Two introductions to the painting of the era, one by an American (Donald R. McClelland) and one by a Soviet scholar (L. I. Iovleva) are included. The former emphasizes the parallel to American artists in the same period, seeing "their own native landscape as the ultimate embodiment of the national spirit." Iovleva's introduction reveals how compatible the views of Western and Soviet art historians have become with respect to both the realists and the "individualists" of the early twentieth century, which Iovleva refers to as an era of "triumphal individualism" becoming "ever more dynamic and dazzling" in the pre-war years. Two very brief historical sketches on the Tret'iakov Gallery and the Russian State Museum provide background on their collections.

The identifications of painters and paintings are more than adequate, often including a quotation or significant detail providing insight or a deeper context. The only quibble might be with the alphabetical arrangement, unnecessary since the artists number only thirty-four and making no sense in terms of stylistic chronology. An up-to-date select bibliography primarily of works available in English is appended. This book will be of use to students and teachers of Russian culture and is a good source of reproductions from which to make slides.

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The fiftieth anniversary in 1983 of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union was the occasion for four lectures delivered at Brown University by George F. Kennan ("A Participant’s View"), John Lewis Gaddis ("The First Fifty Years"), Adam B. Ulam ("the High Cost of Illusions"), and Alexander Dallin ("Some Lessons of the Past"). Shared Destiny gathers together these lectures and supplements them with additional chapters by Robert Dallek ("How We See the Soviets") and Hans Rogger ("How the Soviets See Us"), and with introductory and concluding observations by Abbott Gleason and Mark Garrison respectively.

The major theme of the volume is the difficulties both sides have had in understanding each other. The book’s most useful contribution is to spell out certain historical roots of the misconceptions it describes. For the most part, the authors avoid the classic error of attributing too much to misperception, of assuming, that is, that Soviet-American conflict is primarily the product of misunderstanding. As Dallin points out, misperceptions have aggravated a conflict which has its roots in real differences of interest. The essays are also notable for the way they deemphasize the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology, stressing instead the commonalities between Soviet foreign policy on the one hand, and that of Tsarist Russia and other traditional imperial powers on the other.

Kennan’s elegant essay, a series of vignettes taken from his more than half-century of exposure to follies both Soviet and American, sets the stage by illustrating the mess we and the Russians have gotten ourselves in. Gleason’s erudite introduction notes parallels between the American reaction to officially encouraged Russian anti-semitism in the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. Hans Rogger demonstrates that both left-wing and Slavophile critics of the tsars shared an antipathy toward American democracy that also animates Soviet-era dissidents like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Gaddis argues against accepting Moscow’s view of itself as a uniquely socialist state. The best way to understand the Soviet Union, he insists, is as a traditional great power, one that is more akin to Imperial than to Nazi Germany. According to Gaddis, Soviet
imperialism is the product of great power plus great insecurity, a formula first analyzed by Thucydides. The way to deal with such a power, Gaddis goes on to say, is with firmness, flexibility, and consistency, that is, with just the combination of qualities that the United States has proved congenitally incapable of sustaining.

With the essays by Dallek and Dallin, Shared Destiny's focus shifts more directly to American policy toward the Soviet Union. Dallin itemizes American misperceptions, while Dallek interprets them as the result of projecting U.S. domestic troubles and fears onto the international scene. This last idea, a mirror image of the Leninist view that capitalism exports its own internal contradictions internationally, is fascinating but underdeveloped in Dallek's chapter. Adam Ulam's contribution is, in effect, a case study of the interaction between Soviet and American illusions in the period between 1958 and 1962. Elaborating on themes he has explored in The Rivals and Expansion and Coexistence, Ulam emphasizes the twin dangers of exaggerating the Soviet threat and of being insufficiently firm with the Kremlin.

The provenance of the volume in a public lecture series means that the essays are eminently readable. The other side of the same coin, however, is that they occasionally have a polemical tone, and are sometimes longer on vague generalities than on serious, sustained scholarship. Of all the chapters, Hans Rogger's is the most carefully argued and fully documented. Taken as a whole, however, they add up to a valuable survey of a half-century of Soviet-American relations.

William Taubman


Valentin Litvin is skeptical that structural reform can improve agricultural performance. He analyzes the agro-industrial complex by examining the three spheres which comprise it: those sectors responsible for material and technical supply and agricultural services, agriculture itself, and the infrastructure of transport, storage, and sales. He assesses the performance of each sphere based on the published Soviet record and first hand observations drawn from his professional experiences before emigrating from the Soviet Union.

The strongest aspect of the monograph is untangling the organizational structure of agriculture in the Soviet Union. The many organizational charts provide a clear taxonomy of structural change. This will be welcomed by many students beginning their study of agricultural organization. Litvin's presentation of how policies are adopted and then executed will also prove useful. His general perspective on agricultural problems is brought into focus as he examines the use of foreign technology in Soviet agriculture. Here he provides an examination of research and development in Soviet agriculture and the problems which it confronts based on first hand experience. In assessing the management of the agro-industrial complex in the 1980s, the author's observations are a bit too formalist for a political scientist, but do provide the outlines of emerging policies. RAPOs and the formation of the Gosagroprom (State Agro-Industrial Committee) are viewed as yet another attempt to institute state control. Litvin doubts that bureaucratic reorganization can improve performance.

Although the author's assessments and the data cited offer few surprises, a number of the specific observations are questionable. Livestock is a critical indicator of agricultural well-being in the USSR. Litvin questions the ability of the Soviet Union to provide sufficient feed for its livestock, a view at odds with recent work in this area by Barbara S. Severin which suggests that the Soviets have made