The "Introduction" is adequate but what follows does not jibe with its apparent attempt to organize the thinking about environmental problems along the lines of a tripartite division of natural resources according to the degree of their exhaustibility (p. xii). Victor Mote's "The Geography of Air Pollution in the Soviet Union" repeats an earlier work of his ("Air Pollution in the USSR" in Ivan Volgyes, editor. Environmental Deterioration in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe [New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974]) almost word for word. A few detailed maps and a speculative but probably quite accurate table of potential major polluting sites and air pollutants are new. Craig Zum Brunnen in "Water Pollution in the Black and Azov Seas" offers a descriptive account of instances of pollution in the two basins and the relatively ineffectual measures to counteract it. Professor Zum Brunnen sees the Soviet Union's experience with respect to water quality management thus far as comparing "quite closely to what one might expect of a poor and developing nation regardless of its institutions." He adds, quite sensibly, that this conclusion "stems directly from the Soviet leadership's emphasis on exponential economic growth" (p. 53). "Protection and Restoration of Surface-Mined Land in the Soviet Union" is a sure contender for the slimmest paper in the batch. It bemoans misallocation of prime agricultural lands and the inadequacy of restoration of mine-ravaged landscapes. This reader's impression is that, in the author's view, the main difficulties lie in "insufficient coordination at the early planning stages" (p. 61), "refusal to place a price on natural resources," and the fact that prosecution of violators of the elegantly structured protective laws is not "carried out swiftly and without exception" (p. 70). If only the "planners" and the procurators shaped up, rationality would finally vanquish sin and the Soviet environmental troubles would, presumably, be over. "Externalities in a Command Society" by Leonore Shever Taga is the only analytical piece in the collection. Unfortunately, the analysis is, by and large, neither particularly original nor comprehensive. Ms. Taga recognizes that the value sets of "the system's directors" largely determine the outcomes of the utilization of the environment (pp. 76-78, 94). Yet, her paper is primarily concerned with possible improvements in the detail of plans, coordination within planning, pricing reforms, and law enforcement. Some reflections on how "the system's directors" happen to acquire, hold and transmit their values and how a change in them might come about could have been illuminating. The book is technically well done. Its flaws are few and insignificant. It has no index, however.

Lastly, the reviewer wishes to address a broader concern rather than the quality of the immediate work. Journals (of which there is legion) would seem to be a medium better suited to disjointed narrow-gauged articles. It might make good sense to reserve the book format for more substantial and consistent work. To prevent ill-conceived ventures in environmental literature, publishing houses should perhaps be required to file an environmental impact statement before going ahead.

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The British government, declaring war on the Central Powers in 1914 for reasons which had nothing directly to do with events in Eastern Europe, found itself by November, 1918, deeply involved with the various East European nationalities and committed implicitly to supporting both their quest for independence and the doctrine of national self-determination. Dr. Calder has set out to explain how this came about. Using the
official and private documentation now available to students of early twentieth-century
British foreign policy, the author analyzes the complex relations established early in
the war between British officials and the various spokesmen and organizations claiming
to represent the South Slavs, Poles, and Czechs, together with the evolution of British
attitudes and policies on the principle of national self-determination as espoused by
these groups. The author's central conclusion is that the British government, while eager
and willing to use the East European nationalities for purposes of winning the war,
always rigidly subordinated any sentiment for redrawing the map of Europe according
to the principle of self-determination to hard-headed considerations of diplomatic and
strategic expediency. Thus, early in the war the Home Office found it useful to deal
with trusted émigrés to sort out problems of Slavic aliens. The War Office was eager
to exploit any proffered sources for manpower. Wellington House, the government's
propaganda arm, found émigrés useful for its purposes. The Foreign Office viewed plans
for a Yugoslav program as a possible means to facilitate formation of a Balkan league
against the Central Powers. Czechs and Poles in America were valuable in intelligence-
gathering and counter-espionage activities, the link with Polish Americans being viewed
as of major importance in countering the German and Irish blocs in the United States.
These contacts and tactics, according to Dr. Calder, evolved pragmatically, with no
central directives embodying a formal policy. But the development of such tactics
inevitably carried certain implications of support for the goals of the nationalities, and
the references to the Poles and Czechs included in the Allied reply of January, 1917, to
Wilson's peace note illustrated the sympathies that were expected in return for the sup-
port offered.

As the nature of émigré support for the Allied Powers grew in scale and importance
through 1917 and 1918, and particularly as the Czechs and Poles developed effective
fighting forces, the pressures increased on the Allies to clarify and formalize their sup-
port for the principle of self-determination. The author shows how British leaders,
skillful in using the talents and manpower of the East European nationalities, were
extremely cautious in granting formal recognition to émigré organizations and equally
reluctant to make promises and commitments for the future beyond what was absolu-
tely necessary to retain their support. Always the sensibilities of Russia toward the
Poles, the promises to Italy in the treaty of London, and the necessity of retaining the
option of a separate peace with Austria-Hungary precluded definite commitments to
self-determination. Only after the Russian revolution and the abandonment of all hope
for a separate peace with Austria-Hungary was the British government willing to join its
Allies in the Supreme War Council in endorsing the creation of a united and independent
Polish state with free access to the sea and in expressing earnest sympathy for Czecho-
slovak and Yugoslav national aspirations for freedom.

The British government would not go beyond these limited formal commitments
before the end of the war, although much use would be made of the principle of self-
determination in propaganda aimed at the enemy and although Beneš was successful
in having the Czech National Committee granted recognition which almost amounted
to provisional government status. When the end of the war came suddenly, British
governmental attitudes and policies were in a state of transition and some confusion.
Only if the war had continued into 1919 would the tactic of mounting nationalist
revolution inside Austria-Hungary have resulted in the logical and clear commitment to
the reorganization of Eastern Europe according to the principle of self-determination.
Nevertheless, despite the confused and indeterminate state of British policy, Dr. Calder
concludes that by a piecemeal and pragmatic process, and for reasons usually of expedi-
ency and military strategy rather than from a perception of long-range interests concern-
ing postwar Eastern Europe, by November, 1918, the British government was irrever-
sibly involved in a "commitment by implication" to a settlement based on the desire of