slav communists' unexpected victory in Macedonia in World War II, stands at least pass-
vively by the Cominform and the USSR in 1948, reverts to a Bulgarian national identity
thereafter and gets himself sentenced in 1956 to five years' harsh imprisonment on Goli
Otok for writing and circulating an anti-Tito poem.

The publisher's interpretation of the book will not do. In the first place, "the triumph
of the human spirit" here portrayed is really the apotheosis of hatred: hatred of the Yu-
goslav state, hatred of Tito and his clique, hatred of their Macedonian confidence trick,
hated of their long years of service in the agencies of Anglo-American intelligence and
hated of their and all others' deviations from and revisions of unalloyed Stalinism. This
is the spiritual triumph of Mein Kampf, and the book is permeated with the lust for re-
venge. Goli Otok was evil not in and of itself, but because Markovski and his kind were
not the ones meting out the punishment.

The invocation of Hitler is apposite in other senses as well. Markovski's language is
crude and hysterical; his philosophizing, of which there are enormous dollops, is turgid
and banal; his view of history is alternately conspiratorial and hagiographic; his self-im-
portance is simultaneously whining and insistent; and his mendacity is evident on virtually
every page.

If this book has any redeeming features, they are in just that realm of the particular
that the publisher seeks to disavow. Some of the scenes of prison camp life are effectiv-
ely harrowing and ring true. The reader will quickly appreciate that the peculiar awfulness
of Goli Otok, now much written about in Yugoslavia, was that the inmates were made to
discipline, torture, and degrade one another in what was, indeed, a cruel parody of self-
management. But one can have no real faith in the veracity of the "letters"—some of
which are given the appearance of being contemporary, others of which were obviously
composed long after the events they describe—since they are replete with absurdities,
evasions, and internal contradictions. Their tone of invective is so exaggerated as to be
ludicrous, their employment of religious and sexual imagery so demented as to demand
psychiatric intervention, and their moral blindness so total as to be sickening.

Markovski's hymn of hate has not been published in Bulgaria, where he has lived
since 1966, latterly as poet laureate. Although it is difficult to imagine that even the
Bulgarians and the Russians could be so stupid as to expect that this book's appearance
in the West would do them any good, it must be assumed that it has been published with
their consent. If Ranković were still alive and known to be more imaginative than in fact
he was, it would be tempting to suspect that this venture was part of a devious exercise
to rehabilitate UDBa. But why, in any case, should an American academic publisher be
an accomplice?

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Steven L. Burg. Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making

Six years ago on May 4, 1980 Josip Broz Tito died, depriving Yugoslavia of the
charismatic authority widely seen as an integral part of the Yugoslav alternative to the
Soviet model. At home and abroad Tito's personality had become synonymous with the
Yugoslav experiment in self-managing socialism. Like the Indian banyan tree, the Godfa-
ther of the Yugoslav revolution overshadowed other political leaders and institutional
developments. For ten years before he died, Western speculation on "after Tito" focused
on such dire predictions as inter-ethnic civil war, a preemptive military coup, or Soviet
intervention.
Continuing pessimistic forecasts concerning Yugoslavia’s economic time of troubles tend to obscure the political dynamics of post-Tito Yugoslavia. The bad news is that the economy seems to perpetually totter on the brink of collapse. The good news is that prophets of doom were wrong. Rather than disintegrating into civil war or martial law, Yugoslavia has demonstrated substantial political stability in the hands of a rotating collective leadership chosen on the basis of national (ethnic) and territorial/bureaucratic criteria.

This is undoubtedly one of the most elaborate quota systems in the world. Steven L. Burg’s study is invaluable for understanding why it works as well as it does, how it works, and the weak links in the post-Tito political machinery. Burg’s analysis of the organizational and procedural provisions for decision making in Yugoslavia since 1966 is a carefully researched work on the ongoing twenty-year effort of Yugoslav political elites to establish “rules of the game” to contain systemic conflict flowing from the country’s multinational population with a history of inter-ethnic hatred and disparities in levels of economic development. As the author puts it, the Yugoslav leadership has “identified and encouraged forms of elite behavior that tended to regulate conflict and has identified and discouraged behavior that exacerbated it.” (p. 5)

The strength of this volume comes in Burg’s attention to the role of institutions and procedures for conflict regulation Yugoslav style and his ability to combine in-depth treatment of Yugoslav data with generally first-rate analysis. His discussion of the 1966-69 period shows the complex interaction between democratization and federalization of the Yugoslav political process; pointing to the frequently ignored dimension of growing enterprise autonomy in which managers of major enterprises wielded “increasing independent political influence over local politico-administrative elites, the leaderships of their respective regions, and central decision makers in the federal parliament and federal administrative bodies.” (p. 61) The problems of how to deal with monopolies continues to haunt Yugoslav policy makers attempting to balance economic nationalisms and stabilize the country’s economy.

Burg also should be commended for his masterful chapters dealing with the constitutional amendments of 1971 and the 1974 constitution. He has captured the politics of constitution writing, while making the consequences of organizational and procedural choices understandable. In doing so, the chapter on the regulatory formula in practice provides a graphic example of the dilemma facing the Federal Executive Council (the Yugoslav government). It would be hard not to agree with his conclusion that “although a strong and capable Council may be a necessary condition for the resolution of inter-regional conflict, it is not by itself sufficient. (p. 298)

On the minus side, the chronological treatment of the body of this work tends to conceal the degree to which public policy—indeed the very effort to work out the regulatory mechanisms that Burg is analyzing—contributed to those interregional conflicts that they were designed to contain. The 1971 constitutional amendments contributed to the breakdown of elite cooperation in 1969-72. The amendments themselves confused the issue as to what was appropriate in-system behavior on the part of republican party elites in Croatia and elsewhere; a confusion that Tito himself compounded with his visit to Zagreb in 1972.

In his analysis of the dynamics of the Croatian events of 1971-72 and Tito’s subsequent mini-cultural revolution against the Serbian party leadership and others, Burg leaves an impression without actually saying so that the central League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) leadership was fully behind Tito’s determination to cut the republican leaderships down to size. In my view, there are signs that Tito moved with the support of his hand-picked Executive Committee, but without solid backing of the Central Committee. If so, the reality of institutional alignments is much more complicated than it appears here. A more definitive judgment undoubtedly requires future research.