examples of the phenomenon Lincoln describes in the early years of Nicholas' reign were, of course, N. Miliutin, A. Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, and S. Zarudnyi. They in turn opened the doors of their influential offices to the next, much larger, group of the 1840s (including people like A. V. Golovnin and D. A. Tolstoi—both future ministers under Alexander II).

The author's tack is to trace in some detail the careers of these key players as part of a more general pattern. He also identifies certain progressive institutions (such as the Geographical Society) and figures at court (in particular the Grand Duke Constantin Nikolaevich and the Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna). Thus, according to Lincoln, by the end of the reign of Nicholas I the "personnel resources to staff...the administrative instruments to shape policy" were in place. For the first time in modern Russian history there existed all three necessary ingredients for reform "from above"—1) the right people in the right places, 2) the data base, and 3) the shared perception of what needed to be done with concomitant coordination of efforts among the central government agencies. Against these combined forces not even the entrenched and retrograde nobility could hold out, with the result that major state reforms were finally undertaken.

Lincoln's book builds upon the works of his compatriots: Emmons, Field, Orlovsky, Rieber, Sinel, Starr, Wortman (among others), as well as the Soviet scholars Gerasimova, Garmiza, and of course, Zaionchkovskii himself. His thesis is closest to Field's, but it goes even further in postulating the precise sociology of bureaucratic transformation. There is much to be learned from this analysis: unquestionably Lincoln is right to emphasize the central role of the enlightened bureaucrats. Nevertheless, it is not clear that his approach represents a mutually exclusive alternative to the traditional interpretation of what happened. That is, when all is said about what the Miliutins, Zarudnyis, and Zablotskiiis accomplished, would any of it have happened or mattered if there had been no Alexander II? The experience of their counterparts under the preceding reign and—much more important—the two following ones suggests that the role of the tsar remained the crucial factor throughout. And if Alexander II were indeed more influenced by his enlightened bureaucrats than were his son and grandson, surely that ought not to be discounted.

As with his earlier works, Lincoln's book is thoroughly documented (the archival references are particularly impressive), full of useful and often esoteric information, and rich in the detail of historical folklore. Every student of the period, whether convinced by the author's main thesis or not, will find something new and worthy of attention; the more general reader will enjoy the book for its expository felicity.

N. G. O. Pereira
Dalhousie University


In his latest book, George Yaney has written another monograph that pertains to his labor of love, i.e., the theoretical, operational, and efficacious nature of governmental administration. The particulars used to demonstrate his views on the nature of the administrative process have to do with a very broad examination of the Stolypin Land Reform, the focal point of the book, the title notwithstanding. The first four chapters, covering the period from 1861 to 1906, serve as an elaborate introduction and examine how the tsarist government arrived at the decision to change peasant society. The last three chapters concern the aftermath of the reform, from 1914 to the beginning of collectivization, revealing how the land settlement program continued to evolve after the official end of the reform, sometime during World War I.
The Stolypin Reform is a particularly appropriate vehicle for the author’s purposes because it “presents an unusually well-documented example of a government attempting to impose social change on a people through administrative means” (p. 3). As a result, Yaney argues that an investigation into the implementation of the reform allows us an in-depth view of the impact of the actual administrative process on capital city objectives. Even a brief perusal of the book will make evident that this is a work of monumental proportions, in terms of the length (it seems to me that there are at least two books in this manuscript), the overwhelming amount of material presented, the depth of analysis, and the astounding familiarity and command of the sources—Western, Soviet, and archival. It is not a quick study. As the author himself states: “This is a large book and... a complex one” (p. vii).

To the iconoclasts among us, Yaney’s book is something of a delight. Within the context of Russia’s agrarian history from 1861 to 1930, Yaney challenges one of the basic assumptions that historians hold concerning the administrative process, i.e., that the enactors or directors of a reform establish the goals or ends desired, and the administrative “machinery” constitutes the means to accomplish these ends (p. 3). In his view, far too much attention is paid by historians to the statutes/reforms emanating from the central government and to the ascertainment of the relative success or failure of the given statute/reform. From this rather simple perspective—statute in the context of success or failure—Yaney argues that historians have ignored the active role and impact of the administrative organization on the reform itself, ignored what the officials actually did. Yaney’s response to those who write history in this way is concise and to the point: “They do not know what they are talking about” (p. 4).

Conceiving the Stolypin Land Reform as a process in which the local agencies of government, as well as the peasants, did not actually carry out the central government’s program but redirected it from their own perspective, Yaney is intrigued by the question of motivation. He finds that governmental authority, law, and even ideology did not provide inspiration or guidance to local officials. What was it then that kept local administrators and technicians hard at work in the countryside, that kept alive the impulse to reform, despite the failure of capital city schemes? His very intriguing answer is what he calls the “urge to mobilize.” In his view, local officials and agrarian specialists were not seeking primarily “to bring benefits to peasants but to satisfy their own inner need to force the rural population into conformity with ‘modern’ assumptions regarding human nature” (p. 5). The “urge to mobilize,” Yaney asserts, is an important characteristic of the modern Western mind. It is an historical outgrowth of the drive toward systemization, a belief in a systematic universe, and it was this desire that drove officials into the countryside to impose social change on the peasant. His basic assumption is “that faith in the power and truth of system precedes and causes the urge to mobilize” (p. 8). His point is illuminated quite well in his discussion of Walter Rathenau’s raison d’être as a specialist functioning within a government bureaucracy (pp. 447-55).

As is suggested above, Yaney is unquestionably one of the more perceptive and provocative historians plowing the fields of Russian history. Beyond the general theme of mobilization, ancillary interesting and stimulating interpretations and insights abound. For example, he views the creation of the Land Captains as a “progressive, not reactionary” step (pp. 73-75). Another somewhat unusual insight is his view that famine hysteria, rather than a true shortage of food, created a famine consciousness which played a very important role in the events of February and October, 1917 (pp. 408-14).

Concerning the Stolypin Land Reform, one finds in this book interpretation upon interpretation. As a generalization, Yaney argues that the purpose of the reform was not the destruction of the peasant commune and the establishment of the sanctity of private property, as many scholars espouse (pp. 144-45, 380-83). By 1911, the goal of the government had become land settlement, and, in fact, by this time the government’s