excluded from reward. Economic growth, furthermore, depended on technological skills which might have to have been imported from more advanced countries which otherwise were hardly worthy of emulation.

By the same token, government had to function well and be so perceived. This could only be the case when it served the society at large, not just the needs of the single ruler much less oligarchy. That government was best which enriched the entire society to the point that all classes were content. To accomplish this a single strong leader, selected by hereditary means and visible as a model to all, was the best.

Still, Krizhanich was not a systematic nor for that matter a very orderly thinker and writer. Throughout Politika inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and prejudices abound. Foreign trade and skills were crucial, but foreigners were to be distrusted, shunned, and excluded as much as possible. Russians were a people magnificent in heart and soul, but, too often, of mean, self-indulgent, and uncultured habits. Germans, Jews, Armenians and others were reprehensible to the core, yet, Krizhanich grudgingly admits, had made notable accomplishments. For all of his prejudices and contradictions, Krizhanich is the richer as an historical source.

This is a good job of bookmaking. The translation is smooth and polished, wisely leaving many terms and titles in the original. Although relying on Gol'dberg's modern renderings, the authors consulted Krizhanich's original "Common Slavonic" for precision. The many notes are excellent and are usually there when needed. The bibliography, although selected, is extensive and well organized. Krizhanich, well studied by modern scholars such as the Soviet Gol'dberg and the Americans Eekman, Kadić, and Bozicevic, among others, must now command the attention of the non-specialist who aspires to generalize about Russians and things Russian.

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Historians of Anglo-Russian relations and biographers of Peter I and William III have traditionally been leery of making too much of the first meeting of the two monarchs at Utrecht in 1697. Official English and Russian sources tell us nothing of what transpired, and other sources have traditionally been deemed unreliable. Foremost among the latter were two French-language versions of a speech purportedly delivered by the tsar, one published in 1721 and the other in 1742. Even after Leo Loewenson (The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 36 [1957-58]) informed us of another version of the same purported speech printed in 1697 and of two contemporary English summaries of what the tsar had to say (one in Narcissus Luttrell’s diary, one in a sermon given by Bishop Burnet in December 1697), scholars have remained cautious in interpreting the meeting between the two monarchs. While pursuing other research in the summer of 1982, Professor George Barany discovered among the Sutherland papers at the National Library of Scotland an undated and anonymous manuscript entitled “The Czar of Muscovy’s Speech to King William when he met him at Utrecht.” It was this discovery and its implications for our knowledge of Peter I’s and William III’s first meeting that prompted him to write the study reviewed here.

Primarily a student of Hungarian history, Barany ventures in this slim monograph to translate his chance discovery into a reinterpretation of Anglo-Russian relations over a seven-month period in 1697-98, characterizing the rela-
tionship as "history's first anti-French Anglo-Russian entente" (pp. 68-69, 71). He discusses the significance of his find in a brief introduction, focusing our attention on Loewenson's article and asserting that his find corroborates one of Loewenson's most important points and "allows us a fuller understanding of the two monarch's first meetings on Dutch soil" (p. 3). Immediately following the introduction are two brief chapters, the first presenting the document itself, and the second comparing it with the French texts published in 1697, 1721, and 1742, as well as with the two contemporary English summaries of what the tsar had to say. So far, so good. Barany argues convincingly that the language in Luttrell's diary and Bishop Burnet's sermon conforms much more closely to "The Czar of Muscovy's Speech" than to the French-language version of the purported speech published in 1697, thus suggesting that the English-language version was known rather broadly and may have been spread purposely by the king and his advisers. But while the newly-discovered text corroborates Loewenson's findings, it does not in substance tell us anything new about what the tsar may have said to William III; as Barany himself says, "one cannot help being struck by the near-identity" of the French and English texts of 1697 (p. 11).

Having thus convinced himself and the reader that an English-language version of the speech attributed to Peter I was circulating in late 1697, Barany proceeds to analyze Anglo-Russian relations on the assumption that the purported speech was in fact delivered. Indeed, at one point he states that "Looseness' in the Utrecht speech was neither accidental nor without purpose" (p. 43), thus suggesting that the French and English texts of 1697 are near-verbatim accounts of what the tsar said. In these texts, Peter is purported to have expressed his long-standing admiration for William in the most flattering terms, while offering to join with the king against Louis XIV (should the war then winding down continue) and to grant the king's subjects "greater Immunities" than they had ever before enjoyed in their trade with Russia. As is well known, William subsequently hosted Peter a second time in the Netherlands, made him a gift of his best royal yacht, facilitated his visit to England in 1698, and allowed him to recruit specialists in various fields for service in Russia.

Barany's theory of an Anglo-Russian entente cordiale is based primarily on the tsar's purported speech and on the king's hospitality and generosity; it is laid out and developed in subsequent chapters on Russian concerns about the Polish royal elections of 1697, on English "tobacco diplomacy" vis-a-vis Peter I, and on technology transfer from England to Russia. In a penultimate chapter on the "Erosion of the Anglo-Russian Entente Cordiale," Barany traces the tsar's reactions to William III's mediation between the Holy Roman Emperor (Peter's ally) and the Ottoman Empire (Peter's enemy) during 1698, a mediation that led to the Treaty of Carlowitz in January 1699 and occasioned Peter's disillusionment with both Austria and England. Indeed, this theme of disillusionment is carried to an extreme in the author's concluding "Summary and Afterthought," in which he goes so far as to speculate that "Peter's disillusionment may have reinforced those negative traits in his personality which manifested themselves in the cruel revenge on the streltsi upon his return from Europe and in the deviously treacherous manner in which he prepared his attack on Sweden" (p. 68).

Barany is to be congratulated for bringing to our attention "The Czar of Muscovy's Speech" and for analyzing its relationship to the other contemporary evidence relating to Peter I's purported speech to William III at their first meeting in September 1697. But when all is said and done, his bold attempt to revise our view of the consequences of that encounter remains unconvincing. That the young tsar idolized William III is a well-known fact, and that he hoped for the king's support in his own struggle with the Turks is more than understandable. So, too, is the king's willingness to extend his hospitality to the tsar, to impress him with his generosity, and to allow him to recruit technical personnel. Each of the two monarchs attempted to ingratiate himself to the other, but these gestures do not