
The book provides a very timely collection of papers dealing with the patronage models and clientalism in a number of countries, both developing countries and advanced industrialised democracies. The primary focus is on the countries of Latin America, India and former socialist, now transitional countries. The book finds a fairly similar pattern of behaviour aimed at ensuring that particular groups do vote for a preferred candidate. But, besides a number of chapters that deal with practical cases, the book provides a very good general read, giving a reader an opportunity to enjoy the survey of modern mainstream literature on the subject. The volume is well balanced and generally the chapters are fairly coherent and fit in the book neatly together.

An introductory chapter will certainly be of good use to a novice researcher in the field, as it surveys the literature well and provides a context for the further development of the book. The editors who co-authored the introductory chapter focus on the group and individual monitoring, democratic linkages and economic development. All these variables have had clear impact on the development of patronage relationships and clientalistic opportunistic behaviour. In analysing the aspects of economic development and peculiarity of clientalistic behaviour, the authors (editors) have addressed both demand a supply side of the equation and in general they have developed a set of premises to be tested, along with the dominant principal-agent theory of governance. Presented experience in Africa, has focused on two modalities of clientalistic behaviour: tribute, patronage and prebends. Tribute being the traditional practice of gift exchanges in peasant societies, where patron and client are engaged in bonds of reciprocity and trust. Patronage is in the practice where public resources are used (or wasted) to provide jobs and services for political clients. Prebendalism is a practice where an individual is given a public office in order to gain personal access to state resources. In early stages of post-colonial societal development political clientelism was to facilitate the building of inner structures amongst young African (post-colonial) elites. It was prebendalism that generally was regularly practices. One was given the access to funds, with probably...
implicit assumption that he (or she) would any way embezzle them. In the initial stages of development clientalism was somehow to be presumed. However, with the passage of time and the creation of an effective multi-party environment one would assume that the democracy would find solid roots, but a number of practices and their persistence to change, suggests that Africa will not change soon. In fact, in an African political environment the authoritarian patterns demonstrate stubborn persistence; in a political arena one party usually is singled out as the most powerful (leading), and all that is accompanied by low ideological salience.

The reader will also find a nice attempt to build a sustainable model of a ‘patronage democracy,’ looking at the interface of a voter and the elite, within a particular national setting. The model assumes that in a patronage democracy, obtaining control of the state is the principal means of obtaining better livelihood and higher societal status. Government jobs are the primary sources of employment and political power often leads to economic power. In a patronage democracy, the politicians have an incentive to collect rents as the very system is inductive to it, not to say that the system is based on rent-seeking. Similarly, on the other end voters are prone to extract benefits due to their voting choices.

Clientalism may be more likely to be found in low-income, developing countries. But, by no means, this practice is reserved for developing countries only. Clientalistic behaviour can be reported for Japan, a G-7 country. The farmers’ (agricultural producers’) block of votes is very important in some parts of Japan, and simply controlling the outcomes of general elections in some particular electoral units. The Japanese politicians have the relationship with two distinctive groups – koenkai and construction groups. Koenkai are personal support organisations designed to support the electoral activities of the candidate. Large Koenkai may have tens of thousands of supporters. However, it has been claimed that the clientalism practice is in serious decline, in Japan, in the most recent years. Although, in essence, the Japanese overall electoral system was build around the clientalistic ideas, implicit or explicit.

The last two chapters are a real jewel. In one, Kitschelt, co-editor wrote on the demise of clientelism in affluent capitalist democracies, providing a very good theoretical framework and studying aspects of clientelism, focusing primarily on the experience previously presented in the volume. Although, it builds on the particular experience, it also builds a largely