by each approach (p. 4). The first of his three lenses or frameworks addresses interaction between the Soviet Union and its principal negotiating partner, the United States; the second concerns bargaining within the Soviet alliance system; the third has to do with internal bargaining within the Soviet political system.

Jönsson's findings on the first level are his most instructive and original. He judges Soviet behavior vis-à-vis the U.S. to be "more flexible and less propagandistic than could be anticipated after consulting Western observers" (p. 77). This flexibility is demonstrated by reference to ten specific questions about Soviet strategy and tactics. On most scores, Jönsson emphasizes, Soviet behavior changed several times during the five-year span of the test ban negotiations.

The book's section on intra-bloc bargaining is exclusively concerned with Soviet relations with China, which were undergoing fundamental change at this time. These chapters show in detail how the test ban issue, related as it was to China's nuclear aspirations, was a major irritant in the worsening relationship. They add little to our overall understanding of the Sino-Soviet rift, but they do make clearly the negative point that the Chinese impact on Soviet decisions was consistently weak. Intra-bloc bargaining, on this issue at least, explains very little of Soviet behavior.

Four chapters devoted to internal bargaining comprise the longest section of the book and also, curiously, the most flatly written and the least rich in personal and contextual detail. They present policy as the outcome of both factional politics and interaction among interest groups. Descriptive shortcomings and ellipses aside, the author has little difficulty showing that officials in an assortment of Soviet institutions, and at different levels, held divergent views on Khrushchev's test ban proposals. Military officers spoke disparagingly, or not at all, about the ban. Heavy industry managers were mostly negative, while scientists and foreign policy specialists were divided in their preferences. As for factions within the party leadership, Jönsson's analysis is more derivative and more questionable. Perhaps inevitably, he is reduced to searching out minute differences of emphasis among speakers who are often addressing quite different audiences. Where the analysis is least convincing—again, this may be as much the inescapable result of a paucity of data as of the author's methods—is on the crucial point of the translation of opinions and preferences into policy actions. Was the Khrushchev regime's policy on arms control determined by political "bargaining"? To a certain degree it probably was, but Jönsson is not really able to show the causal link with any persuasiveness. Moreover, the bargaining rubric seems insufficient to comprehend a host of policy determinants which emerge from Jönsson's narrative and from our other sources of information on the period—the personality and fluctuating desires of the party boss, self-promotion and intrigue in the halls of power, the interplay of expert opinion, the objective constraints of the Soviet political economy, the halting process of learning about the world set in motion by the death of Stalin.

None of this is to detract from the value of Soviet Bargaining Behavior. It is a careful piece of work. It addresses important issues, makes no exaggerated claims, and offers much food for future thought and debate.

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Each year the NATO Economics Directorate organizes a colloquium designed to foster discussion of topics of current interest related to Soviet and East European economics. Regional development in the USSR is the latest published volume, and is based on essays
given in Brussels, Belgium on 25-27 April 1979. The volume contains the works of twelve European and North American researchers, together with critical commentary. As briefly reviewed by James Ellis (p. 5), the major conclusions of the conference were that "the problem of regional economic development in the Soviet Union is basically one of a mal-distribution and growing shortage of labor in certain areas, which cannot be overcome by increased investment alone. But in seeking inducements to provide for an adequate regional labor supply, Soviet planners are frequently at odds with their policy of eliminating inequities in living standards. These problems are exacerbated by transport difficulties and an inefficient distribution network, as well as planners' hesitancy in integrating regional economies for the maximum benefit of the nation as a whole."

In general, the individual papers provide summary statements on regional development policy (past, present, and anticipated future). The specific topics covered by the authors include regional living standards, autarky and regional investment, labor force availability, regional raw material development, regional transport availability, military implications of regional policies, and trade aspects of regional development policies. However, one should not, for the most part, pick up this volume expecting new insights into these various topics. With some exceptions, the articles are of a review nature with little new analysis being offered. But then the purpose of the colloquium was information dissemination and not necessarily the generation of new insights. As such, the volume is to be recommended as a rather good source of some detailed information on selected aspects of Soviet regional development.

With regard to the specific papers, a number of observations can be made. There are some interesting methodologies, for example those of Eason and Abouchar; and the articles run the gamut from conceptual (e.g., Clayton) to highly empirical (e.g., Beazley). As would be expected, there are a fair number of comments and analytic statements that could be taken issue with—and indeed are by the various commentators. On the negative side, it is somewhat disconcerting that some of the analyses reflect only a tenuous link to the underlying theme of the conference, "regional development in the USSR." For example, the Hardt article is not regional in substance, despite its title "The Military-Economic Implications of Soviet Regional Policy."

Also evident in some of the articles is an incomplete understanding of Soviet spatial planning models, especially that of the "territorial-production complex." Not only does this weakness exist, but the selection of colloquium topics overlooked some that are of critical importance to the theme of regional development in the USSR. Specifically, relatively little is said (aside from comments in Shabad and Abouchar) about Soviet location policy and the associated institutional methods of regional planning. Nor is much said about the role of urban centers as they impact on regional development; agriculture is covered but not urban centers per se.

Finally, and unfortunately, there are a number of editing errors that unnecessarily detract from the book's content. Although the book is produced in English, there is a five-page comment by Chantal Beaucourt that is in French. In a volume of 293 pages should not it have been possible to translate these five pages? Misspellings are quite common. Finally, and further reflection of the poor "proofing," there exist two instances of improper placement of pages. Part of Alan Abouchar's essay (pp. 99-102) is simply reprinted at the end of Tony Scanlan's "comment" (pp. 182-84), making Mr. Scanlan's remarks appear inappropriate. The two "comments" by Zbigniew Fullenbuchl are reversed in proper placement, that which occurs on pages 113-17 should be exchanged with that found on pages 287-90. As a result, one reads Mr. Fallenbuchl's first comment wondering why he fails to mention the articles just read, only to discover almost 200 pages later that the commentary refers to a later section in the book.

In summary, Regional Development in the USSR is recommended for those persons...