line and the other leaders who were ready to accelerate the pressure on the establish-
ment.

According to Staniszkis, the leadership of Solidarity underestimated the capacity of
the government to act violently and overestimated the willingness of the membership to
support Solidarity under any circumstances. There was not enough effort invested in
the construction of a strong institutional basis for the movement. It was relatively easy
for the militarized establishment to paralyse the functioning of Solidarity under the
martial law.

It is clear that Solidarity was not prepared for the eventuality of martial law and a
violent repression. However, the current ruling establishment also does not have much
chance to change things for the better.

The extremists within the establishment push for more repression that would alien-
ate the masses from the government even more than this already happens now. The bu-
reaucrats are familiar only with administrative measures which neither improve the
economy nor secure a modus vivendi between the common citizens and the rulers. The
acceleration of violence on both sides seems probable in such a situation but it does
not promise any bright future for the whole country.

Staniszkis does not consider some more optimistic alternatives that are still possible
and in the long range a moderate majority may cumulate around them. The constant
deterioration of the economic situation may force all involved partners to make some
compromises of a practical nature. Also for the Soviet Union the situation in Poland is
very embarrassing, and this may provide more room for peaceful solutions, especially
when the Polish population insists on more freedom and constantly denies the legit-
imacy of the current establishment.

Alexander J. Matejko
University of Alberta

Eurocommunism Between East and West. Edited by Vernon V. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta,

As Vernon Aspaturian suggests in the opening chapter of this book, “it is a universal
but predictable lament that Eurocommunism as a concept ... is ambiguous, amorphous,
elastic, and elusive.” (p. 3) It is equally predictable that the attempt to locate this elusive
phenomenon in the vague terrain “between East and West” should produce somewhat
amorphous and ambiguous conclusions. The ambiguity results only partially from the
elasticity of the Eurocommunist concept. The book under review is a collection of chap-
ters by fourteen scholars, and it suffers from the proverbial lack of integration typical of
such volumes. In this case, however, lack of uniformity may be an asset. Most of the con-
tributors are distinguished scholars, which lends both breadth and depth of specialized
knowledge to the work. Furthermore, diversity of approach may portray the reality of
Eurocommunism more accurately than would a uniform treatment.

The editors of the volume aspired to produce “a different book on Eurocommunism”
by focussing on “questions of Eurocommunism as part of a worldwide communist move-
ment.” (p. vii) In this reviewer’s judgement they succeeded. The book is of special im-
portance for scholars of the Soviet bloc, because a central concern is the interaction of
East European politics and Eurocommunism. With the exception of Bulgaria and Alba-
nia, each East European country (including the USSR) is treated in a separate chapter.
Deceptively simple titles like “Eurocommunism and East Germany” provide an umbrella
for exploration of a fascinating network of political relations. In their relationships with
Eastern Europe, each Eurocommunist party (e.g., the French, Italian, and Spanish) must
respond to domestic political pressures, internal party demands, and Soviet interests.
Support for East European dissidents may sour relations with the USSR, but ignoring them may undermine domestic support. The collection highlights the unique dilemmas facing Eurocommunist parties and demonstrates the ambiguous relevance of Eurocommunism to East European actors. Several authors also suggest a reverse flow of influence. Jiri Valenta argues that "simply put, the Prague Spring can be considered the forerunner of Eurocommunism." (p. 171) Robin Alison Remington claims that Eurocommunism "began in the late 1940s in Eastern Europe, or more precisely in Yugoslavia." (p. 203) Paul R. Milch and Andrzej Korbonski note similarities between Hungarian and Polish revisionist thinking in the mid-1950s and present-day Eurocommunist themes. The authors do not, however, apply a standard definition of Eurocommunism, although they generally understand it as communist commitment to pluralist politics and/or "an updated expression of polycentrism and national communism." (Melvin Croan, p. 143)

The remaining chapters in the book form a less coherent unit. The first four essays place Eurocommunism in broad historical and theoretical perspective. The final three chapters discuss Eurocommunism in relation to NATO, China, and Japan. Unfortunately the book lacks a concluding chapter to link the diverse strands of analysis. Aspaturian's introductory chapter does, however, pose tantalizing questions about the nature of Eurocommunism, its roots in indigenous political culture, and the relevance of the post-World War II experience in Eastern Europe in assessing motives of West European Eurocommunist parties. Herbert Dinerstein, in his chapter on "Communism in Europe, 1944-49," provides much factual material, but is inconclusive in evaluating the implications of the period for contemporary Eurocommunist policies. Should the Czechoslovak experience of 1948 raise doubts about French and Italian Eurocommunist commitment to political pluralism today? Dinerstein leaves this and similar issues hanging.

As in all such collections, the individual chapters are of varying quality. The most insightful contributions include chapters on the USSR (Valenta), East Germany (Croan), Czechoslovakia (Valenta), Romania (Trond Gilberg), China (Parris H. Chang), and Japan (Peter Berton). The book should, however, be read cover to cover, for the contrasting conclusions offered by the various authors are thought-provoking. For example, Croan's assertion that "Eurocommunism is likely to remain of marginal significance to East Germany" (p. 153) is hardly surprising; Korbonski's similar conclusion about Poland is somewhat less expected. Croan argues that Eurocommunist revisionism in the GDR is too threatening to be tolerated because it might point toward eventual liquidation of the GDR itself, by suggesting the possibility of national reunification in a democratic, pluralist framework. Croan relates dissident and oppositional tendencies in the GDR to this unique East German dilemma. Korbonski, on the other hand, finds Eurocommunism of little relevance to Poland for vastly different reasons. Since 1976 the Polish political system has achieved enough pluralism to largely satisfy this important Eurocommunist demand (p. 135). Furthermore, already in the 1940s and 1950s Polish writers had raised many of the issues now championed by Eurocommunists. Finally, Korbonski asserts, "there has been remarkably little interference by the Kremlin in the internal affairs of its junior allies" in recent years, thus "the Eurocommunist call for equality and nonintervention may well sound a bit hollow in Polish ears." (p. 134) Although Korbonski acknowledges that PCI pressure may have helped soften Gierek's response to dissidents, he finds Eurocommunism of little relevance to Eastern Europe, including Poland. These conclusions are not shared by other authors in the collection, and Korbonski's chapter obviously predates December, 1981.

The chapters on Romania and Hungary provide another interesting contrast. Gilberg identifies a central dilemma underlying Romania's affinity to Eurocommunism: "The problem for Ceausescu, therefore, is how to take advantage of the autonomist ideas of the Eurocommunists in the international movement, while preventing its revisionist aspects from gaining a foothold in Romania." (p. 191) Milch, on the other hand, links