with Russia, which ended officially only with the Russo-Finnish peace of 14 October 1920. Dr. D. G. Kirby, lecturer in the history of the east Baltic lands at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies of the University of London, has collected a series of documents dealing with the question of Finnish national identity during this period. These documents should be of great interest to students of Baltic affairs. Both Russian and Finnish documents are included, but the vast majority are from Finnish sources and therefore available for the first time to persons unfamiliar with the intricacies of the Finnish language.

Part 1 of this set of documents deals with the period of autonomy from 1809 to 1890. In 1808 the Grand Duchy of Finland passed into the Russian Empire on much the same basis as the Baltic duchies did a century earlier under Peter the Great. It appeared that Alexander would not only recognize the rights and privileges of the Finnish estates but grant a diet and a great degree of self-government. However, Alexander eventually rejected the constitutional solution and no diet was summoned until the reign of Alexander II. The autocratic emperor remained responsible, while a bureaucratic form of Finnish self-government prevailed. During this period, Kirby's documents show that Finns were unable to construct any real theory of statehood. Following the first diet in 1863, splits emerged between conservative Finnish nationalists stressing good relations with Russia, Swedish separatists, and "Young Finns" interested in increased constitutional liberties.

Part 2 deals with Russian assimilatory strategy after 1890, a strategy which culminated in the proclamation of the February, 1899 manifesto by the tsar. With the Finnish language threatened and the army faced with amalgamation into the Russian, the Finnish Senate split on whether or not to promulgate the manifesto. The 1905 movement in Finland, characterized by Kirby as nationalist, ended quickly once the tsar rescinded most of the acts imposed on the Finns during the previous five years. Finnish Social Democrats emerge as opposed to the revolutionary activities of their Russian counterparts.

The largest section of documents (143 of the 257 pages) is devoted to the Russian revolution, civil war, and independence. The new liberal March government in Russia was unwilling to concede Finland the internal independence desired by both Social Democrats and other "independentist." With the downfall of the Provisional Government in the fall of 1917, political authority was thrown into the Finn's laps. As Finnish socialists shrank from seizing revolutionary power, the moderates formed the first government, one recognized by the Soviets in December, 1917. The Finnish civil war, which broke out in January, 1918, is viewed as Finland's real war of independence against Finnish radical elements supported by Russian troops. Finnish independence was recognized by Britain in 1919. Allied intervention forces and White Russians jumped off into Russia from Finland, and final peace between Russia and Finland was only achieved in 1920 upon the collapse of intervention.

These three large periods are clearly defined and each is introduced by a short expository overview, which is well written and integrates the subsequent documents. Kirby adopts the traditional political approach to most of his subject, but has clearly sought out a good variety of documents from the various protagonists to illustrate his views.

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This nineteenth volume in Brill's "Studies in East European History" series is a fit-
ting addendum to the author's earlier studies of Russian trade with the West. Though it
does not bring the American-Russian trade contacts in the Alaska and North Pacific area
within its spectrum (there is some reference to the activities and plans of American en-
trepreneurs in the Amur region from 1840 to 1860, however), the pattern of the Trans-
atlantic trade is meticulously examined, in Kirchner's usual methodical style, and from
the survey some important conclusions emerge. These may be summarized as follows:
(1) Generally, hopes for the development of reciprocal interchange of commodities were
not realized on a significant scale; (2) nevertheless, many of the participants in the trade,
in both countries, did make profits, and participation did play a useful part in adding to
the pool of experience of foreign commerce in Russia and the United States.

The first American ship reached St. Petersburg in 1782, marking the beginning in a
triangular trade operated by New England merchants and shipowners and involving ship-
ments of timber and foodstuffs from their home ports to Cuba, and of sugar and other
Caribbean products from that island to Russia, with return cargoes of hemp, pig iron,
and coarse linens to America. In 1790 no fewer than twenty-two American ships entered
St. Petersburg, and in the following thirty years the trade was plied fairly steadily, until
difficulties in the form of hampering tariffs under Finance Minister Kankrin (1822-44)
made a move toward a commercial treaty seem desirable to the Americans. In 1832,
when both countries were reversing their protectionist attitudes, the treaty was negoti-
ated, and the Americans looked forward to a rapid expansion of trade. As Kirchner
demonstrates, however, this did not materialize. Tsar Nicholas and his ministers had
granted the treaty for political reasons, especially in the hope that it would stifle criti-
cism of Russia's suppression of the Polish revolt in 1830. The whole matter of the Tre-a-
ty was, in fact, a characteristic example of the use by the tsarist government of commer-
cial considerations for political purposes. This "meaningless" conferring of "most fa-
vored nation" status on the United States is regarded as a typical Russian diplomatic
tactic.

The analysis of the commerce of the period that followed the treaty is highly de-
tailed, and the statistics for cotton and sugar shipments show considerable activity,
though Kirchner rightly points out that the figures must be treated with caution since
England and the Hanse towns acted as entrepots through which large quantities of A-
merican and Caribbean goods were shipped. He also demonstrates that distortion of the
Russian imports statistics was inevitable in view of large-scale smuggling and the preva-
lent habit of bribing tsarist customs officials. For these reasons, American trade into
Russia was really much more extensive than officially recorded.

Among the problems experienced by American traders were difficulties in securing
return cargoes, costly delays in Russian ports, speculation and the making of "corners"
by Russian merchants in certain commodities (e.g., hemp and iron), and the rapid in-
crease, after 1840, in Russian beet sugar production, which obviated the need for cane
sugar imports. Certainly, after Kankrin's establishment of the stable silver ruble in 1839,
trade conditions were more reliable, and industrial investment was encouraged, but the
basic handicaps remained. Kirchner, however, takes the view that the Americans
"missed their best chances," especially when they failed to enter the Black Sea trade,
which burgeoned steadily in the later part of the period, especially after the Crimean
War.

The later chapters, which provide detailed studies of American traders and entre-
preneurs in Russia and their agents, mostly German firms long-established there, are an
important and valuable contribution to our knowledge of Russian business and social
history. Railroad builders, such as George Whistler, engineers such as Thomas Winans,
steamboat-line promoters, large-scale dealers in hemp--there was a remarkable influx of
such Americans in the 1850s and 1860s. The rapidly advancing technology of the United