prising clauses (favoring industry over agriculture) and set the whole affair in the context of a concerted effort to introduce collective commodity exchange in order to displace market exchange. Intense controversies, reversals of policy, and compromises characterized the evolution of this program, as did major errors in judgment about the socio-economic nature of the peasantry and about the extent of their hostile responses. Despite overwhelming evidence that these policies proved unsuccessful (Narcomprod never supplied over 50 percent of the food needs or even reached the 1916-17 levels of tsarist provisioning), the predominant attitude toward the end of 1920 favored retaining the progradverska policy, even after the end of the war emergency, as the basis for a non-market economy. But the March 1921 tax in kind reversed all that!

While successfully demonstrating the absence of overall coherence in the pattern of innovation (either for coping with the war-time emergency or with the transition to communism), Malle reveals the overriding tenor of those policy decisions. Not unexpectedly the penchant for centralization marks the primary motivation (if certainly not the outcome): “the conflict between a desired but not achieved centralization and an effective but unwanted decentralization characterized the first communist experiment in economic organization in Russia.” (p. 207) Therefore, the administrative processes of control rather than market relations and objective economic productive forces preset the categories of analysis and shaped the priorities in developing strategies. Various forms of coercion followed as a not-too-fickle handmaiden. Overshadowing the whole process loomed the singular impulse to establish the authority and role of the Party. All of this was bolstered (at times) and beleaguered (at others) by “an ideological framework realistic enough to accept all sorts of exceptions but utopian enough to encourage all sorts of expectations.” (p. 209)

The levelling of ideology and war-time conditions as contextual influences on decision makers and policy outcomes offers definite advantages in evaluating the complexities of the War Communism period on its own terms. Yet, in the somewhat tedious coverage of the myriad conference discussions, institutional diagrams, and statistical tables (all necessary and helpful in exposing the facts of the period), both the ideology and the period get lost. The topical division of the book impedes an evaluation of the twists and turns of ideologically based thinking and of the acuity (or lack of it) with which the participants perceived the realities of the situation at various points in the period. Malle’s reluctance to engage in “linear” thinking about trends and patterns (even where they might be present) has weakened the book’s evaluative content in favor of informational presentation. The opportunity to bring alive in both personal and intellectual terms the parade of personalities involved in the decision-making process in not taken up by Malle. As one plows through the seemingly endless debates and policy frustrations in the areas covered, one senses that the “real” story of War Communism was not being played out at the central level, but in the give-and-take of transformation and crisis conditions at the local level. One hopes that Malle’s next work might focus on the Northern Raion or the Moscow Council of the National Economy, where more creative solutions were being worked out.

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James E. Mace, a post-doctoral fellow of the Ukrainian Research Center at Harvard University has written an excellently researched study of the first nation to attempt a
separate road to socialism from that prescribed by the USSR: the fate of that experiment has the thematic subtitle—"National Communism in Soviet Ukraine." With an unusually lively exposition and thoughtful organization, Mace has traced how indigenous Ukrainian communism began, particularly in the Bolshevik policy of Ukrainization flowering at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923, and how it ended beginning with the Shakhty Trial in 1928. Mace's point is that "Ukrainization succeeded in giving Soviet Ukraine a measure of national legitimacy, but this success was achieved only at the cost of legitimizing Ukrainian national aspirations within the Party itself." Mace concludes that Soviet Ukraine did evolve its own national road to socialism within the framework of the USSR as part of a future world socialist commonwealth. Mace has created an outstanding case study of this process.

Mace's story begins with his distinguishing between Mykhailo Drahomanov's Ukrainian populism of the 1870s and the Marxian approach to the nationalism question wherein proletarian internationalism, national equality, large political units and the assimilation of small nations are preferred goals. These generalizations were debated successively by Otto Bauer/Karl Renner, Rosa Luxemburg, and V. I. Lenin: the Austrian thinkers believed that nationalism within the empire should have territorial autonomy and that nationalist minorities' socialist parties would be part of a national federation. Luxemburg felt that nationalism was reactionary and, thus, a non-issue for proletarians, who should be strict internationalists: Lenin demanded a single and united socialist party. He recognized the right of self-determination, but believed socialists of the oppressed nations would never exercise that right because they would advocate unity.

A revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) was founded in 1900 and by 1905 had split with the majority joining the RSDRP, the Ukrainian Spilka, and a tiny remainder renamed the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party (USDRP). Another Ukrainian socialist party, followers of Drahomanov, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) also continued to exist. When news reached Ukraine about the tsar's abdication, a Ukrainian national council (Ukrainian Central Rada) was formed simultaneously with the Kiev Soviet of Workers' Deputies. By degrees the former was transformed into a political body and, then, recognized as the organ of the Provisional Government. Finally, it developed into an independent Ukrainian Peoples Republic. Its three principal parties were the UPSR (populists), USDRP (similar to Mensheviks), and the UPSF (Kadets). The Kiev Soviet was in Bolshevik hands under I. Piatakov and I. Bosh, Ukraine's Provisional Government was the main enemy of the Bolsheviks as well as the Rada. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks were in disarray and split into antagonistic groups: Katerynoslavans, Kievans, and Poltavans. The first got Lenin's blessing. Yet, the Kievans under Piatakov soon took over until the Germans engineered the Hetmanate under P. Skoropadskiy. Soon after the collapse of the Hetmanate following the Armistice, V. Vynnychenko and S. Petliura led a massive peasant revolt which established an Ukrainian Peoples Republic under a Directory, a regime which came to rely on plundering warlords. The Bolshevik invasion began as a civil war between the Piatakov regime and the Ukrainian Directory. By August 1918 the Piatakovskia came to an end as the Bolsheviks left Kiev to the Whites.

Both Piatakov and his right-hand man, K. Rakovskii, were followers of the Luxemburgian nationality viewpoint. But there were others such as V. Sakhrai and S. Mazlakh, who early on realized that any successful Soviet Ukrainian state would be impossible without peasant acquiescence. Both called for the creation of a new Ukrainian Communist Party (b). It was G. Lapchinskii, however, a federalist who joined the Ukrainian communist party with its two indigenous radical factions - the Borotbisty and Ukapiisty. The former had taken shape in the left wing of the UPSR, which had served in the brief Piatakov regime and merged with the Bolsheviks. Though they were Ukrainian nationalists, they were also communists. After Denikin's retreat in late 1919 and the reestablishment...