much more. A large section of the book outlines the biographies and careers of the first twenty-four authors, many of whom Mehnert personally interviewed. An even larger section describes, usually by means of synopsis, as a rule avoiding aesthetic analysis or critical evaluation, some eleven works of these writers—the titles which Mehnert's informants named as their favorites. There is a brief, and admittedly inadequate, chapter on Soviet readers' preferences among Russian classics and foreign authors. There are also interesting information and observations about the Soviet book trade. The concluding chapter, which attempts in a modest fashion to explain and interpret the present-day preferences of Soviet Russia readers, seems sound but somewhat lacking in original insights.

The main strength of this study is its objective account of what is currently popular in Russian fiction, regardless of that fiction's literary worth. It turns out, for example, that works about World War II still predominate, long after the topic has ceased to interest Western readers. Also prominent are works about rural Russia (the so-called village prose) and especially about Siberia. Detective stories and tales of international intrigue and espionage are favorites, as is science fiction. The Russians still appear to love massive novels encompassing numerous generations and the whole of twentieth-century Russian history, with casts of hundreds.

The major weakness of this study—a curious one in view of Mehnert's sophistication and eminence as an authority on the USSR—results, I suspect, from his excessive striving for a kind of photographic objectivity. He notes, for example, and without further comment, that the works of his top twenty-four authors do not "demand political changes within the USSR. Their authors may be critical of existing conditions, but they do not advocate reforms." This would suggest that positive contentment reigns among Soviet writers and readers alike, and that it is the public will, and not governmental controls, that explains the paucity of dissent in legally published Soviet writing. Although Mehnert notes the existence of censorship and Party controls over literature, he seems strangely insensitive to their implications for the topic of this study. Moreover, he seems unwilling to speculate on what Soviet literature, and the tastes of its readers, would be like if these controls did not exist. Thus his survey, based on what is legally available to Soviet readers, is skewed, willy-nilly, in favor of official literary policy, so that he comes dangerously close to concluding that, as in a free market, that which is printed is that which Soviet readers want.

The twenty-four (plus the additional twenty-four) writers whom Mehnert mentions are unquestionably popular, but so were Aksenov, Voinovich, and several others who have been driven from Soviet literature. I think it is safe to say that Solzhenitsyn would have been enormously successful had he been allowed to remain and publish freely in the USSR. These are considerations that Mehnert, unfortunately, ignores. Nevertheless, the material he so diligently assembled and analyzed, and his conclusions based on them, shed much light on contemporary Soviet culture and society.

Deming Brown
it ends abruptly in the mid-1360s when Muscovite policy toward the Golden Horde was shifting from reluctant servility to cautious defiance.

The Rise of Moscow's Power is divided into three parts. Part one provides background on the geography and inhabitants of medieval Russia, the origins of the earliest Rus' state, and the Rus' conversion to Orthodoxy. The second part traces the history of the upper Volga region from the ninth to twelfth centuries. Part three looks at the emergence of Moscow. After considering the Mongol conquest and the origins of Moscow, it analyzes the growth of Moscow by princely reign. Paszkiewicz was writing chapter ten on the era of Dmitrii Donskoi when his untimely death occurred in December 1979.

Historians have approached the rise of Moscow in various ways. Some, like V. O. Kliuchevskii, emphasize forces, downgrade personalities, and focus upon the region of Moscow. Others, like John Fennell, stress the role of individuals, argue for a hierarchy of causes, and examine the emergence of Moscow in a setting which extends from Lithuania in the west to Sarai in the east. Where then does Paszkiewicz's work fit into this spectrum of views and what contribution does it make? Unlike Kliuchevskii, Paszkiewicz believes that the key to the rise of Moscow lay in the ability of its princes to manipulate their environment rather than in the workings of impersonal historical forces. At the same time, Paszkiewicz's horizons, like Kliuchevskii's, rarely extend beyond the upper Volga. He ignores both Novgorod and Lithuania and fails to examine the situation within the Golden Horde prior to the late 1350's. In addition, Paszkiewicz completely neglects the crucial role of the metropolitans and never considers the weaknesses of Moscow's internal rivals, e.g. Riazan', Nizhni Novgorod, and Tver'. In short, Paszkiewicz maintains that the rise of Moscow can be explained almost entirely by an analysis of the policies of the Muscovite princes and particularly their dealings with the Khan. He sees no hierarchy of causes in the rise of Moscow—just the interaction of Moscow and Sarai.

Personally, I find Paszkiewicz's approach very parochial. It is not possible to understand the emergence of Moscow without examining the history of the Golden Horde, Novgorod, Lithuania, the Orthodox Church, and the other Rus' principalities. On the other hand, Paszkiewicz's contribution lies in his detailed analysis of the policies pursued by the early Muscovite princes. Here he makes several important points. For instance, he attributes the early rise of Moscow primarily to the successful policies of Daniil. Paszkiewicz portrays Ivan Kalita as more than Khan Uzbeg's toady: Kalita was also trying to use Uzbeg for the benefit of Moscow, and the two were engaged in a continual game of trying to outmaneuver the other. Paszkiewicz also sees Ivan II as an outstanding prince whose entire reign was devoted to reconciling the other Suzdalian princes in order to build up an anti-Mongol coalition. While scholars will certainly question some of Paszkiewicz's interpretations, e.g., I am not convinced Uzbeg really had to play games with Kalita, there is no doubt that Paszkiewicz has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the policies pursued by the Muscovite princes up to the mid-1360s.

A few other comments are in order. Given Paszkiewicz's two books on the pre-Mongol era, he had no reason to spend five chapters and five appendicies (totaling over 200 pages) going over the pre-Mongol era especially when he fails to show that this background is relevant to the rise of Moscow. The author has only utilized a small number of the pertinent new studies which appeared in the 1970s. Illness may account for this. It is also regrettable that the only two maps have been so reduced that their legends are impossible to read without a magnifying glass. The stereotypical description of Batu (p. 140) as a “typical Asiatic by origin and in his political mentality” is an unfortunate lapse. Paszkiewicz ignores the people of Moscow as well as their society, economy, religion, and art. The Muscovite princes seemingly operate in a wasteland populated by only a few boyars and lesser princes. In this connection, it is very disappointing that Paszkiewicz, who used archaeology so extensively in examining issues unrelated to the rise of Moscow, completely ignores the extensive evidence unearthed about post-Mongol Moscow.