology is more than