
The 1976 edition of the *Yearbook* follows the format used since the editor decided to delete the chronology of events and the collection of Communist documents which formed a valuable part of the *Yearbook* in the 1960s. It now consists of a short analysis of general trends in the Communist and non-Communist worlds, followed by brief accounts of over two hundred Communist parties and groups, whether pro-Soviet, Maoist, or independent of both Moscow and Peking, as well as of some Trotskyist organizations. Most of the parties are described under such headings as "organization and tactics," "domestic developments," publications, and relations with the CPSU and CPC. Comparable entries relate to half a dozen international organizations which, broadly speaking, reflect the Soviet stand in international affairs and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Potted biographies of a dozen Communist leaders precede a select bibliography of books heavily weighted in favor of those published in English in 1975.

Students of East European politics will be mainly interested in the coverage of the Warsaw Treaty states, Yugoslavia and Albania. Communist parties in that part of the world receive much more detailed coverage than those elsewhere. The sources used vary; they include both Communist publications and news items from Western newspapers which have correspondents in Eastern Europe. In view of the Communist penchant for secrecy and the highly mixed background of the contributors, the value of the entries on Eastern Europe vary a great deal. Inevitably informed readers will complain about the exclusion of this or that piece of information or disagree with the analysis of certain events and trends. Those eager to probe beyond the headlines still have to do their own research, especially if they are studying factionalism in the Communist hierarchies or looking for signs of dissent outside the capitals of Communist regimes.

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The academic and other cultural exchanges which are the subject of this book began before detente but have come to full flower (if that is the word) in the last few years. Now that detente itself has become a source of controversy, the time is ripe for a full-scale reassessment of the exchanges—who benefits, how much and in what ways? Although Robert Byrnes deals with these questions in part, his book is both more and less than such a reexamination. It is a modest but useful history and analysis of the exchange programs including those in which Professor Byrnes himself played a leading administrative role.

From July 1960 through May 1969, Byrnes, who is professor of history at Indiana University, chaired the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants (IUCTG), the modestly named agency which directed various American academic exchanges with the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe until succeeded by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) in 1969. Professor Byrnes represented American universities in dealings both with the United States Government and with Soviet academic and government officials. Byrnes correctly notes that the exchanges are "not a cooperative process but a competitive one." He treats the exchanges as a mirror in which one can see reflected large and important aspects of Soviet-American relations, and some troublesome problems of American academic-government relations as well.

The first two chapters (about the origins of American scholarly interest in Russia and
the varieties of cultural exchanges) have an almost chronicle-like quality. More analytical is the discussion of inter-university relations, along with those between IUCTG and various agencies of the United States Government. On the whole, Professor Byrnes considers these relations a success story—free institutions, public and private, working in overall harmony to deal with unfree bureaucracies of a totalitarian state. But he is quite critical of a certain lack of coordination among the agencies running the various exchanges, and he is not particularly generous in praise of IREX. The latter has come up with innovations including joint East-West projects and has improved the exchanges in a number of other ways. But in view of "the basic restrictions which remain" (mostly if not entirely at the insistence of the Soviets), Byrnes is unwilling to view improvements achieved over the years by both IUCTG and IREX as more than "minor and cosmetic."

The need for government support, along with the danger of government interference, is a theme which interests Professor Byrnes. But his discussion of the issues is not always as deep or dispassionate as it might be. The issue of what constitutes sufficient cause for the American government to try to veto a scholar's participation in the exchange program is raised but not really resolved. Along with other academic administrators of the 1960s, Byrnes seems to have suffered and been scarred by radical protests: He refers several times to damage done by "the emotional madness which affected some members of the academic community in those days."

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book concerns "Negotiating with the Russians." No one will accuse Byrnes of being "soft on the Soviets"; he is ever mindful of tough policies which produced Soviet concessions. But Byrnes is careful to note how Western standard operating procedures inadvertently created difficulties for the Soviets, and also how what might appear to be obstructionist tactics actually were standard patterns of Soviet organizational life. The Ministry of Higher Education with which IUCTG negotiated (as a result, Byrnes says, of an early and perhaps misguided American decision to stress junior-level academic exchanges) is not the most potent of Soviet institutions: "The offices of the Chief of the Foreign Affairs Administration in the Ministry, responsible for exchanges with all countries, before 1969 had only two telephones. On one occasion in 1964, neither telephone worked for several weeks. The office has so few secretaries that phones were left unattended throughout the entire day when the staff was engaged in discussions or negotiations. The Ministry made no international telephone calls to the Committee or IREX until March 4, 1974 ...."

The result of apathy and inefficiency in the Ministry (and no doubt of obstructionism, too) was that between 1958 and 1969, Soviet nominations of exchange participants never arrived by the date the Ministry had promised. Byrnes records other "snafus," too, in their near-ludicrous detail. Nor does he ignore patently political practices—rejection, until very recently, of American scholars working in such "sensitive" fields as "Russian foreign policy in the nineteenth century" (because, said the Soviets, these involved "relations with other countries"); and the overwhelming Soviet stress on science and technology as evidenced in the preponderance of Soviet exchange participants in those fields.

After a chapter on "Eastern Europe: Another World," Byrnes draws some general lessons. In his view, both sides incur real costs in the exchange programs. U.S. costs include Soviet gains (to that extent Byrnes still has a zero-sum view of things) plus the price we pay in government encroachment on academic autonomy. The USSR, on the other hand, is "on the horns of a fearful and eternal dilemma. To obtain benefits that it thinks important, even crucial, it must risk contamination of its intellectual elite and of its ideological foundations." Why are exchanges worth supporting? While recognizing the pay-off in increased knowledge of the USSR, Professor Byrnes lays even greater stress on America's national interest in encouraging "dissidence and dissent among [Soviet] intellectuals." Yet many of the leading Soviet dissidents are at the very least skeptical about ex-