politics in his writings about religion and morality, so much so that *A Common Faith* is described as a treatise for social interactions. Such an attempt, to place religious language within the language of democracy, loses the radical religious insights that Dewey offers.

Second, while I find Rogers’s book both sound and well written, I am not sure how persuasive it is. It is true that a fresh perspective can bring new insight, but only if the reader retains a sort of openness akin to the first day he or she met Dewey. This is no small task for any reader; it might even be impossible. The kind of openness required for Rogers’s book to be persuasive is the same kind that, perhaps, could prevent the very same debate that the book addresses.

I think Rogers has done a fantastic job outlining the uses and abuses of Dewey’s notion of inquiry. He defends Dewey brilliantly while still allowing room for growth; he also avoids turning Dewey into an indomitable and infallible figure. This book participates within the larger Dewey scholarship while also staying practical enough to serve as a guide book for social change. Rogers achieves this balance well enough, but, save for an epilogue outlining the practical use of Dewey’s thought, there is not much by way of explaining how practically Dewey’s theories fair in the public sphere. *The Undiscovered Dewey* is well worth the reader’s time. Rogers particularly excels when it comes to his discussions of democracy and the historical influences of Dewey’s philosophy. While his discussion of religion seems to reduce Dewey’s religious thought to political theory, his overall argument remains well intact. Whether the reader is a professional or a student, beginner or expert, any will find philosophical nourishment here.

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The new essays collected in *The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy* are an addition to a growing literature that attempts a philosophical and historical assessment of the aims and achievements of Anglophone philosophy in the twentieth-century. Misak’s aim was to gather a collection of essays that together present a relatively unified picture of American philosophy. Misak suggests that such a picture emerges when one strikes a balance between appreciating, on the one hand, the full flavor of America’s home-grown philosophy – the pragmatism that originated in the mid to late nineteenth-century in Cambridge, Massachusetts – and avoiding, on the other hand, giving the
impression that all philosophical work coming out of America is shot through with a pragmatist spirit (p. v). It is a tribute to Misak’s editorial abilities that the twenty-six essays contained in this volume go a long way to realizing this aim.

The essays cover many of the central figures and areas of philosophical inquiry within the American tradition, with precisely half given over to the explication and assessment of those within, or closely associated with, classical pragmatism. The volume has a distinctly historical tinge to it, with well over half the pieces focusing on American philosophy before Quine, and almost all the pieces focusing on what imprint a certain figure or tradition has left on philosophy in America. The essays are mostly introductory pieces, except for Arif Ahmed’s “W. V. Quine” which is a more advanced survey, and Bjørn Ramberg’s “Rorty, Davidson, and the Future of Metaphysics” that defends an original thesis about Rorty.

In many ways, the two essays that open and close this volume can be read as representative pieces, providing clear presentations of the book’s core themes. Roger Ward’s “Jonathan Edwards and Eighteenth-Century Religious Philosophy” presents the Calvinist theologian as being something of a forebear to pragmatism; sketching in outline the basic ideas that would soon hit the philosophical world through James, Dewey, and Peirce. Ward argues that Edwards’s theology was animated by ideas such as: the importance of inquiry being orientated towards the felt needs of a community; the centrality of holism and experience; the relationship between open inquiry and an open society; impatience with unnecessary speculation; respect for common sense; and an ambiguous stance towards continental idealism.

What emerges from this essay is the familiar and unsurprising idea that pragmatism is deeply ingrained within American thought, having both its strongest roots and most pervasive legacy within America. The accounts of the classical pragmatists, the transitional figures of Alfred North Whitehead and C. I. Lewis, the impact of Wittgenstein and Sellars, in addition to the introductions to the philosophy of science and mathematics contained in this volume see this idea continually revisited.

Ann Garry’s “Essences, Intersections, and American Feminism,” which closes the volume, presents a reading of a literature that is far removed from Jonathan Edwards’s eighteenth-century New England. Yet it brings to light the other defining feature of American philosophy that emerges from this volume – the attempt to ensure that philosophical reflection is not insulated from the concerns of society. Garry argues that feminist philosophy arose concomitantly with feminist activism in the 1960s and 70s, with the aspiration to end women’s oppression and make the world a better place for all women (596). At the time, this was an explicit expression of the commitment to make sure that the living of an examined life stayed ‘close to the heart of the profession itself’ (597).

What emerges from Garry’s essay is perhaps a little more surprising – the idea that American philosophy did not and has not become a neutral, detached, academic activity that insulates itself from the concerns of society, but has