tive and the cases of relative overproduction are mainly limited by the overall scarcity and the existence of a sellers' market rather than by market research.

Part 4 presents methods used to model and forecast developments in the field of natural resources, a system of ecological and economic models for environmental planning and control, and the discussion of the financial accountability and the right to use resources. Thornton in her introduction provides an excellent assessment of the progress which has been made in the Soviet Union in resource economics. She concludes that this field belongs to the forecasters, operations researchers, and pure mathematicians but that "it remains to be seen whether there is a place in Soviet science for the economist who builds models in order to generate testable hypotheses" (p. 338).

The book clearly demonstrates a considerable advancement in the use of sophisticated mathematical methods. There are references to Keynes and other Western economists and the use of the Cobb-Douglas production function and other Western analytical tools. All this represents change, but one can also find continuity. In some contributions the overall Marxist background is clearly stated. There are still quotations not only from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Brezhnev but also from the resolutions of the recent Party congresses. At least in some fields scholarly enquiry seems to be limited by the so-called "standard methodologies," constructed by the committees of experts, a typically bureaucratic device.

Although this book is not easy to read, it provides many insights into what is happening in Soviet economics, particularly in mathematical economics, and it is, undoubtedly, very useful.

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Western interest in Russia's military might has a long history. It began when the West—Western Europe, that is—discovered Russia at the beginning of the modern era and intensified greatly by the time of Peter the Great, when the Russian Empire was already one of the great powers of Europe, whose size and military might allowed her to play a very important role far beyond the European continent. Russia's military success was the key to her involvement in European affairs, for in all other aspects of Russian life—the economy, social structure, government, culture, or religion—Russia was so different from the rest of Europe that it could be viewed as a non-European country like Turkey or Persia. The nineteenth century, in particular the second half of the century, witnessed so great a decline in Russia's military power that Friedrich Engels expectantly awaited the defeat of Russia at the hands of Turkey during the war of 1877-78. But Russia was now part of Europe, and Western fascination with Russian and the Russian army, motivated by a mixture of fear and contempt, did not disappear and indeed has been reinvigorated by twentieth century developments. For all those who feared revolution, the Red Army now stood as an added threat, increasing the danger presented by the ideology of communism and giving it a military dimension.

Until 1945, however, the USSR (and previously the Russian Empire) had been only one of the major European, and global, powers. In spite of Russia's great military achievements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, its victories over great European heroes from Charles XII to Napoleon, and the glorified "Brusilov Offensive" of World War I,
Russia always occupied only a secondary place among the great powers, behind that of Great Britain, France, and the German Empire. Moreover, during the 1930s the Soviet military was so shaken by internal developments that the other nations of Europe (and America and Japan as well) did not regard her as of great military value. During the crisis of summer 1938, which ended with the Munich agreement, Soviet military capabilities were ignored by the Western powers, and as late as the spring of 1939 Japan started a military adventure against the USSR (which ended in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army).

Not until after the cataclysmic events of World War II did profound change occur both in the real power of the Soviet Union and in Western perception of it, hence in Western scholarship on Russia and the Soviet Union. The Western nations, feeling threatened by Russian military might (more than they felt threatened by Communist ideology after the rise of Bolshevism in Russia), were ready to create an environment where scholarship on Russia and the USSR would flourish. In the West, political and economic elites expected the academic world to supply them with the answers to their numerous questions on the Soviet Union, questions not always clear even to those who formulated them. The scholars, on their part, were occupied with other themes and other questions on Russia, and not much was written on the Soviet military. The dearth of sources, the air of secrecy characteristic of the Soviet Union, the interdependency of the political and military in the USSR, the connection of the Soviet military with internal security organs, all these (and other) factors presented almost insurmountable obstacles to those who wanted to study the armed forces of Russia. These obstacles were not entirely removed with the changes in relations between East and West; however, changes within the USSR itself increased the quantity of the available sources, and access to archives in the Soviet Union was made, on occasion, easier both for Soviet and non-Soviet scholars. As a result, in the last twenty years, more (and at times better) works have been published on the Soviet and pre-Soviet military.

It is in this relative increase of Western literature on the Soviet military that the problem lies. While some of these works are of great value, the majority tell us more about Western thinking on the Soviet military than about the Soviet and Russian Army. One reason for this is that the number of academics and government experts is small. Another is that most of the literature on the subject revolves around the question of the Soviet threat to the West. Soviet grand-strategy, especially nuclear strategy, is discussed extensively though some attention is given to current military-political relations in the Soviet Union, with emphasis on the role of the Communist Party and the decision-making process. All this is expressed in Western terms. Moreover, too much of the literature on the subject has political overtones, stemming from the debate in the West on relations with the Soviet Union. All these factors have created literature that is speculative in nature and tentative in its findings, whether it deals with current Soviet strategy or with social and ethnic problems affecting the Soviet Army, Party-military relations, or the history of the military in Soviet Russia (which presents quite different problems than does the history of the Russian Imperial Army). There is clearly a need for some type of compilation that will include as much information as possible from as many sources as possible, to aid the future study of the Russian military.

The encyclopedia under review tends to fill the void in this field. It is a very ambitious project; and, if the first three volumes can offer any indication for the future, it is very wide in scope. When finished, the encyclopedia will probably embrace fifty volumes, perhaps even more. It certainly deserves a respectable place among the not so many reference books on Russia and USSR, but it has greater value than just a reference book. Some of the entries in the second volume are delightful short studies of important problems of Russian military history by themselves. Certainly much of the credit for this enterprise must go to the editor, David R. Jones of Dalhousie University, who is known among his-